Consolidated Comment Resolution Matrix.doc

UNCLASSIFIED

Working Tier 2 JCA

Data Call (Planner Level)

Consolidated Comment Resolution Matrix

25 January 2006

UNCLASSIFIED6/14/2010

# JCAOPR

Org/Reviewer

Lexicon Page #

Lexicon Line #

Taxonomy Slide #

Class Comments A/R/P/D

1 JSOIOFA

U.S. ArmyTRADOC Futures Center

DSN: 680-4140

29 1297 15 U Critical:

Recommendation: Delete “information operations” and “stability operations” from discussion/definition of “Joint Irregular Operations/Warfare”.

Rationale: Joint Information Operations and Joint Stability Operations are stand-alone Tier 1 JCAs. As such, they are not to be listed as a subordinate capability to another Tier 1 JCA. See page 30 for Joint IO Tier 1 and page 37 for Joint Stability Operations Tier 1. Additionally, JCA stability operations lexicon needs to be consistent with, and supportive of, NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05.

JCA OPR Comment:2 JSOIO

FAUSSOCOMSOKF-J9

DSN: 239-3062

29-30 1281-1361

U Critical:

Recommendation: Replace the current Tier 2 lexicon information with the following:

Special Operations - The ability to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations may require

low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities that are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently of or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies. They may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Also called SO. (Derived from JP 1-02)

• Special Reconnaissance – The ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance actions in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. Also called SR. (Derived from JP 3-05; JP 1-02)

• Direct Action – The ability to conduct short-duration strikes and small-scale offensive actions using unconventional tactics, techniques, procedures, and forces in a hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environment. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk. Also called DA. (Derived from JP 1-02)

• Counterterrorism – The ability to conduct offensive measures to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.

Also called CT. (Derived from JP 3-05)

• Counterproliferation - The ability to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military forces, partners and allies. Also called CP. (Derived from Draft National Military Strategy to Combat WMD)

• Unconventional Warfare – The ability to conduct clandestine military or paramilitary operations in a hostile or non-permissive environment primarily by surrogate or indigenous forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed by an external source to achieve an identified endstate. It includes, but is not limited to, guerilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (Derived from JP 1-02)

• Foreign Internal Defense – The ability to participate in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Derived from JP 1-02)

• Civil-Military Operations – The ability to conduct activities that establish,

maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. (Derived from JP 3-57; JP 1-02)

• Psychological Operations (PSYOP) – The ability to conduct planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (Derived from JP 1-02)

Irregular Warfare – The ability to conduct warfare that seeks to erode an adversary's power and will primarily by applying or countering indirect, non-traditional means. Within the context of this definition, non-traditional means refers to means other than traditional forms of combat involving

peer-to-peer fighting between the regular armed forces of two or more countries. Also called IW.

• Counterinsurgency – The ability to conduct military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (Derived from JP 1-02)

• Counterterrorism – The ability to conduct offensive measures to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Derived from JP 3-05)

• Unconventional Warfare – The ability to conduct clandestine military or paramilitary operations in a hostile or non-permissive environment primarily by surrogate or indigenous forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed by an external source to achieve an identified endstate. It includes, but is not limited to, guerilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (Derived from JP 1-02)

• Information Operations – The ability to conduct operations using the integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Psychological

Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities*, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (Derived from DRAFT DoDD 3600.1)*Supporting Capabilities: Information Assurance, Physical Security, Counterintelligence, and Visual Information Activities. This list is not all-inclusive.

• Foreign Internal Defense – The ability to participate in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Derived from JP 1-02)

• Civil-Military Operations – The ability to conduct activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may

include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. Also called CMO. (Derived from JP 3-57; JP 1-02)

• Stability Operations – The ability to assist in the establishment and/or maintenance of order in states and regions involving all instruments of national and multinational action, including the international humanitarian and reconstruction community to support major conventional combat operations if necessary; establish security; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish the political, social, and economic infrastructure; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. Also called StabOps. (Derived from Stability Operations JOC)

Rationale: Currently defined Special Operations with associated core tasks did not change, however the core tasks for both Special Operations and Irregular Operations were rearranged so that they follow the Tier 2 titles as applicable. As an outcome of the ASD/SOLIC and USSOCOM co-sponsored Irregular Warfare Workshops conducted Sep 05, the above Irregular Warfare definitions and associated core activities were developed. The definition and activities are planned to be staffed to the Services and Joint Staff followed by OSD approval.

Previously developed Irregular Warfare definitions, considered by the 2005/06 QDR effort, are integrated as developed thus far and vetted in the recommended definition and list of activities herein. Tier 3s (Psychological Operations and Civil Military Operations, owned by Tier 2 Special Operations) are called out specifically within the Irregular Warfare Tier 2. This is done to help reflect the supporting relationships and distinctions between the supporting Tier 3 Special Operations JCAs and Tier 3 Irregular Warfare JCAs. The relationship that these Tier 3 JCAs have are unique due to the Tier 1 JCA containing both Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare.


FAUSSOCOMSOKF-J9

DSN: 239-3062

15 U Critical:

Recommendation: Change Tier 2s to reflect a line and block chart for Special Operations and another for Irregular Warfare.

Rationale: The current Tier 1 Taxonomy for Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare is largely representative of Tier 2 tasks for Special Operations with one Tier 2 shown as Joint Irregular Warfare. The recommendation to show a separate Tier 2 for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare allows for a distinction between the two Tier 2s and better clarifies by the use of Tier 3 JCAs that are more descriptive of the respective Tier 2 capability areas.


FAUSSOCOMSOKF-J9

DSN: 239-3062

15 U Critical:

Recommendation: Change the Taxonomy for Tier 2 Special Operations to reflect the following Tier 3s:

• Special Reconnaissance (Blue Box)• Direct Action (Blue Box)• Counterterrorism (Blue Box)• Counterproliferation (J) (White Box)• Unconventional Warfare (Blue Box)• Foreign Internal Defense (IW) (White Box)• Civil-Military Operations (Blue Box)• Psychological Operations (Blue Box)

Rationale: The above Tier 3s are best represented as Special Operations’ Core Task. These tasks are in accordance with JP 3-05.


FAUSSOCOMSOKF-J9

DSN: 239-3062

15 U Critical:

Recommendation: Add the Taxonomy for Tier 2 Irregular Warfare to reflect the following Tier 3s:

• Counterinsurgency (Blue Box)• Counterterrorism (SO) (White Box)• Unconventional Warfare (SO) (White Box)• Information Operations (IO) (White Box)• Foreign Internal Defense (Blue Box)

• Civil/Military Operations (SO) (White Box)

• Stability Operations (White Box)

Rationale: The above Tier 3s are best represented as Irregular Warfare Core Activities as derived from the Sep 05 ASD/SOLIC and USSOCOM co-sponsored Irregular Warfare Workshops. The Tier 3 JCAs recommended for inclusion are the most essential for conducting Irregular Warfare, although there are other JCAs not listed that are supportive of the Tier 2 Irregular Warfare JCA, but to a lesser degree.


FAUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585

29 1304 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add reference to source of Joint Irregular Operations/Warfare lexicon entry.

Rationale: Improves substantiation and argument of lexicon entry. Also, it adds consistency IAW the JCAMP's JCA lexicon rule set.


FAJS J6, DSN: 671-9589

31 1374 and 1377

16 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Consider deleting Supporting Capabilities and Related Capabilities.

Rationale: Definitions should be able to stand-alone.


FA OPNAVN3IO1B

(703) 695-3372

N810(703)

614-0163

15 U Substantive: PSYOP should be moved back under IO as a blue box (retain in Spec Ops as a white box).

Recommendation: PSYOP should be moved back under IO as a blue box (retain in Spec Ops as a white box).

Rationale: IAW JP 3-13. Although SOCOM is tasked with the mission, PSYOP capabilities still reside with the services. PSYOP is a core capability of IO.


FAOUSD(AT&L)/DS Systems Engineering

703-695-2300

30 1335 U Substantive: Special Operations Tier Two tasks of Foreign Internal Defense, Civil-Military Operations and Psychological Operations are tasks that are covered in the Shaping, Stability and Information Operations JCAs.

Recommendation: Reword the other JCAs to capture the intent of the Special Operations task and eliminate them from the Special Operations JCA.

Rationale: Clarify the Focus of the Special Operations JCA


FAUSAREUR

DSN: 314-370-6621

31 1387 U Administrative:

Recommendation: Delete: “use of electromagnetic…”

Rationale: Correction.


FAUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Capitalize the first letter "T" in the word "the" in "Foreign Internal Defense – the…."

Rationale: Improves understandability. Also, it adds consistency.

JCA OPR Comment:12 JStO

FAU.S. ArmyTRADOC Futures Center

DSN: 680-4140

37 1677-1717

20 U Critical:

Recommendation: Change Tier 2 Joint Stability Operations JCAs to align with the stability operations tasks established in DoDD 3000.05, paragraph 4.3. Specifically, the Tier 2 JCAs should reflect DoDD 3000.05 specified tasks to assist Department of State:

1. Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment.

2. Revive or rebuild the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and

3. Develop representative governmental institutions.

Rationale: Consistency and correctness with latest Presidential and SECDEF guidance and policy. It is important for JCAs to mirror both the lexicon and intent of NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05 in order to promote the recent policies and guidance on stability operations as established by the President and the SECDEF.


FAASD(NII)CS&MP

DSN: 225-6123

38 1688-1698

20 U Critical

Recommendation: Change second sentence to read “These activities, most likely military-led, must ensure the functioning of basic services to include emergency response capabilities such as internal security forces, medical, fire, and the restoration of basic services such as power, communications, water, and the reopening of critical local businesses.”

Rationale: Consistency with NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and JP 3-08. Power and communications infrastructure are required for the coordination and provision of all other emergency response capabilities and

basic services, hence must be delineated in the lexicon, and resulting doctrine, directives, and instructions.


FAUSJFCOMJ9/JCD&E

DSN668-3338

20 (Stab Ops)

U Critical:

Recommendation: Under US Government Interagency Integration (JIINC) include white boxes entitled “Intergovernmental Organization Coordination” (JIINC) and “Non governmental Organization Coordination” (JIINC)

Rationale: The DoDD 3000.05 was signed 28 Nov 05. Several paragraphs mention Joint Interagency/IGO/NGO Coordination (4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8.2, 4.12, etc.) the IGO and NGO pieces were missing.

JCA OPR Comment:

15 JStOFA

ASD(NII)CS&MP

DSN: 225-6123

38 1712-1717

20 U Critical

Recommendation: Change first sentence to read “The ability to rebuild the critical systems or infrastructure (i.e. physical, power, communications, economic, justice, governance, societal) necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance.”

Rationale: Consistency with NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and JP 3-08. Power and

communications infrastructure are required for the coordination and provision of all other critical systems and infrastructure, hence must be delineated from physical infrastructure in the lexicon, and resulting doctrine, directives, and instructions.


FAUSJFCOMJ9/JCD&E

DSN668-3338

20(Stab Ops)

U Substantive:Recommendation: Include a white box entitled “Develop and Maintain Shared Situational Awareness and Understanding.” (JC2)Rationale: The DoDD 3000.05 was signed 28 Nov 05. Paragraph 4 discusses policy. Para 4.10 includes a discussion of intelligence efforts, and 4.12 references sharing of information. This JCA seems to fit both.


FAUSJFCOMJ9/JCD&E

DSN668-3338

20(Stab Ops)

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Include a white box entitled “Develop Skills” (JFG)

Rationale: The DoDD 3000.05 was signed 28 Nov 05. Paragraph 4 discusses policy. Para 4.11 includes a discussion of Stability Operations skills. This JCA seems to fit.


FAUSJFCOM

20 (Stab Ops)

U Substantive: Recommendation: Include a white box

J9/JCD&E

DSN668-3338

entitled “Planning” (JFM)Rationale: The DoDD 3000.05 was signed 28 Nov 05. Paragraph 4 discusses policy. Para 4.8 includes a discussion of planning requirements. This JCA seems to fit.JCA OPR Comment:

19 JStOFA

CENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191

20 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Switch locations of Tier 2 JCAs “Basic Services Restoration” with “Building Military Partner Capacity” and “Building Military Partner Capability.”

Additionally Tier 2 JCA “Basic Services Restoration” could also be placed under Tier 2 JCAs Consequence Management as well as Humanitarian Assistance.

Rationale: Military Partner Capability and Capacity are better located under Security. Basic Service Restoration is better located under Reconstruction. Basic Service Restoration is also a component of both Consequence Management and Humanitarian Assistance.


FAOPNAV N813 (703)

614-0170

38 1712-1717

20 U Substantive: This scope of Stab Ops Tier 2 “Reconstruction” is very large, and should have underlying Tier 2b capabilities listed.

Recommendation: Add 5 Tier 2b JCAs: Physical; Economic; Justice; Governance; Societal.

Rationale: Will provide for better clarity of required capabilities.


FAUSJFCOMJ69

DSN: 668-4531

20 U ADMIN:

RECOMMENDATION: DELETE “BUILDING MILITARY PARTNER CAPACITY”

RATIONALE: IT WAS WRITTEN TWICE

JCA OPR Comment:22 JSpO

FAUSSTRATCOMJ841

DSN: 272-8303

26 1158 U Critical:

Recommendation: Insert the following: "Space Support – The ability to launch, deploy, augment, maintain, sustain, replenish, deorbit, and recover space forces, including the C2 network configuration for space operations. Space Support includes capabilities to: deliver satellites, payloads, and material into space (i.e. Spacelift); maneuver, configure, and sustain on-orbit forces and to activate on-orbit spares (i.e. Satellite Operations); plan operations for replenishing space forces in the event of loss of space assets (i.e. Reconstitution of Space Forces). (Derived from JP 3-14)"

Rationale: Matches this lexicon with the well recognized, well documented, and well accepted description of Joint Space Operations that is contained in JP 3-14.


FAUSSTRATCOM/J841

DSN: 272-8303

13(Joint

Space Ops)

U Critical:

Recommendation: Delete all "white" boxes on the Joint Space Operations Taxonomy chart. Add two additional "blue" boxes (Tier 2s): Space Force Enhancement Space Support

Rationale: This makes the chart consistent with the text changes recommended above for the Joint Space Operations Lexicon.


FAUSSTRATCOMJ841

DSN: 272-8303

26 1158 U Critical:

Recommendation: Insert the following: "Space Force Enhancement – The ability to use space capabilities as a force multiplier to enhance battlespace awareness and the effectiveness of other Joint Force capabilities. Space Force Enhancement includes capabilities that provide: terrestrial (air, land, and sea) monitoring of AOIs from space to help reveal location, disposition, and intention at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war (i.e. ISR); timely detection and warning of an adversary's use of ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction against US strategic forces, tactically deployed forces, and US allies (i.e. Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack

Assessment—ITW/AA); data on meteorological, oceanographic, and space environment factors that might affect operations in other battlespace dimensions (i.e. Environmental Monitoring); that provide JFC and subordinate commanders the ability to execute reach-back operations, draw from planning support databases in the continental United States, sustain the two-way flow of data, and disseminate plans, orders, and force status over long distances, increasing C2 effectiveness, especially in areas with limited or no communications infrastructure (i.e. Satellite Communications—SATCOM); precise, reliable position and timing information that permits joint forces to more effectively plan, train, coordinate, and execute operations as well as permitting the navigation of terrestrial forces, combat identification, and target weaponeering for precision munitions (i.e. Position, Velocity, Time, and Navigation—PVTN). (Derived from JP 3-14)"



FAOPNAVN8QDR

(703) 692-4542

29 1279, 1292-13

08

15 U Critical:

Recommendation: Delete the Tier 2 JCA “Irregular Warfare” from “Jt Special Ops & Irreg Ops”, and delete “& Irregular Ops”

from the Tier 1 title. Delete lines 1291-1308 from the lexicon.

Rationale: Irregular Ops/Irregular Warfare are overarching concepts that involve broad applications of DoD resources across multiple Tier 1 JCAs, and are better covered by para 3.d. of the JCAMP.


FAHQDA G8 FDE

703 4137617

25 1136 n/a U Substantive: Joint Homeland Defense includes a Tier 2 JCA defined as “Air and Space Defense (ASD)” yet no IAMD function is included subordinate to Joint Space Ops.

Rationale: Concerning IAMD in a broad context, AMD related Tier 2 definitions include; Theater Air and Missile Defense subordinate to Joint Air Operations; Air and Space Defense subordinate to Joint Homeland Defense, and Global Missile Defense subordinate to Joint Global deterrence. Either ASD should be included here as it includes the word “space,” or TAMD should be included here as it is included in all other domain JCA types, or IAMD should be included as the appropriate Tier 2 JCA. A point of confusion is that all three related AMD activities are included subordinate to operational JCA types while only the TAMD definition is included subordinate to all domain JCA types. It is unclear whether this is a conscious decision to distinguish among JCA types. Should this be a conscious decision to establish

three separate but related definitions concerning IAMD, then consideration should be given to establishing IAMD as a Tier 1 JCA. Should IAMD not be designated as a Tier 1 JCA, consideration should be given to establishing a Tier 2 JCA IAMD that consolidates and substitutes for the three separate existing AMD related Tier 2 JCA definitions.

Recommendation: Define IAMD as it is referenced from two sources. “Integrated Air and Missile Defense is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the Homeland and US national interests, protect the Joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating the adversary’s ability to achieve adverse effects from the air and missile capabilities. The threat set includes: space-based and ballistic missile reentry vehicles; ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, SRBMs); cruise missiles (air, land, sea, and sub-surfaced launched); aircraft (fixed-wing, rotary-wing, unmanned aerial vehicles, balloons, airships, etc); indirect fire rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM); C2 nodes, battle management processes, and organizations used to employ adversary air and missile threats; launch sites, airfields, delivery platforms, and targeting sensors; munitions, supplies, and infrastructure supporting adversary air and missile threat potential (Integrated Air and Missile Defense Joint Integrating Concept) and include

capabilities as defined in the emerging Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capability Based Assessment the capability to: Surveil; Detect; Track; Identify; conduct threat evaluation and weapon assignment; Act (Attack, Shoot, Defend); and Assess activities against threat air and missile threats.

JCA OPR Comment:

27 JSpOFA

JS J6, DSN: 671-9589

26 1154, 1163, and 1177

13 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Consider incorporating key points from the notes into the respective tier 2 definitions.

Rationale: JCA definitions should be able to stand alone without background information.


FAUSSTRATCOMJ841

DSN: 272-8303

26 1149-1157

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Change to read: " Space Control – The ability to provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while, when directed, denying it to an adversary. It may involve activities conducted by land, sea, air, space and/or special operations forces. Space Control includes capabilities that: provide the ability to conduct surveillance of space; protect friendly space assets; prevent hostile actions

against space assets; negate threats to space assets. (Derived from JP 3-14)"



FAUSSTRATCOMJ841

DSN: 272-8303

26 1159-1185

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Change to read: "Space Force Application – The ability to conduct attacks against terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapon systems operating in or through space. Space Force Application includes capabilities to: accomplish global strike operations (both nuclear and non-nuclear) with ballistic missiles: engage a ballistic missile attack while the threat missiles are transiting space. Currently, there are no force application capabilities that are based in space. (Derived from JP 3-14)"



FAJS J6, DSN: 671-9589

26 1154, 1163, and

13 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Consider incorporating

1177 key points from the notes into the respective tier 2 definitions.

Rationale: JCA definitions should be able to stand alone without background information.

JCA OPR Comment:31 JInO

FAASD(NII)DCIO/A&I

703-607-0238

32 1414-1416

16 U Critical

Recommendation: Change CND to “white,” and show JNCO as the supporting.

Rationale: The definitions contained in the lexicon for IA and CND clearly show that CND is an integral part of IA. Also, this change is needed to conform to DoDD 8500.1, DoDD 5144.1, NetOps CONOPS, and the revised JP 6.0.


FAJS J6, DSN: 671-9589

31 and 32

1405 and 1414

16 U Critical:

Recommendation: Delete Computer Network Defense from the Information Operations JCA.

Rationale: Computer Network Defense, as implied in JP 3-51, focuses on network

defense against external threats. Information Assurance, which is a Joint Net-

Centric Operations tier 2, covers defense against external and internal threats by

addressing all aspects of availability,

integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. Internal threats have

proven more numerous and can be more damaging than external threats. IA also

addresses defense down to the client level.Joint Concept of Operations for GIG NetOps, dated 10 Aug 05, states, “2.3 GIG Network Defense. To convey the global dimension of STRATCOM’s mission to defend the GIG, the

term GND is used in this document to encompass USSTRATCOM’s operational

responsibilities for Information Assurance (IA), Computer Network Defense (CND),

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and other GIG defense tasks in an effort to more

clearly define the scope of this NetOps essential task.


FAJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

16 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Should only have 5 tier 1s.

Rationale: The definition of information operations includes 5 specific sub sets of capabilities and this should be reflected in the taxonomy.


FAOUSD(AT&L)/DS Systems

31 1404 U Substantive: Information Operation Tier Two task of Computer Network Attack covers tasks already covered in the Net-Centric JCA.

Engineering

703-695-2300

Recommendation: Reword the Net-Centric JCA to capture the intent of the Information Operations task and eliminate it from the Information Operations JCA.

Rationale: Clarify the Focus of the Information Operations JCA


FAJS J6, DSN: 671-9589

31 1374 and 1377

16 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Consider deleting Supporting Capabilities and Related Capabilities.

Rationale: Definitions should be able to stand-alone.

JCA OPR Comment:36 JGD

FAUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Add reference to source of Global Defense lexicon entry.



FAUSSTRATCOMJ824


Recommendation: Reword first sentence

DSN: 271-1585

to comply with JCAMP's JCA lexicon rule set, "The ability to…."

Rationale: Adds consistency IAW the JCAMP's JCA lexicon rule set.


FAJSJ8/DDFP, 703.602.5397,

34 1519 & 1523

18 U Substantive: Move Tier 2 “Global Defense” and Sub Tier 2 “Global Missile Defense Operations” to Joint Protection.

Recommendation: The Blue boxes “Global Defense” and “Global Missile Defense Operations” should be changed to white boxes on slide 12 and changed to blue boxes on slide 8.

Rationale: Both of these JCAs more closely align to Joint Force Protection portfolio. The definitions in the Lexicon should also be moved from JAO to JP (Pg28).


FAHQDA G8 FDE

703 4137617

34 1523 n/a U Substantive: Air and Space Defense listed as a Tier 2 JCA subordinate to Joint Homeland Defense should be replaced by IAMD. Rationale: Concerning IAMD in a broad context, AMD related Tier 2 definitions include; Theater Air and Missile Defense subordinate to Joint Air Operations; Air and Space Defense subordinate to Joint Homeland Defense, and Global Missile

Defense subordinate to Joint Global deterrence. A point of confusion is that all three related AMD activities are included subordinate to operational JCA types while only the TAMD definition is included subordinate to all domain JCA types. It is unclear whether this is a conscious decision to distinguish among JCA types. Should this be a conscious decision to establish three separate but related definitions concerning IAMD, then consideration should be given to establishing IAMD as a Tier 1 JCA. Should IAMD not be designated as a Tier 1 JCA, consideration should be given to establishing a Tier 2 JCA IAMD that consolidates and substitutes for the three separate existing AMD related Tier 2 JCA definitions.

Recommendation: Define IAMD as it is referenced from two sources: “Integrated Air and Missile Defense is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the Homeland and US national interests, protect the Joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating the adversary’s ability to achieve adverse effects from the air and missile capabilities. The threat set includes: space-based and ballistic missile reentry vehicles; ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, SRBMs); cruise missiles (air, land, sea, and sub-surfaced launched); aircraft (fixed-wing, rotary-wing, unmanned aerial vehicles, balloons, airships, etc); indirect fire rockets,

artillery, and mortars (RAM); C2 nodes, battle management processes, and organizations used to employ adversary air and missile threats; launch sites, airfields, delivery platforms, and targeting sensors; munitions, supplies, and infrastructure supporting adversary air and missile threat potential (Integrated Air and Missile Defense Joint Integrating Concept) and include capabilities as defined in the emerging Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capability Based Assessment the capability to: Surveil; Detect; Track; Identify; conduct threat evaluation and weapon assignment; Act (Attack, Shoot, Defend); and Assess activities against threat air and missile threats.

JCA OPR Comment:

40 JGDFA

J5DDSP

DSN: 223-2749


Recommendation: Modify DSPD Definition as follows:The ability to understand, engage, influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of U.S. policy and advance U.S. interests, and to collaboratively shape the operational environment. This ability includes public information activities and information operations consisting of multi-media programs such as websites, radio, print, and television to assist selected host nations and the Department of State in reaching

foreign target audiences. DSPD comprises DoD’s support to USG public diplomacy, which are defined as those overt international public information activities of the USG designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.

Rationale: More concise grammar


FAHQDA G8 FDE

703 4137617

34 1523 n/a U Substantive: Global Missile Defense Operations listed as a Tier 2 JCA subordinate to Joint Global Deterrence should be replaced by IAMD. Rationale: Concerning IAMD in a broad context, AMD related Tier 2 definitions include; Theater Air and Missile Defense subordinate to Joint Air Operations; Air and Space Defense subordinate to Joint Homeland Defense, and Global Missile Defense subordinate to Joint Global deterrence. A point of confusion is that all three related AMD activities are included subordinate to operational JCA types while only the TAMD definition is included subordinate to all domain JCA types. It is unclear whether this is a conscious decision to distinguish among JCA types. Should this be a conscious decision to establish three separate but related definitions

concerning IAMD, then consideration should be given to establishing IAMD as a Tier 1 JCA. Should IAMD not be designated as a Tier 1 JCA, consideration should be given to establishing a Tier 2 JCA IAMD that consolidates and substitutes for the three separate existing AMD related Tier 2 JCA definitions.

Recommendation: Define IAMD as it is referenced from two sources. “Integrated Air and Missile Defense is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the Homeland and US national interests, protect the Joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating the adversary’s ability to achieve adverse effects from the air and missile capabilities. The threat set includes: space-based and ballistic missile reentry vehicles; ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, SRBMs); cruise missiles (air, land, sea, and sub-surfaced launched); aircraft (fixed-wing, rotary-wing, unmanned aerial vehicles, balloons, airships, etc); indirect fire rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM); C2 nodes, battle management processes, and organizations used to employ adversary air and missile threats; launch sites, airfields, delivery platforms, and targeting sensors; munitions, supplies, and infrastructure supporting adversary air and missile threat potential (Integrated Air and Missile Defense Joint Integrating Concept) and include capabilities as defined in the emerging

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capability Based Assessment the capability to: Surveil; Detect; Track; Identify; conduct threat evaluation and weapon assignment; Act (Attack, Shoot, Defend); and Assess activities against threat air and missile threats.

JCA OPR Comment:

42 JGDFA

OSD(AT&L)DS/JFA

DSN: 227-2312

34 1523-1532

188

U Substantive: Global Missile Defense Ops relationship to IAMD

Recommendation: Substitute IAMD for Global Missile Defense Ops under Global Defense in Joint Protection (Chart 8) and make color white. Change Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (JAO) to Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (JP).

In Lexicon, delete all reference to Global Missile Defense Ops throughout.

Rationale: Simplify. Duplicate capability descriptions. IAMD covers all Global Missile Defense aspects.


FAOPNAV

N81

(703) 614-0163

(703)

35 1549-1559

18 U Substantive: As written, this is an employment issue vice a capability issue.

Recommendation: Change to “The analytic capability to measure or model the effects of various inducements and select the best

614-0170 options.”

Rationale: Will provide for better clarity of required capabilities.


FAN/NCJ43

DSN: 699-0783

N/A N/A 18 U Substantive

Recommendation: Include the following entry in the list beneath Global Strike: Agile Sustainment.

Rationale: Logistics support is a necessary pre-requisite for a successful execution of a global strike option. Joint logistics is already acknowledged on this page as a subset of Force Projection, but global strike implies an operation removed in time and space from force projection, and its different logistic support requirements should also be acknowledged.


FAUSSTRATCOM/J841

DSN: 272-8303

18(Joint Global

Deterrence)

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add the following "white" box under the "Joint Global Deterrence" yellow box Space Force Application

Rationale: This addition indicates how Joint Space Operations supports the Joint Global Deterrence JCA. It is put at this level to indicate the key support it provides

to both the "Global Strike" and "Global Defense" blue boxes.


FACENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191

18 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Under Tier 1 JCA Global Deterrence, add Tier 2 white block JCAs “Nonproliferation” and “Counterproliferation.”

Alternately, under Tier 2 JCA Inducements, add Tier 2 white block JCAs “Nonproliferation” and “Counterproliferation.”

Rationale: Deterring the development and proliferation of WMD via Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation is a significant Joint Global Deterrence mission


FAMarine Combat Development Command

DSN: 278-6247

18 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add a white Tier 2 JCA for “Develop & Maintain Shared Situational Awareness & Understanding (JC2)”

Rationale: Consistency with the Strategic Deterrence JOC


FAMarine Combat

18 U Substantive:

Development Command

DSN: 278-6247

Recommendation: Add a white Tier 2 JCA for “Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination (JC2)”

Rationale: Consistency with the Strategic Deterrence JOC


FAJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

18 U Administrative:

Recommendation: Delete “Global Strike” from the last tier 3 box under the tier 2 box - Global Strike.

Rationale: Consistency with the first tier 3 box under Global Strike.


FAJSJ8/DDFP703.602.5397,

NA NA 18 U Administrative: Correct the “owning OPR” -

Recommendation: The white box “Theater Air and Missile Defense” should list “(JP)” not (“JAO”) if Joint Protection is given the blue box for this Tier 2. See above.

Rationale: Theater air and Missile Defense is currently assigned to the Force Protection FCB portfolio and we have requested to change this to a Blue Box for Joint Protection.

JCA OPR Comment:51 JGD JSJ8/DD NA NA 18 U Administrative: Correct the “owning OPR”

FA FP, 703.602.5397,

-

Recommendation: The white box “Air & Space Defense” should list “(JP)” if Joint Protection is given the blue box for this Tier 2. See above.

Rationale: Theater air and Missile Defense is currently assigned to the Force Protection FCB portfolio and we have requested to change this to a blue box for Joint Protection


FAUS Army, G8-FDA 703-602-

3244

n/a n/a 18 U Admin:

Rationale: Clarification

Recommendation: “Non-Kinetic Global Stike” to “Non-Kinetic Global Strike”

JCA OPR Comment:

53 JGDFA

USSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Capitalize the letter "i" in the word "influence" in "Among these capabilities…."


JCA OPR Comment:54 JGD USSTRAT 34 1505 U Administrative:

FA COMJ824

DSN: 271-1585

Recommendation: Change "SD JOC" to "Strategic Deterrence JOC.Rationale: Improves understandability. Also, it adds consistency.


FAUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Change "SD JOC" to "Strategic Deterrence JOC".


JCA OPR Comment:56 JLO

FAUSJFCOMJ9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

10Joint Land Operations

U Substantive: Improper linking between Humanitarian Assistance (JStO) and Control Territory Populations & Resources

Recommendation: Elevate Humanitarian Assistance (JStO) to a sibling (equal) JCA to Control Territory Populations & Resources.

Rationale: Need to have consistent supporting supported relationships between JCAs. Control Territory Populations & Resources is at most a sibling to Humanitarian Assistance per slide 20.


FAJACD, CDE,

Futures

20 919-967 10 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Change to read:

Center,TRADOC

DSN: 680-4140

Land Force Movement (Tier 2) - disposing joint land forces to conduct land operations in support of the JFC’s campaigns, major operations, and other contingencies by securing positional advantages before combat operations commence. This joint capability area includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area. It also includes enhancing the mobility of friendly forces. The movement joint capability area encompasses a number of tasks including: (1) deploying, shifting, regrouping, or moving land formations within the operational area by any means or mode (air, land, or sea); (2) maneuvering joint land forces to achieve a position of advantage over an adversary; (3) providing mobility for joint land forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver without delays caused by terrain or obstacles; (4) providing countermobility to delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by adversary formations including operations that employ obstacles and enforce sanctions; (5) control significant areas in the JOA whose possession or control provides either side an operational advantage; and (6) conduct evacuation operations. (Derived from JP 3-0, RSD, 9 May 2005)

Direct Engagement (close combat) (Tier 2) –application of land forces, supported by air, sea, and space, to conduct simultaneous,

distributed operations in direct attack of enemy decisive points and centers of gravity – including the ability to close with, and destroy the enemy – in order to achieve the JFCs desired effects and objectives. This joint capability area includes conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes and exploiting tactical success to achieve the JFC’s operational and strategic objectives and effects. It is characterized by continuous operations and controlled operational tempo that seeks to decisively resolve the outcome of battles and engagements through close combat with enemy forces. Direct attack of enemy centers of gravity by joint land forces may require the capability to destroy opposing forces, secure key terrain, control vital lines of communications, establish local military superiority, or control territory, populations, and resources. (Derived from TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0 and JP 3-0, RSD, 9 May 2005).

Indirect Engagement (Tier 2) - employment of JFLCC and other component fires using available lethal and nonlethal weapons against an adversary. Planning the employment of tactical, operational, and strategic fires is primarily a joint capability area integrated by the joint force commander (JFC). Joint fires are produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to

achieve desired results in support of a common JFC objective. Fires typically provide destructive force, but some ways and means (such as offensive IO) can be employed with little or no associated physical destruction. This joint capability area includes a wide variety of lethal and nonlethal capabilities and encompasses a number of tasks (or “missions” in some cases), including: (1) conducting joint targeting; (2) providing joint fire support; (3) countering air and missile threats; (4) interdicting enemy capabilities; (5) conducting offensive action against targets—whether military, political, economic, or other—which are selected specifically in order to achieve JFC desired effects that support his objectives; (6) conducting offensive IO using a number of ways and means to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision- making; (7) assessing the results of employing fires focusing on determining the effectiveness of lethal and nonlethal fires employment including assessing both the immediate, first-order effectiveness of the event as well its contribution to the larger operation or objective. (Derived from JP 3-0, RSD, 9 May 2005)

Land Based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) (Tier 2) - provides an understanding of the operational environment, and insights about the strategic environment to the JFLCC. ISR

tells the JFLCC what his adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, what they may do in the future, and possibly motivations for their actions. This joint capability area assists the JFLCC and his staff in visualizing the battlespace and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future COA. ISR includes: (1) Directing intelligence activities; (2) collecting, processing, exploiting, and sharing information; (3) conducting surveillance and reconnaissance in support of information collection; (4) preparing, disseminating, and integrating intelligence and related products; (5) evaluating intelligence activities in the operational area; (6) managing the counterintelligence (CI) effort; (7) directing CI activities, including those that help protect against espionage, sabotage, and assassinations. (Derived from JP 3-0, RSD, 9 May 2005)

Land Force Sustainment (Tier 2) - the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required (to include legal, medical, and religious support) to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful mission accomplishment or revision of the desired end state. Sustainment plays a key role in both offensive and defensive combat operations. JFCs normally begin building sustainment

capabilities during the earliest phases of a campaign or operation. As with achieving dimensional full- spectrum superiority, sustainment provides JFCs with flexibility to develop any required branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts as required. The sustainment joint capability area encompasses a number of tasks including: (1) coordinating the supply of food, fuel, arms, munitions, and equipment; (2) providing for maintenance of equipment; (3) coordinating support for forces, including field services, personnel support, health services, mortuary affairs, religious ministry support, and legal services; (4) managing logistic support in joint land operations; (5) building and maintaining sustainment bases; (6) acquiring, managing, and distributing funds; (7) Providing politico-military support to other nations, groups, and government agencies as directed by the JFC; and (8) establishing and coordinating movement services. (Derived from JP 3-0, RSD, 9 May 2005)

Command and Control of Land Forces (Tier 2) - encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a JFLCC over assigned and attached joint and multinational forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFLCC provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint land force. JFLCCs employ assigned single-Service, joint, and multinational land forces to accomplish

missions assigned by the joint force commander (JFC). When directed, a JFLCC will form and organize a joint force land component headquarters to plan, direct, and coordinate operations. JFLCCs may develop and execute policies, plans, and programs within their authority. C2 of land forces encompasses a number of tasks, including the following: communicating and maintaining the status of information; (2) assessing the situation in the operational environment; (3) preparing plans and orders; (4) commanding subordinate forces; (5) establishing, organizing, and operating a joint force headquarters; (6) coordinating and controlling the employment of joint lethal and nonlethal capabilities; (7) coordinating and integrating joint, multinational, and interagency support; (8) providing public affairs in the operational area. (Derived from JP 3-0, RSD, 9 May 2005)

Land Force Protection: (Tier 2) - conserving the joint land force's fighting potential in three primary ways — (1) active offensive and defensive measures (such as air defense) that protect the joint land force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and LOCs from an adversary’s attack; (2) passive measures (such as concealment) that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; and (3) applying technology and procedures (such as medical

prophylaxis). As the JFLCC’s mission requires, the protection joint capability area also extends beyond force protection to encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. Protection capabilities apply domestically in the context of HS. The protection joint capability area encompasses a number of tasks, including: (1) collecting information for indications and warning; (2) providing air, space, and missile defense;(3) protecting noncombatants, including conducting NEOs when required; (4) providing physical security for forces and means; (5) conducting defensive countermeasure operations, including counter- deception and counter psychological operations; (6) providing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense; (7) conducting defensive IO (including OPSEC); (8) securing and protecting flanks, rear areas, and LOCs; (9) conducting chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) CM; (10) conducting antiterrorism operations. (11) Providing health services; and (12) establishing capabilities and measures to enhance safety and prevent fratricide.

Rationale: A more comprehensive definition is required in order to ensure the Tier 2 JLO joint capability areas can be properly nested within the definition of JLO.


JAUSADAMO-SSP

DSN: 222-9444

22 964 U Substantive: Conduct Refugee Operations

Recommendation: In the lexicon for Refugee Operations, change “mange persons” to read “manage persons.”

Rationale: Typo, but significant.


JAUSADAMO-SSP

DSN: 222-9444

22 968 10 U Substantive: Manage Internally Displaced Persons

Recommendation: On slide #10 change “Manage Indigenous Displaced Persons” to read “Manage Internally Displaced Persons.”

Rationale: Correct taxonomy slide #10 to correspond with the Tier 2 title for “Manage Internally Displaced Personnel Operations.”


JAUSADAMO-SSP

DSN: 222-9444

22 973-976 10 U Substantive: Manage Enemy Prisoners of War

Recommendation: On taxonomy slide #10 change “Mange” to “Manage.”

Rationale: Typo, but significant


JAUSADAMO-

22 974 10 U Substantive: Manage Enemy Prisoners of War

SSP

DSN: 222-9444

Recommendation: Delete “in Article” so the definition correctly reads “…defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention…”

Rationale: Remove superfluous words.


FACENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191

10 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Under Tier 2 JCA Control Territory, Population and resources add white block Tier 2 “Consequence Management”

Rationale: During a CBRNE Consequence Management event it may be necessary to control populations and resources, i.e. quarantine, secured contaminated areas, use of control points and decon lines.


FAJSJ8/DDFP, 703.602.5397,

NA NA 10 Administrative: Correct the “owning OPR” -

Recommendation: On the Joint Land Ops slide (slide 10) the white box “Theater Air and Missile Defense” should list “(JP)” if Joint Protection is given the blue box for this Tier 2. See above.

Rationale: Theater air and Missile Defense is currently assigned to the Force Protection

FCB portfolio and we have requested to change this to a Blue Box for Joint Protection.


FAN/NCJ43

DSN: 843-3675

N/A N/A 10 U Administrative:

Recommendation: Correct spelling for the word “Mange” to Manage in the Tier 2 JCA “Manage Enemy Prisoners of War”

Rationale: Spelling/correctness.


FAUSJFCOMJ69

DSN: 668-4531

10 U ADMIN:

RECOMMENDATION: CHANGE “MANGE” TO “MANAGE”

RATIONALE: SPELLING

JCA OPR Comment:66 JAO

FAJSJ8/DDFP, 703.602.5397,

28 1259 14/8 U Substantive: Move “Theater Air and Missile Defense” and sub-tier 2s – “Defensive Counterair” & “Theater Ballistic Missile Defense” to Joint Protection

Recommendation: The Blue boxes “Theater Air and Missile Defense” “Defensive Counterair” and “Theater Ballistic Missile Defense” under Joint Air Operations should be changed to white boxes on slide 14 and changed to blue boxes on slide 8.

Rationale: Theater air and Missile Defense is currently assigned to the Force Protection FCB portfolio. The sub tier 2 JCAs are linked and should be moved as well. The definitions in the Lexicon should also be moved from JAO to JP (Pg28).


FAHQDA G8 FDE

703 4137617

28 1259 n/a U Substantive: Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) reference is subordinate to Joint Air Operations that aligns with the Force Application FCB. TAMD more properly aligns with the Force Protection FCB, but this singular observation masks several disconnects that the JCA Lexicon encompasses related to the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capability area. Consideration must follow across the entire IAMD spectrum.

Rationale: Primary rationale in support of aligning TAMD with Force Protection FCB is that the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization Director are dual-hatted as the Deputy Director for Force Protection on the Joint Staff. Concerning IAMD in a broader context, additional AMD related Tier 2 definitions include; Air and Space Defense subordinate to Joint Homeland Defense, and Global Missile Defense subordinate to Joint Global deterrence. A point of confusion is that all three related AMD activities are included subordinate to operational JCA types while only the TAMD definition is included

subordinate to most domain JCA types. It is unclear whether this is a conscious decision to distinguish among JCA types. Should this be a conscious decision to establish three separate but related definitions concerning IAMD, then consideration should be given to establishing IAMD as a Tier 1 JCA. Should IAMD not be designated as a Tier 1 JCA, consideration should be given to establishing a Tier 2 JCA IAMD that consolidates and substitutes for the three separate existing AMD related Tier 2 JCA definitions.

Recommendation: Define IAMD as it is referenced from two sources. “Integrated Air and Missile Defense is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the Homeland and US national interests, protect the Joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating the adversary’s ability to achieve adverse effects from the air and missile capabilities. The threat set includes: space-based and ballistic missile reentry vehicles; ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, SRBMs); cruise missiles (air, land, sea, and sub-surfaced launched); aircraft (fixed-wing, rotary-wing, unmanned aerial vehicles, balloons, airships, etc); indirect fire rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM); C2 nodes, battle management processes, and organizations used to employ adversary air and missile threats; launch sites, airfields,

delivery platforms, and targeting sensors; munitions, supplies, and infrastructure supporting adversary air and missile threat potential (Integrated Air and Missile Defense Joint Integrating Concept) and include capabilities as defined in the emerging Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capability Based Assessment the capability to: Surveil; Detect; Track; Identify; conduct threat evaluation and weapon assignment; Act (Attack, Shoot, Defend); and Assess activities against threat air and missile threats.


FACENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191

14 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Under Tier 2 JCA Air Interdiction add white block Tier 2 JCA “Counterproliferation”

Rationale: Interdiction of WMD or WMD precursors is one of the several mission areas within the Tier 2 JCA Counterproliferation, therefore Counterproliferation should be a Tier 2 JCA under Air Interdiction


FAUSSTRATCOM/J841

DSN:

14(Joint Air

Ops)

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add the following "white" box on the Joint Air Operations Taxonomy chart under the "Theater Air &

272-8303 Missile Defense" blue box Space Force Application

Rationale: This addition indicates how Joint Space Operations supports the Joint Air Operations JCA.


FAUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Add reference to source of Conventional, Kinetic Attack lexicon entry.

Rationale: Improves substantiation and argument of lexicon entry. Also, it adds consistency IAW the JCAMP's JCA lexicon rule set


FAOSD(AT&L)DS/JFA

DSN: 227-2312

28 1259-1261

810,11,12,

14, 18

U Substantive: Theater Air & Missile Defense rename

Recommendation: (1) Rename Theater Air & Missile Defense to “Integrated Air & Missile Defense” (IAMD) in Lexicon. Use this definition for IAMD: Integrated air and missile defense is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the Homeland and US national interests, protect the Joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to achieve adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities. (IAMD JIC, Sep

04)

(2) Make change on charts 10, 11, 12, 14, and 18.

Rationale: Term published in the IAMD JIC and OSD has a published IAMD roadmap.


FAUSJFCOMJ9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

14Joint Air

Operations

U Substantive: Deleted JCA still on taxonomy.

Recommendation: Delete Battlefield Deconfliction (Air Space Control) (JC2).

Rationale: Battlefield Deconfliction (Air Space Control) (JC2) no longer listed on JC2 taxonomy or in the JCA lexicon.


FAOSD(AT&L)DS/JFA

DSN: 227-2312

1828

Insert at 778

Delete 1259-12

76

814

U Substantive: Integrated Air & Missile Defense to Joint Protection and recolor

Recommendation: Change IAMD, Defensive Counterair and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from white to blue boxes on Joint Protection (chart 8) and make corresponding changes to Joint Air Operations (chart 14).

Make corresponding changes in Lexicon, cut words on Integrated Air & Missile Defense, Defensive Counterair, and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense on pg 28 and paste at line

778 on pg 18. Add sentence for clarity: “IAMD is the umbrella term including Theater Ballistic Missile Defense.”

Rationale: IAMD, DCA, and BMD are clearly Joint Protection capabilities. IAMD has JIC and Roadmap.


FAUSAREUR

DSN: 314-370-6621


Recommendation: Delete: Also called SEAD

Rationale: Correction. Tier 2 task is labeled SEAD.

JCA OPR Comment:75 JAADO

FAMarine Combat Development Command

DSN: 278-6247

11 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Delete “Blockade” and replace with “Counter Operational Mobility”.

Rationale: To be followed by what are currently tasks in OP 1.4 from the UJTL 1.4.1 Employ Operational System of Obstacles, 1.4.2 Conduct Sanctions and Embargoes, 1.4.3 Conduct Blockades, 1.4.4 Conduct Maritime Interception

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsm/m350004c.pdf

JCA OPR Comment:

76 JAADOFA

USSTRATCOM/J844

DSN: 271-7256


Recommendation: Change "...land, sea, and air..." to: ...land, sea, air, space, and cyber..."

Rationale: Today's operational LOCs extend through all operational domains, and information provides a critical piece of sustainment.


FAOPNAV N813 (703)

614-0170

22 998-1000

11 U Substantive: As written, “Freedom Of Navigation” is an employment issue vice a capability issue.

Recommendation: Change to “The ability to provide required forces to conduct…”

Rationale: States a capability vice an employment of the capability.


FAJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Delete some of the tier 2s.

Rationale: Listing 19 tier 2s seems excessive.


FAUSJFCOM

11 U Administrative: Typo

J9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

Recommendation: Under Space Control, change (JSOIO) to (JSO)

Rationale: Correctness.

JCA OPR Comment:80 JMLO

FA OPNAVN812(703)

614-0314

- - 12 U Substantive: Move “Ocean/Hydro/River Survey & Support Ops” up to the Tier 2a level.

Recommendation: Within Maritime/Litoral Ops, delete the 2 white boxes called “Jt Theater Logistics” and “Humanitarian Service”, and move the Blue Box called “Ocean/Hydro/River Survey & Support Ops” up to the Tier 2a level.

Rationale: These two white boxes are not necessary. “Ocn/Hydro/Rvr Survey & Support” is being treated as a Tier 2a in current Navy implementation efforts.

JCA OPR Comment:

CDR Robin Tyner

OPNAVN812(703)

614-0314

81 JMLOFA

CENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191

12 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Under Tier 2 JCA Maritime Interdiction, add Tier 2 white block “Counterproliferation.”

Rationale: Interdiction of WMD or WMD precursors is one of the several mission areas within the Tier 2 JCA Counterproliferation, therefore Counterproliferation should be a Tier 2 JCA

under Maritime Interdiction.

JCA OPR Comment:82 JMLO

FAJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Delete the Joint Theater Logistics tier 2 or add it to the Land and Air tier 1s.

Rationale: Consistency.

JCA OPR Comment:83 JNCO

NCJS J6, , DSN: 671-9589

17 765 7 U Critical:

Recommendation: Add the following tier 2 term and its definition: “Network Management - The ability to provide the network with the desired level of quality, agility, and trustworthiness. Network Management focuses on the configuration, availability, performance, and manageability of network services and the underlying physical assets that provide end-user services, as well as connectivity to enterprise application services. (Derived from Joint Concept of Ops for GIG NetOps)”

Rationale: Adds the term to reflect the framework developed during writing of the Net-Centric Operational Environment JIC v1.0, which incorporated aspects of the Joint Concept of Ops for GIG NetOps, dated 10 Aug 2005.

Note: Revised slide 7 sent SEPCOR.


NCUSEUCOM ECJ6/9

DSN: 314 430-4439

17 731 7 U Critical: Need to better accommodate Spectrum Assurance

Recommendation: Add following new Tier 2 JCA under Tier 1 Joint Net-Centric Operations:

Electromagnetic Spectrum Access - The ability to provide access to Electromagnetic (EM) Spectrum bandwidth resources needed to operate radio frequency (RF) radiating systems in the battle space. Requires attention to applicable domestic and foreign regulations, policies, and allocations that govern use of RF spectrum within the host nations. EM Spectrum supports terrestrial and satellite Communications as well as Intel, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) applications.

Rationale: Current edition of Lexicon doesn’t properly account for EM Spectrum Access. This is a multidiscipline area and needs to stand alone


NCFutures Center FwdATFC-F

17 732 U Critical: The tier 1 and tier 2 JCAs should more closely align with the depiction in the GIG Enterprise Services Strategy.

Recommendation: Make only three tier 2

DSN: 332-4973

JCAs. Put all NCES areas (Information Assurance and Applications plus others not listed) in a tier 2 JCA called Enterprise Services and change the other two tier 2 JCAs labeled “Information Transport” and “Knowledge Sharing” to “GIG Network” and “Domain/Community-of-Interest (COI) capabilities, services”.

Rationale: Information Transport appears to be the GIG Network, Information Assurance and Applications are actually listed as Enterprise Services, and Knowledge Sharing appears to be the Domain/Community of Interest capabilities and services as depicted in the NCES Strategy.


NCFutures Center FwdATFC-F

DSN: 332-4973

7 U Critical: The tier 1 and tier 2 JCAs should more closely align with the depiction in the GIG Enterprise Services Strategy.

Recommendation: Either make the NCES areas the tier 2 JCAs or (preferred) put all NCES areas in a tier 2 JCA called Enterprise Services and add two other tier 2 JCAs labeled “GIG Network” and “Domain/Community-of-Interest (COI) capabilities, services”.

Rationale: This would more accurately correlate with the GIG Enterprise Services Strategy documentation.


NCJS J6, , DSN: 671-9589

17 734 7 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Change the definition of Information Transport to read, “The ability to provide the physical communications media over which assured connectivity takes place, supported by switching and routing systems, and the computing infrastructure. (Derived from NCE JFC)”

Rationale: Formally adds a recognized aspect of the transport medium that is mutually inclusive of the associated switching and routing functions.


NCJS J6, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change Enterprise Services reference from “(Derived from various sources)” to “(Derived from NCOE JIC)”

Rationale: Updates the reference as a result of the approval of the Net-Centric Operational Environment JIC v1.0, 31 Oct 2005.


NCJS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change Information Assurance reference from “(CNSSI 4009)” to

“(DoD Directive 8500.1, Information Assurance)”

Rationale: Updates the reference to reflect a higher level DoD reference.


NCJS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change “Applications” definition and reference to read, “The ability to provide a locally resident software program or group of programs that interfaces directly with Joint Force decision-makers and communities of interest, which carries out generalized or mission-specific tasks or processes for which a computer is used, i.e., word processing, spreadsheets, graphics, database management, and communications packages. (Derived from NCOE JIC)”

Rationale: Changes the case of “Joint Force” and updates the reference as a result of the approval of the Net-Centric Operational Environment JIC v1.0.


NCUSSTRATCOM/J841

DSN: 272-8303

7(Joint Net-

Centric Ops)

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add the following "white" box on the Joint Net-Centric Operations Taxonomy chart under the "Information Transport" blue box

Space Force Enhancement (SATCOM)

Add the following "white" box under the "Enterprise Services" blue box Space Force Enhancement (PVNT)

Rationale: These additions indicate how Joint Space Operations supports the Joint Net-Centric Operations JCA.


NCASD(NII)Spectrum

DSN: 325-0726

17 734 N/A U Substantive

Recommendation: Delete last phrase under Information Transport, “… supported by switching and routing systems.”

Rationale: Switching and routing systems are only two examples of systems that support IT. This phrase is misleading because it is incomplete.


NCOPNAV

N81

DSN: 225-8450

16-17 723-764 7 U Substantive: Reinstate Tier 2b JCAs in Jt Net-Centric Ops.

Recommendation: “Cryptology” and “Computer Network Defense” should be broken out under Information Assurance.

Rationale: Previous JCA version briefed to Net-centric FCB had 20 Tier 2b JCAs under NC Ops. The two areas listed above are significant and unique enough to still

warrant Tier 2b boxes…though Computer Network Defense would need to be a white box due to overlap.

** Note: if IO, PA, and NC merge into Strategic Comms…ends the overlap issue.


NCJS J6, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change the definition of Information Transport to read, “The ability to provide the physical communications media over which assured connectivity takes place, supported by switching and routing systems, and the computing infrastructure. (Derived from NCE JFC)”

Rationale: Formally adds a recognized aspect of the transport medium that is mutually inclusive of the associated switching and routing functions.


NCJS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change Enterprise Services reference from “(Derived from various sources)” to “(Derived from NCOE JIC)”

Rationale: Updates the reference as a result of the approval of the Net-Centric Operational Environment JIC v1.0, 31 Oct

2005.


NCJS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change Information Assurance reference from “(CNSSI 4009)” to “(DoD Directive 8500.1, Information Assurance)”

Rationale: Updates the reference to reflect a higher level DoD reference.


NCJS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change “Applications” definition and reference to read, “The ability to provide a locally resident software program or group of programs that interfaces directly with Joint Force decision-makers and communities of interest, which carries out generalized or mission-specific tasks or processes for which a computer is used, i.e., word processing, spreadsheets, graphics, database management, and communications packages. (Derived from NCOE JIC)”

Rationale: Changes the case of “Joint Force” and updates the reference as a result of the approval of the Net-Centric Operational Environment JIC v1.0.

JCA OPR Comment:98 JFG

JTUSEUCOMECJ1

DSN: 430-6950

GEN U Critical: Incorporate Sustain the Force

Recommendation: SUSTAINING THE FORCE goes hand in hand with manning/recruiting. Recognize sustaining the force in the lexicon or Tier 1 or Tier 2 JCAs. Sustaining the force should be included in either the Force management or Force generation JCAs.

Rationale: Sustaining the force should be addressed in either the Force management or Force generation JCAs. The current JCA process is not conducive in identifying indirect mission supporting priorities (e.g. quality of life programs) which help sustain the force and support manning/recruiting. Quality of life programs play a key role in service member and family member satisfaction with military lifestyle and can be a major factor in retaining the high quality personnel our volunteer force depends on. The current JCA process is not conducive in identifying indirect mission supporting priorities (e.g. quality of life programs) which help sustain the force and support manning/recruiting.


JTCENTCOMCCJ3-E

ALL ALL ALL U Critical: Joint Training is not identified as a Joint Capability Area.

Recommendation: Include Joint Training

DSN: 651-4064

as a Joint Capability Area.

Rationale: There are two schools of thought with regard to Joint Training. 1) The capability to conduct Joint Training cuts across all joint capability areas and therefore should not be a separate area. 2) Since the NMS, DPG and the Joint Command Plan all make reference to establishing a Joint National Training Capability, Joint Training should be a separate JCA. Including Joint Training as a JCA maintains alignment of JCAs with Functional Capability Board areas.

JCA OPR Comment:

100 JFGJT

JFCOM – JT FCB /

DSN: 668-7093

2 86 U Substantive: Change Tier 2 definition title

Recommendation:Change: Mission Exercise Rehearsal – The ability to (during pre-deployment training) test the adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; ensuring all echelons are familiar with plans; and testing communications-information systems. (Derived from JP 1-02, rehearsal phase) To: Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) -

Rationale: Correctness. Called Mission Rehearsal Exercise in Taxonomy table and is common term in Joint Training


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

2 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add Retain or Reenlist as a Tier 3 under the Man Tier 2

Rationale: The 2 ways we man our force are through recruiting and retention.


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

2 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Change the Tier 4 Academic to Civilian under the Tier 3 Educate

Rationale: The 2 formal ways we educate our forces are with civilian schooling and military education. The titles Civilian and Professional Military Education make this clear.


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

1 29-30 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add develop to the definition. E.g., The ability to develop and obtain equipment … … .

Rationale: If develop does not fit here we need to find a place for it, since R&D is a large portion of the budget..


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

2 52 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Change Academic to Civilian education.

Rationale: The 2 formal ways we educate our forces are with civilian schooling and military education. Academic (by itself) could also apply to military schooling.


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

2 65 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Change to read “The ability to train individuals based on doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to perform … … .”

Rationale: Consistency with definition of collective.


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

3 91 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add the objective of these exercises to the end of the definition.

Rationale: Consistency with the other 2 definitions in this area.


JTCENTCOM

1-3 10-95 2 U Substantive: This section on Force Generation is not

CCJ3-E

DSN: 651-4064

focused at the joint level. This outlines capabilities that each service must have, but does not describe the joint force generation process that is in place for OIF and OEF.

Recommendation: This entire JCA needs to be rewritten from a joint perspective and should be realigned under Force Management so that it aligns with the Functional Capability Board areas.

Rationale: Force Management involves prioritization of requirements against available capabilities. Force Management includes aligning force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the Defense Strategy and joint force availability requirements. Force generation for COCOMs involves 1) the COCOM conducting troop to task analyses and articulating their capability requirement to the force provider (JFCOM), 2) the force provider assessing available service forces that provide the required capability and 3) the services identifying, preparing, and providing the required force at the proper time and place.


JTCENTCOMCCJ1-MP

DSN: 651-6930

2 81-84 U Substantive: The word validation also refers to a supported combatant commander’s function of validating a joint task force (JTF) joint manning document (JMD) IAW CJSCI 1301.01C.Recommendation: Modify the definition to

include this.

Rationale: Completes the definition.


JTOPNAVN812

(703) 695-8748

1-3 8-128 2-3 U Substantive: The Tier 2 JCA structures for JFG and JFM are too broad to be useful. More fidelity is required if they are to be used to operational, analytical, or programmatic purposes.

Recommendation: If the desire is to retain these JCAs (JFG & JFM), their Tier 2 structures must be fleshed out to provide more clarity and greater fidelity. “Planning” roles need to be deconflicted btwn JFM and Jt C2.

Rationale: Navy is preparing their Integrated Capabilities Plan (ICP), which is the basis for POM development, utilizing JCAs…except JFG & JFM. Because JFG & JFM lacked sufficient fidelity, Navy is assessing these areas using prior-existing N1/N4 manpower & readiness categorization schemes.

JCA OPR Comment: 110 JFG

JTN-NC/IC; :DSN: 692-0846


Recommendation: Modify Bullet to read – “…The ability to conduct effective and mutually beneficial Interagency, Intergovernmental, and multinational

exercises.”

Rationale: Essential to add qualifier which specifies than such Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational exercises are not just be a “show event,” but be both effective and mutually beneficial to our Agency or Multinational partners.


JTHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

2 87.88 U Substantive

Recommendation: “Mission Exercise Rehearsal – The ability to test … the timing and tempo of detailed operations….”

Rationale: Correct an omission. “Tempo” is significant to combat operations, is distinct from “timing” and should be rehearsed in mission exercises at various levels of tempo, as described in JP3-0, p III-15.


JTMarine Combat Development Command

DSN: 278-6247

2/3 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Deconflict “Develop Skills” and “Train and Educate” between JFG and JFM Tiers and the JFM JfuncC.

Rationale: Consistency with the Force Management JFC and common military practice and usage.


JTHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696


Recommendation: “Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (IIM) Exercises – The ability to conduct exercises between joint forces and interagency and multinational entities in order to test the joint forces’ abilities to accomplish the exercise objective(s) (e.g., produce maximum combat power and apply intelligence sources and methods) interagency, intergovernmental and multinational exercises.”

Rationale: The original definition was valueless and confusing. Since the definition of the term “exercise” was previously defined on lines 77.79 we can use the term in this definition. Also, since the definition of the term “exercise” includes use of the term “synchronize”, it’s important to use examples of exercise objectives that relate to the definition of the term “synchronization” as found in JP 2-0 and 1-02 (i.e., 1. The arrangement of military actions … to produce maximum … combat power…. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan).


JTJ8, FAAD 2 U Administrative:

DSN: 222-3893

Recommendation: Delete the Validation, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, and Interagency, Intergovernmental & Multinational Exercises boxes.

Rationale: These are not the only 3 types of exercises used to develop skills (the Tier 2 capability). Since it would be impractical to list all of the exercise types, none should be listed.


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Change to read “The ability to train units based on doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to prepare forces to respond … … .”

Rationale: Clarity.


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Change “validate training” to “train”.

Rationale: Exercises are training.

JCA OPR Comment:117 JIINC

JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

4 144-149 U Critical:

Recommendation: Rewrite this definition.

Rationale: As written it is the definition of US Government Interagency Integration. The published definition says nothing about state/local government.


JTASD(NII)CS&MP

DSN: 225-6123

37-38 1665-1717

20 U Critical

Recommendation: Need to include Host Nation (HN) Agencies and Members of the Private Sector in the Tier 2 Taxonomy and Lexicon definitions as part of the Joint Interagency/IGO/NGO Coordination Level 1 JCA.

Rationale: JP 3-08, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S), and DoDD 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations includes for information sharing and coordination with foreign nation/HN and security forces/agencies, and NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05 includes the requirement for information sharing and coordination with members of the Private Sector for SSTR operations.


JTATFC-F

DSN:

4 U Critical:

Recommendation: Include Tier 2 JCA,

332-4145 Synchronize Operations with mission partners and other agencies, as a Tier 2 JCA supported by another Tier 1 JCA.

Rationale: Would better support a Joint capabilities portfolio dedicated to developing DoD capabilities for coordinating with external agencies.



DSN: 278-6247

Slide 4 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Change “Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) to “International Organization”. International Organization is the term in daily use among civil-military operations planners.

Rationale: JP 1-02 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/02768.html



DSN: 278-6247


Recommendation: Add Host Nation Government, or similar. For consistency, add a Tier describing state and local coordination if capability is distinct from CONUS local. Alternatively, rewrite more broadly so that any mil-civ gov’t coordination is broadly described, the type of gov’t then becomes a “Condition”.

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/02768.html

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/02768.html

Rationale:



DSN: 278-6247


Recommendation: Unclear if State and Local coordination is intended as a Tier 3 JCA, or as a distinct Tier 2. In any case, it should apply to foreign societies as well as US.

Rationale:


JTJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

4 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Review first 2 Tier 2 boxes.

Rationale: Is US Government the same as Intergovernmental? Is integration the same as coordination? Should the tier 3 State and Local Coordination fall under the Coordination tier 2 vice the Integration tier 2?


JTN-NC/IC; :DSN: 692-0846


Recommendation: Modify Bullet to read – “…instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort and support of US objectives.”

Rationale: Essential to tie this requirement to not just unity of effort, but that, that unified effort also specifically supports US objectives.


JTN-NC/IC; DSN: 692-0846


Recommendation: Modify Bullet to read – “…Application and coordination of all instruments of national, state, and local power to ensure unity of effort.”

Rationale: If this Tier 2 JCA is to relate to Homeland Defense or Homeland Security Forces, Plans, and/or Operations, and within its heading of “State/Local Government Coordination,” then it has to address and take into account (i.e. coordination) state and local assets and requirements.

JCA OPR Comment:126 JFM

FMCommand – Joint StaffDirectorate – J8

DSN: 692-1675

3 124 3 U Critical: Standardize the definition of Planning. The term planning is used as a Tier 2 capability in three places within the JCA Lexicon. Pg 3 – Planning, Pg 4 – Planning & Direction and Pg 13 – Plan Collaboratively. The definitions listed after the terms are all different. One definition/Tier 2 capability would clarify planning as a capability. Planning should remain under JFM Tier 1, but be influenced/informed by other Tier 1s (C2,

BA – using ‘white box’ construct).

Recommendation: Modify the definitions listed on Pg 4 and Pg 13 and use the Pg 3 definition.

Rationale:

Pg 3 – Planning: The ability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require; occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, requires the regular involvement of senior DoD leaders, and results in plans containing a range of viable options. (Adaptive Planning Roadmap v1.1)

Pg 4 – Planning & Direction: The ability to develop intelligence requirements, coordinate and position the appropriate collection assets, from the national to the tactical level, to ensure robust situational awareness and knowledge of intended domains is gained. (JCA CRC – 28 Apr 05; modified from JP 2-01)

Pg 13 – Plan Collaboratively: The ability to plan utilizing an effects-based approach that directly ties offensive actions to campaign objectives, drawing on global resources and considering global consequences. Planning must be conducted with the collective knowledge of the decisions and plans of others to produce coherent integration. Planners must be able to focus on exploiting

critical capabilities and potential collateral damage. Parallel, distributed, collaborative planning capabilities and improved assessment tools are needed to compress process timelines. However, collaboration does not imply decision making by committee or consensus. The ability to assess the suitability of a plan through wargaming and mission rehearsal prior to execution is also needed. (C2 JIC)


FMATFC-F

DSN: 332-4145

2-3 U Critical:

Recommendation: Subordinate “Exercise” to “Global Force Management” within Joint Force Management instead of its current position under the “Develop Skills” portion of Joint Force Generation.

Rationale: Exercises, especially validation and mission rehearsal exercises, address a specific situation or contingency, and are therefore more appropriate to Joint Force Management, the focus of which is to ready capabilities for specific contingencies. This would also allow greater coherence between Joint Force Management and the Army Force Generation Model.


FMATFC-F

DSN:

3 118 U Critical:

Recommendation: Substitute phrase “U.S.

332-4145 military capabilities” for U.S. conventional military forces.

Rationale: U.S. military capabilities extend beyond conventional operating forces. They also include special operating forces, defense agencies, and the institutional capabilities of DoD components, aka the Generating Force.

129 JFMFM

PACOMJ543DSN:

315-477-1691

3 124 3 U Substantial: Tier 2 "Planning" lexicon does not reflect recent SecDef guidance.

Recommendation: Replace the Tier 2 "Planning" JCA with an "Adaptive Planning" under the Joint Force Management JCA.

Rationale: Currency. Synchronizes lexicon with recently approved SecDef guidance (see SecDef approved AP roadmap 13 Dec 05). If we could go back, “planning” would be a Tier 1 JCA and JFM would be Tier 2 because planning transcends all aspects of capability and force management.


FMJ3 DDGO/CSOD, COL DSN: 695-0637

3/13 124/564 3/6 U Substantive: Both Joint Force Management and Joint Command and Control Tier 1 JCAs list different Tier 2 planning JCAs with similar definitions. The Joint Force Management JCA defines its Planning Tier 2 JCA in terms of Adaptive Planning. Joint Command and Control has a Plan Collaboratively Tier 2 JCA, which in itself is a component of Adaptive Planning.

Recommendation: Resolve the duplicity by either redefining the Tier 2 JCAs to eliminate the overlap or by deleting one of the Tier 2 JCAs and referencing the Tier 2 JCA from the other parent Tier 1 JCA in a supporting role.

Rationale: As written, the document basically contains the same Tier 2 JCA under two separate parent JCAs.


FMUSJFCOMJ9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

3 U Substantive: Planning (JFM) should be related to Plan Collaboratively (JC2)

Recommendation: Put Plan Collaboratively (JC2) as a supporting capability area for Planning (JFM).

Rationale: Planning is an activity that occurs at multiple levels & for multiple purposes. The campaign & operational planning described in the Planning (JFM) JCA should be conducted collaboratively as described in Plan Collaboratively (JC2) JCA. All the sub-JCAs below Plan Collaboratively (JC2) also apply to Planning (JFM).


FMJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

3 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Delete the Planning Tier 2 box; or title it in force management

specific terms.

Rationale: Planning does not belong to Joint Force Management more than it belongs to any other Tier 1 capability.


FMJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Delete “Future Capability Identification” from this JCA.

Rationale: Unless we plan for the FM FCB to take charge of all concept development; all CBAs etc. this task remains a subset of each JCA, e.g., the organization responsible for Homeland Defense will identify capabilities required to improve the joint forces ability to protect the homeland.


FMJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Delete “Planning” from this JCA.

Rationale: Planning does not belong to Joint Force Management more than it belongs to any other Tier 1 capability.


FMCENTCOMCCJ3-E

3 100-128 3 U Substantive: Joint Force Management as a JCA should incorporate all aspects outlined in the Force Management Functional

DSN: 651-4064

Concept developed by the Force Management Functional Capabilities Board.

Recommendation: 1) Global Posture should be rolled in with Global Force Management. 2) Delete the Planning section and replace with development of Joint Forces for 10 to 20 years in the future.

Rationale: Force Management capability area should align with the Force Management Functional Capability Board responsibilities.


FMOPNAVN812

(703) 695-8748

1-3 8-128 2-3 U Substantive: The Tier 2 JCA structures for JFG and JFM are too broad to be useful. More fidelity is required if they are to be used to operational, analytical, or programmatic purposes.

Recommendation: If the desire is to retain these JCAs (JFG & JFM), their Tier 2 structures must be fleshed out to provide more clarity and greater fidelity. “Planning” roles need to be deconflicted btwn JFM and Jt C2.

Rationale: Navy is preparing their Integrated Capabilities Plan (ICP), which is the basis for POM development, utilizing JCAs…except JFG & JFM. Because JFG & JFM lacked sufficient fidelity, Navy is assessing these areas using prior-existing N1/N4 manpower & readiness

categorization schemes.

JCA OPR Comment: 137 JFM

FMOUSD(AT&L)/DS Systems Engineering

703-695-2300

3 104 U Substantive: The Lexicon of the Force Management JCA only talks about being able to identify future needed capabilities.

Recommendation: Reword to make Joint Force Management JCA more in Sync with JCIDs and DOD 5000 Processes.

Rationale: Identifying the need is only part of the process. JCA should account for the entire process


FMOUSD(AT&L)/DS Systems Engineering

703-695-2300

3 108 U Substantive: This Force Management Tier Two task overlaps with many of the activities in the Logistics and Shaping JCAs

Recommendation: Focus this Tier Two task to specifically address the Force Management activities of Global Posture

Rationale: This would allow JCAs to become more mutually exclusive


FMOSD(AT&L)DS/JFA

DSN:

3 106 NA U Substantive: Clarify Future Capability Definition

Recommendation: List reference (if none – need one) for Future Capability Definition Process

227-2312Rationale: Assist users to understand process – who does it and how? Are roadmaps involved?


FMHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696


Recommendation: “Global Force Management – The ability to align, assign and allocate forces force apportionment, assignment and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy….”

Rationale: Clarity. The original sentence is awkward.


FMPACOM

J543

DSN: 315-477-

6784

3 128 U Administrative: AP Roadmap is Version 1, signed by SECDEF 13 Dec 05

Recommendation: Update reference

Rationale: Currency and relevance


JTHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

2 86.87 U Administrative

Recommendation: “Mission Exercise Rehearsal – The ability to (during pre-deployment training) test (during pre-deployment training) the adequacy of plans….”

Rationale: Awkward sentence. The clause supports the word “test” not the word “to”.

JCA OPR Comment:143 JS

FMUSJFCO

MJPASE

DSN: 668-6778Comm:

757-203-6778

35-36 1598-1592

N/A U Critical: Confusing and possibly misunderstood capability definition

Recommendation: Change to read: “This ability can include public information activities as well as information operations consisting of multi-media programs such as websites, radio, print, and television to assist selected host nations and the Department of State in reaching foreign target audiences through communication channels such as websites, radio, print, and television.”

Rationale: Current wording seems to indicate that only IO has multi-media capability. Public information activities can employ the same methods and usually are the method of first choice when shaping operations are directed at broad audiences.

JCA OPR Comment:

JSFM

144 JSFM

USJFCOM

JPASE

DSN: 668-6778Comm:

757-203-

36 1602-1616

N/A U Critical:

Recommendation: Replace entire definition for “Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination” with the following: “Strategic Communication - The ability to focus U.S. Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in

6778 order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and products integrated with the actions of all elements of national power” (QDR draft definition)

Rationale: The draft QDR definition of Strategic Communication is more encompassing and succinct.


FMUSJFCO

MJPASE

DSN: 668-6778Comm:

757-203-6778

36 1618-1627

N/A U Critical: Limited capability description

Recommendation: Change to read: Analytic Support and Assessment - The ability to collect, analyze, fuse and assess information pertaining to target audience analysis, foreign public opinion polling, foreign media analysis, foreign public opinion analysis, identifying sources of influence, mapping the media environment, measures of effectiveness, perception management, human factors analysis, and cultural/societal analysis in order to achieve a holistic assessment of the information environment and support strategic information and engagement strategic communication activities. (Derived from recommendations contained in the 2004 Defense Science Board Report; COCOM input to Strategic Communication QDR)

Rationale: Analytical Support and Analysis

should not be limited to foreign audiences. Monitoring and evaluating all media coverage and public opinion (not conducting polling in the US but analysis of polling data) both domestic and foreign is key to assessing the effectiveness of joint shaping operations.


FMJ5DDSP

DSN: 223-2749


Recommendation: Change definition as follows:Strategic Information & Engagement Coordination (SIEC) – The ability to coordinate Joint Force Commander and DoD information and engagement activities to collaboratively shape the operational environment by engaging foreign audiences in order to achieve desired effects. These activities may include the activities of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD), Military Diplomacy (MD), Security Cooperation, Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations (IO), and Civil-Military Operations (CMO). These information and engagement activities They shall be integrated into military planning and operations, synchronized with the elements of national power, and coordinated with Interagency and coalition partners. This coordination is essential in order to establish shared situational awareness to achieve unity of effort and synergistic effects. Effectively coordinating and de-

conflicting activities is a capability multiplier for the Joint Force Commander.

Rationale: Provides a clearer definition of SIEC


FMJS J6, Lt, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Reconsider deleting the definition of Technology Protection. The definition, “Actions taken to deny adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes.”is very close to the Information Assurance definition of, “The ability to provide the measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.”

Rationale: The Technology Protection definition is too narrowly focused on IT systems. Consider threats to technology with respect to areas such as weapons systems.

JCA OPR Comment:148 JS J-5, 19 U Substantive: Threat Reduction Cooperation

FM DDWOTCWMD

DSN: 223-1317

should be included in Joint Shaping.

Recommendation: Add Threat Reduction Cooperation as a Tier 2 JCA. Define as “Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation authorities to enhance physical security, and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a State’s existing WMD program, stockpiles, and capabilities. (Derived from Draft NMS-CWMD)”

Rationale: Threat Reduction Cooperation is included as one of the 8 mission areas in the draft NMS-CWMD. It is an important part of USG nonproliferation efforts and is cooperative in nature and fits more clearly under Joint Shaping.


FMUSJFCOMJ9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

19Joint

Shaping

U Substantive: Improper linking of Psychological Operations (JSOIO) under Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (JS)

Recommendation: Psychological Operations (JSOIO) should be a sibling (equal) to Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (JS).

Rationale: Need to have consistent supported/supporting relationships between JCAs. List them as equal per slide 15 (JSOIO).

JCA OPR Comment:

150 JSFM

USJFCOMJ9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

19Joint

Shaping

U Substantive: Improper linking of Public Information (JPAO) under Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (JS)

Recommendation: Public Information (JPAO) should be a sibling (equal) to Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (JS).

Rationale: Need to have consistent supported/supporting relationships between JCAs. List them as equal per slide 17 (JPAO).


FMCENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191

19 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Under Tier 1 JCA Joint Shaping and alongside Tier 2 JCA Nonproliferation, add new Tier 2 white block “Counterproliferation”

Rationale: Counterproliferation is a complementary capability alongside nonproliferation for joint shaping of environments involving combating WMD.


FMUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585

36 1616 U Substantive

Recommendation: Add reference to source of Strategic Information & Engagement Coordination lexicon entry.

Rationale: Improves substantiation and

argument of lexicon entry. Also, it adds consistency IAW the JCAMP's JCA lexicon rule set.


FMCHINFO (09C)CAPT

DSN: 227-7391

35-36 17 & 19 U Substantive: The activities within DSPD are overwhelmingly public affairs/public information/overseas community relations functions.

Recommendation: Designate DSPD as a Tier 2 JCA supported by the Tier 1 Joint Public Affairs Operations JCA vice Tier 1 Joint Shaping JCA.

Rationale: DSPD describes the role component PAOs perform in support of DoS overseas. Specifically, PA tasks such as communication planning ISO U.S. foreign policy, coordination of themes and messages, press conferences/interviews/backgrounders with foreign officials and foreign press, overseas community relations programs, foreign media analysis, placement of opinion pieces in foreign press, countering of misinformation and coordination of visual information activities are examples of direct support of the DoS public diplomacy mission.


FMCHINFO (09C)

36 19 U Substantive: The coordination of capabilities that contribute to information

DSN: 227-7391

and engagement is a process, not a capability unto itself.

Recommendation: Eliminate Strategic Information & Engagement Coordination (SIEC) as a Tier 2 JCA.

Rationale: While coordination and deconfliction among the disciplines identified in the description of SIEC to achieve desired effects is essential, it does not rise to the level of creating a separate capability to perform those tasks. The capability to engage in the process of that coordination and deconfliction should already be resident in each of those Tier 1 and 2 capabilities. Many other Tier 1 and 2 capabilities have similar relationships requiring coordination and deconfliction, but a separate capability is not required to perform that function.


FMCHINFO (09C)

DSN: 227-7391

32 & 36 17 & 19 U Substantive: Communication Assessment & Evaluation and Analytical Support & Assessment overlap.

Recommendation: Eliminate Communication Assessment & Evaluation as a Tier 2 capability. Include AS&A on the JPA Ops chart as a Tier 2 JCA Supported by another Tier 1 JCA.

Rationale: The capability described in CA&E is a subset of AS&A. The lexicon for

the two demonstrates they are similar, with AS&A involving a deeper examination of the impact of information and engagement activities.


FMCHINFO (09C)

DSN: 227-7391

36 Line 2 of AS&A

description

U Substantive: Analytical Support & Assessment activities are duplicative and can be better shared across capabilities.

Recommendation: Change “. . . fuse and assess . . .” to “. . . fuse, assess and disseminate . . .”

Rationale: AS&A has multiple practitioners and consumers (e.g. PA, PSYOP, Intel, Shaping). The capability as currently described does not articulate the importance of ensuring all the participants in the contribute to, and benefit from, the products created from AS&A.


FMHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

35 1549.1558

U Substantive

Recommendation: “Inducements – The ability to influence or mitigate an adversary’s decision-making consequence of restraint. For example, shared early warning provided by the U.S. … could influence them to restrain … activity. Shared early warning may induce would mitigate the adversary to eschew actions that may adversary’s risk of being pre-

empted. In another example, assume may be an adversary’s decides decision to forgo WMD ownership in response to U.S. Global Deterrence efforts. To induce mitigate the adversary’s decision to take the path of safe and secure WMD elimination consequences of restraint, the U.S. may can offer to provide assistance in safely transporting, securing, deweaponizing or neutralizing WMD.”

Rationale: Clarity. The original text is incomprehensible. It is unclear what “mitigate an adversary’s consequence of restraint” means.

Inducements are to motivate behavior not to mitigate behavior. Inducements are indicative of influence.


FMUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Remove abbreviation from "Strategic Information & Engagement Coordination (SIEC)." An index of abbreviations used in the document might be a good idea.

Rationale: Never used in paragraph or section again. Also, it adds consistency.

JCA OPR Comment:159 JS USJFCO 19 U ADMIN:

FM MJ69

DSN: 668-4531

RECOMMENDATION: DELETE “BUILDING MILITARY PARTNER CAPACITY”

RATIONALE: IT WAS WRITTEN TWICE

JCA OPR Comment:160 JPAO

FMUSJFCO

MJPASE

DSN: 668-6778Comm:

757-203-6778

33 1486-1490

N/A U Critical: Inaccurate capability description

Recommendation: Change to read: “Community Relations – The ability to plan and synchronize programs to enhance interaction and communication among U.S. Joint Forces, coalition partners, and Host Nation and select domestic and foreign stakeholders populations throughout all operational phases to support commanders’ strategic and operational objectives.”

Rationale: Community relations programs are not

restricted to coalition partners and host nations. Community Relations programs may address domestic audiences (Congress, interest groups) as well as foreign audiences that, without hosting forces or joining a coalition, may still influence events in the AO.

These programs should be characterized as targeted toward key “stakeholders,” “publics,” “opinion leaders” or “audiences,” rather than “populations” as a whole.

JPAOFM


FMUSJFCO

MJPASE

DSN: 668-6778Comm:

757-203-6778

l

17 U Critical:

Recommendation: Replace “Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination” white block with “Strategic Communication” white block.

Rationale: The draft QDR definition of Strategic Communication is more encompassing and succinct. (See lexicon comment for Strategic Communication definition.)


FMUSJFCO

MJPASE

DSN: 668-6778Comm:

757-203-6778

17 U Critical:

Recommendation: Delete “Communication Assessment and Analysis” blue box and replace with “Analytic Support and Assessment” white block.

Rationale: Public Affairs needs to conduct communication assessment and analysis, but should leverage the more encompassing “Analytic Support and Assessment” by coordinating requirements and using shared products. Modification to definition reflected in lexicon comments.


FMUSSTRATCOMJ824


Recommendation: Add reference to source

DSN: 271-1585

of Public Affairs Operational Planning lexicon entry.



FMUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Add reference to source of Communication Assessment and Evaluation lexicon entry.



FMUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Add reference to source of Community Relations lexicon entry.

Rationale: Improves substantiation and argument of lexicon entry. Also, it adds consistency IAW the JCAMP's JCA lexicon rule set


FMCHINFO (09C)

32 & 36 17 & 19 U Substantive: Communication Assessment & Evaluation and Analytical Support &

DSN: 227-7391

Assessment overlap.

Recommendation: Eliminate Communication Assessment & Evaluation as a Tier 2 capability. Include AS&A on the JPA Ops chart as a Tier 2 JCA Supported by another Tier 1 JCA.

Rationale: The capability described in CA&E is a subset of AS&A. The lexicon for the two demonstrates they are similar, with AS&A involving a deeper examination of the impact of information and engagement activities.

JCA OPR Comment:167 JBA

BAUS Army Futures Center, TRADOCJoint & Army Concepts Div.

DSN 680-3988

7 313, 316

U Critical: Intelligence Preparation of the Environment

Recommendation: Change “environment” to “battlespace in lines 313 and 316.

Rationale: Revert to the approved JP 2-01 term. There is no strong justification to make this cosmetic change. The original definition in the draft JCA Lexicon (and the JP 2-01 definition) states the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment involves the enemy, the environment, and the terrain. This analytical methodology therefore involves more than just the environment; to rename it IPE is not accurate or necessary.

JCA OPR Comment:

168 JBABA

US Army Futures Center, TRADOCJoint & Army Concepts Div.

DSN 680-3988

8 324-330 U Critical: Operational Intelligence and Targeting Intelligence

Recommendation: Define operational intelligence and targeting intelligence separately.

Rationale: There is no valid justification to combine these two terms. The requirements for intelligence that supports the planning and conducting of a campaign are very different than those for targeting efforts. This combination of terms implies that campaign planning and execution is primarily based on targeting: a false assertion. Additionally, this section defines targeting—it does not offer a definition for targeting intelligence.



DSN 680-3988

8 354-356 U Critical: Predictive Analysis

Recommendation: Change to read: Predictive Intelligence – intelligence that determines the enemy’s intent and anticipates future enemy actions based on its capabilities.

Rationale: The original definition in the JCA Lexicon has two shortcomings. First, it claims to define “predictive analysis,” but then offers a definition for “predictive intelligence.” Analysis and intelligence are not synonyms. Secondly, it is not enough to predict an enemy’s location and enemy

commander’s intent—also critical are the enemy force’s capabilities and actions.


BA OPNAVN812(703)

614-0314

N810(703)

614-0163

15 U Critical: Battlespace Awareness Tier 2s must include blue and white force tracking/SA.

Recommendation: Jt BA must be expanded to include the full scope of true battlespace awareness (red/white/blue). In some cases this may require additional Tier 2s, but in many cases it just means expanding definitions to NOT limit themselves to red or red/white info/data.

Rationale: Any operational commander needs complete SA; any operational COP needs to display a complete picture. An accurate representation MUST include blue/red/& white data. This concept was recently endorsed by JROCM 276-05 dated 22 December 2005. One of several points contained in this JROC-endorsed attachment to this JROCM provides an example, by stating that “BFT, JBFSA, and CID [which all support JF S.A.] are not identical but interrelated and cannot be separated.”


BAATFC-FDSN: 332-4145

5 U Critical:

Recommendation: Include “Information”

as a domain under “Observation and Collection (All Domains)”

Rationale: Information operations are an increasingly important dimension of warfighting. Moreover, cyberspace, and other aspects of the information domain, are not necessarily comprehended by the other listed domains.


BAATFC-F

DSN: 332-4145

6 244 Critical:

Recommendation: Insert:

Informational: Collection of the multiple sources or transmission paths for communications, data, or information – including news media.

Rationale: Information operations are an increasingly important dimension of warfighting. Moreover, cyberspace, and other aspects of the information domain, are not necessarily comprehended by the other listed domains.


BAECJ2, DSN: 430-6770


Recommendation: Replace IMINT with GEOINT and define each subcategory in lexicon.

Rationale: Reference to IMINT only is not consistent. GEOINT includes GI&S, IMINT, and AGI.

JCA OPR Comment: 174 JBA

BAUS ArmyG8-FDB

DSN: 222-6463

6 237-238 5 U Substantive: Limits definition to nuclear particles only

Recommendation: Should read, Collect and store detected particles that are products of nuclear reactions or other radioactive decay.

Rationale: Broadens definition to cover potential use of non-nuclear, radioactive weapons. Specifically Radiological Dispersal Devices


BAUS ArmyG8-FDB

DSN: 222-6463

6 237 5 U Substantive: Collection and observation of chemical, biological, and toxic industrial materials (TIM) is not addressed in the JCA lexicon.

Recommendation: Add joint definitions for the collection/observation of chemical, biological and TIM to the taxonomy slide and the lexicon pages.


BAUSJFCOMJ9/JDPO

5Joint

Battlespace

U Substantive: Knowledge Sharing (JNCO) shown as a child of Develop & Maintain Shared Situational Awareness & Understanding (JC2)

DSN668-3119

AwarenessRecommendation: Move Knowledge Sharing (JNC) to a sibling relationship (equal) as Develop & Maintain Shared Situational Awareness & Understanding (JC2)

Rationale: On slide 6, JC2, Knowledge Sharing (JNC) and Develop & Maintain Shared Situational Awareness & Understanding (JC2) are shown in a sibling (equal) relationship. This will prevent confusion in the taxonomy over supported/supporting relationships.


BAJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

5 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Split the last tier 2 box into 2 separate boxes; 1 for developing and maintaining situational awareness and 1 for sharing situational awareness.

Rationale: Developing and maintaining situational awareness is a BA task, sharing situational awareness is a C2 task.


BAUS Army Futures Center, TRADOCJoint & Army

6 243-244 U Substantive: Human – Collection of neural processes to include cultural, social and individual thoughts and feelings

Recommendation: Change to read: Human—Collection of data related to

Concepts Div.

DSN 680-3988

individual and group intentions, will, attitudes, morale, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs.

Rationale: This category of observation and collection should not be defined as a collection of “neural processes.” How does one report on “neural processes” to a joint force commander? Collection in the human environment focuses on both individuals and groups (military units, tribes, religious minorities, etc.). The joint force commander must understand the intentions, will, attitudes, morale, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of adversaries, non-combatants, and neutrals in his battlespace.



DSN 680-3988

7 287-291 U Substantive: Analysis and Production – The ability to develop knowledge from exploited all-source information and provide intelligence. Assessment may involve fusion, modeling, simulation, and forecasting to increase situational awareness and better understand possible courses of action (COAs).

Recommendation: Change to read: The ability to convert processed information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements.

Rationale: The definition in the draft JCA lexicon has three shortcomings. First, to “provide intelligence” is a function that belongs in the category of dissemination and integration, not analysis and production. Secondly, the original definition uses the term “assessment” in the second sentence—is “assessment” a synonym for “analysis?” If not, what is the difference between “assessment” and “analysis,” and how do these two functions relate to each other? Thirdly, the original definition makes reference to understanding “courses of action,” without making clear if these are friendly or enemy courses of action. The recommended change is from JP 2-0.



DSN 680-3988

7 303 U Substantive: “in the commander’s AOR.”

Recommendation: Change to read: “in the commander’s battlespace.”

Rationale: Using the term “AOR” implies that only a combatant commander receives current intelligence. In fact, all commanders need current intelligence. “Battlespace” is a more generic term.


BAUSSTRATCOM/J841

5(Joint BA)

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add the following "white" boxes on the Joint Battlespace

DSN: 272-8303

Awareness Taxonomy chart at the bottom of the "Observation & Collection (All Domains)" blue box: Space Control (SSA) Space Force Enhancement (ISR/Environmental Monitoring

Add the following "white" box under the "Dissemination & Integration" blue box: Space Force Enhancement (ITW/AA)

Rationale: These additions indicate how Joint Space Operations supports the Joint Battlespace Awareness JCA.


BAOPNAVN812

(703) 695-8748

7-8 313-322 U Substantive: The definition of IPE appeared limited to a single methodology & database for tracking, analyzing, and utilizing a broad scope of dynamic data.

Recommendation: Change the definition of Jt BA Tier 2b Intelligence Preparation of the Environment to read “Analytical methodologies employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment (air, sea, littorals & terrain) for all types of operations. Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) facilitates extensive databases for potential opareas, which can be accessed or analyzed to determine potential impacts on friendly and enemy operations. Because environmental data (especially air & sea attributes) is highly perishable, IPE is a

continuous process.” (Modified from JP 2-01, 7 Oct 04)

Rationale: These subtle changes make the definition more simple, joint, & inclusive, and less intel-centric.


BAOPNAV

N81

DSN: 225-8450

5 205-212 5 U Substantive: Slide refers to ISR architecture development. Definitions refer only to Intelligence architecture development.

Recommendation: Match definition with slide. Requirement should be to develop architecture for ISR, rather than intelligence only.

Rationale: More inclusive. Clarity.


BAOPNAV

N81LCDR DSN:

225-8450

9 377-379 5 U Substantive: Remove phrase “Specially designed systems”

Recommendation: Replace with “designated systems”

Rationale: The selection of systems for enabling intelligence product dissemination/smart push-pull should not be separate from other net-centric enterprise efforts.

JCA OPR Comment:185 JBA HQUSAF 5 182 U Substantive

BA AF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

Recommendation: “A collection requirement is an established intelligence need (i.e., the annual JCS WMD Threat Prioritization Report) considered in the allocation of intelligence resources to fulfill the … other intelligence needs of the commander.”

Rationale: It’s important to provide at least one example of “an established intelligence need”. This information will aid anyone who is trying to figure out how to influence the intelligence collection decision-making process. The example should be of an established intelligence need, such as the annual WMD Threat Prioritization Report, which identifies COCOM requirements for intelligence information related to CBRN threats (states and non-state actors). The example should also be indicative of a source that has a proven track record of influencing intelligence collection decisions. The WMD Threat Prioritization Report has had only limited success with the latter; however, in lieu of a better example, we recommend using it.


BAHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

6 245 U Substantive

Recommendation: Add a new entry.

“Chemical/Biological – Collect and store detected toxic chemical particles/material

that cause toxic effect in exposed personnel, and microorganisms that cause disease or the deterioration of materiel.”

Rationale: Correct an omission. The section contains “nuclear/radiological” but failed to include the required capability to collect and monitor “chemical and biological warfare agents” and “chemical agents”, as required by the National Military Strategy for Combating WMD (i.e., CBRN). The narrative in the recommendation is derived from the definitions of the terms “biological agent” and “chemical agent” as found in JP 1-02, and used in JP 3-40, and the definitions of the terms “toxic industrial chemicals” and “toxic industrial materials”, as found in the National Military Strategy for Combating WMD (publication pending).


BAOPNAV

N84

DSN: 762-0588

6 231 5 U Substantive: Definition of Geophysical is not complete.

Recommendation: Change the definition of “Geophysical” to read: “Collect and store acoustic, oceanographic, hydrographic, meteorological, riverine, and terrain data.”

Rationale: This more completely describes the battlespace natural environment.

JCA OPR Comment:188 JBA OPNAV 7 315 5 U Substantive: Clarify definition.

BA N84

DSN: 762-0588

Recommendation: Change “environment” to read “natural environment”.

Rationale: Clarifies the definition of IPE.


BAOPNAV

N84

DSN: 762-0588

8 352 5 U Substantive: Expand modeling and simulation definition to include the natural environment.

Recommendation: Add the following sentence: “Use of numerical prediction systems to assess and forecast the natural environment.”

Rationale: Ensures inclusion of a significant elements of DoD Joint modeling and simulation.


BAOPNAV

N84

DSN: 762-0588

12 513and517

5 U Substantive: Expand definition to include space environment.

Recommendation: In both lines, after the word “geospatial” add “, astronomical”.

Rationale: Identified role of astronomical information in Joint Command and Control.


BAOPNAV

N848 357 5 U Substantive: Predictive analysis definition

was limited to intel processes.

DSN: 762-0588

Recommendation: Add the following sentence: “Provides assessment of the forecast natural environment and its impact on joint force operations and enemy course of action”

Rationale: Incorporates impact of the natural environment on joint force planning.


BAOPNAV

N81

DSN: 225-8450

6 243 5 U Administrative: Remove term “neural processes”

Recommendation: Replace with “spoken, written, and other interpersonal information exchange”

Rationale: clarity.


BAOPNAV

N81 DSN:

225-8450

12 543-546 5 U Administrative: Remove term “collaboratively” from definition to match slide

Recommendation: Remove term “collaboratively” from definition to match slide

Rationale: Not all mission analysis needs to be conducted collaboratively. “Plan collaboratively” is addressed under separate C2 Tier 2b JCA.


BAHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

7 276 U Administrative

Recommendation: Change first sentence to read:

“TECHINT – Intelligence derived from … material, and produced for … commanders.”

Rationale: Readability and context. The intended context is for intelligence to be produced for commanders. As originally worded the sentence implies that foreign material is produced for the commanders.


BAOPNAV

N84

DSN: 762-0588

8 321 5 U Administrative: Proper word usage

Recommendation: Change “continuing” to read “continuous”.

Rationale: Clarification.

JCA OPR Comment:196 JC2

C2ATFC-F

DSN: 332-4145

10 412 U Critical:

Recommendation: Insert:

“Develop Theater Strategy” In conjunction with interagency, multinational and non-governmental partners, develop a comprehensive strategy that leverages all elements of national power to accomplish U.S. and coalition objectives in a given

theater of operations.

Rationale: According to JP 1.02, strategies are developed to meet levels as low as theater; moreover, Joint and Combined headquarters have developed separate strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategies must comprehend all elements of national power, not just those provided by the U.S. DoD, and require a different set of skills than those needed for military operations.


C2ATFC-F

DSN: 332-4145

6 U Critical:

Recommendation: Include “Develop Theater Strategy” as a subordinate element of Tier 2 JCA “Exercise Command Leadership.”

Rationale: According to JP 1.02, strategies are developed to meet levels as low as theater; moreover, Joint and Combined headquarters have developed separate strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategies must comprehend all elements of national power, not just those provided by the U.S. DoD, and require a different set of skills than those needed for military operations.

JCA OPR Comment:198 JC2 US Army 11 488 U Substantive: Joint Blue Force Situation

C2 G8-FDJ

DSN: 222-4971

Awareness is not addressed in the Develop and Maintain Shared Situational Awareness and Understanding JCA. This definition is important to the ongoing JBFSA-BFT-CID discussions and Executive Steering Committee way ahead.

Recommendation: Add the definition for Joint Blue Force Situation Awareness as listed in CJCSI8910.01 dated 30 Apr 04. Joint Blue Force Situation Awareness is the collection and integration of capabilities provided by systems or tracking devices and transmission media employed to obtain, report, and share Blue Force identification, location, status, and intent information. Sometimes called Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA)


C2JS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change, “Identify collaboration requirements; establish the collaboration infrastructure - Set the infrastructure to enable knowledge sharing, implement information/ knowledge management within the staff, across the force, and with mission partners.” to read,“Identify collaboration requirements; coordinate collaboration infrastructure requirements - Set knowledge management rules to enable knowledge sharing, implement information/ knowledge

management within the staff, across the force, and with mission partners.”

Rationale: Net-centric brings the information transport, enterprise services, network management, applications, information assurance, and basic knowledge management practices that, in this instance, facilitate collaboration. C2 does not own the infrastructure / equipment / personnel to do this organically.


C2JS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change, “Establish collaboration mechanisms (business rules, systems interface, etc.) with mission partners - Effectively manage, integrate, configure and use existing and net-centric C2 systems to ensure interoperability.”to read, “Establish collaboration mechanisms (business rules, etc.) with mission partners - Effectively manage and integrate collaboration efforts, and use existing and net-centric C2 systems to ensure interoperability.”

Rationale: Net-centric establishes and integrates the systems (and their associated interfaces) to facilitate C2 collaboration capabilities. These same capabilities also support all functional areas.


C2JS J6, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change, “Establish appropriate operational, personal, liaison, electronic and network linkages with agencies and international organizations to ensure coordination of operations.”to read,“Establish appropriate operational, personal, and liaison linkages with agencies and international organizations to ensure coordination of operations. Facilitate this through the use of net-centric capabilities, and pre-coordinated and ad hoc procedures, as necessary.”

Rationale: Net-centric establishes connectivity and enterprise services to facilitate C2’s linkages with agencies and international organizations. These same capabilities also support all other functional areas’ similar linkages to these entities.


C2JS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change, “Effectively establish communications and ensure synchronization of activities and that procedures exist to support the effective transition of phases.”to read,“Effectively establish communications

contact and ensure synchronization of activities and that procedures exist to support the effective transition of phases.”

Rationale: NC establishes connectivity; C2 makes contact.


C2USEUCOM/USAREUR

DSN: 314-370-6621

10 412 U Substantive: C2 ROE

Recommendation: Change to read: Ensure JTF Commander has adequate ROE to execute assigned tasks. Empower commands and staffs to recommend changes or modifications to ROE. Ensure subordinate commands disseminate ROE. Empower commands and staff sections and organizations to develop and disseminate ROE.

Rationale: ROE are a means of providing guiance and direction to the JTF commander and subordinate commanders within framework of overall political and strategic directives. They define the degree and manner in which force may be applied. They are the principle means the JTF commander has ensure that the application of force is controlled. ROE inform commanders of the degree of constraint or freedom permitted to carry out assigned tasks. ROE are centrally approved and must be clearly understood, particularly in MN operations.


C2USAREUR

DSN: 314-370-6621

10 432-433 U Substantive: Interagency

Recommendation: Change to read: “… to processes that will enable integration of allies, partners and other government agencies that maximize horizontal…”

Rationale: Ensure that it is recognized that JTF headquarters are rarely, if ever, only military. JTF commander will require integration of non military agencies, coalition members or host nation into their structure.


C2USAREUR

DSN: 314-370-6621

12 503 U Substantive: Info Sharing

Recommendation: Add after last sentence: Ensure maximum allowable intelligence and information is shared with all participating agencies, alliance members and coalition partners.

Rationale: The technical means to share intelligence is essentially available. Release of intelligence is a critical policy issue. It is essential that other participating agencies and nations have common operational and intelligence picture. This builds confidence among participants and ensures that participating forces are operating appropriately to the security threat. It also promotes the need for information sharing

that enables collaborative operational plans and synchronization of all military activities. Links tier 2 tasks at page/line 13/581, 14/620, 16/708 & 715


C2USJFCOMJ9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

6Joint

Command and

Control

U Substantive: Force Projection missing from Joint Command and Control (JC2).

Recommendation: Add Force Projection as a supporting Tier II to JC2 (highest sub-level).

Rationale: Force Projection is a necessary enabler to Joint Command & Control. The JC2 of forces in the force projection process is required to give the Joint Force Commander the capabilities required to execute Joint Operations. The JC2 CDD identifies Force Projection as a key mission capability.


C2J8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

6 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Split the third tier 2 box into 2 separate boxes; 1 for developing and maintaining situational awareness and 1 for sharing situational awareness.

Rationale: Developing and maintaining situational awareness is a BA task, sharing situational awareness is a C2 task.


C2J8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

12 533-534 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Delete “In the net-centric collaborative environment”.

Rationale: Regardless of the environment the commander’s intent must be shared with subordinates. Collaborative tools just happen to be one way we share information today.


C2J8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Delete “an effects-based”.

Rationale: Unnecessary.


C2N-NC/IC; DSN: 692-0846


Recommendation: Modify the Bullet to read – “…The ability to share and access a “common operational picture (COP) with other Joint, Interagency, and Intergovernmental partners, as necessary, presenting current and forecast information…”

Rationale: Essential to highlight that COPs must be more than just service or command specific to fully support the range of

campaign, national, theater/regional, and international operations we face today and in the future. Actual and effective information sharing necessitates Joint, Interagency, and/or Intergovernmental COPs.


C2N-NC/IC; DSN: 692-0846


Recommendation: Modify the Bullet to read – “Collaboratively develop joint/Interagency/coalition campaign plan,…”

Rationale: Essential to include Interagency in the Plan Collaboratively Tier 2 JCA as JOPES already includes an Annex V (Interagency Coordination) in our plan development process and requirement.


C2N-NC/IC; DSN: 692-0846


Recommendation: Modify Bullet to read either – “Synchronize operations with non-DOD agencies and multinational partners -…” OR “Synchronize operations with DOD agencies, Interagency partners, and multinational partners -…”

Rationale: Depending upon the intent of this Tier 2 JCA and its supporting bullet/paragraph, some reference to our

non-DOD or Interagency partners needs to be included in the bolded Tier 2 JCA.


C2N-NC/IC; DSN: 692-0846


Recommendation: Modify the supporting paragraph to read – “… Establish appropriate operational, personal, liaison, electronic and network linkages with agencies and international organizations to ensure coordination of operations. Such linkages include tools and organizations discussed in JP 3-08 such as Liaison Officers and Agency Representatives, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs), and Interagency Planning Cells (IPCs).”

Rationale: Highlights specific tools, organizations, and linkages to enhance required planning coordination and collaboration. Also helps reduce duplication of efforts.


C2OSD(AT&L)DS/JFA

DSN: 227-2312

6 U Substantive: JROCM # 276-05 chartered Executive Steering Committee to oversee CID, BFT and JBFSA.

Recommendation: (Question) – How does this JROCM affect the current version Joint C2 JCA? Can the JROCM be implemented without changing the JC2 JCA? How does existence of JCAs help or hinder

implementation of JROCM # 276-05?

Rationale: Answers to these questions may help DoD community better understand use and dynamics of JCAs.


C2HQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696


Recommendation: “Synchronize operations with DOD agencies, other U.S. Government agencies, NGOs, and multinational partners – Establish appropriate operational, personal, liaison, electronic and network linkages with appropriate agencies, organizations and multinational partners to ensure ensuring synchronization of operations.”

Rationale: Correct omissions and typos. Consistent with Tier 1 Joint Coordination found on pages 3.4.


C2HQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696


Recommendation: “… electronic and network linkages with agencies, and international organizations, and multinational partners to ensure coordination of operations.”

Rationale: Coordination needed with multinational partners, as with operations

related to the Proliferation Security Initiative, for example.


C2JS J6, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change, “Identify collaboration requirements; establish the collaboration infrastructure - Set the infrastructure to enable knowledge sharing, implement information/ knowledge management within the staff, across the force, and with mission partners.” to read,“Identify collaboration requirements; coordinate collaboration infrastructure requirements - Set knowledge management rules to enable knowledge sharing, implement information/ knowledge management within the staff, across the force, and with mission partners.”

Rationale: Net-centric brings the information transport, enterprise services, network management, applications, information assurance, and basic knowledge management practices that, in this instance, facilitate collaboration. C2 does not own the infrastructure / equipment / personnel to do this organically.


C2JS J6, DSN:


671-9589 Recommendation: Change, “Establish collaboration mechanisms (business rules, systems interface, etc.) with mission partners - Effectively manage, integrate, configure and use existing and net-centric C2 systems to ensure interoperability.”to read, “Establish collaboration mechanisms (business rules, etc.) with mission partners - Effectively manage and integrate collaboration efforts, and use existing and net-centric C2 systems to ensure interoperability.”

Rationale: Net-centric establishes and integrates the systems (and their associated interfaces) to facilitate C2 collaboration capabilities. These same capabilities also support all functional areas.


C2JS J6, , DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change, “Establish appropriate operational, personal, liaison, electronic and network linkages with agencies and international organizations to ensure coordination of operations.”to read,“Establish appropriate operational, personal, and liaison linkages with agencies and international organizations to ensure coordination of operations. Facilitate this through the use of net-centric capabilities, and pre-coordinated

and ad hoc procedures, as necessary.”

Rationale: Net-centric establishes connectivity and enterprise services to facilitate C2’s linkages with agencies and international organizations. These same capabilities also support all other functional areas’ similar linkages to these entities.


C2JS J6, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change, “Effectively establish communications and ensure synchronization of activities and that procedures exist to support the effective transition of phases.”to read,“Effectively establish communications contact and ensure synchronization of activities and that procedures exist to support the effective transition of phases.”

Rationale: NC establishes connectivity; C2 makes contact.


C2J8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Change “Develop and Maintain Shared Situational Awareness” to “Share Situational Awareness”.

Rationale: BA has the capabilities to

develop and maintain situational awareness and C2 has the capabilities required to share this awareness


C2J8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Change “utilize” to “use”.

Rationale: Simplicity (ref AR 600-70 dtd 5 Apr 85).


C2N-NC/IC; DSN: 692-0846

16 696 6 U Administrative:

Recommendation: Correct last sentence in Bullet – “..This is accomplished He does this through coordination, collaboration,….”

Rationale: Eliminates stray words and improves readability.


C2OPNAV

N81

DSN: 225-8450

12 523-524 6 U Administrative: Modify JC2 slide to match definition wording

Recommendation: Change Block reading “Display tailored relevant SA info –UDOP-“ to read “Display tailored relevant actionable info – UDOP-“

Rationale: Clarity. Information is displayed. From that, SA is achieved when

a decision maker has the correct information and that info is understood.


C2OPNAV

N81

DSN: 225-8450

13 586-588 6 U Administrative: Mismatch between definition and slide

Recommendation: Replace phrase “joint capability area domains” in definition with “full range of military operations” to match slide

Rationale: Clarity


C2OPNAV

N81

DSN: 225-8450

14 620 6 U Administrative: Should read “with non-DoD agencies”

Recommendation: Replace phrase “with DoD agencies” with “with non-DoD agencies”

Rationale: Typo


C2OPNAV

N81

DSN: 225-8450

15 655-673 6 U Administrative: Remove term “Collaboratively” from definitions.

Recommendation: For definitions of “assess achievement of planned effects” and “identify and assess implications of unintended effects”, remove term “collaboratively.”

Rationale: Assessments may not need to be done collaboratively. Brevity.


C2HQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

16 694.696 U Administrative

Recommendation: “…mission partners. Not under his command. Mission partners … organizations. This is accomplished He does this through….”

Rationale: Verbiage.

JCA OPR Comment:229 JP

FPJ-5, DDWOTCWMD

DSN: 223-1317

New Slide 23

U Substantive: Include 8 mission areas from the draft National Military Strategy for Combating WMD as Tier 2 JCAs.

Recommendation: Add the 8 mission areas under the new Combating WMD Tier 1 JCA according to attached powerpoint slide. Tier 2 JCAs in blue indicate the mission areas that are essential to combating WMD and are not found under other JCAs.

Rationale: The NMS-CWMD will serve as the Chairman’s guidance on how to address combating WMD issues. Addressing the 8 mission areas specifically under a Combating WMD JCA will help to identify those issues that are WMD-specific, important to the department, and do not have the expertise for WMD issues under other JCAs.


FPCENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191


Recommendation: Change line 800 heading from “Protect Against WMD Threat” to “Combating WMD”And per comment 1 above, move to a new slide as a Tier 1 JCA vice a Tier 2 JCA.

Rationale: For consistency with comment 1 above, change ensures proper use of mission term “CbtWMD.” The joint CbtWMD mission is designated under high level guidance such as NSPD 17, the National Strategy to Combat WMD, the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, JSCP, SGS and the new global integration mission for USSTRATCOM.


FPJS J6, DSN: 671-9589

18 802 and 812

8 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Consider removing “Consequence management” from the tier 2 definition for Protect Against WMD Threat.

Rationale: Consequence Management operations commence after protect and defend efforts have failed and the WMD incident occurs.


FPJS J6, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change to read, “…effects to designated personnel and physical assets from…” Sentence is still a run on sentence, making it unclear. The sentence may be correct if it’s worded as such, “The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects to designated personnel and physical assets from enemy actions and to take full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes.”

Rationale: Clarity.


FPJ-5, DDWOTCWMD

DSN: 223-1317

8 U Major: Delete counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management.

Recommendation: Insert Active Defense and Passive Defense as Tier 2 and make additional adjustments according to attached powerpoint slides.

Rationale: The National Military Strategy for Combating WMD organizes combating WMD into 8 military mission areas. The mission areas under the NMS-CWMD that apply to Joint Force Protection include Active Defense and Passive Defense. Additional items under Active and Passive

defense have been identified in publications such as JP 3-40 and other joint doctrine.


FPUSJFCOMJ9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

8Joint

Protection

U Substantive: Improper linking between Global Missile Defense Operations (JGD) and Theater Air & Missile Defense (JAO)

Recommendation: Theater Air & Missile defense should be shown as a child (supporting) Global Missile Defense Operations (JGD) in order to match the relationship established on slide 18.

Rationale: Need to keep consistency through the entire taxonomy with respect to supported/supporting JCAs.

JCA OPR Comment: 235 JP

FPJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

8 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Delete the Train, Educate, and Exercise tier 3s under the Terrorist Threat tier 2.

Rationale: All capabilities require training, education and exercises, no need to list them for this tier 2. JCA OPR Comment:

236 JPFP

J8JRO-CBRND DSN: 331-0880

19 817-820 8 & 19 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Modify Security Cooperation (JS) as a sub-set to Non-

(703-602-0880)

Proliferation and update the definition. This needs to be de-conflicted with Joint Shaping based on newer reference draft National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, which will supersede the 2003 SecDef guidance on security cooperation. Keep this as a blue box for Joint Shaping and reflect this as a whit box under Joint Protection-Non-proliferation.

Rational: Newer reference – draft National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction awaiting Sec Def approval.


FPJ8JRO-CBRND DSN: 331-0880 (703-602-0880)


Recommendation: Add the following:Security Cooperation and Partner Activities – Activities to improve partner and allied capacity to combat WMD across the eight mission areas through military-to-military contact, burden sharing arrangements, combined military activities, and support to international activities. (Draft National Military Strategy for Combating WMD)---[White Box]Threat Reduction Cooperation – Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation authorities to enhance physical security, and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a State’s existing WMD

program, stockpiles, and capabilities. (Draft National Military Strategy for Combating WMD)---[Blue Box]

Rational: Identifies the mission areas that are sub-tier 2 tasks in the draft National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.


FPJ8JRO-CBRND DSN: 331-0880 (703-602-0880)


Recommendation: Add the following:“Elimination – Military operations to locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a State or non-State actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities in non-permissive environments.Interdiction – Operations to stop WMD, delivery systems and associated technologies, materials and expertise from transiting between States, and between State and non-State actors of proliferation concern in any environment. Passive Defense – Measures to minimize or negate the vulnerability and effects of WMD employed against U.S. and partner Armed Forces as well as U.S. military interests, installations, and critical infrastructure.” Active Defense – Military measures to prevent or defeat the delivery of WMD. Measures include offensive and defensive, conventional or unconventional actions to detect, divert, and destroy an adversary’s WMD and/or delivery means while en route

to their target.

Rational: Identifies the mission areas that are sub-tier 2 tasks in the draft National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (draft currently with Sec Def for signature). These recommendations also support the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense efforts in CBAs. This also follow current – existing funding streams.


FPMarine Combat Development Command

DSN: 278-6247

8 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Pollution and hazardous materials control are not addressed.Rationale: Important safety concern for troops.

JCA OPR Comment:

240 JPFP

CENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191

8 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Under Tier 1 JCA, Joint Protection, change Tier 2 Block “WMD Threat” to two white blocks “Counterproliferation” and “Consequence Management”

Rationale: This recommendation is to be done in conjunction with the CENTCOM J5-C first recommendation in the Tier 1 JCA

Comment Matrix regarding adding Combating WMD as a Tier 1 JCA. Combating WMD as a Tier 1 JCA would have three Tier 2 JCAs: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation and Consequence Management, of these 3, Counterproliferation and Consequence Management are applicable to Joint (Force) Protection.


FPUSSTRATCOMJ824

DSN: 271-1585


Recommendation: Add reference to source of Non-proliferation lexicon entry.



FPOPNAV N810

CDR (703) 614-0163

19 817-820 8, 19 Substantive: Move the Tier 2 “Nonproliferation” from Joint Protection to Joint Shaping

Recommendation: Move the Tier 2 “Nonproliferation” from Joint Protection to Joint Shaping as a blue box (may remain in Protection as white if desired)

Rationale: better joint alignment

JCA OPR Comment:

243 JPFP

OUSD(AT&L)/DS Systems Engineering

703-695-2300

19 822 U Substantive: Protection Tier Two task of protect against Exploitation is a task that is covered in the Net-Centric JCA under Information Assurance.

Recommendation: Reword the Net-Centric task to include the Protection aspects and eliminate it in the Protection JCA.

Rationale: Clarify the Focus of the Protection JCA


FPOUSD(AT&L)/DS Systems Engineering

703-695-2300

19 833 U Substantive: Protection Tier Two task of Personnel Recovery changes the focus of this JCA from systems need to protect personnel and facilities to Air and Land operations tasks of search and rescue.

Recommendation: This should be a Tier 3 type task in Land or Air Operations.

Rationale: Clarify the Focus of the Protection JCA


FPUSJFCO

MJ82A

DSN 836-9368

18 778 8 U Substantive: Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat should be added as a Tier 2 Joint Capability Area.

Recommendation: Establish Joint IED Defeat as a Tier 2 JCA. Insert Joint IED Defeat as a blue box under the Tier 1 JCA of Joint Protection on Taxonomy Slide #8.

Insert definition of Joint IED Defeat on Lexicon page 18 (Definition provided below).

Rationale: - IEDs are the number one killer of

American and Coalition forces today and represent the terrorist weapon of choice around the world;

- IED Defeat is the DoD’s number two priority, right behind Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) efforts, and represents a threat to national security with significant impacts on legislative and public support to DoD warfighting goals;

- IEDs represent a threat across the warfighting continuum – Strategic – Operational – Tactical; as such, requirements for IED System Defeat will compete against a myriad of other issues for JROC/JCB attention – a JCA would establish appropriate processing and decision priority for critical capability review, sponsorship and resourcing through near term venues, such as the Joint IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDD TF) and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) and longer term sustainment like the Joint Integration and Development System (JCIDS) processes;

- The proposed Center of Excellence for IED Defeat will certainly result in a steady flow of “JROC/JCB interest” programmatic and policy

requirements that will impact the Services, Defense Agencies and the Regional Combatant Commands across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum.

USJFCOM Deputy Commander formally requested a Tier 2 JCA for Joint IED Defeat in a 21 Dec 05 memorandum to the J7, Joint Staff. That memorandum offered the following definition for Joint IED Defeat:

Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat (IED) Defeat. The ability to reduce or eliminate the effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition Forces, including policy, resourcing, materiel, technology, training, operations, information, intelligence, assessment, and research aimed at reducing or eliminating the effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition forces and specifically includes the following:

Defeat of the IED. The ability to reduce the effects of IED detonations for safe operations including route clearance, device neutralization explosive detection, military explosive ordnance disposal, and vehicle and personnel protection.

Defeat of the IED System. The ability to reduce the effects and interrupt the insurgent chain of IED activities through

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations, counter-bomber targeting, device technical and forensic exploitation, disposal of unexploded and captured ordnance, and persistent surveillance.

Training the Force. The ability to mitigate the effects of insurgent IED employment through, but not limited to, multi-echelon training, technology training, information management and dissemination, strategic communications, and doctrinal and institutional training changes.


FPAF/XOR-FP

DSN: 227-0415

18 783 8 U Substantive: Add a new blue box titled PERSONNEL PROTECTION directly under the current CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS THREAT box, to include a new lexicon/definition

Recommendation: Add the Personnel Protection blue box and update the Tier II lexicon with the following to line 783: “Personnel Protection - The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects to personnel from small arms fire, blast, fragment, thermal and laser hazards on and off the battlefield. (Internal USAF derived)

Rationale: Accurately depict personnel protection capabilities w/i the JCA


FPAF/XOR-FP

DSN: 227-0415

na na 8 U Substantive: Add a new white box titled OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS (JAO) under THEATER AIR & MISSILE DEFENSE (also a white box)

Recommendation: Include OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS (JAO) with box this with box

Rationale: This is a key component and part of the IAMD JIC and JCB


FPHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

18 800 U Substantive

Recommendation: “Protect Against WMD Threat – The ability to integrate and synchronize the dynamic activities of the Department….”

Rationale: Correct an omission. See SECDEF memo, 6 Jan 05, subject: Designation of Responsibilities for Combating WMD to CDRUSSTRATCOM.


FPJS J6, DSN: 671-9589

18 802 and 812

8 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Consider removing “Consequence management” from the tier 2 definition for Protect Against WMD Threat.

Rationale: Consequence Management

operations commence after protect and defend efforts have failed and the WMD incident occurs.


FPJS J6, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Change to read, “…effects to designated personnel and physical assets from…” Sentence is still a run on sentence, making it unclear. The sentence may be correct if it’s worded as such, “The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects to designated personnel and physical assets from enemy actions and to take full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes.”

Rationale: Clarity.


FPJS J6, DSN: 671-9589


Recommendation: Reconsider deleting the definition of Technology Protection. The definition, “Actions taken to deny adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes.”is very close to the Information Assurance definition of, “The ability to provide the measures that protect and defend information and information systems by

ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.”

Rationale: The Technology Protection definition is too narrowly focused on IT systems. Consider threats to technology with respect to areas such as weapons systems.


FPJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

181819

780, 790 and

823

U Administrative:

Recommendation: Delete “designated”.

Rationale: Unnecessary, assumed.


FPJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893


Recommendation: Change to read, “ … … initiatives, or any combination of these.”

Rationale: Clarity


FPJ8JRO-CBRND DSN: 331-0880 (703-602-


Recommendation: Change to read: “Personnel Recovery (PR) – Operations” to identify acronym used in definition.

0880) Rational: Consistency


FPN/NCJ42 (Engr)

DSN: 692-2630

8 U Administrative:

Recommendation: The Joint Protection taxonomy chart uses threats rather than capabilities in its top tier. Recommend that the threats be expressed as a capability by preceding each with “protect against ... ".

Rationale: “Capability” should be expressed as an actionable activity (eg verb vs noun).

JCA OPR Comment:256 DSCA

FPNCJ3, DSN: 692-1598

39 1751 22 U Substantive: Add the following definition under Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

Recommendation: Add the following definition for “Suppress Insurrection:” The ability to complement federal, state or local law enforcement agencies by providing forces in order to put down lawlessness by force or an act or instance of insurgency, rebellion or revolt against civil authorities of an established government which opposes the law or impede the course of justice under the law within that State.

Rationale: Definition clarifies critical MACDIS aspect.


FPNCJ3DSN: 692-1598

39 1751 22 U Substantive: Add the following definition under Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

Recommendation: Add the following definition for “CBRNE Consequence Management:” Those actions taken to respond to the consequences and effects of WMD use against our homeland, forces and US interests abroad, and to assist friends and allies to restore essential services.

Rationale: Definition clarifies Civil Support function.


FPJ8, FAAD

DSN: 222-3893

22 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Reconstruct the hierarchy.

Rationale: The first tier 2 is support to an operation, the second tier 2 is support to organizations (that may be conducting the operations referenced in the first box), the third tier 2 is a subset of the organizations referenced in the second tier 2 box.


FPMarine Combat Development

22 Substantive:

Recommendation: Change “Military Assistance of for Civil Disturbances”

Command

DSN: 278-6247

Rationale: • http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/co

rres/html/302512.htm

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/acronym/m/03055.html


FPCENTCOMJ5-CCDR LowmanDSN: 651-5191

22 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Under Tier 2 JCA Military Assistance to Civil Authorities add Tier 2 white block JCA “Consequence Management”

Rationale: As stated in lexicon, CM may be a component of MACA.


FPN-NC/IC; :DSN: 692-0846

39 1768 22 U Substantive - Recommendation: Modify Bullet to read – “…to support the Principal Federal Official (PFO) of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) Primary Agency (PA) on an…”

Rationale: The National Response Plan (of which the DOD is a signatory) no longer uses the Term (Noun) Lead Federal Agency (LFA), but instead uses the term Primary Agency (PA); and, since this Tier 1 JCA is specifically addressing DSCA and the Tier 2 JCA of MACA, then we should align our terminology with the NRP.

JCA OPR Comment:262 DSCA NCJ3, Lt 39 1752 22 U Substantive: The term MACDIS is in



http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/302512.htm

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/302512.htm

FP DSN: 692-1598

coordination for change.

Recommendation: DODD 3025 is currently under review and appears very likely the term MACDIS will be replaced. Change all references of MACDIS to Defense Support of Civil Authorities for Civil Disturbance Operations.

Rationale: Terminology continuity.


FPOPNAV

N81

(703) 614-0163

614-0170

39-40 1774-1783

22 U Substantive: Change to a Tier 2b JCA.

Recommendation: Make this a Tier 2b JCA under “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities” and “MACDIS.”

Rationale: Subset of stated Tier 2 Capabilities.


FPOPNAV N813 (703)

614-0170

40 1785-1791

22 U Substantive: Specify this is pre-crisis.

Recommendation: Change DSCA Tier 2 “Emergency Preparedness” to “Pre-Crisis Emergency Preparedness.”

Rationale: More clarity.


FPUSNORTHCOM J581

39-40 1774-1783

22 U Administrative: Definition for Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA) contains two definitions

DSN: 554-3292

that say the same thing.

Recommendation: Change definition to match the definition contained in the DOD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (page 16). “A mission set of Civil Support that includes support to civilian law enforcement agencies. This includes, but is not limited to: combating terrorism, counter-drug operations, border patrol augmentation, and critical infrastructure protection.”

Rationale: Correctness and clarity. As written, the definition for MSCLEA contains two thoughts that are nearly identical. Using the DOD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept definition is correct and provides clarity.


FPHQUSAFAF/XOS-F

DSN: 224-5696

39 1757 U Administrative

Recommendation: “…forces and equipment to support the several states, the District of Columbia….”

Rationale: Extraneous word.

JCA OPR Comment:267 JHD

FPMarine Combat Development

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Deconflict why the T2s for HLD are also the domain T1s. We get

Command

DSN: 278-6247

into a feedback loop inn which capabilities are described in terms of them selves.

Rationale:


FPMarine Combat Development Command

DSN: 278-6247

21 U Substantive:

Recommendation:

Explicitly link “Forward Homeland Defense” into the JHD construct.

Rationale: The Strategic Deterrence JOC envisions OCONUS preemptive military operations. See the quote from the JOC below. The current Tier 2 JCAs do not appear to address this requirement.


FPCENTCOMJ5-C

DSN: 651-5191

21 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Under Tier 1 JCA Joint HLD add Tier 2 white block JCAs “Counterproliferation” and “Consequence Management”

Rationale: Need to include Counterproliferation to interdict WMDs being smuggled into or developed within the US by adversaries. Consequence Management to be prepared to assist civil authorities in responding to CBRNE events within the US.


FPUSSTRATCOM/J841

DSN: 272-8303

21(Joint

Homeland Defense)

U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add the following "white" boxes under the "Joint Homeland Defense" yellow box Space Force Application Space Control

Rationale: This addition indicates how Joint Space Operations supports the Joint Homeland Defense JCA. It is put at this level to indicate the key support it provides to all the identified blue boxes.


FPN-NC J8, , DSN 692-2312

38 1727 21 U Substantive: Joint Homeland Defense JCA – Air and Space Defense

The definition for Air and Space Defense does not make this JCA standout from other JCAs. The current definition only makes it a mission and not a capability that a roadmap with specific programs of record would be procured to support. Capabilities provided by Joint Air Operations and Joint Space Operations (as well as all other JCAs) are currently similar to this JCA. Those JCAs are MCO focused on theater operations which are generally time limited. Homeland defense is 24/7/365, global, and is the 1 in the 1-4-2-1 construct yet the current definition does not provide indicate any

attributes that set the JHLD Tier II area apart from those under Joint Air Control Ops.

Recommendation: Determine a definition for Air & Space Defense that brings in the attributes of the National Defense Strategy, Strategy for HLD and CS as well as the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept.

For example – The ability to conduct an active, forward, and layered air and space (military planning, posture, operations) defense of our nation, interests, and partners against an array of traditional, disruptive, irregular, and catastrophic adversary capabilities in a permissive, high- traffic environment with security responsibilities shared between USG agencies, private sector and multinational partners. This ability includes the physical defense of the U.S. through the use of military missions at home to defend the U.S., its population, and its critical infrastructure from external attack. [HLS JOC, National Defense Strategy]

Rationale: Defense of the Homeland is active (24/7/365), forward, and at home.


FPN-NC J8, , DSN 692-2312

39 1730 21 U Substantive: Joint Homeland Defense – Land Defense

The definition for Land Defense does not make this JCA standout from other JCAs; e.g., What makes this capability different from Joint Land Control Ops? The current definition is a mission, not a capability that a roadmap with specific programs of record would be procured to support. Capabilities provided by Joint Land Operations (as well as all other JCAs) are currently similar to this JCA. Those JCAs are MCO focused on theater operations which are generally time limited. Homeland defense is 24/7/365, global, and is the 1 in the 1-4-2-1 construct yet the current definition does not provide this emphasis.

Recommendation: Determine a definition for Land Defense that brings in the attributes of the National Defense Strategy as well as the Strategy for HLD and CS and the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept.

For example – The ability to conduct an active, forward, and layered land (military planning, posture, operations) defense of our nation, interests, and partners against an array of traditional, disruptive, irregular, and catastrophic adversary capabilities. This ability includes the physical defense of the U.S. through the use of military missions at home to defend the U.S., its population, and its critical infrastructure from external attack. [HLS JOC, National Defense Strategy]



FPN-NC J8, , DSN 692-2312

39 1733 21 U Substantive: Joint Homeland Defense – Maritime Defense

The definition for Maritime Defense does not make this JCA standout from other JCAs. The current definition is a mission and not a capability that a roadmap with specific programs of record would be procured to support. Capabilities provided by Joint Maritime/Littoral Operations (as well as all other JCAs) are currently similar to this JCA. Those JCAs are MCO focused on theater operations which are generally time limited. Homeland defense is 24/7/365, global, and is the 1 in the 1-4-2-1 construct yet the current definition does not provide this emphasis.

Recommendation: Determine a definition for Maritime Defense that brings in the attributes of the National Defense Strategy as well as the Strategy for HLD and CS and the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept.

For example – The ability to conduct an active, forward, and layered maritime (military planning, posture, operations) defense of our nation, interests, and partners against an array of traditional,

disruptive, irregular, and catastrophic adversary capabilities in a permissive, high- traffic environment with security responsibilities shared between USG agencies, private sector and multinational partners. This ability includes the physical defense of the U.S. through the use of military missions at home to defend the U.S., its population, and its critical infrastructure from external attack. [HLS JOC, National Defense Strategy]



FPUSNORTHCOM J581554-3292

39 1740 21 U Substantive: Cyber Defense is not mentioned as part of the supporting Tier 2 Lexicon for Joint Homeland Defense.

Recommendation: Add Cyber Defense paragraph as supporting Tier 2 Lexicon and use the definition from the DOD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (February 2004).“Cyber Defense – All defensive Information Operations (particularly computer network defense [CND]) taken to detect, deter, prevent, defeat, or nullify hostile cyber threats against DOD assets and the Defense Industrial Base. [HLS JOC]”

Rationale: Correctness. Cyber Defense is a HLD mission set as outlined in the DOD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept

(February 2004).


FPUSNORTHCOM J581

DSN: 554-3292

21 U Substantive: Cyber Defense is not included as a supporting Tier 2 Joint Capability Area.

Recommendation: - Add Cyber Defense as a Tier 2 JCA Supported by the Tier 1 JCA, Homeland Defense (blue box).- Move Computer Network Defense under Cyber Defense as a Tier 2 JCA supported by another Tier 1 JCA, Joint Information Operations (white box).

Rationale: Correctness. Cyber Defense is a HLD mission set as outlined in the DOD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (February 2004). Computer Network is a subset of Cyber Defense.


FPOSD(AT&L)DS/JFA

DSN: 227-2312

21 U Substantive: Role of Missile Defense in JHLD

Recommendation: Add Integrated Air & Missile Defense (white box) under Air & Space Defense

Rationale: Appropriate subset of Air & Space Defense of Homeland

JCA OPR Comment:277 JL Marine 9 U Substantive:

FL Combat Development Command

DSN: 278-6247

Recommendation: Delete: “Joint Theater Logistics” and replace with “Joint Theater Logistics Management.”

Rationale: The change will maintain consistency with the Focused Logistics JFC and will avoid any confusion with the Tier 1 JCA.

JCA OPR Comment:278 JL

FLUSMC JCDE Office, Suffolk. DSN: 668-354

20 N/A 873 U Substantive:

Recommendation: Within the “Force Health Protection” Tier II definition, add “dental services” to line 873 after “patient movement.”

Rationale: Clarification. JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations, includes dental services under HSS.


FLN/NCJ43

DSN: 843-3675

20 889 - 891

N/A U Substantive Cmt.

Recommendation: Change sentence to read “It provides the means for collaborative logistics planning and synchronization of critical logistic capabilities to operational requirements ensuring …”

Rationale: Logistics planning and execution (synchronization) of operational

requirements and logistics capabilities are accomplished in a collaborative environment involving Joint Staff, COCOM and component level planners and information systems (JOPES, LCOP, service component systems, etc.). Thus further defining the term “Logistics Information Fusion”.


FLUSJFCOMJ9/JDPO

DSN668-3119

9Joint

Logistics

U Substantive: Force Projection (JGD) should be supporting Joint Logistics.

Recommendation: Put Force Projection (JGD) as a supporting JCA to Joint Logistics.

Rationale: The Joint Logistics definition is: “The ability to provide effective, responsive, and efficient movement and sustainment capacity; exercise control from end to end; and provide certainty to the supported Joint force commander that forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and on time in all domains. (Derived from the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, December 2003).” By it’s very nature, Force Projection is a collaborative capability with respect to Joint Logistics.

JCA OPR Comment:281 ALL Command

DirectoratALL ALL ALL U Critical: Little to no consideration of

coalition planning and international

eName: AT&L International CooperationDSN: 227-1130

cooperation in the definition or role of the JCAs

Recommendation: There should be a Tier 2 capability following each of the Tier 1 JCAs that should support this national objective. This is especially important in the domain JCAs as well as those relating to C2 and Network integration.

Rationale: (From the National Defense Strategy, Strategic Objectives)Strengthen alliances and partnerships. We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us. We will help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.

USD(AT&L) has stated in various conferences and meetings that he recognizes the need to prepare our warfighter to interact in a coalition, as our future missions and operations will be conducted through coalitions.

To date, working with our international partners has been extremely difficult as we have yet to include a coalition mandate within the DoD. A DoD coalition requirement would drive international cooperative R&D earlier in the acquisition process, allowing better measurements and budgeting of programs in the PPBE process and beneficial cost savings for the DoD over

the life of the systems.

JCA OPR Comment:282 ALL OPNAV

N812

(703) 695-8748

(703) 695-8748

1-3, 9-16

8-128, 391-723

2, 3, 6 U Critical: Several Tier 2 JCAs do not meet the SECDEF/Tank-approved (or JCAMP) criteria. Many of these Tier 2 JCAs are more operational art labels than capability areas - i.e. (from JC2): “Assess Compliance with Commander’s Intent”, “Manage Risk”, etc.

Recommendation: 1 - Review all JCAs to ensure they meet SECDEF/Tank-approved Tier 1 & 2 critieria/definitions. Revise Jt C2, JFG, & JFM structures with an eye towards identifying JCAs that can be delegated, executed, analyzed, or specifically supported by DoD systems & programs. 2 - JICs should follow JCAs, not vice versa. 3 – Consolidate all the operational art and leadership elements currently in C2 into 2-3 white Jt C2 Tier 2 boxes, which would appear as blue Tier 2 boxes in JFG.

Rationale: Navy attempts to utilize JCAs for analytical and planning purposes have had to exclude JFG, JFM, and parts of JC2 because, as currently structured, they do not lend themselves to execution, delegation, analysis, or programming. Jt C2 should contain capability bins that can be owned or delegated by a CJTF or Component Cmdr. The operational art and leadership functions can largely be

supported by training programs within JFG & the JT FCB.

JCA OPR Comment:283 ALL USSTRAT

COMJ824

DSN: 271-1585

GEN U Substantive:

Recommendation: Add references to source of lexicon entries. After reviewing the whole document, many lexicon entries are missing definition / derivation references.


JCA OPR Comment:284 J7 OSD(AT&

L)DS/JFA

DSN: 227-2312

1 8- U Substantive: Concise description Capability Based Planning (CBP)

Recommendation: Add paragraph on key aspects of CPB before defining JCAs

Rationale: JCAs are enablers for CBP. Understanding CBP prerequisite for understanding application of JCAs

JCA OPR Comment:285 J7 US Army,

G8-FDA 703-602-

3244

n/a n/a Thru-out U Substantive

Rationale: Slide Presentation is confusing in terms of the Tier 2 JCAs; no written explanation is given on the “Supported by

this…” or “Supported by another

Recommendation: Clarifying explanation of the different types of Tier 2 JCAs which were shown in the Slide presentation (titled Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 & Tier 2 Taxonomy) as “Tier 2 JCA Supported by this Tier 1 JCA” and “Tier 2 JCA Supported by another Tier 1 JCA”.

JCA OPR Comment:

286 J7 OUSD(AT&L)DS/SE/DT&ECOMM: (703) 697-5806DSN: 227

NA NA ALL U Administrative: JCAMP paragraph 6 b, in part states: “…Tier 2 is blue when supporting own JCA, white when supporting another JCA;” Whereas, the legend on each chart states for blue: “Tier 2 JCA Supported by this Tier 1 JCA” Is this the correct relationship? JCAMP entry seems that the relationship is higher to lower, not lower to higher.

Recommendation: Clarify the tier-to-tier functional relationships.

Rationale: Consistency in describing JCA tier relationships

JCA OPR Comment:287 J7 USSTRAT

COMJ822

DSN:

1 6 Administrative:

Recommendation: Add a Table of Contents to the Lexicon document (list each Tier 1 and its corresponding page number).

271-6239Rationale: Will greatly improve the ease of finding Tier 1 and Tier 2 definitions for a specific Tier 1.

JCA OPR Comment:

Business

Consolidated Comment Resolution Matrix.doc