Paul Amyotte

INCORPORATION OF INHERENT INCORPORATION OF INHERENT SAFETY PRINCIPLES IN PROCESS SAFETY PRINCIPLES IN PROCESS

SAFETY MANAGEMENTSAFETY MANAGEMENT

Paul Amyotte & Attiq GorayaPaul Amyotte & Attiq GorayaDalhousie UniversityDalhousie UniversityDennis HendershotDennis Hendershot

Chilworth Technology Inc.Chilworth Technology Inc.Faisal KhanFaisal Khan

Memorial University of NewfoundlandMemorial University of Newfoundland

21st CCPS International Conference Orlando, FL (April 23 – 27, 2006)

With Thanks to TrevorWith Thanks to Trevor

INHERENT SAFETYINHERENT SAFETYWHAT YOU DO NOT HAVE CAN’T LEAKWHAT YOU DO NOT HAVE CAN’T LEAK

THE WISDOM OF KLETZTHE WISDOM OF KLETZ

OUTLINEOUTLINE

IntroductionIntroduction

Inherent Safety (IS)Inherent Safety (IS)

Process Safety Management (PSM)Process Safety Management (PSM)

PRIM AnalysisPRIM Analysis

Framework for IS in PSMFramework for IS in PSM

ConclusionConclusion

AcknowledgementsAcknowledgements

INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

ScopeScope– Prevention and mitigation of process incidentsPrevention and mitigation of process incidents

ObjectiveObjective– Explicitly incorporate principles of inherent Explicitly incorporate principles of inherent

safety (IS) in a process safety management safety (IS) in a process safety management system (PSM)system (PSM)

MotivationMotivation– IS increasingly viewed as integral component IS increasingly viewed as integral component

of PSMof PSM– But more linkages between IS and PSM are But more linkages between IS and PSM are

needed to enhance use of IS principlesneeded to enhance use of IS principles

INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

Previous workPrevious work– IS and dust explosion prevention and IS and dust explosion prevention and

mitigation (PSEP, JHM, JLPPI, CEP)mitigation (PSEP, JHM, JLPPI, CEP)– IS considerations in Dow F&EI and CEI IS considerations in Dow F&EI and CEI

(JLPPI)(JLPPI)– IS-based incident investigation (PSP)IS-based incident investigation (PSP)– Linkages between IS and cost of process Linkages between IS and cost of process

safety (PSEP)safety (PSEP)

Bhopal Conference (Kanpur, India – 2004)Bhopal Conference (Kanpur, India – 2004)

INHERENT SAFETYINHERENT SAFETY

Minimization: Minimization:

Minimize amount of hazardous material in Minimize amount of hazardous material in use (when use of such materials cannot use (when use of such materials cannot be avoided – i.e. elimination)be avoided – i.e. elimination)


Substitution:Substitution:

Replace substance with less hazardous Replace substance with less hazardous material; replace process route with one material; replace process route with one involving less hazardous materialsinvolving less hazardous materials


Moderation: Moderation:

Use hazardous materials in least Use hazardous materials in least hazardous forms; run process equipment hazardous forms; run process equipment with less severe operating conditions (e.g. with less severe operating conditions (e.g. T and P)T and P)


Simplification: Simplification:

Simplify equipment and processes that are Simplify equipment and processes that are used; avoid complexities; make equipment used; avoid complexities; make equipment robust; eliminate opportunities for errorrobust; eliminate opportunities for error

INHERENT SAFETY

PROCEDURAL (ADMINISTRATIVE) SAFETY

PASSIVE ENGINEERED (ADD-ON) SAFETY

ACTIVE ENGINEERED (ADD-ON) SAFETY

Hierarchical ApproachHierarchical Approach

PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENTPROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Process safety:Process safety: the operation of facilities that the operation of facilities that handle, use, process or store hazardous handle, use, process or store hazardous materials in a manner free from episodic or materials in a manner free from episodic or catastrophic incidentscatastrophic incidentsProcess safety management:Process safety management: the application of the application of management principles and systems to the management principles and systems to the identification, understanding and control of identification, understanding and control of process hazards to prevent process-related process hazards to prevent process-related injuries and incidents (fire, explosion, toxicity, injuries and incidents (fire, explosion, toxicity, corrosivity) corrosivity) CCPS: CCPS: Guidelines for Technical Management of Chemical Process Guidelines for Technical Management of Chemical Process SafetySafety

MIACC MIACC → → CSChE: PSM Guide (3CSChE: PSM Guide (3rdrd edition) edition)

PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENTPROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT1.1. Accountability: objectives and goalsAccountability: objectives and goals2.2. Process knowledge and documentationProcess knowledge and documentation3.3. Capital project review and design proceduresCapital project review and design procedures4.4. Process risk managementProcess risk management5.5. Management of changeManagement of change6.6. Process and equipment integrityProcess and equipment integrity7.7. Human factorsHuman factors8.8. Training and performanceTraining and performance9.9. Incident investigationIncident investigation10.10. Company standards, codes and regulationsCompany standards, codes and regulations11.11. Audits and corrective actionsAudits and corrective actions12.12. Enhancement of process safety knowledgeEnhancement of process safety knowledge

PRIM ANALYSISPRIM ANALYSIS

No.No. ElementElement %%

66 Process and equipment integrityProcess and equipment integrity 23.823.8

22 Process knowledge and documentationProcess knowledge and documentation 21.221.2

44 Process risk managementProcess risk management 16.816.8

77 Human factorsHuman factors 8.98.9

55 Management of changeManagement of change 7.37.3

33 Capital project review and design proceduresCapital project review and design procedures 6.56.5

Process-Related Incidents Measure: 2004 Data (89 incidents)

PRIM 98/99 TO 2004- Element 6 ( Process & Equipment Integrity)

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

PSM ELEMENT 6 - Sub-Elements

% o

f In

cid

ents

Att

rib

ute

d t

o E

lem

ent

6

98/99

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

PRIM INCIDENT CAUSE ANALYSIS 1998/1999 TO 2004

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

PSM Element Possibly Involved

% o

f T

ota

l In

cid

ents

An

alyz

ed

98/9920002001200220032004

FRAMEWORK FOR IS IN PSMFRAMEWORK FOR IS IN PSM

Elements 2 – 7 or Elements 2 – 7 or all 12 elementsall 12 elementsExample-based guidance (IS examples)Example-based guidance (IS examples)– Everyday lifeEveryday life– TechnicalTechnical– Process-relatedProcess-related

Qualitative methods (IS-based)Qualitative methods (IS-based)– Protocol Protocol → → Plan/Do/Check/ActPlan/Do/Check/Act– IS guidewords and checklistsIS guidewords and checklists– Validation with case studiesValidation with case studies

Quantitative methods (IS-based)Quantitative methods (IS-based)– Validation with case studiesValidation with case studies

Guideword Description

Minimize Use smaller quantities of hazardous materials when use of such materials cannot be avoided. Perform a hazardous procedure as few times as possible when procedure is unavoidable.

Substitute Replace a substance with less hazardous material or processing route with one that does not involve hazardous material. Replace a hazardous procedure with less hazardous one.

Moderate Use hazardous materials in their least hazardous forms or identify processing options that involve less severe processing conditions.

Simplify Design processes, processing equipment, and procedures to eliminate opportunities for errors by eliminating excessive use of add-on safety features and protective devices.

1. Accountability: Objectives and Goals1. Accountability: Objectives and Goals

Process safety is a Process safety is a corporate valuecorporate valueRequires management Requires management commitmentcommitment and and leadershipleadershipHopkins (2005): Hopkins (2005): Safety, Culture and RiskSafety, Culture and Risk– Safety culture (reporting, just, learning and Safety culture (reporting, just, learning and

flexible subcultures)flexible subcultures)– Collective mindfulnessCollective mindfulness– Risk-awarenessRisk-awareness

Hierarchy of controlsHierarchy of controls

Royal Australian Air ForceF111 Deseal/Reseal ProgramThe absence of any commitment to the hierarchy of controls is another manifestation of the priority of platforms over people (Hopkins, 2005).

2. Process Knowledge and Documentation2. Process Knowledge and Documentation

Company memory (management of Company memory (management of information)information)– Inherently Safer Design (ISD) features may Inherently Safer Design (ISD) features may

not have obvious purposes unless well-not have obvious purposes unless well-documenteddocumented

Normal and upset conditions (operating Normal and upset conditions (operating procedures)procedures)– Procedures must be current, accurate and Procedures must be current, accurate and

reliablereliable

Antivirus SoftwareFor Windows XP/2000/NT

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3. Capital Project Review and Design Procedures3. Capital Project Review and Design Procedures

Early consideration for this element + early Early consideration for this element + early consideration for inherent safety = high consideration for inherent safety = high potential impact on effective PSMpotential impact on effective PSMQuantitative techniques for hazard reviewsQuantitative techniques for hazard reviews– INSET (European Union)INSET (European Union)– Overall IS Index Prototype (UK)Overall IS Index Prototype (UK)– IS Index (Finland)IS Index (Finland)– Fuzzy-Based IS Index (USA)Fuzzy-Based IS Index (USA)– IS Index/Expert System (Singapore)IS Index/Expert System (Singapore)– Hierarchical Approach (Switzerland)Hierarchical Approach (Switzerland)

Other Examples of IS in Element 3Other Examples of IS in Element 3

Hazard Reviews:Polyethylene Facility

Siting/Plot Plan: Flixborough

4. Process Risk Management4. Process Risk Management

New quantitative tools (e.g. I2SI)New quantitative tools (e.g. I2SI)Existing quantitative toolsExisting quantitative tools– Dow Fire and Explosion IndexDow Fire and Explosion Index– Dow Chemical Exposure IndexDow Chemical Exposure Index

Existing qualitative toolsExisting qualitative tools– What-If analysis extended to What-If/Checklist What-If analysis extended to What-If/Checklist

analysisanalysis– Use of IS-based checklists in identifying both Use of IS-based checklists in identifying both

hazards and additional risk reduction hazards and additional risk reduction measuresmeasures

5. Management of Change5. Management of Change

EliminationElimination

MinimizationMinimization

SubstitutionSubstitution

ModerationModeration

SimplificationSimplification

Inherent safety involves change that must Inherent safety involves change that must be managedbe managed

Inherent safety opportunities when making Inherent safety opportunities when making process changesprocess changes

Identify Required Review and Approval Steps

Conduct Required Hazard Review

Inherent Safety Guidewords/Checklist

Implement and Follow-up

Obtain Approval

Identify Need for Change Inherent Safety Guidewords

Inherent Safety Guidewords/Checklist

Take Action to Control Hazards

7. Human Factors7. Human Factors

Operator-process/equipment interfaceOperator-process/equipment interface– IS-based WI/CL toolIS-based WI/CL tool

Administrative control versus hardware Administrative control versus hardware controlcontrol– Ideal opportunity to “name” inherent safetyIdeal opportunity to “name” inherent safety

Human error assessmentHuman error assessment– Need for objectivity in an otherwise subjective Need for objectivity in an otherwise subjective

processprocess

Giant Industries’ Ciniza Refinery (US CSB)Giant Industries’ Ciniza Refinery (US CSB)

Initiating Event

(tI )

Awareness Phase (tA)

Evaluation Phase (tEv)

Egress Phase (tEg)

Recovery Phase (tR)

Elevated Exposure Phases (EEPs)

Risk increasing with time to muster

Muster Actions

Offshore Platform Musters - SLIMOffshore Platform Musters - SLIM

Offshore Platform Musters - SLIMOffshore Platform Musters - SLIM

Risk Matrix

Human ErrorProbabilities

ConsequenceTable

Risk ReductionMeasures (IS)

9. Incident Investigation9. Incident Investigation

..

Team Planning

Incident

Loss

Notification to Activate Team

On-Site Investigation

Identification of Immediate Causes

Identification of Basic Causes

Lack of Management Control Factors

Recommendations

Implement Recommendations

Follow-Up

Inherent SafetyGuidewords

Inherent Safety Checklist

Inherent SafetyGuidewords

• People• Property• Production• Environment

• Position• People• Parts• Paper

• Immediate/ Technical• Avoid Hazards• Improve Management System

Remaining PSM ElementsRemaining PSM Elements

6. Process and Equipment Integrity6. Process and Equipment Integrity– Preventative maintenance (IS implications of Preventative maintenance (IS implications of

RBIM)RBIM)– Maintenance procedures (IS implications)Maintenance procedures (IS implications)

8. Training and Performance8. Training and Performance– IS needs analysis (e.g. incident investigation IS needs analysis (e.g. incident investigation

reports)reports)– IS learning objectives (measurable action IS learning objectives (measurable action

verbs)verbs)– IS resources (e.g. US CSB reports, AIChE, IS resources (e.g. US CSB reports, AIChE,

IChemE)IChemE)

Remaining PSM ElementsRemaining PSM Elements

10. Company Standards, Codes and 10. Company Standards, Codes and Regulations Regulations

– External/Internal (IS requirements)External/Internal (IS requirements)

11. Audits and Corrective Actions11. Audits and Corrective Actions– Evidence of commitment to IS usageEvidence of commitment to IS usage

12. Enhancement of Process Safety 12. Enhancement of Process Safety Knowledge Knowledge

– Include enhancement of IS knowledgeInclude enhancement of IS knowledge

CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION

Inherent SafetyInherent Safety is an integral component is an integral component of effective PSM.of effective PSM.Inherent SafetyInherent Safety is a common thread is a common thread throughout PSM elements.throughout PSM elements.Inherent SafetyInherent Safety is, however, an implicit is, however, an implicit consideration in PSM documentation.consideration in PSM documentation.Examples and methodologies – qualitative Examples and methodologies – qualitative and quantitative; new and existing – are and quantitative; new and existing – are available to make available to make Inherent SafetyInherent Safety an an explicit part of PSM.explicit part of PSM.

ACKNOWLDEGEMENTSACKNOWLDEGEMENTS

Natural Sciences and Engineering Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of CanadaResearch Council of Canada– Financial assistanceFinancial assistance

Canadian Chemical Producers’ Canadian Chemical Producers’ AssociationAssociation– PRIM data and analysis resultsPRIM data and analysis results

Colleagues in the process safety Colleagues in the process safety communitycommunity– Technical advice and critique of researchTechnical advice and critique of research

With Thanks to DennisWith Thanks to Dennis

TO REDUCE HAZARDSTO REDUCE HAZARDSMAKE IT SMALLER OR CHANGE ITMAKE IT SMALLER OR CHANGE IT

SO NO ONE GETS HURTSO NO ONE GETS HURT

Business

Paul Amyotte