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ConclusionInvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Par
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Company Overview
FNMA buys mortgages on the secondary market
1FNMA pools
mortgages into packaged securities
2FNMA sells mortgaged-
backed securities to investors
3
ConclusionInvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Par
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Kim
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Company Overview
FNMA buys mortgages on the secondary market
1FNMA pools
mortgages into packaged securities
2FNMA sells mortgaged-
backed securities to investors
3FNMA is a critical component to the United States’ ability to lead the
world in homeownership rates providing stability, credibility, andliquidity to the mortgage market
ConclusionInvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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Investment Thesis
Shareholders are suing the US Treasury over unlawful seizure of private assets
This seizure of shareholder assets is a violation of the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment
Should the court rule in favor of shareholders, we believe substantial value to be unlocked
FNMA presents an astounding 10-15x in upside potential
ConclusionInvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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FNMA Timeline
Government spends $188bn to bail out FNMA in exchange for senior preferred stock offering a 10% dividend
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) puts FNMA under conservatorship
2008:
Financial Crisis
2012: Government
amends agreement
Current: Ongoing litigation
Future: shareholders
win/lose
FNMA unexpectedly returns to profitability
US Government forgoes previous dividend policy and lays claim to all FNMA profits effectively shutting off equity holders from future earnings
Shareholders file lawsuits against the US Government alleging the Treasury acted illegally when it amended the terms of FNMA’s deal with the government
There are two possible outcomes for FNMA’s shareholders as value is derived from future legislation, not FNMA’s core business
ConclusionInvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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Possible Outcomes for Stakeholders
Shareholders lose
Shareholders win
Share price drops to zero
Share price growth opportunities
upwards of 10-15x market value
Share Price Reaction
Outcome of Litigation
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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Key Issue
Under 2008 SPS Agreement
FNMA Profits
CF to Government(Fixed Amount- 10%)
CF to Private Investors(Residual)
Senior Preferred
Stock
Preferred and Common Stock
Under 2012 Amended Agreement
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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Key Issue
Under 2008 SPS Agreement
FNMA Profits
CF to Government(Fixed Amount- 10%)
CF to Private Investors(Residual)
Senior Preferred
Stock
Preferred and Common Stock
Senior Preferred
Stock
CF to GovernmentAll Profits
Under 2012 Amended Agreement
Key Issue:
Does the US Treasury and FHFA’s seizure of private profits violate
by amending the terms of its stock to eliminate all private shareholders?
the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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Litigation Overview
Perry Capital Treasury & FHFAv.
Arg
um
ent
Sup
po
rt
The Treasury’s 2012 amendment to the SPS agreement is illegal under the Takings Clause of the 5th
Amendment and is an abuse of power as a conservator
As FNMA is a GSE and the FHFA is its appointed conservator, FHFA has unrestricted control over the company to impose any changes to the SPS agreement
Conservative interpretation of HERA governing FHFA
Precedent court case
Expert opinion
Very liberal interpretation of HERA and FDIA
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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HERA and FDIA Language
“The Conservator’s duty is to operate, rehabilitate, reorganize, and restore the health of the troubled institution. When that is achieved, the conservatorship is terminated,
and the institution is returned to the private sector.” – §1145, HERA (2008)
FHFA & Treasury Argument:
Like §11 of the FDIA, §1145 of HERA
says the conservator has a higher power than any and all stakeholders in
the business
This sounds like property rights of
stakeholders are wiped out under
conservatorship; however…
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Par
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HERA and FDIA Language
“The Conservator’s duty is to operate, rehabilitate, reorganize, and restore the health of the troubled institution. When that is achieved, the conservatorship is terminated,
and the institution is returned to the private sector.” – §1145, HERA (2008)
FHFA & Treasury Argument:
Like §11 of the FDIA, §1145 of HERA
says the conservator has a higher power than any and all stakeholders in
the business
This sounds like property rights of
stakeholders are wiped out under
conservatorship; however…
“…stakeholders retain their right to payment or settlement of their claims
on the business…”
“It shall, to the extent of proceeds realized from performance of contracts or sale of
assets of the institution, pay all valid obligations of the regulated entity at the time
that are due and payable at the time.”
Rebuttal:
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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HERA and FDIA Language
“The Conservator’s duty is to operate, rehabilitate, reorganize, and restore the health of the troubled institution. When that is achieved, the conservatorship is terminated,
and the institution is returned to the private sector.” – §1145, HERA (2008)
FHFA & Treasury Argument:
Like §11 of the FDIA, §1145 of HERA
says the conservator has a higher power than any and all stakeholders in
the business
This sounds like property rights of
stakeholders are wiped out under
conservatorship; however…
“…stakeholders retain their right to payment or settlement of their claims
on the business…”
“It shall, to the extent of proceeds realized from performance of contracts or sale of
assets of the institution, pay all valid obligations of the regulated entity at the time
that are due and payable at the time.”
Rebuttal:
HERA and FDIA language supports Perry Capital’s claim that
the Senior Preferred Stock Agreement amendment was not within FHFA’s
power as an appointed conservator.
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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Precedent Case
O’Melveney & Myers v. FDIC (1994)
American Diversified Savings Bank (ADSB) shareholders in conflict with conservator
The FDIC believes its fiduciary duty is to taxpayers, not to ADSB shareholders
Supreme Court rules 9-0 in favor of shareholders
The O’Melveney & Myers v. FDIC case serves as an effective precedent that tells us courts will issue a ruling in favor of FNMA shareholders
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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Expert Opinions
Takings law asserts- as it’s currently construed—if the qualitative value of FNMA being wound down is being used as a
reason for winding it down—you still need to provide just compensation for existing stakeholders.
““Richard Epstein-- Professor in Constitutional Law, NYU
…[language] in the FDIA and the FDIC has shown precedent in following procedures to maximize value for shareholders.
““Randall Guynn-- Partner and Head of Financial Institutions Group, Davis, Polk & Wardwell
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
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Expert Opinions
If there is disclosure regarding future Fannie and Freddie earnings and the administration has a commitment that
existing Fannie and Freddie common equity holders will never receive any future positive earnings…this commitment would
be material to investors and should be disclosed.
“ “
Lewis Lowenfels-- Managing Partner, Tolins & Lowenfels
Takings law asserts- as it’s currently construed—if the qualitative value of FNMA being wound down is being used as a
reason for winding it down—you still need to provide just compensation for existing stakeholders.
““Richard Epstein-- Professor in Constitutional Law, NYU
…[language] in the FDIA and the FDIC has shown precedent in following procedures to maximize value for shareholders.
““Randall Guynn-- Partner and Head of Financial Institutions Group, Davis, Polk & Wardwell
Expert sentiment is overwhelmingly in favor of FNMA shareholders:
Additionally, experts agree that FNMA has a case on both a constitutional
and contractual basis.
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Decision Tree
Favorable
Unfavorable
PT: $40
$0
9.3%
90.9%
Litigation Outcome Payoff Market-Defined Probability
Due to its investor sentiment surrounding FNMA’s past and the
risk appetite of investors leaving FNMA, current prices do not accurately reflect the expected value for the litigation payouts.
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Peer Analysis
P/E P/B
Apartment and Investment Management Trust AIV 21.7x 4.9x
Equity Residential EQR 10.0x 2.0x
UDR Inc UDR 16.3x 2.3x
American Capital Agency Corp AGNC 6.8x 0.9x
Anworth Mortgage Asset Corporation ANH 10.6x 0.9x
Annaly Capital Management NLY 3.0x 0.9x
Capstead Mortgage Corporation CMO 13.8x 1.0x
MFA Financial, Inc. MFA 10.0x 0.9x
Median 10.3x 1.0x
FNMA .65x NA
Relative Valuation
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Relative Valuation
Valuation
2013A EPS (Billions) 84.0
-DTA Valuation Reclamation 50.6
2013A Adj. EPS 33.4
Industry P/E 10.3x
Peer Group Position Adjustment -33%
FNMA P/E Target 6.9x
Expected Market Cap 231.2
FDSO (Treasury Warrants Exercised) 5.8
Expected Share Price $40.12
2.9x $16.81 348%
3.9x $22.61 503%
4.9x $28.41 657%
5.9x $34.20 812%
6.9x $40.00 967%
7.9x $45.80 1121%
8.9x $51.59 1276%
9.9x $57.39 1430%
10.9x $63.19 1585%
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Historical Financial Information
12.0x
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Historical Financial Information
12.0x
Significant downward pressure on valuations
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Historical Financial Information
12.0x
Significant downward pressure on valuations
Valuations remain depressed despite a
major upturn in profitability
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Investment Execution
Portfolio Return:+15%
FNMA
Rest of Portfolio
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Investment Execution
Due to its rare risk-return profile, FNMA’s payoffs can result
in immaterial losses, but its upside potential contributes
significantly to overall portfolio return if sized correctly.
Portfolio Return:+15%Portfolio Return:
-1%
Catalyst
FNMA
Rest of Portfolio
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Catalysts
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC (1994)
1
3
2
4
October 1993- Case Filed
March 1994- Went to Court
July 1994- First Decision
October 1995- Supreme Court Decision
ConclusionInvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Investment Thesis
Shareholders are suing the US Treasury over unlawful seizure of private assets
This seizure of shareholder assets is a violation of the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment
Should the court rule in favor of shareholders, we believe substantial value to be unlocked
FNMA presents an astounding 10-15x in upside potential
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Appendix SlidesGovernment Plans for FNMA- 23Intrinsic Valuation- 24Legislation Current Progress- 25Capital Structure- 26Risks- 27Price Chart- One Year- 28Management- 29Circumstances Surrounding Entering Conservatorship- 30Capital Structure Breakdown over time- 31Shareholder Base- 32Senior Preferred Stock Agreement- 33Historical Interest Income- 34FDSO Calculation- 35DCF Flaws- 36Calculating Discount to P/E- 37Addressing the GSE- Ultimate Power- 38Theodore Olson – Strong Attorney- 39O’Melveny and Myers v. FDIC 1994- 40Existing FNMA Structure- 41Government Suggested Structure- 42Price Chart- Since 2007- 43Why is it Mispriced?- 44Recent News Decision Trees-45Housing Industry in Regards to FNMA- 46Credit Quality- 47Twitter Sentiment Analysis- 48
Litigation- 6Valuation- 12Conclusion- 19
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Government Plans for FNMA
1Only if the government wipes out shareholders through legislation means will it be able to shut down FNMA
2A new system would feature several smaller versions of FNMA in which the government would financially back mortgages—not firms.
The government’s plans for FNMA do not impact FNMA’s value unless the government is able to wipe out
private investors.
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Intrinsic Valuation
Analyst Case
2008A 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Interest and Dividend Income 42877 40813 154616 143449 129677 118740 116615 114877 110305 106996 104856
Interest Expense, Total 34341 28204 141035 133636 110193 92355 93292 91902 88244 85597 83885
Net Interest Income 8536 12609 13581 9813 19484 26385 23323 22975 22061 21399 20971
Net Interest Margin 19.9% 30.9% 8.8% 6.8% 15.0% 22.2% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%
Salaries and Other Empl. Benefits 1032 1133 1277 1236 1195 1218 1633 1551 1434 1391 1258
Cost of Services Provided 947 1074 1320 1134 1172 1327 1866 1723 1544 1391 1258
Other Operating Exp. 0 0 0 0 238 1001 1633 1493 1324 1177 1153
Operating Income 6557 10402 10984 7443 16879 22839 18192 18208 17759 17440 17301
Operating Margin 15.3% 25.5% 7.1% 5.2% 13.0% 19.2% 15.6% 15.9% 16.1% 16.3% 16.5%
Tax Expense 2597 4119 4350 2947 6684 9044 7204 7210 7033 6906 6851
EFCF 3960 6283 6634 4496 10195 13795 10988 10998 10726 10534 10450
Discount Factor 0.87 0.68 0.54 0.42 0.33
PVEFCF 9519 7501 5759 4453 3478
Terminal Value 18,963
Exit Multiple (P/E) 6.0x
Equity Value 49,672
FDSO 5,762
Share Value $8.62
ProjectedHistorical
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Legislation Current Progress
Post-CourtCourt, 1.5 years
D issues rebuttal in November
2013
P files lawsuit against D in July
2013
A federal judge grants P a motion to conduct discovery in February
2014
Lower Court Supreme Court P WINS
D WINSAppeal
State Court
Appeal
Right now, Perry Capital LLC v. Department of Treasury is in pre-court
phase
Pre-Court, 8 months
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Capital Structure
Held by US Treasury, initially issued to provide a bailout during 2008.Initially Issued with a 10% dividend paid quarterly on the liquidation preference, with unpaid dividends accruing to the LP. Amended in 2012 to pay out all of net worth.
A
117.1bn
24.1bn
19.1bn
Senior Preferred Stock-
E-Shares Preferred Equity-
2.25% dividend payment on liquidation preference.Non-cumulative dividend, perpetual maturity.Entitled to full dividend satisfaction before funds can be passed on to common equity holders.
Common Equity-
US Treasury currently holds warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of outstanding common stock that have not yet been exercised. Under the existing senior preferred stock agreement, no new common equity may be issued.
C
B
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Risks
There is no precedent that dictates FHFA cannot abuse its conservator powers to eliminate equity holders
O’Melveney & Myers v. FDICGave a related decision that the
FDIC’s role as a conservator was to maximize firm value
FNMA’s stock price currently reflects concerns over distributable cash flows, not the fundamentals
of the core business
The core business will struggle if the overall housing market
deteriorates- eroding FNMA’s significant upside potential
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Management
Timothy J. Mayopoulos, President and CEOCEO since June 2012, joined FNMA in 2009 serving as General Counsel and EVP
25 Years of legal Experience in BAML, CSFB, DB, and DLJ, DPW
$600K Base and Total Salary
David C. Benson, 54, Executive VP and CFO since April 2013Served in FNMA/FMCC for 12 years in various executive roles
Previously an MD for Merrill Lynch
$574k Base Salary, $1.4M Deferred Salary
Terrence W. Edwards, 58, Executive VP and COO since Sept. 2013Joined FNMA in Sept. 2009 in Credit Portfolio Management
Previously CEO of PHH Corporation, a mortgage and fleet management services company and CEO of Cendant Mortgage Company
$500K Base Salary, $1.2M Deferred Salary
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Circumstances Surrounding Entering
Boards of Fannie and Freddie consented to being put into conservatorship because that would insulate the boards from liability
At the time, the board consented to entering conservatorship on a number of agreements- one of which was that it would remain publicly held so it could emerge from conservatorship as a private company with normal corporate governance structure.
Had the board not consented to entering conservatorship, FHFA did NOT have the statutory authority to force the company in. So turning back on this is highly illegal
FHFA now says they have a responsibility to taxpayers to destroy it– but! HERA and FDIA and Precedent court cases tell us as a conservator, you owe shareholders more than taxpayers
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Shareholder BaseExisting Shareholders
Shares Ownership
Pershing Square Capital Mgmt. 115.6m 9.98%
Fairholme Capital Mgmt. 25.9m 2.24%
Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. 12.5m 1.08%
Seamans Capital Mgmt. 2.2m 0.19%
13D Mgmt. .6m 0.05%
Buying Shareholders
New Shares Ownership
Pershing Square Capital Mgmt. +115.6m 9.98%
Fairholme Capital Mgmt. +25.9m 2.24%
Seamans Capital Mgmt. +2.2m 0.19%
13D Mgmt. +.6m 0.05%
Jet Capital Investors +.4m 0.03%
Selling Shareholders
New Shares Ownership
MetLife Advisers, LLC -.2m 0.01%
Lord, Abbett & Co. -.1m 0.06%
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Senior Preferred Stock Agreement
Issued as an initial commitment fee in consideration of the commitment from the treasury to provide funds.
On a quarterly basis, they can draw funds up to the amount, if any, by which their liabilities exceed total assets.
The stock started at 1.0bn liquidation value, but has had mispaymentsof dividends accrue to a total liquidation value of 117.1bn
Used to be 10% dividend but this has changed to an amount based on net worth (total assets – total liabilities) – capital reserve (2.4bn – 600m each year until zero on Jan 1 2018) <- effectively no CF to other ivnestors, this is whats being lawsuited (2012 amendment to the agreement)
They can pay common stock dividends after the senior pref is paid in full with all liquidation pref and dividends
Funding commitment must be terminated in order to fully buyout the treasury
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Historical Interest Income
Income Statement
For the Fiscal Period Ending
Restated
12 months
Dec-31-2003
12 months
Dec-31-2004
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2005
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2006
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2007
Currency USD USD USD USD USD
Interest and Div. Income, Total 47,833.0 47,456.0 44,756.0 42,936.0 44,713.0
Interest Expense, Total 29,587.0 29,737.0 33,339.0 36,875.0 40,185.0
Net Interest Income 18,246.0 17,719.0 11,417.0 6,061.0 4,528.0
%Margin 38.1% 37.3% 25.5% 14.1% 10.1%
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2008
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2009
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2010
12 months
Dec-31-2011
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2012
12 months
Dec-31-2013
USD USD USD USD USD USD
42,877.0 40,813.0 154,616.0 143,449.0 129,677.0 118,740.0
34,341.0 28,204.0 141,035.0 133,636.0 110,193.0 92,355.0
8,536.0 12,609.0 13,581.0 9,813.0 19,484.0 26,385.0
19.9% 30.9% 8.8% 6.8% 15.0% 22.2%
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
FDSO Calculation
FDSO
Current Shares Outstanding(1) 1,158.1
Treasury Warrant Ownership 79.90%
FDSO 5761.592
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
DCF Flaws
We do not believe there is a material variant perspective when pricing the fundamentals of a $300bn secondary mortgage financing giant
Consequently, we believe analyst estimates serve as our best insight into the value of FNMA under normal capital payout structures
Additionally, applying a single WACC for FNMA is inappropriate, as the risk of FNMA is tied to its capital structure-related cash flow considerations, not the core fundamentals of the business.
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Calculating Discount to P/E
For the Fiscal Period Ending
Restated
12 months
Dec-31-2003
12 months
Dec-31-2004
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2005
Reclassified
12 months
Dec-31-2006
Currency USD USD USD USD
Interest and Div. Income, Total 47,833.0 47,456.0 44,756.0 42,936.0
Interest Expense, Total 29,587.0 29,737.0 33,339.0 36,875.0
Net Interest Income 18,246.0 17,719.0 11,417.0 6,061.0
%Margin 38.1% 37.3% 25.5% 14.1%
Average = 28.8%Average (ex-2006) = 33.7%Median = 31.4%
2013 Margin = 22.2%Avg Margin = 33.7%22.7/33.7 = 33% Discount
“Normalized Profitability Potential”
Assuming capped profitability
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Addressing the GSE-Ultimate Power
Why we think being a GSE doesn’t necessarily give it ultimate power
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Theodore Olson – Strong Attorney Appointed to U.S. Solicitor in 2001, served until 2004 when he retired and went back to private practiceOlson successfully represented presidential candidate George W. Bush in the Supreme Court case Bush v. Gore, which effectively ended the recount of the contested 2000 Presidential election.2006 – landmark case, defended journalists in Supreme Court case to defend their rights to keep sources confidential, even as request of court2011 - awarded the ABA Medal, the highest award of the American Bar Association
Won federal lawsuit for plaintiff in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, which challenged Proposition 8, a California state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage
Named one of Time’s Top 100 Thinkers for his work on this case
“The government’s scheme to wipe out these investors is bad policy and a plain violation of the law that respects private, investment-backed expectations and our constitutional protection of property rights.”
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
O’Melveny and Myers v. FDIC 1994
FDIC tried to show it had power beyond what the FDIA allowed for it in conservatorship, but the supreme court said under the statute, when you become a conservator, you step into the shoes as a stakeholder and have a duty to maximize value for the stakeholders.
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Why is it mispriced?
Overly Negative Investor SentimentFew people want to be involved with a company that was at the headlines of 2008’s housing meltdown
2008 overshadows the litigation thesis
Unique Risk Appetite RequiredFew investors are willing to invest in something where a 100% loss is possible, ignoring the significant upside.
Litigation AnalysisOur precedent case is not a direct reference to the FHFA-HERA case, as it relates to FDIC-FDIA but given how FHFA-HERA are modeled after FDIC-FDIA we believe it is a perfect precedent case nonetheless.
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Recent News Decision Tree
Today
Litigation Outcome
FNMA is able to pay out profits
Post-Litigation Outcome
FNMA continues on with the SPS
dividend = NI
FNMA is wound down according to
Johnston-Crapo
Probability/Payout
80% / $40
10% / $0
10% / $0
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Housing Industry in Regards to FNMA
As rates rise, lenders will loosen rates and more mortgages will be available on the market
“Since 1999, mortgage purchase applications and all measures of sales activity have actually been higher when mortgage rates were higher.” -Forbes
In 2013, 2.5 million underwater homeowners regained positive equity status thanks to an increase in housing value which strengthens FNMA’s existing portfolio
Why? As default risk in FNMA’s portfolio decreases, FNMA’s investments are more likely to reach maturity
Forecasted market trends do not negatively affect FNMA’s business model
“Frankly, we see that our retail execution, selling individual homes to individual buyers, as still our best execution strategy. So, we will still continue to do the vast bulk of our executions in that way.” –FNMA CEO Timothy Mayopoulus (Q4 2013)
InvestmentOverview
Valuation Considerations ConclusionLitigation
Twitter Sentiment Analysis
-100% 0% 100%Negative Neutral Positive
Average sentiment per tweet mentioning litigation
-21%
Simple random sample of top 1400 most influential tweets from March 10th – March 18th
Classified each tweet in two categories: Litigation mentioned, yes or no?Sentiment score: 1 positive, 0 neutral, -1 negative
Calculated the net effect of positive and negative tweets as an average sentiment per tweet
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