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THE GENEALOGY OF METHODOLOGY & THE METHODOLOGY OF
GENEALOGY: PUTTING ACCOUNTING INTO CRISIS.
By
Ken McPhailUniversity of Glasgow
Draft 2.2 (Adelaide Revisions)
ABSTRACT
Michel Foucault’s histories and his method of genealogy have generated a considerable
amount of debate in many academic disciplines and arguments about the accuracy, probity
and veracity of Foucault’s histories have also entered into the accounting history arena
(Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman et al 1996; Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991; Parker 1999;
Fleischman, Mills & Tyson 1996; Hammon & Sikka 1996; Carnegie & Napier 1996; Tyson
1993) and accounting research in general (see Neimark 1990; Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994;
Grey 1994). This essay attempts to contribute to this debate. It presents a new interpretation
of Foucault’s method: a genealogical interpretation of Foucault’s genealogical method. The
paper suggests that genealogy differs quite fundamentally from traditional historiographical
method. It is contended that the aim of genealogy is to put into crisis and therefore that
applications of genealogy within accounting research should endeavour to put accounting into
crisis.
AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Rob Gray for his help in developing the ides in this paper.
2
INTRODUCTIONThe work of Michel Foucault has generated a considerable amount of debate within the
accounting history arena (Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman et al 1996; Miller, Hopper &
Laughlin 1991; Parker 1999; Fleischman, Mills & Tyson 1996; Hammon & Sikka 1996;
Carnegie & Napier 1996; Tyson 1993) and accounting research in general (see Neimark 1990;
Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). This essay attempts to contribute to this debate
by providing a genealogical interpretation of Foucault’s genealogical method.
It is quite difficult to place Foucault's method within any specific tradition. Indeed, Foucault
himself resisted classification, for example, he says,'I think I have been situated in most squares on the political checkerboard, one after another
and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or disguised Marxist,
nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the service of Gaullism, new liberal,
etc.....It’s true I prefer not to identify myself and that I'm amused by the diversity of ways I
have been judged and classified,’ (Foucault, in Rabinow 1984; see Grey 1994)
Foucault’s aversion to classification is however not a personal idiosyncrasy but an integral
part of his philosophy. He does not wish to promote a general method. Foucault's argument
is basically that the formalisation of Method can become substituted for the uncritical and
unreflective application of a series of procedures1. Hoskin (1994) explains Foucault's
argument as follows,‘Method comes easily to persuade researchers of their sovereign rationality and
consequently to overlooking the reflexive problems of how the method itself and their own
use of method is generated,’ (Hoskin 1994).
Thus, what we have in Foucault is not so much a method as an attitude or predisposition and
it is this attitude that will be discussed in this paper.
A number of accounting academics have drawn on the work of Michel Foucault in order to
present new and critical histories of accounting (see for example Preston 1992; Loft 1986;
Miller & O’Leary 1987; Hopwood 1987 and Hoskin & Macve 1988). Indeed Miller, Hooper
and Laughlin (1991) suggest that such is the extent of these new approaches that one may
legitimately talk of a new accounting history paradigm2. However despite the burgeoning
number of projects which have, ‘drawn on’ (Preston 1992) or been ‘inspired by’ (Miller &
O’Leary 1987; Loft 1986) Foucault’s notions of genealogy and archaeology, the literature as
1 Foucault is quite close to Derrida on this point (Norris 1988).
2 Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991 also include new Marxist perspectives in their category of newaccounting histories.
3
yet lacks a systematic delineation of Foucault’s method of historical analysis (although see
perhaps Miller & O’Leary 1987, and Hopwood 1987).
This paper suggests that Foucault’s histories differ quite fundamentally both from traditional
accounting histories and from many of the new Foucauldian studies of accounting. The paper
attempts to contribute to the debate over the way in which Foucault’s method has been
employed within accounting research to date and in particular addresses the claim that some
of these studies are conservative and lack critical impact (see Neimark 1990; Armstrong
1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). This essay links Foucault with the work of the early critical
theorists and the Frankfurt School and suggests that the very essence of genealogy is to put
into crisis.
This link with Critical Theory is quite important. From an analysis of the accountancy
literature it seems that Foucault is often deleteriously labelled a postmodernist or conservative
theorist and viewed in sharp contradistinction to critical theorists and Marxist historiography
(see Neimark 1990; Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). Habermas (1994, in Hoy
1994) for example criticises Foucault for what he perceives as his complete rejection of
modernity. He condemns Foucault as a postmodernist, 'Young Conservative, enemy of the
project of modernity,' (Habermas 1984, in Simons 1995). However, I believe that neither
Foucault’s philosophy, nor postmodernism per se simply rejects modernity. Foucault was not
completely opposed to every characteristic of the enlightenment (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1994)
and indeed, he personally refuted claims that he was a postmodernist3 (Hoy 1988). This essay
attempts to challenge the postmodern interpretation of Foucault’s work. It will be argued that
Foucault follows in the tradition of the early critical theorists, although his work also
represents a fundamental break from this tradition.
The paper is split into two sections. Following a short preamble, section one provides the
historical context within which Foucault’s method of genealogy developed and should
therefore be understood. Section two considers the main characteristics of Foucault’s method
of genealogy.
PREAMBLE
Debate over the validity of a specific piece of research often appears to concentrate on the
accuracy of a particular research technique and the ability of its concomitant methodology to
3 An interesting anecdote is that in an interview in Telos, Gerard Raulet asked Foucault aboutpostmodernism. Foucault replied, 'What is postmodernism? I'm not up-to-date.' (Thanks to Scott Moorof the Foucault list for this point).
4
generate knowledge. This seems particularly so within the debate surrounding the new
accounting histories (see for example Tyson 1993 and Funnell 1996). However, the nature of
this debate perhaps belies a more fundamental set of assumptions about the function of
historiography and research in general (see Parker 1999, Gaffikin 1992), i.e. that the primary
objective of research is to help us understand (the past) better. The genealogical method
delineated in this paper starts from the assumption that the function of research is not only to
generate knowledge but to generate knowledge in a conscious attempt to change both the
subject studied and our knowledge of ourselves, that is, it assumes that research should take
the form of a radical praxis.
Research undoubtedly plays an active role in constructing the world investigated. This may
seem a rather obvious point, few people who have considered the effects of Copernicus's
astronomy, Newton's physics or Darwin's biology could deny the impact of research on
society (see, for example, Checkland 1990; Arrington & Francis 1989). Research into a
particular issue can have quite significant social and political effects. However, apart from
the more tangible consequences, research also effects society in a more subtle kind of way
through the legitimation of particular ways of generating knowledge, and perhaps also the
institutionalisation of specific ways of thinking. The social and political nature of research is
highlighted by Galtung (1977, in Morrow & Brown 1995) when he says,‘Far from being universal, a methodology even contributes to the definition and maintenance
of a certain social structure by being compatible with it, or to its downfall and replacement
by another by being incompatible with it.’
Checkland (1990) suggests that scientific research in particular has had a profound effect on
society and on the way we think, he says,'More than being merely a product ... science is an invention of our civilisation - a cultural
invention - and it is probably the most powerful invention ever made in the whole history of
mankind. Our world in the 20th century is essentially the world created by the activity of
science, and not only created physically in our cities, our transportation, and our
communication systems, but also created institutionally in our political and administrative
procedures, in the way we organise our society. Rationalism and empiricism, twin outcomes
of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, have influenced all our civilisation, not only
its mere technology.' (Checkland 1990 pp23)
The discipline of accounting history, perhaps until fairly recently, has been almost exclusively
based on and legitimated by the objective, positivist methodology of science (Parker 1999;
Hammond & Sikka 1996). However new accounting histories represent a challenge, not only
to this approach to historiographical analysis but also to both the social and cognitive
structures it helps to maintain.
5
Starting from the assumption that research is a social and political activity highlights the
consequences of research, at least to the extent that they can be known or anticipated. This
may push the debate back from epistemological issues of method, truth and knowledge to a
more fundamental, ethical debate about the kind of society we want to live in, rather than
producing research which consciously or otherwise acts to shore up the inequalities and
inequities in the prevailing system. Arrington and Francis (1989) make this point clear when
they say,‘The practice of accounting and theorising about the practice are always and already
informed by ethics which help to create the material conditions of human life. To deny the
value-ladeness of one’s theorising is to deny responsibility for the consequences of your
theories.'
From this, similarly value laden perspective, the choice of method and methodology are
essentially political and ethical decisions. It would appear that traditional accounting
historians have been preoccupied with the defensibility of their analysis and the rigour of their
method and perhaps little consideration has been given to the ethical justification for the study
or the consequences of the interpretation provided (see Parker 1999).
SECTION ONE: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT.
This section attempts to provide the context for understanding Foucault’s method of
genealogy. It provides some historical background to the two methodological strands that
Foucault knotted together. The paper contends that Foucault’s method is located at the
junction of philosophical hermeneutics and Critical Theory. Without an appreciation of this
context it is impossible to understand the characteristics of the genealogical method discussed
in section two.
Hermeneutic Philosophy
The first theoretical strand that is important for understanding Foucault’s method of
genealogy is hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics is the theory of interpretation of meaning (Audi 1995; Llewellyn 1993).
Traditionally this notion was related to the interpretation of ancient texts and as such had a
relatively narrow application. However hermeneutics evolved into a whole philosophical
position that emerged in Germany in the twentieth century (see Audi 1995). Hermeneutics
draws an analogy between the interpretation of a text and any attempts to understand social
action (Llewellyn 1993). While there are a number of significantly different hermeneutical
6
positions within the social science literature all are characterized by an attempt to get beyond
the subject-object dichotomy.
The hermeneutical turn which has taken place in the broader social sciences has been
manifest in the accounting literature. It has been introduced into organisational theory
(Boland 1989) and management accounting theory (Llewellyn 1993) and also has been used
in the analysis of accounting education (Power 1991a). Recently within the accounting
history literature Fleischman et al (1996) have drawn on Gadamer’s hermeneutics in their call
for greater dialogue amongst the various parties in the new historiographic debate. However
this methodological position has not yet been used to develop an understanding of Foucault’s
method of genealogy.
There are two related issues here which are important to understanding the impact that
hermeneutics has had on accounting research. The first issue relates to attempts which have
been made to apply hermeneutics as a method for investigating accountancy (see Llewellyn
1993). The second issue relates to the, 'linguistic turn,' within hermeneutic philosophy. This
linguistic aspect has been used to develop new perspectives for understanding the role that
accounting plays in society.
In relation to this second issue some researchers have viewed accounting as a kind of
language system (see Laughlin 1981,1987; Cooper 1983; Roberts and Scapens 1985, Lavoie
1987). Boland (1989) for example stresses the importance of hermeneutics in appreciating the
interpretative nature of accounting. He says, 'accountants are engaged in the interpretative act
as both readers and writers of organisational texts,' however he contends that accountants
have become conditioned into interpreting situations in specific ways. Laovie (1987) literally
studies accountancy as the language of business. Schweiker (1993) provides a hermeneutic
examination of the process of giving an account, in an attempt to stress the moral dimension
of accounting. Francis (1994) studies auditing from a hermeneutic perspective and suggests
that it is a hermeneutic activity (see also Manicas 1993) and Power (1991a) has introduced
hermeneutics to the study of accounting education. He analyses the process of professional
accounting training from a Habermasian perspective and suggests that they can be
conceptualized in terms of a distorted speech situation.
There are two basic divisions in hermeneutics. The first is based on the work of the German
philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). This approach attempts to develop
hermeneutics as a method for social science research and seems to be related to the first sense
in which hermeneutics is being applied within accounting research. The second strain of
7
hermeneutics is generally called, ‘Hermeneutic Philosophy,’ and is based on the work of
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Foucault’s method of genealogy draws on this second strain
of hermeneutic philosophy.
The work of the German philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) on understanding
represents the beginning of hermeneutics as it has developed from Dilthey (Audi 1995).
Schleiermacher developed a method of analysis known as the hermeneutic circle. This notion
is based on the observation that in social science both the researcher and the individuals being
researched are connected by particular traditions and customs, essentially because they are
part of the same society or community. The concept of the hermeneutic circle refers to the
idea that the interpretation of a specific situation or event depends upon an interpretation of
the whole social context within which the event takes place and conversely the interpretation
of the whole context depends upon the interpretation of its constituent parts. The method
proceeds firstly with an initial overview of the subject matter, this overview informs an
examination of the parts which in turn elucidates the concept of the whole. This is repeated in
an iterative process which, it is assumed, will gradually lead to a better understanding of the
situation (see Llewellyn 1993; Boland 1989; Audi 1995).
From this analysis it is hopefully clearer how the subject-object dichotomy is transcended
within hermeneutics. Both the researcher (the subject) and the individuals being researched
(the object of the study, which may be subjects) are seen to be linked together to the extent
that both belong to a generally similar cultural and historical tradition. The differences in the
understanding of both the researcher and the object of his/her research are mutually exposed
and reconciled in the course of the research. As such, this approach is significantly different
to the empirico-scientific approach described above.
From a hermeneutic perspective, the study of society is seen as an endless process of
reassessment rather than a transition from ignorance to truth, as is characteristically the case
within positivist research (Bauman 1978). Bauman (1978) describes the hermeneutic circle as
a process where understanding is seen to go in circles rather than in a linear process towards
progressive enlightenment. In hermeneutics, there is no correct place from which to begin or
end.
The strain of hermeneutics that emanates from Dilthey’s work is generally called,
'Hermeneutic Theory' (as opposed to, Hermeneutic Philosophy,’ which will be described later,
see Audi 1995). Hermeneutic Theory is concerned with the problem of how an individual can
objectively understand meaning (Bleicher 1980) and, as such, still represents what seems to
8
be a fairly innocuous attempt to increase understanding. Within this type of hermeneutic
analysis, it is assumed that any situation has a meaning independent from the act of
interpreting the situation (Winograd & Flores 1987). Thus, while it is important to note the
fundamental differences between hermeneutics and scientific methodology, it is also
important to note that this particular form of hermeneutics seems to remain a neutral tool for
generating a better understanding of things. As such, both science and Hermeneutic Theory
may be seen to have generally similar aspirations, although, as we have seen above, the way
in which they attempt to achieve them is fundamentally different.
The second strain of hermeneutics is generally termed philosophical hermeneutics and is
associated with the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger elaborates his philosophical
hermeneutics at two levels. Firstly, he contends that the nature of being lies not in the essence
of the thing itself but rather lies in the structures within which things are situated and which
create the space for them to be. However in the second part of his thesis Heidegger suggests
that the, 'deep truth,' behind our partial and taken-for-granted interpretations is just more
interpretation, an 'unsettling groundlessness,' (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Thus, from this
perspective Freud’s contention that consciousness is somehow underpinned by the libido and
Marx’ argument that consciousness is underpinned by economic structures are exposed as just
more interpretation (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Thus in Heidegger the notion of the
hermeneutic circle is radicalized such that it is taken to apply to everyday life and
interpretations of the deep meanings behind everyday life.
Hermeneutic philosophy has been developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer (see Vattimo 1988;
Bleicher 1980; see also Boland’s 1989 analysis of the work of Gadamer and its implications
for organisational theory). In Gadamer’s work hermeneutics is conceptualised not as a
method of investigation (as in Dilthey’s Hermeneutic Theory) but as a characteristic of all
knowledge and as such a feature of everyday life (see Audi 1995). Gadamer develops the
second major contribution Heidegger has made to hermeneutics (see Bleicher 1980).
Heidegger provides a link between being and language (Vattimo 1988). This aspect of
Hermeneutic philosophy is particularly important for understanding Foucault’s notion of the
construction of the self through discourse. Heidegger’s famous dictum, 'the being that can be
understood is language,' is developed by Gadamer. Gadamer explains that when Heidegger
said that, ‘language is the house of being,’ he meant that,'it is not so much a matter of showing that every experience of the world is made possible
for the individual by the possession of language; language is not that which the individual
speaks but rather that which speaks the individual,' (Vattimo 1988).
9
Gadamer contends that the problem of language is the most crucial issue in hermeneutics. He
presents language not as an objectification or a system of symbols that we use4 but, using
terminology similar to Heidegger’s, he says language is, 'that which speaks to us,' (Bleicher
1980).
Like Heidegger, Gadamer views the hermeneutic circle as characteristic of all knowledge and
activity (Boland 1989; Bleicher 1980; see also Winograd & Flores 1987; Fleischman et al
1996). Gadamer (1975, 1976) contends that we are confronted everyday by an essentially
meaningless world that we immanently make meaningful. He says, 'the world must be
interpreted by us if we are to engage in purposive action in it.' However he also contends that
the way in which we make the world meaningful is an historic act and therefore that our
cognition is unavoidably prejudiced and biased. Gadamer places considerable emphasis on
the role that language plays both as the location within which we ascribe meaning to things
and also as the harbinger of bias.
For Gadamer language is the place where the, ‘collective ethos of a historically determined
society,’ is manifested4. He suggests that language encapsulates the cultural history of a
particular society and embodies the shared world (or collective consciousness) of the
members of that society (Thompson 1981). Gadamer thus construes language as more than
just the faculty of speaking. Gadamer's ideas on language may be taken as referring to,‘a kind of collective consciousness, which, although it serves as a basis for our judgments, is
not always fully apparent to us,’ (Vattimo 1988).
This short analysis of Gadamer’s contribution to the hermeneutic tradition hopefully clarifies
the notion and objectives of the hermeneutic circle. Both the researcher and the researched are
seen to be participants in a historically generated language. In his philosophy, the hermeneutic
process involves a situation whereby the two ‘horizons,’ that of the researcher and the
researched are, ‘fused together’ (Outhwaite 1994). Gadamer construes understanding as a
continuing historical process in which, 'prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened,'
(Audi 1995). At this boundary, or horizon, to use Gadamer’s terminology, where world views
meet, it is assumed that prejudices will be revealed and subsequently, that we will become
aware of the constraints they place on our thinking (Winograd & Flores 1987).
4 Language has always been an important aspect of hermeneutic thinking. Dilthey, for example,highlighted the importance of the role that language plays in understanding. He contended thatlanguage is not a system of logical relationships, as some linguistic theory assumes, and therefore thatthe interpretation of meaning can not be reduced to the search for and study of simple linguistic rules.
10
Gadamer argues that to present the world in this way means that understanding is not the
terminus we reach when all influence and bias is eliminated, as is assumed in positive
science5, rather it is, 'a moving dialectic that always takes place anew at the horizon of our
prejudice,' (Boland 1989). Indeed hermeneutics suggests that progress or understanding is
made when individuals discuss their interpretations and attempt to understand the differences
between them6.
Foucault’s work was undoubtedly influenced by his reading of Heidegger. Eribon (1989) for
example recounts how Foucault had once commented:‘I still have here the notes I took when I was reading Heidegger. I’ve got tons of them! And
they are much more important than the ones I took on Hegel or Marx. My entire philosophical
development was determined by my reading of Heidegger.’
Foucault’s work draws on philosophical hermeneutics in two important respects. Firstly his
work is both influenced and characterised by the unsettling groundlessness of Heidegger’s
philosophical hermeneutics. Foucault’s work seems to rest on the premise that the, 'deep
truth,' behind our partial and taken-for-granted interpretations is just more interpretation. His
work paradoxically represents a shift from a search for deep truth to the study of
interpretations or the study of truths or knowledge. Foucault is interested in how certain
interpretations have come to dominate in an almost haphazard way and how they are
sustained through networks of power relations. He also attempts to show the groundlessness
of these prevailing interpretations7 (see Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Foucault’s method of
genealogy represents a conscious attempt to replace the prevailing social structure with
something else, if only temporarily. Foucault’s work also draws heavily on Heiddeger’s
dictum that, ‘the being that can be understood is language.’ Echos of Heidegger can be heard
in Foucault’s contention that subjectivity is constructed through discourse. The links between
Foucault and philosophical hermeneutics are deveoped in more detail in the second section
under the heading, ‘genealogy is interpretation.’
5 Gadamer's examination of prejudice and tradition is situated within his critique of positive science.Even those scientific techniques which appear most neutral are set within a nexus of traditions andprejudices (see Bleicher 1980).
6 Habermas suggests that hermeneutic understanding is incomplete because it fails to recognise thatlanguage is not just a means of communication but is also used as a medium for control and domination(Outhwaite 1995).
7 There are of course contradictions in Foucault’s position. However, he recognises this and in anattempt to remain consistent attempt to deligitimise his own interpretation.
11
However, while Foucault's work draws heavily on Heideggers philosophical hermeneutics it
also represents a radical departure from the hermeneutic tradition. Foucault’s position was
essentially takes us beyond hermeneutics (see Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). His work differs
from philosophical hermeneutics on a number of accounts. Firstly, while hermeneutics
replaces the Cartesian line with a spiral both tend upwards, having pretensions of progress
and development. Foucault brought into question the enlightenment tenet of progress (see
Hoy 1994). Secondly Foucault’s method of genealogy is more critical than hermeneutics, it
searches for strategies of power and the interests served by specific dominant interpretations.
Finally, Foucault’s position is different because he changed the focus of attention from
language to discourse.
Marxism & Critical Theory
The second major methodological strand that is important for understanding Foucault’s
method of genealogy is Critical Theory.
This section commences by highlighting four aspects of Marxist theory that are critical for
understanding the development of Critical Theory and Foucault’s genealogical position8.
These aspects are praxis; historical materialism; dialectics and immanent critique.
Praxis
The notion of praxis has a long history which dates back to the work of Aristotle (Audi 1994).
Within Marxist theory it has two related meanings. The first aspect is summed up in Marx
moral exhortation to, 'not only interpret the world but also to change it.' (Roderick 1986). As
such Marx contends that there should be a close correlation between theory and practice.
Contemporary analysis of the notion of praxis goes even further in challenging the distinction
between theory and practice. It is suggested that praxis pre-dates and pre-empts theory and is
not simply the application of it. The second aspect of praxis relates to Marx belief that human
beings act upon the world, that is they ‘work.’ In particular, Marx links praxis with the
economic system of production and exchange which is set up within society to meet human
needs (Abercrombie et al 1994; Audi 1995). Within contemporary philosophy, the notion of
praxis is seen to be related more to communication and discourse than a specific system of
8 Having said this however, there are so many different interpretations of Marx’s work that any attemptto identify even the most basic elements of his thinking, particularly by someone not trained inphilosophy, is bound to be simplistic and partial.
12
production, as the discussion of hermeneutics above has indicated. Foucault’s method of
genealogy is more specifically related to the first sense of praxis.
Historical Materialism & Dialectics
The second important issue is Marx notion’s of historical materialism. Marx quite
fundamentally rejected any possibility of a world of ideas beyond the material world. He also
rejected materialism because of its deterministic view of individuals. Instead Marx combines
materialism with his belief in the historically changing nature of human agency.
Marx9 believed that our understanding of the world, our actions and our perceptions of our
needs all result from social-historical processes (Roderick 1986; Poster 1984) and in
particular he suggested that there was a direct correlation between individual class
consciousness and the role individuals play in the economic system.
The importance of the notion of historical materialism will hopefully be more apparent when
we remember the arguments made within Gadamer’s form of hermeneutic philosophy.
Gadamer argued that the language of our collective consciousness is the outcome of historical
processes.
From a Marxian perspective, this historical process is characterised by struggle, particularly
the struggle between classes10. Marx believed this conflict was attributable to the actual
material structure of society, a structure that was both determined by and reflected in the
mode of production. Marx's dialectic relates to the contradictions found in the struggle
between classes. He believed that the process of history does not follow strict logical laws
but was the outcome of class conflict. There are three aspects of dialectics which are pertinent
to the ensuing discussion (see Poster 1984): Firstly, dialectics contains the notion of progress.
Through the dialectical process, progress is made towards the resolution of conflict and
contradiction. Secondly, in order for this to happen, Marx depends on individuals who will
recognise the contradictions within society and act to resolve them; and finally, if the
8 In some forms of Marxism, what Roderick (1986) calls, ‘Scientific Marxism,’ there is a rigid anddeterministic correlation between the mode of production (the base) and ideology, or falseconsciousness (the superstructure), such that the relationship is assumed to be governed by laws. Fromthis perspective, human agency becomes subsumed within the structures of society (Roderick 1986). 10 It is important to note in passing the relationship between historical materialism and Foucault’smethods of analysis. The fact that Foucault called what he was doing archeology and genealogy(two notions with obvious historical connotations) is not without significance.
13
contradictions are not acted upon, then this means that the members of the dominated class
are characterised by a false consciousness.
Immanent Critique
The final issue of importance is the notion of immanent critique (or internal critique). Because
Marx claimed that reason itself was shaped by the struggle between classes through history
and the mode of production, this apparently removes the ability of reason to act as a basis for
critique (Poster 1984). The method of immanent critique represents an attempt to try and get
round this problem. Immanent critique is a method of criticism that proceeds only by
appealing to those values actually found in a given social and historical context. As such, it
does not require an external basis (Poster 1984).
Critical Theory
Marxist theory was developed by the Early Critical Theorists and the Frankfurt School.
Towards the end of the 19th century Germany experienced a rapid development in capitalism.
It was within this milieu that a social research institution, now commonly known as the
Frankfurt School, was established. The institution was deliberately set up outside the
academic community and was not initially associated with any university. This was because
the members of the Frankfurt School believed that the universities had become too
conservative. Indeed, the aims and work of the institute represented a concerted attempt to,
're-engage learning.' The early theorists who worked at the institute believed that the rapid
expansion of capitalism was having a deleterious effect on society. They argued that one way
to combat this malaise was through education but suggested that in order to realize its
potential, education first had to, 're-engage' with learning. The important point to highlight
here is that the Frankfurt School was set up during a period when capitalism was flourishing.
The early theorists contended that a proper understanding of society required a broader kind
of analysis than Marxism offered. They suggested that a form of analysis11 was required that
incorporated ideas from different branches of the social sciences and they subsequently
11 The school engaged in research which combined theoretical and empirical inquiry based on amaterialist perspective.
14
attempted to reinterpret Marx. They argued this was essential because the nature of society
had changed such that it did not fit into the old Marxist categories. They were particularly
concerned with the non-revolutionary nature of the proletariat and, in an attempt to try and
understand this characteristic of capitalist societies, changed their focus of attention away
from the working class towards culture and power in general (Rose 1978; Poster 1984). They
attempted to reconceptualise the Marxist perspective of the individual particularly in his/her
relationship to the economic system of production (Poster 1984) and in doing so they
incorporated developments within the field of psychology into their critical analysis of society.
Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno were amongst the most prominent
early critical theorists. Their work, which was primarily an analysis of western reason,
represents what has been called the, 'rational turn,' in Critical Theory. This was the first of
two theoretical turns within Critical Theory. The second turn can be found in the work of
Jurgen Habermas and relates to the incorporation of the study of language into social critique
(see Wolin 1992).
The early critical theorists studied reason for two reasons. Firstly, they studied reason
because it seemed as though the notion of class struggle had been eclipsed and they wanted to
investigate the way in which the working classes had apparently been psychologically and
culturally integrated into the capitalist system. They also studied reason because they believed
that, 'western rationalism,' was responsible for the political malaise.
The early critical theorists incorporated Max Weber’s work on rationality into Marxist
analysis. As I suggested above this was essentially related to the problem of revolution or
more specifically the lack of it. The problem was that according to orthodox Marxist theory
the economic conditions existed that should have resulted in a revolution. However, this was
not the case, the revolution had not happened. Horkheimer and Adorno, and later Marcuse,
argued that orthodox Marxism did not fully explain the, 'subjective conditions,’
(consciousness) that were also required for revolution (Roderick 1986). These issues were
originally developed by a number of intellectuals who are generally considered to be the
predecessors to the Frankfurt School. This group includes, for example, Lukacs and Gramsci,
amongst others, and they have become known as the, ‘Western Marxists.’ These theorists
suggested that the capitalist system had somehow managed to subjugate the revolutionary
consciousness of the working class.
15
In The Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argued that western reason
was partly to blame for this impasse12. Their argument was based on Max Weber’s notion of,
‘the paradox of reason.’ Weber believed that, 'our increasing degree of instrumental mastery
over the natural and social world,' had been achieved at the cost of freedom. Adorno and
Horkheimer represented the enlightenment tenet of progress as increasing domination. Wolin
(1992) says, 'Benjamin's notion of history as the incessant process of ruination and decline
appears to be a determinant influence on the thinking of Adorno and Horkheimer.’
Adorno and Horkheimer argued that liberation could only be realised through a complete
break from western instrumental reason (Roderick 1986). However, their argument obviously
has significant repercussions for the possibility of immanent critique. Marx had suggested that
critique could be based on values within society, like freedom and justice. However,
Horkheimer and Adorno argued that even those kinds of notions (freedom & justice) were
being reinterpreted within a capitalist framework. They contended that this form of critique
may no longer be possible if, as they believed, capitalism had been able to legitimate itself not
only through recourse to social values like justice and equity but through the rise in the
material standard of living. In other words they argued that capitalism ‘self legitimates.’
This view of rationalism ultimately creates problems for the critical theorists for by equating
reason with domination they undercut both their own analysis and their objective of
disillusionment and empowerment. Wolin (1992) sums up this problem nicely when he says,'when enlightenment becomes equated with, “myth,” and domination, the project of human
emancipation (and the goal of liberal education) renounces its most essential means: rational
reflection and critical thinking. Without them the whole project of human emancipation
descends into esoterics.' (Wolin 1992).
However the problem remains how can critique proceed if reason has been completely co-
opted?
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse had three different responses to this problem. Horkheimer
turned to religion, viewing it as, ‘one of the last repositories of hope beyond a society
dominated by instrumental reason,’ (Wolin 1992). Adorno's approach to the problem was to
turn from reason to aesthetics as an alternative way of knowing (Wolin 1992; Poster 1984).
Adorno believed that art may be considered an alternative vehicle for conveying knowledge
and truth. He argued that art conveys knowledge, not through clarity of analysis and argument,
as in instrumental reasoning, but rather through images, sounds and colour. It is important for 12 Adorno and Horkheimer fused Nietzsche and Weber together (See Rose 1978) and this isparticularly important for understanding Foucault.
16
understanding the analysis of Foucault’s work that a few characteristics of Adorno's aesthetics
are highlighted. Adorno distinguished between contemporary pop-art which he believed was
intended to convey irrationality and non-meaning and other forms of art. His theory of
aesthetics is associated with earlier forms of art which attempt to convey meaning and
understanding. Indeed, he warns that contemporary art is dangerously close to turning into, ‘a
vehicle of affirmation, that is the uncritical mirror image of the happy consciousness of late
capitalism’ (see Wolin 1992; Rookmaaker 1994).
Where Horkheimer turns to religion and Adorno turns to art, Marcuse turns to the imagination.
He argues that imagination plays a crucial role in social change. Wolin (1992) explains that, ‘By virtue of its capacity to take the materials with which it is provided in the here and now
and refashion them according to the demands of the spirit, the imagination serves as a
harbinger of an emancipated sensibility,’
Another attempt to deal with the problem of foundations for critique is found in the work of
Habermas. Habermas attempts to salvage reason through his concept of, ‘the ideal speech
situation,’ (Wolin 1992). He objects to the way in which reason was presented as totally co-
opted within the early critical theorists analysis and fears that this perspective disregards may
of the good aspects of modernity, like (intellectual) progress, enlightenment and
development13 (Wolin 1992).
Wolin, (1992) contends that of all the poststructualrist philosophers, Foucault’s project seems
closest to the early critical theorists14. He says,‘Foucault and the early critical theorists share not only a common set of methodological
concerns but share other concerns as well, particularly the mechanisms of domination and
power,’ (Wolin 1992).
Indeed, Poster (1984) claims that Foucault not Habermas is the main hope for advancing
Critical Theory! (see also Wolin 1992).
13 Foucault, on the other hand, resorts to aesthetics (Simons 1995). Foucault’s notion of aesthetics is,however, different from Adorno’s. He emphasises the role of unreason in art and can be seen to usethis artistic approach in his critiques of rationality.
14 Work by Mark Poster (1984, 1989, 1990) has attempted to appropriate postmodernist themes intoCritical Theory (see Morrow & Brown 1994). This perspective is based on the belief that bothmodernism and postmodernism on their own are essentially incomplete, but when taken together bothpositions could potentially inform each other and perhaps negate their worst excesses (Aronowitz &Giroux 1991). Morrow & Brown (1994) explain that Poster draws mainly on the work of Foucault inhis attempts to combine modern and postmodern themes. It is of course not inconsequential that Posteruses Foucault’s work as the basis for his argument.
17
Foucault made the association between his own work and the work of the early critical
theorists himself towards the end of his life (Morrow & Brown 1994). He situates his own
agenda firmly in line with the critical theorists contending that we must embrace,‘critical thought that will take the form of an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the
present; it is this form of philosophy that, from Hegel, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to
the Frankfurt School, has founded a form of reflection in which I have tried to work.’
(Foucault ,in Wolin 1992)
Foucault thus suggested that there was a profound affinity between his method of genealogy
and the critique of instrumental reason that Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse had been
involved in.
Foucault wasn’t really introduced to critical theory until after May 1968 (Poster 1984). His
education had exposed him to different influences. Indeed, he complained that his lecturers
had not address the Frankfurt School, and suggested that this body of work would have been
helpful to him. Poster (1984, see also Smart 1994) argues that after May 1968 Foucault
carried out a clarification of his ideas based on the work of the Western Marxists. The reason
why the 1968 revolution had such an effect on Foucault was because it was different from
what Marxist theory predicted. The revolution took place at all levels of society. The
demands that were being made were for a more fundamental participation and creative role
within society in general and not just for an equal share in the material produce of capitalism
(Poster 1984). It was after this event that Foucault began to focus more explicitly on the
relationship between power and knowledge (Poster 1984). Foucault was interested in the way
in which power normalized individuals, constructing them as docile bodies. The parallels
between this aspect of Foucault’s work and the Frankfurt schools critique of instrumental
reason are hopefully quite obvious. However, there are also some important and quite
fundamental differences. Foucault’s ideas on power represent a fundamental advance in the
study of rationality and also the possibility of resistance. Foucault changed the focus from the
study of the negative effects of power (i.e. rationality as domination in Horkheimer and
Adorno’s emancipation/domination dialectic), away from the notion of reason as repression
and developed a notion of power as a formative force that shaped and constituted individuals
(Poster 1984). Foucault studied the way in which subjectivity was created through discourse.
The relationship between Foucault’s work and Critical theory is developed in section two
below under the subheadings genealogy is the study of power; genealogy is dialectics;
genealogy is critique and genealogy is praxis. Foucault’s study of power is viewed as an
extension of the project undertaken by the early critical theorists and the critical
18
interpretations (Foucault’s praxis) that he uses to generate dialectical tension are explored
more fully.
The two methodological strands briefly discussed in this section provide the context for
understanding Foucault’s method of genealogy. The characteristics of Foucault’s
genealogical method can only be understood if it is seen to emerge from a combination of
hermeneutic philosophy and critical theory. The following section explains Foucault’s
histories in more detail.
SECTION TWO: FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY.
This section delineates Foucault’s method of historical analysis. After a brief consideration of
the different domains of analysis in Foucault’s work, ten characteristics of his form of
historiography are discussed in some detail.
Three distinct arenas of analysis can be found in Foucault’s work: an analysis of systems of
knowledge; an analysis of power; and an analysis of the way in which individuals discipline
themselves (Davidson 1994; Prado 1995). Foucault employed three different modes of
analysis to study each of these three domains: archaeology, for analysing systems of
knowledge; genealogy, for analysing power; and ethics, for analysing how individuals
construct themselves as ethical subjects (Foucault in Rabinow 1994; Davidson 1994; Smart
1985; McPhail 1999).
Foucault used his method of archeology to study discourses. Archeology does not attempt to
reveal the hidden meaning behind discourse but rather has three different objectives (see
Smart 1985). Firstly, the Foucauldian archeologist studies the structure of discourse.
Secondly, they investigate the factors that contribute to the existence of a discourse and the
conditions under which the discourse continues to exist in the same form. And finally, they
attempt to study the effects of discourse. Rather than investigate what was known (history) or
how knowledge is possible (epistemology), Foucault focused on how fields of discourse or
knowledge are structured and the effect these structures have on human beings (Major-Poetzl
1983).
Genealogy is Foucault’s second mode of analysis. The difference between archeology and
genealogy is that where as archeology appeared to be more of an objective description,
genealogy explicitly considers the role that power plays in the structure of discourse (Smart
1985). Genealogy represents a more overt commitment to critique and the analysis of power.
19
Finally, Foucault’s notion of ethics involves the relationship to oneself, or, 'ethical self
understanding,' but this is not detached from the other two areas of study (Foucault in
Rabinow 1994) Simons 1995). Thus after Foucault had studied the way in which the social
sciences construct individuals as both objects and subject’s, his attention turned to focus more
specifically on how individuals discipline themselves as ethical subjects (see Hoy 1994;
Hacking 1994; Davidson 1994).
There is some dubiety and debate as to whether these three methods of analysis represent
breaks in Foucault’s thought and changes in direction or whether they represent developments
in his thought and are essentially related (See Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982; Hoskin 1994; Megill
1985). For the purposes of this essay, archaeology, genealogy and ethics are considered to be
complementary (see Prado 1995).
The remainder of the paper considers some of the characteristics of genealogy. The object is
not to disregard archeology and ethics but to take the essential elements of them and combine
them with a genealogical perspective as I think Foucault does. The salient elements are
presented first and these are followed by a more detailed discussion. The main characteristics
are as follows (see Dreyfuss & Rabinow 1982):
1. genealogy is empirical;
2. genealogy is opposed to conventional historical method;
3. genealogy is critique;
4. genealogy is interpretive;
5. genealogies are based on an analysis of the present;
6. genealogy attempts to combine the analysis of power and knowledge and actively
looks for strategies of power;
7. genealogy focuses on surface events and avoids the search for deep meanings;
8. the genealogist attempts to view from a distance, to present a broad, general
picture.
9. genealogy is praxis
10. genealogy is dialectical
Genealogy is Empirical
The first important characteristic of Foucault's genealogical method is that it is empirical15
(Hoy 1988). Indeed, Foucault describes genealogy as, 'gray, meticulous, and patiently
14The issue of the role of empirical research in critical accounting has been addressed recently byLaughlin (1995). He explains how changes have taken place in accounting research since the 1970's
20
documentary,' (Foucault 1977, in Prado 1995). His genealogies are based on similar kinds of
documentary evidence as traditional methods of archive analysis and, as such, Foucault’s
genealogies claimed the, ‘status of knowledge,' (Davidson 1994). While some of the new
accounting histories may tend to place greater emphasis on the interpretation over the facts
(see Tyson 1995), it is hard to see how the same charge could be made against Foucault. He
may have looked in different places for the facts and he may have interpreted those facts in an
unusual way, but his histories were always characterised by lots of ‘historical digging’
(Merquior 1985).
Genealogy is Opposed to Conventional Historical Method.
However, while it is true that Foucault used a conventional method of historical investigation,
it is important to point out that Foucault's genealogies are not an objective form of historical
analysis. Neimark (1990) seems to suggest this when she argues that Foucault, 'resurrects a
form of value-free analysis that had previously been rejected in critiques of conventional
social sciences.' However, Foucault’s method is not objective (Poster 1984). Despite its
apparent objectivity genealogy is actually a reaction against traditional forms of historical
analysis (Smart 1985). Foucault challenges the way in which conventional methods attempt
to, 'search for the exact essence of things.' This charactristic represents one of the major
tensions between old and new accounting histories (see Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991;
Carnegie & Napier 1996; Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman 1996).
Fiction
Scientific methodology is characterised by a belief that it is possible to gradually refine the
method of analysis as earlier erroneous theory is replaced by later, more sophisticated, truer
ones (Hoy 1994). Foucault rejects this position. His archaeology of the human sciences is an
attempt to show that this notion of progressive enlightenment is false (but see Armstrong
1994). Similarly, Davidson (1994) contends that Foucault’s later genealogical works are not
an attempt to, 'erect shining epistemological foundations,' but rather attempt to show that what
we take to be knowledge is actually rooted in power (but see Merquior 1985 and Said 1983 in
Neimark 1990).
because normative ideas were not taken up and used in practice. He argues that empirical research inaccounting is now of central importance and explains that this has arisen as a consequence of a need fora better descriptive understanding of how accounting currently functions in society. He argues that thisgreater understanding is to be used in the development of more appropriate normative systems. Copper(1981, in Laughlin 1995) says, '...only through a well grounded understanding of how systems operatecan we prescribe how accounting systems should be changed.'
21
Foucault intentionally created a tension between his work and the kind of objective history
that attempted to discover the chain of causes which lead to particular historical events.
Indeed, genealogy is the antithesis of historiographical method of writing about history as if it
were a story about the progress of freedom and enlightenment16 (Hoy 1994; Parker 1999;
Carnegie 1996). In his book, Discipline and Punish, Foucault presents a story of progress,
but it’s the development of the spread of the discipline of the prison throughout society not of
enlightenment. Reading such a history of progress disturbs conventional notions of progress.
Like Nietzschean genealogies, Foucault’s histories,‘question the tendency of the present to evaluate its own progressiveness positively. Each
present invents its own past, but Foucault has invented a past for some future present,'
(Walzer 1994).
In contrast to this style of historical writing Foucault contended that he had written fictions,
he says,'As for the problem of fiction, it is for me a very important problem; I am well aware that I
have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to go so far as to say that fictions are
beyond truth. It seems to me that it is possible to make fiction work instead of truth, to
induce truthful effects with a fictional discourse, and to operate in such a manner that the
discourse of truth gives rise to or “manufactures,” something that does not yet exist, that is,
“fictions” it. One “fictions” history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one
fictions a politics not yet in existence on the basis of historical truth,’ (The history of
Sexuality, Finas interview p193 in Megill 1985)
Foucault’s books are fictions not because his interpretations are not historically justifiable by
the methods of traditional historical investigation but because the circumstances do not exist
(as yet) to validate them. As we shall see shortly, Foucault is a concerned critic rather than an
objective historian (Hammond & Sikka 1996; Parker 1999).
Parody
Megill (1985) argues that while Foucault’s book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, is often
viewed as a positivistic discourse on method, it is in fact a parody. He argues that, The
Archaeology of Knowledge, is a parody of Descartes, Discourse on Method, and says,‘When one looks at it closely its supposed method turns out to be disturbingly elusive. The
Archaeology of Knowledge is anti-methodological rather than methodological. For all its
quasi-scientific manner, the work is an attack on science, on the whole idea of objective
knowing. Foucault is engaged in undermining a whole structure of thinking, a whole
approach towards reality that he sees as oppressive and uncreative.' (Megill 1985).
Foucault's method may therefore be parodic.
16 As such, genealogies are therefor rather pessimistic.
22
Genealogy As Critique
From the introductory characteristics mentioned above it can be seen that Foucault’s method
of genealogy is a form of social critique (Megill 1985, see also Carnegie & Napier 1996). I
contended above that although Foucault’s method of critique follows in the tradition of the
early Critical Theorists and the Frankfurt School his method of critique is quite significantly
different in a number of respects (Smart 1985; Simons 1995; Hoy 1994).
The first point to note is that Foucault’s diffuse notion of power means that although society
may be characterised by a dominant and hegemonic rationality, it never manages to
completely subjugate all forms of opposition towards it. Thus, Foucault suggests that society
is always characterised by a degree of struggle and resistance. Indeed, he depicts genealogy
as being involved in this struggle, describing it as, ' the struggle against the effects of the
power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific.'
Smart (1985) describes genealogy as local struggle. Smart is talking here not about
geographical locality but rather discursive locality. Grey (1994) explains that, 'local struggles
do not occur in restricted geographical space but rather in a restricted discursive space.'
Foucault believed that neither comprehending the world nor changing it depends on grasping
a total understanding of society and how it can be transformed into a utopian state. In
keeping with his views on power, he believed that change does not occur by transforming the
whole of society at once (for example revolution) but rather by getting involved in specific
local struggles (Hoy 1994). Genealogy is an attempt to get involved in these local struggles
and this relates to the idea of praxis introduced above.
The second important point in relation to the issue of critique is that Foucault viewed critique
not in the conventional sense of revealing the true nature of society, but in the post-structural
sense of putting into crisis (Megill 1985). Foucault hoped that we would find his genealogies
threatening (see Hoy 1994). He says, the genealogist seeks to write, ‘effective history.’ This
relates to the issue of fiction discussed above and also the arguments on the aesthetic nature
of Foucault’s work. Rabinow & Dreyfus (1982; 1994) explain that effective history means,
‘to put everything in historical motion, to dissolve the comforting illusion of identity and
firmness and solidity.’ Similarly, Foucault (1977a) describes effective interpretations as,‘those that will disorder order, those that will break up what is extant, those that will turn the
present into the past, history that disturbs what was previously considered
immobile;....fragments what was thought unified;....shows the heterogeneity of what was
imagined consistent with itself.'(Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays &
Interviews p147).
23
Where as Foucault thinks that many examples of conventional history legitimates the present,
effective history attempts to break up the prevailing order of things. As Foucault puts it,
history becomes effective when it 'introduces discontinuity into our very being.' Thus, the
aim of genealogy is to disrupt commonly held conceptions of society and practices within
society (Smart 1985; Davidson 1994). While Foucault’s texts were presented with detached
objectivity, they were intended to be 'bombs, directed against what he perceived to be very
real problems' (Megill 1985).
Recently within the accounting history literature there have been calls for an increased
appreciation of the power of narrative (see Parker 1999; Funnell 1996; 1998). Foucault uses
narrative in a powerful and provocative way. For many historians, narrative is the ‘bedrock’
of their work, however these narratives are taken to reflect the lived experience of the past
(Parker 1999). Foucault’s narratives are intended to disrupt the lived experience of the
present.
Genealogy As Interpretation.
The fourth aspect of genealogies is that they are interpretations. This characteristic may
initially not seem very different from conventional historiography. Carr (1964 in Carnegie &
Napier 1996) for example contends that, ‘interpretation is the life-blood of history.’ However
Foucault’s genealogical interpretations are significantly different from conventional
accounting histories. There are four important aspects here. Firstly, the way in which
Foucault's genealogies are based on Heidegger’s argument regarding the pervasiveness of
interpretation, Secondly, the way in which Foucault uses this assumption as a tool for opening
up society to social critique. The third issue relates to the goal of Foucault’s interpretations
and the final issue relates to the aesthetic qualities of Foucault’s work.
The first issue relates to the extent to which Foucault’s interpretations are based on
Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneutics. Genealogy is based on Heidegger’s notion that
behind interpretation there is only more interpretation. Foucault believed that because of the
influence of history and culture it is difficult, if not impossible, to get a totally detached view
of society. In his book, Nietzsche Freud & Marx, Foucault says,‘There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret because, when all is said and done,
underneath it all everything is already an interpretation.'
This first step is an essential prerequisite for Foucault’s method of genealogy. Genealogy
does not attempt to uncover hidden meaning but rather tries to show the groundlessness and
arbitrariness of existing interpretations. Foucault says,
24
'The deepest truth that the genealogist has to reveal is the secret that things have no essence
or that there essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.'
The second issue of importance in Foucault's interpretations is the way in which he uses
Heidegger’s hermeneutic as a basis for social critique. The view expressed in the quote above
seems to condemn us to the vagaries of equally arbitrary interpretations. However, Foucault’s
method of analysis is quite subtle on this point. Foucault was concerned with the way in
which interpretations are created and imposed within society. In this assumption of the
groundlessness and arbitrariness of interpretation Foucault opens up society for critique. This
is essential for Foucault’s main task which is to study how specific interpretations of the
world have come to dominate; how these interpretations are sustained and the effect they have
on individuals. As such, genealogy attempts to reveal and analyse the way in which
conventional interpretations emerge from a matrix of power relationships. Poster (1985), for
example, argues that genealogy is essentially to do with, 'tracing the history of modes of
domination.'
Foucault has been criticised for not explicitly evaluating conventional interpretations
(Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). He was more interested in making individuals aware of the kind
of rationality that pre-empts their interpretations. His histories were active attempts to reveal
the taken-for-grantedness of conventional interpretations. It may be helpful to point out that
this aspect of Foucault’s method relates to the dialectical nature of genealogy.
Foucault attempts to re-describe common situations in such a way that his interpretations are
recognised as a challenge to the views and traditions that are reinterpreted (Prado 1995).
Foucault thus attempts to create conflict through interpretation. Using his rhetorical skills he
attempts to exacerbate our collective uneasiness. Building on Heidegger, he attempts to use
his interpretations as a way of provoking individuals into action (Megill 1985; Dreyfus &
Rabinow 1982).
Foucault examined the content of hegemonic discourses from the point of view that is
required to make it meaningful. This idea is incorporated into the requirement in Foucault’s
genealogies to start with an analysis of the present. We shall see shortly how genealogical
interpretation is not arbitrary but rather is based on what Foucault perceived to be the most
important problems facing society. With this image available, he then attempted to present a
counter image, what Churchman (1971, in Checkland 1990) calls its, 'deadliest enemy.'
Checkland (1990) argues that at this point the conflict between these world-views can
construct a new world-view in which the nature of the conflict is understandable. In a similar
25
kind of way, Foucault’s critique operates through the use of difference, the difference
between present and previous forms of society (Poster 1984). Foucault believed that the
power operating within our society could be revealed through the juxtaposition of a
conventional interpretation of society with an equally coherent but different interpretation of
historical societies (Poster 1984).
The final issue in this section relates to the aesthetic nature of Foucault’s interpretations.
Given Foucault’s views on the deleterious effects of western instrumental reason, it is perhaps
not surprising that his interpretations contain certain aesthetic qualities (Megill 1985). This
relates to the discussion of foundations for critique in section one above. Simons (1995; see
also Wolin 1992) suggests that Foucault turns to aesthetics and unreason as a basis for
critique. Megill (1990) contends that Foucault's books were intended to be works of art17.
However, it is important here to realise that Foucault did not see art as existing in harmony
with the prevailing rationality but rather as confronting it and challenging it (Megill 1985).
Megill (1985) contends that Foucault wanted his texts to, 'go out into the world and by the
power of their rhetoric to change it.' Wolin (1992) explains that Foucault, like Adorno turns
from reason to aesthetics (See Megill 1985). However, Foucault’s aesthetic is different from
Adorno's. Goya heralds the kind of art that Foucault is interested in. Goya explored the
boundary between, ‘reason and its other’. Wolin (1992) argues that Foucault’s search for an
origin outside discourse on which to base his critique ultimately takes him to unreason. Wolin
(1992) seems to imply that this attitude is anarchistic and perhaps even fascist, however this
seems to contravene his earlier interpretation of Foucault as following in the tradition of the
early critical theorists. His observation that Foucault resorted to unreason, whether it is
accurate or not, could be open to an alternative interpretation. For example, the sociologist
Herbert Garfinkle advocated the use of unreason as a positive sociological tool. Garfinkle’s
ethnomethodologies involved instructing his students to go home and act in an unexpected
and unreasonable manner, for example, as lodgers. Garfinkle’s aim was to expose the taken
for granted assumptions and meaning system within that particular situation. This would
seem to be more in keeping with Foucault’s critical stance. From this perspective, unreason
can be seen to have quite an important and perhaps even modern function.
This aesthetic perspective contributes towards understanding the issue of fiction in relation to
Foucault’s interpretations. It may also be helpful to remember Marcuse’s arguments about
the critical potential of the imagination. It could be that through the aesthetic qualities of his
16 In the 1940 and 50s Foucault’s friends were painters writers and musicians rather than philosophers.It may be that the literary and artistic avant-garde had a significant impact on Foucault's work (Megill1985).
26
fictions, Foucault hoped that the readers imagination would be stirred up. He may be close to
Fredriche Nietzsche in this respect. Nietzsche maintained that the only valuable
historiography is one that seeks to provide, 'life-enhancing myths,' (Megill 1985). The real
value of the historians work, he asserted, lay,'in its taking a familiar, perhaps commonplace theme, an everyday melody, and composing
inspired variations on it, enhancing it to a comprehensive symbol, and thus disclosing in the
original theme a whole world of profundity power and beauty,' (Megill 1985).
As such, Nietzsche argues for the rejection of history as representation in favour of its re-
creation as literature, poetry and myth18 (Megill 1985). Why? because he believes that to
represent a reality is to legitimate it and perpetuate it (see Megill 1985). Heidegger, in his
book, The Anaximander Fragments, explains this further when he says, 'all historiography
predicts what is to come from images of the past,' (in Megill 1985). However, Foucault's
history is completely different because in demonstrating the foreignness of the past he
undercuts the legitimacy of the present (Poster 1984).
The following sections consider some more characteristics of the kind of interpretation that
Foucault presents.
Genealogy & The Analysis of The Present
The fifth important aspect of Foucault’s method is that it begins with an analysis of the
present (see Merquior 1985). Although Foucault presents his work as a form of historical
analysis, he does not attempt to capture the past as it, 'actually was,' (Megill 1985). Foucault
was more interested in our present situation than in ancient societies. In his book, Discipline
and Punish, Foucault says,'I would like to write the history of the prison with all the political investments of the body it
gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past?
No, if one means by writing history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means
writing the history of the present.'
Foucault was not trying to understand past societies. Rather, he provided a historical
interpretation of the present that explicitly began with a diagnosis of the current state of
society, he said, 'I begin my analysis with a question posed in the present,' (Foucault, in Prado
1995). Foucault isolated what he perceived to be the central issues of society and attempted to
provide a historical account of how the situation arose. This characteristic of Foucault’s
interpretations serves to highlight again that they were not objective. It reveals the
genealogists involvement in genealogy and the, ‘pragmatic intent’ of their analysis. Foucault
18 This aspect of genealogical interpretation seems related to Trevelyan’s idea of history. Trevelyancontended that historical narratives should be poetic (Parker 1999).
27
subtitled one of his works, ‘a history of the present,’ to admit frankly that the account was not
a neutral, objective description.
Genealogy & Power
Thus genealogy begins with an analysis of society. This analysis proceeds by looking for
ways in which power is effected in society. The analysis of power seems to be one of the
defining characteristics of the new accounting histories (Carnegie & Napier 1996). As Funnell
(1996) comments, ‘reliance on a realist form of history and exposure to it’s alleged
deficiencies, it is proposed, has blinded traditional accounting history to discourses of power.’
Genealogy is essentially the study of power and how it operates within society, however it
involves quite a specific view of the way in which power operates and this influences where
the genealogist will look for data and how they will interpret the data. The genealogist
actively looks for, ‘strategies of domination,’ (see Hacking 1994). Thus the interpretation that
the genealogists provides is preempted by a conscious commitment to articulate his/her
studies in terms of the operation of power.
Parker (1999) explains that the primary aim of accounting histories has been to learn about
the human experience in the discipline of accounting. Foucault however provided us with a
particular slant on this objective. The objective of genealogies is to consider how power
operates in order to construct individuals through discourse (Hopwood 1987). The genealogist
attempts to convey the, ‘history of the modern subject.’ The central theme of these kinds of
studies is to show the processes of subjectification. As such, ‘the genealogist is interested in
the modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,’ (Foucault, in Hoskin
1994, Hoy 1994).
Genealogy Focuses On The Surface
Foucault did not study the individuals own interpretations of their actions. Genealogy
therefore is not essentially the study of human beings but rather the study of discursive space.
This is not because Foucault believed that an individual’s understanding of the world was
unimportant or distorted. Foucault did not look for underlying meanings, rather he looked on
the surface for the co-ordinates of power. By focusing on the surface, Foucault is not
suggesting that things are trivial or frivolous, but rather that meaning is something that takes
place on the surface. He explained this aspect of genealogy in his book, Nietzsche, Freud,
Marx,‘Whereas the interpreter is obliged to go to the depth of things, like an excavator, the
moment of interpretation of the genealogist is like an overview which allows the depth to be
laid out in front of him in a more profound visibility.' ( in Rabinow & Dreyfus 1982)
28
While conventional history focuses and to some extent gains its legitimacy from the archive,
Foucault concentrated on a different kind of archive. For Foucault, the archive is discourse
(see Carnegie & Napier 1996). Discourse in a Foucauldian sense is has both material and
discursive qualities and is essentially viewed as space. The surface that Foucault is interested
in is conseptualised in spacial rather historical terms. Indeed, Foucault may ultimately be a
spatial theorist rather than an historian (see McPhail 1999). From this perspective, Miller and
O’Leary’s (1998) recent study of the spatial reorganising of the manufacturing process at
Caterpillar’s Decatur plant is essentially a genealogical study (see also Arnold 1998, Miller &
O’Leary 1998 & Froud et al 1998).
On one occasion Foucault commented that, ‘a comprehensive and critical understanding of
spatiality,’ was at the centre of all his writings (Soja 1997). In an interview in 1989, he said,
‘Geography must indeed lie at the heart of my concerns. People have often reproached me for
these spatial obsessions, which have indeed been obsessions for me. But I think through them
I did come to what I had basically been looking for: the relations that are possible between
power and knowledge.’ Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge has been widely discussed in
the literature. It has been the inspiration behind a number of new accounting histories (see for
example Hopwood 1987; Miller & O’Leary 1987 and Loft 1986) however I would suggest
that this quote suggests that Foucault was interested in power and knowledge from aspacial
perspective rather than an historical perspective (Soja 1997; McPhail 1999).
Genealogy As Praxis
The next important characteristic of genealogies is praxis.
Marx had a profound impact on Foucault's work. In one interview Foucault said that his intention was,'not so much the defalsification and restitution of a true Marx, but the unburdening and
liberation of Marx in relation to party dogma, which has constrained it, touted it and
brandished it for so long.' (Neimark 1990)
On another occasion Foucault says,‘I often quote concepts, texts and phrases from Marx, but without feeling obliged to add the
authenticating label of a footnote with a laudatory phrase to accompany the quotation. As
long as one does that one is regarded as someone who knows and reveres Marx, and will be
suitably honoured in the so called Marxist journals. But I quote Marx without saying so,
without quotation marks and because people are incapable of recognising Marx's texts I am
thought to be someone who doesn't quote Marx.....It is impossible at the present time to
write history without using a whole range of concepts directly or indirectly linked with
Marx's thought and situating oneself within a horizon of thought which has been defined and
29
described by Marx. One might even wonder what difference there could ultimately be
between being a historian and being a Marxist,' (Foucault ,in Neimark 1990).
While Foucault can be seen to provide the basis for a new form of discourse analysis, behind
this method, and his research in general, there is, I believe, the intention to disrupt
conventional perceptions of the issues he studies. The object of Foucault’s method may be
summed up in Marcuse’s desideratum to,‘Make the established language itself speak that which it conceals or excludes, for what is to
be revealed and denounced is operative within the universe of ordinary discourse and action,
and the prevailing language contains the metalanguage.’ (Marcuse 1991).
His method of analysis is based on the assumption that the function of research is both to
increase our awareness of what is going on in society and to change society in the process.
Although Foucault’s histories can be viewed as a form of praxis, his position is more radical.
Marx argues for the close collaboration of theory and practice (see Megill 1985). Foucault
however conflated theory into practice. Megill (1985) argues that, ‘there is a hiatus in Marx
between the interpretation of the world and its transformation.’ Foucault bridges this lacuna.
In a conversation in 1972 with Gilles Deluze, Foucault says, 'theory does not express,
translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice,' (Megill 1985).
Genealogy as Dialectics
The final important characteristic of genealogy is dialectics.
The second important Marxist notion for understanding Foucault’s method of critique is
dialectics. Marx used the notion of dialectics to explain the process of historical changes.
Within conventional thinking, society progresses through the increased accumulation of
scientific knowledge and increased standards of living as measured for example by GNP.
Marx suggested that in fact it was a completely different set of factors that conditioned the
future. Marx argued that capitalist societies were replete with inherent contradictions that
would lead to their own destruction. He suggested that this dialectical society evolved
through a process of resistance and transformation. Marx believed that ideological changes in
society were linked with changes in the economic system of production.
Marx used the notion of dialectics as a conceptual tool to analyse and critique society. Marx’s
dialectical method was not just about trying to deduce knowledge, but rather, was a critique of
power and domination within capitalist societies (Poster 1984).
30
Hegel was very influential within the milieu in which Foucault developed his work (Megill
1985) and indeed a significant part of Foucault’s thesis can be viewed as a challenge to
Hegel’s notion of dialectics (Megill 1985). Hoy (1994) argues that Foucault rejects Hegel’s,
‘dialectic of contradiction.’ However, while Foucault’s work can be viewed as a reaction
against Hegelian dialectics, there may be a sense in which he developed his own form of
dialectical method. Poster (1984) presents genealogy as an alternative to Marx’s dialectic.
Foucault’s dialectic is not between ideology and reality as in Marx, or between what is and
what could be as in Marcuse (see Marcuse 1991) or between language and reality as in
Adorno, although I do think that Foucault was influenced by Marcuse’s notion of imagination
and Adorno’s negative dialectics. Foucault's dialectic is between genealogical interpretations
of history as progressive subjugation and conventional interpretations of history as
progressive enlightenment. The dialectic occurs between the conventional, taken for granted
view of the world and Foucault's alternative description of it (see Poster 1984). While
conventional historiographic approaches view the past as a simulacrum of the present
Foucault’s genalogical approach attempts to present the past as disjointed from the present.
(Carnegie & Napier 1996)
CONCLUSION
Where genealogy has been used within accounting research, there seems to have been a strict
application of historical method. For example, Hopwood (1987) gives an account of the
historical development of Josiah Wedgwood’s costing system; Loft (1986) provides an
account of the development of current costing techniques by the government during the First
World War and Miller and O'Leary (1987) study how standard costing practices emerged in
the USA at the turn of the century (see Armstrong 1994). Neimark (1990) expresses concern
about these applications of Foucault’s method. Her complaint is that these kinds of historical
analysis are not critical enough. This objection apparently relates to the extent to which
Foucault’s work is removed from, what she believes, is its Marxist foundation. Neimark says,'Plucking Foucault away from Marx removes his work from its ground, robs it of what could
be its emancipatory potential and thereby yields a Foucault that readily reinforces the current
global integration of capitalism and its ideologies.' (Neimark 1990).
Given the radical and critical nature of Foucault’s genealogies, perhaps this reservation is not
unfounded.
This paper has attempted to explain how Foucault’s genealogies were undertaken as a form of
social criticism. However, the problem remains that Foucault does not appear to provide a
basis for his method. Indeed, opponents of Foucault suggest that his critiques failed because
31
he offered no moral, political or rational standards to justify his claims (Hoy 1994). Neimark
(1990), for example, calls Foucault a relativist and contends that,'like all relativist philosophers, Foucault is open to questions about his own grounding. How
can Foucault know what he claims without some general concepts, without a theory.'
The problem of a basis for Foucault’s work has been highlighted by a number of theorists
(Wolin 1992). Once you argue that reason itself is duplicitous with power, to what do you
turn in order to analyse and critique society? Both Habermas and Taylor criticise Foucault on
this point. Habermas in particular criticises the normative basis of Foucault’s method of
genealogy. Habermas attempts to identify an inconsistency in Foucault’s work between his,
‘happy positivism’ and the value choices he espouses or seems to espouse (i.e. its normative
basis).
However, this perhaps overlooks the claims of Foucault’s thesis on power. Foucault argued
that knowledge is always produced by power and, as such, is always tied to specific interests.
While it may be the case that from within a particular system of thought, for example
Marxism, it may be possible to derive a fairly clear set of justifications for political action,
that does not mean that that action has any ultimate grounding. The basis for choosing
between Marxism and Fascism for example, will be justified by reference to some other
system of values like humanism, but the choice of the second system again has no grounding.
Thus, to be a Marxist may ultimately just be an intuitive or arbitrary decision. It is not just
Foucault who has an insurmountable problem providing an ultimate grounding for his beliefs
(Grey 1994). ‘As with the related question of the grounding of political belief, epistemic
privilege may ultimately be a matter of faith.’
32
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