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INDUSTROYER Anton Cherepanov / @cherepanov74 Robert Lipovsky / @Robert_Lipovsky

Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

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Page 1: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

INDUSTROYERAnton Cherepanov / @cherepanov74

Robert Lipovsky / @Robert_Lipovsky

Page 2: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Robert Lipovsky

Senior Malware Researcher

@Robert_Lipovsky

Anton Cherepanov

Senior Malware Researcher

@cherepanov74

Page 3: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský
Page 4: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

ICS-targeting malware

The story of INDUSTROYER: Ukrainian blackout

INDUSTROYER analysis

Potential impact

AGENDA

Page 5: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

ICS

MALWARE OPERATOR INDUSTRIAL SITEINTERNET

ICS-targeting malware

Page 6: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

ICS

INDUSTROYER

MALWARE OPERATOR INDUSTRIAL SITEINTERNET POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY

Industroyer

Page 7: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

Page 8: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

Page 9: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

Page 10: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

Page 11: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

23 Dec 2015

Page 12: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

C&C

Network Scanner

File Stealer

Password Stealer

Keylogger

Screenshots

Network Discovery

BlackEnergyCORE

Page 13: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

Page 14: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

Page 15: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Blackout in Ukraine

ESET begins analysis

Initial report finished

Further research

Industroyer report goes public

17 Dec 2016

A few days later

12 Jun 201718 Jan 2017

STUXNET HAVEX BLACKENERGY INDUSTROYER2010 2014 2015 2016

INDUSTROYER

Page 16: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Main Backdoor

ICS

INDUSTROYER

MALWARE OPERATOR INDUSTRIAL SITEINTERNET POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY

Industroyer

Page 17: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Main Backdoor

Main Backdoor

Main backdoor – List of commands

Execute process

Execute process using specified user account

Download file from C&C server

Copy & upload file

Execute shell command

Execute shell command using specified user account

Quit

Stop service

Stop service using specified user account

Start service using specified user account

Replace "Image path" registry value for specified service

Page 18: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Main Backdoor

Main Backdoor

Main backdoor – List of commands

Execute process

Execute process using specified user account

Download file from C&C server

Copy & upload file

Execute shell command

Execute shell command using specified user account

Quit

Stop service

Stop service using specified user account

Start service using specified user account

Replace "Image path" registry value for specified service

Copy & upload file

Page 19: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

MAIN BACKDOOR -> VBS -> MS SQL -> CSCRIPT -> VBS

Page 20: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský
Page 21: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Set cmd = CreateObject("ADODB.Command")

cmd.ActiveConnection = mConnection

cmd.CommandText = "BEGIN EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;RECONFIGURE;

EXEC sp_configure 'Ole Automation Procedures', 1;RECONFIGURE; END;"

cmd.Execute

cmd.CommandText = "BEGIN EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;RECONFIGURE;

EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1;RECONFIGURE; END;"

cmd.Execute

Page 22: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Main Backdoor

Main Backdoor

Main backdoor – List of commands

Execute process

Execute process using specified user account

Download file from C&C server

Copy & upload file

Execute shell command

Execute shell command using specified user account

Quit

Stop service

Stop service using specified user account

Start service using specified user account

Replace "Image path" registry value for specified service

Replace "Image path" registry value for specified service

Page 23: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Main Backdoor

Main Backdoor

DOS TOOL

Port ScannerPort Scanner

Additional Backdoor

EXEC xp_cmdshell 'C:\intel\port.exe -ip=%IP_ADDRESS%

-ports= 2404, 21845, 445, 135';

135 - RPC Locator service

445 – SMB

2404 - IEC 60870-5-104

21845 - webphone

700 – Extensible Provisioning Protocol over TCP

701 – Link Management Protocol

1433 – MS SQL Server default port

1521 – nCube License Manager / Oracle dB

Page 24: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

DOS TOOL

Main Backdoor

Main Backdoor

Port ScannerPort Scanner

Additional Backdoor

Launcher

Page 25: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Malware impact: PAYLOADS

Page 26: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Malware impact: PAYLOADS

Page 27: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Malware impact: PAYLOADS

Page 28: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský
Page 29: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

DOS TOOL

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Main Backdoor

Main Backdoor

Port Scanner

17 Dec 2016 - 22:27 (UTC)

Launcher

Additional Backdoor

Page 30: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload

• Serial

• IOA (Information Object Address) ranges

• single command (C_SC_NA_1)

• double command (C_DC_NA_1)

• OFF -> ON -> OFF

OPC DA Payload

Page 31: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

• TCP/IP

• Modes:

• Range

• Shift

• Sequence

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Page 32: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Page 33: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Page 34: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Page 35: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

• Auto-discovery

• CSW, CF, Pos, and Model

• CSW, ST, Pos, and stVal

• CSW, CO, Pos, Oper, but not $T

• CSW, CO, Pos, SBO, but not $T

Page 36: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

• Discovers OPC servers

• COM interfaces:

• IOPCServer

• IOPCBrowseServerAddressSpace

• IOPCSyncIO

• ctlSelOn (Select on command)

• ctlSelOff (Select off command)

• ctlOperOn (Operate on command)

• ctlOperOff (Operate off command)

• \Pos and stVal (Switch position status)

Page 37: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Page 38: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Github: https://github.com/eset/malware-research/tree/master/industroyer

• Identifies OPC Data Access LIBIDs, CLSIDs, IIDs in binary

• Creates OPC DA structures and enums in IDA Pro

• Can be used for general purpose reverse engineering

Page 39: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Before

Page 40: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

After

Page 41: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Malware impact: DENIAL OF SERVICE

Page 42: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský
Page 43: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský
Page 44: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Malware impact: DATA WIPER

Page 45: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

DOS TOOL

101 Payload 104 Payload 61850 Payload OPC DA Payload

Main Backdoor

Main Backdoor

Port Scanner

Launcher

Additional Backdoor

Data Wiper

Page 46: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

ABB PCM600

ABB MicroScada

Signal Cross References

Substation Configuration Language

Substation Configuration Description

Configured IED Description

Page 47: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský
Page 48: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

! Global Threat

! Dangerous Attacker

! Unfulfilled potential

TAKE AWAYS

Page 49: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský

Thank you! Questions?

@cherepanov74

@Robert_Lipovsky

Page 50: Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by Anton Cherepanon, Róbert Lipovský