Reforming strategic policy support provided by a central department in the context of a

decentralized administration: the case of social security in Belgium

Amaury Legrain, Tom Auwers & Liesbeth Strobbe

FPS For Social Security, DG Strategy & ResearchCentre Administratif Botanique - Finance TowerBoulevard du Jardin Botanique 50/1001000 BruxellesTel : 02/528.63.12gsm: 0486/34.66.99amaury.legrain@minsoc.fed.be www.socialsecurity.fgov.be

Paper submitted for the 10th Conference “Back to the Future” of the European Academy of Management (EURAM 2010) in Roma, Italy, 19-22 May 2010, TRACK 8. Governance in Public and Non Profit Organizations: Systems, Mechanism and Roles.

Summary :

The social security in Belgium is organized according a decentralized framework. Beside the

central department, 16 public autonomous and specialized institutions are active for specific

branches of sectors of the social security. In Belgium, responsibility for proper execution of

the policy cycle lies to large extent with the ministers involved and more particularly with

their personal staff in the so-called ministerial cabinet. Because of the lack of a clear division

of tasks, the responsibilities, devoted to the administrative bodies, for supporting the political

cabinets into the policy cycle created a conflict relation between the central department and

the autonomous institutions. This article tries to explain how the central department made an

end to this situation of competition and developed a new vision of policy support, where

partnerships, joint projects and transversal approach are the masterpieces.

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1. Decentralization of Belgian Social Security

The Belgian social security system as we know it today was created during World War II

when representatives of trade unions and employers' organizations concluded what history has

called the social pact: in exchange for social peace in the labour world, a global public social

insurance system was set up. Shortly after the Liberation, the decree-Law of 28 December

1945 made illness-incapacitation insurance mandatory for workers on salary, as well as

unemployment insurance, old age insurance and insurance for premature death, family

allowances and annual holidays. Subsequently, many laws and decrees have complemented

and improved the system. The Belgian system at this time is divided :

• Into regimes: social cover and the means of financing vary with the categories of workers.

There are three major regimes in Belgium: the regime for employees (79%), the regime

for self-employed workers (12%) and the regime for civil servants (6%). Specific regimes,

called residual regimes, have also been created for certain categories of workers such as

sailors or miners. In 2000, these residual schemes represented only 3% of workers covered

by social security;

• Into branches: in each regime, specific social cover is organized to cover one of the nine

social risks insured by the Social Security system.

Table 1. Social risks covered by Belgian Social Security

Risks Intervention of Social SecurityIllness Intervention in the cost of the illnessLoss of income in case of illness Allowance for incapacitationLoss of income in case of maternity Allowance for incapacitationLoss of income in case of incapacitation

Allowance for incapacitation

Old age or early death Retirement and survival pensionsIndustrial accidents Compensation for industrial accidents

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Occupational illnesses Compensation for occupational illnessesFamily charge Family allowancesUnemployment Unemployment allowances

•This public insurance is based essentially on decentralized semi-autonomous public

institutions, called Social Security Public Institutions and managed jointly by the Belgian

State and the social partners (Employer’s Organizations and Trade Unions). These institutions

form the social security primary network and their assignment is to collect social

contributions, to redistribute the financial resources allocated to social security and to manage

one of the social security branches (by managing, we understand policy support, preparing

regulations, making provisional analysis and studies, controlling private payment

organizations, etc.).

Alongside these institutions are the private payment organizations, grouped in networks by

branch: these are the secondary networks. Indeed for certain branches of social security, the

assignment of paying the allowances is given to private cooperating institutions and

controlled by one or several public institutions from the primary network. These payment

bodies handle de facto management of individual dossiers, including investigation of the

dossiers (granting or refusing the right to allowances) and payment of social allowances.

In certain cases, for social insured persons who do not have the means (or who do not want) to

sign up in a private cooperating institution, a specific public body can also take charge of

making payments. For example, for illness-incapacitation insurance there is an auxiliary fund

called the Auxiliary Fund for Illness-Incapacitation Insurance and for the unemployment

insurance, the Auxiliary Fund for the Payment of Unemployment Allowances offer the same

services as the trade union unemployment funds. Consequently, each secondary network

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consists of the main public institution, the private payment institutions and sometimes a

public paying organization1.

2. Distribution of tasks between the former ministry and the public

institutions.

2.1.Generic definition of strategic policy support

This subject of this article concerns the breakdown of assignments between the central

department (ministry and then the Federal public service (SPF)) and the various semipublic

autonomus bodies as concerns their position in the public policy cycle and more particularly

in the phases for developing those policies. Like the production process of large multinational

companies, "production" of public policies can be divided into various phases (decision,

preparation, execution, assessment, etc.) and split between various organizations, each one

being responsible for all or part of a stage of the public policy cycle (Laegrid P. & others,

2003; Bouckaert G., 1997 & 2003).

The traditional phases were identified by Hoogerwerf (Hoogerwerf A., 1993) :

1. Agenda setting: process by which the theme gains attention of the public and/or decision

takers;

2. Policy preparation: drafting of policy advices and execution of analyses in order to outline

the chosen theme, setting up the possible alternatives for policy makers;

3. Policy definition: taking a decision on the policy to be enacted, its objectives, its target

groups, its timing and the resources made available;

1 The most representative organizations of these networks are: the trade union unemployment allocation funds, the family allowance funds, the annual holiday pay funds, and mutual societies, the social insurance funds for self-employed workers, insurance companies insuring on-the-job accidents

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4. Policy execution: organization of the action and employment of the resources allocated in

order to reach the objectives defined;

5. Policy evaluation : evaluation of the content, processes and effects of the policy carried

out;

6. Correction/termination: definition of corrective measures or termination of the policy in

case of success.

Strategic policy support is consequently found in one of several phases of the public policy

cycle. Brans & others have identified four possible types of definitions (Brans & others,

2003) :

• A very strict definition: all analytical activities to support a player/several players in the

execution of the policy cycle until the policy preparation’s phase;

• A strict definition: all activities to support a player/several players in the execution of the

cycle of policies until the policy preparation’s phase;

• A broad definition: all activities to support a player/several players in the execution of the

entire policy cycle;

• A very broad definition: all activities to support a player/several players in the execution

of the entire policy cycle and management of files.

If from a theoretical standpoint, one can appreciate the breakdown defined by Hoogerwerf

and the effort made to simplify complex processes, it is true nevertheless that this simple

cycle includes certain shortcomings, specifically as concerns preparation of policies.

First of all, it starts with the principle of a sequential series of different phases: in other words,

a phase can only take place after the previous phase has been carried out. But by and large,

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the phases overlap: for example during preparation, the administration is already asked to

make proposals on execution. Alongside this, Hoogerwerf's phases are defined much too

simply. In fact, these phases consist of several sub-phases. In addition, by and large

preparatory activities are reduced in the model to simple analytical activities. But it must not

be forgotten that, particularly in Belgium, defining a policy requires the agreement of many

people and organizations. Preparation can consequently also contain activities for

coordination and management of complex processes. Finally, this concertation also entails

going back and forth between the preparatory phases and the decision-taking phases

(decisions, concertation, adaptations, decisions, etc.). In fact, these two phases are hard to

separate.

Given these comments, certain characteristics of strategic policy support can be defined:

• The objective of strategic policy support is above all to improve the execution of the

policy cycle;

• Strategic support is not done directly on the policy cycle, but mostly by supporting other

people/organizations that are responsible for the correct execution of one or several

phases;

• Strategic support does not only concern production of information but also process

making coordination and concertation activities;

• Strategic support is not a process, but a series of sub-processes and/or secondary activities

supporting one or several phases of a primary process.

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2.2.The distribution of tasks for the policy support : subordination of competition ?

In Belgium, responsibility for proper execution of the policy cycle lies to large extent with the

ministers involved and more particularly with their personal staff in the so-called ministerial

cabinet. As concerns social security, in view of the complex systems of social concertation,

part of this responsibility also lies with the social partners (trade union and employer

organizations). The strategic policy support that the central department can give (ministry

and then Federal Public Service, FPS) is directed in particular to the minister’ political cabinet

and to a lesser extent to the social partners.

Before the creation of the FPS for Social Security2, there was no document that explained,

described or regulated relations between the former central ministry, the institutions3 and the

political cabinets. Based on habit and scarce regulatory texts, there was nevertheless an

official distribution of tasks. On the Internet site of the former Ministry for Social Affairs,

one could read the following paragraph in 2002:

For these fields, the ministry works on developing regulations and legislation. The

practical execution and application of this legislation belongs to the institutions under

the ministry's supervision. These institutions collaborate potentially with approved

private institutions such as mutual societies, annual holiday funds, unemployment

allowance funds and approved insurers in the field of industrial accidents.

2 The FPS, Federal Public Service, is the new name for the federal ministries since the Copernic Management reform of 2002. Before 2002, the competences of the FPS for social Security were managed by the old Ministry for Social Affairs, Public Health and Environment 3Institutions are understood to include the public social security institutions from the primary network as well as two public payment institutions, the Caisse auxiliaire de Payement des Allocations de Chômage and the Caisse auxiliaire d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité. There are 16 of them now.

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This quotation says a great deal about the way the former ministry considered its relations

with the institutions :

• As concerns social policies, the ministry was responsible for supporting the policy makers

(politicians and social partners) by preparing legislative texts. The institutions, on the

other hand, are simply in charge of executing these regulations.

• As concerns the organization and their management, the institutions are supervised

administratively by the ministry, which is responsible for ensuring proper application of

the regulations concerning management (budget, HRM).

According to this vision, the ministry has the central place, supporting the political cabinets in

designing social policies, supervising the proper execution of these policies by the institutions

and also supervising the application of management regulations by the institutions.

In fact, this division of tasks was hardly respected. Many factors and trends have run counter

to the central position that the department claimed to have.

First of all, in view of this specialization, institutions are

increasingly involved in the decision-taking process for their

branch or Social Security scheme. For the most part they have

developed strategic support services in charge of analyzing their

sector and proposing adaptations of regulations to the social

partners and political decision takers. The result has been much

more proactive institutions that make proposals or suggest

adaptations of regulations to cabinets on their own initiative. As

concerns their management, the institutions have been made

Politicalcabinet

Ministry

Inst

itutio

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Figure 1 Official relation of subordination

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accountable by the introduction of performance agreements in 2002. This reform has given

them greater autonomy in the field of financial management, HRM and real estate

management.

In dealing with institutions that are independent as concerns their internal management, that

want to be involved in designing policies and have the analytical resources to do so, the

political cabinets could choose between these institutions or the ministry when they needed

help. No objective criteria really existed to determine who would be involved and in what

type of dossier: a haphazard division of tasks was what prevailed, depending on the situation

and the theme. The choice could be made on the basis of the confirmed or supposed

analytical capacity of the organization, its pro-activity, the confidence someone might have in

its professionalism or even personal relations between the various dossier managers. The

result was a situation of almost direct competition between the ministry and the institutions.

The situation was far from favourable for the ministry. Indeed, the institutions generally had

more opportunity to gain the ear of the political cabinets, and those cabinets took their

proposals much more into account for a number of reasons:

• The institutions have a direct tie with their sector of activity, which increased the

opportunity and feasibility of their proposals and analyses;

• The institutions invested in a single sector of activity, whereas the ministry, on the other

hand, had to cover all social security branches and schemes, which resulted concretely in

situations where for a certain theme, the ministry could line up one or two specialists,

where as the institution in question had about 20;

• The institutions had an opportunity to test their proposals and analyses while the social

partners internally, via their management committee;

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• The performance agreement established a direct relation between each institution and its

Supervising Minister.

In any case, this division of tasks depending on the opportunities of the moment, dossier by

dossier, was far from ideal for the policy design process:

• Because the strategic policy support process was

done in a nontransparent way and was too

dependent on short-term political dossiers;

• Because the strategic policy support process

focused too much on dossiers pertaining specifically

to one branch of Social Security. Very little

attention and resources were devoted to cross-sector

dossiers;

• Because the strategic policy support process was

done in an unstructured way -- monitoring and

quality control were totally absent;

• Because the competition process quickly created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion

between the institutions and the ministry.

3. Reforming the strategic policy support concept within the FPS for Social

Security

3.1.Context and basic principles

Politicalcabinet

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itutio

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Inst

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Inst

itutio

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Min

istr

y

Figure 2 Real relation of competition

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In 2000, the federal government launched a major reform of the federal civil service. The

ministries were transformed into federal public services and budgets were released to enable

the new departments to analyse and improve their internal processes. In this context, those

departments launched large-scale Business Process Reengineering (BPR). The newly created

FPS for Social Security launched 16 BPR in 2002. Seven BPR were devoted among other

things to improving relations with the institutions. One BPR was devoted exclusively to the

phase of social policies preparation and to the support that the new department could offer in

that context.

Reform of the preparatory phase began on the basis of a pragmatic vision, giving priority to a

successful reform of strategic policy support over an academic and theoretical approach that

would require considerable investments and cause undeniable resistance within the

institutions.

Certain basic principles were defined with regard to the competence of the FPS in the field of

strategic policy support:

1. The missions assigned to the FPS for Social Security in the field of strategic policy

support dealt with the competence of all actors active in social security;

2. The social insured person has the right to receive a simple, coordinated response

concerning the award of his social rights. A global approach is therefore needed;

3. Expertise and resources in strategic policy support are broken down between institutions

and the FPS. Centralizing or decentralizing them completely would require much too

much time and would cause many resisting reactions;

4. The institutions have considerable expertise in strategic policy support. This should be

taken advantage of, used and supervised – not fought.

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Nevertheless, improvements should still be made to the situation:

• Transparency of processes for preparing the policy should be improved;

• A clear distribution of tasks accepted by the various players should be established;

• The capacities of the FPS for Social Security in strategic policy support should be

reinforced.

On the basis of these reflections, a new directorate general specifically devoted to strategic

policy support was created in 2008. The objectives of this new directorate general called DG

Research & Strategy were defined as follows:

• The FPS is recognized as a point of reference in the Social Security network;

• With this in mind, the DG focuses on developing its cross-sector competence and takes a

position as a facilitator of processes;

• The DG develops by means of a flexible organizational structure, with a dynamic

intermediary service and new support functions;

• As a support organization, the DG targets responding to strategic needs within the FPS.

3.2.What will the support provided by the DG Research & Strategy pertain to?

The basic idea of the reform consists of making a list of potential missions for strategic

support and then seeing what organizations would be appropriate to handle these missions. As

early explained, the Belgian system at this time is divided into regimes (a social cover for

employees, for self-employed workers and for civil servants) and into branches (Illness, loss

of income in case of illness, loss of income in case of maternity, loss of income in case of

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incapacitation, old age or early death, industrial accidents, occupational illnesses, family

charges, unemployment).

The working group responsible for the BPR identified various types of tasks:

• tasks related to a branch involving a social risk in a single regime;

• multi-branch tasks involving several social risks within the same regime;

• multi-regime tasks involving several social risks within several regimes.

Social security has an increasingly international aspect (particularly at European level).

Consequently, a distinction had to be made between tasks at national level and tasks at

international level.

The conclusion of the BPR was that all strategic policy support tasks dealing with the

exclusive competence of a single institution should be left to that institution. For all other

competences, where collaboration between the institutions is needed, the FPS should be

involved.

Table 2. Division of tasks between the FPS and the institutions

Tasks related to a branchNational level International level

Institutions FPS for Social Security in collaboration with the institutions

Multi-branch tasksNational level International level

FPS for Social Security in collaboration with the institutions

FPS for Social Security in collaboration with the institutions

Multi-regime tasksNational level International level

FPS for Social Security FPS for Social Security

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It goes without saying that this is the definition of primary competences – under no

circumstances do they prevent ad hoc joint efforts.

On the basis of this division of competence, DG Research & Strategy has chosen to work in a

targeted way on cross-sector of international priority policy themes:

• Evolution of social protection: as a knowledge manager, the DG Research and Strategy

provides pertinent expertise to the various supervisory ministries to support strategic

questions and initiatives in the whole social protection sector.

• Bilateral relations in Social Security fields: In this context, the DG Research and

Strategy is responsible for all contacts that must be established with other countries or

international organizations and for this purpose represents the social security system for

all bilateral negotiations carried out in the field.

• Multilateral relations in Social Security matters: the DG makes an effort to support and

reinforce the positions and interests of the Belgian social security system in the field of

social protection in its multilateral contacts and those with international institutions such

as, for example, the EU (European Union), the Council of Europe, the International

Labour Office, OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation Development), etc.;

• Fighting social fraud: expertise of the network of experts on social fraud is used to take

initiatives and offer support in three fields, namely: setting up international synergies

between inspection services; doing awareness work with EU organizations on Belgian

initiatives and active participation in EU projects; doing studies on the phenomena of

"underground economy" and "undeclared work".

• Social indicators: The DG provides strategic support by developing and making available

quantitative indicators in the field of social protection. The DG represents Belgium in the

Indicators Subgroup of the European Union Social Protection Committee;

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• Social Security governance: in direct relation with the institutions, the DG offers

effective support for players concerned by the contractual organization between the

Belgian state and the institutions (the performance agreements) by supervising the

negotiation processes and following up the contracts and coordinating research

programmes adapted to the needs of the institutions on public management matters. The

DG also provides support in the exercise of ministerial supervision in human resource

management within these institutions.

3.3.What will the strategic policy support consist of?

A definition must also be given for what is concretely meant by strategic support. In this

context, the BPR identifies several operating principles:

• As the preparation of policies concerns all players, the policy support offered by the FPS

will be provided in keeping in touch with the network and partnership philosophy, and

using principles like mutual confidence, concertation, transparency and exchange of

information;

• The policy support will be provided by means

of projects. Project management must therefore

be mastered by the FPS services;

• The projects need managers in charge of

supporting the execution of the project, co-

organizing the follow up and setting up

coordination between all players involved;

Politicalcabinets

FPS for Social Security

SS

PI

SS

PI

SS

PI

SS

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SS

PI

Figure 3 New relation of partnership

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• The network of partners must be supported by a certain number of stable processes, such

as knowledge management.

In its relations with other social security players, the FPS emphasizes common project

management and organization in networks in a clear division of tasks is done to optimize

effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of Social Security. Alongside this supporting role for

the supervisory ministers, the FPS for Social Security intends to optimize its role as a

coordinator (in collaboration with the institutions) in cross-sector processes.

The DG Research & Strategy has tried to respect this approach by concretely defining what it

offers in terms of support in the framework of priority policy themes. For each field, the DG

offers its support for the preparation, implementation and assessment of the supervisory

ministers' policy options. This assistance takes the following form:

1. Policy studies and reports: drafting notes, reports on the basis of expertise on the content,

strategic policy studies;

2. Strategic policy advice: reflection on demand and wording of opinions on policy content,

determining positions on the subject of social protection in Belgium and at international

level;

3. Coordination: harmonization of processes, methods of outputs in the framework of

partnerships, management of networks within and outside of Social Security;

4. Negotiation: defense of the position of the Belgian social security system;

5. Communication & Information: communication and information by means of various

media, documentation centre, valorization of policy research.

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3.4.Organization chart on the basis of the conception of strategic policy support

Each strategic policy theme in the new DG is covered by a service, called a domain. The new

DG has resolutely chosen a "flat" structure made up of small teams of experts and process

managers, each working under a coordinator. At horizontal level, cooperation between the

domains as concerns products in the field of strategic policy support should be formed in

order to coordinate and harmonize production and the delivery of these products.

4. A concrete example: support given to the performance agreements

(domain: Governance)

The domain of governance within social security was one of the first themes for which this

new way of conceiving of strategic policy support was tried out, well before the official

Evolution ofsocial

protectionGovernance

Bilateralrelation-

ships

Fightingundeclared

work

Multilateralrelation-

ships

Social indicators

Policy researchand studies

Policy advice

Negotiation

Processcoordination

Communication and valirization

Figure 4 Organizational chart of the DG Research & Strategy

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creation of the DG Research & Strategy. The support focuses on the backing to be provided to

the contractual system between the fifteen public institutions and the Belgian State. The first

activities in the context of this support began in the second half of 2004.

4.1.Summary of the sector’s reform in the field of governance

The accountability policy arose from a proposal made by the institutions themselves by means

of two memoranda (1990 and 1993). The Royal Decree of 3 April 1997 on measures

improved the accountability of public social security institutions. The objectives of the

reform were:

• Ensuring effective and efficient execution of social security missions;

• Ensuring quality service to the citizen;

• Guaranteeing greater transparency of administrative action.

The guidelines of the reform were:

• making institutions accountable for their planning, execution and evaluation of operational

and financial objectives;

• making institutions more autonomous and holding them accountable for their management

of human resources, their financial management and their facility management;

• setting up a partnership relationship between each institution and the Belgian State where

the keywords are concertation, reduction of ex ante control and transparency.

In this context, 15 organizations, most of them from the primary network, were awarded an

performance agreement in 2002 for 10 of them and in 2003 for the other five. In 2006, the

second generation of contracts was concluded with 14 of these organizations for three years

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and a third generation of performance agreements was approved on December 17, 2009. The

performance agreement is an agreement signed between the Belgian State and each public

social security institution to define the governance framework of the institution for a period of

three to five years. This contract can be compared with a medium-term strategic plan (three

years) in which the institution undertakes to reach a certain number of objectives concerning

the proper execution of the basic social security missions (granting of social rights, payment

of allowances, control of insured persons and private payment funds, collecting contributions,

etc.), concerning the quality of service provided to the citizen (personal and general

information, administrative simplification, reception, management of complaints) and

concerning improvement of their internal management (e-gov, call-centre, analytical

accounting, etc.).

Readers should be aware of the exact scope of the objectives in these agreements. The

performance agreements do not concern overall policy objectives, nor the effectiveness of

public policies and social security matters, but rather the operational working of the social

security administrative machinery. Consequently, policy outcomes are not found in the

contract.

The contracts also contain a multi-annual financial framework: this pertains to all

operational budgets (thus without the budgets allocated for social allowances) needed to carry

out the objectives described in the contract. The budget for the first year stipulates the

amounts provided by the institution's annual budget. For the next two years, the multi-annual

budget determines the margin of growth (gross amounts or increase as compared to the first

year).

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In the context of a performance agreement, the Belgian State makes a commitment to respect

certain clauses, including:

•Compliance with the financial framework determined by the contract

•In the assessment of the contract, taking account, of exogenous factors and its own decisions,

which could have had an influence on the proper execution of the contract;

•Organization of effective follow-up and execution of the contracts;

•Compliance with a certain form of concertation with the institution (rapid communication of

administrative and budgetary decisions, concertation concerning implementation of the

regulations);

•Optimizing the accountability policy: system of sanctions, procedure for addenda,

professionalization of the follow-up.

4.2.The players involved

Social Security in Belgium did not result from a public initiative. It stemmed from

concertation of the social partners (employees and employers). In addition, financing is not

public in the strict sense, since the system is not financed by taxes – more or less 70% of the

budget comes from direct contributions from both employees and employers. Three major

"shareholders" consequently finance Belgian social security: employees, employers and the

State. This principle is also found in the internal organization of the public social security

institutions. Consequently, most of them have a management board responsible for the

management of the institution, consisting of an equal number of representatives of trade

unions4, and employers' organizations5. In certain cases, specialized organizations can also be

represented, such as family organizations in the management committee of the National

4 The Fédération générale du Travail en Belgique (Socialist trade union), the Confédération des Syndicats chrétiens (christian trade union) and the la Centrale générale des Syndicats libéraux de Belgique (liberal trade union)5 Belgian Business Federation

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Office for Family Allowances for Employees or medical organizations in the management

committee of the National Illness-Incapacitation Insurance Institute.

Daily management of institutions is exercised under the guidance and supervision of the

management board by a public official (appointed by the King, or in other words, the Federal

Government). The agreement is signed by the CEO (Administrator-General), his deputy and

by a delegation of the management board.

As concerns the Federal State, the contract is signed by the Supervisory policy Minister6, the

Minister of the Budget, plus the Minister of Civil Service. The ministers appoint two

government commissioners per institution in charge of the political supervision over the

institutions and monitoring of the execution of the contracts. The commissioners and the

political level are supported particularly by two central departments, the FPS for Social

Security and the FPS for the Budget & Management Supervision. Other FPS such as the FPS

for Employment, Labour and Social Concertation are also involved but generally in

concertation with the FPS for Social Security. Once the contracts have been negotiated, they

must be approved by the Council of Ministers (Legrain A. 2005, 2006, 2007 ; Quertainmont

P., 1998; Vandervorst P., 2001; Verstraeten J., 2001)..

4.3.The Role of DG Research & Strategy in the context of the performance agreements

On the basis of its experience and expertise, DG Research & Strategy7 provides a

methodological support to all parties involved in the contractualization process (political

6 For negotiations of third generation contracts (2010-2012), there were 6 Supervisory Ministers: The .Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Employment, the Minister of Pensions, the Minister for the Self-Employed, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister for Administrative simplification. 7 The service that would become the future Governance Domain in the DG Research & Study

21

cabinets, FPS, commissioners, institutions). This support must comply with certain basic

principles:

• The contracts create a direct relation between each institution and its Supervising policy

Minister. The DG must support this relation and not interfere with it;

• Contracts are negotiated between the institutions and the ministers in question. The DG

must not interfere with the content of negotiations, and consequently must not take a

stance with regard to the suitability of the objectives and projects proposed by the

institution. The ministers have government commissioners for that purpose;

• Contracts contain a common cross-sector part with which the DG can be involved as an

adviser, the final decision belonging to the direct players (institutions and political

cabinets);

• The development and assessment of the contracts require a well thought-out process

organization accepted by all players.

The support corresponds to four major guidelines:

• Coordinating the processes:

o In collaboration with other players, the DG proposes mapping of the contract

negotiation, monitoring and evaluation for processes;

o The DG monitors the progress of these processes and proposes corrections if there

seems to be a need for them. The final decision always belongs to the players.

• Providing keys to understanding the contract system:

o The DG collects information on the on-going processes and dossiers;

o The DG gives reasoned opinions (on request on its own initiative) and drafts notes

and analyses to promote understanding and/or improvements of the

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contractualization system. These opinions concern the cross-sector or

methodological parts of the contractualization system;

• Promoting the quality of the system:

o In collaboration with other players, the DG proposes quality principles for the

content of the agreement, of the execution reports form the institutions, for

drafting and for the progress of the processes;

o The DG verifies compliance with its principles and proposes improvements, if

there seems to be need for them. The final decision always belonging to the

players;

• Promoting knowledge:

o In collaboration with the other players, the DG detects the need for new

knowledge concerning governance within the Social Security and the institutions;

o The DG launches and/or coordinates research programs for this purpose to adapt

generic management methods to the specific needs of the institutions. The DG

already launched scientific researches on performance measurement, risk

management, output oriented budgets, legal and regulatory nature of performance

agreements and governance structures of the social security secondary networks.

4.4.Coordinator of the negotiation process

During negotiations processes for the second (March 2005- March 2006) and third (March

2009- December 2009) generations, the DG tried to organize the discussions, in collaboration

with the institutions and to come to real negotiations that are not simply limited to the budgets

that the institutions receive.

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During the negotiations of the performance agreements, this mission includes the following

tasks:

• The establishment of a negotiation plan: concerning negotiations, the negotiation plan

includes a division of tasks among all participants, phased discussions and a precise

timetable of negotiations (March to December). Consequently, a consensus should exist

on the framework established and on its concrete interpretation (input and output of the

various stages, timing, concrete organization, identity of participants, etc.). To a large

extent these rules are developed by the parties on the proposal of the DG and adapted on

the basis of comments made by all. The negotiations can only begin once there is an

agreement on the negotiation plan.

During the negotiation process, the DG proposes an interpretation to the parties concerned

of the concrete organization of the stage to be carried out (participants, objectives, needs

in anticipated inputs and outputs). After comments and adaptations by the negotiating

parties, this stage is effectively launched;

• Controlling application of the plan: the DG follows the progress of the negotiations and

can, at any time and for each process, communicate the level of the compromise that has

been reached. When a process begins to go off in a direction other than that provided by

the framework, the DG supports the contracting parties in new process mapping;

• Supporting the negotiations : the DG has always clearly announced that it would not get

involved in individual discussions between contracting parties and that above all it offers

organizational support to negotiations. Nevertheless, its involvement in the discussions is

not nihil. On individual level, for each contract, the DG drafts a summary of the

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execution of the previous contract. This is drafted in collaboration with each institution

and the results of this "evaluation" of previous contracts are communicated to the

political cabinets so that they can dispose of all information needed in order to begin

negotiations. In addition, at the time of the final adaptations, the DG plays the role of an

intermediary for certain contracts between representatives of the State and the institutions

concerned, in order to reach a global agreement on the contracts.

Finally, concerning the cross-sector themes of negotiations8, the parties generally call on

the DG's cross-sector expertise. The DG organizes working groups before negotiations in

order to detect the themes and find the groundwork for compromises between the parties.

On drafting the common chapters, the DG is often involved in the drafting and tries to

word provisions as closely to the compromise reached as possible.

• Guaranteeing quality : quality control is crucial to correctly carry out a process. The

coordinator must ascertain that, like the basic rules of the network, the quality norms are

recognized, understood and applied. These standards are approved in the same way as the

rest of the initiation framework, the DG having proposed norms for the objectives

(SMART rules). The DG analyses the drafts of the contracts on the basis of quality criteria

and communicates the results of this screening technique to the political cabinets.

5. Analyses and conclusion

After two years of existence, it is time to have a close look at the implementation of this new

vision of strategic policy support.

8 These only concern management of human resources (recruitment, training), financial management and accounting system, as well as management of contracts (system of sanctions, evolution of contracts,), performance measurement, commitments of the State).

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5.1.New instruments for strategic policy support

This new approach has significantly changed the way the department handles dossiers.

Alongside the traditional instruments produced by analytical activities (notes, studies), new

instruments for coordination have appeared – they include process mapping, process

information gathering, managing people’s Network and working with project management

tools.

The first job of a cross-sector organization involved in a process is to propose process

mapping. As indicated in the example on the organization of negotiations of performance

agreements, the idea is not just to define phasing, timing and a division of tasks before the

beginning of each process. It should also supply thinking on the process during its execution,

when the process takes an unexpected direction or turns into a crisis that must be managed.

The FPS staff should be able to master the concepts of process management (ISO 9000),

being able to transpose those in concrete process and communicate them to their partners.

A new instrument that the DG has consists of information at its disposal on the progress of

cross- sector processes. In this context, its job is to monitor and collect information on how

the processes go forward. It is clear that this task is based on a job downstream. It is not

when the process takes place, or when it has turned into a crisis, that the sources of

information should be activated: contacts should be maintained and the process should be

measured (for example with the help of an operating report) from the very start of its

implementation. In this context, it is also appropriate not to be content with information on

the past (what happened) but also to have a look at the future (what is going to happen), and

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particularly on the intentions of the players. It is important to communicate on what's going

on. Spreading false rumors with regard to the progress in negotiations / processes should be

avoided, along with accusations about the objectives or actions of certain players.

In addition, as the quantity of information to be processed is quite substantial, these data

should be consolidated. The objective is to be able to give the players a clear, unambiguous

image on the process and its content (points of disagreement, problems to be settled, etc.).

Communication of these data can also serve to keep the players involved. Administrative and

political processes are complicated processes that take time. Players who are not directly

involved in the discussions going forward could abandon the process, as they no longer have

news about what is happening. In addition, it is also possible, via the transmission of

information, to spur particularly passive players to take a position or take a decision on an

important subject. During a process, nothing is worse than indecision. From this standpoint,

thinking carefully about the way information is to be communicated and its degree of detail is

important.

Another means that the DG has at its disposal is the coordination of a process management

network. In fact, a single organization or person cannot manage processes on its own when

they sometimes involve many organizations. So the idea is to constitute a network of persons

from among the organizations involved. These people must be reliable, well organized, aware

of what's happening, sufficiently involved in the processes and convinced that the processes

should go forward in the best way possible. They should not exclusively focus on the content

of the process but should also be able to think in terms of processes. Thanks to these people,

it will be possible to maximize information and communication channels. This group should

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also represent a critical mass that is sufficiently large, so as to develop and finally test the

proposals made by the DG, in order to start the process.

Finally, within the DG, one should no longer think in terms of "dossiers" or "recurrent

activities", but in terms of projects. This new process, even if it often occurs frequently (like

renegotiating a new generation of performance agreements that takes place every three to

four years), should be always considered as a new project. This means that on the basis of

past experience, one should start from scratch and begin sharing tasks again with partners,

defining the phases and a timetable. This way of working makes it possible to rethink the

process every time, in its entirety, and its basics value to its concrete organization.

5.2.External obstacles

Setting up this new way of intervening in strategic policy dossiers cannot take place without

triggering questions and sometimes a certain resistance.

In the first place, the FPS had to convince of the effectiveness of his approach of strategic

policy support. In fact, partners were used to dealing with dossiers individually. This

approach was particularly used because it corresponds to the structural logic of social security

(one dossier concernd one branch en thus also one organization/sector). The FPS had to show

that there were connections between the dossiers, the branches and the regimes and that

consequently, a cross-sector approach was needed alongside the vertical approaches.

Along the same line of thought, the partners also had to be convinced not to think exclusively

in terms of the content of dossiers, but also in terms of processes. Most of the people

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involved are specialists in vertical questions (legal, economic, sociological) and are

consequently more naturally interested in the content of policy. Since the players are still

responsible for the way the processes progress, they have to be convinced to think and to

work in terms of phases, roles, input and output.

Along with this rational "resistance", there was also emotional resistance. In fact, the former

situation of competition between the department and the institutions, as well as his past claims

to impose supervision based on a hierarchy, have left their marks on the institutions. The

forcible return of the FPS in this new approach was considered by some as a means for the

department to impose a new supervision over the institutions, by indirect means, thus

questioning their autonomy.

As the "projects" in the Governance Domain went forward (evaluation of the first generation

of contracts in 2004, negotiation of contracts in the second generation in 2005, evaluation of

the second generation contracts in 2008 and negotiation of the third generation of contracts in

2009) the DG succeeded in convincing the institutions of the value of its approach and of its

expertise. The disadvantage of this situation was that, effectively on the basis of that

expertise, certain institution began to ask the DG to take part in individual negotiations of

contracts (vertical expertise). The institutions considered that, as a real partner, the DG

should defend the institutions in the negotiations with representatives of the State. These

requests were also made by certain political cabinets and central departments involved, which

for their part consider that the DG, as a service of the State and given its expertise, should

defend the positions of the Belgian State with regard to the institutions.

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5.3.Internal obstacles

At the level of the DG itself, integration of this new way of doing things ran up against a

certain number of difficulties in past and present.

During the launch of major policy projects in 2009, it very quickly appeared that certain

domains maintained conflictual relations with the institutions and had trouble developing a

partnership logic. This state of affairs could be explained by several things. The creation of

the DG had not only created the new fields of expertise (governance, social protection, social

fraud), but also integrated former departments. But these departments continue their activities

with the old logic of strategic policy support: they continue to work on vertical dossiers, or

they handle cross-sector dossiers, but without setting up continual consultation with the

institutions. There can be many reasons for this attitude: habit, fear of losing expertise and

sources of information, fear of losing a position that one feels is dominant, fear of seeing

institutions interfere in the dossiers, fear that the dossiers will become more complex if the

institutions are involved, …

Whatever the reasons, this situation has meant that these services were never able to organize

or follow processes in collaboration with the institutions. With a little experience in this field,

the services tried to reinforce their position by focusing on the content of the dossiers, and

thus create a vicious circle. It must be added as well that other DGs also offer old styled

policy support, particularly concerning regulations.

Another problem pending has to do with the paradox in the missions of the DG Research &

Strategy. While the DG Research & Strategy is meant to promote collaboration among all

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social security organizations, it has been noticed that collaboration between the domains

within the DG could be greatly improved. Although this is done on a voluntary basis and on

the basis of a friendly relationship between the agents, it must nevertheless be observed that

there is no real system or structural procedure for exchange of experience, methods and

expertise between domains, except for the well-known "scientific research" aspect9. The

appointment of a "horizontal" coordinator for scientific research in social security has allowed

a transversal approach involving most of the domains in the development of a research

strategy.

5.4.Conclusion

On the basis of these analyses, it can be concluded that the FPS for Social Security is midway

in reforming its conception of strategic policy support. Thanks to certain policy themes and

domains in the DG Research & Strategy, the FPS has been able to develop and test new

methods and instruments in strategic policy support matters. In view of the results recorded

by the various domains and the reactions of partners, it seems that the FPS Social Security

and its DG Research & Strategy are on the right path.

Nevertheless, before considering that the game has been won, efforts must continue in several

directions:

1. The new approach to strategic policy support should be institutionalized to expand it to all

domains of the DG and to the other services where the DG and the FPS are involved in

one way or another in the strategic policy support activities. The approach should be

more systematic; it should be taught and set down in writing so that its application in the

9 The DG has a budget for financing applied research in the Social Security field.

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field will not be too dependent on a few individuals. The risk of losing part of this

approach, should these agents leave, is very much present for the time being;

2. Thinking should be given to the new risks caused by the partnership situation with

institutions. For example, there is growing pressure on the players to have the FPS get

involved in the content of the dossiers – this should be analyzed and a response should be

given;

3. The horizontal structure of strategic policy support should be reformed. In fact, except for

scientific research, subdivision in terms of "products" has not resulted in the anticipated

horizontal coordination. For this purpose, a new subdivision either in terms of activities

or of risks could be considered. An effective nomination of horizontal coordinators could

help reinforce collaboration and harmonize the support offered by the various domains of

the DG.

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