Theories of Scientific Progress and the Epistemological Reconstruction of the History of Science

Theories of Scientific Progress and the Epistemological Reconstruction

of the History of Science Empiricist theories of scientific progress, the rationality of

scientists’ choices and the problems of Lakatos’ methodology of Scientific research programmes.

Athanasia Daskalopoulou Joy Furnival Songyi Han Edister Jamu

Knowledge Production and Justification in Business and

Management Studies (Epistemology)

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Presentation Outline 1

•Grounds for claiming progress in science

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•Rules for assessing competing theories

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•The degrees of verisimilitude and empirical content of scientific theories

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•Problems of crucial experiments and demonstrating progress

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•Criteria for assessing the rationality of scientific change & the selection of research programmes

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•The use of the history of science to support theories of knowledge

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Grounds for Claiming Progress

in Science

Science begins with myths, and with

the criticism of myths (Popper, 1963)

Rules for assessing competing

theories Verisimilitude

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in Science



• Popper (1963)

The repeated overthrow of scientific theories

→ Science progresses by trial and error.

“We can learn from our mistakes and in finding that our conjectures was false we shall have learnt much about the truth, and shall have got nearer to the truth” .

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in Science



• Popper (1963)

The replacement of scientific theories by better or more satisfactory ones

• Chalmers (1976)

Science progresses by having tentative truth including more informative content.

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in Science



A problem

Falsifiable

hypotheses Elimitated

conjectured

hypotheses

Stringent

criticism and

Testing

Criticism and

Testing Successful

conjectured

hypotheses

A falsified

hypothesis New problem

The falsificationist conception of the progress of science

6 Chalmers(1978)

• Popper’s Project

1. A new theory that constitutes a scientific advancement is preferred.

2. The theory that offers more relevant predictions should be preferred.

3. The theory which is easier to verify is preferred.

4. When otherwise equivalent, the clearest and simplest theory should be preferred.


in Science



7 Popper(1963)

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T1 T2

1. New theory(T2) has excess empirical content over its predecessor or rival(T1). 2. New theory(T2) explains the previous success (T1).

3. Some of this excess content of the theory(T2) is corroborated.


in Science



Lakatos(1970)


in Science



• Popper (1963)

– Verisimilitude: “The degree of better (or worse) correspondence to truth or of greater (or less) likeness or similarity to truth”.

– Problems of Verisimilitude:

• Objectiveness (Miller, 1994)

• Comparison of false theories

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in Science



1. t2 makes more precise claims than t1, and these claims stand up to more precise tests

2. t2 takes account of, and explains more facts than t1

3. t2 describes, or explains the facts in more detail than t1

4. t2 has passed tests which t1 has failed to pass

5. t2 has suggested new experimental tests, not considered before t2 was designed, and t2 has passed these tests

6. t2 has unified or connected various unrelated problems

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in Science



Statement A

True

False

Consists of only true statements

Consists of both true and false statements

e.g. A: ‘It always rains on Sundays’ -> False

‘It rained last Sunday’ -> True

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in Science



1. The ‘truth content’ and not the ‘falsify content’ of t2, exceeds that of t1

2. The ‘falsity content’ of t1, but not it’s ‘truth content’, exceeds that of t2

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in Science



Vs(a) == CtT(a) - CtF(a)

– Vs(a) Increases when:

• CtT(a) increases while CtF(a) does not

• CtF(a) decreases while CtT(a) does not

Vs(a): a measure of the verisimilitude of A

CtT(a): a measure of the ‘truth content’ of A

CtF(a): a measure of the ‘falsity content’ of A

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in Science



– Statement A: All pairs of bodies attract each other with a force that varies inversely as the square of their separation.

– Statement B: The planets in the solar system attract each other with a force that varies inversely as the square of their separation.

Statement A is more falsifiable

Statement B implies Statement A

Anything that falsifies B, will falsify A, but the reverse is not true. Chalmers (1978) 14



Crucial experiments

The Eliminator

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Crucial experiments: The

Concept

• Crucial experiment: the eliminator!

– Capable of overthrowing a research programme

– Or deciding between competing programmes

– Or disproving a widely accepted theory

• Two types

1. Minor crucial experiment: experiment within a research programme (between subsequent versions)

2. Major crucial experiment: experiment between rival research programmes

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Crucial experiments: The

Concept

Any defeated research programme can come back:

– By producing a n+1th content-increasing version and verification of some of its novel content

– The war is lost when sustained effort doesn’t produce a comeback

• In this case (with hind sight) the original experiment is seen to have been crucial

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Crucial experiments:

Problems

• There is no such a thing as crucial experiments – Only exist in the absence of resistance from a

defeated one

– No stability: ‘crucial’ depends on status of the theoretical competition in which it is embedded. Any changes will change interpretation and appraisal of the experiment

• Time lapse/reliance on hindsight: how long should it take for an experiment to be declared crucial?

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Problems

Dependency on the problematic concept of novelty.

– The claim by one single experiment on the discovery of scientific (novel) facts is problematic because such discoveries are dependent on other scientific theories

– ‘Novelty’ has multiple definitions

Hands, 2001 19




Problems

‘There are no such things as crucial experiments, not if these are to be experiments which can instantly

overthrow a research programme. In fact, when one research programme suffers defeat and is superseded

by another one, we may, with hind sight, call an experiment crucial…a rash scientist may claim….and …scientific community…rashly accepts his claim…the

idea of instant rationality can be seen to be utopian…’

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Lakatos (1965)




Problems

Given the above observations, it would be difficult to use ‘crucial experiments’ to demonstrate scientific progress:

– We would be going round in circles!

– Goal posts would keep changing with changing circumstances: unless, ceteris paribus!

– We may wait forever in anticipation that hind sight would intervene!

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Verisimilitude Crucial

experiments: Problems

Criteria for assessing the rationality of scientific change

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• Lakatos

– Tried to harmonise Popper’s falsificationism and Kuhn’s paradigms through:

• Naive Falsificationism

• Sophisticated Falsificationism

– Criteria of Acceptance:

• Demarcation Criteria (acceptance)

• Rules of Falsification

Verisimilitude Crucial

experiments: Problems


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What sort of scientific change?

• It depends?! – Pre-existing conditions

– Initial conditions

– Predecessor Theories

• In that sense, the theory under scrutiny isn’t isolated but instead a ‘series of theories’ connected together by continuity – also known as ‘scientific research programmes’

• Empirically Progressive problemshift if: – Increasing in content (new facts)..

– Increasingly corroborated

• No falsification before emergence of a better theory


Problems


Lakatos’s Scientific Research

Programme

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Positive Heuristic Negative Heuristic


Problems



Programme

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Downton Abbey

Use of the history of science

• History provides a basis or background knowledge for determining whether conjectures are bold or otherwise.

• History brings to light paradigm shifts that have occurred/what competing research programmes existed and how their rivalry was resolved

• History takes us to the basics of a theory’s architecture lest we overlook its malformations.

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Programme

History of Science to support theories

of knowledge

• ‘A scientific research programme is appraised only with hindsight’ (Hands; 1970, p112)

– The role of Crucial experiments

– ‘Philosophy of science without history is empty; history of science without philosophy is blind’

– E.g. Bohr’s theory of the atom.

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Programme

History of Science to support theories

of knowledge

Summary

• Survival of the fittest

• Progress in science implies growth of theories with more heuristic power – but don’t forget battle of the theories or Research Programmes!

• Crucial experiments determined with hindsight

• Philosophy of science and history of science are symbiotic

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References • Chalmers, A. (1976). What Is This Thing Called Science?

Queensland University Press and Open University

• Hands, D. (2001). Reflections without Rules. Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory. Cambridge University Press. pp 286-303.

• Lakatos, I. (1965). ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. London

• Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Routledge

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