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AMEC experience in nuclear power
related projects
VII International School on Nuclear Power, Warsaw
David BoathVice President / Chief Engineer, AMEC
2
Content
Who is AMEC
AMEC nuclear history and activities
Case study on introducing PWR technology into the UK (Sizewell B)
Current UK position
International harmonisation
Nuclear Safety responsibilities
Challenges for Owners / Licensees
Personal insights
3
AMEC at a Glance
UK listed Market cap c.£3.6 billion
Revenues ~ £4 billion
Employees ~27 000
Working in Around 40 countries
* 2013 full year results
AMEC is one of the world’s
leading engineering,
project management and
consultancy companies
We design, deliver & maintain strategic assets for our customers, offering services which
extend from environmental and front-end engineering design before the start of a project to
decommissioning at the end of an asset’s life
Clean Energy
Nuclear
Renewables/Bioprocess
Power
Transmission & Distribution
Mining Environment & Infrastructure
Water/Municipal
Transportation/Infrastructure
Government Services
Industrial/Commercial
Oil & Gas
Conventional and
unconventional
4
UK Commercial Reactor History
1990
1980
1955
1960
1970
Berkeley Magnox Reactors
NPPC EE/BW/TW APCGEC/SCAEI/JT
LA
TIN
A
BE
RK
ELE
Y
HIN
KLE
Y A
S
IZE
WE
LL A
WY
LFA
BR
AD
WE
LL
TR
AW
SF
YN
YD
D
HU
NT
ER
ST
ON
A
TO
KA
I
MU
RA
Heysham 1 AGR
Dungeness A Magnox ReactorsTNPG
OLD
BU
RY
HE
YS
HA
M 1
DU
NG
EN
ES
S A
HIN
KLE
Y P
OIN
T B
HU
NT
ER
ST
ON
B
HA
RT
LEP
OO
L
DU
NG
EN
ES
S
B
APC
NDC
BNDC
Sizewell B PWR
Torness AGR
Heysham 2 AGR
HE
YS
HA
M 2
TO
RN
ES
S
NNC
SIZEWELL B
Westinghouse JV
AMEC
5
AMEC Nuclear Pedigree
. . . . 3,000 nuclear
professionals . . . .
. . . . a Nuclear New
Build partner for 60
yrs . . . .
1955
1990
1980
1970
1960
2000
2010EDF Partnership
Sizewell BWestinghouse JV
NSS/NCL
Canada
AMEC Czech Republic
NCI South Africa
AMEC Slovakia
Growth in
Clean-Up
NMP Sellafield
AGR Station
Design &
Construction
(all Consortia)
Magnox Station
Design &
Construction
(all UK Consortia)
Sizewell B PWR
Heysham 1 AGR
Dungeness A - Magnox
Sellafield
Bruce CANDU
Tokai 1
. . . . . a strategic role on
every civil NPP ever built in
the UK . . . .
. . . . a growing
international presence
AMEC Romania
Mactec (US)
AES (US)
ESRC (Serco) (UK)
GDA – EPR, AP1000, ABWRHinkley Point C
Ignalina RBMK
AMEC France
6
Research reactors decommissioning
Magnox decommissioning (UK, France, Japan,
Italy)
Legacy clean-up
- Sellafield
- AWE
Vendor -independent support
O&M optimisation
Periodic Safety Reviews
PLEX
CANDU restarts
Safety upgrades, on-site assistance
Technology assessments
- post Sizewell
- Utility
preparedness &
selection
Vendor design support
UK Generic Design Assessments- EPR, AP1000, ABWR
ESBWR, ACR
Owner’s / Architect Engineer
Engineering & Consultancy
Technology assessments
HTR/VHTR
PBMR
Fast Reactors
Fusion / ITER
Nuclear reactor evolution – AMEC activities
7
Sizewell B
8
Introduction of PWR technology
• In 1978, the UK Government announced the intent to order a PWR
station, provided design work was satisfactorily completed and all
necessary Government and other consents and safety clearances were
obtained
• CEGB issued an Enquiry Specification for Sizewell B in April 1980.
• This specified the use of a 4-loop Westinghouse NSSS (Nuclear Steam
Supply System) and two turbines.
• CEGB applied to the Department of Energy for Section 2 consent and
deemed planning permission for Sizewell B in January 1981
• The Pre-construction Safety Report and the reference design for Sizewell
B were published in April 1982
• The project application was subject to a public inquiry under the Town and
Country Planning Act and the Electricity Act (Section 2 consent).
9
Introduction of PWR technology
• The inquiry was held under the 1971 Town and Country Planning Act which
included provision for a special, more wide-ranging inquiry where there were
either considerations of national or regional importance or complex technical
or scientific aspects
• Public Inquiry started in January 1983. It was expected to be a long inquiry
(lasting 9 -12 months). It actually lasted much longer.
• The Inquiry addressed a number of issues the principal ones being:
– The need and economic justification for Sizewell B
– The choice of design
– The safety and environmental impact of the plant
– Local issues
• Inspector reported to the Secretary of State, recommending consent in 1987.
• In parallel the licensing process had proceeded and NII issued an amendment
to the Site Licence in 1987.
• Preliminary site work started with first structural concrete being poured in July
1988.
10
Sizewell design changes
Changes to SNUPPS design:
• additional provisions to reduce operator radiation exposure
• the adoption of two turbines
• coastal rather than inland site
• electrical frequency difference
• desire to use equipment of UK manufacture whenever possible
• include OEF and lessons learned from TMI-2,
• internal and external hazards - four train systems in the Sizewell B design
compared to two trains for the original SNUPPS design
• pressure vessel integrity requirements
• enhanced radiological protection standards
• introduction of secondary containment
• low cobalt materials
• reliability requirements - use of diverse as well as redundant equipment
• etc,etc,etc
11
A Changing world….
Past:
• Investment by state-owned utilities in regulated markets
• Investment by national players
• Well established national suppliers
• ‘Custom-made’ reactors
Present - Future:
• Investment by privately-owned utilities in highly competitive markets
• More complex risk allocation in with more complex contractual models
• Emergence of national/ multinational utilities choosing among a smaller number of international designs
• Standardisation is required to facilitate new build on a global world wide basis with safer plants
11
12
EPR GDA changes
• Changes to the architecture of the Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
systems
• Additional or suitably classified diverse reactor protection system trip
signals
• Improvements to the spent fuel cooling pool
• Changes to essential support systems
• Classification methodology and upgrade of the safety classification of
Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) important to safety
• Automation of certain actions
• Other modifications that provide additional diversity, defence in depth,
or other safety improvements
13
AP1000 GDA changes
•Categorisation of systems as safety or non-safety
• Inclusion of all radioactive materials in the Deterministic Safety
Assessment and PSA
•Design codes and standards, particularly the justification of the
Modular design and Civil structural codes
•Design of the secondary containment against aircraft crash
•Use of Metric SI units in the GDA application / conversion of all US
(imperial units)
•Safety claims on computer control systems
14
•Applicable and internationally recognised set of safety requirements
• IAEA standards underpin safety in all countries
• Higher level in standards hierarchy, not enforceable
• Supplemented by enforceable national regulations
• Need harmonised set of more detailed requirements
International Harmonisation
14
15
The CORDEL Working Group
• Founded in January 2007
• Main aim: promoting international
standardisation
• Membership:
- all major vendors
- utilities interested in new build
- service companies
• Observers from international organisations
(SDOs, IAEA, EPRI, MDEP, WANO, others)
15
16
Phase 3. Issuing international design certification
Phase 2. Validating and accepting design approvals of other countries
Phase 1. Sharing design reviews and assessments
“Internationalisation” of DESIGN APPROVAL process
CORDEL Roadmap
17
IAEA Fundamental Safety Principle 1
“The prime responsibility for
safety must rest with the person
or organisation responsible for
facilities and activities that give
rise to radiation risks.”
3.5 The licensee retains the prime
responsibility for safety throughout
the lifetime of facilities and activities,
and this responsibility cannot be
delegated. Other groups, such as
designers, manufacturers and
constructors, employers,
contractors, and consignors and
carriers, also have legal, professional
or functional responsibilities with
regard to safety.
18
IAEA Fundamental Safety Principle 1
“The prime responsibility for
safety must rest with the person
or organisation responsible for
facilities and activities that give
rise to radiation risks.”
3.6 The licensee is responsible for:
Establishing and maintaining the
necessary competences;
Providing adequate training and
information;
Establishing procedures and
arrangements to maintain safety under all
conditions;
Verifying appropriate design and the
adequate quality of facilities and activities
and of their associated equipment;
Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive
material that is used, produced, stored or
transported;
Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive
waste that is generated.
19
Regulator’s expectations
“The licensee shall retain primary
responsibility for the safety of its
licensed facility, including
responsibility for those activities of
contractors and subcontractors
which might affect safety.”
“The regulatory body should,
through its regulatory activities,
provide assurance that the licensee
meets its responsibilities for the
safety of its facility. This includes
assuring that the licensee provides
the appropriate level of oversight of
all contractors and subcontractors,
commensurate with the safety
significance of the activity.”
20
Regulator’s expectations
“It is essential that the licensee
retains the capability to be:
• The “controlling mind” of those core
activities for which the licence has been
granted. Ceding that control to other
parties would not be consistent with the
principle that the licensee retains primary
responsibility for safety.
• The “design authority” which understands
the basis of the safety case, and the
significance of ensuring that all activities
are designed so as to keep the facility
within the boundaries of the safety case.
• An “intelligent customer” or “smart buyer”
for the goods and services being procured.
21
Design authority
“11. An operating organization must set
up internally a formal process to
maintain the design integrity as soon as
it takes control of the plant. This may be
achieved by setting up a design
capability within the operating
organization, or by having a formal
external relationship with the original
design organizations or their
successors. There must be a formally
designated entity within the operating
company that takes responsibility for
this process. This entity needs to
formally approve all design changes. To
do this, it must have sufficient
knowledge of the design and of the
overall basis for safety. In addition, it
must have access through a formal
process to all the underlying design
knowledge to ensure that the original
intent of the design is maintained.”
22
UK regulatory approach to Design Authority
Design Authority – the defined function
of a licensee’s organisation with the
responsibility for, and the requisite
knowledge to maintain the design
integrity and the overall basis for safety
of its nuclear facilities throughout the full
lifecycle of those facilities. Design
Authority relates to the attributes of an
organisation rather than the capabilities
of individual post holders.
Responsible Designer(s) –
organisations which have a formal
responsibility for maintaining detailed,
specialised knowledge of all the
systems and components important to
safety, and a core capability in the
detailed design process.
23
UK concept of design authority –
intelligent customer
The design authority may assign
responsibility for the design of specific
parts of the plant to other
organisations, known as responsible
designers.
Ref: ONR NS-TAST-GD-079 Rev 2
24
Design knowledge required
The Design Authority should have the following knowledge:
A detailed understanding of why the design is as it is with knowledge of the
underpinning experimental/ research programme
The design inputs such as basic functional requirements, performance
requirements, safety goals and safety principles
The applicable codes, standards and regulatory requirements, design
conditions, loads such as seismic loads, interface requirements etc
The design outputs such as specifications, design limits, operating limits,
safety limits, failure or fitness for service criteria
A detailed knowledge of the design calculations which demonstrate the
adequacy of the design
An understanding of the inspections, analysis, testing, computer code
validation and acceptance criteria used by the plant designer to verify that the
design output meets the design requirements
The assumptions made in all the steps above, including assumptions related
to operating modes or procedures and expected life history
The implications of operating experience on the design
25
Increasing demands on safety documentation
No of safety
related
documents
10,000 -
5,000 -
1,000 -
1960s
Magnox
1970s
AGR
1980s
AGR
PWR
1990s
PWR
2000+
Windscale
TMI
Chernobyl
Fukushima Standardisation
/Harmonisation
26
Some challenges for owners
Future vendor status
Limits on in-house capability (existing nuclear operator):
- loss of expertise, ageing of personnel with key experience
- stretch due to large concurrent programmes; plant life extension/ upgrade
especially with planned new build
- increasing demands from licensing authority; greater volume and complexity
of documents
- potential impact on design authority/ intelligent customer capability
For future licensees with no or very limited experience of nuclear power plant
operation:
- recruitment and capacity building
- safety culture and reliance on NPP designers/ supply chain
- technology challenges
- regulatory regime / international implications
Maintaining and/or increasing competition to reduce risk
- quality, budget and schedule
Access to expert nuclear services with global experience increasingly
important for world leading performance
27
Strategic and Technical support
28
Benefits brought by Independent Engineer
Pool of suitably qualified expertise across nuclear skill-sets, including
niche skills
Independent of NPP designer; verification, peer review, independent
assessment
Innovation due to wider experience; global projects, other sectors
Reference capability and projects check
Greater certainty on cost & schedule outcomes
Resource planning benefits
Allows licensee to focus on building or maintaining design authority /
intelligent customer key roles
29
Insights on the benefits of the right
nuclear consultancy support
Understanding and managing regulatory expectations is the first
essential
Ensure country context is fully incorporated
Understand the intelligent customer relationship early on to plan an
effective organisational trajectory
The design of the Intelligent Customer relationships is key
The supply chain are crucial in developing technical knowledge transfer
The procurement strategy must allow for the access to the relevant IPR
at the right time
The transfer of Design Authority experience takes time
There are never enough SQEPs available to recruit directly
Its important that global and local suppliers are
embedded into the technical support infrastructure to
give lasting legacy in operations
30
Internationalisation and culture
Recommended