The Real Impact of Say on Pay and a Brief Update from the Dodd-Frank Bill

Th R l I t f S P d B i fThe Real Impact of Say on Pay and a Brief Updated from the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

Hosted by:

New York‐New Jersey Chapter of the NASPP

July 23, 2010

Today’s PresentersToday s Presenters

• Dan Walter, President and CEO,Dan Walter, President and CEO, Performensation

• Ed Hauder, Senior Advisor, Exequity

• Robert McCormick, Esq., Chief Policy Officer, Glass Lewis

What is Say on Pay?What is Say on Pay?

• “Say on Pay” (SOP) is used to refer to:y y ( )– Shareholder proposals asking companies to put executive

compensation and/or policies to a non‐binding shareholder vote• As yet, there is no agreement on how companies should respond or howAs yet, there is no agreement on how companies should respond or how SOP will work– The populist view demands a vote on compensation policy and/or pay levels

– Institutional investors appear to be more interested in regular pp gdiscussion with Compensation Committees to ensure pay systems align with operating strategies

What is Management Say on Pay?What is Management Say on Pay?

• Management SOP (MSOP) proposals asking shareholders to g ( ) p p gapprove by a non‐binding vote, the company’s executive compensation and policies; in one of two forms (at the moment):moment):– Mandatory MSOPs—where the company is required to provide

shareholders with an MSOP vote because of a regulation or law, i.e., participants in TARP or CPP are required to provide shareholders withparticipants in TARP or CPP are required to provide shareholders with an MSOP vote and public companies incorporated in North Dakota are required to provide an MSOP vote to shareholders

Voluntary MSOPs where the company has voluntarily– Voluntary MSOPs—where the company has voluntarily adopted/provided an MSOP vote to shareholders when not required to do so by any regulation or law

What is Say on Pay meant to provide?What is Say on Pay meant to provide?

• Ability for shareholders to voice their opinion on pay policiesy p p y p– Not a vote on specific compensation pay packages or elements

– Origin in is current form goes back to 2003, in the United Kingdom

Now policy in many countries including: Netherlands Australia– Now policy in many countries including: Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, Norway

• Symbolic or does it change compensation philosophy and execution?

The Historical Form and Timing of MSOP P lProposals

Form and Timing of MSOP Proposals

Comprehensive Vote (Yea or Nay) Segmented Vote Other Mechanisms

Formulations vary CD&A and tables Vote separately on different aspects of Survey of investor views

■ Several approaches to MSOP proposals have appeared, though pending legislation and associated regulations could dictate the approach that must be taken

Formulations vary—CD&A and tables, CD&A only; approval vs. ratification; annual vs. biannual vs. triennial

Advantage is that a single vote is simple

Vote separately on different aspects of the program, e.g., philosophy, decisions in previous year (RMG)

CEO compensation is within 20% of an acceptable amount and director compensation is within 20% of an

Survey of investor views (Schering‐Plough, Amgen)

Hold meetings with large shareholders (Pfizer, Occidental Petroleum)

Disadvantage is that a single vote does not permit differentiation and is a blunt instrument that does not provide meaningful input

compensation is within 20% of an acceptable amount (Littlefield)

Advantage is that these can provide for more meaningful feedback

Disadvantage is that it is more li d d i k

Solicit feedback from shareholders on executive compensation disclosure (Prudential)

Shareholder e‐forum (Verizon)

complicated and risks micromanagement

Timing issues—how often will an MSOP be presented to shareholders?Annually—typical structure among voluntary adopters; structure required for TARP/CPP companiesBiennially—Bristol‐Myers Squibb; Colgate‐Palmolive; General Mills

Basic approach taken by Dodd‐Frank

Triennially—Microsoft

Historical Perspective ‐ USHistorical Perspective US

• Shareholder proposals fared fairly well in 2008 and 2009

• Several companies voluntarily agreed to adopt such SOP proposals, with someSeveral companies voluntarily agreed to adopt such SOP proposals, with some starting in 2009, including:

Historical Perspective ‐ USHistorical Perspective US

• Effective February 17, 2009, the U.S. federal government required a non‐binding vote on executive compensation at all TARP/CPP companies

• Legislation was proposed in 2009 that would have required say on pay proposals at all public companies– The House of Representatives approved the Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 4173) that would require an annual, non‐binding, separate shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives as disclosed in the compensation committee report the CD&A the tables anddisclosed in the compensation committee report, the CD&A, the tables, and any related materials

• SOP shareholder proposals were also the second highest governance proposals put forward for the 2010 proxy season (58 reported byproposals put forward for the 2010 proxy season (58 reported by RiskMetrics)

• July 22, 2010 – Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is signed by President ObamaAct is signed by President Obama

Voluntary Adoption of MSOP ProposalsVoluntary Adoption of MSOP Proposals

• Companies that have voluntarily adopted MSOP proposals include:AFLAC Edison International Littlefield State Street*

Alaska Air Group Fifth Third Bancorp* Logitech Steris

American Express* Forest Laboratories MBIA SunOpta

Ameriprise Financial Frontier Communications Microsoft SUPERVALU

Apple Goldman Sachs Group* Mobile Mini SYSCO

Berkshire Hills Bancorp Hain Celestial Group Morgan Stanley* Tech Data

Blockbuster Hill‐Rom Holdings Motorola Tecumseh Products

Bristol‐Myers Squibb Honeywell International Occidental Petroleum PNC Financial*

Capital One Financial* Ingersoll‐Rand Pacific Gas & Electric Tupperware Brands

Charming Shoppes Intel Par Pharmaceutical US Bancorp*

C Bi Fi i l* I t it Pfi V l ECoBiz Financial* Intuit Pfizer Valero Energy

Colgate‐Palmolive Jones Apparel Group PG&E Wells Fargo*

CVS Caremark JPMorgan Chase* Prudential Windstream

Ecolab Lexmark International Southern California Edison Zale

* TARP/CPP company that has since repaid funds to U.S. government, but has or will voluntarily include a MSOP proposal in its proxies

2010 Voting on MSOP Proposals2010 Voting on MSOP Proposals

All MSOP Proposals—Passed and Failed ( )

Voluntary MSOP Proposals—Passed and Failed( )(n = 194)

100.0%

All MSOP Voting Results5/27/2010 ‐ YTD ‐ Available Results

(n = 47)

100.0%

Voluntary MSOP Voting Results5/27/2010 ‐ YTD ‐ Available Results

93.2% 90.8%

75.3%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0% 93.4% 92.1%

77.5%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

90.4% 88.5%75.7%

20 0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0% Average

Median88.0% 86.8%

73.8%

20 0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0% Average

Median

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

For/F+A% For/F+A+AB% For/Outstanding

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

For/F+A% For/F+A+AB% For/Outstanding

2010 Voting on MSOP Votes That Failed2010 Voting on MSOP Votes That Failed

Votes Against % Votes For %

MSOP Votes that Failed through May 27, 2010

57.5%

49 6%50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Votes Against % Votes For %

49.6%

54.3%45.6%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0% 43.6% 42.5%36.7%

50.9% 45.7%38.4%

KEY

MOT

OXY

53.5% 45.7%0.0%

A+ABS/F+A+ABS A+ABS/CSO

46.8% 46.5% 39.6%

F/F+A F/F+A+ABS F/CSO

C F (F) A i t (A) Ab t i (ABS) CSO*

Actual Vote Figures

Company For (F) Against (A) Abstain (ABS) CSO*

KeyCorp 322,682,561 418,099,427 17,693,063 878,960,282

Motorola 887,793,923 855,021,547 201,440,789 2,314,437,239

Occidental Petroleum 321,676,254 365,053,432 5,722,279 812,155,102*As of the proxy record date

2010 Voting on MSOP Proposals That Failed2010 Voting on MSOP Proposals That Failed

What were the MSOP proposals that failed?What were the MSOP proposals that failed? Company

Resolution Voted on by Shareholders

KeyCorp (required)

“RESOLVED, that the shareholders approve KeyCorp’s executive compensation, as described in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis and the tabular disclosure regarding named executive officer compensation (together with the accompanying narrative disclosure) in this Proxy Statement. “

Motorola(voluntary)

"Resolved, that the stockholders approve the overall executive compensation policies and procedures employed by the Company, as described in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis regarding named executive officer compensation (together with the accompanying narrative disclosure) in this Proxy Statement."


What were the MSOP proposals that failed?p pCompany Resolution Voted on by Shareholders

Occidental Petroleum(voluntary)

“RESOLVED, that the stockholders approve the company’s compensation philosophy, objectives and policies as described below:

Occidental’s executive compensation program is designed to attract, motivate and retain outstanding p p g g , gexecutives, to incentivize them to achieve superior performance in the pursuit of Occidental’s long‐term strategic objectives and to reward them for unique or exceptional contributions to overall sustainable value creation for stockholders and the attainment of long‐ and short‐term performance targets.

Specifically, the program is designed to:

Maintain a clear linkage between performance and compensation by ensuring that a high percentage of theMaintain a clear linkage between performance and compensation by ensuring that a high percentage of the total compensation of executive officers is “at‐risk”, i.e., contingent on the achievement of objectively identifiable performance targets;

Apply clear performance measures and associated time horizons that measure both long‐term stockholder value creation and the consistent annual execution of Occidental’s business plan;

D l d t b i d l th t d t ll i f O id t l’ ti t d t fDevelop and execute a business model that produces returns well in excess of Occidental’s estimated cost of capital by focusing compensation targets on the following key elements of value creation: capital allocation, risk management, cash flow, and financial strength and flexibility; and

Align executive and stockholder interests by requiring a substantial ongoing equity ownership position for executives.”

Why did they fail?Why did they fail?


• KeyCorp Summary: pay for performance disconnect; STI plan y p y p y p ; pmore discretionary and performance results only generally referenced; same metrics used for both STI and LTI increasing KEY’s risk profileKEY s risk profile

• Motorola Summary: increase of $8 MM in Dr. Jha’s payment if separation does not occur; Dr. Jha’s amended agreement i l d difi d i i i d MOTincludes a modified excise tax gross‐up provision; and, MOT adjusted results for the MIP program in an inconsistent manner

• Occidental Summary: repeated failure to address: pay y p p ymagnitude; pay disparity; peer group disparity; and, performance target issues

International Experience with MSOP VotesInternational Experience with MSOP Votes

Advisory / DateCountry

Advisory / Binding What is voted on?

Date implemented

U.K. Advisory, annual

Director’s Remuneration Report, which covers pay policy for next year(s) and prior year’s compensation for each director (executive)

2003

( )

Netherlands Binding, upon policy change

Binding vote to adopt the remuneration policy for executives and major changes to existing policy. Annual Remuneration Report itself is not subject to the shareholder vote

Oct. 2004

Australia Advisory, annual

Remuneration Report, which discloses compensation practices for directors and NEOs for past year

July 2005

Sweden Binding, annual

Guidelines for remuneration of senior executives CG Code: July 2005;annual July 2005; Law: July 2006

Norway Binding, annual

Remuneration policy for senior management for coming year

Jan. 2007

S Wh t I t ti l M k t S P A I t P ti I tit ti l I t S i A il 2007Source: What International Markets Say on Pay, An Investor Perspective, Institutional Investor Services, April 2007.

International Experience with MSOP Votes—UKInternational Experience with MSOP Votes UK

• MSOP votes were required for public companies in the U.K. q p pstarting in 2003 after adoption of the UK’s Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 on August 1, 2002

Statement of company’s policy on directors’ [executives’]– Statement of company s policy on directors [executives ] remuneration (set forth in Appendix)

• The goals of the MSOP movement in the UK were:– Improve the linkage between pay and performance

– Empower shareholders and improve shareholder democracy

– Create greater focus and ownership of compensation process by g p p p yremuneration committees

– Engage shareholders on remuneration policies in genera


Significant UK Shareholder Rejections of Remuneration Resolutions

S Ri kM t i GSource: RiskMetrics Group


Reasons for UK Shareholders’ opposing, abstaining, or voting for an MSOP proposalVoting against: Voting to abstain: Voting in support:

A variety of issues can cause concern:Performance conditions have been changed which causes them to be easier to meet

No evidence of excess and a good level of disclosure; but salaries have been increased year on year and there is no

Clear disclosure of the main aspects of remuneration (ie, performance criteria, maximum awards, any departures from normal practices/scheme details)

High levels of pay and there is no real link to the performance achieved, or to be achieved

Annual bonuses continue to rise and

y yjustifiable reason as to why

Overall, there are no structural issues but there is a general lack of disclosure and there is scope for more information to

No evidence of excess

Clear link between pay levels and performance

Clear alignment of the interests of shareholders and directors through robust remuneration practicesAnnual bonuses continue to rise and

salaries continue to increase, perhaps double digit salary increases become a pattern

Structural issues and overall lack of

scope for more information to be disclosed and for the company to be more transparent

directors through robust remuneration practices

Remuneration committee demonstrates behaviors that protect the interests of shareholders whilst offering pay packages and remuneration policies which allow incentivisation and retention

performance linkage

Performance targets do not align with the long‐term strategy of the company

Performance targets for the long‐term incentive plans do support the long‐term strategic plan of the company

Source: Say on Pay, Six Years On, Lessons from the UK Experience, a report by Railpen Investments and PIRC Limited (September 2009)

Empirical Evidence: Research from the UKEmpirical Evidence: Research from the UK

• Say on Pay does not have a great impact on most companies• June 2008 Study

• Academic Paper by Fabrizio Ferri and David Maber Harvard Business School

– No evidence that Say on Pay changed the levels or growth of executive compensation

– Higher sensitivity of CEO cash and total pay to negative operating fperformance

Empirical Evidence: Cautionary UK hresearch

• August 2009 Study• Jeffrey N. Gordon, Columbia University

– The details of pay‐for‐performance may be too complex to effectively communicate to shareholders

– Annual voting requirement may result in a narrow range of compensation best practices

– Smaller firms would be unlikely to benefit for Say on Pay and t i ti t t lik l fi ti l i t th i bilitrestrictions to act like larger firms, may negatively impact their ability

to grow– Truly abnormal pay may be limited to a large companies in a small

group of industriesgroup of industries

Empirical Evidence: Research from the US and UKp

• Say on Pay may create shareholder valuey y y

• August 2009 Study• Jie Cai and Ralph A. Walkling, Drexel University

St k f fi ith th hi h t b l CEO d l f– Stocks of firms with the highest abnormal CEO pay and low pay‐for‐performance sensitivity react in a significant, positive manner to the Say‐on‐Pay

M l t d i i ith t hi b “ t ”– More value created in companies with strong ownership by “vote‐no” mutual funds. Dissenting voice creates pressure for change.

International Experience with MSOP Votes—Australia p

• Australia’s Proposed Changes to MSOP Votesh d i i i i ( ) l d i f i i li i– The Productivity Commission (PC) released a review of executive pay in Australia in January 2010

– The Australian government responded to the PC’s report in April 2010 and indicated it would introduce legislation to implement many of the PC’s 17 recommendations including the “two strikes” proposal for MSOP votesrecommendations, including the two strikes proposal for MSOP votes

– As currently proposed, the two strikes proposal for MSOP votes would work as follows:• A minimum 25% “no” vote on remuneration report triggers reporting obligation on how

concerns addressed, and• A subsequent “no” vote of at least 25% activates a resolution for elected directors to submit for

re‐election within 90 days– Unclear whether this would apply to the entire board, or just the remuneration committee or

chair

– Additionally, the proposals with which the Australian government agreed included:• Prohibiting key management personnel from voting undirected proxies on remuneration

resolutions, and• Prohibiting key management personnel that hold shares from voting on their own

remuneration arrangements

Companies that will be most impacted by MSOPCompanies that will be most impacted by MSOP

• Companies with excessive or ineffective executive compensation

• Companies with independent‐mind shareholders who are willing to challenge managementwilling to challenge management

• Companies that have historically responded positively to shareholder pressure

Shareholder Response to MSOP ProposalsShareholder Response to MSOP Proposals

• Shareholder response to MSOP votes is likely to be heavily influenced by the type of shareholder they arethe type of shareholder they are:– Retail account (mom & pop) shareholders—likely to ignore MSOP votes (and all

other votes) unless something captures their attention and makes them want to voteActive investors short term (hedge funds opportunists etc ) looking for the– Active investors—short‐term (hedge funds, opportunists, etc.)—looking for the lowest cost response that will maximize short‐term share returns

– Active investors—long‐term (mutual funds)—looking for low cost response that will maximize long‐term share returns

– Index investors—long‐term owners with little overhead costs from investmentIndex investors long term owners with little overhead costs from investment activities – looking for most effective response that will result in the best long‐term share returns possible

• Interestingly, in the UK, it was the index investors which led the adoption of MSOP votes. Largely because they had funds available due to theirof MSOP votes. Largely because they had funds available due to their structure and could not take a “Wall Street Walk” if a company began to disappoint them– Felt the best way to improve on their investments was to agitate for change and

open dialogues with management and boardsp g g

Shareholder Response to MSOP ProposalsShareholder Response to MSOP Proposals

Several Possible Shareholder Approaches to MSOP VotesShareholder Impact on Investment Impact if Broker Non VotesShareholder Approach Cost to Shareholder

Impact on Investment Decision

Impact if Broker Non‐Votes Excluded Other

Ignore Low Neutral Negative (a broker non‐vote); increases influence of shareholders that vote

Likely approach for retail shareholders

Support Management

Low Supports Positive Sound argument assuming same management as when investment made

Abstain Low Unknown / Negative (depending on how

Negative Could be a negative if media focuses on shareholders that(depending on how

abstentions counted)focuses on shareholders that do nothing about excessive pay

Develop Own Analysis

High Supports Unknown; to extent shareholder owns significant stakes in many companies

Complicated, resourceintensive task; unable to leveragestakes in many companies,

could increase its influenceleverage

Outsource to Proxy Advisor

Medium (lowest relative cost for informed vote)

Unknown – could support or be negative

Unknown; likely to increase influence of proxy advisors

Provides “cover” for shareholders at lowest cost possible; minimizes cost for i f d tinformed vote

Glass Lewis (GL) Policies Regarding MSOP Proposals( ) g g p

• Will support MSOP proposals where:i li d i h f d– Pay is aligned with performance, and

– Shareholders are provided with a clear, comprehensive discussion of the processes and procedures related to executive compensation

• Specifically, GL’s approach to evaluating MSOP proposals involves the f llfollowing:– CD&A Analysis

• Evaluates content and clarity, consists of a nuanced approach when assessing companies’ rationale for significant adjustments made to performance metrics, target payouts, and benchmarkingbenchmarking

• CD&A disclosure is rated based on a critique of several key elements, including:– Whether the company provides a reasonable rationale for benchmarking at a specific percentile– Its disclosure of performance metrics– Its disclosure of how actual performance translates into pay decisions– Its evaluation of a companies’ rationale for granting discretionary cash or equity awards and– Its evaluation of a companies rationale for granting discretionary cash or equity awards, and– Its review of the extent to which performance plays a role in the granting of equity incentives

– Proprietary Pay‐for‐Performance Analysis• Evaluates the relationship between relative executive compensation and relative performance• GL benchmarks the compensation of the NEOs to the compensation of the NEOs at peer

d h ’ f h f hcompanies and compares the company’s performance to that of those same peers

RiskMetrics Group P li i R di MSOP P lPolicies Regarding MSOP Proposals

• Assesses MSOP proposals on a case‐by‐case basis, considering the following factors in light of a company’s specific circumstances and the board’s disclosedfactors in light of a company s specific circumstances and the board s disclosed rationale for its practices:– Relative Considerations

• Assessment of performance metrics relative to business strategy, as discussed and explained in the CD&A

l f d d• Evaluation of peer groups used to set target pay or award opportunities• Alignment of company performance and executive pay trends over time (e.g., performance down; pay

down)• Assessment of disparity between total pay of the CEO and other NEOs

– Design Considerationsf f f• Balance of fixed versus performance‐driven pay

• Assessment of excessive practices with respect to perks, severance packages, SERPs, and burn rates– Communication Considerations

• Evaluation of information and board rationale provided in CD&A about how compensation is determined

• Assessment of board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues

• RiskMetrics Group also will use MSOP proposals as the primary vehicle to address “problematic pay practices”

RiskMetrics Group Problematic Pay PracticesRiskMetrics Group Problematic Pay Practices

• Problematic Pay Practices– Formerly referred to as “poor” pay practices– Now, two groups:

• “Major”—can lead to negative vote recommendations if one exists; set out in the 2010 Policy Updates

• “Minor”—can lead to negative vote recommendations if more than one exists; set out in the 2010 Compensation FAQs

– RMG will utilize MSOP proposals as the initial vehicle to address problematic pay practices. RMG may recommend votes:• Against MSOP proposals• Against/Withhold from compensation committee members or, in rare cases where

full board is deemed responsible for the practice, all directors, or when no MSOP item is on the ballot, or when the board has failed to respond to concerns raised in prior MSOP evaluationsprior MSOP evaluations

• Against an equity‐based incentive plan proposal if excessive non‐performance‐based equity awards are the major contributor to a pay‐for‐performance misalignment

– List is extensive and detailed

Other Influential VoicesOther Influential Voices

• Council of Institutional InvestorsCouncil of Institutional Investors

• The Corporate Library

Mandatory MSOP in 2011Mandatory MSOP in 2011

• MSOP proposals are required for 2011 and beyond (new p p q y (reality for public companies in the U.S.)

• At least once every 6 years shareholders must be given an t it t t th f f MSOP topportunity to vote on the frequency of MSOP votes

• Companies must provide a choice of voting every year, every two years or every three yearsy y y

• Form will be a comprehensive vote (yes/no) on all the executive compensation disclosed in the proxy— CD&A,

i d bl d i d irequired tables and associated narrative

So what does it allSo what does it all ?mean to you?

Critical Questions to be ResolvedCritical Questions to be Resolved

• Will SEC exempt smaller companies from MSOP forWill SEC exempt smaller companies from MSOP for some period?

• What form will the vote on frequency take?q y

• What changes will occur with shareholders whose current stance is against MSOP?g

• What will the final rules look like once all of the details are settled?

• Will this change the frequency or levels of pay in a measurable way?

Critical Steps as You Move ForwardCritical Steps as You Move Forward

• Know your shareholder base, what they want and what they y , y ydo not like regarding your compensation policies, designs, awards and payments

O li f i ti ith h h ld• Open up lines of communication with your shareholders before next proxy season – both the investment and voting sides of your institutional shareholders

• Understand what compensation issues your shareholders could have with your company, and how those might influence their vote on MSOP proposals and your directorsinfluence their vote on MSOP proposals and your directors

Critical Steps as You Move Forward, cont.Critical Steps as You Move Forward, cont.

• Explore ways to address any perceived issues with your p y y p ycompensation

• Evaluate any compensation changes or tweaks through the b i f th MSOP t ti i t tirubric of the MSOP vote so you can anticipate any negative

reaction that such changes or tweaks might engender and act to minimize or address any shareholder concerns

• Review disclosures to ensure executive compensation is understandable (plain English, executive summary, charts, graphs tables should be utilized as much as possible) thegraphs, tables should be utilized as much as possible), the whys of compensation decisions are explained, and the rationale for controversial pay practices is clearly articulated

Some Parting Thoughts on MSOPSome Parting Thoughts on MSOP

• Say on Pay is not a harbinger of doom• Executive compensation at most companies is not likely to be

dramatically impacted• We will continue to see growth in performance based pay but• We will continue to see growth in performance‐based pay, but

variety may be stifled• Companies with poor remuneration practices may see

iti h h ld l lt f tipositive shareholder value as a result of compensation changes

• The real impact may be the need for improved communication and explanation of compensation practices– This may be especially important for companies with adversarial

shareholder, but reasonable executive remuneration policies

Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

Executive Compensation Provisions (Sections 951–957)

BackgroundBackground

• The following presentation walks through the highlights of the executive compensation provisions contained in the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This presentation is based on the version of the bill dated June 26, 2010 (5:27 p.m.) and posted on the House Committee on Financial Services Web page:Services Web page: http://financialservices.house.gov/Key_Issues/Financial_Regulatory_Reform/Financial_Regulatory_Reform062410.html (under Title IX—Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities).p g )

• Act was signed into law by President Obama, July 22, 2010

• For more information about Exequity, please visit our Web site at www.exqty.com.

Overview – Part 1Overview Part 1

• The Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd‐Frank) has several provisions that impact executive compensation, including:– A nonbinding shareholder vote on the compensation of executives as disclosed in the

proxy (“say on pay vote”) at least once every 3 years.

– A nonbinding shareholder vote on the frequency of the say on pay vote at least onceA nonbinding shareholder vote on the frequency of the say on pay vote at least once every 6 years.

– A nonbinding shareholder vote on golden parachutes.

– Requirement for most public companies to have only independent directors on their i icompensation committees.

– Requirement for most public companies’ compensation committees to utilize only independent compensation consultants and other advisors.

– Mandate for most compensation committees to be given authority to retain a p g ycompensation consultant and independent legal counsel and other advisers, including fiscal authority.

Overview – Part 2Overview Part 2

• The Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd‐Frank) has several provisions that impact executive compensation, including:– Requirement for companies to disclose more information about executive

compensation, including:• Pay versus performance;Pay versus performance;

• Median annual total compensation of all employees;

• CEO’s annual total compensation; and

• Ratio of median annual total compensation of all employees to that of the CEO.

Requirement for public companies to implement a clawback policy– Requirement for public companies to implement a clawback policy.

– Requirement for companies to disclose their policy with respect to executive and director hedging of company equity securities.

– Making covered financial institutions subject to enhanced compensation structure reporting and prohibitions.

– Eliminates broker votes on director elections, executive compensation, or any other significant matter, as determined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for uninstructed shares held by beneficial owners.y

Golden Parachute VotesGolden Parachute Votes

• In any proxy for a meeting where shareholders will be asked to approve an acquisition, merger, consolidation or proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets of an issuer (CIC)consolidation, or proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets of an issuer (CIC), the following must be disclosed and a separate, nonbinding shareholder vote must be held to approve:– Any agreements or understandings with named executive officers concerning any type of compensation that is based

on or otherwise relates to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets of the issuer (“CIC Compensation”);

– The aggregate total of all such compensation that may (and the conditions upon which it may) be paid or become payable to or on behalf of such executive officer; and

• Effective for shareholder meetings occurring more than 6 months after Dodd‐Frank is enacted.

• This vote is not required if agreements or understandings were previously subject to a say on pay vote.

• Issues/Concerns– Broad definition of CIC Compensation; seems to include vesting of prior awards like IRC Section 280G. Thus, disclosure and vote

seems expansive.

– The rules specifically provide that no vote is necessary if previously approved in say on pay vote. If no design changes occur, will a prior vote eliminate need to have vote in merger proxy? Can the “aggregate total” be adequately disclosed and approved in aa prior vote eliminate need to have vote in merger proxy? Can the aggregate total be adequately disclosed and approved in aprior proxy?

– How (if at all) will this relate to the termination disclosures for named executive officers in proxies? Will this change the current form of disclosure, either by rule or practice?

– What happens if the board has authorized CIC Compensation and contractually bound the company but shareholders don’t agree? The shareholder vote is nonbinding—what will the practical consequence be? Can or will companies guard against such a scenario, e.g., will contracts contain shareholder approval contingency clauses?

Compensation Committee IndependenceCompensation Committee Independence

• Companies will not be permitted to be publicly listed unless their compensation committees are composed entirely of independent directorscommittees are composed entirely of independent directors.

• Definition of “independence” will be issued by the national securities exchanges and associations, taking into consideration relevant factors, including:– The source of compensation of a director, including any consulting, advisory, or other

compensatory fee paid by the company to such director; andcompensatory fee paid by the company to such director; and– Whether the director is affiliated with the company, a subsidiary, or an affiliate of a subsidiary.

• The SEC shall permit national securities exchanges and associations to exempt a particular relationship from the above requirements, taking into consideration the size of the company and any other relevant factors.p y y

• Issues/Concerns– We expect the definition of independence to be largely the existing definitions used by the

national securities exchanges and associations for audit committee members, tailored to members of the compensation committeemembers of the compensation committee.

– This requirement will put a final nail in the coffin of having nonindependent directors sit on a compensation committee (which is now only a minor practice).

Independence of Compensation Consultants and O h C i C i Ad iOther Compensation Committee Advisers

• Compensation committees of public companies may only select a compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser (“advisers”) after taking into consideration the factors identified by the SEC.other adviser ( advisers ) after taking into consideration the factors identified by the SEC.

• The SEC must identify factors that affect the independence of an adviser. – Such factors shall be competitively neutral among categories of advisers and preserve the ability of

compensation committees to retain the services of members of any such category, and shall include:• The provisions of other services to the company by the person that employs the adviser;• The amount of fees received from the company by the person that employs the adviser as a percentage of the• The amount of fees received from the company by the person that employs the adviser, as a percentage of the

total revenue of the person that employs the adviser;• The policies and procedures of the person that employs the adviser that are designed to prevent conflicts of

interest;• Any business or personal relationship of the adviser with a member of the compensation committee; and• Any stock of the company owned by the adviser.y p y y

• The compensation committee, at its discretion, may retain the services of an adviser. However, this does not:– Require the compensation committee to implement or act consistently with the advice or recommendations

of the adviser; or– Affect the ability or obligation of a compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfillment of

the duties of the compensation committeethe duties of the compensation committee.• Required disclosures—for any shareholder meeting occurring on or after the 1‐year anniversary of the date of

enactment of Dodd‐Frank, public companies will be required to disclose in their proxies whether:– The compensation committee retained or obtained the advice of a compensation consultant; and– The work of the compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest and, if so, the nature of the

conflict and how it is being addressedconflict and how it is being addressed.

Independence of Compensation Consultants and Other Compensation Committee AdvisersOther Compensation Committee Advisers

(Continued)• Companies that fail to comply with the requirements of this section of Dodd‐Frank will be

prohibited from being publicly listed; those failing to comply will be given a “reasonableprohibited from being publicly listed; those failing to comply will be given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects” before their listing is prohibited.

• SEC will permit the national securities exchanges and associations to exempt a category of issuers from the compensation committee independence and independent adviser requirements.– Shall take into account the potential impact on smaller reporting companies.– Controlled companies shall be exempt from these requirementsControlled companies shall be exempt from these requirements.

• Controlled company is a company that is listed on a national securities exchange or association and holds an election for the board of directors in which more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group, or another company.

• The SEC must conduct a study and review of the use of compensation consultants and the effects of such use and submit a report to Congress within 2 years after enactment of Dodd‐Frank on the results of such study and review.

• Issues/Concerns– The language does permit compensation committees to engage any adviser they like so long as they at least

consider the factors to be promulgated by the SEC.– However, consistent with current trends, these requirements will likely persuade a majority of companies to

i d d t d i t d i th i ti ittengage independent advisers to advise their compensation committees.– Unclear just how the factors mentioned in Dodd‐Frank will be applied by the SEC.– The SEC regulations are unlikely to outright prohibit the consultant from providing any other services to the

company, but this may in practice become a compensation committee requirement. Note, this also applies to other advisors such as legal counsel; this could result in committees engaging different legal counsel than the counsel involved in other corporate matters.p

Executive Compensation DisclosuresExecutive Compensation Disclosures

• Pay vs. Performance—SEC must require each company to disclose in any proxy for an annual meeting a clear description of any compensation required to be disclosed under the proxy disclosure rules, including:– Information that shows the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial

performance of the company, taking into account any change in the value of shares of stock and dividends and any distributions; this disclosure may include a graphic.

• Additional Disclosures—SEC shall require companies to disclose in any filing which requires disclosure regarding the compensation of a company’s named executive officers:

Th di f th l t t l ti f ll l t th CEO (M di E l A l– The median of the annual total compensation of all employees, except the CEO (Median Employee Annual Compensation);

– The annual total compensation of the CEO (CEO Annual Compensation); and – The ratio of the Median Employee Annual Compensation to the CEO Annual Compensation.

• Total compensation is defined as it is for purposes of the Total Compensation column in the Summary Compensation TableCompensation Table.

• Issues/Concerns– Determining the Median Employee Annual Compensation will take a significant amount of work for companies with

large employee bases and/or operations in multiple countries. For example, total compensation includes annual pension increases which can significantly increase the disclosure burden.

– Since ratios will almost always be a sizeable multiple, it is likely to spark shareholder ire where company performance is subpar. Note, again, that this ratio is done largely based on pay opportunity rather than actual pay realized, particularly with respect to equity incentives.

– This pay ratio concept has historically been used to compare executive pay across various countries. However, it is unlikely to guide future pay decisions nor allow for solid comparisons across companies. For example, outsourcing decisions can have a material impact on the calculation.

Clawback Provision—Recovery of Erroneously A d d C i P liAwarded Compensation Policy

• Public companies can only be listed if they comply with the following requirements:– Each company shall:

• Disclose its policy on incentive‐based compensation that is based on financial information required to be reported under the securities laws; and

• In the event that the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the company with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, recover from any current or former executive officer who received incentive‐based compensation (including stock options awarded as compensation) during the 3‐year period preceding the date on which the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what would have been paid to the executive officer under the accounting restatement.

• Issues/Concerns– How will compensation that is based on or related to the movement in the company’s stock price be treated under this

required clawback policy? In other words, with respect to such awards, how can a company determine what “excess amount” was paid if the stock price reflected the market’s understanding of the financial reporting information that was restated?

– Will shareholders have the right to bring a derivative action under this provision if a company does not?

– How will this clawback provision interact with any mandatory holding periods a company has imposed on company securities received by executives or directors, especially where the amounts held relate to a period prior to the 3‐year period prior to any required restatement?

– Can the “appropriate” clawback amount be defined or must this by its nature require significant discretion?Can the appropriate clawback amount be defined or must this by its nature require significant discretion?

– How will other legal challenges be addressed (e.g., wage laws), if at all?

Disclosure Regarding Employee and Director H d iHedging

• SEC shall require companies to disclose in any proxy for an annual meeting whether any employee or member of the board of directors or anywhether any employee or member of the board of directors, or any designee of such employee or director, is permitted to purchase financial instruments (including prepaid variable forward contracts, equity swaps, collars, and exchange funds) that are designed to hedge or offset any decrease in the market value of equity securities:decrease in the market value of equity securities:– Granted to the employee or director by the company as part of his compensation;

or– Held, directly or indirectly, by the employee or director.

• Issues/Concerns– Given the Section 16 insider trading rules, hedging activities by officers and

directors were not prevalent practice.However this will cause companies to formalize an anti hedging policy (if they have– However, this will cause companies to formalize an anti‐hedging policy (if they have not already done so) and apply the policy to all employees.

– To the extent any employee or director is hedging, and the company is concerned about disclosing such transactions, they may wish to undo these transactions prior to the filing of their next proxy.g p y

Enhanced Compensation Structure Reporting for Fi i l C iFinancial Companies

• Covered financial institutions will be subject to new rules and regulations to be promulgated by the appropriate Federal regulators within 9 months after enactment of Dodd‐Frank.appropriate Federal regulators within 9 months after enactment of Dodd Frank.

• These regulations will require each covered financial institution to disclose to the appropriate Federal regulator the structures of all incentive‐based compensation arrangements offered by such covered financial institutions sufficient to determine whether the compensation structure:– Provides an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder with excessive compensation,

fees, or benefits; or, ;– Could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.

• Covered financial institutions with less than $1 billion of assets will be exempt from these requirements.

• Issues/ConcernsIssues/Concerns– Based on the review conducted by the Federal Reserve of large, complex banking organizations, it is

safe to assume that the appropriate Federal regulators will be looking to make significant changes with respect to compensation, including requiring:• Mandatory holding periods;• A significant portion of compensation to be deferred; and• Introducing an absolute metric governing payouts of any performance‐based compensation subject to relative

performance measures, e.g., relative total shareholder returns.– We believe compensation at covered financial institutions will be transformed as a result of this

provision and the Federal Reserve’s recent review. It remains to be seen how compensation programs will be changed and the impact this may have on financial institutions’ ability to attract, motivate and retain key talentmotivate, and retain key talent.

Voting by BrokersVoting by Brokers

• Dodd‐Frank prohibits brokers from voting securities unless the beneficial owner has instructed the broker how to vote the proxy on the following matters:has instructed the broker how to vote the proxy on the following matters:– Election of directors;– Executive compensation; or– Any other significant matter, as determined by the SEC.

But does not include the uncontested election of directors of any investment companyBut does not include the uncontested election of directors of any investment company.• Dodd‐Frank specifically does not prohibit a national securities exchange from

promulgating rules that would expand the list of such matters regarding which brokers are prohibited from voting without instructions from the beneficial owner

• Issues/Concerns– This provision will apply to the new mandatory say on pay votes regarding executive

compensation, which will have a negative impact on vote outcomes and likely will force companies to evaluate whether a proxy solicitation campaign targeted at retail beneficial owners is warrantedowners is warranted.

– Likely will increase the influence of proxy advisory firms as the broker votes are not counted on the above issues.

About Robert McCormickAbout Robert McCormick

• Prior to joining Glass Lewis, Bob McCormick was the Director of Investment Proxy Research at Fidelity Management & Research Co which he joined in 1997 At Fidelity he managed the proxy voting of moreManagement & Research Co., which he joined in 1997. At Fidelity, he managed the proxy voting of more than 700 retail and mutual fund accounts, holding 4,000 domestic and international securities worth in excess of $1 trillion. Prior to joining Fidelity, McCormick was a staff attorney at Keenan, Powers & Andrews and Prudential Securities Incorporated, both in New York City. McCormick is an attorney who earned his law degree from Quinnipiac University School of Law after graduating with honors from Providence College. He serves on the International Corporate Governance Network’s Cross‐Border Voting Practices and Securities Lending committees.

Robert McCormick, Esq.rmccormick@glasslewis [email protected] 415‐678‐4228

• www.glasslewis.com

About Ed HauderAbout Ed Hauder

• Edward Hauder—Senior Executive Compensation Advisor– Senior advisor and practical thought leader: Ed is known industry‐wide as a leading advisor on executiveSenior advisor and practical thought leader: Ed is known industry wide as a leading advisor on executive

compensation matters. He maintains long‐term relationships with numerous companies, serves on the CompensationStandards.com Executive Compensation Task Force, maintains his acclaimed Equity Compensation Blog, edwardhauder.com, and is a practical thought leader on compensation matters.

– Experience across a range of industries: Ed has consulted with hundreds of companies in multiple industries on all aspects of executive and director compensation. Ed focuses on helping companies design compensation programs that help them achieve their strategic goals and objectives while at the same timecompensation programs that help them achieve their strategic goals and objectives, while at the same time keeping them out of the penalty box with shareholders and the media. Ed also helps companies understand and find practical solutions for technical matters impacting compensation, e.g., financial accounting, securities, tax, and corporate governance issues. His expertise includes RiskMetrics Group (a.k.a. ISS) compensation modeling and policies, which enabled him to create the Flexible Share Authorization to maximize equity plan flexibility.Articles and quotes on compensation issues: Ed has recently written articles that have appeared in The– Articles and quotes on compensation issues: Ed has recently written articles that have appeared in The Corporate Board, workspan Weekly, BNA’s Executive Compensation Library, and Tax Management Compensation Planning Journal. He has been quoted in such publications as BNA’s Pension & Benefits Daily, Business Finance, Forbes, HR Magazine, and The NASPP Advisor.

– Background and education: Before joining Exequity, Ed was employed as a Principal at Buck Consultants where he managed the Technical Solutions and Innovation Team. Prior to that, Ed was a member of Hewitt Associates’ Executive Compensation Center of Technical Excellence Ed received a B A in InternationalAssociates Executive Compensation Center of Technical Excellence. Ed received a B.A. in International Relations from Juniata College, a J.D., cum laude, from Seattle University School of Law, and an LL.M. (Tax), with honors, from IIT‐Chicago‐Kent College of Law.

– Contact information: [email protected] or (847) 996‐3990Ed’s Equity Compensation Plan Blog: www.edwardhauder.com

About Dan WalterAbout Dan Walter

• Dan Walter, CEP, President and CEO of Performensation. – Dan has more than 15 years of experience assisting companies with both executive and broad‐based compensation programs.

He provides end‐to‐end solutions for private and public companies in both the United States and abroad.

– His clients have ranged from entrepreneurial start‐ups to established Fortune 100 companies providing his clients with a unique perspective on compensation issuesproviding his clients with a unique perspective on compensation issues.

– Dan’s expertise includes equity compensation, executive programs, performance‐based pay and talent management issues. His experience with these programs includes: diagnosis, design, communication, administration and reporting. Dan has experience with all forms of equity including stock options, restricted shares and units, stock purchase and performance‐based programs.

• Phone: ofc: +1‐415‐625‐3405 | mobile: +1‐917‐734‐4649

• Twitter: @performensation | Skype: performensation

• LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/danwalter

• Performensation Website: www.performensation.com

• Equity Compensation Experts: www.equitycompensationexperts.groupsite.com

• CompensationCafe Blog: www.compensationcafe.com