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China’s environment and power relations: The case of the Conversion of Cropland to Forest Programme
Lucas Gu(érrez Rodríguez Center for Interna(onal Forestry Research
Contents • Introduc(on • Problem • Theore(cal framework (1) • Power rela(ons (1) • CCFP systema(c review • Theore(cal framework (2) • Power rela(ons (2) • Discussion
Introduction • 1998´s floods across rural China • New Forest Policy - Natural Forest Protec(on Programme (NFPP) - Conversion of Cropland to Forest Programme (CCFP)
• CCFP´s goals - Soil erosion control → flood preven(on - Poverty reduc(on
• Scale - 25 provinces & 32 million households - ~ 25 mill ha (9 mill cropland + 15 mill barren land) - 298 billion CNY = 42.82 billion USD (~ 3 billion USD/year)
Problem • 1998´s flooding (Yangtze River) - antropogenic soil erosion + lake dessica(on-‐silta(on - ENSO + geomorfology
• Soil erosion on slopes - natural forests´ extrac(ve uses (State) - natural forests’ clearing for agriculture (Small-‐holders)
• Proposed solu(on - NFPP (State forests) - CCFP (Small-‐holders)
Theoretical framework (1) • CCFP actors - upstream popula(ons (small-‐holder households) - central government and provincial government (funds) - county government (implementa(on)
• Compensatory approach - voluntary - opportunity cost of conver(ng sloping land - grain + livelihood allowance + tree saplings - grass (2 y), ‘economic’ trees (5 y), ‘ecological’ trees (8 y)
• Rural economic re-‐adjustment - reduced dependence on land (agricultural income) - towards off-‐farm employment via migra(on - rural economic growth
Table 1. Conversion of cropland to forests program subsidy rates
SUBSIDY COMPONENT
SUBSIDY RATES
DURATION
Yangtze River Watershed & South China
or Yellow River Watershed & North China
Ecolo
gical
Fores
ts
Econ
omic
Fores
ts
Grass
es
PILOT PHASE (1999-2001): 412 counties in 20 provinces1
ONE-TIME PAYMENT
Sapling/seedling Fee 750 CNY/ha One-time, upon
enrollment
ANNUAL PAYMENTS2 i) Living Allowance (Cash) 300 CNY/ha Payment length as
yet undermined.
ii) Annual Subsidy (Grain)
2,250 kg/ha (i.e. 3,150 CNY/ha) or 1,500 kg/ha
(i.e. 2,100CNY/ha)
PHASE I - Full-scale implementation (2002-2007): 2,500 counties in 25 provinces3
ONE-TIME PAYMENT Sapling/seedling Fee 750 CNY/ha
One-time, upon enrollment
ANNUAL PAYMENTS i) Living Allowance (Cash)
300 CNY/ha 8
years 5
years 2
years
ii) Annual Subsidy
(Grain or cash equivalent value)
2,250 kg/ha (i.e. 3,150 CNY/ha) or 1,500 kg/ha
(i.e. 2,100 CNY/ha)
PHASE II (2008-2016)
CONTINUED ANNUAL PAYMENTS i) Living Allowance (Cash)
300 CNY/ha + 8 years
+ 5 years
+ 2 years
ii) Annual Subsidy
(Cash only) 1,575CNY/ha or 1050 CNY/ha
Source: State Forestry Administration, 2003; State Council, 2007. Average pilot phase exchange rate was 1 USD = 8.28 CNY; average phase I exchange rate was 1 USD = 8.10 CNY; average phase II exchange rate was 1 USD = 6.52 CNY. 1 The pilot phase lasted three years. It was launched in 1999 in Sichuan, Gansu and Shaanxi province. In 2000, the pilot extended to 188 counties of 17 provinces, and in 2001 it further expanded to some 400 counties of 20 provinces. 2 Subsidy durations were not decided during the pilot phase. Upon full-scale implementation, the length of time subsidies had already been delivered during the pilot phase was counted towards the formal subsidy lengths stipulated. 3Though a formal shift to cash-only subsidies was not stipulated until State Council (2007), State Council (2004) provided standards for converting grain to cash subsidies at the rate of CNY 1.4/kg, since many locales paid subsidies fully in cash by that time.
Power relations (1) • Inter-‐regional - East China Vs West China
• Inter-‐governmental - Central Vs Provincial
• Government – Farmers - Central, Provincial governments Vs Farmers (taxes) - Local governments Vs Farmers (implementa(on & voluntarism)
• Less aeen(on to - Inter-‐household & intra-‐household power rela(ons - Private enterprises -‐ Farmers
CCFP systematic review • Research ins(tu(ons: - CIFOR (Indonesia) - Forestry Economic Development Research Center (China SFA)
• Primary ques(on - What socioeconomic and environmental effects has the Conversion of Cropland to Forest Program had on human popula9ons and land resources during its first 15 years in China?
• Secondary ques(ons - How effec9ve has the CCFP been in achieving its own stated objec9ves of soil erosion control, flood preven9on and poverty reduc9on? - Under which circumstances would/have farmers revert(ed) forestland back to cropland? - Are there any unintended socioeconomic/environmental outcomes?
Theoretical framework (2) • Popula(on - CCFP households and individual members - CCFP enrolled cropland, barren land, economic trees, ecological trees
• Interven(on - CCFP targe(ng / subsidies / skill-‐training / enforcement
• Comparator - In/out, before/aier CCFP, upstream-‐upstream / upstream-‐downstream
• Outcome - Household produc(on/consump(on, land tenure, food security and nutri(on, social equity, autonomy & power rela(ons, migra(on & remieances - Flooding, soil erosion & nutrients, forest cover & volume, biodiversity, biomass, carbon storage, energy sources, land-‐use change
• Social equity / Ecosystem func(ons / Socio-‐ecological feedbacks • Hypothesis1 (socioeconomic outcomes) - the CCFP has reduced poverty and increased rural household income, via planta9on of economic trees, migra9on for off-‐farm employment (remiLances), agricultural produc9vity enhancement and CCFP compensa9on delivery.
• Hypothesis 2 (environmental outcomes) - the CCFP has reduced soil erosion and flood risk at the watershed level, by increasing forest cover and standing volume in vulnerable sloping lands, due to higher tree-‐survival rates and reduced rates of land reconversion to cropland.
• Hypothesis 3 (socio-‐ecological feedback outcomes) - the CCFP has ac9vely promoted a livelihood re-‐adjustment by reducing local dependence on sloping lands, reducing generalized poverty levels and improving land-‐use decisions with the resul9ng increase in forest are and volume, resul9ng in effec9ve erosion control and flood preven9on.
AGGREGATE DECREASED DEPENDENCE ON SLOPING LANDS
Targe(ng
Economic trees Ecological trees
County-‐level CCFP office
Sloping cropland Sloping barren land
Small-‐holders (households)
Mid-‐term Outcome(s)
Skill training & species selec(on
Lost income from sloping land
Immediate Outcome(s)
Provincial government Central government funds
CCFP Ins@tu@onal Regulator(s)
Land-‐use conversion
Net freed-‐up labor ((me availability)
Food-‐security compensated
trees + allowance
Migra(on-‐remieances off-‐farm employment
Economic tree harvests
Intensifica(on on flat cropland
Compensa(on + enforcement
Social equity Mediated by Ecosystem services
AGGREGATE DECREASED DEPENDENCE ON SLOPING LANDS
Broad goal(s) Posi(ve environmental change Posi(ve socioeconomic change
End of Program Outcome(s)
Decreased soil erosion
Poverty reduc@on
Flood control on watershed level
Mid-‐term Outcome(s)
Food-‐security compensated
Migra(on-‐remieances off-‐farm employment
Economic tree harvests
Intensifica(on on flat cropland
GENERALIZED livelihood improvement
GENERALIZED Increase in forest area and volume Long-‐term
Outcome(s)
Social equity Ecosystem services Mediated by
Power relations (2) • Social equity & Ecosystem services - ‘Itself’ (generalized livelihood improvement) - As a means for soil conserva(on (socio-‐ecological feedback) - Factors1: age, gender, educa(on level, income group, ethnicity - Factors2: biodiversity (local Vs exo(c species)
• Farmer – Farmer - Intra-‐household, inter-‐household, inter-‐personal equity
• Farmer – Enterprises – Local government - Land Ins(tu(ons: collec(ve/coopera(ve/private management - Par(cipa(on & autonomy in decision-‐making
Discussion • Compensatory approach - ini(al income losses (farmers and local governments) - upstream landuse re-‐adjustment
• Urban-‐rural tensions - Urbaniza(on/market mechanisms/priva(za(on pressures - Countryside policies/ins(tu(onal mechanisms/collec(ve ins(tu(ons
• Livelihood transforma(on - ageing ‘hollow’ villages and migra(on - expansion of urban lifestyles/aggregate ecological footprints in China
• Lower bargaining power - Blaming the poor for environmental degrada(on - Economic growth & urban livelihoods not ques(oned
• Ecosystem services trade-‐offs (soil erosion Vs air pollu(on)
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