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Page 1 of 21
TRUSTS (Rule 98 Parol Evidence Rule 130 Sec 9; Arts.
1440-1457)
1. Concept
SOTTO vs. TEVES
FACTS:
Subject of the plaintiffs'action for declaration of ownership and/or
reconveyance, and for the recovery of possession, rentals, damages
and attorney's fees, are five (5) parcels of land, all located in Cebu
City.
Properties originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses FlorentinoRallos and Maria Fadullon. When
FlorentinoRallos died, the parcels of land in question, together with
the other properties comprising the estate of the deceased,
descendedto his sole heirs, his widow, Maria Fadullon, and two
children, named Concepcion and Carmen Rallos. The lawyer to
whom the Rallos heirs entrusted the settlement of the estate was
Atty. Filemon Sotto.
Shortly after the closure of the probate proceeding in 1913, Atty.
Sotto married Carmen Rallos. Carmen died in 1945 without leaving
any issue. Concepcion died later leaving many children. Maria
Fadullon predeceased her two daughters. Atty. Sotto died intestate
on October 10, 1966.
Competing for the ownership of the five lots are the direct
descendants and blood relatives of FlorentinoRallos and Maria
Fadullon, opposed by the administrator of the intestate estate of
Atty. Sotto. The grandchildren of FlorentinoRallos and Maria
Fadullon, some of whom are assisted by their spouses, are the
plaintiffs in this case. Defendant administrator represents Atty.
Sotto's children out of wedlock. It is claimed by the defendant that
Atty. Sotto was at the time of his death the owner of the five lots in
question.
In life, Atty. Filemon Sotto was a very prestigious man. He wielded
tremendous social and political influence. Successively, he was
municipal councilor, vice-president of Cebu City, Assemblyman,
Senator and Delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1934.
When his life, however, was almost at an end, he was declared
incompetent.
All along, the direct descendants and blood relatives of
FlorentinoRallos had rested on the belief that the properties in
question, which are the fruits of the sweat and toil of their
grandfather, would one day be delivered unto them. The revelation
of Cesar Sotto, however, led the plaintiffs to the discovery that all
the properties in question were now titled in the name of Atty.
Sotto. and were in danger of falling into the hands of his children
out of wedlock, who are total strangers to the spouses Rallos and
Fadullon. Upon such discovery, the plaintiffs initiated the present
lawsuit forthwith."
On June 13, 1967, the herein private respondents(heirs of
Concepcion Rallos)filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
Page 2 of 21
against petitioner Marcelo Sotto, as administrator of the intestate
estate of Filemon Sotto, for the recovery of possession and
ownership of the 5 parcels of land described in the complaint, with
damages.
The complaint was based mainly upon the theory that a trust
relation was established and created with respect to the said
properties, with Atty. Filemon Sotto as trustee and as cestuisque
trust, his mother-in-law, Maria FadullonVda. deRallos; his wife,
Carmen Rallos; and his sister-in-law, Concepcion Rallos (predecessor
in interest of herein private respondents); and that in gross violation
of the trust reposed upon him by Concepcion Rallos and after her
death, by her heirs, the said Atty. Filemon Sotto, through sheer
manipulation, fraudulent acts and means, non-existent and void
decrees, fictitious sales and transfers, succeeded in causing the
transfer of the ownership of the properties to the name of his wife
Carmen Rallos, and finally to his name alone.
It is alleged that Atty. Filemon Sotto, having married Carmen Rallos,
thereby virtually making him a member of the Rallos family, was
looked upon as the head of the Rallos family to look after the
properties inherited from the deceased FlorentinoRallos including
the 5 parcels of land hereinbefore mentioned, thereby establishing
a trust relation with Don Filemon Sotto as trustee of the said
properties for the benefit of his mother-in-law Maria FadullonVda.
deRallos, his wife Carmen Rallos de Sotto and sister-in-law
Concepcion Rallos and the heirs of the latter, as cestuisque trust;
Answering the complaint, petitioner Marcelo Sotto denied that
there was any trust relation between Don Filemon Sotto on one
hand and Maria FadullonVda. deRallos, Carmen Rallos and
Concepcion Rallos on the other; that granting that such relationship
existed between Don Filemon Sotto and Concepcion Rallos, such a
relationship could not have endured until the death of Don Filemon
Sotto;
ISSUE:
Whether or not Don Filemon Sotto became a co-trustee by virtue of
his subsequent marriage to Carmen Rallos.
HELD:
The Court that Atty. Sotto can be regarded as the constructive
trustee of his wife and of the widow and descendants of
FlorentinoRallos
RATIO:
Under the law on Trusts, it is not necessary, as petitioner insists,
that the document expressly state and provide for the express trust,
for no particular words are required for the creation of an express
trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. (Art. 1444,
N.C.C.)
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
Don Filemon Sotto became a co-trustee by virtue of his subsequent
marriage to Carmen Rallos. Petitioner, while admitting that as a
lawyer some form of trust devolved upon the shoulders of Filemon
Sotto
Page 3 of 21
The trust on the shoulder of Filemon Sotto as the family lawyer in
the intestate proceedings of FlorentinoRallos was only coterminous
with the duration of the proceedings itself. The trust on the
shoulder of Filemon Sotto by virtue of his marriage to Carmen Rallos
was only as much as the trust on the shoulders of the two husbands
of Concepcion Rallos, Mariano Teves and Mariano Camara, and this
trust is not the trust defined in our Civil Code on express trust."
By reason of his marriage to Carmen Rallos, and on account of his
prestige and tremendous social and political influence, Atty. Sotto
enjoyed and exercised a personal, domestic, social, political and
moral ascendancy and superiority not only over his wife but also
over Maria Fadullon, Concepcion Rallos, and the latter's children.
The evidence reveals that the Ralloses looked up to Atty. Sotto as
protector and benefactor, as one on whom they could repose their
trust and confidence and who would take care of the properties
inherited from FlorentinoRallos, and on his part, Atty. Sotto
acknowledged his position as protector of the rights and interests of
the Rallos family.
Petitioner assumes that the respondent Court of Appeals found the
existence of an express trust between Atty. Filemon Sotto and the
heirs of FlorentinoRallos, which is not correct. What the appellate
court held is that Atty. Sotto can be regarded as the constructive
trustee of his wife and of the widow and descendants of
FlorentinoRallos.
The relation between parties, in order to be a fiduciary relation"
need not be legal, but may be moral, social, domestic or merely
personal; and where by reason of kinship, business association,
disparity in age or physical or mental condition or other reason, the
grantee is in an especially intimate position with regard to another
and the latter reposes a degree of trust and confidence in the
former, confidential relationship exists which prohibits the one
entrusted from seeking a selfish benefit for himself during the
course of relationship, and affords a basis for imposing a
constructive trust. (89 CJS Art. 151, pp. 1054-1057)
Atty. Sotto's special relationship with the Rallos heirs inhibited him
from any act or conduct that would put his interests above, or in
direct collision with, the interests of those who had reposed their
trust and confidence in him." 15
Private respondents are entitled to the relief prayed for, which is for
the reconveyance of the properties to them. Since
tMariaFadullonVda.deRallos died in 1938, her pro-indiviso share in
the properties then owned in co-ownership descended by intestacy
to her daughters, Concepcion and Carmen. Upon Carmen's death in
1945 without issue, the properties devolved to Concepcion
pursuant to their agreement in 1925 as testified to by PilarTeves.
When Concepcion Rallos died, her heirs, who are now the private
respondents, are entitled to these properties and should be
declared owners thereof. They are also entitled to the fruits
thereof, the rentals of the properties, including damages and
attorney's fees as assessed by the appellate court, which we find
just and reasonable.
Page 4 of 21
2. Express
Ramos vs. Ramos
FACTS:
Spouses Martin Ramos & Candida Tanate died and were survived by
their 3 legitimate children named Jose, Agustin and Granada. Martin
was also survived by his 7 natural children: Atanacia, Timoteo,
Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano, Maria & Federico.
Martin Ramos left considerable real estate to include Hacienda
Calaza and Hacienda Ylaya, both located in Negros Occidental.
Upon their father's death, his properties were left under the
administration of Rafael Ramos, the younger brother of their father
and their uncle. Rafael Ramos later gathered all the heirs saying he
would return the administration of the properties. He turned over
Hacienda Ylaya to Agustin Ramos and Hacienda Calaza to Jose
Ramos.
All said children continued to live in the same house of their father
in Hacienda Ylaya, now under support of Agustin Ramos. Plaintiffs
Modesto, Manuel and Maria eventually left house. Agustin
supported plaintiffs where they asked money pertaining to their
share in the produce of Hacienda Ylaya and received varied
amounts. Jose Ramos gave plaintiffs also money as their shares.
Upon Jose Ramos death, his widow Gregoria continued to give
plaintiffs money pertaining to their shares. She however stopped
doing so in 1951, telling them that the lessee Estanislao Lacson was
not able to pay the lease rental.
No accounting was made to plaintiffs by Jose Ramos, plaintiffs
reposing confidence in their elder brother.
Plaintiff Modesto was informed that a survey of the properties shall
be conducted but he did not intervene since he was promised that
Jose and Agustin would be the ones responsible to have it
registered in the names of the heirs. But apparently, what
happened include the following:
A project of partition was submitted. It was signed by the legitimate
children; by the 2 natural children, Atanacia and Timoteo, and by
Timoteo Zayco in representation of the other 5 natural children who
were minors. The conjugal hereditary estate was appraised at
P74,984.93. It consisted of 18 parcels of land, some head of cattle
and the advances to the legitimate children.
It was agreed that Jose Ramos would pay the cash adjudications to
Atanacia, Timoteo and Manuel, while Agustin would pay the cash
adjudications to Modesto, Federico, Emiliano and Maria. It was
further agreed that Jose and Agustin would pay their sister,
Granada, the sums of P3,302.36 and P14,273.78, respectively.
The estate had an appraised value of P74,985, or
P37,492brepresented the estate of Martin Ramos. 1/3 was the free
portion or P12,497. The shares of the 7 natural children were to be
taken from that 1/3 free portion. Dividing P12,497 by seven gives a
result of P1,783. The partition was made in accordance with the old
Civil Code.
Judge Richard Campbell approved the project of partition.
Page 5 of 21
Judge V. Nepomuceno asked the administrator to submit a report,
complete with the supporting evidence, showing that the shares of
the heirs had been delivered to them as required in the decision. In
a manifestation, which was signed by Jose, Agustin, Granada,
Atanacia and Timoteo, and by Timoteo Zayco, they acknowledged.
However, no receipts were attached to the manifestation.
Apparently, the manifestation was not in strict conformity with the
terms of judge's order.
Plaintiffs did not know that intestate proceedings were instituted
for the distribution of the estate of their father. They never
received any sum of money in cash the alleged insignificant sum
of P1,7855 each. Plaintiffs only discovered later on that the
property administered by their elder brother Jose had a Torrens
Title in the name of his widow and daughter. They were then
constrained to bring the present suit seeking for the reconveyance
in their favor by defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida and
husband Jose Bayot of their corresponding participations in said
parcels of land in accordance with article 840.
The petitioners action was predicated on the theory that their
shares were merely held in trust by defendants. Nonetheless, no
Deed of Trust was alleged and proven. Lower court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of res judicata. The plaintiffs appealed and
vigorously pressed on the Court their theory that they were
acknowledged natural children and were grievously prejudiced by
the partition and that the doctrine of res judicata should not bar
their action.
ISSUE: W/N plaintiffs action was barred by prescription, laches and
res judicata to the effect that they were denied of their right to
share in their fathers estate.
HELD: Yes. Trial court's judgment is affirmed with the clarification
that defendants' counterclaim is dismissed. No costs
RATIO:
The crucial issue is prescription. With it the question of res judicata
and the existence of a trust are inextricably interwoven.
Discussion on Trust:
A trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the
beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another, but the words 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate
duties, relations, and responsibilities which are not strictly technical
trusts.A person who establishes a trust is called the trust or; one in
whom confidence is reposed is known as the trustee; and the
person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to
as the beneficiary.
Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by
the intention of the trust or of the parties. Implied trusts come into
being by operation of law. No express trusts concerning an
immovable or any interest therein may be proven by oral evidence.
An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence. No particular
words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. Express trusts are those
which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by
some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
Page 6 of 21
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trust are
those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are super
induced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties. They are
ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts
A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or
created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted
sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always
to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which
is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed
in the deed or instrument of conveyance. On the other hand, a
constructive trust is a trust raised by construction of law, or arising
by operation of law; a trust not created by any words, either
expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust,
but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of
justice. It does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation
of law. If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or
concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party. A constructive
trust is not a trust in the technical sense
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the
ownership of property entrusted to him, or that an action to
compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust
for the benefit of the cestui qui trust does not prescribed, or that
the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to
recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of
another, or that property held in trust can be recovered by the
beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time. This applies squarely to
express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a
trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by
prescription the property held in trust.
Discussion of Case:
The plaintiffs did not prove any express trust in this case. The
project of partition, the decision and the manifestation as to the
receipt of shares negatives the existence of an express trust. Those
public documents prove that the estate of Martin Ramos was
settled in that proceeding and that adjudications were made to his
seven natural children. A trust must be proven by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and
uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations. As already noted, an express trust cannot be proven
by parol evidence.
Plaintiffs did not also specify the kind of implied trust contemplated
in their action. We have stated that whether it is a resulting or
constructive trust, its enforcement may be barred by laches. In the
cadastral proceedings, which supervened after the closure of the
intestate proceeding, the lots involved were claimed by Jose Ramos
and Gregoria T. Ramos to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. After the
death of Jose Ramos, the said lots were adjudicated to his widow
and daughter. Transactions following this prove that the heirs of
Jose Ramos had repudiated any trust which was supposedly
constituted over Hacienda Calaza in favor of the plaintiffs. Under
Act 190, whose statute of limitations applies to this case (Art. 116,
Civil Code), the longest period of extinctive prescription was 10
years.
Page 7 of 21
Atanacia, Modesto and Manuel, all surnamed Ramos, were already
of age in 1914. From that year, they could have brought the action
to annul the partition. Maria and Emiliano reached the age of 21 in
1917. They could have brought the action. The actions were filed
more than 40 years after it accrued. The delay was inexcusable. The
instant action is unquestionably barred by prescription and res
judicata. Plaintiffs contend that the partition was not binding on
them. They ask that the case be remanded to the lower court for
the determination and adjudication of their rightful shares. All those
contentions would have a semblance of cogency and would deserve
serious consideration if the plaintiffs had not slept on their rights.
Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong
Facts: Eduardo Cuaycong, married to Clotilde de Leon, died in 1936 without issue but with three brothers and a sister surviving him: Lino, Justo, Meliton and Basilisa. Upon his death, his properties were distributed to his heirs as he willed except two haciendas the Haciendas Sta. Cruz and Pusod both known as Hacienda Bacayan. Hacienda Bacayan is in the name of Luis D. Cuaycong, son of Justo Cuaycong. The surviving children of Lino Cuaycong filed a suit against Justo and Luis Cuaycong for conveyance of inheritance and accounting, before the CFI of Negros Occidental alleging that:
1. Eduardo Cuaycong, made known to his brothers and sisters that he and his wife Clotilde had an understanding and made arrangements with Luis and Justo, that it was their desire to divide Hacienda Bacayan among his brothers and sister and his wife Clotilde.
2. The brothers and sister failed to pay for the share in the hacienda thus it was later acquired by Luis Cuaycong thru clever strategy, fraud, misrepresentation and in disregard of Eduardo's wishes by causing the issuance in his name of certificates of title covering said properties.
3. Plaintiffs demands had been refused and in 1960 during the estate proceedings of Praxedes Escalon, deceased wife of Luis D. Cuaycong, the latter fraudulently made it appear that the plaintiffs had nothing to do with the land; that Luis Cuaycong had possessed the lands since 1936. xxx 8. Said two haciendas were then the subject of certain transactions between the spouses Eduardo Cuaycong and Clotilde de Leon on one hand, and Justo and Luis D. Cuaycong on the other, Eduardo Cuaycong told his brother Justo and his nephew, defendant Luis D. Cuaycong, to hold in trust what might belong to his brothers and sister as a result of the arrangements and to deliver to them their shares when the proper time comes, to which Justo and Luis D. Cuaycong agreed.
CFI ruled that the trust alleged, particularly in paragraph 8 of the complaint, refers to an immovable which under Article 1443 of the Civil Code may not be proved by parole evidence. Plaintiffs were given 10 days to file an amended complaint mentioning or alleging therein the written evidence of the alleged trust, otherwise the case would be dismissed.
Page 8 of 21
Plaintiff thereafter manifested that the claim is based on an implied trust as shown by paragraph 8 of the complaint. They added that there being no written instrument of trust, they could not amend the complaint to include such instrument. Complaint was dismissed. Hence this petition. Issue: W/N the trust referred by the plaintiff is implied or expressed? Held: NO. It was an express trust. Express and Implied trust can be understood as:
Express Implied
- created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties
- comes into being by operation of law
- direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed or will or by words evidencing an intention to create a trust
without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, in dependently of the particular intention of the parties
From these and from the provisions of paragraph 8 of the complaint itself, the court found that the plaintiffs alleged an express trust over an immovable, especially since it is alleged that the trustor expressly told the defendants of his intention to establish the trust. Thus, such a situation definitely falls under Article 1443 (Express) of the Civil Code.
Further, the intention of the trustor to establish the alleged trust may be seen in paragraphs 5 and 6. Article 1453 (Implied trust) would apply if the person conveying the property did not expressly state that he was establishing the trust, unlike the case at bar where he was alleged to have expressed such intent.
Even assuming the alleged trust to be an implied one, the right alleged by plaintiffs would have already prescribed since starting in 1936 when the trustor died, plaintiffs had already been allegedly refused by the aforesaid defendants in their demands over the land, and the complaint was filed only in 1961 more than the 10-year period of prescription for the enforcement of such rights under the trust. It is settled that the right to enforce an implied trust in one's favor prescribes in ten (10) years. And even under the Code of Civil Procedure, action to recover real property such as lands prescribes in ten years.
LORENZO V. POSADAS
Facts:
On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will
and considerable amount of real and personal properties. Hanleys
will provides the following: his money will be given to his nephew,
Matthew Hanley, as well as the real estate owned by him. It further
provided that the property will only be given ten years after Thomas
Hanleys death. Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of
the estate. Moore took oath of office on March 10, 1924, and
resigned on Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in his
Page 9 of 21
stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue, assessed
inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2,057.74 which
includes penalty and surcharge. He filed a motion in the
testamentary proceedings so that Lorenzo will be ordered to pay
the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after CFI
granted Posadas motion. He claimed that the inheritance tax
should have been assessed after 10 years. He asked for a refund but
Posadas declined to do so. The latter counterclaimed for the
additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on
the tax and which was not included in the original assessment.
However, CFI dismissed this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzos
claim for refund against Posadas. Hence, both appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Hanley intended to create a trust in his will?
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay
the inheritance tax before the delivery of the decedent's property
to the trustee. Stated otherwise, the defendant contends that
delivery to the trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the
beneficiery in this case, within the meaning of the first paragraph of
subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code.
This contention is well taken and is sustained. The appointment of
P. J. M. Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in conformity
with the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will. It is true that
the word "trust" is not mentioned or used in the will but the
intention to create one is clear. No particular or technical words are
required to create a testamentary trust. The words "trust" and
"trustee", though apt for the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the
use of these two words is not conclusive on the question that a trust
is created. "To create a trust by will the testator must indicate in the
will his intention so to do by using language sufficient to separate
the legal from the equitable estate, and with sufficient certainty
designate the beneficiaries, their interest in the ttrust, the purpose
or object of the trust, and the property or subject matter thereof.
Stated otherwise, to constitute a valid testamentary trust there
must be a concurrence of three circumstances: (1) Sufficient words
to raise a trust; (2) a definite subject; (3) a certain or ascertain
object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so
providing." There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a
trust. He ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept
together undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated purpose. The
probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in appointment a
trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will.
3. Implied
JUAN VS. YAP
Facts
Spouses Maximo and Dulcisima Castaneda mortgaged to petitioner
Richard Juan, employee and nephew of respondent Gabriel Yap, Sr.
(respondent), two parcels of land in Talisay, Cebu to secure a loan of
Page 10 of 21
P1.68 million, payable within one year. The Contract was prepared
and notarized by Atty. Antonio Solon.
Petitioner, represented by Solon, sought the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. Although petitioner and respondent
participated in the auction sale, the properties were sold to
petitioner for tendering the highest bid of P2.2 million. No
certificate of sale was issued to petitioner, however, for his failure
to pay the sale's commission.
Respondent and the Castaneda spouses executed a memorandum
of agreement (MOA) where (1) the Castaneda spouses
acknowledged respondent as their "real mortgagee-creditor x xx
while Richard Juan [petitioner] is merely a trustee" of respondent;
(2) respondent agreed to allow the Castaneda spouses to redeem
the foreclosed properties for P1.2 million; and (3) the Castaneda
spouses and respondent agreed to initiate judicial action "either to
annul or reform the [Contract] or to compel Richard Juan to
reconvey the mortgagee's rights" to respondent as trustor. Three
days later, the Castaneda spouses and respondent sued petitioner
in the RTC of Cebu City to declare respondent as trustee of
petitioner vis a vis the Contract, annul petitioner's bid for the
foreclosed properties, declare the Contract "superseded or
novated" by the MOA, and require petitioner to pay damages,
attorney's fees and the costs. The Castanedaspouses consigned with
the trial court the amount of P1.68 million as redemption payment.
Issue
Whether an implied trust arose between petitioner and respondent,
binding petitioner to hold the beneficial title over the mortgaged
properties in trust for respondent
Ruling
Yes. The question of the existence of an implied trust is factual,
hence, ordinarily outside the purview of a Rule 45 review of purely
legal questions. Nevertheless, our review is justified by the need to
make a definitive finding on this factual issue in light of the
conflicting rulings rendered by the courts below.
An implied trust arising from mortgage contracts is not among the
trust relationships the Civil Code enumerates. The Code itself
provides, however, that such listing "does not exclude others
established by the general law on trust x x x." Under the general
principles on trust, equity converts the holder of property right as
trustee for the benefit of another if the circumstances of its
acquisition makes the holder ineligible "in x xx good conscience
[to] hold and enjoy [it]." As implied trusts are remedies against
unjust enrichment, the "only problem of great importance in the
field of constructive trusts is whether in the numerous and varying
factual situations presented x xx there is a wrongful holding of
property and hence, a threatened unjust enrichment of the
defendant."
Applying these principles, this Court recognized unconventional
implied trusts in contracts involving the purchase of housing units
by officers of tenants' associations in breach of their obligations, the
partitioning of realty contrary to the terms of a compromise
Page 11 of 21
agreement, and the execution of a sales contract indicating a buyer
distinct from the provider of the purchase money. In all these cases,
the formal holders of title were deemed trustees obliged to transfer
title to the beneficiaries in whose favor the trusts were deemed
created. We see no reason to bar the recognition of the same
obligation in a mortgage contract meeting the standards for the
creation of an implied trust.
Kiel vs. Estate of Sabert
Facts
Albert F. Kiel commenced to work on certain public lands situated in
the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, known as Parang Plantation
Company. In 1910, Kiel and P. S. Sabert entered into an agreement
to develop the plantation. Sabert was to furnish the capital and Kiel
was to manage it. It seems that this partnership was formed so that
the land could be acquired in the name of Sabert, Kiel being a
German citizen and not deemed eligible to acquire public lands in
the Philippines.
During the World War, Kiel was deported from the Philippines. Five
persons, including P. S. Sabert, organized the Nituan Plantation
Company, to which Sabert transferred all the rights and interests of
the Parang Plantation Company. Kiel appears to have tried to secure
a settlement from Sabert. But Sabert's death came before any
amicable arrangement could be reached and before an action by
Kiel against Sabert could be decided. So these proceedings against
the estate of Sabert.
Issue
What is the nature of the proceeding? Is this an action to establish a
resulting trust in the land of Sabert? NO
Held
The court held that a ruling on the issue of establishing trust is not
needed. Note that the complaint as framed asks for a straight
money judgment against an estate. In no part of the complaint did
plaintiff allege any interest in land, claim any interest in land, or
pretend to establish a resulting trust in land. This is not an action
to establish trust in the land, because a trust will not be created
when, for the purpose of evading the law prohibiting one from
taking or holding real property, he takes a conveyance thereof in
the name of a third person.
Also, no partnership agreement in writing was entered into by Kiel
and Sabert. Thus the real issue is whether or not the alleged verbal
copartnership formed by Kiel and Sabert has been proved. The court
held that declarations of one partner, not made in the presence of
his copartner, are not competent to prove the existence of a
partnership between them, and that the existence of a partnership
cannot be established by general reputation, rumor, or hearsay.
Although we feel that competent evidence exists establishing the
partnership, Kiel under the facts had no standing in court to ask for
any part of the land and in fact he does not do so. His only legal
right is to ask for what is in effect an accounting with reference to
its improvements and income when Sabert became the trustee of
the estate on behalf of Kiel.
Kiel is not entitled to any share in the land itself, but he has clearly
shown his right to one-half of the value of the improvements and
Page 12 of 21
personal property on the land. The value of these improvements
and of the personal property cannot be ascertained from the record
and the case must therefore be remanded for further proceedings.
Thomson vs. CA
FACTS
Petitioner Marsh Thomson (Thomson) was the EVP and, later on,
the Management Consultant of private respondent, the American
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc. (AmCham) for over
ten years, 1979-1989.
While petitioner was still working with private respondent, his
superior, A. Lewis Burridge, retired as AmChams President. Before
Burridge decided to return to his home country, he wanted to
transfer his proprietary share in the Manila Polo Club (MPC) to
petitioner. However, private respondent insisted on paying for the
share but had it listed in petitioners name, with the condition that
Thomson should execute such necessary documents to
acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the Chamber.
Burridge then transferred said proprietary share to petitioner, as
confirmed in a letter of notification to the MPC.
Upon his admission as a new member of the MPC, petitioner paid
the transfer fee of P40,000.00 from his own funds; but private
respondent subsequently reimbursed this amount. MPC issued
Proprietary Membership Certificate in favor of petitioner. But
petitioner, however, failed to execute a document recognizing
private respondents beneficial ownership over said share.
When petitioners contract of employment was up for renewal in
1989, he notified private respondent that he would no longer be
available as EVP. Still, the private respondent asked the petitioner
to stay on for another six (6) months. Petitioner indicated his
acceptance of the consultancy arrangement with a counter-
proposal in his letter stipulating his intention to retain the Polo Club
share, subject to his reimbursing the purchase price to the
Chamber, or P110,000.
Private respondent rejected petitioners counter-proposal.
Pending the negotiation for the consultancy arrangement, private
respondent executed on a Release and Quitclaim, stating that the
chamber intended to release Thomson from any and all existing
claims that it (Amcham) may have against the latter (Thomson). The
quitclaim however failed to mention the MPC share.
In April 1990, private respondent, through counsel sent a letter to
the petitioner demanding the return and delivery of the MPC share.
Failing to get a favorable response, private respondent filed a
complaint against petitioner.
The trial court awarded the MPC share to Thomson on the ground
that the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of Manila Polo Club
prohibit artificial persons, such as corporations, to be club
members. The CA reversed the trial courts judgment and ordered
herein petitioner to transfer the MPC share to the nominee of
private respondent. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUES
(1) W/N AmCham was the beneficial owner of the disputed share
Page 13 of 21
(2) W/N it was right for Thomson to transfer said share to
Amchams nominee
DECISION and RATIO
YES
Petitioner claims ownership of the MPC share, asserting that he
merely incurred a debt to respondent when the latter advanced the
funds for the purchase of the share. On the other hand, private
respondent asserts beneficial ownership whereby petitioner only
holds the share in his name, but the beneficial title belongs to
private respondent. To resolve the first issue, we must clearly
distinguish a debt from a trust.
TRUST DEBT
Beneficiary of a trust has beneficial interest in the trust property
Creditor has merely a personal claim against the debtor
There is a fiduciary relation b/w a trustee and a beneficiary
There is no such relation b/w a debtor and creditor
Trust refers to a duty to deal w/ a specific property for the benefit of another
Debt implies merely an obli to pay a certain sum of money
If a creditor-debtor relationship exists, but not a fiduciary relationship between the parties, there is no express trust. However, it is understood that when the purported trustee of funds is entitled to use them as his or her own (and commingle them with his or her own money), a debtor-creditor relationship exists, not a trust.
In the present case, as the EVP of AmCham, petitioner occupied a fiduciary position in the business of Amcham. AmCham released the funds to acquire a share in the Club for the use of petitioner but obliged him to execute such document as necessary to acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the Chamber. A trust relationship is, therefore, manifestly indicated. Moreover, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his allegation of being merely a debtor when the private respondent paid the purchase price of the MPC share. Applicable here is the rule that a trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of property in the name of another, because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself. Although petitioner initiated the acquisition of the share, evidence on record shows that private respondent acquired said share with its funds. Petitioner did not pay for said share, although he later wanted to. Private respondents evident purpose in acquiring the share was to provide additional incentive and perks to its chosen executive, the petitioner himself. Although the share was placed in the name of petitioner, his title is limited to the usufruct, that is, to enjoy the facilities and privileges of such membership in the club appertaining to the share. Such arrangement reflects a trust relationship governed by law and equity. While private respondent paid the purchase price for the share, petitioner was given legal title thereto. Thus, a resulting trust is presumed as a matter of law. Petitioner could have negated the
Page 14 of 21
trust agreement by contrary, consistent and convincing evidence on rebuttal. However, on the witness stand, petitioner failed to do so persuasively. We, therefore, find no reversible error in the respondent Courts holding that private respondent, AmCham, is the beneficial owner of the share in dispute. (1) YES Turning now to the second issue, the petitioner contends that the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of Manila Polo Club prohibit corporate membership. However, private respondent does not insist nor intend to transfer the club membership in its name but rather to its designated nominee. In this case, the petitioner was the nominee of the private respondent to hold the share and enjoy the privileges of the club. But upon the expiration of petitioners employment as officer and consultant of AmCham, the incentives that go with the position, including use of the MPC share, also ceased to exist. It now behooves petitioner to surrender said share to private respondents next nominee, another natural person. Obviously this arrangement of trust and confidence cannot be defeated by the petitioners citation of the MPC rules to shield his untenable position, without doing violence to basic tenets of justice and fair dealing. However, we still have to ascertain whether the rights of herein parties to the trust still subsist. It has been held that so long as there has been no denial or repudiation of the trust, the possession of the trustee of an express and continuing trust is presumed to be that of the beneficiary, and the statute of limitations does not run between them. With regard to a constructive or a resulting trust, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the trustee clearly repudiates or disavows the trust and such disavowal is
brought home to the other party, cestui que trust. The statute of limitations runs generally from the time when the act was done by which the party became chargeable as a trustee by operation of law or when the beneficiary knew that he had a cause of action in the absence of fraud or concealment. Noteworthy in the instant case, there was no declared or explicit repudiation of the trust existing between the parties. Such repudiation could only be inferred as evident when the petitioner showed his intent to appropriate the MPC share for himself. The statute of limitation could start to set in at this point in time. But private respondent took immediate positive action. Since the private respondent filed the necessary action on time and the defense of good faith is not available to the petitioner, there is no basis for any purported claim of prescription, after repudiation of the trust, which will entitle petitioner to ownership of the disputed share. As correctly held by the respondent court, petitioner has the obligation to transfer now said share to the nominee of private respondent.
Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan Ling
FACTS
A number of Chinese merchants raised a fund by voluntary
subscription with which they purchased a valuable tract of land and
erected a large building to be used as a sort of club house for the
mutual benefit of the subscribers to the fund.
The subscriber organized themselves into an irregular association,
which had no regular articles in the commercial registry or
Page 15 of 21
elsewhere. The association did not have any existence as a legal
entity
It was agreed to have the title to the property placed in the name of
one of the members, the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, who on his part
accepted the trust, and agreed to hold the property as the agent of
the members of the association.
After the club building was completed with the funds of the
members of the association, Cho Jan Ling collected some P25,000 in
rents for which he failed and refused to account, and upon
proceedings being instituted to compel him to do so, he set up title
in himself to the club property as well as to the rents accruing
therefrom, falsely alleging that he had bought the real estate and
constructed the building with his own funds, and denying the claims
of the members of the association that it was their funds which had
been used for that purpose.
The plaintiffs, being prejudiced filed a case against the defendant
and the lower court favored Uy Aloc and his companions and
granted relief to the damages they suffered. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was an implied trust in the agreement of the
association
HELD
Yes. There was an implied trust. The decree entered by the court
below should be affirmed with costs against the appellants.
RATIO
We are nevertheless unable to see that any real or substantial right
of the appellants Cho Jan Ling, et al. was prejudiced thereby. Due,
doubtless, to the inherent difficulties which must be anticipated in
the conduct of a case wherein a large number of the parties are
Chinese persons, unable to speak any tongue but their own, some
formal or technical irregularities seem to have crept into the
proceedings in the court below but none of these irregularities or
amendments in any wise prejudiced the defense set up by the
appellants in the court below and assignments of error based
thereon can not be sustained under section 503 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that "No judgment shall be reversed on
formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced
the real rights of the excepting party."
Accepting, as we do, the truth and accuracy of the facts found by
the trial court there can be no shadow of doubt that the plaintiffs
are entitled to the relief furnished them by the decree.
In the case at bar we think that the evidence clearly discloses not
only that the funds with which the property in question was
purchased were furnished by the members of the association, but
that Cho Jan Ling, in whose name it was registered, received and
holds the property as the agent and trustee of the association; that
on at least one occasion he admitted the beneficial ownership to be
in the association; and that while the legal registered title is in his
name the beneficial ownership is in the association.
Page 16 of 21
In this case, the legal title of the holder of the registered title is not
questioned. It is admitted that the members of the association
voluntarily obtained the inscription in the name of Cho Jan Ling and
that they have no right to have that inscription cancelled. They do
not seek such cancellation, and on the contrary they allege and
prove that the duly registered legal title to the property is in Cho Jan
Ling, but they maintain, and we think that they rightly maintain,
that he holds it under an obligation, both express and implied, to
deal with it exclusively for the benefit of the members of the
association and subject to their will.
Muller vs Muller
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 26, 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City which terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the
Resolution 4 dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut
Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989
and resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent's parents
but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in
1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany
from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of
petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent's alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
Respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which
terminated the regime of absolute community of property and
decreed the separation of properties between them, ordering the
equal partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.
With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent.
However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for
acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by
the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article
XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will
leave the parties in the situation where they are in without
prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real
property.
The CA held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for
the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or
transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioner's
Page 17 of 21
ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards
the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to
REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the
construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal, deducting
therefrom the amount respondent spent for the preservation,
maintenance and development of the aforesaid real property.
ISSUES:
W/N the Ca erred in granting reimbursement to the respondent
(contested by the petitioner as a circumvention of the
Constitutions prohibition on aliens acquiring real properties in the
Philippines)
RULING:
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue
through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It
would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public
agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. . . .
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not
including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result
would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions,
and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and
hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation
resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly
agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious
to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and
expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared
that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner
because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently
asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be
sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was
created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner's
Page 18 of 21
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases
of hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from
owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership
in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in
violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of
the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as
opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent's
part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to
enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision ordering petitioner Elena
Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City terminating the regime of absolute community
between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of
property between them and ordering the partition of the personal
properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
4. Prescription
AMEROL vs. BAGUMBARAN
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, Branch III, Marawi City. Lot
No. 524, Pls-126 is the tract of land alleged by the plaintiff to have
been forcibly entered into by the defendants and which plaintiff
now wishes to recover possession thereof. The same lot was
covered by two free patent applications: (1) that of defendant
Liwalug Datomanong (erroneously surnamed Amerol) which he
filed on the 4th day of September, 1953, and (2) that of Molok
Bagumbaran which was filed on December 27, 1954. As to these
two free patent applications, that of plaintiff Molok Bagumbaran
was given due course as a result of which Free Patent No. V-19050
was issued on August 16,1955 and duly registered with the office of
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Lanao whereupon Original
Certificate of Title No. P-466 was duly issued. Defendant Liwalug
Datomanong had never known of plaintiff's free patent
application on the land in question nor was he ever notified or
participated in the administrative proceedings relative to
plaintiff's free patent application. In the meantime, said defendant
has been and up to the present in continuous occupation and
cultivation of the same. Said defendant did not take appropriate
action to annul the patent and title of the plaintiff within one year
from issuance thereof and that the first step taken by him to
contest said patent and title was a formal protest dated April 24,
1964, filed before the Bureau of Lands after the lapse of 9 years
from the issuance of patent in favor of the plaintiff. The second
step he took was his counterclaim filed with this court on December
4, 1964, wherein defendant reiterated his stand that plaintiff
secured patent on the land by means of deceit and fraud. Proofs
Page 19 of 21
are sufficient to support defendant's contention that plaintiff is
guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. On or before filing his free
patent application, plaintiff knew that the land in question which
was covered by his free patent application was then actually
occupied and cultivated by defendant Liwalug Datomanong.
Notwithstanding the aforequoted findings, the trial court denied
the counterclaim of the defendants, now petitioners, for the
affirmative relief of reconveyance on the ground of prescription.
The trial court held that, since the answer and counter-claim was
filed on December 4, 1964, 9 years from the date of registration of
the patent, the defendants right to reconveyance within the
period of 4 years from the date of registration of said patent had
prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the
petitioners right of action for reconveyance for violation of an
implied trust prescribed after 4 years from the registration of the
patent of respondent
HELD: YES. An action for reconveyance for violation of an implied
trust prescribes in 10 YEARS.
The act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual
possession and occupation of the property in question, obtaining a
patent and Original Certificate of Title No. P- 466 in his name,
created an implied trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said
property. The land in question was patented and titled in
respondent's name by and through his false pretenses. Molok
Bagumbaran fraudulently misrepresented that he was the occupant
and actual possessor of the land in question when he was not
because it was Liwalug Datomanong. Bagumbaran falsely pretended
that there was no prior applicant for a free patent over the land but
there was Liwalug Datomanong. By such fraudulent acts, Molok
Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the property in trust and
for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong. Notwithstanding
the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of
respondent, he, even being already the registered owner under the
Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey
the subject property to Liwalug Datomanong. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful
and legal owner, or to one with a better right.
It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant
note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the
prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years.
However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance
on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered
on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied,
the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as
mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article
1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil
Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the
four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title
Page 20 of 21
of real property acquired under false pretenses. The action of
petitioner Datomanong for reconveyance, in the nature of a
counterclaim filed on December 4, 1964, has not yet prescribed.
Between August 16, 1955, the date of reference, being the date of
the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the
respondent, and December 4, 1964, when the period of
prescription was interrupted by the filing of the Answer cum
Counterclaim, is less than ten years.
Marquez v. CA
Facts:
Spouses Rafael and Felicidad Marquez had 12 children. In 1945, the
spouses acquired a parcel of land in Rizal where they constructed
their conjugal home. When Felicidad died, Rafael Sr. executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication vesting unto himself sole ownership to the
property. In 1983, Rafael donated the property to 3 of his children -
-- petitioner Rafael JR, Alfredo (respondent) and Belen (respondent)
to the exclusion of his other children.
From 1983-1991, private repondentes (Alfredo and Belen) were in
actual possession of the land. When petitioners learned about the
title of the land, they demanded that since they are also children of
Rafael SR, they are entitled to their respective shares. Respondents
ignored petitioners demands.
According to petitioners, the Deed of Donation executed by their
father was fraudulent since the respondents took advantage of their
fathers advanced age. Respondents contend that the petitioners
action was already barred by the statute of limitations since the
same should have been filed within 4 years from the date of
discovery of the alleged fraud.
Issue:
Whether the action for reconveyance had prescribed
Held: NO
Ruling:
Petitioners contention:
By virtue of the fraudulent deed of donation, a constructive trust
was created, and that an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years.
Held:
Indeed, when Rafael SR. obtained an affidavit stating that he was
the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive,
and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his
name, a constructive trust was established.
On whether the reconveyance had prescribed:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property.
The prescriptive period runs from the date when the transfer of
certificate of title was issued in favor of Rafael SR which was on June
Page 21 of 21
16, 1982. The action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991 =
9 years later, which means that prescription had not yet barred the
action.
Additional:
Rafael SR, as trustee to his wifes share, cannot donate this portion
to the private respondents.
Recommended