Don't Get Hacked! Cybersecurity Boot Camp

C Don’t Get Hacked! Cybersecurity Boot Camp

Patrick C Miller, EnergySec / NESCO Bill Hunteman, US DOE

Miles Keogh, NARUC February 13 2011

NARUC Winter Committee Meetings Marriott Renaissance, Washington DC

C Our Drill Instructors!

l Miles Keogh §  Director of Grants and Research, NARUC

l Patrick C Miller §  Founder, President and CEO, EnergySec §  Principal Investigator, National Electric Sector Cybersecurity

Organization (NESCO) §  Former Director, NERC CIP Practice, ICF International §  Former Manager, WECC CIP Audits & Investigations §  Corporate Security staff for several Pacific Northwest utilities §  Deep roots in Telecom sector, IT and Industrial Control Systems §  CRISC, CISA, CISSP-ISSAP, SSCP, CEH, CVI, NSA-IAM

C Our Drill Instructors!

l Bill Hunteman §  Chief Advisor for Cybersecurity, US Department of Energy §  DOE Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and Associate CIO

for Cyber Security §  Cybersecurity Program Manager for the DOE National Nuclear

Security Administration §  Worked in the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories §  Managed cybersecurity research and development activities §  Participated in the development of national and international cyber

security criteria §  Joint projects with Russia to improve cyber security in the Russian

nuclear weapons complex §  Design and development of high performance computer networks

and operating systems for many of the supercomputers used by DOE (and its predecessors)

§  Bachelor or Science in Mathematics and Master of Science Electrical Engineering/Computer Science

C What We’re Covering Today

l What’s the “Cyber” in “Cyber security?”

l What are we trying to protect?

l What threats do we face?

l What are the challenges of instituting cyber security?

l Where do the vulnerabilities within the system exist?

l What can Commissions do about it? l What are the policy structures you have

to work with?

C What Have You Seen?

l How well do you understand the confluence of networked and traditional devices?

l Has cybersecurity come before your commission?

l What has that looked like? l What questions do you have about

cybersecurity? l Is cybersecurity a concern at your

commission?

5 The Na'onal Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza'on (NESCO) is a DOE-‐funded EnergySec Program

Rising Cybersecurity Threats

CyberWar (InfoWar)

Aurora

Night Dragon

•  Recently published by McAfee

•  Activity designed to obtain sensitive data from targeted organizations in global oil and energy industries…

Night Dragon

•  Source appears to be China, but this is difficult to confirm exactly

•  Began Nov 2009, possibly as early as 2007

•  Techniques: –  Social engineering

–  Spear-phishing attacks

–  Exploitation of Microsoft Windows vulnerabilities

–  Microsoft Active Directory compromises

–  Remote administration tools (RATs)

Night Dragon

•  Harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations, and project-financing information for oil and gas field bids and operations

•  Controlled systems, then cracked accounts to move to more sensitive information/systems

•  Focus was on operational oil and gas field production systems and financial documents related to field exploration and bidding

•  In certain cases, the attackers collected data from SCADA systems

Stuxnet

•  First publicly disclosed control systems rootkit, but certainly wont be the last...

•  USB vector; focused on “air-gapped” networks

•  Highly sophisticated; infects everything, then rewrites PLC logic and hides

•  Undermines integrity of control system

•  Most regulations wouldn’t have stopped it

•  No 100% security against determined

adversary

SHODAN, ERIPP, ETC

Berkeley Cyclotron HMI images

There’s An App For That

•  “Get mobile access to your control system via an iPhone, iPad, Android and other smartphones and tablet devices. The Ignition Mobile Module gives you instant access to any HMI / SCADA project created with the Ignition Vision Module.”

Public Domain

Only The Disclosed

TwitBookBlogosphere

Research and Disclosure

•  October 24, 2010, 12:39PM, Threat Post –  SCADA Vendors Still Need Security Wake Up Call

•  http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/scada-vendors-still-need-security-wake-call-102410

–  “Please don’t waste my time”

•  October 28, 2010: ICSJWG Seattle Meeting –  Invensys, IOActive, ICS-CERT presented on case study on

Wonderware vulnerability

•  Disclosure positions are hotly debated

From Obscurity To Novelty

•  Smart Meter hacking

•  Hacking cookbooks

•  Metasploit

•  Fuzzers

•  Supply chain attacks

•  Manuals available in all languages on Internet

Shiny Object

•  Shiny object for the mass media

•  60 minutes

•  Wall Street Journal, National Journal, CNN

•  Too many IT trade publications to name

•  Blockbuster films

•  Prime time television shows

•  Social Media (blogosphere, Twitter)

Economic Drivers

•  Recession economy brings unique challenges

•  Decreased participation working groups and conferences

•  Static or shrinking headcount; increased workload

•  Insider threat increases

•  Decreased spending on new equipment

•  Older products extended beyond intended lifespan

•  Security is expensive for customers and vendors

People Problem

•  Humans are the weakest link in any security system –  Passwords for candy; Social engineering

•  Humans are also the strongest link in any security system –  The Aware Person System (APS)

–  ICS culture shift is very slow, but can be very powerful

•  Danger: unskilled/untrained operators of power tools can cause significant damage –  Increasing complexity = training treadmill

People Solution

•  So you’ve bought all of the fancy cybersecurity gizmos… –  What about the skilled staff to use

•  So you’ve put cameras in all critical sites… –  What about the staff to monitor and

respond?

•  An appropriate balance of skilled people and current technology must be used

Back In The Good Old Days

•  Pneumatic, electromechanical, analog

•  Telephone meant POTS or “bat phone”

•  No Internet

•  Less automation

•  Less complexity

•  Proprietary

•  Long life span

ICS Gen-X

•  Automation, more complexity

•  Internet Protocol (TCP/UDP/etc)

•  Data, more data and even more data

•  Processing power, memory, bandwidth = SPEED!

•  Interconnected business

•  Flat networks

•  COTS software and hardware

•  Increasingly shorter lifespans

Millennium Systems

•  Highly digital, highly complex

•  Highly interconnected, highly layered

•  Bitflocking, dynamic emergent behavior

•  New protocols

•  New interdependencies

•  Homogenization

•  Innovation treadmill; constant lifespan flux

Bigger, Better, Faster

•  ARRA and other “green” dollars are flowing

•  SCADA devices now come with a flash-webserver-WiMax-mesh-ZigBee-kitchensink

•  Mixing legacy and bleeding edge tech is difficult

•  Logical distance between kinetic endpoint and HMI is exponentially increasing; “hyperembeddedness”

•  Most (but not all) vendors put features first, security last; this will not change in the foreseeable future

Advantage: Attackers

•  Security approaches favor new installations, legacy environments are still vulnerable

•  Very difficult to replace/patch in-service devices

•  Stuxnet: game changer, sets the new bar - even when sophisticated attacks aren’t necessary

•  Organized crime will top Nation States and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) as biggest threat

•  Welcome to the cyberarms race

Cybersecurity Vocabulary

•  Network

•  Connectivity

•  Packet

•  Header

•  Traffic

•  Bandwidth

•  Latency

•  Internet Protocol

•  Virus/Trojan/Malware

•  Firmware

•  Denial of Service

•  NIST

•  NERC CIP

•  SCADA

•  Encryption

•  Credential

Information Technology 101

•  Connectivity: how the systems talk to each other –  Hub –  Switch –  Managed Switch –  Router –  Firewall –  Next Generation Firewall –  Workstation/Server

•  What are we building for?

Device Intelligence

“dumb”

“smart”

Three Flavors

Business Systems Control Systems “Smart Grid”

Business IT Security

•  Typical approach: password, firewall, anti-virus, etc •  Protecting four key domains

1. Confidentiality – preventing unauthorized access to information

2. Integrity – preventing the unauthorized modification or theft of information

3. Availability – preventing the denial of service and ensuring authorized access to information

4. Non-Repudiation – preventing the denial of an action that took place or the claim of an action that did not take place

What Is A Control System?

Remote Comms Master Meters Sensors Field Devices

PLC IED RTU Controller

Protocols Wired Wireless

SCADA Server HMI EMS DCS

Control Valve

O.L. STOP START

Basic Motor Control Ladder Logic

Human Machine Interface

Programmable Logic Controllers

IT vs ICS Security

TOPIC Informa5on Technology Industrial Control Systems

AnA-‐Virus/Mobile Code Common, widely used Uncommon, impossible

Typical Lifespan 3-‐5 years 15-‐20 years

Outsourcing Common, widely used Rare, uncommon

Patch Management Regular, scheduled Slow, vendor-‐specific

Change Management Regular, scheduled Uncommon

Time CriAcal Content Generally delays accepted CriAcal due to safety

Availability Generally delays accepted 24 x 7 x 365 x forever

Security Awareness Good Poor, except physical

Security TesAng/Audit Scheduled, mandated Occasional, uncommon

Physical Security Secure Remote and unmanned

Typical Architecture

Corporate Network

Internet SCADA and other field devices

Process Control Network

Firewall

Smart Grid Complications

What Have You Seen?

•  Did cyber security appear in your filings and hearings?

•  How did this fit in your list of priorities?

•  What elements were most important? –  Privacy?

–  Reliability?

–  Cost?

–  Security Effectiveness?

–  Upgradeability as a solution or vulnerability?

Threat Sources

•  Inadvertent errors

•  Power system equipment malfunctions

•  Communication equipment failure

•  Deliberate malicious acts

Threat Types

•  Replay attacks

•  Indiscretions (leaks) by personnel

•  Brute force

•  Bypass controls

•  Man-in-the-Middle

•  Denial of Service

•  Resource Exhaustion

Nothing New Under The Sun

•  Mature security practices; highly refined –  Defense in Depth

–  Principle of Least Privilege

–  Segregation of Duties

–  Need to Know

–  Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

•  No Silver Bullet, 100%, Total Security

•  Strong protection has never been easy, inexpensive or quick to implement

•  Tradeoff between functionality and security

Strategies for Defense In Depth

•  Governance, policy

•  Authentication

•  Authorization

•  Admission control

•  Encryption

•  Integrity checking

•  Auditing, detection

Defense In Depth: Example

•  NERC CIP Standards

– CIP-002 – Critical Cyber Asset Identification

– CIP-003 – Security Management Controls

– CIP-004 – Personnel & Training

– CIP-005 – Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

– CIP-006 – Physical Security

– CIP-007 – Systems Security Management

– CIP-008 – Incident Reporting & Response Planning

– CIP-009 – Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets

Proven Security Solutions

•  Physical Protection

•  Network Controls: Admission, Segmentation

•  Strong ID, Authentication and Authorization

•  Aware Person System (Training and Awareness)

•  Intrusion Detection/Prevention

•  Integrity Assurance

•  Application Whitelisting

•  Response and Recovery

You Don’t Need a Perfect Defense

•  If defensive measures can be beaten, does the system ensure the results of the attack are : –  Unprofitable

–  Limited in its ramifications

–  Hard enough to make the “juice” not worth the “squeeze”

–  Difficult to replicate

–  Quickly and easily recoverable

–  Traceable and easy to detect; and

–  Otherwise unappealing

C Why Your Role Is Increasing

l  Increased attacks to business processes l  NERC CIP compliance l  The deployment of smart grid

l  These are increasingly drivers for cost recovery consideration and other contexts in cases that are coming your way very soon

l  Is that reflected in what you’re seeing / hearing?

C Proposal: Roles for

Public Utility Commissions 1.  Ask the right questions when considering cost

recovery of prudent utility expenditures for cyber security.

2.  Assuring that cyber security requirements that utilities are subject to are being met.

§  PUC Staff need to be up-to-date on cyber security requirements and potential threats.

3.  Assuring that the PUC’s computer systems and operations are subject to on-going cyber security reviews and remediation, and that disaster recovery plans are in place and tested.

§  This also included cyber security awareness for agency employees.

4.  Understand and participate in regional and national efforts for protecting critical infrastructure

C l Worth saying twice: someone at the PUC staff needs to be up-to-date on cyber security requirements and potential threats.

l Ask how security is addressed (conceptually) for each component l Don’t accept assurances that all products used were built to be secure, or that IT solutions will work for SCADA systems. Insist that vendors document & independently verify their security controls

l Use “compliance” as a floor, not a ceiling: Ask to see risk assessment documentation

l Ensure security is budgeted for and individuals are assigned responsibility

l Ensure service providers (for example, telcos, meter data processors) are included in risk assessment and provide sufficient information

l Ensure integrated security between business systems and control systems for existing grid and for smart grid

Cybersecurity Investments: What To Ask

C Three examples of State action

l Pennsylvania l Missouri l New York

l PUCs don’t need to become cyber experts or enforces, but if you ask a utility a question they will return with an answer

Cybersecurity Requirements and Resources

•  For the Bulk Power System: –  The North American Electric Reliability Corporation --

Standards CIP-002 through CIP-009 (the Critical Cyber Asset Identification portion of the Critical Infrastructure Protection standards)

–  http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=2|20

•  For the Smart Grid: –  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

smart grid interoperability standards and specifications for inclusion in the Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Framework, Release 1.0. These include three volumes on cyber security

–  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html#NIST-IR-7628

•  What’s Missing? –  Distribution systems, serial control systems, and other gaps

Smart Grid Investment Grant Program

•  Requires a description of how cyber security concerns will be addressed with respect to the use of best available equipment and the application of procedures and practices involving system design, testing, deployment, operations and decommissioning, including at a minimum: i.  A description of the cyber security risks at each stage of the system

deployment lifecycle, ii.  Cyber security criteria used for vendor and device selection, iii.  Cyber security control strategies, iv.  Descriptions of residual cyber security risks, v.  Relevant cyber security standards and best practices, and vi.  Descriptions of how the project will support/adopt/implement

emerging smart grid security standards

Source: Notice of Intent to Issue a Funding Opportunity Announcement For the Smart Grid Investment Grant Program, April 16, 2009

Is Smart Grid More Vulnerable?

Source: “San Diego Smart Grid Study”, October 2006

Power outages cost between $80 billion and $150 billion every year

Energy Independence and Security Act o  In the Energy Independence and Security Act

(EISA) of 2007, Congress established the development of a Smart Grid as a national policy goal.

o  Under EISA, NIST is directed to “coordinate the development of a framework that includes protocols and model standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems” as well as maintain the reliability and security of the electricity infrastructure.

Conceptual Reference Diagram for Smart Grid Information Networks

Interoperability Framework

Testing and Certification

Standards

Security Architecture and Requirements

Conceptual Reference Model

Business and Public Policy Requirements

NIST Three Phase Plan

PHASE 1 Identify an initial set of

existing consensus standards and develop a roadmap to fill gaps

PHASE 2 Establish public/private

Standards Panel to provide ongoing recommendations for

new/revised standards

PHASE 3 Testing and Certification Framework

2009 2010 56

Smart Grid – an Opportunity o  Modernization provides an opportunity to

improve security of the Grid o  Integration of new IT and networking

technologies n  Brings new risks as well as an array of security

standards, processes, and tools o  Architecture is key

n  Security must be designed in – it cannot be added on later

CSWG o  To address the cross-cutting issue of cyber

security, NIST established the Cyber Security Coordination Task Group (CSCTG) in March 2009

o  Moved under the NIST Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) as a standing working group and was renamed the Cyber Security Working Group (SGIP–CSWG)

o  The CSWG now has more than 475 participants from the private sector (including vendors and service providers), academia, regulatory organizations, national research laboratories, and federal agencies

Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security

o  NIST Interagency Report 7628 - Augut 2010 n  Development of the document lead by NIST n  Represents significant coordination among

o Federal agencies o Private sector o Regulators o Academics

n  Document includes material that will be used in selecting and modifying security requirements

NISTIR 7628 – What it IS and IS NOT What it IS o  A tool for organizations that are researching, designing,

developing, and implementing Smart Grid technologies o  May be used as a guideline to evaluate the overall cyber risks to

a Smart Grid system during the design phase and during system implementation and maintenance

o  Guidance for organizations n  Each organization must develop its own cyber security strategy

(including a risk assessment methodology) for the Smart Grid.

What it IS NOT o  It does not prescribe particular solutions o  It is not mandatory

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Smart Grid Cyber Security Strategy - Tasks

NISTIR 7628 Content The NISTIR includes the following

o  Executive Summary

o  Chapter 1 - Overall cyber security strategy for the Smart Grid

o  Chapter 2 – High level and logical security architecture

o  Chapter 3 – High level security requirements

o  Chapter 4 – Cryptography and key management

NISTIR 7628 Content (2)

o  Chapter 5 - Privacy and the Smart Grid

o  Chapter 6 – Vulnerability Classes

o  Chapter 7 – Bottom-up security analysis of the Smart Grid

o  Chapter 8 - R&D themes for cyber security in the Smart Grid

o  Chapter 9 – Overview of the standards review

NISTIR 7628 Content (3) o  Chapter 10 – Key power system use cases for

security requirements

o  Appendices A - J

How to Participate in CSWG

o  NIST Smart Grid portal http://nist.gov/smartgrid

o  Cyber Security Working Group n  Lead: Marianne Swanson

(marianne.swanson@nist.gov) n  NIST Support: Tanya Brewer

(tanya.brewer@nist.gov) o  Cyber Security Twiki site o  http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/

SmartGrid/CyberSecurityCTG

C Security of PUC’s computer

systems

l Assuring that the computer systems that the PUC relies have on-going cyber security reviews and remediation of identified vulnerabilities.

l Disaster recovery plans are in place and tested and Continuity of Operation Plans have been developed.

l Cyber security awareness for agency employees including social engineering and insider threats.

This may be the responsibility of another state agency or office, but the implication of a failure will impact the business operation of the Commission

C Continuity of Operation Plans

(COOP) l  Internal contingency plans of government and

business to assure the rapid resumption of essential functions as soon as possible if they are disrupted for any reason: e.g., fire, tornado, hurricanes, wildfires, earthquakes, terrorism, pandemics, etc. – Build Self-reliance and Resiliency

l  Helps assure that critical/essential functions can quickly resume operations

l  Addresses key or essential employees, required facilities, computer system records and back-up data systems, etc.

l  Minimize damage & losses l  Management succession & emergency powers

C On what cyber systems do you

rely? l  What IT systems

support critical PUC functions?

l  What are the backed up systems?

l  What systems are needed to support restoration?

l  What systems are needed operationally?

l  In what sequence should systems be restored?

l  What are the telecommunication needs and requirements?

Hourly Loss from Downtime in the Information Technology Sector: $1.3 million/hr

C What if this happened?

C Employee Education

http://www.michigan.gov/cybersecurity

Resilience Factors

•  Robustness –  The ability to operate or stay standing in the face of

disaster •  Resourcefulness

–  skillfully managing a disaster once it unfolds •  Rapid Recovery

–  The capacity to get things back to normal as quickly as possible after a disaster

•  Learning lessons –  Having the means to absorb the new lessons that can be

drawn from a catastrophe

Resilience Considerations

•  Resilience depends on humans –  Human networks are key –  Ability to work together and individually –  Potential for panic or confusion –  Build necessary connections (relationships) in advance

•  In the event of an electric power sector cyberattack, do you know: –  Your role? If not, whose role it is to act? –  Who to call? What they can /should do?

Protecting The Right Stuff

•  Very little security actuarial data vs. engineering actuarial data

•  Most organizations don’t communicate details of security breaches

•  Most estimates are based on FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt)

•  Need better/current data on: –  What is being attacked? (most preferred targets)

–  Which attacks were successful?

Product/Service Problem(s)

•  Utilities are married to their products [and vendors] for many years

•  Most products are very expensive to replace or upgrade and challenging to coordinate

•  Product vendors are trying to balance security and profit; guess which one wins…

•  Some vendors are responsive, most are not

•  SCADA Procurement Language can help, but only for new purchases

What Can State Regulators Do?

•  Get educated (even more than today)

•  Strategic communication, in all directions

•  Build new relationships and reshape old

•  Support measures to get actuarial data

•  Support secure procurement measures

•  Support security training/education

•  Support appropriate staffing levels

•  Rethink the rate case approach

What Can State Regulators Do?

•  Ask questions… –  Are you using the SCADA Procurement Language?

–  Are you participating in local, state, regional, national security/disaster exercises?

–  What security training/education/awareness are you providing to your staff and how often?

–  Where do you get your situational awareness data?

–  What cybersecurity technologies do you use?

–  Have you performed a full [exhaustive] inventory of all control systems and all associated communication links?

Education and Training

•  What is happening in Operations, Federal, States?

•  OpSec, Red-Blue, Security Body of Knowledge, security concepts

•  Security practices change rapidly –  Need for training on new tactics and new technology is

perpetual

•  Lack of education leads to a false sense of security –  Otherwise known as knowing just enough to be dangerous

Communication

•  Ratepayers want a secure grid, until they see the bill –  Expect rate shock

–  Rates could triple or more, for some infrastructures

•  “Common Practice” vs. “Best Practice”

•  Early and regular, fact-based communication can minimize negative public reaction

•  Remind ratepayers that smart, informed decisions are being made

Communication

•  Keep the story fresh; lather, rinse, repeat

•  Leverage existing Safety communication vehicles/mechanisms –  Newsletters

–  Mailers, billing notices

–  Public service announcments

–  Sponsored events

•  Partner with utilities, Federal agencies and even Media to convey a unified message

Relationships

•  Get out and talk to your operators

•  Get to know the industry thought leaders

•  What are your peers doing?

•  Situational Awareness –  NESCO, VirtualUSA, Einstein, Fusion centers, Infragard…

•  Take a partnership approach to the rate case (vs. adversarial) as much as possible

Closing Thoughts

•  Cybersecurity is worth taking seriously, but will have to fit into a long list of concerns and priorities

•  There are few response networks for utility sector cybersecurity among State Governments

•  Few of those evaluating cybersecurity investments understand cybersecurity

•  An unskilled operator of any power tool will hurt themselves and those around them –  Training and staffing are imperative

•  A culture shift is the first ingredient for success

•  Soft-skills may matter more than technical skills

C Questions?

Patrick C Miller, President and CEO, EnergySec Principal Investigator, NESCO

patrick@energysec.org 503-446-1212

Miles Keogh, NARUC Director of Grants & Research

mkeogh@naruc.org 202-898-2217

Bill Hunteman, Chief Cyber Security Advisor

US Department of Energy Office of Electricity Deliver & Energy Reliability

William.hunteman@doe.gov

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