Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Dr. Elmar Kutsch Dr. Neil Turner Cranfield University.
Modes of Project Resilience
APM Oxford
9th February 2016
Agenda
Why ‘Resilience’?
Are project processes enough?
A different way of thinking –
‘Mindfulness’
Our research - what do organisations
actually do?
How might you apply this to your work?
Resilience
Project Resilience – how to adjust to,
and recover from, disruption and/or
adversity.
Some risks you just can’t foresee – how
well can you respond?
The Importance of Projects
Projects deliver organisational strategy
(change, IT, new products...)
Numerous studies have shown we’re
(still) not good at them.
Why? And how might we improve?
But we’re much better now?
Training, qualifications, standards…
5
Project Plan Met Successfully?
6
Is ‘process’ enough?
Are all projects created equal?
‘Execution-as-
Efficiency’
‘Execution-as-
Learning’
Projects can be placed along
this continuum
• Where are you, and where should you be?
7 © Cranfield University 2016
Project Complexity
“There is always an easy solution to every human problem - neat, plausible,
and wrong.”
H.L. Menken (1917)
© Cranfield University 2016 8
Projects challenges.
‘Coupling’ – how interlinked elements
are, and the knock-on effect one has
on another. Buffering, ‘breathing
space’.
Complexity – linear (predictable) or non-
linear (unpredictable) outcomes.
Interactions & Coupling
Interactions/Coupling
Chart (adapted from
Perrow, 1984, p. 97)
Project Failures
© Cranfield University 2016 11
Response to complexity.
Consider two different approaches:
‘Rule-based’ - ‘We have a process for
that’.
‘Mindfulness-based’ - more reliant on
situated human cognition.
Another View - ‘Resilience’
13
• Behavioural response to complexity,
based on ‘mindfulness’. Five principles:
• ‘Preoccupation with Failure’
• ‘Chronic unease’ about potential errors
reporting of weak signals is encouraged
and incentivised
• Near-misses and errors are used as
learning opportunities and shared freely.
13
Another View - ‘Resilience’
14
• ‘Reluctance to Simplify’
• Assumes that failure is not the result of a
single, simple cause.
• Weak signals seen as systemic failures
that require a strong response
• People are encouraged to show a constant
doubt about simple explanations.
14
Another View - ‘Resilience’
15
• ‘Sensitivity to Operations’
• Organisational ability to remain close to
where failure happens.
• Ability to integrate pieces of information to
understand the ‘big picture’ is paramount.
• Requires fast and un-bureaucratic
communication and the imagination to look
beyond weak signals in isolation.
15
Another View - ‘Resilience’
16
• Deference to Expertise
• Expertise is valued more than hierarchy.
• Rank and status are subordinated to
pertinent knowledge and experience.
16
Another View - ‘Resilience’
17
• Commitment to Resilience
• Those closest to the problem and can
enact a first-response need to be
encouraged and motivated to do so.
• Needs training and investment in skills,
enabled by widened responsibility and
accountability.
17
Empirical Research
18
• Study in 5 UK organisations:
• Two insurance companies (‘Insure-Alpha’
and ‘Insure-Beta’)
• A large power station (‘Power-Co’)
• Major new power system product
development group (‘Engine-NPD’)
• Research company performing high-tech
R&D projects for clients (‘Inno-R&D’).
• 88 Interviews, 26 incidents. 18
Findings (Engine-NPD)
• Major incidents included failures in the release of new
computer-aided design software.
• Normal response procedures - escalation, change requests
and rolling-back the software. However, the control systems
were unwieldy, leading to tense periods in which parties
allocated the costs and accountability to each other.
• Limited set of rules and procedures – efficient but not good
at dealing with complex issues.
‘Traditional’
Findings (Insure-A & -B)
• Major incidents – disasters, including hurricanes.
• Creation of ‘temporary mindful capabilities’ – ‘Tiger Teams’
to give extra expert resources at times of need. Structurally
and emotionally detached.
• Good for dealing with rare emergencies, difficult to give
clear ownership of issues. ‘Parachuted-in’ staff dealing with
the challenge, hard for existing staff to let go.
‘Just-In-Time’
Findings (Power-Co)
‘Infusion’
• Relatively high degree of mindful practice during times of
normality. Empowered to go beyond normal routines.
• Incidents included the breakdown of vital machinery,
essential to energy production.
• Challenge of dealing with both normality and abnormality
simultaneously - overload. Managers paid attention
primarily to the unfolding events, rather than the unaffected
systems that still had to be monitored and managed.
Findings (Inno-R&D)
‘Entrepreneurial’
• The creation and maintenance of permanent mindful
capabilities. Limited rules and procedures. Decision-
makers are relatively ‘free’ to develop their own methods.
• Once a critical incident or situation had been identified and
shared, it was accepted that no standard operating
procedure may be suitable for dealing with it.
• Uncertainty was not seen as something to be avoided, but
as an opportunity for innovation, and to learn and improve.
Flexibility and problem-solving given priority.
A crisis
Rule-based Mindfulness-based
Incident
Recovery
Response to Complexity?
Project Complexity
A) Where are your
projects? (1-4)
B) How do you run
them? (1-4)
• Work on project processes to date has not
‘solved’ the problems we encounter.
• Flexibility and situated human expertise can
(sometimes) work better than ‘more rules’.
• ‘Project Resilience’ – build a culture of
‘mindfulness’.
• Mindfulness is not a panacea – it is can be
viewed as less ‘efficient’ in stable situations,
but effective and valuable in complex ones.
26
Summary – Key Takeaways
And finally….
