View
2
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
The Decline of European Sea Power
Europe's Navies in a Time of Austerity and Brinkmanship
Diplomarbeit
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Magisters der Philosophie
an der Karl-Franzens Universität Graz
vorgelegt von
Jeremy STÖHS
am Institut für Geschichte
Begutachter: Ao.Univ.-Prof. i.R. Mag. Dr. phil. Siegfried Beer
Graz, 2015
1
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I want to express my profound gratitude to my parents.
This thesis is the result of their unconditional support throughout my life. I owe
all of my achievements to them.
I also want to thank Professor Siegfried Beer for encouraging me to pursue
excellence in my studies and for providing me with so many opportunities to
study, discuss, and write about what interests me most.
Finally, I want to thank Diana for all her love.
2
Table of Content
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................................................................... 3
List of Figures: ........................................................................................................................... 5
PART ONE ............................................................................................................................... 7
1) Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 7
2) Principles of Sea Power ................................................................................................... 14
3) The ‘Pivot’ Towards Asia – and the Consequences for Europe ...................................... 23
PART TWO ............................................................................................................................ 30
4) Case Studies: Analyzing Europe’s Navies ....................................................................... 30
5) The UNITED KINGDOM: Keep Calm and Get Those Carriers Operational ................. 33
6) FRANCE: Stretched but Willing – Europe’s Most Capable Naval Force ....................... 50
7) ITALY: The Marina Militare – Between Global Interest and Regional Necessities. ..... 65
8) SPAIN: Creating a Well-Balanced Fleet – and Maintaining It ........................................ 81
8) TURKEY and GREECE: Allies and Yet Not Friends – Diverging Naval Powers ......... 96
8.1) Turkey ......................................................................................................................... 100
8.2) Greece ......................................................................................................................... 105
9) GERMANY: Reluctance and Reductions – Not Stepping Up to the Plate .................... 111
10) DENMARK and the NETHERLANDS: Commercial Might and Military Inaptitude 127
10.1) Denmark .................................................................................................................... 131
10.2) The Netherlands ........................................................................................................ 140
11) FINLAND, SWEDEN, NORWAY: Scandinavian Navies Sticking to their Guns ..... 147
11.1) Finland ...................................................................................................................... 150
11.2) Sweden ...................................................................................................................... 153
11.3) Norway ...................................................................................................................... 159
PART THREE ...................................................................................................................... 166
12) Analysis and Observations – Quo Vadis Europe? ....................................................... 166
13) Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 174
3
Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 183
Selected Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 189
List of Illustrations ................................................................................................................. 207
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
A2/AD: anti-access/area-denial
AAW: anti-air warfare
ABM: anti-ballistic missile
APAR: active phased-array radar, also AESA: active electronically scanned array
APR: Asian-Pacific Region
ASN: anti-ship missile
AsuW: anti-surface warfare
ASW: anti-submarine warfare
CATOBAR: catapult-arrested take-off barrier-assisted recovery
CIWS: close-in weapon system
CODOG: combined diesel or gas
COIN: counterinsurgency
CT: counterterrorism
CTF: combined task force
DoD: United States Department of Defense
EEZ: exclusive economic zone
EMI/EMC: Electromagnetic interference / electromagnetic compatibility
EMPAR: European Multifunction Phased Array Radar
ERAM: Extended Range Active Missile (RIM-174 Standard SM-6)
ESSM: Evolved Sea-Sparrow Missile
EU: European Union
FREMM: Frégate européenne multi-mission
GDP: gross domestic product
GIN: Greenland-Iceland-Norway (gap)
HADR: human assistance and disaster relief
4
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (also IS: Islamic State)
LCF: Luchtverdedigings en Commando Fregat, Dutch air defense frigate
LCS: littoral combat ship
LHA: landing helicopter assault (amphibious assault ship)
LHD: landing helicopter dock
LPD: landing platform dock
LSD: landing ship dock
MCM: mine countermeasure
MM: Marina Militare
MN: Marine Nationale
MoD: Ministry of Defense (general)
MW: mine warfare
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLG: Netherlands Guilder
OPV: offshore patrol vessel
OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
PAAMS: principle anti-air missile system
RAM: radar absorbing material,
RDN: Royal Danish Navy
RIMPAC: Rim of the Pacific (exercise)
RN: Royal Navy
RNLN: Royal Netherlands Navy
RNoN: Royal Norwegian Navy
SAM: surface to air missile
SAR: search and rescue
SDR: Strategic Defense Review (U.K.)
SDSR: Strategic Defense and Security Review (U.K.)
SIGINT: signal intelligence
SLBM: submarine launched ballistic missile
SLOC: sea-lines of communication
SMART-L: Signaal Multibeam Acquisition Radar for Tracking, L-Band
SNMG: Standing Naval Maritime Group
5
SSBN: ship submersible ballistic missile nuclear (nuclear powered ballistic missile
submarines)
SSK: ship submersible conventional (diesel-electric powered submarine)
SSM: surface to surface missile
SSN: ship submersible nuclear (nuclear powered attack submarine)
STANAVFORLANT: Standing Naval Force Atlantic
STANAVFORMED: Standing Naval Force Mediterranean
STOVL: short take-off or vertical landing
TEU: Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (standard container)
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISON: United Nations Operation in Somalia
US: United States
USN: United States Navy
VLS: vertical launch system
VSTOL: vertical and/or short take-off and landing
List of Figures:
Figure 1: United Kingdom – Defense Spending ...................................................................... 33
Figure 2: United Kingdom – Number of Major Vessels .......................................................... 34
Figure 3: France – Defense Spending ...................................................................................... 50
Figure 4: France – Number of Major Vessels .......................................................................... 51
Figure 5: Italy – Defense Spending .......................................................................................... 65
Figure 6: Italy – Number of Major Vessels. ............................................................................. 65
Figure 7: Spain – Defense Spending ........................................................................................ 81
Figure 8: Spain – Number of Major Vessels. ........................................................................... 81
Figure 9: Turkey – Defense Spending ...................................................................................... 96
Figure 10: Turkey – Number of Major Vessels. ...................................................................... 97
Figure 11: Greece – Defense Spending .................................................................................... 97
Figure 12: Greece – Number of Major Vessels. ....................................................................... 98
Figure 13: Germany – Defense Spending .............................................................................. 111
6
Figure 14: Germany – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................. 112
Figure 15: The Netherlands – Defense Spending ................................................................... 127
Figure 16: The Netherlands – Number of Major Vessels. ..................................................... 127
Figure 17: Denmark – Defense Spending .............................................................................. 128
Figure 18: Denmark – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................. 128
Figure 19: Finland – Defense Spending ................................................................................. 147
Figure 20: Sweden – Defense Spending ................................................................................ 147
Figure 21: Sweden – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................... 148
Figure 22: Norway – Defense Spending ................................................................................ 148
Figure 23: Norway – Number of Major Vessels. ................................................................... 149
Figure 24: United United States – Defense Spending ............................................................ 183
Figure 25: United States – Number of Major Vessels. .......................................................... 183
Figure 26: Japan – Defense Spending .................................................................................... 184
Figure 27: Japan – Number of Major Vessels. ....................................................................... 184
Figure 28: South Korea – Defense Spending ......................................................................... 185
Figure 29: South Korea – Number of Major Vessels. ............................................................ 185
Figure 30: China – Defense Spending .................................................................................... 186
Figure 31: China – Number of Major Vessels. ...................................................................... 186
Figure 32: India – Defense Spending ..................................................................................... 187
Figure 33: India – Number of Major Vessels. ........................................................................ 187
Figure 34: Russia – Defense Spending .................................................................................. 188
Figure 35: Russia – Number of Major Vessels. ..................................................................... 188
7
PART ONE
1) Introduction
There are no trends extant – technological, economic, political, or military – which suggest
an imminent diminution in the strategic leverage of sea power.1 (Colin S. Gray)
For over the past five hundred years, every single century can be considered a
maritime century. Decade after decade, seafaring nations such as the Portuguese, Spanish,
French, Dutch and English ventured farther out into the vast realms of the blue waters in
search of uncharted lands, new trade routes, and vast riches. In essence, these efforts can be
considered one of the driving forces behind globalization. However, this process was by no
means always peaceful and many wars were fought to decide who was to command the sea. In
those days it was necessary for economic power to be backed by military force and few rulers
were foolish enough to underestimate the utility of naval forces when it came to protecting
their interests – the maritime realm was no exception to that rule. It was this competitive
nature of trade among the leading European powers and the useful marriage of commercial
and military sea power that put the West far ahead of the rest, thus permitting the creation of
great colonial empires.2 Consequently, other powers unwilling or unable to follow suit, such
as the Chinese Ming Dynasty or the Ottoman Empire were degraded to second or even third-
rank powers.3
Today, naval scholars rejoice at the achievements of those exciting times. Historians
marvel at the superb seamanship of Magellan, Vasco da Gama, and Sir Francis Drake and
study the military feats of Lord Nelson, Tōgō Heihachirō, and Admiral Nimitz. The sea is no
longer the great unknown it once was – full of opportunities as well as danger. As a matter of
fact, naval conflict has become a rare sight and only a few people are still alive to tell the tales
of the last Great War at sea. Yet the underpinning rules of geopolitics remain constant and the
oceans of this world, as we shall see, will continue to constitute the most important medium
of power distribution on this planet. As Colin S. Gray states: “If the coming of the railroad,
internal combustion engine, air, missile, nuclear, and space eras could not demote the strategic
1 Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power, The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: The Free
Press, 1992): 289. 2 See Chris Parry, Super Highway, Sea Power in the 21
st Century (London: Elliot and Thompson Limited, 2014):
65. The economist and historian, Niall Ferguson discussed Western ascendency more broadly. See Niall
Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (New York: Penguin Books, 2011). 3 See Parry, Highway, 10-23.
8
value of sea power significantly, it is difficult to see what could emerge to do so over the next
several decades.”4
It may seem somewhat peculiar for a scholar from Austria to write about a topic
concerning naval matters. The end of World War I and the subsequent provisions of the
Treaty of Saint-Germain not only stripped Austria of its entire naval fleet but, more
importantly, also of its access to the sea. Therefore, (except for the period under Nazi rule)
since 1918, Austria has been a landlocked country and thus part of only 11 percent of the
world’s states that do not to have a coastline.5 However, its prosperity and wealth for a large
part depend on the sea – even if the average Austrian citizen wastes little time pondering on
this circumstance.
Life on our planet finds its origin in the salty matter we call the ocean. Over two-thirds
of the earth’s surface is covered by this enormous body of water which, together with the
seabed below, provides mankind with a precious source of food, energy, and raw materials.
However, of equally great importance is the ability to carry these goods in the currently safest
and most cost-efficient way – by sea. In fact, 90 percent of global commerce is currently
transported by ships, along lines that span across the oceans from continent to continent,
which one can imagine as great highways at sea.6 What many people in Austria, and
elsewhere for that matter, forget is that in the globalized world of today every single state is
either directly or indirectly dependent on the unimpeded flow of maritime commerce.
Although Austria does not import and export goods by ship its two largest trading partners,
Germany and Italy, do. As a matter of fact, together with their European partners both
countries have significant stakes in seaborne trade. Were a crisis to arise somewhere in the
world to make trade via these sea lanes impossible, and be it for just a short period of time,
the global supply chain would falter, possibly having severe repercussions on the industries,
economies and people across the globe.7 The decision of Iran’s leadership to close the Strait
of Hormuz – through which over 17 billion barrels of oil pass every day –would, for example,
quickly be felt across Europe, even in a state as ‘benign’ as Austria. Therefore, the freedom of
navigation, or the ‘good order at sea’ as it is often referred to, is of utmost importance.
4 Gray, Leverage, 290.
5 Parry, Highway, 37.
6 The term “great highway” was coined by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, one of the most prominent naval
strategists. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan On Naval Warfare. Selections from the Writing of Rear Admiral
Alfred T. Mahan, ed. Allan Westcott (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999 [1941]): 17. 7 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, 18 March (2011): II. 4.
http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm.
9
For the past seventy years the United States and its navy have protected the
international system of maritime trade. As the retired Admiral Chris Parry observes, “America
[has been] able to protect – and guarantee itself and its friends – access to the world’s
resources and deny access to an opponent or other disturber of the international peace.”8
However, the tides are turning. As we speak we are witnessing fundamental changes in
geopolitics, the likes of which we have not seen in the last five hundred years. For the first
time in modern history, the center of power is shifting from the West (the Atlantic and
Europe) to the East (the Indian Ocean and Asian-Pacific Region). In light of this evolution
there is the possibility that the United States, like Britain before, will no longer be willing or
able to perform the role as the global guardian of the seas.9
Yet security at sea will remain of pivotal importance, not least for Europe. Hence, it is
also in Europe’s interest to make provisions to maintain sufficient military power in case of an
emergency, something, as we will see, the European states have neglected over the last
twenty-five years. Sea power, both of economic and military nature, “will be critical to the
world’s future, one way or another”, Till concludes.” The only real question”, he adds, “is
whose seapower it will be?”10
Over the course of the following chapters I intend to provide
some answers to this pressing question.
The main aim of this thesis is to gain insight into the development of Europe’s naval
forces since the end of the Cold War. In order to better comprehend the drastic changes the
European navies have undergone over the past twenty-five years, I will conduct a thorough
analysis of the countries’ defense policies as well as the evolution, deployment, and
capabilities of their naval forces.
In particular, the focus of my thesis will lie on the effects the Soviet dissolution had on
European naval strategy. In an increasingly diverse security environment, states and their
armed services have had to deal with an emergence of new technology, growing threats and
conflict running the entire gamut of the intensity spectrum. Many European states have
grappled with this seismic shift by drastically transforming their military forces in an attempt
to deal with a widening range of security challenges. As a consequence, today many European
naval forces bear little resemblance to the respective fleets at the end of the Cold War.
With the Soviet Union and its Communist Party relegated to the pages of history in
December 1991, to many it seemed as if the threat to Europe’s security had disappeared once
8 Parry, Highway, 85.
9 Ibid.
10 Geoffrey Till, Seapower. A Guide for the Twenty-First Century: Revised and Updated Third Edition (New
York: Routledge, 2013): xv.
10
and for all. After almost sixty years of militarization and the looming threat of nuclear war
within the heart of Europe, peace had finally come. As an immediate reaction, military
funding was cut across the board as the large armies, fashioned for the cataclysmic showdown
with the forces of the Warsaw Pact, were no longer needed. As I will show, nearly all the
European countries reduced their defense spending in the initial aftermath of the Cold War.
For the most part, these reductions have continued to the present day. Unsurprisingly, this has
led to Europe’s armies being considerably smaller in size. Germany’s military, for example,
had roughly 330,000 active duty personnel and 700,000 reservists in 1990. In comparison, the
current land forces have been reduced to around 60,000 service members. At the same time
the number of tank units has dropped from 16 panzer brigades to 12 panzer companies.11
Or
put differently, out of the 2,125 Leopard 2 main battle tanks delivered to the Bundeswehr only
176 remain in operational units.12
Similar examples can be found across Europe. Not only had
the threat of the Red Army and its large mechanized forces disappeared but, more
importantly, the military operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan heralded a
paradigmatic shift in how land warfare was fought.13
Although heavy armored units
represented the only credible protection against improvised explosive devices, rocket-
propelled grenades and road-side bombs in these contingencies, the evolution of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism warfare made large numbers of mechanized units
seem anachronistic and therefore unnecessary.
Naval warfare, on the other hand, has also witnessed a significant – yet somewhat less
profound – change. The primary functions of naval forces, as we shall see later, have largely
remained constant over the centuries and navies today conduct very similar missions as they
did a quarter century ago, albeit over a far broader range of possible contingency. For
example, today a greater emphasis is being placed on projecting power from the sea onto land
or using naval assets for human assistance operations. Notwithstanding this the evolution of
naval theory and the different interpretations of what navies ought to be able to do,14
the
maritime sphere, by nature, precludes similar developments as have been witnessed on land.
Asymmetrical warfare, despite being a buzzword in naval quarters, will arguably have far less
impact on naval planning and the shape of naval forces than the unconventional fighting
11
F. Stephen Larrabee et al, NATO and the Challenges of Austerity (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012):
28. 12
Ezio Bonsignore et al, “Germany,” Military Technology The World Defense Almanac 2014, Issue 1 (2014):
130. 13
For an excellent account of the development of war, see Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in
the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2005). 14
For a detailed description of naval functions see Till, Seapower, 32-35.
11
which has taken place in Baghdad, Mosul or Helmand Province has had on the general
perception of land warfare. The “wars among the people”15
we see on land today cannot be
fought at sea. As Sir Julian S. Corbett wrote in his seminal work, Principles of Maritime
Strategy, “[y]ou cannot conquer sea because it is not susceptible of ownership [and] you
cannot subsist your armed forces upon it as you can upon enemy’s territory”.16
Therefore,
because the oceans are uninhabited by man no person can be subjugated to the maritime
forces at sea.
While there is a general reluctance among Western states to engage in ground
operations after the experiences in the so-called ‘War on Terrorism’, the number of naval
operations conducted by European states, however, has continuously expanded over the past
decade. Yet the drastic decline of available naval assets, a concomitant of general downsizing
of Europe’s armed forces and the consequent reduction of capabilities have left operational
gaps and precarious shortfalls in training and readiness. These developments pose grave risks
to the future of Europe’s ability to protect its interests at sea.
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part One introduces the general topic, as well as
the research question, whereupon Chapter Two will examine the fundamental elements of the
maritime domain, as well as the basic principles of sea power. Based on the writings of the
two most renowned naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan and Julian S. Corbett, as well as more
recent publications by, inter alia, Colin S. Gray, Geoffrey Till, and Chris Parry, the utility of
naval forces will be discussed. Chapter Three focuses on the current shift in geopolitics –
from Europe and the Atlantic Ocean towards the Asian-Pacific Region (APR). This trend, as I
will show, will be one of the defining factors of power distribution in the 21st century. As a
matter of fact, the United States, as Europe’s closest ally and most important NATO member,
is in the process of “pivoting”17
towards the Asia-Pacific in order to secure its national
interests there. At the same time, numerous countries in the region (in particular China, India,
Japan and South Korea) have become regional powers in varying degrees and all wield
substantial political, economic and military might. While most of the actors in the APR have
apparently understood the importance of robust naval forces, Europe, in comparison,
continuous to suffer under an austere financial environment, budget deficits and the lack of
political will, as well as public support, to strengthen its naval capabilities.
15
Smith, Utility, 3. 16
Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications 2004 [1911]): 89. 17
The rebalancing of the United States towards the Asian-Pacific Region is described in further detail in Chapter
Three.
12
Part Two represents the mainstay of my thesis. In it, Chapter Four will provide an
outline of the parameters according to which the analysis of the subsequent case studies will
be conducted, while Chapters Five to Eleven cover the majority of Europe’s naval forces. On
the one hand, my research will be based on each country’s defense policies and naval
doctrine, promulgated in official documents, white papers, and public statements. On the
other hand, the composition, size, and capabilities of the individual fleets will need to undergo
close examination.
To begin with, the development of the four major European naval powers, the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain, will be construed. All four fleets continue to maintain
capabilities over the entire spectrum of naval warfare but have also been considerably reduced
in size, allowing some of them to just barely operate a so-called balanced fleet.
Thereafter, the navies of Turkey and Greece will be compared. Despite both countries
being NATO members, their strained relationship has had substantial ramifications on naval
doctrine and the composition of their naval forces. While Turkey is apparently aspiring to
become a regional power in its own right, thereby going to great lengths to modernize its
fleet, Greece is unable to maintain such an arms race with its larger neighbor and has relapsed
to a defensive naval strategy.
Germany is also a country which is likely to play an increasingly important role in
Europe’s development in the 21st century. However, the German Navy has been considerably
truncated over the last two decades and despite commissioning highly sophisticated warships,
its surface and submarine fleet is far smaller than at the end of the Cold War.
The Netherlands and Denmark have a rich history as seafaring nations. Although their
naval heydays, during which they had a major influence on the events in Europe and the
world, have passed, they continue to be major players in maritime trade. Thus, it could be
expected that both states operate reasonably capable naval forces. In fact, the Dutch and
Danish navies have made some substantial improvements in terms of the capabilities of the
warships they have put into service over the last two decades. On the other hand, as will be
discussed, both countries’ naval forces have been drastically reduced in the same period of
time, both in number and in the range of operations they can perform, ceding some critical
capabilities along the way.
The northern European nations of Norway, Sweden and Finland provide interesting
examples of relatively small states effectively dealing with sinking defense budgets and the
rising costs of equipment and personnel. Despite Sweden and Finland being neutral and
13
therefore self-responsible for their national defense – while Norway’s national security is
assured through NATO’s Article 5 – these countries’ navies will be examined in conjunction.
Some countries, such as Poland, the Baltic States, and Belgium will only be mentioned
in passing and other states will not be addressed at all. However, I am confident that my
analysis includes all major European naval forces and provides a comprehensive overview of
naval strategies, defense procurement policies, naval capabilities and recent operations. The
findings of my case studies will support my assessments, predictions, and conclusion of this
thesis. It is worth noting that an analysis of the Coast Guards is beyond the scope of this
study, despite their great importance regarding littoral security.
Part Three will finally recapitulate on the main tenets of the preceding chapters. In the
penultimate Chapter Twelve, I will provide substantial evidence that the previous and
continuing budget cuts to the naval branch of the armed forces should be considered serious
brinkmanship. Ultimately, I will conclude that based on the understanding of sea power as a
prerequisite for political influence and economic health, the geopolitical shift towards the
Asian-Pacific Region, and most importantly the general decline of European naval
capabilities, Europe’s role and influence in the world will be seriously jeopardized in the
future. To avoid the possible detriment such a development could have on the prosperity and
security of the continent and the people living on it, the European states, (in particular its
NATO members), need to revoke their propensity for saving as much money as possible on
their naval forces.
History has provided numerous examples in which the rise and fall of great powers
was decided by a state’s or an alliance’s ability to successfully engage in trade by sea, and if
challenged, protect its vital interests by hard power in the form of its naval forces. Four
hundred years ago, Sir Walter Raleigh famously stated that “whoever commands the sea,
commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the
world, and consequently the world itself.”18
So far his words have held true. Despite dramatic
changes in the global security environment over the last two decades, there is no indication
that the fundamental axioms of sea power will be called into question any time soon.
Therefore, it lies in the responsibility of current and future governments to decide whether
Europe will be relegated to the outermost fringes of a world centered on the Pacific Ocean, or
if in fact, Europe can reverse its growing geopolitical and strategic irrelevance by reviving
and committing to its naval capabilities.
18
Sir Walter Raleigh quoted in Parry, Highway, 3.
14
2) Principles of Sea Power
Earth is called the Blue Planet for a reason. From space the shimmering blue orb
allows the observer to comprehend the sheer vastness of the world’s oceans. 70 percent of its
surface is covered with water and 80 percent of the world’s population lives within 150
kilometers of the coast.19
Although we neither find shelter nor sanctuary among its waves, we
have been able to access the valuable resources it contains and found means to move upon its
surface in a most cost-efficient manner. Thus, the world’s trade is dependent on the waters
connecting the continents. In fact, 90 percent of global commerce flows by sea. What is more,
the unique characteristics of the continental landmass and demographic factors have led to 75
percent of this trade having to pass a small number of narrow canals and straits.20
The moment man ventured out to sea, the maritime realm became a sphere of
conflicting interests. Different parties sought to expand their influence by peaceful means of
commercial enterprise as well as by the use of force. Hence, the concept of sea power was
born. Despite the dramatic evolution of mankind over the ages, many principles which govern
this concept have remained constant. “[M]uch about sea power is enduring” former British
Admiral Chris Parry notes. “[It] can be best expressed as the combined investment in the sea
of the various components and resources of a state or enterprise in the pursuit of favourable
outcomes”.21
These investments, are neither constant nor can they be strictly categorized, but
instead depend on a multitude of factors. In general, a distinction can be made between hard
power and soft power. The former is based on the use or threat of force (economic or
military), while the second is understood to be ruled by the principles of cooperation and
consensus, by means of diplomacy, respectable policies, and other ‘benign’ measures.22
Over
the last centuries, those countries capable of merging hard and soft power, such as Portugal,
Spain, Denmark and England, have created vast colonial empires and could make their
economic and military presence felt around the world.23
19
NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, 18 March (2011): II. 4.
http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm. 20
Ibid. 21
Parry, Highway, 258. 22
The term was coined by Joseph Nye in his book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power
and expanded in 2004 in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. In the preface of his latter
publication the author briefly defines what he considers to be ‘soft power’: “What is soft power? It is the ability
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means To Success in World
Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): Preface. 23
Parry, Highway, 65.
15
Illustration 1: Arguably most renowned naval strategist: Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Abbildung 1
From this bipartite, sea power can be subdivided into four elements: 1) the business of
international commercial trade by sea; 2) the utilization of the ocean’s resources, be it the
exploitation of oil and gas under the seabed or creating energy from the ocean’s continuous
tidal flow; 3) using naval forces or economic instruments in support of national interests in
time of peace; and lastly 4) naval operations in war.24
As we can see, sea power cannot be
fully understood without considering all these aspects of maritime operations. “In this regard,
appearance can be deceptive”, Parry notes: “[T]he most powerful navy in the world is that of
the USA; the largest merchant fleet is held by the Greeks; the largest fishing fleet, by volume
and activity, is the Chinese; and the biggest commercial shipping company is Danish. In this
sense, sea power is diffused.”25
Trying to address all forms of sea power is well
beyond the scope of this thesis. My main aim
therefore, as was stated in the introduction, is to
focus on Europe’s naval forces; in other words
the individual states’ naval hard power.
Although mainly European naval issues – in
peace as well as in crisis and war – will be
analyzed, the economic factors of sea power,
(commerce and the exploitation of natural
resources) merit close attention and will
therefore also be addressed over the course of
the following chapters.
History has shown that the marriage of
naval sea power and commercial sea power
constitutes a principal factor in a state’s ability
to gain power, wealth and prosperity. As A.T.
Mahan famously stated “Control of the sea by
maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the world … (and)
is the chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of the nations.”26
Much has changed since Mahan published his profound writings in 1890. However, his ideas
and those of his British contemporary, the naval strategist Julian S. Corbett, remain
quintessential for the understanding of sea power. Their insight into maritime strategy remains
24
Parry, Highway, 4. 25
Parry, Highway, 4. 26
Mahan quoted in Till, Seapower, 57.
16
as timely as ever, in regard to military as well as economic issues. Of course, from a modern-
day perspective, the two strategists based their presumptions on the somewhat “old fashioned
[concept of the] nation-state as the basic unit of concern”; while today we are already
witnessing a period in which these formally established systems of statehood, society and
civilization are being perforated by the profound changes in the way peoples engage with
each other. Notwithstanding these developments, any scholar concerned with maritime issues
needs to indulge in these “seminal and enduring works of maritime strategy”, Till
underscores.27
This is because the elements of sea power are governed by “the unchangeable,
or unchanging, order of things remaining the same in cause and effect, from age to age.”28
They belong, as it were, to the Order of Nature, of whose stability so much [was heard
of in Mahan’s days]; whereas tactics, using as its instruments the weapons made by
man, shares in the change and progress of the race from generation to generation.
From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down,
but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock.29
Therefore, we can assume that the principles of sea power, described in this chapter will
continue to remain applicable in the decades to come. In regard to maritime strategy, war on
and from the sea, and the utility of sea power in general, a close reading of history is of
paramount importance in forming viable conclusions and making meaningful predictions of
the future. As Mahan wrote in the opening pages of his chapter on Naval Principles, “a study
of the military history of the past, […] is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to
correct ideas and to the skillful conduct of war in the future.”30
He continues by arguing that
throughout time military tactics have often undergone change due to the evolution in weapon
technology, while other aspects of war at sea have remained unaltered and universally
applicable, thereby forming general principles.31
One of these general principles is the purpose of naval forces. The British scholar Ken
Booth argued that the three basic functions of a navy are its military, diplomatic, and policing
roles. Of the three elements the military function represents the foundation of this trinity.32
Essentially, military force can be utilized to attack an enemy, to defend oneself against attack,
27
Till, Seapower, 349. 28
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1890):
88.
A digital version is freely accessible under: https://archive.org/details/seanpowerinf00maha. 29
Ibid. 30
Mahan, Naval Warfare, 4. 31
Ibid. 32
Ken Booth in Karl Rommetveit and Bjørn Terjesen, “Introduction,” in: The Rise of naval power in Asia and
Europe’s decline, (eds.) Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø (Oslo Files: Dec. 2012): 10.
17
or to deter an enemy from attacking. 33
Naval forces are in many cases the best tool to perform
these tasks. They are able to react to crisis quickly and can project power over great distances.
At the same time, navies have distinct advantages over other military forces because they are
able to operate freely in the vast realms of international waters. As Admiral Carlisle A.H.
Trost put it “[o]perating in international waters, [navies enjoy] the unique advantage of being
able to signal menace without violating sovereignty, and once the need is past, of being able
to sail over the horizon without signaling retreat.”34
However, ultimately navies have one sole
purpose “to influence decisions and events on land, because that is where people live.”35
In order to have an influence upon history, as the title of Mahan’s book indicates, a
country’s navy has to command the sea. However, it would seem obvious that given the
vastness of the oceans any effort to patrol its entire surface at all times would be a hopeless
undertaking. “You cannot conquer the sea because it is not susceptible of ownership”, Corbett
rightfully pointed out. “You cannot, as lawyers say, ‘reduce it into possession,’ because you
cannot exclude neutral from it as you can from territory you conquer [and] you cannot subsist
your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy’s territory.”36
Therefore, so his conclusion,
the natural state for it is to be uncommanded.37
So how can a naval force exercise sea power if
it cannot command the sea such as an army can command enemy territory?
According to Mahan the key lay in ‘communications’. “[The term designates] the lines
of movement by which a military body, army or fleet, is kept in living condition with the
national power.”38
However, such lines of communication are not limited to military strategy
but rather can be applied more generally to any form of communication between two
geographical points of distribution.39
For example, the great highways at sea on which 90
percent of global commerce travels represent such strategic lines of communication. A navy
capable of controlling this maritime traffic is, in turn, able to greatly influence decisions made
on land. Both Mahan and Corbett therefore ascribe to the principle that controlling these
strategic lines of communications (SLOCs) is the key to preeminent sea power.
By winning command of the sea we remove [a possible] barrier from our own path,
thereby placing ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon the national
life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time we solidify it against him and prevent
33
James Eberle, “Maritime Strategy,” Naval Forces, Vol. 8, 2 (1987): 38. 34
Carlisle A.H. Trost, “Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected
Documents, (eds.) John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008): 263. 35
Parry, Highway, 64. 36
Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications 2004 [1911]): 89. 37
Ibid., 87. 38
Mahan, Naval Warfare, 52. 39
Corbett, Principles, 90.
18
his exerting direct military pressure upon ourselves. Command of the sea, therefore,
means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial
or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications,
and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory.40
Concordantly, since the end of World War II the U.S. Navy has been able to fashion a fleet
powerful enough to control the global SLOCs. In fact, throughout this period only the Soviet
Union seriously challenged U.S. naval preponderance. However, throughout its history Russia
had been a continental land power, and despite its impressive naval buildup during the Cold
War, it failed to overcome Western naval dominance. Ultimately, the NATO alliance and its
principles of sea power withstood the test.41
Gray further expands on the superiority of sea
powers over land power:
One argument is that modern history has shown the inability of preponderant
continental power to fashion potent enough maritime (or air) instruments for the defeat
of offshore sea powers. Another, more convincing is that no land power has been
sufficiently preponderant on land as to have the surplus resources necessary for the
conduct of successful war against great-power enemies offshore.42
Today, the pillars on which U.S. naval strategy rests are a reiteration of this “maritime
narrative.”43
Despite criticism for not having a comprehensive maritime strategy, provisions
are being made for the U.S. Navy to remain the world’s only globally steaming navy, capable
of substantial forward presence in the most important regions of the world, maintaining
credible nuclear and conventional deterrence, exacting sea-control and power projection
globally, providing maritime security, and lastly supporting human assistance and disaster
relief (HADR).44
The conclusion we can draw from over five hundred years of predominance through
sea powers would likely have us believe that the Western European states also understand the
importance of powerful naval fleets as a guarantor for economic wealth and prosperity.
However, it seems that in the wake of the Soviet demise, the security of Europe as well as the
safety of international system of trade was considered to be inviolable by the leadership in
London, Paris, Berlin and Rome. How else can the dramatic decline in the size and capability
of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold War be explained?
40
Ibid., 90. 41
Till, Seapower, 1-5. 42
Gray, Leverage, 281. 43
Ibid., 5. 44
See Department of Defense, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, (Washington DC, 2007).
19
This is my prediction for the future – whatever hasn’t happened will happen and no-one will
be safe from it.’ […] in the dynamic security environment, any assessment of the future is
truly only as valuable as its facility for being up-graded.45
Today, the process of designing and building capital warships can take up to three
decades. Therefore, by the time a ship enters service the strategic environment in which it
operates might differ greatly from that which it was designed for. Similarly, if a government
decides to cancel the procurement of new weapon platforms or finds itself under financial
pressure to reduce the size of its fleet, this will entail profound strategic ramifications for the
country’s naval forces down the line. Therefore, eliminating naval capabilities, such as the
ability to operate submarines due to short-term fiscal restraints, can be considered
brinkmanship of the first order. In practice, it strips the country of an important political tool
of hard power and in most cases the enormous costs to regain such capabilities make
amendments unfeasible.
What is more, modern warships have to be capable of conducting a vast variety of
different missions. During the greater part of the Cold War NATO destroyers and frigates
were generally designed to protect the convoys from the United States to Europe against
Soviet submarines, while guided-missile cruisers provided the necessary air defense for
carrier battle groups. Nowadays, new surface combatants are no longer classified as cruisers,
while modern-day destroyers and frigates conduct everything from anti-piracy operations to
fleet air defense tasks. Therefore, they need to incorporate built-in redundancies and sufficient
room for incremental upgrades over the course of their service life – which in many cases can
reach fifty years. As a result, a trend is currently noticeable among most naval forces in the
world towards operating large, multi-purpose surface combatants.
As the size and sophistication of these platforms grow, so does the price tag of each
individual ship. It is important to note that this development constitutes one of the reasons for
the shrinkage of many navies over the last decades. For most states it is no longer feasible to
operate fleets of dozens – and sometimes hundreds – of warships. At the same time Gray
observes “[t]here is a centuries-long pattern of democratic, or relatively democratic,
commercial-minded sea powers choosing to neglect their defenses in peacetime”.46
With a
decrease in defense expenditure among all but a few European states after the Cold War and
exploding costs of building and operating naval vessels, the logical consequence has been a
45
J.B. Haldane quoted in Geoffrey Till, “A global survey of naval trends: the British approach,” in: Oslo Files
on Defence and Security, The Rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, ed. Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein
Tunsjø, Dec. (2012): 17. 46
Gray, Leverage, 284.
20
drastic reduction in the number of ships, submarines, aircraft and their crews. As will be
discussed in further detail later, advanced weapon systems and sensors can compensate for the
decline of a fleet’s size to a certain extent, providing long distance radar coverage or a greater
operational radius for search and rescue missions (SAR), for example.47
However, there is no
substitute for a relatively large, well-balanced fleet, in order to command the sea, control the
critical straits through which commerce passes, and to maintain a credible deterrent force. In
fact, in this day and age, deterrence has replaced the destruction of the enemy as the principle
function of naval forces. Therefore Lord Nelson’s famous lines “What a country needs is the
annihilation of the enemy. Only numbers can annihilate”48
can be translated into: What a
country needs is a sufficiently large forced with the potential capability to inflict unacceptably
high losses to the enemy in the case of belligerence. This is more likely to be achieved with
superior forces, both in quality and quantity.
Deterrence is a complex concept. Clearly, a good case can be made that nuclear
deterrence has worked over the past six decades. However, one cannot be as confident in
claiming that the same has been the case for conventional deterrence. Recent history has
demonstrably shown otherwise. Neither Saddam Hussein nor the Argentinean Junta shied
away from invading foreign territory, despite their respective opponents possessing far
superior firepower.49
Sam J. Tangredi, a senior American defense planner, makes an excellent
point by arguing that even though predictions about another country’s intentions and possible
actions are difficult, a less credible military capability increases the probability of the other
side pursuing a more aggressive course. Moreover, “deterrence is not a physical property – it
is a state of mind.”50
Therefore, to achieve credible deterrence, a nation’s military forces have
to exhibit distinct capabilities and be deployed in a specific manner so that hostile actors
believe they are unlikely to overcome them. The problem inherent to this equation is that it is
often based on assumptions. Hundreds of billions of dollars are spent on military equipment
every year in order to provide the countries with supposed, necessary deterrent capabilities.
“Yet the forces themselves may never be used”, Tangredi continues. “This is not a standard
business model.”51
47
An excellent article on the development of naval sensors and weapons and their effect on naval warfare can be
found in Norman Friedman, “Technological Reviews – Naval Sensors and Weapons,” in: Seaforth World Naval
Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth, 2009): 167-176. 48
Lord Nelson quoted in Mahan, Naval Warfare, 80. 49
Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare, Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013):
238. 50
Tangredi, Access, 78. 51
Ibid., 77.
21
Few battles at sea have occurred in the last seventy years and it is likely that for the
foreseeable future naval forces will largely be deployed to fulfill diplomatic and policing
tasks. Unfortunately, if history teaches us anything, it is that major inter-state conflict cannot
be entirely ruled out. For that reason, the growing defense procurement in the Asian-Pacific
Region, for example, must be monitored closely. “Indeed [contrary to European
developments] one of the principal [observations] is that the naval build-up in the Asia-Pacific
is significantly focused on war fighting capabilities and that Asian navies are better funded
and provided with extra resources to perform non-traditional security tasks.”52
In particular,
China’s military buildup is deeply vexing to U.S. defense planners, many of whom are
already predicting the inevitable end of U.S. naval supremacy unless large-scale investments
are made.
It is important to bear in mind that Lord Salsibury, the British Secretary of State for
India and later Prime Minister under the reign of Queen Victoria, once warned us from
placing too much weight on the opinion of so-called ‘experts’. “No lesson seems to be so
deeply inculcated by the experience of life as that you should never trust experts. If you
believe doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent: if
you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require their strong wine diluted by a very
large admixture of insipid common sense.”53
Hence defense planners fall into the same
category. Their predictions also have to be considered cum grano salis because from their
perspective the greatest possible range of military capability should always be retained in
order to deal with every possible contingency in the future.54
Although a healthy degree of
skepticism towards overly pessimistic statements from the quarters of the military and defense
establishment is warranted, common sense should nevertheless allow even the most casual
observer to realize the utility of a well-balanced naval force.
Budget cuts over the last two decades have caused many European navies to reduce
the overall size of their fleets and increasingly focus on specific areas of naval warfare (i.e. air
defense, expeditionary warfare, or the defense of the littorals). Based on the principle,
“[b]etter to be master in some trades rather than mediocre at many”55
this niche specialization
offers smaller states a number of advantages, not least because it is much cheaper to entertain
such a force than a multi-purpose fleet. However, there are also serious drawbacks to this
approach. Specialized fleets find it much more difficult to adapt to the emergence of new
52
Rommetveit, “Introduction,” 10. 53
From a letter to Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 1st Earl of Lytton, 15 June (1877).
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Robert_Gascoyne-Cecil,_3rd_Marquess_of_Salisbury. 54
Till, “British Approach,” 18. 55
Till, Seapower, 121.
22
threats, while “[a] navy that maintains a wide range of skills, is best placed to cope with a
variety of expected and perhaps unexpected operational contingencies.”56
Today, many
European states rely heavily on the naval forces of friends and allies (in particular the United
States) to fill the capability gaps their austerity policies have created.
As we shall see in the further course of the discussion, this trend entails considerable
strategic risks in light of a profound shift in geopolitics. As a matter of fact, the Western
European states often barely manage to conduct basic peacetime duties at the desired rate, and
have very limited surge capacity in the event of war. Parry laments that “[i]n conflicts not
involving the USA, these ‘come as you are’ navies will have to fight with what they have, or
play for time.”57
What makes this situation even more precarious is that there is little certainty
whether the “arsenal democracy” would be willing and able to quickly rush to Europe’s
assistance.58
Over a hundred years ago “Mahan painted an encouraging picture of the manner in
which naval strength underpins and encourages economic prosperity and then feeds from it in
a kind of virtuous circle”, Till notes.59
This process is clearly visible in the Asian-Pacific
Region, in which naval power is growing in lockstep with commercial maritime trade. This
practice constitutes a core principle of sea power, as was described before. The more money
that is allocated to naval shipbuilding programs, the faster naval sea power grows, thus
providing the beneficial conditions for the sea-born trade industry to expand and vice-versa.
However, “the arrows go both ways” and when countries are less willing to invest in their
naval forces, for example in times of peace or during economic difficulties, the circle can run
vicious.60
The British Royal Navy, for example, has not only been reduced by roughly 60
percent since the end of the Cold War, but at the same time the country’s merchant marine
and shipping industry have also experienced recent years of hardship. Once commanding the
largest trading fleet in the world, the island nation is currently ranked only twentieth among
the biggest merchant fleets in the world in regard to registration and gross tonnage.61
In the
end, sea power both in economic as well as in military terms will continue to underpin
economic prosperity and political influence in the world. Although it is often overlooked in
56
Till, Seapower, 121. 57
Parry, Highway, 262. 58
Ibid. 59
Till, “British approach,” 21. 60
Ibid., 21. 61
Department for Transport, Statistical Release – Shipping Fleet Statistics 2014, 18 Feb. (2015).
https://www.gov.uk/.../shipping-fleet-statistics-2014.pdf. For more information see: Parry, Highway, 48-51.
23
the public debate, the “mutually reinforcing relationship” between commercial and military
elements of sea power is well worth the investments.62
In the coming decades of the 21st century the principles of sea power outlined in this
chapter are likely to remain constant. The current economic and military maritime efforts by
the United States, Russia and many Asian states allow us to infer that sea power will, by all
reasonable estimates, remain an essential element of foreign policy in an increasingly
competitive world.63
The sea lines of communication will continue to be essential for a
prosperous global trade regime while well-balanced, general-purpose fleets will continue to
constitute the most useful tools to project power, protect national interests abroad, deter
aggressions and if need be underpin these interests by the use of force. As was the case in the
many centuries before, those actors who are willing and able to utilize the maritime domain to
a greater degree than their competitors will likely be able to secure more favorable outcomes
for themselves.
3) The ‘Pivot’ Towards Asia – and the Consequences for Europe
Our problem is not that [the Europeans] doubt our commitment. […] The allies do about as
much as they think they have to do. And they don’t think they have to do too much because the
U.S. is there to bankroll them.64
(Barry S. Posen)
In this chapter I will take a closer look at the United States’ recent rebalancing towards
the Asian-Pacific Region and outline the ramifications the ‘pivot’, as it is often referred to,
will have on Europe’s maritime security. By and large, we are currently seeing a shift from a
period of U.S. preponderance to a time of multipolar power-distribution. As a consequence,
the United States has “come down from the peak of hegemony that it occupied during the
unipolar era [after the Cold War]”,65
ceding some regulatory capabilities along the way. At
62
Parry, Highway, 326. 63
“It is always difficult to sketch out the future that defence planners need to prepare for, but never more so than
now, since in addition to the usual sets of challenges to do with the rise and fall of nations and the deadly
quarrels so often associated with this (which may well be hugely exacerbated by the perfect storm of shortages in
energy, food and water foreseen by some by the 2030s), we also have to grapple with a range of asymmetrical
threats from a variety of non-state actors including terrorists and pirates. And then there are the faceless threats
and challenges brought about by climate change – such as the increased propensity for catastrophic weather
events or the rising importance of the increasingly ice-free water of the High North both of which could have
both a direct and an indirect impact on Alliance security.” Till, “British approach,” 17. 64
Barry Posen, “Panel Discussion: A Moment of Transition,”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIg_ZDHeoJg, min 33:00. 65
John G. Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics. The Enduring Power of Liberal Order,” in: Foreign Affairs,
May/June (2014): 81.
24
the same time, globally networked, radical Islamic terrorism presents a threat to the spread of
democracy, while the revisionist powers of China, Russia, and Iran are resisting the liberal
order the United States has been promoting since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.66
Nevertheless, the United States remains Europe’s closest ally – politically, economically, as
well as militarily. Unfortunately however, Europe remains utterly dependent on a number of
key U.S. military capabilities in order to conduct medium and high-intensity warfare over
longer periods of time and looks to the United States to protect the freedom of navigation at
sea.
Roughly 90 percent of global commerce travels by sea. Within this intricate system of
trade we are currently witnessing a fundamental shift. Over the past decades, the focus of
commercial and maritime activity has moved from West to East: from the Atlantic to the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. Already in 1984, U.S. trade across the Pacific had eclipsed that of
with Western Europe.67
Today, a greater value of goods is being imported and exported
among developing countries (South-South trade) than between developing countries and
developed countries (South-North trade).68
This dramatic geopolitical transformation had
coincided with the “downwards drift of most Western navies and the growth of others most
obviously in the Asian- Pacific, [which] promises a profound shift in the future world’s naval
balance in the decades to come.”69
One of the major rising naval powers in the Asian-Pacific Theater over the past decade
has been the People’s Republic of China. The country has emerged as a regional power in
South–East Asia and, in many ways, can be considered a peer competitor to the United States.
Therefore, the U.S. Armed Forces are shifting their attention from previous areas of operation,
such as the Atlantic and Mediterranean, to the Asian-Pacific Region in order to underscore
their continued interest in the region. Despite Europe remaining one of three areas in the
world that is critical to the United States,70
conceivably, the Europeans could conceivably be
able to defend their territory as well as their interests abroad on their own; especially if one
considers that Europe as a whole has a larger economy and greater population than the United
States. Many critics in Washington, therefore, argue that Europe has been on a long
66
See Walter Russel Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of Revisionist Power,” in: Foreign Affairs,
May/June (2014): 69-79. 67
John F. Lehmann, “The 600–Ship Navy,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, ed. John
B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz. (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2008): 248. 68
Parry, Highway, 58. 69
Till, Seapower, 2. 70
“Europe and North-East Asia matter because that’s where the great powers are, and they are potential threats
to the United States; and the Middle East […] matters because that’s where the oil is, and oil is a critical resource
like no other.” See John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKFHe0Y6c_0.
25
procurement holiday while free riding on the backs of American taxpayers. John
Mearsheimer, for example, leaves no doubt about his repugnance towards Europe’s reluctance
to invest in their own defense: “When the Cold War ended […] I’d pull everything out of
Europe, […] let the Europeans defend themselves.”71
Yet, there is no indication that the
United States will reconsider its obligations towards its NATO allies anytime soon. In fact, in
the light of Russia’s actions in the Ukraine, additional U.S. forces have been redeployed to
Germany, Poland and the Baltic States as well as to the waters surrounding Europe.72
Despite these standing commitments, the geopolitical shift from West to East seems
irreversible and will compel the United States to focus less on Europe and more on Asia.
“Already much of the US Navy, […] sees the Atlantic merely as an area that must be passed
through on the way to somewhere more important. And this perception is more likely to grow
than to diminish in the future”,73
Till notes. “The result”, he predicts, “[will be] a fast
developing and historic shift in the naval balance between East and West [Europe and Asia]
which is likely to result in substantial but currently unknowable change in the world’s security
architecture.”74
At present, China is the main motor behind the naval arms race currently underway in
South-East Asia. Proof to this claim is the 175% increase in China’s defense budget since
2003.75
As a result, its ongoing military buildup is viewed critically by many of its neighbors,
while in the United States it is largely understood to be specifically designed to prevent U.S.
military forces from operating near, into, or within the South and East China Sea (also
referred to as anti-access/area-denial or A2/AD).76
Therefore, the United States considers
these developments as “primary strategic challenges to [its] international security
objectives”77
and, in 2010, announced that it would “out of necessity rebalance towards the
71
Mearsheimer, “Imperial,” min. 17:00. 72
Only ten months after the last batch of M1 Abrams main battle tanks had left Europe in April 2013, 29 Army
tanks arrived in Germany Ezio Bonsignore et al, “United States of America,” Military Technology: The World
Defence Almanac 2014, Issue I (2014): 32. 73
Till, “British approach,” 23. 74
Till, “British approach,” 23. 75
Although the percentage of defense spending has remained relatively constant, the dramatic increase in total
GDP has enabled China to allocate significantly more money to its defense sector. Sam Perlo Freeman et al,
“Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013,” in: SIPRI Fact Sheet, April (2015), 2. 76
Anti-access and area denial are strategic approaches to warfare. Their aim is to deny enemy forces the ability
to operate in a contested area. Essential to this strategy, however, is the understanding that the enemy is
strategically superior and a force-on-force engagement should be avoided by all means. Asymmetric
technologies and tactics, as well as niche-capabilities, are sought by states relying on anti-access strategies to
offset the opponents’ military advantage. For obvious reasons, superior intelligence, misinformation and
deception play a vital role in A2/AD efforts. See Tangredi, Access, 1-5. 77
Ibid., 1.
26
Illustration 2: The two imagined lines of defense China might want to establish to expand its sphere of influence.
Abbildung 2
Asian-Pacific region.”78
As a consequence, and in concordance with a decrease of its land
forces, naval and aerial assets have been redeployed to the region. More than half of U.S.
naval vessels, most notably its carrier strike groups, and 60% of the Air Force’s oversea-based
assets have already been allocated to the Asian-Pacific. 79
As Øystein Tunsjø points out,
“[already in] 2007, for the first time in 60 years, more [U.S.] ships were based in the Pacific
than in the Atlantic. Two-thirds of the US Navy used to be located on the East coast and
deployed in the Atlantic, but about two-thirds are now located on the West coast and operate
in the Pacific. Newly commissioned ships are largely deployed to Asian waters.”80
Meanwhile, the Chinese are ramping up their military capacities. Apart from their
enormous land forces, they have recently developed a number of weapon systems that have
been widely discussed in public. In spite of being criticized in the past for obtaining many of
these capabilities through reverse engineering, espionage, cyber-attacks and other such
dubious measures, China has nonetheless been able to produce sophisticated fighter jets, long
range ballistic missiles, as well add some credible warships and weapon systems to its fleet.81
According to the latest U.S.
documents, China’s plan to expand its
“comprehensive national power” and
“[secure] China’s status as a great
power” continues to be viewed
skeptically.82
They point out that despite
“Chinese leaders [expressing] a desire to
maintain peace and stability along their
country’s periphery; […] and [to] avoid
direct confrontation with the United
States and other countries”83
, the United
78
Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21st
Century Defense (Washington DC, GPO 2012): 2. 79
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel quoted in Robert S. Dudney, “Verbatim,” Air Force Magazine, July (2013):
45. 80
Øystein Tunsjø, “Maritime developments in Asia: implications for Norway,” in: Olso Files on Defense and
Security: The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, ed. Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø Tunsjø,
Dec. (2012): 94. 81
According to many defense analysts, it will take three to five years for the LIAONING to become operational.
See Dawei Xia, “China: The People’s Liberation Army Navy,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed.
Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 56-65. 82
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2014 (Washington DC, 2014): i,15.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf. 83
See Ibid., i.
27
Illustration 3: This map depicts the major trading routes to China and the critical choke points that lie between.
Abbildung 3
States has repeatedly urged the Chinese government to be more transparent regarding its
military and security policies. Otherwise, Chinese actions could “[pose] risks to stability by
creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.”84
In particular, the latest efforts by the Chinese to forcefully expand their sphere of influence
have caused much alarm.
Currently, China is trying to reach and maintain military dominance in and over its
adjacent waters. Therefore, in November 2013, the People’s Liberation Army established an
air defense identification zone that overlaps with those of Japan and South Korea, adding to
the already substantial tensions in the region. Moreover, China has claimed sovereignty over a
number of islands, reefs and rocks ranging from the Korean Peninsula, Japan, southwards to
Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. These measures would not only significantly increase
China’s exclusive economic zone, but in strategic terms constitutes part of an imagined first
line of defense against possible foreign intervention. Moreover, the historic rivalry with Japan
as well as the unresolved issues concerning Taiwan is being closely followed by the U.S., as
China’s anti-access/area-denial networks within the first island chain are becoming
increasingly formidable.
In addition to the defense of the waters within the imagined ‘first-island-chain’, the
Chinese Navy apparently also
wants to establish what is called
“Far Sea Defense”.85
This second
line of defense stretches further
out into the Pacific, well beyond
the first line of defense, as is
indicated in the map above. The
need for these two lines of
defense also finds its strategic
reason in China’s dependency on
oil. The U.S. Defense
Department estimates that
84
Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington DC, 2009): i.
www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf. 85
“The term ―yuanhai fangwei‖ (远海防卫) which translates to ‘distant/far sea defense’, began appearing with
increasing frequency in Chinese publications. Authors associated with the Naval Research Institute (NRI) called
the ‘shift from offshore to open ocean naval operations’ an ‘inevitable historic choice’ for China noting that
naval power must ‘match the expansion of China’s maritime interests.’” Department of Defense, Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China – 2010 (Washington DC, 2010).
28
although China still relies on coal as its primary source of energy, it will soon surpass Japan
as the second largest oil importer, most of it from the Middle East and Africa. Therefore,
China is keen on securing these SLOCs, particularly the numerous critical straits between the
Middle East and South-East Asia, which in the case of war could be closed by the U.S.
Navy.86
The United States, on its part, will for a number of reasons continue to rely on its
naval forces to deter aggression and maintain its influence in the region. Firstly, since the
Second World War the U.S. has been able to maintain a naval fleet that has been and will
continue to remain unchallenged in a force-on-force engagement for the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, the current global geographical and political parameters allow Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s principles of controlling the SLOCs to insure economic, political and military
dominance to become applicable.87
In addition, while U.S. capabilities during ground
operations have been put to the test in asymmetrical conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq,
often causing painful casualties, this paradigmatic change of warfare does not affect the realm
of blue-water operations to the same extent. Therefore, the United States Navy can continue
to rely on its ability to ‘deter by presence’.
However, this presence is growing somewhat thin. Given the numerous commitments
the United States has across the globe, even a military giant like the United States finds itself
in a dilemma. The U.S. Navy is by far the largest fleet, operating 283 ships, including ten
aircraft carriers, 100 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, over 50 attack submarines, and more
than 30 amphibious warships. However, under the recently announced ‘Optimized Fleet
Response Plan’ the U.S. will not increase its global deployed naval presence of around 95
ships, and as a retired naval officer claims, “the lethality inherent in this presence, based on
the ship types deployed, [will] be less than today’s 95-ship presence.”88
In fact, only two
carriers will be forward deployed at any given moment in time – down from three to four
carriers. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any European nation would come to the
assistance of the United States in case naval conflict would erupt between China and the U.S.,
and if so, any such assistance would be rather insignificant, given the small number of assets
available to Europe’s navies.
86
The United States’ ability to close the Strait of Malacca is one of the biggest concerns to the PRC. See DoD,
China 2009, 3. 87
See Nikolaus Scholik, “Mahan oder Corbett: Das maritim-strategische Dilemma „Chinamerika“ im indo-
pazifischen Raum,“ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 2 (2013): 140-151. 88
Robert C. Rubel, “Straight Talk on Forward Presence,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March (2015): 25.
29
Illustration 4: In the future the United States will continue to rely on its carrier battle groups to safeguard its interests around the globe.
Abbildung 4
So where does this fundamental shift leave Europe? As we will see over the course of
the following chapters, most naval forces in Europe have suffered a significant decrease in
size and funding since the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, many navies have either
ceded key capabilities, or have tried to operate balanced fleets with very few reserves and
therefore are barely able to fulfill the military, diplomatic and policing roles they are designed
for. Although utterly
dependent on trade by sea, it
is questionable to what
extent Europe can
contribute to the protection
of the SLOCs and, thereby,
to the freedom of the sea.
“On paper, NATO, with its
Standing Maritime Groups,
seems to be capable of
deploying relevant naval
forces across the globe”,
Felix Seidler points out. “In practice, however,” he relativizes, “any mission with a NATO
logo needs approval of 28 member states [and] many members would object any new NATO
involvement outside the Euro-Atlantic Area.”89
He continues by arguing that the European
Union likewise has little leverage regarding security issues outside its rather limited sphere of
influence “showing Brussels’ enduring strategic irrelevance in the Indo-Pacific.”90
In the
future, the United States will “expect their partner to ‘man up’, in policy, capability and
resource terms [because] the USA will not always be available as the force of first – or even
last – resort”.91
However, as the following case studies will show, little such effort can be
made out among the European partners.
89
Felix Seidler, “Europe’s Role in an East Asian War,” CIMSEC, 11 Jun. (2014), http://cimsec.org/europes-role-
east-asian-war/11576. 90
Ibid. 91
Parry, Highway, 273.
30
PART TWO
4) Case Studies: Analyzing Europe’s Navies
The following case studies constitute the mainstay of this thesis. Over the course of
the next chapters the development of European sea power since the end of the Cold War will
be examined. The principle aim of each case study is to gain insight into the evolution of the
respective naval forces. For that reason, the focus of this analysis will be twofold:
Firstly, the differences in the general composition of each fleet over the course of time
will be illustrated. To make the steep decline in both military expenditure and overall size of
Europe’s naval forces more palpable, two separate graphs will provide an outline of each
country’s annual defense spending and the number of warships. It is safe to say that
throughout history the principle criterion of any naval force (and any military force for that
matter) has been its size. Although, size – or in other words, the number of ships and naval
aircraft – does not necessarily reflect a fleet’s capabilities per se, it nonetheless often
represents a valid unit of measuring naval power. However, given the limited space of this
study, not every type of naval vessel qualifies to be taken into consideration. Despite their
importance, it would not make sense to count every training craft, transport ship, or
helicopter, for example. Therefore, my analysis will mainly focus on four types of warships:
aircraft carriers, large surface combatants (such as destroyers or frigates), submarines, and
finally ships designed for amphibious warfare.
Observant readers will have noticed that smaller surface combatants (torpedo boats,
guided-missile attack craft, mine warfare ships) are not included in these categories. Although
these kinds of vessels will also be discussed in some detail, they play a less important role in
(European) naval planning than during larger parts of the 20th
century. In particular, over the
course of the last twenty-five years, many naval forces around the world have undergone
drastic changes. In the light of the steadily evolving security environment, countires which
had formerly focused on defending the littoral waters closer to their homeland are now
building so-called ‘blue-water navies’. While fast attack craft, small diesel-electric
submarines and mine warfare vessels had been the preferred tools for territorial defense in the
‘brown-waters’ close to shore, nowadays much larger, more sophisticated warships are
needed in order to conduct operations for long periods of time and over great distances.
What is important to note is that the classification of naval ships can be at least as
misleading as simply comparing the number of warships between two navies. While, for
31
Illustration 5: A telling picture of Europe’s naval decline. Two older vessels are being replaced by a single new warship. Many navies have been literally cut in half over the last 25 years.
example, throughout the last century cruisers (nominally the second largest surface
combatants92
after battleships) had a displacement of anywhere between 5,000 and 10,000
tons, nowadays ships of similar size, such as the British Type 45 Daring-class (nearly 9,000
tons), are designated as destroyers (generally ranked one tier lower). However, to make things
more complicated, the new German Baden-Württemberg-class will displace more than 7,000
tons once she enters service, but is referred to as a ‘stabilization frigate’. Only two decades
ago, many frigates in service in Europe’s navies were actually small warships (1,000-3,000
tons), primarily designed for escort duties and anti-submarine warfare. As Till notes, in this
day and age, “the possession of given number of large surface combatants if often regarded as
rough indication of relative strength and purpose.”93
Therefore, the inclusion of all larger
surface combatants in one category not only provides us with better means of comparison
between the different navies, but also illustrates the rapid decline in the number of Europe’s
fleets over the last twenty-five years. 94
Apart from quantity, quality obviously plays a significant role in assessing naval
power. However, evaluating a ship’s capability is a somewhat more difficult undertaking.
First of all, we have not witnessed any major military confrontations at sea from which we
92
Note that aircraft carriers are generally not referred to as surface combatants. 93
Till, Seapower, 117. 94
See Ibid., 122-124.
32
could draw meaningful conclusions in more than thirty years. In fact, the last war to provide
insight into major naval warfare dates back to the Falkland War in 1982. Even in that case, it
was mainly a contest between the British surface forces, their carrier air wing, and the
Argentinean air force. In absence of large force-on-force engagements, much of the debate
regarding the ostensible capabilities of naval forces is theoretical (in particular, in regard to
high-intensity warfare at sea). However, recent military interventions (Iraq, Bosnia,
Afghanistan, Libya, and Georgia), naval exercises, live weapons tests, and technical analyses
do give us some idea of the past, current, and future capabilities of Europe’s navies, their
ships and their crews. For that reason a good part of each chapter will be dedicated to the
examination of the technical aspects of modern warships, such as weapon and sensor systems.
The second focus of attention in each case study will be the strategic framework in
which the navies operate. Although all European states under scrutiny are either part of the
European Union or NATO and hence share similar values and have a certain degree of
common security interests, historical, political, and lastly geographical circumstances have
resulted in each country identifying different key security needs. Accordingly, although many
European naval forces are assigned to multinational operations, such as fighting piracy around
the Horn of Africa, conversely they also have a very distinct strategic and tactical focus.
While Norway, for example, will remain vigilant towards Russia’s growing naval power in
the High North and therefore has strengthened its blue-water capabilities, Italy wastes little
thought on the possible reemergence of Russian sea bastions around the Kola peninsula, as it
is confronted with a human catastrophe unfolding right before its eyes. Smaller offshore
patrol vessels are needed to rescue refugees from drowning as they seek to escape the horrors
of wars that have engulfed larger parts of North Africa and the Middle East, while at the same
time larger warships are critical in order to protect Italy’s interests in the greater
Mediterranean region. Its neighbor Greece, on the other hand, is deeply vexed about Turkey’s
growing military power at sea despite both countries formally being NATO allies and
therefore remains focused on territorial defense. And lastly, the British Royal Navy is trying
to reassert itself as a first-rate naval power with global power projection capabilities by
rebuilding its fleet around two new aircraft carriers.
As we can see, there are numerous and often conflicting strategic interests among and
within Europe’s military services. What is more, continuous reduction in defense expenditure
over the last two decades has only exacerbated the already difficult question of how to best
allocate military funding. By taking a closer look at the provisions stipulated in each country’s
defense white papers and other public statements over the last two decades, valuable insight
33
will be gained in regard to the core missions of the navies, as well as the degree of trust they
enjoy within their respective country’s defense and security strategy. A comparison between
each navy’s responsibilities – assigned to them by their political and military leadership – and
its actual capabilities will provide evidence that many naval forces are barely able to fulfill
these duties in times of relative peace. Moreover, in light of the United States’ rebalance
towards the Asian Pacific Region, the studies will show that strategic foresight among
Europe’s policymakers and defense planners alike is evidently sorely lacking. As a
consequence, the following analysis will give little solace to those who are concerned that
Europe might become increasingly marginalized in a maritime century in which the center of
gravity will have finally shifted away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific.
5) The UNITED KINGDOM: Keep Calm and Get Those Carriers Operational
Figure 1
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 1 U.K.: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
34
Figure 2
Volumes could be written about the dramatic decline of British sea power over the
course of the last one hundred years. Once the world’s preeminent sea power which ruled the
waves of the seven seas, the British Royal Navy (RN) today can barely be considered
Europe’s most capable naval force. As the adjacent Figure 2 indicates, the size of the British95
fleet has been reduced by roughly sixty percent since the end of the Cold War. Although the
Royal Navy continues to operate a balanced fleet, the austerity measures over the last two
decades have elicited this alarming decline. The Royal Navy is much smaller and less capable
than it was in 1990; in particular, when compared to other naval powers of each era. These
developments are likely to undermine Britain’s role in world affairs and risk the nation’s
ability to defend its interests abroad.
Within less than twenty-five years, the Royal Navy has been forced to cede some vital
capabilities. The most visible among these cuts, without a doubt, has been the decision to
decommission all of its aircraft carriers. After almost seventy years of successful carrier
operations, the Royal Navy has lost its entire fleet of Harrier combat jets and its last
remaining aircraft carrier was withdrawn from service in 2014. Meanwhile, the escort fleet
has been reduced from 48 vessels in 1990 to merely 19 destroyers and frigates, while the
95
Despite not including the same geographical areas, the terms Great Britain and United Kingdom will be used
synonymously.
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 3 3 0
Large Surface Combatants 48 41 19
Submarines 22 16 10
Assault/Amphibious 7 8 6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 2 U.K.: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
35
Illustration 6: British destroyers are conducting operations on both ends of the intensity spectrum: Fleet-air defense in the Atlantic and anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden.
number of attack submarines has been halved. Since the emergence of the Soviet submarine
threat in the early 1960s, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) had been the forte of the British
fleet. Faced with ongoing retrenchment, such as the cancelation of the Nimrod MRA.4
maritime reconnaissance aircraft and fewer ships available for these tasks, the Navy’s ASW
capability has been severely atrophied. The only area not to be truncated to such an extent has
been the Royal Navy’s amphibious forces.
Over the course of the next chapters the reader will recognize a similar pattern among
all but very few European countries. With the end of the Cold War, the enormous provisions
for a cataclysmic showdown between East and West were no longer considered warranted. In
the case of the Royal Navy, this meant that “[i]ts own Cold War mission of hunting Soviet
submarines had vanished, and along with it the chief justification for large chunks of the
Fleet.”96
Faced with new forms of conflict and the emergence of threats that ranged across the
gamut of the intensity spectrum, many European countries had to make substantial
adjustments to their national defense strategy. However, the most important question that
needed answering was to what extent Europe’s governments would reduce their armed forces
as part of the “peace dividend”.97
The United Kingdom presents us with a somewhat ambiguous case study. On the one
hand, the country remains one of the few European NATO members committed to spending a
significant percentage of its
gross domestic product
(GDP) on defense (well over
the 2 percent margin), as
well as actively participating
in numerous U.N., NATO
and U.S.-led military
operations around the globe
over the last two decades.
On the other hand, since the
end of the Cold War, it has
been unable – or shall we
rather say unwilling – to
96
Nick Childs, Britain’s Future Navy. Rev. ed. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2014, [2012]): 7. 97
The term ‘peace dividend’ refers to the practice of allocating money that would have been invested in defense
to other areas, such as health care or social services, as the result of dramatic changes in the global security
environment.
36
maintain its military capabilities in relation to other countries in the world. Numerous critics,
therefore, have made a point to stress that as a consequence, the British Royal Navy has lost
much of its former might and no longer qualifies as the great sea power it used to be. As a
matter of fact, at the height of the Cold War only the two superpowers (the United States and
Soviet Union) had more capable naval forces than Britain.
Twenty-five years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, a brief comparison with other
naval powers should suffice to comprehend the perilous situation the Royal Navy currently
finds itself in. Clearly, the U.S. Navy remains the undisputed behemoth of sea power and
despite recent discussions about its ostensible decline, will continue to operate the most
powerful naval force for the foreseeable future.98
In addition, depending on one’s locus of
analysis, a number of other navies can be considered superior to the Royal Navy.
Russia, for example, is currently making a concerted effort to regain its former glory
by modernizing its fleet of Soviet-era warships and also building new submarines and surface
combatants. As a result, Russia maintains both substantial nuclear as well as conventional
naval capabilities. China’s process of “national rejuvenation”99
has led to the construction of a
sizable fleet of modern vessels within a very short period of time. The Chinese fleet is steadily
becoming a more effective force in blue-water operations, causing the Americans to shift their
strategic focus from the Atlantic to the Asian-Pacific Region. Similarly, the Indian Navy is
also undergoing a significant modernization process and currently deploys two aircraft
carriers, 13 submarines, as well as 31 destroyers and frigates. Nonetheless, its capabilities are
still not considered on par with western naval forces. Indian Commodore Manohar K. Banger
therefore rightfully asked why “[…] the Indian Navy is now a 100-ship navy yet [is] still
considered by the major powers to be a brown-water force”, when Great Britain only has 25
surface combatants but remains adamant that it operates a credible blue-water navy.100
Unlike
the Indian Navy, Japan’s naval forces (officially the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force),
despite their lack of power projection capabilities, are understood to operate a larger and more
98
See Scholik, “Chinamerikas,“ 140-151. 99
See DoD, China 2014, i. 100
Manohar K. Bangar, “Nobody asked me but… The Royal Navy: Whither Goes Thou?” Naval Institute
Proceedings, March (2008).
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-03/nobody-asked-me.
Brown-water navies generally are not able to sustain operations over great distances and longer period of time on
the open ocean. A brown-water fleet also tends to operate warships that are smaller than those of blue-water
navies and which are designed for tasks closer to shore.
37
capable Navy than Great Britain. In fact, many consider the Japanese Navy to be the world’s
second-most effective conventional naval power apart from the U.S. Navy.101
Even among the European navies, a case can be made that the French Navy actually
would deserve to be put in the spotlight in any study of European sea power (a fact that is
surely loathed by many Britons). Both the British and the French navies operate a similar
number of frigates and destroyers. They each operate four strategic ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN) as well as six nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) and are both able
to conduct sizable amphibious operations. What puts the French ahead of the British (at least
until 2020) is the ability to deploy its naval air-arm from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft
carrier. Apart from the United States, no other nation can project power to the same degree or
conduct air-strikes with similar effectiveness as the French Navy’s naval air-arm – the
Aéronavale. However, there is a silver lining on the horizon for the British Royal Navy.
Notwithstanding its recent decline, there is reason to believe that it will again become
Europe’s most effective naval fighting force.
Had the dissolution of the Soviet Union seemed implausible to many analysts during
the mid-1980s,102
the dramatic events at the end of the decade heralded the beginning of a
new era – even if subliminal tensions persisted. Great Britain was quick to interpret the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union as the harbingers of a drastic change in
the global security environment. In light of these changes, the U.K.’s Armed Forces were
considered to be too large and too expensive. Based on these conclusions “the MoD
commenced a far-reaching study into future defense requirements and policy entitled ‘Option
for Change’”, as John Roberts points out. “The fundamental aim of the study,” he explains,
“was to find large-scale savings to fund the expected ‘Post-Cold War Peace Dividend’ whilst
preserving as much of the front line as possible.”103
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the consequent military operation, under
the auspices of the United States, put a brief halt to the planned defense cuts. The military
success of the Coalition vindicated the widely-shared concept of large-scale conventional
101
Yoji Koda, “Naval developments in Japan,” in: The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s, eds. Bjørn
Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø (Oslo Files. Dec 2012): 57. 102
Few members of the intelligence community predicted the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Australian defense
analyst Paul Dibb was one of them. In 1986 he published The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower which
pointed to the many weaknesses of the Soviet system. 103
John Roberts, Safeguarding the Nation: The Story of the Modern Royal Navy (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing,
2009): 202.
38
Illustration 7: The HMS Sheffield burns after being hit by Argentinean anti-ship missiles during the last major conflict at sea: The Falkland War.
Abbildung 5
warfare, despite asymmetric forms of conflict becoming far more common.104
However,
regardless of their success in the liberation of Kuwait, the British Army and Air Force had to
suffer the largest parts of the cuts postulated in the defense review.
The most significant cuts fell on the Army, which was reduced in strength by one
third, from 160,000 to 120,000. The largest cuts were in the ground forces based in
Germany which were reduced by over half. Tactical air power based in Germany was
significantly reduced with the closure of two out of four RAF bases and the
withdrawal of six RAF squadrons.105
These decisions were met with heavy criticism, mostly for the study having been written
without carefully assessing the “exact nature of the [evolving] strategic security
environment”.106
The Navy fared somewhat
better than its sister services. Only a
small number of older warships were
initially to be taken from service
while the number of personnel was to
be reduced from almost 69,000
(including the Royal Marines) to
55,000 by the mid-1990s. Despite
these cuts, the Royal Navy’s future
looked promising. All three 20,000
ton Invincible-class aircraft carriers
and their respective rotary and fixed-
wing detachments remained in service, providing significant operational flexibility to Western
interventions in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan over the coming years. The United
Kingdom’s new nuclear deterrent, in the form of the 16,000 ton Vanguard-class SSBN, was
also entering service, replacing the older Resolution-class. Close cooperation with the United
States during the design and construction phase provided the British boats with the American
Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Each missile could be fitted with up
104
The paradigmatic shift in armed conflict and the consequences it had on the U.S. Armed Forces is discussed
in Jeremy Stöhs, “US Defense Policy Since the End of the Cold War: The Difficulty of Establishing a Balanced
Force Structure,” JIPSS, Vol. 8, 1 (2014): 139-153. Also discussed in Smith, Utility. 105
Claire Taylor, A brief guide to previous defense white paper (House of Commons Library, 2010): 9.
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05714.pdf. 106
Ibid.
39
to 12 nuclear warheads. Four of these boats were built allowing the Royal Navy to
continuously have at least one submarine with a maximum of 192 nuclear warheads at sea.107
In regard to the Navy’s attack submarine force, a final decision was made, namely to
withdraw all of its conventionally powered submarines. Being subject to severe financial
restrictions, the Navy concluded that operating a mixed fleet of nuclear and conventional
diesel-electric submarines had become unfeasible as the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Benjamin
Bathurst, noted at the time:
The judgment we made to withdraw the Upholder class [conventional submarines]
was the toughest decision the Navy Board has had to make for many years. I would
like to emphasize that […] we had a hard choice to make, and we decided to
consolidate around SSNs because by retaining support for two types there came a
point where we wouldn’t be able to afford to run both classes given the other resource
needs within the Navy.108
On the other hand, experience from Operation Desert Storm had convinced the British of the
utility of sea-launched cruise missiles and an initial order for 65 American Tomahawk land
attack missiles, which would be fired from the attack submarines, was made in 1995.109
Meanwhile, the large escort fleet was undergoing constant modernization. Both the
destroyers and frigates had shown significant vulnerabilities during the Falkland War when
the ships’ air defense systems proved unable to effectively engage low-flying targets. In total,
six ships were lost to enemy air attacks. As a result of this costly experience, the Royal Navy
reacted quickly and introduced significant upgrades to its SAM (surface-air missile) systems
and, like many other navies in the world, fitted their warships with close-in weapon systems
(CIWS) like the American Phalanx. It is possible that these upgrades saved the battleship
U.S.S. Missouri when it was fired upon by Iraqi forces during the Gulf War. Fortunately for
the Americans, the Type 42 air defense destroyer Gloucester successfully tracked and
destroyed the Silkworm missile racing towards the battleship.110
The slow and creeping reduction of surface forces during the later years of the decade
was largely compensated for by the introduction of more capable units. In particular, the Type
23 Duke-class frigates represented one of the finest multi-purpose frigates in the world,
107
The number of warheads was later reduced to 48. Ezio Bonsignore et al. “United Kingdom,” Military
Technology. The World Defence Almanac 1995-96, Issue 1 (1996): 168. 108
Benjamin Bathurst, “The Royal Navy in the 1990s,”Naval Forces Vol. 14, 4 (1993): 21. 109
See Bathurst, “Navy 1990s”, 21. Also in Bonsignore, “United Kingdom,” 168. 110
The Missouri, however, was also fitted with two Phalanx CIWS on each side of the ship. See Roberts
Safeguarding, 214.
40
Illustration 8: An artist’s impression of the cancelled Nimrod MRA.4 maritime patrol aircraft. Such aircraft constitute an invaluable asset for any navy.
despite having been specifically designed for ASW missions in the North Atlantic.111
In total,
16 of these ships were built between 1990 and 2003 and all but three remain in service as the
Royal Navy’s arguably most versatile asset.
Despite the somewhat more capable Sea Wolf SAM system aboard the Type 23
frigates, the Navy exerted itself in finding a suitable replacement for the obsolescent Type 42
Sheffield-class destroyers, two of which were sunk by the Argentineans in 1982. “Particular
weaknesses identified were the Type 42 destroyer’s inability to illuminate – and therefore
engage – more than two targets simultaneously”.112
As we shall later hear in more detail,
during the 1980s, the project for a common frigate design for most NATO allies was to
alleviate the pressing need for a capable surface combatant. However, insurmountable
differences over the respective capabilities and features of the ship ultimately led to the
cancelation of the NFR-90 program. However, the idea of a joint venture between European
NATO members persisted, not least because of immense costs of designing and building a
class of such warships packed with sophisticated weapon systems and electronics.
In 1992, the project ‘Horizon’ was brought into being. A trilateral cooperation
between the United Kingdom, France and Italy set out to build a new class of destroyers
which could provide a credible multi-tier fleet air defense against even the most advanced
aerial threats. (A more detailed description of this program is provided in the chapter on the
Italian Navy). Despite
the U.K. abandoning
the program in 1999,
substantial progress
had been made
regarding the ship’s
general layout as well
as the radar and SAM
systems and the British
shipbuilders went on to
incorporate many
design features found
111
A.D. Baker III, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 2000-2001. Their Ships, Aircraft,
and Systems (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press 2000): 860-862 112
A comprehensive article on the ship can be found in Conrad Waters’, “Significant Ships: HMS Daring: The
Royal Navy’s Type 45 Air-Defence Destroyer,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters
(South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 133.
41
in the Italo/French Horizon-class. In the end, Italy and France each commissioned a pair of
nearly identical ships, while the British Royal Navy has received six Type 45 destroyers,
known as the Daring-class. Apart from some smaller differences in the ships’ appearances,
the main point of distinction between the Daring and her ‘cousins’ concerns the radar system.
All ships are fitted with the SMART-L long range volume search and track radar as part of its
principle anti-air missile system (PAAMS). However, while Italy and France have chosen to
install the somewhat less capable EMPAR (European multi-function Electronically Scanned
Adaptive Radar) for target search, acquisition, and tracking, the Daring-class is fitted with the
BAE Systems Sampson multi-function radar, located on top of the ship’s main mast, thus
providing an increased search radius.
The intransigence on the part of the Royal Navy in incorporating the highly capable
Sampson radar in spite of its costs was, for the most part, founded in the Navy’s contingency
planning, which envisions “a much more demanding operational scenario than either the
[Marina Nationale or the Marina Militare]”.113
Although the “[f]ocus of the Type 45’s air
defense role has resulted in the remaining weapon fit being somewhat sparse for a ship of the
Daring’s size”,114
(single 114mm 55 cal Vickers Mod. 8 gun, Lynx or Merlin helicopter, two
single 30mm guns115
) it is by no means a bargain. Increasing costs and the austere financial
environment have led to the production being suspended after the completion of six vessels.
Instead of the initially planned replacement of the 12 Sheffield-class destroyers at a rate of
one-to-one, at the end of the day the Royal Navy will have to get by with only half as many
ships.
In contrast to the decline of the escort fleet, the Royal Navy’s amphibious capabilities
were strengthened as part of the U.K.’s strategic reorientation towards joint-expeditionary
operations. As we will see in the further course of this study, the majority of European states
changed their naval doctrine over the last two decades, shifting from the previous prevalent
concept of territorial defense to crisis-prevention and conflict-resolution further away from
home. Projecting power from the sea onto land, therefore, became a desirable capability for
most of today’s larger navies. The Strategic Defense Review in 1998 substantiates these
aspirations by stating that “[i]n the post Cold War world, we must be prepared to go to the
crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us.”116
113
Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “A Fateful Name - Horizon,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 2 (1997): 14. 114
Waters, “HMS Daring,” 143. 115
Considerable provisions for additional weapons have been made. Possible cruise-missiles of European or
American make, Torpedo tubes, CIWS, Harpoon anti-ship missiles. 116
Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review (London: 1998): np.
42
Against this background, the Review suggested a continuing shift in focus away from
large-scale open-ocean warfare towards a wide range of operations in littoral areas.
This reflects changes in the potential maritime threat, especially relative to NATO, the
missions of our forces and the likely geographic location of future operations. These
changes are a continuation of trends since the end of the Cold War. They include a
decline in the likelihood of an open-ocean anti-submarine or anti-surface threat on the
scale previously envisaged.117
The helicopter assault ship HMS Ocean was the first ship to epitomize the aforementioned
strategic reorientation. By 2007 two Albion-class assault landing ships (LPD)118
and three
Bay-class dock landing ships (LSD) had been added to the fleet, replacing the much less
capable Fearless-class and elderly tank landing ships. Although the new warships represented
a considerable financial burden to the defense budget, they gave the Royal Navy hitherto
unprecedented capabilities to project power over great distances, and more importantly, into
the littoral waters and onto distant shores.
The most important procurement decision made by the British government since the
end of the Cold War has to be the construction of two new aircraft carriers. Although this
process has caused considerable debate among politicians, military brass and the broader
public, the recent decision to commission both carriers can be considered a hallmark moment
for the Royal Navy. Having experienced difficulties operating its Harrier jets from the short
decks of the three Invincible-class carriers in hot weather conditions, most noticeably during
deployments in the Persian Gulf,119
the Strategic Defence Review in 1998 announced that the
three ships would be replaced by two new aircraft carriers capable of “[delivering] increased
offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the
widest possible range of roles.”120
Initially planned to displace between 30,000-40,000 tons
and embark up to 50 aircraft, the former figure has significantly increased while the latter
figure no longer seems financially feasible.
Apart from the aircraft carriers, further promising provisions were made in the
Strategic Defence Review. For example, many observers at the time believed that the
117
MoD, SDR, np. 118
LPD stands for landing platform dock, LSD for landing ship dock. “An amphibious transport dock, also
called a landing platform/dock (LPD), is an amphibious warfare ship, a warship that embarks, transports, and
lands elements of a landing force for expeditionary warfare missions. Several navies currently operate this kind
of ship. The ships are generally designed to transport troops into a war zone by sea, primarily using landing craft,
although invariably they also have the capability to operate transport helicopters. Amphibious transport docks
perform the mission of amphibious transports, amphibious cargo ships, and the older LPDs by incorporating both
a flight deck and a well deck that can be ballasted and deballasted to support landing craft or amphibious
vehicles.” “Amphibious transport dock,” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_transport_dock. 119
MoD, SDR, np. 120
Ibid.
43
Illustration 9: The difference in size between the former Invincible-class carrier and the new Queen Elizabeth becomes apparent in this picture.
procurement decision regarding the carriers necessarily meant that all twelve air defense
destroyers would be built.121
As we now know, this was merely wishful thinking. On the other
hand, the planned successor to the venerable Trafalger and Swiftsure-class submarines was to
be increased to a total of five units and, in fact, by 2015 three boats of the new Astute-class
have entered service while an additional three hulls are under construction. The seventh, and
final, unit has been ordered and tentative plans see the SSN entering service in 2024.122
According to the white paper, only minor adjustments had to be made in other areas.
The mine countermeasure (MCM) force was to be strengthened by five instead of ten ships,
the existing Nimrod MR.2 maritime patrol craft were to undergo modernization while work
on a successor, the Nimrod MRA.4, was already underway and, finally, the Air Force’s land-
based Harrier GR7s were to merge with the Navy’s Sea Harriers and be put under joint
command, “enabling them to operate equally effectively from both land and sea.”123
In toto, “[t]he
Strategic Defense Review
is an impressive
document”, E.R. Hooton
wrote at the time, “which
seems to indicate that the
Ministry of Defense has
taken a cold, hard look at
British defense policy for
the next century in the
light of diplomacy and
industrial capability.”124
Hooton’s upbeat remarks regarding the Strategic Defence Review are quite justifiable,
considering that its provisions apparently were made in a “time of relative plenty”125
and after
a close study of the United Kingdom’s aims and needs in the post-Cold War security
environment. The Royal Navy can be thankful for the prudence and strategic vision the
political and military leadership displayed at the time. “It may not have seemed like it at the
121
E. R. Hooton, “Britain’s Strategic Defence Review: Smiles All Around,” Military Technology, Vol. 22, 9
(1998): 34. 122
“UK: BAE Systems Secures $1.92 Bln Submarine Deal,” Navaltoday.com, 11 Dec. 2012.
http://navaltoday.com/2012/12/11/uk-bae-systems-secures-1-92-bln-submarine-deal/. 123
Taylor, Guide, 11-12. 124
Hooton, “Smiles,” 36. 125
Childs, Future Navy, 7.
44
time but, with the benefit of hindsight, the SDR probably marked [the] modern high-point for
the Royal Navy […]”.126
Had the foundation for a well-balanced and capable fleet not been
set during these critical years it is likely that the once proud British Royal Navy would by
now have been reduced to a small regional force with limited power projection capabilities
after the years of stringent defense cuts that followed.
It goes without saying that the British Armed Forces have conducted a vast number of
operations over the last two decades, ranging from large-scale mechanized warfare during
Operation Desert Storm to current anti-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa.127
Moreover, the Royal Navy regularly participates in naval maneuvers and also hosts the annual
Cougar exercises128
in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Indian Ocean. “[T]he UK still has
expeditionary capabilities to join US-led operations [to the] East of Malacca” an analyst notes
and the “[d]isaster relief after Typhoon Haiyan by the destroyer HMS Daring and the
helicopter carrier HMS Illustrious prove that British capability.”129
The most costly deployments, both in terms of money and lives lost, however, have
been the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a key ally to the United States, the U.K. has
suffered considerable casualties in what is known as the ‘Global War on Terrorism’. In
addition to the painful sacrifices the country has made in the last decade, the strategic focus
on counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) operations has also created what
critics, including Dr. Dave Sloggett calls, sea blindness: “[Many] countries in NATO are
transfixed at the moment by the problems in Afghanistan [Syria, Iraq and North Africa] and
the threat from transnational actors. In doing this they have developed a sea blindness that
appears to forget and marginalize their maritime heritage.”130
The British military is no
exception to this rule. Over the course of the last decade the British armed services were
forced to come up with new strategies and tactics of how to fight land wars, which were
anything but the conventional conflicts the military’s top echelon had known and trained for
during the Cold War.
With the British combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan having come to an end,
Britain must now look beyond Basra and Helmand Province. Nevertheless, much controversy
remains in regard what future conflicts will look like. Some argue that if Western powers
126
Childs, Future Navy, 7. 127
For a excellent overview of the Navy’s operations during this period of time see Roberts, Safeguarding, 202-
234. Note that the book was published in 2009. For more recent information on deployments visit:
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/. 128
See “Cougar 14,” Royal Navy,
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/mediterranean-and-black-sea/cougar. 129
Seidler, “Europe’s Role,” np. 130
Dave Sloggett, “Norway Leads Where Others Should Follow,” Warships, 5 (2009): 23.
45
again decide to intervene militarily, it will be in Afghanistan-like stabilization operations,
fighting insurgencies with so-called ‘Joint Rapid Reaction Forces’ and large expeditionary
contingents, meaning ‘boots-on-the-ground’. Others, however, state quite the contrary,
namely that ground troops apart from Special Forces will not be needed and that air power
alone, be it land or sea based – manned or unmanned, will be a sufficient coercive measure
when the ground war is fought by rebels, self-proclaimed freedom fighters or other
indigenous forces.131
This argument is often backed by the NATO-led air campaign in Libya,
in which interdiction bombing gave the disjointed and rag-tag rebels a chance to overthrow
the Gaddafi Regime. Still others argue that a potential interstate conflict is likely to occur in
the next decades. In such a case, the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy – which has affected
all military branches by replacing high performance and heavy military assets with lighter but
cheaper systems designed for COIN operations – has left armies vulnerable in high intensity
conflicts.132
While considerable adjustments have been made to the force structure, enabling the
British Army and Royal Marines to become far more effective in fighting asymmetric wars on
land, the current Royal Navy cannot be considered more capable in dealing with emerging
threats than it used to be. With the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continuously
growing over the course of the last decade, the Navy’s large-scale procurement plans were
causing an additional burden on the defense budget, which fortunately remained at a
comparatively high level of around 2.5 percent of GDP. Therefore, it came as little surprise
that after the attacks of 9/11 large and expensive programs such as the Daring-class
destroyers were cut in order to allocate sufficient funds towards combating the “increased
threat from international terrorism.”133
However, it should have at least occurred to some of
the commentators, if not the political and military leadership at the time, that these decisions
would have severe ramifications for the Royal Navy in the long term. It therefore seems
inexplicable how a senior defense journalist such as E.R. Hooton, could dismiss the cuts to
the destroyers’ force as “no surprise and in indeed not a ‘real’ loss.”134
Even the most casual
131
Stephan Maninger, “Der Schattenkrieg – Ergänzungen zur „Counterinsurgency“ – Debatte,” Österreichische
Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 3 (2013): 305.
An interesting article comparing the two forms of warfare is Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency go together?” International Affairs, Vol. 86, 2 (2010): 333-353. 132
Carlo Kopp, “COIN reorientation- too far or not far enough,” Defence Today, Vol. 9, 2 (2011): 24-27. 133
Ministry of Defense, Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defense White Paper, (London: 2003): 2-3.
While in early 2001 the requirement stood at 12 vessels it was subsequently reduced, first to eight then to six
ships. Compare E. R. Hooton, “Britain’s Type 45 Destroyers Advantage,” Military Technology, Vol. 25, 6
(2001): 57-60 and E.R. Hooton, “’Delivering Security in a Changing World’: UK Defence White Paper 2003,”
Military Technology, Vol. 28, 2 (2004): 76-78. 134
Hooton, “Security”, 77.
46
observer should have realized that this would mean that, at the end of the day, the surface fleet
would be reduced to a little over 20 vessels – and that this number represented a rather
optimistic estimate.
In 2010, the British Government published the already infamous Strategic Defense and
Security Review (SDSR), titled: Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty.135
In the light of
the global economic downturn, the European debt crisis and the ongoing war in Afghanistan,
the entire Armed Forces were to become subject to a “draconian downsizing.”136
The Royal Navy’s combat air fleet was disbanded and in the process the aircraft
carrier force was eliminated. Of the three Invincible-class carriers, the lead vessel had already
been decommissioned in 2005, but was maintained in reserve. In 2011 the ship was towed to
Turkey and scrapped. The second ship, the Illustrious, as we have heard, remained in service
until 2014, albeit its capability being limited by the absence of fixed-wing aircraft. The Ark
Royal had joined the fleet in 1985 and was previously scheduled to be withdrawn once the
new class of aircraft carriers became available. In accordance with the SDSR, the British
Government, however, decided to “decommission HMS Ark Royal immediately”,137
after only
twenty-five years of service, thus creating a capability gap until the 65,000 ton Queen
Elizabeth enters service around 2020. (By comparison, the recently decommissioned U.S.S.
Enterprise was in service for over fifty years.) The lack of naval air power was clearly visible
during the NATO-led air campaign against Libya in the summer of 2011. After axing the Ark
Royal, Britain had to rely on the Royal Air Force’s Tornados and Typhoons to conduct strike
missions from the homeland, while French Rafale combat aircraft flew sorties from the
Charles de Gaulle carrier off the coast of Libya, as did the Italian and U.S. Harriers from the
Giuseppe Garibaldi and U.S.S Kearsage. It goes without saying that operating a carrier would
have made a crucial difference for the British forces, both in means of cost reduction and
mission effectiveness. Moreover, the hiatus in carrier operations will also result in a
considerable challenge to restore such capabilities. Fortunately, close ties with the United
States have provided opportunities for British personnel to train on the U.S. Navy’s big deck
aircraft carriers, in order to maintain their flying and flight-deck operation skills.138
As previously mentioned, the surface fleet has been consolidated around the six Type
45 destroyers and 13 Type 23 Duke-class frigates, with its successor, the Type 26, scheduled
135
Minstry of Defense, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, The Strategic Defence and Security Review.
(London: The Stationary Office, 2010). 136
Larrabee, Austerity, xii. 137
MoD, SDSR, 22. 138
Dr Dave Sloggett, Iain Ballantyne, “Charting a new course for the ‘Special Relationship’ at sea,” Warships,
March (2015): 18-19.
47
to replace the Dukes in the course of the next decade. Cost overruns and delays in the Nimrod
MRA.4 program ultimately led to the cancelation of the maritime patrol aircraft and with it
the loss of an integral element of the U.K.’s ASW capabilities. These capabilities have been
sorely missed, in particular more recently when a Russian submarine allegedly was sighted in
the waters off Scotland. In a somewhat embarrassing move, the Royal Navy asked its
American ally for assistance in the search for the submarine.139
What is more, a further round
of cuts in manpower levels has left the Navy with a force of roughly 30,000 military
personnel, less than half than at the end of the Cold War.
To sum up these developments, a recent RAND study comes to the conclusion that
“reduced manpower levels, curtailed equipment procurement, and [subsequent] capability
gaps [have] direct consequences for the UK’s ability to carry out current and future
missions.”140
Although the Royal Navy is making investments to maintain a balanced naval
force – deciding to commission both new Queen Elizabeth-class carriers and planning a new
class of ballistic missile submarines – some analysts ask themselves if the British Navy is not
backing the wrong horse. “A key question, however, is whether a balanced force is ultimately
in the strategic interests of the United Kingdom, or whether such a force should be abandoned
in favor of a ‘cruising’ navy requiring a greater number of frigates and destroyers and
providing more naval presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can
accomplish.”141
In fact, as McGrath continuous, “[c]onsidering the United Kingdom’s global economic
interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with the US Navy, a force of less than 20
combatants might not suffice.”142
Over the past decade the Royal Navy, by and large, has
tried to trade quantity for quality. By pursuing a strategy of ‘leapfrogging’, “cutting defense
expenditure heavily today while investing in new types of capabilities”,143
the British Navy
hopes to profit down the line, or in other words accepting “that there will be some significant
long-term gain, but also some significant short-term pain.”144
However, this practice cannot
be seriously considered an appropriate solution to the problem, especially if national security
139
Jamie Merrill, “MoD asks for American help in searching for Russian submarine near Scotland,” The
Independent, 1 April, 2014.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mod-asks-for-american-help-in-searching-for-russian-
submarine-near-scotland-9966080.html. 140
Larrabee, Austerity, 6 141
Bryan McGrath, “NATO at sea: Trends in allied naval firepower,” American Enterprise Insitute, September
18, 2013: np
http://www.aei.org/publication/nato-at-sea-trends-in-allied-naval-power/. 142
McGrath, “NATO Trends,” np. 143
Larrabee, Austerity, xvii. 144
Dr. Lee Willett, “The Strategic Defence and Security Review, A Preliminary RUSI Assessment,” min. 04:52-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yt0NOuFL_Ss.
48
is at stake. Furthermore, the shortage of surface combatants is unlikely to become any less
critical in the future. At any given moment in time, British destroyers and frigates are
conducting a number of tasks in different parts of the world as the former First Sea Lord, Sir
Mark Stanhope pointed out:
Standing commitments [at the time included]: Protecting Iraqi oil infrastructure, anti-
piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-drugs, safeguarding overseas territories and Crown
Dependencies including the Falklands. Those missions require at least five or six ships
at any one time and the wisdom is that you need three or four ships for each
commitment, in order to guarantee having one on station. That means one out there,
one, possibly two, in refit or maintenance and another training to deploy. In frigate and
destroyer terms there is not a lot, if anything left over for emergencies such as war or
for training with allies to underpin alliances that prevent wars.145
Clearly, such a high frequency of deployments also increases the wear and tear on the
warships and their crews. Fatigue not only takes its toll on the ships’ hulls but also becomes
visible among the men and women who do their utmost to protect the interests of the United
Kingdom at sea.
In order to alleviate this dire situation – as we shall see in the following chapters –
many European states now operate flotillas of small ocean-going patrol vessels (OPV),
specifically designed for the increasing number of low intensity anti-piracy, drug interdiction,
fishery protection or search and rescue (SAR) operations. However, currently the Royal Navy
merely has four such vessels in service, of which only one is assigned to operations outside of
the British Isles’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).146
As a consequence, the more capable
frigates and air defense destroyers also have to conduct these operations, in which their
multimillion dollar electronics and weapons suit are rarely needed. General Sir David
Richards points to this paradox by stating, “‘You get to this ridiculous situation where in
Operation ‘Atalanta’, off the Somali coast, we have £1bn (Type 45) destroyers trying to sort
out pirates in a little dhow with RPGs […] costing $50 […]. That can’t be good.’”147
The Strategic Defense and Security Review in 2010 caused considerable capability
gaps among all branches of the Armed Forces. However, there is cautious optimism in naval
quarters, concerning the future of the Royal Navy. After years of defense cuts, military
expenditure is to increase slightly from 2015 onwards.148
In the light of a somewhat better
145
Iain Ballentyne, “The Big Interview, First Sea Lord of the RN,” Warships, Sep. (2009): 7. 146
Richard Beedall, “The Royal Navy: Mind the Gaps,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad
Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013), 80. For information on EEZ, see Footnote 157. 147
Sir David Richards quoted in ibid. 148
Till, “British approach,” 25.
49
economic situation Prime Minister Cameron announced that, instead of selling or mothballing
the second carrier, the Prince of Wales will join the fleet early next decade. “The second
carrier will be brought into service. [This] means the Royal Navy will be able deploy a carrier
100 percent of the time,” Cameron stated.149
Moreover, the teething problems the new Astute-
class SSNs have encountered will have been sorted out by the time the carriers arrive, making
them some of the most capable hunter-killer submarines in the world. The design phase of the
new Type 26 frigate and replacement for the four Vanguard ballistic missile subs is well
underway and it is hoped that the current size of the fleet can be maintained. Anything short
of the construction of 13 new frigates and four SSBNs would only exacerbate the already
critical state regarding the size of the fleet, and therefore can rightfully be considered as
possible brinkmanship on part of the government.150
Unless some unforeseen events occur which would necessitate substantial adjustments
to be made to the current procurement plan, the British Royal Navy will operate a multi-
purpose navy with increased power-projection capabilities by the beginning of the next
decade. By and large, the Royal Navy will have emulated the United States’ naval forces. In
fact, as a number of observers note, the Royal Navy already “looks strikingly like the US
Navy, except [at] a fraction of its size.” However, “the resources necessary to achieve these
goals are to some degree harvested from savings gained from a significantly smaller escort
and combatant fleet” McGrath criticizes.
151 Notwithstanding this predicament, operating a
balanced naval force gives the political and military leadership the most effective tool to cope
with the changing security environment and a myriad of emerging threats. “The general
tendency [in the 21st century]”, Geoffrey Till observes, “is to guard against the difficulty of
prediction by building general purpose fleet capabilities that can be adapted to respond to
unexpected events and trends.”152
After having now reached its ostensible nadir since the end of the Cold War, the
British Royal Navy is slowly recovering from the severe retrenchment that has befallen all of
the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces. With numerous high-profile procurement projects
underway, the Royal Navy can look forward to a somewhat brighter future. Britain is likely to
149
Andrew Chuter “Cameron: UK Will Operate 2 Aircraft Carriers,” Defense News, 5 Sep. (2014).
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140905/DEFREG01/309050019/Cameron-UK-Will-Operate-2-
Aircraft-Carrier. 150
In particular, if only three SSBNs would be built this would severely change the strategic principle of an at-
sea nuclear deterrent force, as the U.K. would no longer be able to have one ship at sea all the time. Compare:
“Debating Continuous-at-Sea Deterrence: Britain's Nuclear Security”.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jC3-TPRnXhM&list=PLFAgO2TZWpwBH9t3LB4CJscyDOo5M3dt9. 151
Mc Grath “NATO Trends,” np. 152
Till, “British Approach,” 18
50
once again deploy fast jets in the form of the Lockheed Martin F-35B from the decks of its
aircraft carriers and thus regain substantial power projection and deterrent capabilities.
Ultimately, however, the drastic reduction in the size of the fleet over the last twenty
years has been a very costly one in strategic terms. As Till concludes, “a decline in the RN’s
global footprint seems inevitable given the decline in the number of its ships and people.”153
Such a development is likely to accelerate the already ongoing shift in the global naval
balance from West to East.154
This year, in 2015, the next Strategic Defense Review will be
published. As a consequence some of the findings in this chapter regarding Britain’s Naval
Forces might need to be qualified in view of the new provision made by the British
Government. However, there is little reason to believe that significantly more money will be
allocated to defense which would allow the Royal Navy to regain the status it enjoyed at the
end of the Cold War.
6) FRANCE: Stretched but Willing – Europe’s Most Capable Naval Force
Figure 3
153
Till, “British Approach,” 26. 154
Ibid., 28.
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 3 France Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
51
Figure 4
Over the centuries the French and British fought epic naval battles to decide who was
to command the sea. In the end, French aspirations for global dominance ended with the
crippling defeat at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 against Lord Nelson and the accreted might
of the Royal Navy. From that point onwards the British would rule supreme for over a
hundred years, until their power was finally eclipsed by the United States and its Navy.
Consequently, during the Cold War the Royal Navy was subordinated to NATO’s naval
strategy against the Soviet threat. As has been noted, the British slowly shifted their focus
from a more general power projection capability to anti-submarine warfare in the North
Atlantic, relying on the United States’ carrier battle groups to bring the fight to the enemy in
the case of war. France, on the other hand, for both political and geographical reasons, had to
build and maintain a balanced multi-purpose fleet, able to shoulder the entirety of conceivable
maritime tasks.
Firstly, in 1966, after apparently insurmountable differences between France and the
United States regarding the Grand Nations status within NATO, President Charles de Gaulle
announced the country’s withdrawal from the Alliance.155
Therefore, the French Navy, or
155
Although the French Armed Forces were no longer incorporated into NATO’s command structure, France
had significant forces stationed in Germany. Throughout the Cold War NATO contingency planning was largely
based on the assumption that France would join the other NATO forces in the event of war with the Soviet
1990 2000 2015
Aircraft Carriers 3 3 1
Large Surface Combatants 38 30 20
Submarines 18 12 10
Assault/Amphibious 9 9 7
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 4 France: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
52
Marine Nationale, not only had to be designed to provide credible nuclear deterrence in the
form of its ballistic missile submarines (referred to as the force de frappe), but also had to be
capable of conducting naval operations ranging across the gamut of the intensity spectrum:
from fleet air defense to fishery protection.
The second defining factor was the unique nature of France’s geography. While other
European states such as Italy or Norway had (and still have) relatively confined spheres of
interest – the greater Mediterranean region and High North respectively – France had access
to the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the English Channel, hence to the North Sea.
Numerous sea lines of communication run through these waters and protecting them is of vital
interest to France, which like so many other nations is dependent on seaborne trade. What is
more, France still retains numerous oversea territories, including, inter alia, French Guiana in
South America (home to Europe’s spaceport), Guadalupe and Martinique in the Caribbean,
Réunion in the Indian Ocean, Adélie Land in Antarctica and French Polynesia in the middle
of the Pacific Ocean. Apart from the U.S., France is the only country to have its naval forces
continuously on station in all three oceans of the world156
and also possesses the second
largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ)157
which stretches over more than 11,000,000 km².
Accordingly, the French Navy has over the past decades operated a mix of ‘first-rate’
warships, as well as patrol vessels designed for low-risk sea surveillance, fishery protection
and constabulary duties.
Sustained military expenditure of over 3.5 percent of the nation’s GDP throughout the
Cold War allowed the French Navy to become one of the most prominent sea powers in the
world by the time the global confrontation between East and West had come to an end.
Although its surface fleet was not as numerous as that of the British Navy (38 large surface
combatants compared to Britain’s 48), the Marine Nationale had one distinct advantage over
the British and other large naval forces. Instead of relying on small cruiser-sized aircraft
carriers that could only deploy the Harrier jump-jets (such as the British Invincible-class, the
Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi, or the Spanish Principe de Asturias), France operated two flat-
deck carriers using a CATOBAR system (catapult assisted take-off barrier arrested recovery).
Union. See Norman Friedman, The Fifty Year War. Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (London: Chatham
Publishing, 2000): 295-298. 156
Seidler, “Europe’s Role,” np. 157
“An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including
energy production from water and wind. It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles (nmi) from its
coast. In colloquial usage, the term may include the continental shelf. The term does not include either the
territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 nmi limit.” Quote from “Exclusive Economic Zone,”
Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone.
53
This system allowed heavier aircraft like the Dassault Etendard IVPs, Grumman F-8E
Crusaders, and the Alizé maritime patrol planes to safely operate from the carrier, thus
increasing the naval air-wing’s combat radius and payload. In essence, the French carrier
battle groups around the Clemenceau and Foch represented Europe’s most powerful naval
assets.
In addition, the Jeanne d’Arc helicopter carrier, somewhat similar in design to the
Soviet Moskva-class, provided the fleet with ASW and amphibious capabilities. The escort
fleet consisted of 18 cruisers and destroyers, as well as 24 smaller frigates. Although a
considerable force, many of these ships had already been in service for nearly thirty years and
were becoming increasingly expensive and difficult to operate. On the other hand, units such
as the Cassard-class belonged to the most capable air defense destroyers of their time,158
while the new class of George Leygues ASW destroyers represents the core of the Navy’s
multi-purpose surface capabilities to date.
Like Britain, the French Navy operated a mix of nuclear propelled and conventional
diesel-electric submarines, the latter of which, it was decided during the 1990s, were to be
decommissioned in favor of the SSNs. A new class of boomers (SSNBs) had already been
laid down at the national shipyards at Cherbourg159
and would slowly replace the six existing
boats. Four nuclear power attack submarines of the Améthyste-class were also ordered to
augment the existing Rubis-class, but in the end only two units were built, bringing the
number of nuclear attack submarines to a total of six. Interestingly, these boats were very
small compared to other SSNs and, in fact, displaced less than, for example, the Japanese
Soryu and Oyashio-class conventional submarines.160
As mentioned, the French DCN
shipbuilders had also constructed the highly capable Agosta and Daphné SSKs, which were
158
“The two frigates are the most modern and doubtless the best equipped in all the navies of Western Europe, in
particular with respect to electronic warfare equipment.” Bernard Prézelin, Naval Institute Guide to Combat
Fleets of the World 1992-93. Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 1992):
xiii. 159
“The system under which the French Navy procures its warships and naval equipment is unique. The main
responsibility falls on the Direction des Constructions Navales [DCN], an official design bureau answerable to
the General Armament Authority. This resembles the structure of other leading navies’ procurement processes,
but the bureau is also responsible for running the dockyards, markets its products for export, undertakes a
surprisingly wide range of manufacturing, and collaborates with industry.” Antony Preston, “Warship Design for
the French Navy,” Naval Forces Vol. 13, 1 (1992): 16. 160
Tons submerged: Améthyste-class SSN, 2,680 tons; Oyashio-class SSK, 3,600 tons; Soryo-class SSK, 4,200
tons; Trafalger-class SSN, 5,200 tons; Los Angeles-class ca. 7,000 tons; Akula-class SSN, >9000 tons. See 160
Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World. 16th Edition. Their Ships, Aircraft,
and Systems, (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 2013): 34. 160
Ibid., 37, 200, 359, 581, 797, 847.
54
particularly useful in waters closer to shore. The vessels’ quality is underscored by their
considerable commercial success.161
The need for offshore patrol vessels, sometimes referred to as surveillance frigates at
the time, has already been briefly addressed. Although warships, such as the 17 D’Estienne
D’Orves-class in service with the French Navy in 1990, would nowadays not be considered
credible surface combatants bearing in mind their shortcomings in size, speed and armament
(1,140 tons, 23kts, one 100mm gun, four Exocet missiles, ASW rocket launcher); at the end
of the Cold War they provided an indispensible element of the Marine Nationale’s fleet, in
particular because they could be built in great numbers. In comparison to the British Navy,
France has always sought to maintain a sizable fleet of such OPVs. However, their design
features and nature of deployment often blurs the line between the different classes of
warship. (Offshore patrol vessels now have reached the size, and sometimes capabilities, of
ships classified as destroyers twenty-five years ago).
In terms of amphibious capabilities and auxiliaries, France had already made
respectable investments by the time other European countries only started to realize the utility
of such forces in time of crisis. One 9,300 ton large dock landing ship (LSD), a smaller 3,310
ton LSD, two older Ouragan-class ships and five medium sized landing ships provided
comparatively robust power projection capabilities, despite some critics arguing at the time
that the “amphibious assault capabilities [were] dangerously reduced”.162
With five large fleet
replenishment ships and a sizable fleet of mine hunters, the French Navy could generally
consider itself on par with the British Navy, only outclassed by the U.S. Navy and the Soviet
naval juggernaut.163
The drastic changes at the end of the 20th
century obviously also had serious
repercussions on the French Armed Forces. Military spending was quickly reduced and the
entire defense structure underwent radical reorganization. At its heart, the so-called ‘Optimar
95’ plan, formulated only a year after the Cold War had come to an end, provided for some
far-reaching conditions, namely to disband all previous naval command structures. In short,
the naval squadron and flotillas were to be dissolved and the “bulk of the surface fleet [was]
subdivided into three large specialized structures, which could be looked at as coherent ‘force
pools’.”164
Somewhat similar to the development of the Alpha and Delta groups in Spain165
161
A number of Agosta boats were sold to Pakistan, Spain and Malaysia, while the Daphné saw service with the
Portuguese and Pakistani naval forces. See Chris Chant, Ships of the World’s Navies (London: Brain Trodd
Publishing House, 1990): 30-31. 162
“‘Optimar 95’ For The French Navy,” Military Technology Vol. 16, 9 (1992): 52. 163
See Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xii-xiv, 136-181. 164
“’Optimar 95’,” 51.
55
Illustration 10: The Singapore version of the French La Fayette frigate exhibits significant signal reduction features.
“the Joint Chief of Staff [would] be able to ‘pick up’ at will the naval assets he [needed] to
face a given crisis situation.”166
Space does not
allow the listing of all the
changes made as a
consequence of the
Optimar 95 plan, but in
general it can be said that
the foundation for the
current force structure was
laid during this period of
time. The aircraft carriers
and the majority of the
surface fleet (including air
defense and ASW frigates, the amphibious forces and fleet replenishment tankers), as well as
the nuclear attack submarines, would henceforth be stationed at Toulon in southern France.
The rest of the French fleet has its home at Brest on the Atlantic coast. The primary mission
of the frigates and OPVs stationed there is to protect the SSBNs on their way to and from
their nearby port at Ile Longue. The larger part of the mine countermeasure force also
operates from Brest and is supported by replenishment vessels.167
Despite a serious effort being made to modernize the fleet during the 1990s, it was not
long before the general state of the French Navy began to cause considerable alarm among
defense analysts. Defense expenditure had remained remarkably high during the early 1990s
(around 3.3 percent of GPD) but began to decrease drastically from 1995 onwards. By the
year 2000, the budget had been reduced by nearly 25 percent (to 2.5 percent of GDP). Apart
from the aforementioned streamlining measures, fiscal restrictions forced the Navy to make a
number of concessions. While some of the procurement projects were cut, such as the second
pair of Cassard air defense frigates,168
others were postponed or underwent “programme
165
Discussed in the chapter on Spain. 166
Ibid. 167
See for initial plan in “’Optimar 95’,” 51-54. Current forces in Jean Moulin, “France: The Marine Nationale:
The Bare Minimum for the Job,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire:
Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 85. 168
“It was originally planned to build four air defense destroyers to escort the Charles de Gaulle, but the
Cassard-class was cut back to two ships. More air defense ships will be needed”. Preston, Antony. “France’s
Naval Industry in the 1990s.” Naval Forces Vol. 13, 5 (1992): 16.
56
stretching measures”169
in order to avoid rash decisions, which might come back to haunt the
Navy. As Jean-Louis Promé stated at the time, “[g]iven the very long delay between the launching
of a modern weapon system and its eventual entry into service, a wrong decision today could
compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the French defense posture as a whole in the 2000-
2010 timeframe.”170
However, regardless of these saving measures, the Marine Nationale found itself in
gradual decline. By 1996 the last of the Daphné-class submarines had been decommissioned
and ultimately the Navy “opted to abandon the conventional submarine component.”171
This
is a shame given France’s continued proficiencies in building highly capable SSKs. The
Clemenceau was taken from service in 1997, while her sister the Foch waited for the arrival
of France’s new carrier before being decommissioned and sold to Brazil in 2000. Since then
the French Navy has operated a single carrier: the Charles de Gaulle.
Meanwhile, five new La Fayette frigates entered service, exhibiting groundbreaking
design features, not seen before in any warship.172
The public interest in the ships was
heightened when it was featured in the 1995 Bond movie GoldenEye. Stealth had become a
buzzword of the post-Cold War era, as American stealth fighters and bombers could penetrate
enemy air defense networks with seeming impunity. In the maritime realm, “[t]he best way to
protect a ship is still to avoid detection”, a commentator stated.173
Designed to drastically
reduce the ship’s radar cross section, the hull and superstructure of the La Fayette are slanted
to “control radar reflectivity”174
and are covered with radar absorbing material (RAM). The
usual openings one finds in the ship’s hull and superstructure are all covered with retractable
screens to enhance stealth as the illustration above shows. Apart from their groundbreaking
features, the ships provide a reasonable amount of firepower, despite having been designed
for long-range missions, overseas possessions control, as well as defensive operations closer
to home.175
A single 100mm 55 cal gun can be used against air, surface and land targets,
while the eight Exocet SSMs and Crotale CN2 SAM systems provide additional effectiveness
169
Jean-Louis Promé, “The French 1992-94 Military Programme Law: A Case of ‘Let’s Wait and See’ While
Adapting,” Military Technology Vol. 16, 9 (1992): 42. 170
Promé, “Military Programme,” 42. 171
Jean-Charles Lefebvre, interview by Naval Forces, “The French Navy in a Phase of Transition,” Naval Forces
Vol. 13, 5 (1992): 41. 172
“La Fayette Frigate Programme: A Major Success.” Naval Forces. Special Issue: French Naval Technology
(1994): 21-22.
Alan Hinden, interview by Naval Forces, “La Fayette Ship Profile (I),” Naval Forces Vol. 19, 2 (1999): 45-47. 173
“La Fayette,” 22. 174
Wertheim, “Combat Fleets 16th
,” 207. 175
Ibid.
57
in medium-intensity combat. A helicopter can be embarked, and owing to the ship’s
sophisticated stabilization system it can land even in very rough seas.176
On the international market the La Fayette design has been highly successful.
Modified versions of the ship have been sold to Singapore, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia.
However, for the French Navy, the frigate has become a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, it pioneered naval ship design and had significant influence on both France’s Horizon-
class destroyer and FREMM-class frigate (FREMM stands for Frégate européenne multi-
mission). At the time it gave the Navy exactly what it needed, namely a state-of-the-art
warship and technology test bed, which could fill the gap between the fleet’s OPVs and
aforementioned “first rank ships”.177
It is safe to say that very few people in the naval service
at the time would have imagined the five vessels, referred to as second rank ships,178
to
become front-line frigates, constituting a third of the Navy’s current escort fleet.179
Inherently
slow, arguably too lightly armed for high-intensity conflict (although a more capable air
defense system could be installed), the La Fayette exemplifies how important it is to build
multi-purpose surface combatants, capable of conducting a wide variety of missions and
which are able to quickly adapt to an ever changing security environment.
In hindsight, one can question the decision to invest so heavily in signature reduction,
instead of building more powerful and heavily armed warships. Even at the time, it was not
reasonable to believe that the stealth frigate would ever have to avoid a modern anti-ship
missile fired by an angry local fisherman while on station off the shores of Martinique or
Tahiti.
The French can rely on a powerful military industrial complex. Over the last decades,
French companies have provided cutting-edge designs in many areas of military technology.
In terms of shipbuilding, the French DCNS industrial group can rightfully be considered one
of the most experienced and successful manufacturers of naval weapon systems. In fact, it is
one of the few companies able to build nearly every kind of warship: from conventional and
nuclear powered submarines, to patrol vessels, frigates, assault ships and aircraft carriers.
More importantly, over the last two decades, the French naval industry has successfully
teamed up with other European shipbuilders to design and manufacture some of the best naval
vessels in service today (the trilateral Horizon-project has already been mentioned and will be
described in further detail in the next chapter). Based on these experiences, the continued
176
A helicopter can land at up to sea state six. See “La Fayette,” 22. 177
Hinden, “La Fayette Profile,” 48. 178
Ibid. 179
Ministère de la Défense, French White Paper, Defense and National Security 2013 (Paris 2013): 131.
58
Illustration 11: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, conversing with his counterpart, Pierre de Villiers aboard the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier.
cooperation with Italy’s Fincantieri has led to the construction of the highly versatile FREMM
frigates, eight of which have been ordered by the French Navy, called Aquitaine-class.180
Many design features of both the Horizon and the La Fayette are visible the Navy’s
new warship. Most notably it incorporates signature reduction measures to make it arguably
the most advanced warship in this area today.181
Despite its radar system being somewhat less
sophisticated than on the Italian FREMMs (Herakles radar instead of the more capable Selex
EMPAR radar), it nonetheless provides robust air defense capabilities. Besides its AAW
weapons, Exocet anti-ship missiles, and the French equivalent to the U.S. Tomahawk land
attack cruise missile (the MBDA SCALP), the ship’s anti-submarine warfare suit is most
impressive. Apart from the obligatory torpedo launchers, the ship has a Thales low frequency,
active and passive sonar mounted on the ship’s bow. “Providing long-range detection
irrespective of environmental conditions, it is particularly effective at detecting targets above
the thermal layer and has been influenced by Mediterranean anti-submarine conditions”,
Waters comments.182
A second variable-depth sonar is deployed from underneath the flight
deck and is designed to find submarines even at very great distances beneath the thermal
layer. Once a submarine has been located the Aquitaine’s helicopter is mainly responsible for
its pursuit. The current
Westland Lynx model is
currently being replaced
by the more capable
French Caïman version
of the NH-90. 183
This brief
description clearly
shows that the French
warship relies almost
exclusively on European
technical know-how. It is worth noting that as the defense spending, and thus the demand for
new warships, among European states began to sink in the wake of the Soviet breakup, France
180
Conrad Waters, “France’s Aquitaine: First French FREMM Heralds a Renaissance for Its Surface Fleet,” in
Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 90-107. 181
Waters, “French FREMM,” 99. 182
Ibid., 95. 183
The thermal layer or thermocline is a general feature of large bodies of water, such as lakes or oceans. This
layer separates the upper more turbulent and mixed layer from the calm dark water below. The depth of the
thermocline is not constant but, generally, is found at around 100 meters below the surface.
59
was at the forefront of the attempt to maintain its industrial proficiencies, thereby also
ensuring that Europe’s defense industry remained competitive on the international market.184
Successive French defense white papers underscored the vital necessity to strengthen the
common European defense sector. “Industry must be European” they urged and made a point
by stating that “[i]ndividual European countries can no longer master every technology and
capability at national level. […] As regards the other technologies and capacities that it may
wish to acquire, France believes that the European framework must be privileged: combat
aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, satellites, electronic components etc.”185
While many European surface combatants had relied on American sensors and armament,
such as the Tartar and Standard SM-1ER missiles for upper tier fleet air defense during the
later years of the Cold War, the French were adamant that their future warships should be
fitted with European weapon systems to the greatest possible extent. In regard to air defense
capability – one of the primary elements of modern warships – a French and Italian defense
consortium developed and introduced the Aster missile series in the late 1990s. Two versions
of this highly capable SAM are currently in service: the short range Aster 15, for point and
local air defense and the larger Aster 30, for long-range air defense. Both types have been
successfully tested against a variety of targets and, owing to their active seeker and thrust
vector control, are by some analysts considered superior to all but the newest American
Standard missiles.186
Among the vessels fitted with the DCNS SYLVER vertical launch
system firing the Aster missiles are the four French and Italian Horizon-class destroyers, the
British Type 45 (which evolved out of the Horizon-project), the export versions of the La
Fayette frigate, the Italian aircraft carrier Cavour, as well as all new FREMM-class frigates.
The first ship to incorporate the Aster air defense missile, however, was the nuclear-
powered Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier – the backbone of Marine Nationale. After the keel
of the ship had been laid down in 1989 it took five years for the ship to be launched and, after
numerous delays, another seven! years for her to enter service. At a displacement of over
37,000 tons and a length of 261 meters, the French carrier will remain Europe’s largest
warship until the Queen Elizabeth joins the British fleet in around 2020.187
As was noted at
the beginning of the chapter, the ship is more powerful than any other aircraft carrier currently
184
Ministére de la Dèfense, Livre Blanc sur la Défense 1994 (Paris, 1994): 117-119. 185
Ministére de la Dèfense, The French White Paper on defence and national security (Paris, 2008): Chapter 2,
9. 186
The new SM-3 is generally considered the currently best air-defense missile against high-altitude targets and
has successfully been tested in the ballistic missile defense role. Moreover, Raython is now also building the
Standard SM-6 ERAM with an active seeker in order to engage targets beyond the horizon of the ships sensors. 187
For general data on carriers see Wertheim, Combat Fleets 16th
, 195-196.
60
Illustration 12: French troops are heavily engaged along the country’s geographical axis of interest, such as in Mali.
in service, save the American supercarriers. Furthermore, the French Navy has a long and
successful history of operating fast jets from the decks of its aircraft carriers.
Apart from the ships’ nuclear propulsion, the most notable difference to similar ships
in service today is the installation of catapults and arresting wires. France was not only able to
benefit from the American’s experience in CATOBAR carrier operations, “[buying] important
parts of these systems in the US”,188
but can also operate its Aéronavale detachment from the
U.S. Navy’s carriers, as members of the respective naval air-arm explain: “The goal of the
deployment [of French aircraft onboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt] was to
demonstrate, on a large scale, our ability to integrate with US forces”, the commander of the
French air group said,189
while a senior US pilot added that “[i]ntegrating with the French did
not pose any major problem. […] Basically, we have the same mentality and all French pilots
have been trained by the US Navy […]”.190
Close cooperation between the two countries has
been quite common over the last decades, and it is safe to say that after rejoining NATO in
2009, “France today is much more integrated in NATO planning and operations than at any
time since the mid-1960s.”191
Such interoperability and cooperation not only provides
valuable trust-building measures but also enhances Europe’s ability to effectively deploy
together with their most important ally, the United States.
The Charles de Gaulle has
been one of the most important
assets in naval operations since its
introduction in 2001. The
Aéronavale conducted air strikes
with its Super-Étendard and Rafale
fighter-bombers against al-Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan as
part of Operation Enduring
Freedom, (the French naval
operation was called Operation
Herakles), while E2-C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft provided radar coverage and airborne
188
Philippe Remon-Beauvais quoted in Jean-Paul Philippe, “The CHARLES DE GAULLE Takes Shape,”
Military Technology, Vol. 16, 10 (1992): 45.
This is a considerably well-written article regarding the envisioned design features and requirements towards the
carrier in 1992. 189
Patrick Zimmermann quoted in Henri-Pierre Grolleau, “RAFALE Demonstrates Interoperability,” Military
Technology Vol. 32, 10 (2008): 92. 190
Ibid., 94. 191
Larrabee, Austerity, 26.
61
early warning. In 2011, the Charles de Gaulle participated in the air campaign against Libya’s
longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi, while most recently the carrier made a high-speed
transition from its previous station in the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf to join the U.S.-led
airstrikes against the IS network in Syria and Iraq.192
Despite serious discussion of building a second carrier has been going on for over two
decades (a possible cooperation with the British seemed to be the most cost-efficient solution)
the topic has now been dropped indefinitely. As a consequence, not a single large-deck
aircraft carrier will be operational in Europe between 2016 and 2018 when the French ship
undergoes her mid-life refueling and overhaul, and only the Spanish and Italians will be able
to deploy a very limited number of Harriers from their carriers. Meanwhile, India is already
making progress in deploying MiG-29K jets from the deck of the refurbished Soviet-era
Admiral Gorshkov, while the second carrier, the Viraat will await the introduction of India’s
first domestically built aircraft carrier before being decommissioned. Similarly, China has
also begun deployments of its first ‘flat-deck’, the Liaoning. While experts note that these
efforts do no amount to a credible aircraft carrier capability, both China and India have made
tentative provisions to build their fleet around numerous carrier battle groups. Moreover,
considering the current naval arms race which is under way in the Asia Pacific Region, these
developments clearly highlight the opposite trajectories that the European and Asian sea
powers are on.
In strategic terms France, however, remained steadfast. Despite increased political and
economical headwinds, the French Armed Forces would maintain a “full spectrum”193
force
and sufficient military means to conduct large-scale high-intensity interventions globally.
Priority would be given to the “geographical axis from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the
Arab-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.”194
However, as the defense white paper in 2008
noted, for ‘significant’ and ‘major’ operations, assets from other countries would be
needed.195
In other words, the United States’ heavy sealift, airlift and replenishment
capabilities, its aerial refueling fleet, large stock of precision ammunition, command and
control facilities, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets (ISR)196
would in any case remain a sine qua non in Europe’s defense planning.
192 “
France deploys aircraft carrier in Arabian Gulf for ISIL fight,” The National World 23 Feb. 2015.
http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/france-deploys-aircraft-carrier-in-arabian-gulf-for-isil-fight. 193
MdlD, Paper 2013, 12. 194
Ibid., chapter 2, 9. 195
Ibid., chapter 11. 196
An overview of American naval information warfare capabilities is provided in Jeremy Stöhs, “Intelligence
and Deterrence at Sea. The Role of US Naval Information Technology During the 1980s and Today,” JIPPS,
Vol. 8, 2 (2014): 73-91
62
Between 2008 and 2015, the size of the French Navy continued to decrease. The initial
plan to scale down the escort fleet to 18 vessels was found to be too costly in the light of an
11 percent cut to the Navy’s budget.197
Consequently, instead of 11 FREMM-class frigates,
(17 were originally planned in 2002) only eight would be procured, bringing the number of
“front-line” frigates down to the aforementioned 15 ships. Six of these warships are designed
for ASW tasks (in order to protect the force de frappe) while the last two units will be
upgraded to provide fleet air defense. The number of ballistic missile and attack submarines
remained untouched. On the other hand, in the past decade and in accordance with France’s
defense strategy, its amphibious forces were considerably strengthened. Three Mistral-class
(LHD) were built between 2003 and 2012198
and together with the Siroco LHD provide more
than “[just] limited crisis response and humanitarian intervention”, as McGrath believes to be
the case.199
In fact, apart from the British, France has the largest amphibious force in
Europe.200
The Mistral has been in the media spotlight as of late. In 2010, after more than two
years of secret negotiations, France and Russia signed a contract for four of these amphibious
assault ships to be built in French and Russian naval yards. The decision elicited fear among
some NATO members, not least because these ships would give the Russian fleet the
amphibious capabilities it so sorely lacked during the war against Georgia in 2009. Therefore,
it seems to be a somewhat peculiar historic coincidence that the second vessel under
construction is named after the port city annexed by Russian troops in the summer of 2014;
the Sevastopol. Given the renewed confrontation between East and West, the French
government ultimately had to bow to pressure from its allies and at first postponed and then
cancelled the delivery of the Vladivostok which already had a Russian crew onboard for
training at sea.201
197
Larrabee, Austerity,19. 198
Keel of the lead vessel Mistral laid down in 2003. Third and final unit Dixmude commissioned in 2012.
LHD stands for Landing Helicopter Dock. These vessels can embark helicopters as well as landing craft, small
vessels, and in some cases hovercraft from its well deck. Examples would be the American Tarawa and
America-class, the French Mistral-class, or the British HMS Ocean. 199
Compare McGrath “Decline,” np. 200
A summary regarding the vulnerability of the fleet’s large ships due to the lack of available escorts is
provided on Wikipedia: ““Incidents such as the near-loss of the Israeli corvette INS Hanit to a Hezbollah-fired
anti-ship missile during the 2006 Lebanon War have shown the vulnerability of modern warships to asymmetric
threats, with the Mistral-class ships considered under-equipped for self-defence in such a situation.[26]
Consequently, Mistral and Tonnerre cannot be deployed into hostile waters without sufficient escorting ships.
This problem is compounded by the small number of escort ships in the French Navy; there is a five-year gap
between the decommissioning of the Suffren-class frigates and the commissioning of their replacements, the
Horizon-class and FREMM frigates.” “Mistral-class amphibious assault ship,” Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mistral-class_amphibious_assault_ship 201
Dave Sloggett and Ian Ballantiyne, “Franco Russian Carrier Saga,” Warships 1 (2015): 13-14.
63
Illustration 13: Recent actions in Eastern Ukraine have persuaded the French government to cancel the delivery of the Mistral-class LHD to Russia.
The dispute over the Mistral ships for the Russian Navy also offers two important
insights into current naval issues. Firstly, regardless of claims that Russia’s naval industrial
capacity will soon be back in full swing, the country remains unable to build large surface
warships, or as Mikhail Tsypkin puts it “[t]he Russian defense industry is not dead by any
means, but Russia is no longer an autarkic defense industrial power.”202
Secondly, France will
have to pay a high price for not committing to its agreements. Not only will it have to pay
back the money it has already received, but the French defense sector runs the risk of
becoming stigmatized, incapable of securing any bids for new weapon systems in the future.
Fortunately, the latter ostensibly has not become evident, as Egypt in late February 2015
placed an order of 24 Rafale jets, as well as two FREMM frigates.203
Among the European
states, France remains the
currently most capable naval
force. It has for the most part
maintained a well-balanced
fleet, including carrier strike
power and a nuclear deterrent.
These assets, such as the assault
ship Mistral which deployed
French forces to Mali in 2013,
will become increasingly
important as the United States
slowly shifts its priorities away from Europe. Therefore, the French effort to cooperate more
closely with its friends and allies, not only in operational terms but, moreover, in defense
procurement projects has to be considered particularly laudable. The most recent defense
agreement between the United Kingdom and France (The Lancaster House Treaties) “could
provide a roadmap to more effective European defense cooperation, based on deeper
capability planning and mutual dependency.” Although, as a senior defense advisor criticizes,
“[the Franco-British cooperation] side-steps the strategic question of the role of NATO and
the United States in European defense and security [and does not] address concerns among
202
Mikhail Tsypkin, “The challenge of understanding the Russian Navy,” in: Oslo Files on Defence and
Security, The Rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø Dec.
(2012): 90. 203
Frédéric Lert, “Egypt to acquire FREMM frigate,” HIS Jane’s 360, 23 Feb. 2015.
http://www.janes.com/article/49163/egypt-to-acquire-fremm-frigate.
64
some European states over the long-term disengagement of the US from Europe”, it will
nevertheless “set the ‘gold standard’ for defense cooperation [in Europe].”204
France is likely to remain actively engaged along its ‘geographical axis of interest’,
which currently includes the Sahel, the European periphery, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Persian
Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean.205
Moreover, the French Navy will continue to
commit naval forces to policing duties in its overseas territories and across France’s
11,000,000km² exclusive economic zones. However, as a result of the most recent austerity
measures, the size of the naval fleet has been significantly reduced and former ‘second-rate’
vessels, assigned to the aforementioned tasks, are now part of the Marine Nationale’s ‘first-
line’ of surface combatants. Jean Moulin somberly concludes that, “[t]he Marine Nationale
finds itself in a difficult position, with no reduction in its commitment but fewer resources.”206
Finally, the last round of defense cuts in 2014 elicited stark reaction on part of the top military
echelon, who warned that the Armed Forces were close to exacerbation. Only after the entire
military leaderships threatened to resign did the French government promise to leave the
budget untouched for the coming years.207
Fortunately for the French Navy many of its naval platforms remain highly effective
and can rightfully be considered among the most sophisticated in the world. This includes its
Rafel combat aircraft, the Aquitaine-class frigate, which likely incorporates the most
advanced signature reduction features of any current warship, the Horizon air defense
destroyers and the three Mistral-class LHDs. In the end, the French Navy will remain
Europe’s most capable naval force for another five years, after which it will rank a close
second to Britain’s strengthened Royal Navy. It will continue to be looked to when crises
occur and in support of both French and European interests abroad. The Navy will continue to
do what it must. It will be willing – but it will be stretched.
204
Ben Jones, “Franco-British military cooperation a new engine for European defence?” Occasional Paper 88,
Feb. (2011): 5. 205
See MdlD, Paper 2013, 54. 206
Moulin, “Marine Nationale,” 87. 207
Francis Beaufort, “French Chiefs ‘In Revolt’,” Warships, July (2014): 3.
65
7) ITALY: The Marina Militare – Between Global Interest and Regional
Necessities
Figure 5
Figure 6
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 5 Italy: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 1 1 2
Large Surface Combatants 30 29 22
Submarines 12 8 6
Assault/Amphibious 4 3 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 6 Italy: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
66
The strategic space where Italy feels herself involved has its centre of gravity in the
Mediterranean Sea. It starts form Gibraltar and moves along two main lines one reaching the
Black Sea and the Middle East through the Balkans and the Aegean Sea; the latter moving
southward through the Red Sea down to the Indian Ocean, the Gulf, and including the Horn
of Africa.208
(Admiral Angel Mariani, Chief of the Italian Navy)
For millennia the denizens of the Italian peninsula have looked towards the sea in hope
of prosperity and wealth. In many cases they were not disappointed. Throughout history its
geographical position has proved expedient to those prudent enough to take advantage of the
waters surrounding Italy. The adjacent shores and the hinterland of the regions mentioned in
the lines above represented some of the most fertile and prosperous lands in the world. Trade
flourished as merchants transported and traded goods from near and far. Some made great
fortunes on precious materials and useful goods, exchanged on the brisk market that
connected the Levant with the Spanish Peninsula, the North African shores with the ports of
the Turkish coast.
Whereas the Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians and the Roman Empire commanded
the seas over hundreds of years, a millennium later, Italian military and commercial sea power
again dominated events in the Mediterranean. Throughout the 13th
, 14th
, and 15th
centuries,
Italy’s princely states were able to fashion navies and merchant fleets large enough to
dominate seaborne trade, thus elevating their cities to hitherto unseen cultural heights.
However, given their geographic position – which confined them to Mediterranean waters –
city states such as Genoa and Venice were not able to maintain their power once the New
World was discovered. Ultimately, Italy’s states were “maritime state[s] with too narrow and
geotropically too exposed a base of resources at home to compete with the emerging much
larger sea and land powers”,209
such as Spain, France and Great Britain. Nonetheless, the
Mediterranean would remain an important theater in world affairs and as of late has again
become the strategic focus of attention.
Looking back on Italy’s more recent past, because of its role in the Second World War
the Italian navy was reduced to less than a third-rate sea power by the provisos of the Paris
Peace Treaty. However, over the course of following decades Italy’s Marina Militare, as the
Navy is called, became increasingly relevant. The primary reason for this trend lay in the
208
Angelo Mariani, “A Strategic View of the Italian Navy,” Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 6. 209
Gray, Leverage, 135
67
Soviet Union’s vigorous attempt to wring naval supremacy from the NATO Allies in the
1970s and 80s. The hitherto unprecedented Soviet naval buildup made the need for Italy’s
naval capabilities on the southern flank more pressing. Conrad Waters explains that “[a]fter a
period of low-key performance,” the Soviets’ large-scale naval deployments to the
Mediterranean elicited “a renewed Marina Militare [to abandon] its previous ‘silent service’
policy [and] become, almost overnight, a more overt player on the world stage.”210
Italy’s new vision was postulated in two major defense white papers, one in 1985 the
other in 1991. Both represent a watershed for the Navy. Based on Italy’s aspirations to take on
a more assertive role in international politics, the new doctrine underscored the importance of
its armed forces in support of its national interests. Multinational missions further away from
home (such as the Lebanon mission between 1982-84) were considered an essential element
of Italy’s foreign policy. The defense papers, therefore, represented a major stepping stone for
the country’s strategic reorientation and consequent modernization of its military, as Admiral
Campo di Paolo states: “The White Paper of 1985 contained some important guidelines,
aiming at restructuring defense towards a better integration of the forces at both operational
planning and, management of resources levels; from the definition of missions, the unification
of the line of command, to the organization of the industry and procurement policy.”211
Italy’s transition from a strategy of static-defense to engaging in an active role, either
alone or as part of a multinational operation, continued throughout the decade. These changes
were also heavily influenced by extrinsic political events, such as the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the Gulf-War. As a result, the Modello di Difesa 1991 highlighted the increasing
challenges in the post-cold war era and utility of military force in support of the government’s
agenda. Multilateral cooperation within NATO, the European Union and United Nations was
to be expanded in order to legitimize the use of force.212
Fabrizio Coticchia summarizes these
tenets: “The key point of the whole document seems to be the identification between security
and the safeguarding of political and economic interests abroad, by means of new power
210
Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara, “Fleet Review – Italy: The Marina Militare: A Well-balanced Force
in Time of Crisis,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth
Publishing, 2012): 82. 211
Original quote: “Il Libro Bianco del 1985, […], conteneva alcune indicazioni importanti, mirando alla
ristrutturazione della Difesa nella direzione di una migliore integrazione delle forze sia a livello operativo che di
pianificazione e gestione delle risorse, a partire dalla definizione delle missioni, dall’unificazione della linea di
comando, fino all’organizzazione del settore industriale e della politica degli approvvigionamenti.”
Giampaolo Di Paola, “L’evoluzione della Difesa italiana negli ultimi trent'anni,” Ministero Della Difesa,
September 28, 2012.
http://www.difesa.it/Il_Ministro/Articoli/Pagine/LEVOLUZIONEDELLADIFESAITALIANA.aspx 212
Fabrizio Coticchia. “Il Lungo Sentiero sul Lago di Ghiaccio: L’Evoluzione della Politica di Difesa Italiana
dalla Fine della Guerra Fredda all’Operazione Leonte,” (PhD diss., IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca,
2009): 185.
68
projection capabilities of the military instrument, as the heart of the country’s foreign
policy.”213
Although the Modello di Difesa also included a general reduction of Italy’s force
structure, Admiral Umberto Guarnieri, showed much certainty that the Navy at the time was
well equipped to achieve these tasks. The force of the 1990s, he pointed out, “will be
composed of elements of better quality, able to preserve the security and national interest of
Italy, wherever necessary be it alone or in cooperation with its allies.”214
The basic “strategic
functions” listed by Guarnieri have also not been altered to any considerable degree over the
course of the last 25 years. In fact, the Marina Militare’s primary tasks nowadays are very
similar to those mentioned back then:
- during peacetime, presence and surveillance in the areas of strategic national interest;
- during times of tensions and crisis, protection of national interest and cooperation with
international security organisations; and
- during war, contribution to the combined defence of national and allied homelands.215
Based on Italy’s doctrinal continuity, the Navy’s fleet structure has also undergone little
change since the end of the Cold War. Many vessels were commissioned during the
modernization process in the 1980s, laying the foundation for the Italian naval forces we see
today. Despite its declining numbers and ageing vessels, the Marina Militare, in general,
continues to field a balanced fleet which can conduct operations over a wide range of
contingencies. Moreover, in concordance with its defense policy it has been able to deploy
naval air power, retain power-projection capabilities, deploy naval forces – both alone and
with its NATO Allies – and promote maritime security for many years. However, similar to
other European countries, (e.g. Germany, Netherlands), Italy’s continued cuts in defense
expenditure have reduced the fleet to such an extent that the Navy might have to consider
ceding some of its aforementioned capabilities altogether in the mid-term, as Figure 6 shows.
One the other hand, the Italian Navy, arguably more than any other, is confronted with
the problem of maintaining both high-intensity war-fighting capabilities as well as extensive
naval provisions for low-intensity and humanitarian aid operations. The most challenging of
213
Original quote: “Il punto-chiave dell’intero documento appare l’identificazione tra la sicurezza e la
salvaguardia degli interessi politici ed economici all’estero, attraverso una nuova capacità di power projection
dello strumento militare, elemento cardine della politica estera del paese [italics in the original].”
Ibid. 214
Umberto Guarnieri interviewed by Naval Forces, “Roles, Missions and the Force Structure of the Italian
Fleet,“ Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 10. 215
Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 10.
69
the latter is caused by the influx of refugees trying to make their way from North Africa and
the Levant to Europe by sea.216
Migration, as Parry stresses, “is particularly acute in the
Mediterranean where there is a marked disparity in wealth, opportunity and social provision
between the northern and southern shores.”217
In these operations, which occur on a daily
basis, the Marina Militare and Italian Coast Guard conduct search and rescue operations to
save hundreds of refugees from drowning as they try to escape the war-torn regions of Africa
and the Middle East via the Mediterranean. These missions require both resources and
outstanding seamanship in humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR); qualities
that often come at the cost of more traditional capabilities of naval forces. However,
irrespective of this strategic dilemma, the “Marina Militare’s activities in this regard make it
stand out in terms of its compliance with the duties imposed by treaty – and by humanity – in
respect of the safeguarding of lives at sea.”218
Concerning its conventional naval forces, Italy has been able to rely on its substantial
defense industry to develop state-of-the-art warships and weapon systems. This industrial
base includes the Fincantieri shipyards, which are among the largest and most important
shipbuilders in Europe, Agusta and OtoBreda as part of the Finmeccanica group, and the
naval propulsion specialists of FIAT Avio.219
Italy’s ship designs are considered among the
best in the world – “Italian naval architects are artists”220
– and have been considerably
successful on the export market. Despite the “heyday [of] the Italian naval shipbuilding
industry”, dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, the country remains at the forefront in the field
of naval technology. 221
This can be explained, in part, by Italy’s ability to make smart choices
when it comes to balancing “indigenous development, offshore procurement and license
production.”222
Moreover, as Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara point out, the Marina
Militare does not simply rely on its naval vessels to exact its strategic interests, but in fact
pays much attention to incorporating the latest weapon systems and electronics to its ships, as
well as manning them with highly trained crews.223
This progressive way of thinking has been
reflected in the fleet structure at least since the end of the Cold War.
216
Of the 42,000 refugees that registered in Italy in 2013, 34,141 had come by sea. Rivista Italiana Difesa, “Mare
Nostrum: Commando e Controllo e Operazioni Aeronavali,” Foto X-tra’gli speciali di RID, 10 (2014): np. 217
Parry, Highway, 245. 218
Cernuschi, “Marina Militare”, 84. 219
“The Italian Naval Industry,” Naval Forces Naval Forces Special Issue 1 (1997): 36-46. 220
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv. 221
In particular, during 1970s and 1980s Italian shipbuilders spearheaded the design of minehunters. More
recently the situation has become somewhat more difficult for Italy’s naval industry.
Antony Preston, “The Italian Navy Today,” Naval Forces, Vol. 14, 6 (1993): 32. 222
Ibid. 223
Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 89.
70
Illustration 14: The Albatros octuple SAM launcher is visible just behind the 100mm gun.
By the time the military confrontation between East and West drew to a close, Italy’s
Marina Militare had fashioned a sizeable fleet capable of conducting the entirety of naval
operations, except nuclear war. After a hard-fought battle against its sister service, the more
prestigious Aeronautica Militare, and some adverse political elements, the Italian Navy
finally acquired its first STOVL, AV-8B+ Harrier II aircraft from the United States in 1989 to
operate from the Giuseppe Garibaldi escort carrier. With this move the Navy was not only
able to replace its increasingly obsolete helicopter carriers (Andrea Doria-class, in service
since 1964) but, more
importantly, Italy joined the
small club of nations able to
operate fixed wing aircraft
from the sea.224
Unlike
Australia, Canada and the
Netherlands, who all lost their
carrier forces throughout the
Cold War, the Italian Navy
was able to strengthen its
doctrine of operating two
naval groups, each with an
aerial detachment.225
Akin to the envisioned “naval force with a nucleus of 18 combatant ships of the first
echelon, of which two are flat deck aircraft carriers”226
, Italy’s surface fleet was extensively
modernized. In 1991, the average age of its ships was only eight years,227
with a pair of new
air defense destroyers (Animoso-class) already under construction. Together with the two
Audace-class vessels and the larger helicopter-carrying cruiser Vittorio Veneto, the ships
would provide the fleet with the necessary defense against enemy aircraft and missiles
throughout the 1990s. Smaller frigates and corvettes, such as the eight Maestrale, four Lupo
and the eight Minerva-class ships were all designed to have substantial AAW, ASW, and
ASuW capabilities. All cruisers, destroyers and frigates also had an aviation detachment and
helicopters embarked, providing the Navy additional ability to find and track Soviet
submarines. The anti-air systems deployed on these vessels merit some additional attention as
224
Among the states capable of operating aircraft carrier including fixed-wing manned aircraft are Argentina,
India, Spain, US, UK, France, Russia. 225
Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 80-81. 226
Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 16. 227
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv.
71
they are representative for Italy’s aforementioned ingenuity in combining domestic and
foreign design in order to come to the best results.
Mainly due to its complexity and proven effectiveness, at the time, the Italian Navy
decided to procure the long-range Standard SM-1ER missiles directly from the United States,
or ‘off-the shelf’ if you will.228
Its Albatros SAM launcher, visible in on the frigate in
Illustration 14, however, basically consisted of a licensed-built American Mk29 octuple
launcher that can fire both the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow as well as an improved version designed
and produced by Alenia: the Aspide missile. Such development processes proved highly
successful as the Albatros system found numerous international buyers and remains in service
to date.229
What stands out when one compares Europe’s navies at the time of the Soviet
dissolution with modern day naval forces, is that their fleets also included a number of small
and very often obsolete vessels. The Greek Navy, for example, still retained the Cannon-class
gun frigate (commissioned in 1944) as part of its fleet in 1990. Norway had the Sleipner-class
(1965) and the Spanish Navy was phasing out its Atravida-class (1953). Italy, for its part, had
both the Albatros (not to be confused with the SAM-system) and the De Cristoforo.230
With
governments across Europe seeking to reduce their respective military budgets, there has been
little place for such unnecessary addendum.
While some of the older vessels had been used for training, patrol and constabulary
operations in the fragile security environment of the Cold War, budget restrictions over the
past two decades have made these maintenance-intensive platforms unfeasible. As a result,
more funds and personnel could be allocated to modern platforms. The flipside inherent to
any reduction of surface forces lies within the geographic realties of the sea. Technology can
make up for some of the lost physical presence. However, the ability to operate numerous
vessels at sea is an advantage not even a radically new concept in sensor-fusion and maritime
awareness can provide. This is particularly the case in constabulary operations, such as
“fishery protection, pollution control, drug interdiction, and control of illegal immigration”231
,
tasks the Marina Militare is only too familiar with.
For more than three decades Italy’s naval ambitions have remained largely unaltered –
deploying a well-balanced blue-water navy designed around two aircraft carrier groups and
228
See Preston, “Navy Today,” 28-32. 229
A basic overview of the SAM system can be found on Wikipedia.
“Spada (Flugabwehrsystem),” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia,
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spada_%28Flugabwehrsystem%29. 230
Chant, Ships, 144, 158, 160, 166. 231
Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 10.
72
their escort fleet. Amphibious forces are to provide the Italian government with the ability to
project power over long periods of time and into regions further away from home. These
efforts have been hinged, for one, on Italy’s role as a founding NATO member and its
subsequent emphasis on achieving sea-control in the Mediterranean Sea and, on the other
hand, on Italy’s own strategic interests in the region. As Admiral Mariani explains, “[during
the Cold War] a great deal of the NATO navies’ efforts were devoted to preparing for the
battle for control of the sea.”232
With the decline of the Warsaw Pact, new challenges
emerged. The shift within “the global strategic environment”, so Mariani elucidates, “have
contributed to the birth of a new idea which draws attention to the coastal water, stirring up
the interest in operations conducted in the littoral environment.”233
Unlike Germany, who had
comparably few multi-purpose platforms capable of adapting to the new situation, Italy’s
naval forces demonstrably proved they were both capable and willing to take a leading role on
Europe’s southern flank. Cernuschi and O’Hara provide a excellent summary of Italy’s global
presence since its re-emergence as a medium-sized naval power:
[This has] included naval and air confrontations with Libya off Malta in 1980 and
1986; constant naval patrol activities in the Red Sea since 1982; missions off Lebanon
between 1982 and 1984 and, again, since 2006; international minesweeping operations
in the Red Sea in 1983; Persian Gulf operations in 1987-88; the war against Iraq in
1991; Yugoslavia from 1991-97; Mozambique in 1993; Somalia from 1991-95;
Albania in 1997; Eritrea in 1998; the conflict against Serbia in Kossovo [sic] from
1999 (where the AV-8Bs from Garibaldi conducted their first bombing missions);
Timor in 1999; Afghanistan since 2001 (here again the Garibaldi’s air wing
participated in combat); Iraq peacekeeping since 2003; and continuous anti-piracy
patrols in the Indian Ocean. On 22 November 2011, for example, the new ‘Horizon’
class destroyer Andrea Doria exchanged gunfire with a motorboat suspected of pirate
activities eight miles off the Somali coast.234
In addition, Italy also participated, even if somewhat hesitantly, in the NATO-led air-
campaign against Libya in 2011, again demonstrating the utility of naval air power as well as
the need for a balanced fleet in high-intensity combat operations. However, before we analyze
the latest developments concerning the Marina Militare, Italy’s effort to maintain its naval
capabilities during the 1990s and 2000s has to be outlined in more detail.
Despite being a heavyweight among European shipbuilders, Italy’s maritime defense
industry has also shown considerable interest in collaborating with other countries in order to
reduce the costs of designing and constructing warships. Among the most successful bilateral
232
Mariani, “Strategic View,” 7. 233
Ibid., 7. 234
Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 82.
73
efforts has been the joint development of the Horizon, and FREMM-class frigates by France
and Italy. These projects have shown that despite different operational requirements and
numerous hurdles such large-scale projects entail, the European defense industry can
successfully cooperate in putting highly-sophisticated ships to sea. The Horizon project,
however, also lends itself to explain the problems Europe’s navies have had to face in the
austere financial environment after the Cold War.
After the idea of a common frigate design had finally been buried underneath the
waves of conflicting views among the NATO partners regarding its specific capabilities, Italy,
France and the U.K. joined forces in 1992 to design and construct a future air defense frigate.
Largely based on the countries’ myopia towards the future trajectory of defense spending, the
initial plan envisioned a class of 22 ships; 12 for the Royal Navy, six for France, and four for
the Italian Navy. This highly optimistic calculation was soon understood to be entirely
unrealistic. Already early on, it became apparent that the military budgets of each partner
would allow far fewer units: “In all likelihood, the RN will eventually have to be contented
with six-eight ships, and both the [Marine Nationale] and [Marina Militare] will each procure
two to four”235
, as a project insider, going by the pen name ‘Alcibiades Thalassocrates’,
observed in 1995. Furthermore, due to their strategic incongruence of the states involved,
there was considerable risk of the entire project failing before a single ship was built. This had
not least to do with
the Royal Navy looking for a large (6,000+ tons) ship, featuring extended range for
North Atlantic operations and offering quite considerable surface-to-air missile
capabilities; the French, on the other hand, had more ‘modest’ aims, and were thinking
in terms of a substantially smaller ship with reduced range and half the missile battery
as called for by the UK.236
In the same vein, Italy’s requirements were more limited due to its fleet being able to operate
in the Mediterranean (its primary theater of operation) under the aegis of Italian air power.
Continued differences between the U.K. and its two partners finally caused the British to
withdraw from the Horizon effort in 1999.237
Notwithstanding this setback, the two remaining
countries would complete the project. The Marina National and Marina Militare each
received two identical ships which continue to form the mainstay of their fleet air defense.
Displaying considerable stealth features, highly sophisticated electronics – including the
235
Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “Glimmer on the HORIZON,” Military Technology, Vol. 19, 7 (1995): 17. 236
Thalassocrates, “Glimmer,” 10. 237
The numerous reasons are explained in Ibid., 27-34.
74
PAAMS (Principal Anti Air Missile System) with its Alenia EMPAR radar, DCNS SYLVER
vertical launch system and Aster-15/30 short and long-range missiles – the Horizons are
among the most capable air defense warship in the world.
The allure of buying proven and capable systems from the United States also caused
the U.K. to consider installing the Mk41 VLS on its domestic destroyer design (the Daring-
class); although ultimately they also decided to rely on the SYLVER VLS. Similarly, the
Horizon project was criticized for sticking to the tri-national PAAMS system instead of
choosing the AEGIS combat system and SPY-1D radar as the Dutch and Spanish had done.238
Regardless of the obvious advantages the U.S. design could bring to the table, the Italians and
French have to be credited with upholding a large part of the European defense sector and
therefore remaining competitive on the naval market, even if this proved considerably
difficult against their overbearing American competitors.
Of course […] adopting a US shipborne air-defense system, or even only the surface-
to-air missile, would have meant the end of credible European alternative in many
high-technology fields. To this [it] could be replied that maintaining these alternatives
makes little sense, given that the chances of ever achieving export sales for PAAMS
against the more mature US solutions are exceedingly faint.239
Notwithstanding the enormous effort poured into the Horizon project, the Italian and French
cooperation has proved that such multi-national programs can have substantial cost saving
benefits if conducted in a prudential fashion and, more importantly, are the “only way for
European countries to remain present on the international market as designers and producers
[of] major weapons systems.”240
In addition to the two air defense Horizon destroyers, the Andrea Doria and Caio
Dulio, launched in 2005 and 2007, the Italian Navy was also able to commission its first batch
of air-independent propulsion Type-212A submarines in 2006-07. Again, teaming up with
other European partners (in this case Germany) in order to effectively modernize its fleet
proved to be a wise choice by the Italian government.241
The currently largest European naval
238
Guarnieri, “Italian Fleet,” 15. 239
Alcibiades Thalassocrates, “A Fateful Name - Horizon,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 2 (1997): 15. 240
Thalassocrates, “Fateful Name,” 15. 241
A very detailed chapter on the Italian version of the FREMM can be found in Conrad Waters’, “Significant
Ships – Italian Fremms: Carlo Bergamini (General Purpose) and Virginio Fasan (Anti-Submarine) Frigates,” in
Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 89.
The Type 212 is discussed in more detail in the chapter on the German Navy. For more information on the Type
212 see Conrad Waters, “Significant Ships – Germany’s Type 212A Submarines: Cutting-Edge Technology
Drives German Maritime Transformation,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters (South
Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 137-152.
75
project, with an estimated investment of over ten billion Euros, is the Italo-French FREMM-
class frigate program.242
Planned as the successors to the two countries’ numerous surface combatants, the
FREMM project was able to capitalize on the experiences gained during the development of
the previously described Horizon-class. Furthermore, the new frigates’ design was based on
features of both the air defense destroyers and French La Fayette stealth vessels
(commissioned between 1991 and 1996).243
Unlike during their previous cooperation, the two
countries decided to facilitate the process by allowing each navy to design major elements of
the ship according to their specific requirements. The French, on the one hand needed a rather
large number of ASW and AAW frigates to, firstly, replace the majority of its escort forces
built in the 1970s, and secondly, to provide sufficient defensive capabilities for its most vital
assets: its aircraft carrier and ballistic missile submarines. “Protection of the strategic missile
submarines of France’s […] nuclear deterrent is a key mission for the new class, as evidenced
by the principle ASW designation [of almost all units of the class].”244
France, moreover, has
territorial interests in all three major oceanic regions of the world, hence has far more space to
cover with its only somewhat larger navy than Italy, whose sphere of national interest was
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The French planners therefore chose to “select
equipment sufficient to meet role requirements over more capable but costly alternatives” in
order to “maintain its first-line surface fleet at roughly current strength”245
while most other
European naval forces have to make concessions by reducing the size of their fleet even
further.
Italy’s FREMM frigates or Rinascimento as they are sometimes referred to, on the
other hand, look distinctively different than the French version.246
At the end of the day, the
difficulties of finding common ground led to the ships being “closely-related cousins”247
rather than sister-ships, with common hulls, similar propulsion and some shared equipment,
electronics and weapon systems. As a consequence, however, “[a] key attraction of the
FREMM concept”, as Waters argues, is “the ability to configure a common design to different
242
Waters, “Italian FREMMs.” 89-107.
An article describing the early stages of the program can be found in “France and Italy Launch Joint Frigate
Programme,” Military Technology, Vol. 27, 2 (2003): 64-68. 243
The FREMM frigates incorporate impressive stealth features and the French Aquitaine supposedly has an
even smaller radar cross-section (RCS) than the La Fayette-class. For more see Waters, “Aquitaine,” 90-107. 244
Ibid., 94. 245
Waters, “Aquitaine,” 107. 246
Italy also looked into cooperating with Britain’s Future Surface Combatant (Type 24 frigate) and Germany’s
F-125 project. However, because of the ageing fleet it was decided that a joint venture with France would be
more favorable and make the frigates available at an earlier point. See “Joint Frigate,” 2003, 64-68. 247
Waters “Italian FREMMS,” 90.
76
roles through limited changes to new equipment outfit.”248
So far, the Marina Militare has
received three vessesls; the lead-ship being the general-purpose design Carlo Bergamini,
whereas the two following units are designed for ASW. The construction of six of these
highly capable frigates has been approved by the Italian government with the fate of the
pending order of the final two vessels being decided in the course of this year.
There are two main reasons for the budgetary constraints that have caused the
reduction of the FREMM-class (initially 10 were planned). The first goes by the name of
Cavour, Italy’s second aircraft carrier, which, at a displacement of over 22,000 tons,
constitutes the largest warship to be built in Italy since the end of World War II. The second
reason is known around the world as fiscal crisis, debt crisis, or economic crisis. The former,
it can be argued, has cost the Navy a pretty penny to build and due to its large crew of nearly
750 sailors also contributes to the Navy’s considerable “personnel costs, [which] are one of
the highest overhead in any of the developed nations’ fleets.”249
The debt crisis which hit
Italy’s defense sector hard in the immediate aftermath of the Libyan air-campaign in 2011, on
the other hand, represented a real litmus test for the Marina Militare. However, before we
come to the most recent fiscal realities, let us first take a brief look at the Navy’s most
impressive addition to the fleet: the Cavour.
Based on Italy’s two-carrier doctrine, discussed previously, the new and much larger
successor to the Giuseppe Garibaldi provided Italy the flexibility and power-projection the
nation’s strategic doctrine called for.250
Incorporating significant amphibious capabilities (it
can carry a force of over 300 marines as well as deploy heavy equipment such as tanks into
theaters of operation), medical facilities for HADR, substantial electronic warfare measures, a
sophisticated air defense system relying on the same EMPAR Radar and Aster 15 missiles as
on the FREMM frigates, and, last but not least, its air wing of helicopters and fast-jets, the
Cavour offers the Marina Militare an essential tool to execute the country’s national
248
Waters “Italian FREMMS,” 89. 249
Ibid., 107.
“The Italian defense budget is divided into three major areas: (1) investment (what the U.S. calls research and
development, plus procurement), (2) personnel, and (3) training, maintenance, and operations. Since going to a
volunteer military in 2006, the Italian goal was to spend roughly 50 percent of their budget on personnel, 25
percent on investment, and 25 percent on training, maintenance, and operations. In reality, personnel costs have
consumed roughly 70 percent of Italian military spending.”
Larrabee, Austerity, 36. 250
The defense white paper 2005 remains on point that: “[t]he multilayered and unpredictable nature of future
threats […] demand development of a capability to prevent and, when necessary, to intervene quickly and
efficiently even at a great distance from the homeland. In other words, unlike in the past, the military
contribution to national security can no longer depend exclusively on the capability to guard and provide static
defense of the metropolitan areas (“Homeland defense”); it must develop the capability to dynamically face
threats whenever they occurs[sic].” Giampaolo di Paolo “Il Concetto Stregico del Capoi die Stato Maggiore dell
Difesa. 2005,” 10-11.
77
strategy.251
Once the Lockheed Martin F-35B is embarked (early 2020s), this fifth generation
combat aircraft, despite its bumpy development and numerous cost-overruns, will provide the
Italian Navy with “unprecedented hitting power and protection.”252
The carrier Cavour did not take part in the NATO-led air-campaign against Libya’s
long-time ruler, Muammar al-Gaddafi. However, Italy’s AV-8B Harriers flew 560 sorties
against targets in Libya from the light carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. The war in Libya has
provided much insight into how future NATO operations will be conducted. In general, the
decision of some NATO members to interpret the U.N. mandate as a green light to expand
their mission from establishing a no-fly zone, to pursuing regime-change – ultimately creating
the circumstances in which radical Islamic factions such as IS can thrive – has caused
considerable criticism. I do not intend to reiterate the conflicting views on the issue or to lay
blame. The following short summary of Italy’s participation should merely provide insight
into Italy’s ability to deploy its forces in such multinational operations.
As part of operation Unified Protector, ships assigned to NATO’s Standing Maritime
Groups participated in strike missions and enforced the embargo against the Gaddafi regime.
Italy’s contribution to the mission by the most honest examination has to be viewed as
somewhat ambivalent. Conrad Waters, for example, points to both Italy’s initial reluctance to
take action – due, in part, to its economic interests in Libya – and later restraint when it came
to striking risky targets. He mostly emphasizes the Navy’s contribution to the naval blockade,
the ability of Italy’s fleet to deploy its aircraft carrier into the vicinity of Libya’s coast,
(greatly reducing the cost of strike-missions) and therefore concludes that “the Marina
Militare [was able] to take satisfaction in its performance.”253
Bryan McGrath, setting his
analysis in a somewhat larger strategic frame, on the other hand, comes to a different
assessment regarding Italy’s resolve and commitment: “Britain and France proved both highly
capable and highly committed,” he argues. Italy, however, only provided “partial […]
support.”254
As a matter of fact, when the financial crisis finally caught up with Italy in the
summer of 2011, the newly appointed government showed little interest in continuing the
expensive deployment and withdrew its carrier, the Giuseppe Garibaldi, leaving the Coalition
without its much needed naval aviation assets.255
251
Andy Nativi, “Mission Ready: Italy’s New Carrier Has Multiple Roles,” Defense Technology International,
Vol. 2, 8 (2008): 19-20. 252
Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent P. O’Hara, “Significant Ships – The Aircraft Carrier Cavour: Doctrine and Sea
Power in the Italian Navy,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire:
Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 127. 253
Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 85. 254
McGrath, “Decline,” np. 255
Agence France-Presse, “Italy Removes Aircraft Carrier from Libya Campaign,” Defense News, 7 July 2011.
78
Gary J. Schmitt, the co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies,
points to a very important fact: “Like other European states that are reducing number of
people and platforms, the pledge is that Italy’s military will be ‘of smaller dimension but with
higher quality.’ Whether that will happen remains to be seen.”256
Given Italy’s unabated effort
to take part in large-scale multinational combat missions, peacekeeping operations and
continuous HADR in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, ongoing defense cuts will
unquestionably cause precarious shortcomings among Italy’s armed forces and the Marina
Militare in particular.
In general, it can be said that Italy’s more recent defense white papers have only
reiterated its grand strategy first postulated in the 1980s.257
In fact, in a special article of the
Naval Institute Proceedings in 2012, Admiral Bruno Branciforte made a point to emphasize
that “the navy will be guided by the operational experience gained in the past decade[s]”,
remaining dedicated to the Navy’s expeditionary and amphibious capabilities, its fleet air arm,
its multirole platforms designed to cope with the entire spectrum of possible conflict, and
hence being able to underpin Italy’s national defense and maritime security.258
“The Italian
Navy, in coming years”, so he claims “will boast the capabilities needed to fulfill its national
and international commitments.”259
Regardless of what the future will bring, the strain on the
naval force will undoubtedly remain continuously high, while at the same time older ships
cannot be replaced at a rate of one to one. As the graph at the beginning of the chapter shows,
in 1990, the Navy had a fleet of 47 large vessels, not counting the smaller and crucial offshore
patrol vessels (OPV)260
and auxiliaries. By 2000 this number had dropped to 39, and yet
another 15 years later has been reduced to 33. Unfortunately, Italy’s maritime surveillance is
also diminishing in lockstep with Europe’s general difficulty in keeping pace with the rapidly
developing sector of intelligence and surveillance. “The Breguet Atlantic maritime aircraft
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20110707/DEFSECT05/107070311/Italy-Removes-Aircraft-Carrier-
from-Libya-Campaign. 256
Gary J. Smith, “Italian Hard Power: Ambitions and Fiscal Realities,” American Enterprise Institute, 1
November (2012): np.
http://www.aei.org/publication/italian-hard-power-ambitions-and-fiscal-realities/. 257
See Ibid., np. 258
Bruno Branciforte, “The Commanders Respond: Italian Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March (2012).
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/commanders-respond-italian-navy. 259
Ibid. 260
Italy has decided to build five new offshore multipurpose patrol vessels, with an option of four additional
ships. “The Pattugliatore Polivalente D’Altura (PPA) vessel will replace Minerva-class corvettes, Cassiopea-
class patrol vessels and two Duran de la Penne-class destroyers.” Needless to say the new class will in any case
number fewer than the ships being decommissioned. Tom Kingston, “Italy Closing in on Patrol Vessel Deal,”
Defense News, 26 October, 2014.
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20141026/DEFREG01/310260018/Italy-Closing-Major-Patrol-Vessel-
Deal.
79
Illustration 15: The most recent tragedy in the Mediterranean, has finally elicited a somewhat more immediate reaction by the European Union. However, it remains unclear as of how exactly the EU intends to deal with the incredible influx of illegal refugees.
will be retired in 2012 and [like in the U.K.] there are currently no plans to fill its maritime
surveillance capabilities.”261
Of course, the fleet has also been able to expand its capabilities in certain areas. New
vessels, such as the Horizon destroyer, FREMM frigates, the Cavour, Type 212As, and
Commandanti OPVs, are far
more versatile than their
predecessors, to some
extent being able to
compensate for their limited
numbers with longer
endurance, reduced
maintenance and crew
requirements, as well as
more sophisticated combat
systems. Over the last two-
plus decades the naval
forces have been
restructured and modernized, in concordance with Italy’s transition to an all volunteer force.
From a platform-centric point of view, and considering Italian shipbuilding prowess, its
leading position in naval gun technology and electronics, there is little reason to believe that
the Marina Militare cannot operate a well-balanced fleet of state-of-the-art combat ships in
the future. Undoubtedly, a somewhat larger defense budget will be needed in order to protect
Italy’s interests in the future – at home and abroad.
With a pending humanitarian catastrophe of hitherto unprecedented magnitude
developing opposite Europe’s southern shores, Italy (as well as France and Spain) will need to
make substantial investment in SAR assets and HADR capabilities in the coming years. Alone
the Mare Nostrum mission, which was conducted by Italy’s Navy under the auspices of the
E.U. between October 2013 and 2014, cost over nine million Euros a month262
and was
conducted by numerous air and sea elements of the Italian Armed Forces. Its successor, the
European FRONTEX mission Triton, paradoxically, has so far been more limited in its scope.
However, with public pressure mounting and hundreds of refugees already having drowned in
261
Larrabee, Austerity, 41. 262
Lizzy Davies and Arthur Neslen, “Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue mission ‘puts thousands at risk’,” The
Guardian, 31 October, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/italy-sea-mission-thousands-risk.
80
2015, there is reason to believe Italy and its European partners will be forced to expand their
efforts.263
If these circumstances alone are not enough to persuade Italy’s ministers to raise
Italy’s defense budget to the 2 percent of GDP commonly agreed upon by all NATO
members, the United States’ rebalancing towards the Asian-Pacific Region should by all
means be a sufficiently compelling reason to do so. As the mighty United States Navy is
currently coerced in shifting its forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific as a consequence of
China’s emergence as a near-peer competitor, “[it] seems to be a reasonable assumption [that] the
Cavour and the Italian fleet are effectively going to be a substitute [for the] American carrier battle
group in the larger Mediterranean as the reduced US Navy carrier line-up is increasingly concentrated
on the Pacific and Indian Ocean.”264
In 1990, the well-known Italian naval analyst Giorgio Giorgerini came to the
following assessment regarding the future operational scenario of the Italian Navy.
It would indeed be difficult to foresee, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, what
future situations may demand the intervention of the Italian Armed Forces, and
particularly the Marina Militare. One point can, however, be taken for granted. Due to
its geographical and political characteristics, the Mediterranean will remain what it has
always been throughout the centuries – namely, an extremely sensitive basin from
both the strategic and the political point of view, an area where tension and crisis can
stream in from all cardinal points and criss-cross with each other.265
This profound insight applies just the same today as it did twenty-five years ago. No matter if
for humanitarian reasons or out of strategic interest, Italy’s Marina Militare will consequently
continue to be a most useful tool in Italy’s foreign policy toolkit. However, remedial actions
have to be taken to ameliorate the increasingly difficult situation the Navy finds itself in and
to guarantee that these tools do not suffer abrasion to an extent at which they can no longer be
used. Similarly to France, Italy’s fleet has reached a point at which continued reductions of its
force level cannot be compensated for by superior ship design and better training. Unless the
current size of the Navy is maintained by increasing the nation’s defense budget, Italy’s
government will likely have to accept limitations in the operational capability of the Marina
Militare. As a result, Italy’s grand strategy – which for decades has relied on the Navy as a
263
Britain only has one officer as part of Frontex speaking of the “pull factor” if illegal immigrants knew that
they would be saved.
Joch Lowe, “EU Migration: why has the Home Office opposed rescuing migrants?” Prospect, 28 October, 2014.
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/blogs/prospector-blog/eu-migration-why-has-the-home-office-opposed-
rescuing-migrants. 264
Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 86. 265
Giorgio Giorgerini, “The Italian Navy in the 1990s,” Military Technology, Vol. 14, 5 (1990): 48.
81
principle pillar of the nation’s vision of an indispensible power in the greater Mediterranean
region and the world – could become unfeasible
8) SPAIN: Creating a Well-Balanced Fleet – and Maintaining It
Figure 7
Figure 8
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 7 Spain Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2015
Aircraft Carriers 1 1 0
Large Surface Combatants 19 17 11
Submarines 8 8 3
Assault/Amphibious 5 4 3
0 2 4 6 8
10 12 14 16 18 20
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 8 Spain: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mil itary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
82
For over five hundred years the Spanish navy has made its mark in the annals of
history: From the discovery of the New World by Cristobal Colon, to Hernán Cortés’
campaign against the Aztecs and the subsequent Spanish colonization of large parts of the
Americas over the course of the next three centuries. During this period of time, the Spanish
navy provided the Spanish Crown with an indispensible instrument to pursue the ‘conquista’
of new territories and to transport its vast riches back to Europe. Spanish power grew
corollary with its expansion abroad, while its military campaigns, both abroad as well as
against its European opponents, were largely funded by precious metals from its colonies.
The Spanish navy, however, is also known for suffering some of the most crippling
defeats in naval history. To date, the arguably greatest calamity in Spanish history was the
battle between the English fleet and Spain’s ‘Invincible Armada’. In 1588, the moribund
Spanish Armada set sail in support of the Spanish Invasion of England, but found its doom in
the form of the English galleons and the merciless nature of the sea. After having suffered
severe damage in the battle at Calais, the Spanish commander Medina Sidonia chose to take a
route around the north of Scotland and then down the Irish west coast to reach Spanish
waters.266
“Freak storms turned their voyage home into a naval catastrophe. Scattered ships
disappeared without trace in the Atlantic Ocean or were wrecked upon the wild north and
west coast of Ireland. […] Just 67 ships out of the original fleet of 130 succeeded in making it
back to Spanish shores.”267
Although the Spanish were able to reassert themselves as a naval power after the
events of 1588, their maritime dominance was increasingly challenged by other powers such
as the English, Dutch and, particularly on the continent, by France under King Louis XIV.268
Nonetheless, throughout the 17th
century Spain was able to command a fleet of the first order
and, for the most part, to protect its interests at sea. However, this would change after the
Spanish War of Succession and the Utrecht settlements in 1713.269
Spain was essentially
“stripped of all of its non-contiguous European territories, its succession was determined by
266
R.G. Grant, Battle at Sea: 3,000 Years of Naval Warfare (London: Dorling Kindersley Limited, 2008): 120. 267
Ibid. 268
In particular, as the Spanish also owned territories surrounded by major naval powers. 269
“Spain was the big loser of the war and the settlement. Although it signed a series of treaties with its military
opponents, it never accepted their terms until forced to do so in 1719-20. As soon as the Succession War was
over and the Utrecht Treaties signed, Spain set out to undo the entire settlement. It had been stripped of the
Netherlands, all of its Italian holdings, and Gibraltar and Minorca. It was compelled to grant British participation
in the Asiento trade, shipping African slaves to Latin America and to the Spanish West Indies. Philip V had been
forced to renounce his claim to the French throne. The settlements were thus a major national and dynastic
humiliation. […] The assault on the settlement came quickly.” Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts
and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 77-78.
83
outside powers, and it remained diplomatically isolated.”270
The country’s effort to undo these
decisions was effectively cut short by British sea power and the French invading Spain in
1719.271
Thereafter, for almost a century, the Spanish and French naval forces would fight the
growing British naval dominance (Spain’s fleet ranked third largest behind the two other great
powers) but the alliance was ultimately defeated in the famous Battle of Cape St. Vincent, the
Battle of the Nile, and the climactic Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. When the largest warship at
the time, the Spanish flagship Santisima Trinidad – having lost all three of its masts as well as
many of its men – surrendered to the British Forces, the ground was set for the Royal Navy’s
unchallenged dominance that lasted for more than a century.
Spain’s naval power declined even further as it lost many of its colonies in South
America throughout the course of the 19th
century. Yet it still retained some important
territories in the Caribbean, South America and the Asia-Pacific Region. It is somewhat
remarkable that Spain’s ultimate demise would be decided by its closest military ally today,
namely the United States. In 1898 war broke out between the two countries effectively putting
an end to Spain’s status as a great power. At the end of the 19th
century the two nations were
on entirely opposite trajectories. On the one side, the rising naval power of the United States
under President McKinley was willing to use force in support of its national interests in the
Caribbean and Pacific, which by itself represented a Copernican revolution in U.S. foreign
policy. On the other hand the Spanish fleet, which was annihilated by the superior American
warships and as a consequence Spain lost all but a small number of its colonial possessions. In
effect, the Battle of Santiago de Cuba and Commodore George Dewey’s victory at Manila
Bay relegated the Spanish naval power to the footnotes of history for decades to come.
Today the Royal Spanish Navy, or Royal Armada Española, again has found its place
among the world’s medium-sized sea powers, albeit not attaining the glory of former days. As
mentioned, Spain owes its naval resurrection in large part to the United States’ support during
the Cold War. Despite the Franco Regime being largely isolated from the European
reunification effort after the horrors of the Second World War, strategic imperatives of the
evolving confrontation between East and West persuaded the U.S. to provide Spain with
substantial military support. Similar to Italy, the Spanish Navy received two light aircraft
carriers from the surplus U.S. fleet. While the Italian Marina Militare was not able to operate
fixed-wing aircraft from their carriers due to a law dating back to the days of Mussolini that
270
Holsti, Peace, 78. 271
Ibid., 78.
84
granted the air force the sole right to maintain combat aircraft, the Spanish pioneered the use
of VSTOL aircraft from its carriers.272
Despite closer cooperation with other European
defense industries over the last years, Spain’s naval forces still exhibit their close ties to the
United States.
In general, Spain’s navy has not suffered the same reduction in size since the end of
the Cold War as, say, the British Royal Navy or the German Bundesmarine. For the most part
Spain has been able to make prudent choices in its procurement policy as well as its national
defense strategy and has exhibited an adroit apportionment of its funds to build a small but
modern multi-purpose fleet. As a consequence, the Armada Española is often compared to
Italy’s navy and, in fact, has many similarities, despite being only two-thirds the size.
Like the Italian Navy, the Spanish naval forces constitute a well-balanced fleet capable
of conducting operations across the gamut of the intensity spectrum, both alone and in
conjunction with friends and allies. Furthermore, the Spanish Navy has undergone a similar
strategic reorientation from a sea-control navy to an expeditionary force that can “[exert]
influence from the sea over coastal areas” in out-of-area operations. 273
Although the graph
above indicates a reduction in amphibious platforms, the Navy’s actual expeditionary
capabilities have increased dramatically as will be discussed later. Continuing our
comparison, Italy operates its fast jets from its new Cavour aircraft carrier, while Spain,
likewise, retains the ability to deploy naval air power in the form of a dozen AV-8Bs
Harrier/Matador aircraft from its new amphibious assault ship/LHD, the Juan Carlos I. It is
worth noting that Spain’s strategic framework differs from Italy’s, hence requiring the
Armada Española to provide somewhat fewer capabilities. This is mainly due to the different
roles the respective countries seek to play in world affairs.
As I have pointed out, Italy as a member of the G-7 (formally G-8) and founding
member of NATO has tried to assert itself as a regional power in the greater Mediterranean
region and active player in world politics. In order to meet these ends, its navy also needs to
represent a sizeable force – an undertaking that has become increasingly difficult over time.
Spain, on the other hand, has somewhat more limited ambitions abroad and fittingly refers to
itself as a “medium-power” with its main region of interests lying within the Western
Mediterranean and the Atlantic waters between the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary
272
The Spanish Matador aircraft were based on the British Hawker Siddeley Harrier short/vertical take-off and
landing (S/VTOL) aircraft. The Spanish version is almost identical to the U.S. Marine Corps’ AV-8A Harrier. 273
Minsterio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, Defense White Paper 2000 (Madrid: Centro de
Publicaciones, 2000): 193.
85
Islands.274
Consequently, its armed forces and the navy in particular are the smallest of
Europe’s four major naval powers.
From this brief description, one might conclude that the last twenty years have been
plain sailing for Spain’s naval forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. As one of the
NATO members with the smallest percentage of defense expenditure (in fact one of the
lowest in all of Europe), the most recent financial crisis has hit Spain much harder than other
European countries. As a consequence, the Armada Española once again is threatening to
wither away as it had over 100 years ago. This time, however, its fate will not be decided by
American guns but by political myopia and the fiscal restrictions of the post-Cold War era.
It is safe to say that the Spanish Navy undoubtedly began the post-Cold War era on a
high note:
The day of 31 May 1989 was auspicious for the Royal Spanish Navy. It was on that
date that King Juan Carlos handed over to the Armada its new aircraft carrier Principe
de Asturias in an imposing ceremony attended by a number of foreign warships,
including the French aircraft carrier Foch and the antiaircraft frigate Cassard,
assembled in the roads of Barcelona. With the commissioning of the new carrier, the
glorious Royal Spanish Navy has reached today a level of power of which one must go
far back into its history to find equivalent.275
Not only had the aforementioned aircraft carrier been put into service, but quite frankly the
entire naval force was in the process of undergoing substantial modernization and
restructuring. The year 1990, as a matter of fact, not only provided the Navy with a hitherto
unprecedented strike capability in form of the Principe de Asturias, it also constituted a
watershed moment in Spain’s force structure and long-term naval planning. The Alta Mar
Plan, presented to the public in March of 1990, outlined the procurement plan over the course
of the next 15 years and also had significant influence on the fleet’s reorganization into the
Grupo Alfa and Grupo Delta over the course of the following years.276
The Grupo Alfa was
formed around Spain’s capital ship (the carrier plus its aircraft) and included both fleet escort
and fleet support vessels. The Grupo Delta, on the other hand, was later created in light of the
increasing need for amphibious forces in the progressively diverse security environment.
274
MdD, White Paper 2000, 57. “Within the geostrategic unity of the Mediterranean, where problems and
tension spread easily, Spain considers that its western basin requires much attention as a nearby area with
specific characteristics.” Ibid., 65. 275
Prezelin, Combat Fleets, xv. 276
Íñigo Puente, “Plan Alta Mar: ¿sueño de lo que pudo ser o anticipo de lo que será?” Revista Naval, December
1997. http://www.revistanaval.com/www-alojados/armada/especial/planalta.htm.
86
Illustration 16: European aircraft carriers at the end of the Cold War. The French flat top is equipped with steam catapults, while the Italian and Spanish carriers rely on ski jumps to launch their Harrier jump-jets.
Perhaps most
importantly, the Alta Mar
Plan was based on the premise
that the Navy should have 15
frigates at any given time and
therefore needed a concerted
shipbuilding plan to mitigate
the capability gaps the
decommissioning of its older
fleet escort would create.277
Given the upbeat economic
situation at the turn of the
decade this was by no means
an unrealistic proposal. As it
happened, the escort fleet at the time consisted of 15 major surface combatants, if one
excludes the obsolete World War II ex-U.S. Gearing FRAM-I class destroyers. The Gearing-
class, however, was not the only U.S. design in service with the Spanish Navy.
As part of the greater Cold War picture, Spain played an important role in the United
States’ strategic planning. Already under the Franco regime, the U.S. provided the Armada
Española with second-rate warships. After Franco’s death the re-established Spanish
Monarchy quickly – and officially – aligned itself with the Western Allies, becoming a NATO
member in 1982 and a member of the European Union in 1986. As a quit pro quo for U.S.
support, if you will, the Spanish Navy had provided the West with credible ASW and ASuW
capabilities in the Atlantic and Western Mediterranean vis-à-vis from the Soviet Union.278
The principle task of the Navy was, therefore, to exercise sea-control and to protect the
SLOCs around the Iberian Peninsula.279
In 1990, the Spanish Navy’s five Baleares-class and
four Santa Maria-class frigates and half-dozen of the somewhat smaller Descubierta-class
ships reflected this strategic requirement.
277
Camil Busquets i Vilanova, “The Spanish F-100 Frigates,” Naval Forces, Vol. 17, 5 (1996): 26. 278
It can be expected that Spanish naval forces would have provided support to NATO operations in the case of
a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Spanish are described as specifically looking to the
Americans for help. See F.J. West Jr., et al, “Sea Plan 2000,” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s – Selected
Documents, ed. John Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007): 113.
By the 1980s Spain’s maritime role within NATO was clearly laid out. See Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 76. 279
“Grupo Alfa’ – the Spanish Navy’s Main Fighting Force,” Naval Forces Vol. 12, 5 (1991): 20.
87
The Baleares-class was an improved version of the American Knox-class. Constructed
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these capable ships had substantial weapons and sensor
suits.280
The ships were continuously upgraded over the years to increase their capabilities.
Nevertheless, the Royal Spanish Navy for some time had been hard pressed for a class of new
frigates. Although a decision to build new warships was made as early as 1977, the
construction of the carrier Principe de Asturias had taken priority over the frigate construction
and it was not until 1986 that the first of six modified U.S.–design Oliver Hazard Perry
frigates was delivered to the Royal Armada Española. Originally designed as part of the U.S.
Navy’s maritime strategy of SLOC protection, together with the planned Sea Control Ship,
the Perry-class was to safeguard American transport vessels from Soviet air and underwater
threats, much the same as the Allies had done during the Second World War. Despite the
aggressive strategic reorientation under President Reagan, the Perry-class was built in larger
numbers than any other western major surface warship (total of 72) and was also successful
on the international market.281
The Spanish variant of the frigate, the Santa Maria-class, has
similar capabilities, including the Mk 13 Mod 4 launcher for both Standard SM-1 MR and
Harpoon missiles, a 76mm OTO Melara gun, six torpedo tubes and a CIWS.282
As noted, the
frigate’s design allowed substantial updates and the six ships remain a vital asset in the
country’s current fleet structure.
Interestingly, the Principe de Asturias was the second type of warship based on the
U.S. vision of a sea-control Navy and a strategy of SLOC defense to be built by Spain. As
Bernard Prezélin explains, the “[d]esign is essentially that of the final version of the U.S.
Navy’s Sea Control Ship concept, with a 12-degree ski-jump bow added.”283
Inspired by the “Sea Control Ship,” that modern version of the last war’s escort carrier
of which the U.S. Navy wanted to build several units when Admiral [Elmo] Zumwalt
was at its head and which it renounced after his departure, the Principe de Asturias is
now benefiting from all the progress that has since been achieved in naval architecture.
[…] Her very well conceived aviation installations enable her to house on her hangar
deck seventeen aircraft […]. Counting aircraft parked on the flight deck, she can
embark and put into action up to thirty aircraft, or roughly twice as many as the British
Invincible, despite her inferior tonnage […].284
280
For more information see Christopher Chant, Ships, 474-475. 281
A more detailed description of these ships can be found in both Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 803-806. Also in
Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 15th
Edition, (Annapolis
M.A: Naval institute Press, 1993): 143-146. 282
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 473. 283
Ibid., 472. 284
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xv.
88
Having outlined Spain’s comparatively well-balanced naval air and surface
capabilities at the end of the Cold War, it is worth noting that her submarine flotilla at the
time was equally effective. With eight submarines, four of which were older, continuously
modernized French S60 Daphné diesel-electric submarines and four were of the highly
capable S 70 Agosta series, built in Spain with French technical assistance, “the situation of
the Submarine Flotilla of the Navy […] was superb, the best, certainly since the advent of the
Second Republic in 1931 (or maybe even the best ever)”,285
Íñigo Puente points out.
In line with most other European countries, the Spanish Armed Forces did their best to
adapt and restructure their standing forces, as well as to align their procurement plan with the
paradigmatic shift within the global security environment. In many ways their current naval
force is a testament to this vigorous effort to maintain a balanced fleet while at the same time
addressing the need for larger amphibious forces. This feat becomes even more impressive
when one compares the Spanish approach towards the increased need for expeditionary
capabilities with that of Germany. As we shall see in Chapter Nine, Germany has decided to
solely rely on multi-purpose frigates to satisfy the needs for out-of-area capable platforms.
The F-125 Baden-Württemberg represents the latest example of this approach. Regardless of
their size and sophistication, none of the German frigates built since the end of the Cold War
can be considered en par with even the smallest modern amphibious assault ships when it
comes to projecting sea power onto land. It is not by chance that the German Defense white
paper remains vague on how exactly the Bundesmarine intends to support ground operations
on the shores of far-off regions.286
The Spanish naval strategy, on the other hand clearly describes why amphibious forces
are of paramount importance for the nation’s security. Even before the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent shift towards counterterrorism, stability operations,
and littoral combat, the Ministerio de Defensa published a white paper clearly stating that
amphibious operations represented a cornerstone of Spain’s defense policy. More importantly,
it also provides evidence for the general shift of most European states from the idea of sea-
control to expeditionary capabilities:
285
In the original: “La situación de la Flotilla de Submarinos de la Armada a principio de los 90 era magnífica, la
mejor, sin duda, desde el advenimiento de la II República en 1931 (o quizá, incluso, la mejor de su historia). Se
hallaban en servicio 8 submarinos pertenecientes a dos series, cuatro del tipo Delfín (S-60), construidos en torno
a 1970, y cuatro Galerna (S-70), construidos diez años después.”
Puente, “Plan Alta Mar“ np. 286
“Neben ihrer [der maritimen Kräfte] Befähigung zum bewaffneten Einsatz auf See können sie wirkungsvoll
zu Operationen an Land beitragen.”Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 2006, Zur Sicherheitspolitik
Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin, 2006): 122.
89
The chief mission of the Navy is to ensure the free use of the maritime routes, which
are a particularly significant interest in the case of Spain, as it is a country with vast
coastline, archipelagoes and enclaves, heavily depended on trade and on the
exploitation of marine resources. However the strategic environment does not pose
great risks for navigation. Therefore, the navies of the allied countries – particularly
that of Spain – currently gear their capabilities to exerting influence from the sea over
coastal areas of operations far from national territory in what is also a characteristic
mission of the Navy.287
The Spanish Strategic Defense Review in 2003 added that
[t]he very presence of an amphibious force has a deterring effect, obliging the enemy
to carry out defensive deployment and distracting a disproportionate number of forces.
Therefore it is important to acquire a greater capability for naval power projection over
land, a fundamental capability that the Navy can contribute to joint and combined
strategy.288
The Grupo Alfa and Delta have already been briefly mentioned. They, however,
merely represent a stepping-stone (if but an important one) towards the Armada Española
attaining a broader set of capabilities in a time marked by declining defense budgets and
increasing needs. Only shortly after the aforementioned white paper had been published, a
new directive unified the two groups under a single command.289
Regardless of its organizational structure, the Spanish Navy was able to secure the
funds for building two Galicia-class dock landing ships. Profiting from the shipbuilding
experience of the Dutch Royal Shelde and Spain’s Empresa Nacional Bazán (now Navantia),
both countries received two units each, thus providing each navy with far greater amphibious,
power projection and HADR capabilities than ever before.290
Along with two former U.S.
tank landing ships transferred in 1994 and 1995, and the construction of a replenishment
oiler, the Spanish Navy was able to incrementally expand its expeditionary capabilities.
Despite growing financial difficulties, the Spanish Government could not bring itself
to cancel the procurement of a new fleet escort. A class of four F-100, Álvaro de Bazán
frigates was granted in 1997 and the first of these highly capable, domestically designed and
constructed ships joined the Armada Española in 2002. Featuring American-designed Aegis
287
MdD, White Paper 2000, 193. 288
Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, Strategic Defence Review, (Madrid: Imprenta Ministerio
de Defensa, 2003): 107. 289
Ministerio di Defensa, Directive 001/2000 Admiral Chief of Staff of the Navy, GRUFLOT is created
http://www.armada.mde.es/ArmadaPortal/page/Portal/ArmadaEspannola/conocenos_organizacion/prefLang_en/
03_Flota--02_Flota-Fuerza-Accion-Naval--023_COMGRUP2--02_historia_grup2_es. 290
Baker III, expands on the ships’ impressive features: “[These amphibious warfare ships] can carry up to 6
helicopters in the hangars. [They] have 1,010m² internal vehicle parking space and can use 885m² docking […]
for additional vehicles; further vehicles can be carried on the helicopter deck and in the helicopter hangar.”
Baker III, Combat Fleets, 723.
90
Illustration 17: A cut-away of the Canberra for the Australian Navy. The ship is built by the Spanish Navantia shipbuilder.
combat system (SPY-1D and Standard SM-2 Block IIIB), the class will provide the backbone
of the Navy’s air defense for the next three decades.
After the NFR-90 project had failed in the late 1980s, Spain joined Germany and the
Netherlands in the cooperative development of a new class of air defense warships.291
Up
until this point in time, all large surface combatants in service with the Armada Española had
been of U.S. design. However, the only ships the United States could offer were the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyers, which, despite being considered the most capable air defense
destroyers in the world, were far too expensive for Spain. Therefore, the state-owned
Navantia shipbuilder made an effort to capitalize on general design features provided by its
Dutch and German partners while relying on the American air defense system. “The selection
of the Aegis/SPY-1D/VLS Mk 41 is a good decision given that it is sufficiently proven”,
Busquets i Vilanova underscored. “Its large series production allows one to count on effective
291
“The three partners were able to agree on practically identical operational requirements, establishing the basis
for a cooperation programme [in 1994].” Michael Herwig, “Trilateral Cooperation for a Frigate Programme –
Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany,” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 5 (1994): 35.
91
technical support incorporating without difficulty the successive improvements.”292
Undoubtedly, Spain had proven that in spite of its comparatively smaller industrial base it was
able to build warships which could bear comparison with the best in the world.
This claim can be supported by Australia’s decision to build three F-100 design
frigates, the first unit (Hobart) entering service in 2016. The blocks for these ships are
produced both in Spanish and Australian shipyards, while the final assembly of the parts takes
place in Australia. In addition, the Australian government has also decided to award the
Spanish shipyard with the construction of two 27,000 ton amphibious assault ships. “Built to
Spain’s Juan Carlos I design, the ships’ hulls were fabricated by Navantia at Ferrol Spain
prior to being transported by heavy lift vessels to Williamstown near Melbourne for
installation of their island structure and final fitting out by BAE Systems.”293
Laid down during a period in which Spain’s defense budget was briefly increased, the
Juan Carlos I LHDs are truly remarkable ships, expanding the Navy’s capabilities in
numerous operational areas. Initially called the BPE, the Buque de Proyecciòn Estratégica,
(Strategic Projection Ship) this is the largest warship ever to be built in Spain. Sometimes
mistaken for an aircraft carrier like the Italian Cavour, the “BPE […] comes to very close
dimension of the [Italian ship], and indeed she appears having been designed through a rather
similar process based on the same operational considerations”.294
However, in addition to
operating STOVL aircraft and helicopters from its deck, the Juan Carlos also has a large stern
well dock for the deployment of landing craft and other small vessels. Furthermore, she can
carry up to 46 main battle tanks and 925 troops. Like most other small carriers, LHAs and
LHDs, the ship is much slower than the American supercarriers, largely because of her less
powerful propulsion and different hull form.295
Nevertheless, the Juan Carlos is “the very first
and only aviation-capable amphibious assault platform to be fitted with a ski-jump […] for a
dramatic increase in the payload/range of fixed-wing STOVL aircraft” such as Spain’s AV-
8B Harriers.296
292
Busquets i Vilanova, “F-100,” 25. For more detailed information on the capabilities see Wertheim, Combat
Fleets 16th
, 672. 293
Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Asia and the Pacific,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad
Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 28. 294
Massimo Annati, “European Aircraft Carrier Programmes,” Military Technology, Vol. 29, 10 (2005), 44. For
more information also see article of Europe’s amphibious vessels in: Christina MacKenzie, and Andy Nativi,
“Mission Ready: Amphibious Ship Designs Meet Diverse Operational Needs,” Defense Technology
International Vol. 3, 3 (2009): 34-35. 295
The CODLAG (combined diesel-electric and gas turbine) in the Juan Carlos creates a thrust of 30,500 hp
allowing speeds up to 21 knots, while the nuclear reactor on U.S. carriers can produce over 280,000 hp giving
the ships’ sustained speed of over 30 knots. 296
Annati, “European Programme,” 44,
92
Unfortunately, the Navy’s submarine force has not done as well over the last two
decades. As the graph at the beginning of the chapter indicates the total number of operational
submarines has fallen to only three. This precarious shortfall in subsurface capabilities has
been caused by major problems encountered during the production of Spain’s first AIP
submarine, the S-80.297
To make matters worse, these circumstances will hardly help the S-80
compete against Germany’s Type 212A and Type 214 on the export market.
Having outlined the modernization of the Spanish fleet over the course of the last
twenty-five years, it is now time to briefly discuss its deployment during this period. “Spain’s
contributions to NATO’s maritime roles, while not in the class of the United Kingdom or
France, [has] remained relatively strong in what is admittedly an increasingly weak field”,298
McGrath summarizes. Between 1994 and 1996 the Asturias (F 74) and Reina Sofia (F 84)
frigates took part in NATO operation Sharp Guard, enforcing the embargo against former
Yugoslavia.299
Spanish naval forces have also provided its capabilities to NATO’s standing
naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic – known since 2006 as the Standing NATO
Maritime Group 1 & 2 – and at the time of writing, the Patiño replenishment oiler is deployed
with the SNMG 2 in the Adriatic Sea.300
At the same time the Perry-class Canarias frigate is
currently conducting anti-piracy operations as part of the NATO Operation Active Endeavour.
This mission has been underway since Article 5 was invoked in the aftermath of 9/11.
Although there is considerable question as to how effective these naval anti-terrorism
operations have been over the past thirteen years, for now most NATO members judge the
gains in “deterrence and collective defence, crisis management; cooperative security; and
maritime security”301
worth the costs.
The same can be said in regard to Spain’s military contribution to the War in
Afghanistan. Despite the precipitous learning curve all NATO allies were confronted with,
297
“A major ongoing concern is the troubled S-80 submarine programme, which envisages completion of four
boats to replace Spain’s existing underwater flotilla. Construction work has effectively been suspended until
major weight and buoyancy problems identified in the first submarine, Isaac Peral in May 2013 are resolved.
General Dynamics Electric Boat of the USA has been brought in to assist a major re-design, which will involve
lengthening the submarines into a S-80 Plus configuration.” Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and
Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing,
2014): 65.
The following quote is from Bryan McGrath, “NATO Trends,” footnote 38. See Jose Alberto Gonzalez, “La
Armada da de Baja el ‘Siroco’ y Centra Sus Esfuerzos en Los Submarines S-80” [The Navy Withdraws the
‘Sirocco’ and Focuses Its Efforts on the Submarine S-80], La Verdad, 5 August, 2012,
www.laverdad.es/murcia/v/20120508/cartagena/armada-baja-siroco-centra-20120508.html. 298
McGrath, “NATO Trends,” np. 299
“NATO/WEU: Operation Sharp Guard,” NATO, 2 October, 1996. http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-
grd.htm. 300
The ship was in Trieste on the 2 March, 2015. See
http://www.armada.mde.es/ArmadaPortal/page/Portal/ArmadaEspannola/_inicio_home/prefLang_es/. 301
NATO, “Operation Active Endeavour,” 3 March, 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm
93
Spain remained committed to the task, albeit on a relatively small scale. From a military point
of view, however, “NATO troop contingents became divided into those who fought (the
Americans, the British, the Canadians, and the Italians) and those who did not fight”.
Together with France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the Spanish largely belonged to the
latter group. This, as John Ballard et al, explain, was “mainly due to restrictions or ‘national
caveats’ imposed by their political leadership.”302
The U.S.-led invasion in Iraq (2003) would underscore the deep rifts within NATO,
rifts which have only grown bigger since the heavily criticized liberation of Iraq. Initially, the
Spanish government under the conservative Prime Minister José María Aznar decided to take
sides with the Americans and British and provided slightly over 1,300 military personnel to
the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’. However, after the devastating terrorist attacks in
Madrid in March of 2004, the deeply dissatisfied Spanish population voted the Aznar
Government out of office. The decision of the newly elected government to withdraw all
Spanish forces from Iraq reaffirmed the notion that Europe had become increasingly
inconsistent and discordant concerning global security issues.
As noted, the Spanish maritime contribution to multi-national operations has been
somewhat more robust, owing to her geographic position and economic dependency on
seaborne trade.303 Sadly, the brief period of economic growth during the first years of the 21
st
century granted the Navy only temporary respite. “[W]hen the global economic crisis began
rippling across Europe in 2008, Spain took a bigger hit than other Western European states,
and its defense budget was cut three separate times.”304
Over the following years, Spain’s
Ministerio de Defensa tried to compensate for the lack of funding by stretching out their
procurement plans from 15 to 20 years. Moreover, after having decided to acquire a fifth ship
of the Bazán-class during the aforementioned favorable budgetary environment, plans for a
sixth vessel were finally dropped. In addition, cuts in personnel had to be made across all
services, opening up gaps in readiness and the ability to quickly deploy a large number of
units.305
The overall number of troops has dropped from 32,000 (including 6,200 Marines), to
302
John R. Ballard et al, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back. The U.S: at War in Afghanistan and Iraq (Annapolis
MA: Naval Institute Press, 2012): 137.
As of 2013 Spain had 856 troops deployed to the relatively stable Badghsi province in the northwest. This is a
small number when compared to other countries’ troop levels: Romania 1077, Italy 2825, Germany 4400. See
“U.S. War in Afghanistan, 1999-Present,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-
afghanistan/p20018. 303
Departamento De Securidad National, Presidencia Del Gobierno, The National Maritime Security Strategy
2013: Sharing a Common Project (Madrid, 2013): 35.
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/documents/estrategiaseguridad_baja_julio.pdf. 304
Larrabee, Austerity, 45-46. 305
Ìbid., 49-50.
94
22,000 (including 5,836 Marines) over the course of only six years. To make matters worse,
Spain has decided that preserving its general purpose fleet has precedence over all other
matters. “[O]ne of the ways the Spanish have ensured continuity of capabilities in the face of
spending constraints has been to reduce overall training levels”, a RAND study points out.
“All units are no longer required to undergo training to reach an established standard.”306
The costs of manning ships as well as training navy personnel have affected Europe’s
naval forces across the board. However, although Italy, for example, is hard pressed to reduce
the number of sailors in order to decrease their overall costs, its naval leadership remains
adamant that highly trained crews are of paramount importance.307
The Spanish Navy, on the
other hand, is willing to risk its overall degree of professionalism in order to preserve its fleet.
Simply put, Spain’s brinkmanship stems from its negligently low defense expenditure.
“The very low percentage of GDP spent on defense [0.9 percent in 2014] makes Spain one of
the worst performers in terms of defense spending in Europe”308
, and puts it in a league with
Lithuania, Latvia, and Luxemburg.309
As of late, slight signs of improvement in the overall
financial situation have come about. For the first time in seven years the government has
approved an increase in its defense budget as the Armed Forces will receive an additional €57
million.310
Although honorable, these figures are far from the 2 percent benchmark agreed
upon by all NATO members at numerous consecutive summits. What is more, the slight
budget increase will not amend the shortfalls suffered by the naval forces over the last several
years. Quite frankly, much of the damage to the Armada Española has already been done.
As Conrad Waters states, “[p]revious rumors that the aircraft carrier Principe de
Asturias, would be decommissioned were proven correct and the former fleet flagship was
withdrawn from service in February 2013.”311
The Juan Carlos I now remains the sole
platform for the reduced naval air-arm. Moreover, the lack of funding for the S-80 submarines
and inability to quickly resolve their technical shortcomings has left the submarine force at its
lowest level since the end of the Cold War. In fact, to permit the fleet to operate a minimum
306
Larrabee, Austerity, 49. 307
Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 89. 308
Larrabee, Austerity,51 309
For more information on defense spending, see SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 310
David Ing and Fenella McGerty, “Update: Spain to Increase Defence Spending,” Janes.com, 1 October, 2014,
http://www.janes.com/article/43968/update-spain-to-increase-defence-spending. 311
Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad
Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 65.
95
of two submarines, while the third is undergoing an overhaul, the fourth unit of the Galerna-
class (S-70) has been cannibalized for spare parts.312
What is equally vexing for Spanish naval commanders is the growing gap between the
number of small surface combatants or offshore patrolling vessels (OPV) and the number of
incidents regarding unlawful or criminal activities. As the National Maritime Security
Strategy in 2013 points out “Ii]llicit trafficking is [particularly] common at sea [and] in a
broad sense is one of the most serious risks and threats to National Security”.313
In line with
many other European states, Spain is therefore participating in the U.S.-led “Africa
Partnership Station” operations, providing maritime security to the African shores and thereby
extending the cooperation between the numerous states and agencies in the region.314
However, these additional tasks will continue to put increased strain on the few ships in the
Spanish fleet. In particular only four new OPVs have been built with an additional two under
construction. (Originally a class of 14 was planned.)
Given the increasing scope of maritime operations that have evolved since the
conclusion of the Cold War, Spain’s initial effort to maintain a modern and well-balanced
fleet is laudable, more so, if one considers the increasingly austere environment the naval
forces found themselves in the 1990s and early 2000s. Unfortunately, it comes at a high price.
As the rather positive financial situation turned sour in the face of Europe’s debt crisis and the
severe cuts to military spending that followed, training and readiness have suffered greatly.
In conclusion, the Royal Armada Española, notwithstanding these shortcomings, for
now remains the fourth largest naval force in Europe, which actively participates in numerous
international maritime missions despite continuing economic difficulties. On a more positive
note, Spain’s naval industrial base has grown substantially over the last twenty-five years and
was recently able to secure a number of high-profile export deals. Given the country’s unique
geopolitical position on Europe’s southern flank and its close political ties to its European,
African and American partners, Spain will likely want to continue to play an active role in
world affairs. However, with the importance of the maritime realm steadily increasing over
the coming decades, the Spanish Navy will be forced to make some substantial investments
312
As of early 2013 the Navy only had two submarines operating, with an average age of 27 years, the 'Galerna'
and the 'Tramuntana', since the 'Mistral' was under repair until the spring of 2013. If delays occur in the delivery
of the S-80, the complexity of the construction that will take it beyond 2016, the armed forces would be
operating only one submarine. It would be the 'Mistral', which as of early 2013 was passing its last major review.
Later in 2013 'Tramuntana', the most modern in the series, entered overhaul. The 'Tramuntana' ends its
operational life in 2018. See: “Series 70 Galerna-type submarines,” np.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/s-70.htm. 313
DSN, Strategy 2013, 21. 314
Department of Defense: Africa Command, “African Partnership Station,” http://www.africom.mil/what-we-
do/security-cooperation-programs/africa-partnership-station.
96
mid-term, in order to maintain a fleet capable of conducting the entirety of naval operations.
These investments would include the F-110 successor for its Perry-class frigates, a larger
number of OPVs, as well as purchasing the Lockheed/Martin F-35 Lighting II in order to
retain a capable naval air-arm. All these projects, however, come with a significant price tag.
Given the large number of maritime missions that are underway, as well as the need to recruit
and train the necessary crews, it is hardly possible that this feat can be achieved under the
current budgetary levels.
It is therefore possible that over the next decades the Spanish fleet might have to
slowly abandon its multi-purpose capabilities, ultimately arriving at a smaller, less powerful
force, similar to that of Germany or Denmark. Such a development would, however, severely
affect Europe’s naval power, adding to its overall decline.
8) TURKEY and GREECE: Allies and Yet Not Friends – Diverging Naval
Powers
Figure 9
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 9 Turkey: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
97
Figure 10
Figure 11
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatants 22 26 18
Submarines 16 14 14
Assault/Amphibious 4 4 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 10 Turkey: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 12 Greece: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
98
Figure 12
The last two European naval powers to have strategic interests in the Mediterranean
theater are Turkey and Greece. Unfortunately, the two countries have a long history of mutual
animosity and distrust tracing all the way back to the Greco-Persian Wars during the 5th
century B.C. Over much of their history the two states have remained regional competitors,
often resolving their differences by military means. Even today, Turkey and Greece “are
widely considered to be major antagonistic powers in the region” as Christos Kollias and
Gülay Günlük-Şenesen state.315
Paradoxically, they remain in an unstable limbo between
being NATO allies, yet entertaining the possibility of going to war against each other in order
to protect their individual national interests. Despite this strained relationship, the two
countries’ geostrategic position as well as their interest and influence in the Mediterranean,
the Aegean Sea, and the Black Sea lend themselves to be analyzed in conjunction.
In general, Turkey and Greece make significant investments towards their national
defense. In part, due to unresolved issues regarding Cyprus, the status of a number of small
islands and rocks, (hence the issues regarding the EEZ), as well as the “nonexistence of an
agreement determining the sea boundaries between Turkey and Greece on the Aegean Sea”,316
315
Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen, Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation.
A political Economy Perspective, eds. Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen (New York: Nova Science,
2003): 1. 316
Turkish Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2000, Section Five, np.
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatants 10 16 13
Submarines 9 8 8
Assault/Amphibious 4 5 7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 11 Greece: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
99
both countries maintain large armed forces. Their naval forces are also similar in size and
capability; the Turkish Navy though being somewhat larger. Furthermore, both countries’
defense spending has for many years exceeded that of its European neighbors and, in fact, as
the graphs show, has remained well over 2 percent of GDP since the end of the Cold War.
Although the economic crisis has also affected Turkey and Greece, (especially the latter of the
two), and both states have had to reduce their military budgets somewhat over the past
decade, they still share the highest percentage of defense spending of all European NATO
members.317
The hostility between the two has had profound influence on Turkish and Hellenic
maritime strategy. During the 1990s, many European countries sought to attain a wider range
of maritime capabilities; slowly shifting from the parochial tasks of ASW and ASuW against
the Soviet Navy towards out-of-area operations, power projection, and littoral warfare far
from home. However, given Turkey’s and Greece’s foreign policies their respective naval
strategies have largely been dictated by the principles of sea-control and protection of the sea-
lines of communication.318
As I will show, the largest part of both navies consists of platforms
capable of conducting sea-control and sea-denial, while amphibious capabilities, for example,
up until recently have only played a negligible role.
The ongoing dispute in the Aegean Sea also provides a good example of what the
future holds. While much attention is currently given to China’s claim over numerous islands
in the South and East China Seas, thus creating tensions with its neighbors and the United
States, it is often overlooked that the continued hostilities between Greece and Turkey are also
caused by territorial feuds about the many islands and islets of the Aegean Sea – Cyprus in
particular.319
It also goes to show how difficult these conflicts are to resolve, in particular in
times of growing nationalism in many regions of this world. Quite frankly, the conflict
between the Turks and Greeks remains a volatile situation, and crisis, such as imminent war
over the Imia/Kardak islet in 1996, remains a possibility. However, what also bears
mentioning is that despite all the criticism NATO and the United States have had to face since
1990, mutual NATO membership as well as pressure by the U.S. and European Union have
very likely prevented outright war between the two countries.
The fleets of Turkey and Greece show some resemblance and have also undergone a
similar development since the end of the Cold War. As noted, both states have designed their
317
Greece Turkey and the UK account for the highest defense expenditure with 2.2 percent of GDP. 318
TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Five, Section Three, n.p. 319
Littoral disputes have also included Israel to which Turkey has frozen diplomatic ties with its former ally. See
Burak Ege Bekdil and Umit Enginsoy, “Mediterranean Littoral Dispute Challenges Turkish Navy,” Defense
News, 9 Jan. (2012): 10.
100
naval forces around the concept of sea-control and the protection of SLOCs.320
Thus, these
territorial defense operations have taken precedence over other forms of naval capabilities,
such as expeditionary warfare. Compared to the four major European navies already discussed
in this thesis, the Turkish and Greek fleets lack large warships necessary to conduct large-
scale out-of-area operations. Particularly, they have little capability to project naval power
over great distances. The most obvious proof for this argument is the absence of warships
capable of embarking aircraft and amphibious forces, such as small aircraft carriers, LHAs or
LPDs. Therefore, the number of amphibious forces shown in the graph at the beginning of the
chapter is somewhat misleading. While Greece retains seven ships capable of amphibious
operations (including two Soviet-design air cushion craft),321
the aggregated power of these
units is not comparable to, say, Spain’s two Galicia-class LPDs or its single Juan Carlos I
LHD. Numbers do matter. However, any meaningful analysis has to take numerous other
factors into account, as I have repeatedly pointed out. What the Hellenic and Turkish navies
do have is substantial numbers of smaller warships, ranging from frigates and corvettes, to
guided-missile craft and patrol vessels. Moreover, both maintain the ability to conduct sea-
denial operations by fielding large submarine fleets of German-design as well as mine warfare
vessels. This comes as no surprise. The geopolitical realities of the region have driven both
states to invest heavily in such operational capabilities, not least due to the significance of the
Bosporus and adjacent waters.
8.1) Turkey
Of the two navies, the Turkish Naval Forces are the somewhat larger and more
capable. This goes hand in hand with Turkey being larger, more populous and enjoying the
benefits of a more powerful economy. The Turkish industrial base has evolved drastically
over the past twenty-five years; its naval branch in particular having profited immensely from
this development.322
For this reason, Turkey has been able to expand its indigenous
shipbuilding, whereas Greece remains largely dependent on foreign sales. For over two
decades the Turkish leadership has made a concerted effort to modernize and strengthen its
320
TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Two, np. Also see Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, White Paper for the
Armed Forces 1996-1997, Chapter 1, np. 321
These are the largest air cushion vehicle landing craft in the world, (Russian Zubr-class). See Wertheim,
Combat Fleets, 253-254. 322
The article provides examples for the up-and-coming naval ship industry in the 1990s.
“Turkish Navy – Reasons to Celebrate.“ Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 4 (1994): 23-24. 23-24.
101
armed forces and has in turn created one of the most capable armies in the world. American
defense expert George Friedman points out that, by his estimate, Turkey’s conventional
capabilities have surpassed those of France and Germany, also providing evidence for the
general decline in military power among European states. “[Turkey] has one of the most
substantial armies, not only in the region, but in Europe. Except for the British army – and it
would be an interesting fight, I wish I could stage it – […] there is no European army that
could face Turkey. […] And this is important, because Turkey was historically the dominant
power in the region.”323
In line with the seismic shift that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey’s
security environment also changed drastically. For the larger part of the Cold War, Turkey
had been subject to the constant threat of a Soviet military thrust southwards to take the
Turkish Straits.324
Similar to the Germans in the Baltic Sea, the Turkish fleet, in the case of
belligerence, was appointed with fighting the Soviet Black Sea Fleet as it moved to secure the
exit to the Aegean.325
It is not by chance that the Turkish purchased and license-produced
many warships of German design. The similar geographical constraints of the Baltic and the
Black Seas,326
as well as the similar size of the Soviet Forces deployed to the respective
theaters, demanded similar naval strategies and forces. As a result, in 1990, the Turkish fleet
consisted of 16 submarines (including six German Type 209), 22 surface destroyers and
frigates (mostly older American designs and four newer German MEKO 200-class), 22
German guided-missile and torpedo boats, as well as numerous other vessels designed for
territorial defense.327
Unlike many European countries which reduced their naval forces as part of the post-
Cold War peace dividend, Turkey gradually increased its naval power over the following
years. Thanks to its significant defense budget, reaching over 4 percent of GDP in the mid and
late 1990s, the country was able “[t]o maintain [its] ambitious growth programme and
strengthen NATO’s southern flank”, by adding numerous new warships to its fleet.328
More
than half of these ships were of American origin. (The U.S. Navy had a large surplus of
frigates that were too expensive to keep in service). As part of U.S. military assistance to
323
“A forecast for the 21st century: George Friedman. ANU,” min. 46:40.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiMRAhupqE0. 324
“The primary Soviet thrust would be in Central Europe. Smaller attack would also occur to attempt to seize
Northern Norway and the Turkish Straits. A limited offensive is also possible in Eastern Turkey, to try to draw
off forces defending the straits [italics in the original].” Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 78. 325
Ibid., 76. 326
The Black Sea has a size of 436,000km and its average depth is 1200 m, The Baltic Sea is of similar size
377,000km but is much shallower at an average depth of 55 meters. 327
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 533-552. 328
“Celebrate,” 24.
102
many NATO allies, a total of six Oliver Hazard Perry-class and eight Knox-class frigates
were transferred to the Turkish Navy under ‘grant-in-aid’ programs during the later years of
the Cold War. Also, the Gölcük shipyards, located on the southern coast of the Sea of
Marmara, were awarded with the shared production of four improved MEKO 200TN-class
frigates.329
These frigates provide impressive capabilities for such relatively small vessels
(3,100 tons). All Turkish MEKOs have a hangar for a single helicopter, hull-mounted sonar,
air and surface search and track radars, Harpoon-missile launchers, the widely used and
powerful 127mm 54-cal Mk45 guns, Sea Sparrow air defense systems, and Sea Guard CIWS.
Torpedoes, jammers and decoys complete the ships’ offensive and defensive capabilities. In
addition, the navy can capitalize on the ships’ modular design which greatly facilitates the
installation of new weapon and combat systems. The octuple Sea Sparrow launcher module
atop of the hangar area has been exchanged for the Mk 41 vertical launch system firing the
more advanced folding wing Evolved Sea Sparrow SAM in the last two units of the class (F
246 and F 247).330
By 2000, the submarine force was also making great strides to expand its capabilities.
Most of the ex-U.S. submarines, dating all the way back to World War II, were being retired
while license-built Type 209/1400331
were entering service at a rate of a ship per year.332
Therefore, although the total number of submarines had decreased, Turkey’s underwater fleet
was in a much better state than it had ever been. Interestingly, the defense white paper
published the same year mostly reiterated the same maritime tasks that had been expected of
the Turkish Navy in the early 1990s, namely territorial defense (in particular of the Turkish
Straits), protecting the SLOCs, participating in multinational operations, as well as
humanitarian aid and search and rescue.333
Therefore,
[t]he operational requirements of the Turkish Naval Forces [dictated] owning modern
platforms having the capacity and capability of undertaking Above Water Warfare,
Anti Submarine Warfare and Air Defense Warfare. Reconnaissance, surveillance and
submarine warfare for preserving and protecting maritime transport in the surrounding
seas has an important place among the duties of the Navy.334
329
Two units were built by Blohm + Voss in Hamburg, two by the Gölcük shipyards. 330
Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 749. 331
These were somewhat larger and more capable than the Type 209/1200 already in service. 332
Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 802. 333
Admiral Vural Bayazit interview by Naval Forces “A Secure Turkey – A Secure Alliance.” Naval Forces
Special Supplement: Turkish Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1992): 2-8. 334
TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Three, np.
103
Illustration 18: Turkey is one of the few nations able to strengthen its maritime forces with domestically designed and built warships.
Again, amphibious
operations and power
projection over great
distances was not
considered a primary
concern. In fact, there is
not a word of either
concept in the 107-page
document.335
It is also
somewhat surprising that
it would take another 15
years before the Turkish
leadership decided to
make large investments in
these areas. Considering Turkey’s ambition to become a regional power, this fact remains
quite astounding. In part, of course, the country’s military doctrine has to be ascribed to its
unaltered geographical position and historical experiences. Surrounded by regions of
instability and conflict – the Balkans to its northwest, the current civil war in the Ukraine to
its north, the recent armed conflict in Georgia and war in Nagorno-Karabakh to its east, and
ongoing turmoil and bloodshed along its border with Iraq and Syria, and, lastly its strained
relationship with Greece to its west – Turkey is not in an enviable position. Moreover,
domestic unrest, either in the form of the Kurdish resistance movement, known as PKK, or
from regular citizens, frustrated by the country’s increasingly authoritarian leadership, have
persuaded the government to deal with issues closer to home before spending time and money
on regional crises on distant shores.
Nonetheless, the Turkish Navy has contributed to a number of multinational
operations. These have included operation Sharp Guard in the Mediterranean and Adriatic
Seas, numerous deployments with NATO’s naval standing forces, as well as by taking a
leading role in the creation of the Black Sea Naval Force in 2001. This effort was aimed at
promoting closer cooperation among the states surrounding the Black Sea. In this particular
case it is worth mentioning that joint exercises, such as those regularly conducted by the
335
Amphibious forces are only mentioned in the list of Turkish forces assigned to NATO: “The number of forces
presently assigned to NATO by the Turkish Armed Forces is as follows: […]15 Frigates, 2 LSTs, 17 Patrol
Boats, 9 Helicopters, 11 Minesweepers/hunters 1 Logistic Support Ship, 7 Submarines and 1 Amphibious
Infantry Battalion.” Ibid., Part Two, np.
104
NATO allies, have many positive effects. Common goals and shared interests during these
missions are largely responsible for fostering mutual trust and respect among the different
services and can break down the wall of preconception and misunderstanding. As such, Greek
and Turkish naval forces have operated together on numerous occasions in the past, which
arguably could be a deciding factor in a naval stand-off between the two countries: It is much
harder to shoot at someone you know and who you have learned to respect.
Based on the Navy’s decision to continuously modernize its existing force and replace
its ageing frigates with new warships on a one-to-one basis336
, the Turkish naval forces set
itself the goal of “transforming from a force structure required for coastal operations, to a
structure that could have a say in the open seas”, over the next 15-20 years.337
Conrad Waters
comes to the conclusion that as a result of this process over the last two decades, Turkey is the
“[o]perator of what is numerically the strongest of Europe’s mid-sized naval forces”.
Furthermore, he adds, “Turkey has managed to combine the creation of a modern and well-
balanced fleet with a progressive increase in the involvement of domestic industry in warships
construction.”338
With the development of the MILGEM corvette, Turkey has not only
demonstrably shown its industrial capacity, but also “join[ed] the small group of countries
able to both design and construct their own warships.”339
Yet, a number of hurdles remain.
The announced development of the TF-2000 air defense frigate in 1996 can be seen as
an important step in the fleet’s evolution into a blue-water navy, despite claims that “Turkey’s
naval defense concept is almost exclusively littoral-based.”340
However, not a single ship has
been laid down as of 2015. This unfortunate circumstance has caused a strategic “window of
vulnerability” as Israeli defense analyst Micha’el Tanchum notes.341
So far Turkey has been
able to balance its naval forces against both the Hellenic as well as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
However, with Russia’s naval buildup under way, Turkey can no longer rely on its naval
parity. “Prior to the Crimean conflict, Russia’s Black Sea fleet consisted of twenty-four major
surface combatants and one diesel submarine while Turkey’s major naval assets consist of
336
Wertheim, “Combat Fleets,” 751. 337
TMoD, Paper 2000, Section Three, np, 338
Waters, “Europe 2010,” 99. 339
Ibid. 340
An early outline of shipbuilding for the first decade of the 21st century is provided in: “Ship Construction and
New Projects.“ Naval Forces Vol. 18, 4 (1997): 27. Recent development found in: Umit Enginsoy and Burak
Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Seeks Full Littoral Defense Architecture,” Defense News, 10 Jan. (2011): 13. 341
Micha’el Tanchum, “Turkey Vulnerable to Rising Russian Power in the Black Sea,” The Turkey ANALYST. A
Biweekly Briefing on Current Affairs, 9 April (2014): np.
http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/101-turkey-vulnerable-to-rising-russian-
power-in-the-black-sea.html.
105
approximately twenty-four surface combatants and fourteen submarines”,342
Tanchum
elaborates. The deployment of Russia’s new Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates and Kilo-
class submarines to the Black Sea (the first units will enter service this year), however, “will
quickly tilt the balance of naval forces in Russia’s favor, giving Russia a significant strategic
advantage for a window of four to eight years […].”
The problem of insufficient fleet air defense capabilities will only be exacerbated by
the introduction of the new assault ship in the near future. Although this ship and the addition
of two new tank landing ships will, for the first time in recent history, give the Turkish Navy
robust amphibious capabilities, the smaller version of the Spanish Juan Carlos is not intended
to carry a SAM system, thus making it dependent on its escort for air defense. This
circumstance goes to show how difficult it is to build a balanced fleet capable of conducting
sea-control as well as expeditionary and amphibious operations. Even if there are significant
funds available, building numerous different types of ships, as well as training its crews, is a
significant challenge. Without previously gained experience in constructing and operating
these new platforms, the learning curve is very steep for both the shipbuilders as well as for
the Turkish Navy itself. It will be interesting to see how the government deals with the
financial burden such grand visions of Turkey’s naval forces entails. One point many
advocates of a large Turkish navy however stress, is that “Turkey, unlike many European
countries, always has money for defense”.343
8.2) Greece
Similar to Turkey, the Hellenic Navy has profited from a sustained defense budget of
over 2 percent of the country’s GDP. As a matter of fact, according to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Greece allocates the highest percentage of all
European countries to national defense. Even the economic crisis and ongoing difficulties in
reducing the national debt have not led to the cuts in military spending one would have
imagined, given the severity of the Euro debt crisis. Despite this fact, it is not quite clear how
the financial problems will pan out in the future and there is some evidence suggesting that
the Hellenic Navy will be forced to forfeit some of its capabilities down the road. In short, it
is unlikely that the Greece will be able to modernize its fleet at the same pace it has been able
342
Tanchum, “Turkey Vulnerable,” np. 343
Adnan Caglayan quote in Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil, “Does Turkey Need an Aircraft Carrier?”
Defense News, 7 May, (2012): 13.
106
to over the last twenty-five years, and maybe more importantly (from a Greek point of view)
the strategic balance will shift even more in favor of its neighbor, Turkey.
As I have explained, the two countries share a common interest in a geopolitically
highly volatile region. “Greece is located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia
and Africa). It is an integral part of the Balkans […] and is also in close proximity to the
Black Sea and oil-rich regions of the Middle East and Caucasus,”344
Kollias and Şenesen
point out. Throughout history Greece was considered a seafaring nation. It is no surprise that
even now its navy cherishes the country’s naval heritage that predates that of most modern-
day sea powers. However, as Dokos and Tsakonas explain, “[Greece’s] strategic importance
was eclipsed twice in history, once by naval technology, shifting the traffic of sea commerce
to the Atlantic and the other, during the Cold War, when the central front of the continent
attracted most allied attention.”345
In many ways, “[i]n the past NATO and the West had generally regarded the
Mediterranean as the peripheral strategic theatre.”346
For Greece, however, the surrounding
waters represented a national necessity. Therefore, capable naval forces were considered
imperative for the country’s prosperity. Unfortunately, Greece and Turkey have not been able
to put aside their differences over the islands and waters of the Aegean Sea and as a
consequence Turkey’s military power continues to dictate Greece’s defense policies. Nowhere
can this be observed better than in its national defense strategy.
Although Turkey and Greece were essential NATO members (both joined in 1952)
assigned with challenging Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean and Middle East,
conflicting interests between the two NATO allies in the Aegean Sea led to a number of
precarious situations throughout the second half of the 20th
century. Even the conclusion of
the Cold War had little positive effect on both countries’ oppugnancy. It is astounding that
many Greeks – policymakers and citizens alike – perceive Turkey as an even greater threat
than the Soviet Union.347
“In trying to understand how Turkey is seen from the other shore of
the Aegean Sea, we can compare it with about the Turks’ perception of the USSR”,348
Sönmezoğlu and Ayman elaborate.
344
Thanos P. Dokos and Panayotis J. Tsakonas, “Greek-Trukish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” in: Greece
and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A political Economy Perspective, eds. Christos Kollias
and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen (New York: Nova Science, 2003): 10.
Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 10. 345
Ibid. 346
Ibid. 347
See Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 37-48. 348
Kollias, Greece and Turkey, 38.
107
Illustration 19: The Hellenic Navy remains focused on territorial defense, thus relying on guided-missile attack craft.
As a neighbor and a historically conflicting partner of Tsarist Russia Turkey has
perceived (and continues to perceive) [its] northern neighbor as a source of threat
regardless of its regime. With sizeable territory, large population, enormous natural
resources and the perennial aim of reaching the ‘Warm Waters’ via controlling the
Turkish STRAITS […], this ‘big neighbor of the North’ has put potential threat and
sometime actual pressure on Anatolia [italics in the original]349
“Despite some differences, we can apply a similar scenario to the Turkish-Greek
relationship”, the two authors continue. “With a big territory, a large population, and a
dynamic economy […], Turkey seems to be perceived as a considerable source of pressure
[and threat] by Greece.”350
Proof to this claim can be
found in the Greek defense
white paper from 1996. In this
document the Ministry of
National Defense postulated “the
national military strategy which
provides the directives for the
use of the country’s military
power, […] defense planning,
[…] structure of the forces, [and]
decision-making in defense
matters.”351
The Hellenic Armed Forces were to be designed around a defensive strategy
capable of protecting the so-called ‘Greece-Cyprus Joint Defense Area’ against the most
vexing enemy: the Turks. Therefore, the “central axis of Greece’s military strategy [was] the
deterrence of the Turkish threat”.352
The Navy was to perform four principal tasks: 1)
deterrence, 2) naval presence, 3) sea-control and 4) power projection ashore.353
(The last
point, however, would have been difficult to achieve given Greece’s limited amphibious
capabilities).
In the early 1990s, the Hellenic naval forces reflected this defense strategy. Mostly
designed for territorial defense among the many islets of the Aegean Sea against a possible
Turkish incursion, the Navy exhibited effective ASW and ASuW capabilities. Its submarine
force consisted of eight Type 209 vessels and two old U.S. subs for training. 11 destroyers and
349
Ibid., 39. 350
Ibid., 30. 351
HMoND, Paper 1996-1997, np. 352
HMoND, Paper 1996-1997, np. 353
Ibid.
108
frigates, mostly veterans from World War II, were in service and newer ships of Dutch and
German design were either being bought abroad or built in Greek shipyards. The Dutch
Kortenaer-class, for example, represented “an excellent general-purpose frigate type optimized
for the anti-ship and anti-submarine roles”.354
Ultimately, ten of these warships would sail
under the Hellenic flag. The second type of warship that came into service during the 1990s
was the MEKO 200-class, similar to those built for the Turkish Navy, except for the
propulsion system and CIWS. Four of these ships were built and remain in service today.
Small surface combatants, especially patrol vessels and fast guided-missile attack craft, had
always played an important part in Greece’s naval doctrine. As Conrad Waters observes
“[t]here has been continued investment in this warship category in spite of the fact that it has
increasingly fallen out of favour elsewhere.”355
With tensions between the two neighbors somewhat decreased at the beginning of the
new millennium, so did Greek defense spending. While older vessels were decommissioned,
the Hellenic Armed Forces made an effort to restructure and modernize its naval fleet. It had
become apparent that an arms race with Turkey was neither useful nor could it be sustained.
The Navy’s main role therefore remained hinged on the strategy of territorial defense and
protection of the SLOCs. Investments were made to maintain the current fleet and replace
older ships with more sophisticated ones. As a result, it can be argued that this decision was
the only reasonable approach to the fiscal realities that confronted the Greek government. In
his thesis from 2001 Major Stergio Tsilikas comes to the following assessment of Greece’s
strategy:
Greek-Turkish relations have entered a period [in which] the prospects for resolution
are better now than they have been in years. A new rapprochement effort has unfolded
between the two countries since the 1999 destructive earthquakes in Turkey, and the
two sides have made gestures of reconciliation. Unfortunately, experience has shown
us that similar efforts in the past [were of only temporary nature and] in certain cases
were followed by major crisis. Greece's deterrence doctrine includes those elements
needed to restore the balance in the Greek-Turkish interaction and tries to ensure that a
low or medium level crisis will not get out of hand.356
The modernization of the Hellenic Navy proved to be a significant challenge as
payment difficulties postponed a number of naval projects. The procurement problem that
354
Chant, Ships, 126. 355
Waters, “Europe 2010,” 98. 356
Stergios Tsilikas, “Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and Its Implications on Greek-
Turkish Relations,” (Master thesis, U.S. Navy: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2001).
www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a397555.pdf.
109
caught the most public attention was that of a successor to the ageing Type 209 submarines.
With Germany leading the field in AIP submarine technology, the Greek government awarded
the Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems, who also owned Hellenic shipyards, to build four new
Type 214-class boats. It was reported that despite these ships being launched as long ago as
2004, financial constraints enticed the Greek government to reject the vessels on the ground
of alleged technical shortcomings.357
The legal feud which lasted for years “has become
something of a cause célèbre in Greek political circles”, Waters notes. “A former Greek
defense minister has been jailed over the alleged handing of bribes from another company
[…] and other Greek officials are under investigation.”358
It seems this might also have an
effect on the decision from whom to procure a new air defense frigate. While the German
shipbuilder was one of the primary contenders for the bid, more recently, Greece has showed
interest in buying the French version of the FREMM frigate, which has already been sold to
Morocco and Egypt. However, any such procurement is far from certain as declining funds
make large-scale investments in the future seem increasingly unlikely. Greece’s obscure and
sometimes dubious acquisition processes largely contribute to the difficulty of predicting the
future of the Hellenic Navy:
There have been no comprehensive analyses or systematic studies of arms
procurement decision making in Greece, despite the high level of resources allocated
to defence. The lack of previous research is a major obstacle to examining this
process. The Greek defence planning process and in particular the arms procurement
decision-making process are also fairly closed in terms of public accountability,
transparency, parliamentary scrutiny, monitoring and oversight.359
What seems to be clear is that the Greek Navy will want to retain a large number of warships
in order to protect its interests in the region. The latest defense white paper, published in
2014, acknowledges the fact that the United States is in the process of pivoting to the Asian
Pacific Region, which, as a consequence, will “create new conditions for the security and
defence demands in the European area.”360
Greece intends to address these demands by
participating in international peacekeeping operations, supporting the transformation of
NATO, facilitating the creation of a joint European defense and security policy and
357
Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 248. 358
Waters, “Europe 2014,” 70. 359
Stelios Alifantis and Christos Kollias, “Greece,” in: Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume II: Chile,
Greece, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Taiwan, ed. Ravinder Pal Singh (Oxford: University Press, 2000):
39-66. 360
Hellenic Ministry of Defense, White Paper, (2014): 18.
110
supporting the HADR effort in the Mediterranean Sea.361
Like Spain, France, and Italy,
Greece will have to shoulder the growing burden of mass migration from the African and
Asian continents towards Europe’s shores.
Though specific requirements in terms of military capabilities is not provided in the
white paper, it reiterates the basic tenets of Greece’s defense strategy, which has largely
remained unaltered since the end of the Cold War (and in fact since the creation of the
deterrent strategy after the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in 1973).362
Greece will pursue the
“[e]nhancement of Hellenic Navy capabilities, area air defense capabilities, maritime
cooperation aircraft and modern submarines.”363
To what extent the Greek government will be
able to provide the necessary funds to fulfill these needs remains to be seen. It is quite
possible that the size of the fleet will decrease after 2020 if no replacement of the Kortenaer-
class frigates and Type 209 submarines can be found. Moreover, unlike its neighbor, its
“existing domestic construction appears to be paralyzed whilst longstanding plans of new
orders have been stalled.”364
Furthermore, it is also questionable if a replacement for the
Navy’s six P-3B Orion patrol planes (retired in 2011) can be found anytime soon.
Both Greece and Turkey currently entertain robust naval capabilities. However,
although both countries allocate significant funds towards their national defense, Turkey has
incrementally expanded its naval capabilities since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It has
also been able to revive a defense industry capable of building warships up to the size of
frigates and fit them out with domestically developed electronics and weapon systems – a
great achievement by any standard. But even Turkey has to make sure it does not get ahead of
itself. With national pride soaring high, not least among the country’s elite and advocates of
sea power demanding the production of an aircraft carrier to buttress Turkey’s status as a
regional power, the country might outrun itself, both financially as well as politically.
Maintaining a large naval force is both costly and manpower intense. Already there are too
little funds to properly balance all the navy’s capabilities. This would only grow more
difficult if a carrier would be put to sea, not to mention a naval air-wing of F-35s. Moreover,
in the long term, Turkey will also need to revoke its increasingly authoritarian rule, or else it
is likely to further alienate allies like the United States, and possibly reawaken hostilities with
its neighbors such as Greece.
361
HMnD, Paper 2014, 42. 362
For more information on the development of Hellenic naval strategy see thesis by Tsilikas, “Military
Strategy.” 363
HMnD, Paper 2014, 42. 364
Waters, “Europe 2014,” 69.
111
The future of the Hellenic Navy looks much bleaker. With the ongoing struggle
between the European Union and the current Greek government regarding its financial debt,
large-scale investments seem unlikely. It will, therefore, need to make smart choices in its
future procurement policies, not least making them a less likely victim of corruption and
dubious political schemes. Moreover, in the near and midterm Greece will likely have to
streamline its forces and make a number of painful concessions.
However, what is most important is that the two countries continue their political
dialogue, put their differences aside and move closer together. Turkey and Greece will
undoubtedly play an important role in Europe’s future. They will also determine to what
degree Europe has a say in world affairs and their respective maritime forces will be a
significant factor in this.
9) GERMANY: Reluctance and Reductions – Not Stepping Up to the Plate
Figure 13
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 13 Germany: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
112
Figure 14
Since the end of the Cold War, the German armed forces have undergone one of the
most drastic changes of all European states. As was pointed out in the introduction, since its
founding in 1949 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany
invested heavily in its military forces. At the same time numerous other NATO members
deployed large forces on German soil in order to deter a possible attack by the Warsaw Pact.
Similarly, East Germany, officially the German Democratic Republic, had a huge number of
men and military matériel deployed on its territory. As a matter of fact, at the height of the
Cold War, the Soviets alone had more than 300,000 soldiers, organized in twenty tank and
motorized rifle divisions, in East Germany. These troops were considered “Category I”: the
best trained and equipped among the Soviet Army.365
During this period of time, the common assumption was that if deterrence were to fail
and war was to break out, the decisive battle would be fought on the Central European Front:
in Germany, France, Italy, and possibly also in Austria.366
American and NATO contingency
planning called on the West German armed forces to share the burden of confronting the bulk
of Soviet heavy mechanized forces. For that reason the German Army and Air Force received
the lion’s share of military funding.
The role of the German Navy, the Deutsche Bundesmarine, on the other hand, was for
the most part limited to operations in the littoral waters of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.
365
See William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (London: McGraw-Hill, 1982): 180. 366
See Dieter Krüger, Felix Schneider (eds.), Die Alpen im Krieg: Historischer Raum, Strategie und
Sicherheitspolitik (Munich 2012), 123, 243, 256, 269.
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatants 21 14 16
Submarines 24 14 6
Assault/Amphibious 0 0 0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 14 Germany: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
113
The Navy was designed to play a key role within NATO’s maritime strategy in case of
conflict, conducting anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and mine
warfare (MW) against Soviet naval forces.367
In particular, the mining operations of the
Danish Straits, one of many critical-choke points in NATO planning, required the Germans to
sustain a large fleet of mine warfare vessels and substantial mine inventory.368
When the Iron Curtain had finally fallen, the Berlin Wall had crumbled, and East and
West Germany had finally celebrated their reunification, the German navy consisted of over a
hundred vessels, including nearly a dozen destroyers and frigates, 42 guided-missile patrol
boats and nearly 50 mine warfare ships. In addition, the Howaldtswerke in Kiel had designed
and produced what were considered among the best diesel-electric submarines in the world.
While the Bundesmarine had 18 Type 206, and six older Type 205 submarines in 1991,
numerous modified versions were sold to other states, including Venezuela, Chile, Norway,
Greece, and Indonesia.369
East Germany, on the other hand, had a much smaller force and
many of the ships were quickly put out of service. Unlike some advanced Soviet technology,
most notably the Mikojan-Gurewitsch MiG-29 combat aircraft, which was of interest to
Western defense analysts, the handful of Soviet-built frigates, corvettes and missile patrol
boats were of no relevance in the post-Cold War era and were quickly taken from service or
sold.370
Compared to other European powers, such as Great Britain, Italy and France, Germany
has for most of its history been considered a continental power. Its naval ambitions were
squandered in both World Wars and therefore Germany lacks the naval history and culture of
a blue-water fleet that is capable of conducting the full range of naval warfare.371
Despite the
German Empire’s vigorous attempt to gain the strategic upper hand prior to the outbreak of
World War I, by challenging Great Britain in a naval arms’ race, “the superiority of the
British Grand Fleet to the German High Sea Fleet […] was such that even the most aggressive
German commanders were loath to accept battle except in the most favourable
367
The naval strategy documents states that Americas allies would deploy their forces according to plan. “The
West German Navy would move to conduct forward operations in the Baltic, and the Turkish Navy, especially
its submarines would do the same in the Black Sea.” James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy, 1984,” in: U.S.
Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (Newport, RI:
Naval War College Press, 2008): 76. 368
German mine inventory countered roughly 10,000 mines. See Arthur Moreau, “Maritime Strategy
Presentation (for the Secretary of the Navy, 4 November 1982),” in: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected
Documents, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008): 38. 369
Grant, Ships, 41-46. 370
“In a significant increase to the Indonesia Navy a total of 39 ships have been procured from Germany
covering ships of the former East German Navy.” See Ezio Bonsignore et al. “Indonesia.,” The World Defense
Almanac 1992-1993, Vol 17, Issue 1 (1993): 190. 371
McGrath, “NATO trends,” np.
114
circumstance.”372
As Geoffrey Till points out, Admiral Tirpitz, who oversaw Germany’s
ascendance as a naval power, however, created a navy strong enough so that the Royal Navy
was neither able to “impose a close blockade” nor to attack the submarine bases on the
German coast.373
Moreover, the size and power of Tirpitz’s fleet limited Great Britain’s
ability to use its superior forces elsewhere. Designed as a constant threat, the German
battleships and battle cruisers were to tie down the Grand Fleet until favorable circumstances
would come about that would make an engagement possible. These are also the basic
elements of Mahan’s concept of a ‘fleet-in-being’.374
The only two battles involving larger
formations of each side, the Battle of Dogger Bank and battle of Jutland (known to the
Germans as the Skagerrakschlacht) were inconclusive. Ultimately, the German High Sea Fleet
would fail to be a deciding factor in World War I. As Gray observes, “the Royal Navy had
defeated German’s High Seas Fleet strategically in the war without benefit of victory in a
major fleet-to-fleet battle.”375
The Second World War would provide a similar experience for the German navy as
the Kriegsmarine attempted to draw strategic advantages from its war at sea. While Nazi
Germany’s submarine war against the convoys reinforcing Great Britain and Russia from the
United States was highly successful, Hitler’s surface fleet again posed little threat to major
Allied naval operations. In total, the Kriegsmarine had only two battleships,376
(the Bismarck
and Tirpitz), two battle cruisers (the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst) and a handful of heavy
cruisers. Its only aircraft carrier, the famous Graf Zeppelin, was never put into service.
German sea power in both World Wars, Gray argues, “was never imbued with that
determination to close with, and destroy, the enemy which was the tradition in Britain’s Royal
Navy.” As a large land power, “the Germans either lacked superiority in force or they had
ulterior objectives in mind, in support of which the hazards of battle would be an arguably
needless complication.”377
Considering the relative strategic inaptitude of naval forces throughout Germany’s
history, the evolution of the Bundesmarine since the end of the Cold War seems quite
372
Till, Seapower 175. 373
Ibid. 374
“This approach is of particular value for a fleet that knows it is inferior to its adversary (in number and
quality) and cannot realistically hope to gain or contest command of the sea by the normal method.“ Till,
Seapower, 173.
For information on the concept see Mahan, Naval Warfare, 255-275. The origin of the term is discussed in
further detail in Corbett, Principles, 215-228. 375
Gray, Leverage, 18. 376
The Bismark was sunk in 1941, while her sister, the Tirpitz, saw little actual combat in the waters off the
Norwegian coast and was sunk by a bomb raid in 1944. 377
Gray, Leverage, 225.
115
remarkable. Conceived as a littoral maritime force, limited both by its role and required
capabilities within NATO, the navy has developed into a multi-mission fleet that can be
deployed over great distances. The ability of this ‘Expeditionary Navy’ to conduct so-called
‘out-of-area operations’378
reflects the change in how the role of the Bundesmarine of the 21st
century is perceived by the German government. The defense white paper, published by the
German Defense Ministry in 2006 describes the capability of the navy as following:
[Die Marine wird] in die Lage versetzt sein, dauerhaft auch in großer Entfernung, im
multinationalen Rahmen und unter Bedrohung vor fremden Küsten operieren zu
können. […] Deutsche maritime Kräfte können ungehindert und frühzeitig in weit
entfernte Regionen vorausstationiert werden und diplomatische Aktivitäten flankieren.
Neben ihrer Befähigung zum bewaffneten Einsatz auf See können sie wirkungsvoll zu
Operationen an Land beitragen.379
Based on these criteria and the numerous reform efforts, including the abolishment of
conscription as a major goal of the Bundeswehrreform (initiated in 2000), the force structure
has undergone drastic changes. As Figure 14 illustrates, the number of warships has
plummeted over the last twenty years as older ships have been replaced by fewer, yet more
capable, vessels. Moreover, the entire naval structure has undergone major reorganization and
the current fleet is now divided into two flotillas, one in Kiel (Einsatzflotille 1: submarines,
guided-missile craft, mine warfare vessels, K-130 corvettes and tenders) and in
Wilhelmshaven (Einsatzflotille 2: frigates and larger support vessels); naval command
(Marinekommando) has been consolidated at Rostock while the only remaining naval aviation
base is located at Nordholz.380
Before I continue my analysis, it is important to briefly address some principal points
of discussion. Currently, there is considerable debate among defense analysts whether the
German armed forces in general, and the Navy in particular, can provide sufficient military
readiness and will be able to deploy and sustain forces abroad in the near term. The reduced
force level is likely to cause considerable strain on the available platforms and cause defense
planners quite a headache. Moreover, there are numerous indicators suggesting that Germany
378
The term ‘out of area’ is explained by the Oxford dictionary as follows: “(Of a military operation) conducted
away from the place of origin or expected place of action of the force concerned.” In the case of Germany it can
be explained as, “NATO Alliance operations and non-NATO coalition operations in which the United States and
other NATO allies participate and that occur outside or on the periphery of Alliance territory.” Myron Hury et al,
Interoperability, A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
2000): Chapter 1, 1.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235.html. 379
BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 112-115. 380
Ulf Kaak, Die Schiffe der Deutschen Marine: 1990 bis heute (München: GeraMond Verlag, 2013): 6-7.
116
will remain unwilling to conduct any form of high-intensity warfighting in the foreseeable
future. Considering Germany’s experiences in Afghanistan and its reluctance to take part in
other large-scale military operations in recent years (Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Syria 2014),
“[t]he key question is whether Germany will be willing [and able] to deploy forces in
contingencies beyond its borders.”381
Lacking the ability to project significant military power
at the upper end of the intensity spectrum, and with apparently no intention to make any large-
scale investments to increase these capabilities in the near future, it is likely that we will see
Germany only taking part in low-threat, peacekeeping operations, delegating responsibilities
in high-risk operations to others.
In the mid 1990s the German Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces published a
number of strategic white papers in an attempt to define the role of its military in the new
security environment. The Weißbuch 1994 put forward a defense policy framework in which
the German naval forces where to be transformed from the aforementioned littoral to a
modern blue-water navy (‘expeditionary navy’).382
As its principal task it was designed to
support the freedom of the sea and undertake crisis-management operations further away from
home: “[Die Neuausrichtung zu einer Marine, die] im Bündnisrahmen einen eigenständigen und
sichtbaren Beitrag zur Aufrechterhaltung des Prinzips der ‚Freiheit der Meere’, insbesondere jedoch
für maritime Maßnahmen in der internationalen Krisenbewältigung [leistet].”383
This reorientation also forced the Navy to reevaluate its fleet structure. Adjustments
had to be made to guarantee its effectiveness and future procurement decisions had to be
reconsidered, all under a far more restrictive financial atmosphere. By the mid-1990s many of
the Navy’s vessels were nearing the end of their service life, or were no longer capable of
conducting the new missions envisioned by the defense planners. For these reasons further
goals of the Bundesmarine were outlined in what was known as the ‘Fleet 2005’ and ‘Marine
2005’ plans. Their basic tenet was to restructure the Navy, gradually reducing its size, but
ultimately arriving at a force that constituted a well-balanced fleet, capable of conducting out-
of-area operations, albeit not of the same order as the four major European naval powers.384
The initially and, as so often, overoptimistic procurement plan envisioned the fleet to
be comprised of 16-20 frigates, 20-30 patrols boats, 20-30 MW vessels, 10-14 submarines,
15-17 support ships, 60-65 naval fighter-bombers, 35-40 search and rescue (SAR) helicopters
381
Larrabee, Austerity, 33. 382
Despite being outlined in earlier white papers the term was only used in the 2006 defense white paper. See
BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 112. 383
German Weißbuch 1994 quoted in Berthold Meyer, “Von der Entgrenzung nationaler deutscher Interessen.
Die politische Legitimation weltweiter Militäreinsätze,” in HSFK-Report 10/2007, (Frankfurt a.M. 2007): 16. 384 See Jürgen Rhades, “The German Navy Faces the Future,” Naval Forces 6 (1992): 18-22.
117
and 12-14 ASW and marine patrol craft.385
In his article from 1992, Jürgen Rhades rightfully
states that these numbers were merely provisional as “it [was] impossible to predict precisely
what [would] be required after 2005.”386
In fact, the actual number of ships envisioned for the
‘Fleet 2005’ was quickly revoked as the magnitude of defense cuts became apparent as Figure
13 indicates. By the time 2005 came along, the austerity measures had reduced the
Bundesmarine not by one-third, as Rhades had predicted, but effectively cut it in half. 387
Retired Admiral Sigurd Hess comments on this development by pointing to the fact
that the German Navy had to realize that it could neither replace its aging vessels to a
satisfactory degree, nor could it build and deploy the platforms necessary to conduct the
envisioned operations.
Die Marine bemühte sich zunächst mit gewissem Erfolg, für ihren Beitrag zum
Fähigkeitenkatalog der Bundeswehr den Vorteil zu nutzen, den ihr die
parlamentarische Unterstützung des Neubauprogrammes „Flotte 2005“ bot. Sie musste
jedoch sehr bald zur Kenntnis nehmen, daß der in diesem desaströsen Ausmaß noch
1991 für unmöglich gehaltene Einbruch der investiven Mittel mehr und mehr das in
Frage stellte, was das Ziel der „Flotte 2005“ ausmachte. Bald wurde der Marine,
sowohl aufgrund der Erfahrungen aus multinationalen Kriseneinsätzen, als auch durch
die Mitverfolgung des konzeptionellen Geschehens bei ihren Bündnispartnern, immer
klarer, daß sie sich einem doppelten Dilemma gegenübersah: Es fehlte ihr nicht nur
das Geld, um ihren gegenwärtigen Komponenten rechtzeitig die für eine sinnvolle
Durchhaltefähigkeit notwendige Anzahl von Neubauten zuzuführen, sondern ihr
fehlten damit auch die Mittel, die Bundeswehr mit den nun zusätzlich erforderlichen
Fähigkeiten ausstatten zu können, wie [die] Fähigkeit zum strategischen Seetransport.
Für die militärische Führung war in den Jahren 1994 bis 2003 weder in
verteidigungspolitischer noch in konzeptioneller Hinsicht eine wirkliche Perspektive
erkennbar.388
Despite these drastic changes, Germany has been able to produce and deploy highly
capable warships and weapon systems. Compared to the fleet of the 1980s, Germany
gradually put newer (yet fewer) ships to sea. These surface and subsurface combatants were
designed to conduct a larger variety of missions more effectively and over greater distances.
Based on Germany’s industrial prowess, its shipbuilding facilities have substantial experience
in producing state-of-the-art vessels. In particular, shipbuilders such as Blohm & Voss,
385 Rhades, “German Navy,” 20. 386 Ibid. 387 Ibid. 388
Sigurd Hess, “Die konzeptionelle Planung der Marine 1989-2002“, in: Die Wende. Die Deutsche Marine auf
dem Weg in die Einheit, eds. Stephan Huck, Hartmut Klüver (Bochum: Dieter Winkler Verlag, 2007): 21-30.
Quote taken from the author’s homepage: http://www.sigurd-hess.de/hauptseite-deutsche-version.
118
Illustration 20: Germany has established itself as the leading nation in the construction of diesel-electric submarines. This drawing illustrates the Type 214 AIP submarine sold to Greece.
Thyssen Nordseewerke and the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft have developed innovative
designs and delivered cutting-edge technology.
Besides the previously mentioned Type 206 submarine, the MEKO (Mehrzweck
Korvette), built since the 1980s, is representative for German technical ingenuity. Although
the MEKO design was never
procured by the German
Navy, it enjoyed
considerable commercial
success and units continue to
be operated by, inter alia,
Australia, Argentina and
Turkey.389
As we shall later
see, the modular design of
the MEKO already
incorporated many ideas of
later ship-building trends.
Parry points out that
“[reconfiguring] or [adapting] ships in the face of changing operational requirement […] has
often proved prohibitively expensive.”390
Therefore, concepts like the German MEKO, the
Royal Danish Navy’s Standard Flexible (Standflex) system on its Absalon-class command
ships and Ivor Huitfeldt frigates, or the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ship mission packages can
save costs and provide the needed flexibility.
As part of a more globally deployable naval force, Germany also sought to develop the
first air-independent (AIP) diesel-electric submarine. In general, diesel-electric powered
submarines need to surface regularly to reload their batteries and cannot stay submerged over
longer periods of times.391
For many years, only nuclear powered submarines had such a
capability. However, first tests of a fuel cell-based air-independent propulsion system were
already conducted as early as 1988. Due to technical challenges and fiscal restrictions, it
389
While the German government decided not to procure any of these ships for its own navy the MEKO design
was successfully sold to other states such as Turkey, Greece, Argentina and Nigeria. 390
Parry, Highway, 185-187. 391
“Submarines with diesel-electric propulsion generally have to surface every couple of days to run the
charging generator and recharge the batteries. However, with a special fuel cell system, subs can remain under
water for longer. The present record – set by an HDW Type 212A submarine – is 14 days. If a submarine is
unable to surface, the regulations require that the crew is able to survive for at least six days.” Stefan Nitschke
and Stephen Elliott, “Under Water,” Naval Forces, http://www.nafomag.com/2015/01/under-water-faq-on-
submarines.html.
119
would take another 15 years until the first AIP Type 212A submarine was delivered to the
German Bundesmarine. The new submarine, a joint venture between Germany and Italy, gave
its commanders the unique ability to remain submerged for much longer periods of time than
previously possible owing to the vessel’s fuel cells. What is so extraordinary about this
technology is that the boats are very quiet, thus very difficult to locate by enemy forces. In
general, diesel-electric submarines are known, and feared, for their ability to operate at a very
low noise level, loitering in shallow waters where their comparatively louder and larger
nuclear counterparts are less willing to venture. With the inherent limitations of the diesel-
electric propulsion having been overcome, the new German submarines are even more
difficult to locate. Operating the Type 212A the German Navy now “has a submerged
endurance bettered only by those few navies able to afford nuclear-propelled boats, as well as
an overall level of stealth that is perhaps second-to-none.”392
On the downside, Germany’s intention to build and deploy 10-14 such submarines as
envisioned during the 1990s “is little more than a distant memory”,393
Waters remarks. All
Type 206 subs have been decommissioned, leaving the Navy with no more than six
submarines.394
What is more, despite the Type 212’s increased endurance – necessary in out-
of-area operations – the Bundesmarine is “still some distance away from furnishing the true
offensive oceanic proficiency of high-speed attack submarines powered by high-capacity
nuclear reactors,”395
such as the United Kingdom or France operate.
In regard to surface combatants, the shift towards a more globally-oriented navy is the
most visible. Not only have many of the former MW and ASuW vessels, such as the
Frankenthal minehunters and Tiger-class guided-missile craft, been taken from service, but
much more capable platforms such as the F-123, F-124, F-125, and K-130 have been, or are
in the process of being commissioned.
Beginning with the F-123 Brandenburg-class, a ship with a total length of 139 meters
and a displacement of over 4700 tons, the German navy commissioned the first of a number
of very large and capable frigates. Despite being designed during the 1980s as an ASW frigate
to replace the increasingly obsolescent Lütjens-class destroyers (commissioned in 1969), the
F-123 carried a wide variety of ASW, ASuW, and AAW weapons and, at the time of
construction, also incorporated novel elements of stealth in its design. In addition, the number
392
Waters, “Type 212A,” 152. 393
Ibid., 151. 394
The final two Type 212As for the German Navy will enter service in 2015. 395
Waters, “Type 212A,” 152.
120
Illustration 21: While other European navies have expanded their amphibious forces, Germany has invested in highly sophisticated frigates, such as the F-124 Sachsen-class seen here firing a Standard SM-2 missile.
of crew could be somewhat reduced due to increased automation and its maintenance cycles
were prolonged.396
Its successor, the F-124 Sachsen-class, is in general a refined version of the F-123 and
was based on a trilateral cooperation for a future frigate between Germany, the Netherlands
and Spain. After the initial plan (the NRF-90 project) to build a common frigate for the eight
most important NATO members failed in the late 1980s, a memorandum of understanding
among the aforementioned three nations was signed in 1990.397
Its provisions required the
future frigate to be deployable in operations across the intensity spectrum. In essence, the ship
had to be a multipurpose platform. At the time, Michael Herwig pointed out that the focus had
shifted away from anti-submarine warfare, towards anti-surface and anti-air warfare.
Therefore, “[t]his new emphasis [demanded] improved equipment in the areas of surveillance,
communications, air defence and C2 [command and control].”398
This, he concluded, could
have “hardly been [achieved] by German, Dutch, or Spanish industry alone.”399
Although the
final versions of each country’s ships (the Álvaro de Bazán, De Zeven Provinciën, and
Sachsen-class) are different in design and combat systems, all of them exhibit substantial
capabilities, hitherto unprecedented in vessels of this class.
While the Spanish
Bazán frigate (also known
as F-100) relies on the
American Aegis combat
system to deal with aerial
threats, the Dutch and
German ships feature the
long-range 3-D volume
search radar (SMART-L)
and APAR multi-function
radar (an Active
Electronically–Scanned
Array, or AESA in short).
400 As Massimo Annati
396
Chris Chant Kriegsschiffe Heute (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 2006): 75. 397
Herwig, “Trilateral,” 35. 398
Ibid. 399
Ibid. 400
An interesting article regarding the German and Dutch AAW frigates can be found in Massimo Annati,
“German and Dutch AAW Frigates at Sea,” Military Technology, Vol. 26, 3-4 (2002): 102-108.
121
notes, “the APAR represented a very significant design, development and industrial
challenge,” while “the sophisticated technology used for [the SMART-L radar] allows its use
even in littoral scenarios, [as] it was especially designed to deal with small low-flying
targets”.401
Therefore, both radars on board the Sachsen-class are excellent examples of
Europe’s defense industry holding its own in this specific sector.402
Another common feature
is that all three classes deploy the American Standard SM-2 air defense missile fired from the
ships’ Mk 41 vertical launch system.
Finally, the three units of the Sachsen-class are among the most capable and well-
balanced AAW-frigates in the world and are, in fact, the only frigates to deploy anti-air
missile systems for all tiers of air defense.403
Moreover, Germany could integrate the SM-3
missiles in its frigates as part of the United States’ and NATO’s plan to establish a sea-based
theater ballistic missile system. However, so far, there are few indications that the German
government will go forward with such procurements.404
Within NATO, these vessels offer air and missile-defense to other, less capable units
and have also been deployed together with U.S. carrier strike groups over the past years. In
2013, and for the first time in history, a German frigate (F220, Hamburg) was assigned to
coordinate the air space around the strike group, thus being solely responsible for its air
defense.405
The growing interaction with other fleets, however, is only part of Germany’s
effort to increase its international presence. By and large, Germany’s involvement in
international operations has grown considerably over the past two decades. In the context of
its strategic reorientation and growing engagement abroad, the German Navy has been
deployed in numerous missions: from clearing mines in the Persian Gulf to fighting piracy off
the coast of Somalia.
The post-Cold War Bundesmarine conducted its first larger operation “Southern
Cross” in 1994, in an effort to evacuate German UNISOM II troops from Mogadishu,
Somalia. Between July 1994 and July 1996 the navy also took part in enforcing the embargo
against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. As a continuous part of NATO’s Standing Naval
401
“The programme was aimed at the realisation of a very advanced multi-function radar, in some way
comparable to the US SPY-1 and able to offer adequate performance to control both SM-2 and ESSM missiles,
but at the same time remain well below the size, weight and power characteristics of its US counterpart.” Ibid.,
103. 402
The SMART-L and APAR were developed by the Dutch Signaal company, now Thales. 403
RIM-166 for low-tier AAW, ESSM for medium-tier, and SM-2 Block IIIb for high-tier air defense. 404
See Footnote 5, in Norman Friedman, “Technology Review. Ballistic Missile Defense And The USN,” in:
Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 191. 405 “Vom Flugzeugträgerverband verabschiedet - Fregatte "Hamburg" macht Heimatumdrehungen!” Presseportal 18.06.2013, http://www.presseportal.de/pm/67428/2495613/vom-flugzeugtr-gerverband-verabschiedet-fregatte-hamburg-macht-heimatumdrehungen.
122
Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), German destroyers and frigates participated in
nearly 6000 boarding operations and inspections at sea.406
The Navy’s longest-standing naval
deployment thus far has been its anti-terrorism mission as part of Operation Active
Endeavour. In an act of unprecedented solidarity, following the attacks of 9/11, the German
Bundestag decided to deploy its naval forces to the waters around the Horn of Africa and
consequently took command of joint task force CTF-150 on a number of occasions.407
Though publicly criticized, the German government remained adamant that the mission was
necessary to counter the threat that terrorist activities posed to the good order at sea: “Bei der
Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus kommt Seewegen eine besondere Bedeutung zu.
Im Vordergrund stehen dabei die Überwachung des Schiffsverkehrs und die Unterbrechung
von Versorgungslinien terroristischer Organisationen.”408
Germany’s commitment to
peacekeeping operations was buttressed by its leading naval role in the United Nation’s
UNIFIL mission off the coast of Lebanon. Based on Resolution 1701, the Bundesmarine
has been assisting and training the Lebanese Navy since 2006.409
The latest additions to Germany’s naval forces, the K-130 Braunschweig-class
Corvette, the F-125 Baden-Württemberg-class frigate, and the Berlin-class combat support
ship, reflect Germany’s effort to adapt to the new maritime security environment. As
mentioned, the Navy’s guided-missile Tiger, Gepard, and Albatros class patrol boats had
limited ability to perform out-of-area operations. As the maritime journalist Guy Toremans
points out, “[t]he one-watch boats had a very limited endurance by nature of their limited
seaworthiness and the fatigue factor impacting their crews.”410
Keeping these shortcomings in
mind, in 2001 a consortium of three German shipbuilders was awarded a €880 million
contract to build a first batch of five new corvettes. Incorporating signature-reduction
features, modern combat systems and potent AAW and ASuW capabilities, the
Braunschweig-class undoubtedly can meet a number of the Navy’s requirements over the next
decades. However, despite being “dispatched worldwide to undertake surveillance missions,
embargo and counter-drug operations, as well as, potentially, to participate in combat
406 “NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard,” IFOR Final Factsheet, 2 October 1996. http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm. 407 Conrad Waters, “Regional Review – Europe and Russia,” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009): 96. 408 “Die Operation Enduring Freedom,” Bundeswehr, 4 Dec. 2013. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw. 409 Pierre Schubjé, “UNIFIL: Deutsch-libanesische Kooperation – Ein Zwischenbericht,” Marine Forum 1-2 (2014): 14-16. 410
Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships – Braunschweig Class Corvettes. Eagerly awaited by the German Navy,”
in Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): 129.
123
missions,”411
the vessels remain quite small. “One of the lessons already learned from the K-
130 programme”, Toremans adds, “was that, although significantly larger than the fast patrol
boats, the new corvettes have still proved to be a bit too small to operate comfortably and
effectively in support of some of the German Navy’s growing mission requirements around
the globe.”412
This will put more strain on the continuously shrinking number of large surface
combatants, such as the F-124s and new F-125 ‘Stabilization Frigate’.
If one thing the F-125 Baden-Württemberg-class does not lack, it is size. Its builders
proudly state that with a length of 149 meters and a displacement of over 7,300 tons it will be
the largest frigate ever built. The four ships of the class will replace the eight units of the Type
122 (Bremen-class), starting in 2016. Unlike its predecessors, (designed primarily for ASW),
according to a German naval expert, “[t]he design of the new frigate class reflects everything
that is important for littoral warfare.”413
These modern-day littoral operations, however,
should not be confused with those against the Soviet Baltic Fleet. While during the Cold War
German combatants could operate close to their homeports for shorter periods, the littoral
operations nowadays take place hundreds and thousands of miles away from home. In
concordance with Germany’s defense white paper the design of these ships reflects these
missions-capabilities, namely to project power into foreign littoral waters for long periods of
time, in order to conduct crisis management and conflict resolution operations:
[D]auerhaft auch in großer Entfernung im multinationalen Rahmen und unter
Bedrohung vor fremden Küsten operieren zu können. Damit trägt die Marine dazu bei,
Krisen und Konflikte bereits am Ort ihres Entstehens einzudämmen und – wenn
politisch gefordert – zu bewältigen.414
For those reasons, the F-125 arguably will not provide the same high-end combat
capabilities the Sachsen-class can bring to the table. In particular, its air defense and anti-
submarine capabilities will be limited when compared to other ships of its size,
notwithstanding that the ships have considerable room for upgrades. On the other hand, owing
to increased automation, the crew will be considerably smaller than on previous ships (120
sailors, compared to 200 on the Sachsen) – an important factor in times of reductions in
military personnel. Moreover, the Bundesmarine intends to employ a dual crewing concept
411
Toremanns, “Braunschweig,” 146. 412
Ibid., 147. 413
Sebastian Bruns, quoted in Albrecht Müller, “New Frigate Underscores Germany’s Shift From Cold War
Naval Combat,” Defense News, 13 Jan. 2014.
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140113/DEFREG01/301130031/New-Frigate-Underscores-Germany-
s-Shift-From-Cold-War-Naval-Combat. 414
BmdV, Weißbuch 2006, 122.
124
much like that aboard U.S. submarines (rotating the crews while on deployment instead of
long tours of a single crew), thereby allowing the frigate to conduct operations for up to two
years and 5,000 hours at sea per year.415
Again, this analysis is not intended to be a simple “bean-counting exercise”.416
As was
already pointed out in the introductory chapter to these case studies, apart from the number of
hulls, other important factors, such as “technical quality, professional skill, and maintenance
efficiency”, have to be considered in order to successfully come to a meaningful
understanding of a navy’s capabilities. 417
As a matter of fact, the German Navy would by all
means score high in the second and third category and her current ability to deploy naval
forces, to many observers, also seems to be sufficient. The already quoted RAND study, for
example, points out that Germany’s defense budget has remained constant during the financial
crisis and in some cases has slightly grown over the past years.418
Furthermore, so the study
went on, the “changes to the navy structure are expected to be less drastic than those to the
army.”419
However, Germany’s commitment towards the maritime realm does not pass the
test under closer examination. While the Navy arguably was not hit as hard by the recent cuts
as its sister services, there is not much cause for celebration.
The German Navy is being stretched increasingly thin in support of its many missions.
Currently, its vessels are engaged in the UNIFIL mission and the E.U. anti-piracy operation
Atalanta. They contribute warships to the Standing NATO Maritime Groups as well as the
Standing NATO MCM Groups (mine-countermeasure) on a constant basis and, finally, air
defense frigates regularly deploy with U.S.-carrier strike groups. At the same time, the force
level has dropped to 11 frigates, five K-130 corvettes, and a small number of mine warfare
vessels. While the third and final Berlin-class combat group supply replenishment ship
represents an important addition to Germany’s ‘expeditionary fleet’ the decommissioning of
the last Gepard-class guided-missile craft by 2016 will leave the Bundesmarine with
alarmingly few combatants until the late 2020s (27 submarines and surface combatants in
total).420
The aforementioned maintenance efficiency and ability to deploy forces will become
increasingly challenging in the future, due to the wear and tear on the existing fleet.
Moreover, given Germany’s economic health – and the political, as well as military
influence it could thus conceivably wield – the government has to accept criticism for its
415
Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 233. 416
Till, Seapower, 117. 417
Ibid., 117. 418
Larrabee, Austerity, 34. 419
Ibid., 30. 420
Bonsignore, “Germany,” 131.
125
general reluctance to use ‘hard power’, even in cases where it would be generally considered
justifiable. The NATO-led military intervention in Libya, for example, not only created deeps
rifts between the NATO members and emphasized the absence of a common European
defense strategy, but it also heralded the most likely form of the future Western response to
conflict and humanitarian crisis. As part of the ad-hoc ‘Coalition of the Willing and Able’,
neutral Sweden took part in enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya, while Germany, which for
over 40 years owed its safety and security to her NATO allies, watched from the sidelines. At
the time, “the German decision not to participate in the Libyan operation caught many
officials by surprise and raises questions about whether the Alliance can rely on Germany’s
support for future power-projection missions – even ones, like Libya, that are carried out
under a UN mandate.”421
More recent events, such as the threat of force against Bashar Al-
Assad’s regime in Syria in the summer of 2013, or the current effort against ISIS, underscore
Germany’s antipathy to commit its military forces to operations that entail a certain degree of
risk.
To sum up, since the end of the Cold War, the German Navy has undergone a drastic
reform. Today it bears little resemblance to the Cold War fleet patrolling the waters of the
North and Baltic Sea. Apart from a small number of increasingly obsolete ships, the Navy has
commissioned a number of state-of-the-art submarines, corvettes and frigates. Germany
continues to be a leader in key naval technologies and has had substantial commercial success
on the naval market over the last two decades – gaining contracts from navies around the
world. In addition, the Germans have successfully deployed naval forces in a number of
contingencies, albeit most of them being on the lower end of the intensity spectrum.
However, the drastic budget cuts that ensued as a consequence of the Soviet collapse
have taken a detrimental toll on the naval services. Vice Admiral Hans-Rudolf Boehmer’s
predictions from 1996 of the Navy’s future would almost seem laughable, would they not
have such substantial ramifications for Europe’s security in an increasingly competitive
maritime environment:
In the year 2010, [the Admiral predicted] the Navy will not be much different in size
than it is today, however, it will be significantly more capable. There will be 15
frigates, 10-12 submarines and it will include a strong mine countermeasure capability
421
Larrabee, Austerity, 98.
126
– Further, there will be a mixture of modern corvettes and not-so-modern patrol boats
[and the] naval air arm will still be flying the Tornados.422
Quite frankly, the Bundesmarine can call none of these capabilities its own. The surface and
subsurface fleet remain considerably smaller than envisioned, while the naval air arm has long
handed over its Tornados to the Air Force, and to date the Navy does not possess any
noteworthy amphibious forces.
Compared to other states of its size and wealth, (the other European G7 members for
example) Germany’s naval commitment can be considered lacking. In his critical assessment
of Europe’s navies, McGrath summarizes Germany’s naval abilities as “[falling] mainly
within the lower end of the operational spectrum.”423
Although he recognizes Germany’s
contribution to peacekeeping and stabilization efforts (which follow from its strategic
reorientation throughout the post-Cold War era), he makes clear that its “cruising navy
provides little in the way of power projection.”424
Given the considerable financial burden
countries such as France and the U.K. and, to a lesser degree, Italy and Spain have to carry to
maintain their well-balanced fleets, (which in the case of the former include costly nuclear
deterrent forces) Germany’s naval investments seem disproportionally small. With tensions
rising on Europe’s northern and southern flanks and Russia’s reemergence as a naval power, it
remains to be seen if Germany’s policymakers will take these changes within the geopolitical
security environment into consideration. Ultimately, however, “[t]he interesting question is
not whether the navy supports Germany’s worldview and view of itself; [but]” so McGrath
concludes ”it is whether a nation as powerful, rich, and networked as Germany, is
underinvesting in naval power while free riding on the backs of US, UK, and French naval
capabilities to a greater extent than other European nations.”425
422
Hans-Rudolf Boehmer, “… Today, the Navy is Better and More Capable Than Ever Before.” Naval Forces,
Special Issue 5 (1996): 10. 423
McGrath, “NATO trends,” np. 424
Ibid. 425
Ibid.
127
10) DENMARK and the NETHERLANDS: Commercial Might and Military
Inaptitude
Figure 15
Figure 16
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 16 Denmark: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatants 3 3 5
Submarines 5 3 0
Assault/Amphibious 0 0 0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 18 Denmark: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
128
Figure 17
Figure 18
Both the Netherlands and Denmark are interesting examples of how the principles of
sea power have evolved over the course of history. Centuries ago, both countries belonged to
the major sea powers of their time, fashioning large merchant fleets as well as powerful
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
% o
f G
DP
1990-2013, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 17 The Netherlands: Defense Spending in % of
GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatants 15 15 6
Submarines 5 4 4
Assault/Amphibious 0 1 2
0 2 4 6 8
10 12 14 16
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 18 The Netherlands: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
129
armadas of warships.426
As a consequence of this union between military and commerce –
conducted by many, but refined by the Dutch and ultimately mastered by the British –Mahan
concluded that the “[c]ontrol of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy [meant]
predominant influence in the world”.427
As mentioned, many renowned naval strategists
thereafter have generally accepted these principles.428
However, in this day and age, in the opinion of many European governments, large
and highly-capable naval forces are no longer considered essential to the prosperity of their
nations. Their country’s economy, despite being largely dependent on the transportation of
goods by sea (even those of landlocked countries such as Austria), do just fine without
maintaining large and expensive fleets. What is remarkable, however, is that even seafaring
nations of old, such as those under discussion in this chapter, worry little about their inability
to buttress their economic power with credible hard power in the form of a capable navy.
There are a number of reasons for such a development given the extent of geopolitical
changes over the last centuries. As we have heard, one reason that cannot be disregarded is
that the Western world has evolved into a community of (mostly) shared values and
comparatively little rivalry. More importantly, however, is that in a world of global commerce
in which 90 percent of materials and goods are shipped, one country has taken it upon itself to
protect the quintessential freedom of the sea, namely the United States by means of its navy
and its citizens’ tax dollars. For other countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, this of
course represents a welcome convenience. Both states rarely have to fear that their
commercial ships will fall prey to commerce raiders or are sunk by enemy sea powers, which
in the past were often of European origin. They can expand their commercial activities and in
turn gain large revenue by transporting goods to and fro between Europe, the United States,
the oil-rich Middle East and Asia. As a matter of fact, both countries have expanded their
commercial shipping capabilities, while their military capabilities have often been neglected.
To briefly outline this disparity, it is important to mention that the Netherlands are
dependent on the unimpeded flow of commerce at sea. Moreover, they have invested huge
sums to develop their seaport complex at Rotterdam into the fourth largest port in the world
and the largest in Europe (based on the amount of containers ‘TEU’ handled per day). At a
size of over 12,500 ha it can accommodate even the largest ship and has a throughput of a
426
The Danish-Norwegian personal union included territorial possessions in the High North, the African West
coast, India and the Caribbean. Its power was surpassed by the Dutch, whose East India Trading Company
propelled it to the forefront of political power during the 17th
and 18th
centuries. 427
Mahan, quoted in Till, Strategy, 57. 428
See Ibid., 1-5.
Till concludes that “So far, […] the maritime narrative seems to be holding true.” Ibid., 5.
130
Illustration 22: A Dutch frigate makes a sharp turn starboard as a gigantic Triple E containership of the Danish Maersk shipping company passes by in the background. Both countries are heavily invested in commercial trade at sea, yet have relatively small naval forces.
mindboggling 450 million tons a year.429
Of even greater magnitude is the Danish commercial
shipping industry. As Parry highlights, “the Danes are the understated, high achieving
denizens of the maritime industry”.430
The Danish Møller-Maersk shipping company is the
largest and arguably most famous shipping company in the world. Their huge Triple E
container ships have been specifically designed for the route between Asia and Europe and
can carry over 18,000 TEU.431
With over 249,000 tons, a single ship of this class has a
displacement five times that of the entire Danish Navy combined (around 54,000 tons
including its auxiliaries). Although many of these ventures are made by international
consortium enterprises as well as private investors and are, strictly speaking, not state matters,
it is nonetheless striking how successfully commercial shipping can be pursued in these
countries without the military power one would expect necessary to underpin and protect it in
times of crisis.
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent defense retrenchment among all
European states, the naval forces of both the Netherlands and Denmark were slowly reduced.
While initially, new and highly innovative designed warships were able to absorb the gradual
decommissioning of older vessels, the latest defense cuts have either forced both navies to
drastically reduce the size of their fleet (as in the case of the Netherlands), or to give up
significant capabilities altogether (as in the case of Denmark). No matter how much better the
429
See Parry, Highway, 57. For more information see homepage of the Port of Rotterdam:
ttp://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/Port/port-in-general/Pages/default.aspx. 430
See Parry, Highway, 52-53. 431
Ibid., 54.
131
new warships, OPVs, and replenishment ships are, current defense spending will not allow
them to be used to their full potential, nor will it permit the navies to keep pace with naval
developments elsewhere. This circumstance might in fact one day lead to a similar detriment
both countries already had to painfully experience when their prosperous seaborne trade fell
victim to extrinsic events and hostile actors, who chose to pursue their interest by military
means, ultimately ending in years of hardship for many Danish and Dutch citizens.432
10.1) Denmark
Unlike some of its neighbors, the Danish military might was already eclipsed in the
early 19th
century. Throughout the last century, the Danish military were only able to maintain
comparatively small naval forces considering its strategically important position.433
Hence,
during the Cold War it was understood that the main brunt of a Soviet naval attack from the
Baltic Sea had to be absorbed by West German, Dutch and Norwegian forces, whereas
Denmark’s small flotilla could only provide modest support to ASW, and ASuW operations
against the Soviets around the Danish peninsula and the critical outlet of the Baltic Sea in
particular. Heavy mining of the critical chokepoint was in essence the Royal Danish Navy’s
(RDN) primary task within NATO planning.434
By 1990 the Danish Navy maintained a fleet
of five relatively old diesel-electric submarines of Norwegian and German design, three small
Nils Jule-class frigates, a number of patrol vessels with limited war fighting capabilities
(mainly used for protecting national fishing rights), as well as a number of guided-missile and
torpedo boats from the 1960s and 1970s. All nine warships were of similar age.435
Noteworthy are Denmark’s icebreakers which are needed for operations around Greenland,
part of the Danish Crown Lands. In the case of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
however, Greenland could not have been reached by the small Danish fleet, thus making them
irrelevant to the Navy’s contingency planning.436
432
Mahan discusses Holland’s dependence on the sea: “[I]f England was drawn to the sea, Holland was driven to
it; without the sea England languished, but Holland died. In the height of her greatness, when she was one of the
chief factors in European politics, a competent native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could not
support more than one eighth of her inhabitants.” When the disastrous war with England in 1653-54 drew to a
close it had turned the Dutch harbors into “a forest of masts; the country was full of beggars; grass grew in the
streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted”. Mahan, Naval Warfare, 32-34. 433
Although it only had a relatively small Navy the Danes had some heavy mechanized forces stationed in
Germany. 434
The Danish Navy had an inventory of roughly 6,600 mines. See Moreau, “Maritime Strategy,” 38. 435
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 104-114. 436
In fact, the icebreakers were “civilian-manned and subordinate to the Ministry of Trade and Shipping. See
Ibid., 113.
132
All in all, the Danish Navy could hardly be considered even a second-rate naval power
at the time and further defense cuts proved to be hardly encouraging. Faced with increasingly
strong headwinds, Danish shipbuilders, however, developed one of the most innovative ship
designs to date – the ‘Standard Flex’. “It seems somehow appropriate that the country that
produced Lego should have been a pioneer of naval warship modularisation”, Parry
observes.437
Already in the 1980s, the naval service had come up with a similar idea as was
pursued in the German MEKO design, namely that a ship should be able to quickly adapt and
transform to the needs of the Navy. To make such a flexible design possible the Standard Flex
300 multi-role vessels (Flyvefisken-class) were built with four StanFlex container positions
onboard. (See Illustration 23). In each position, “among others, medium caliber guns, anti-
ship missile launching systems, air defense missile launching systems, MCM control systems,
Variable Depth (VD) sonars, equipment for pollution control and hydrographic equipment”438
could be fitted and, if needed, swapped within a few hours.439
These containers, Parry
explains, “are precisely engineered to allow connections with power, cooling,
communications, water and data supplies [and the] weapon system or sensor is mounted on,
or in the module, with the electronics, power machinery, magazine and supporting equipment
inside.”440
As part of the necessary restructuring of the Danish Navy after the Cold War, the
Committee Concerning the Danish Armed Forces’ Equipment laid down a long-term
procurement policy which stipulated, or better said, recommended that a large part of the fleet
(17 ships) should be replaced by a total of six large vessels, all of which were to incorporate
the StandFlex modules.441
Two units would evolve into the Absalon-class command and
support vessel, on which, in turn, the three highly innovative multi-purpose Iver Huitfeldt
frigates are based. These five ships compose the largest part of the Dutch Navy and will be
described in more detail shortly.
The development of both the Dutch and Danish naval forces over the past twenty-five
years mirrors that of most other European NATO members. As has been discussed, many
navies – such as the British, the French, Italian, Spanish and German – have shifted their
focus from operations against the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic, North Sea and Mediterranean
437
Parry, Highway, 186. 438
Hans Harboe-Hansen, “The Royal Danish Navy’s Modernisation Programme,” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 6
(1997): 93. 439
For a description of Flyvefisken see Grant, Kriegsschiffe, 104. Initially, swapping StanFlex containers took 48
hours, but this time has been significantly reduced. See Guy Toremans’, “Significant Ships. Iver Huitfeldt Class
Frigates: Spearhead of the Royal Danish Navy” in Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, ed. Conrad Waters
(South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013): 108. 440
Parry, Highway, 186 441
Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 92-93.
133
Illustration 23: A telling description of the possibilities the StanFlex system offers.
to expeditionary or out-of-area operations in littoral waters, most notably around the African
continent. In essence, power projection over great distances, and more importantly, from the
sea onto land has taken precedence over the concept of sea-control. Therefore, European
fleets operate larger vessels with notably better sea keeping characteristics which are also
capable of conducting amphibious operations and can remain at sea over longer periods of
time. The general strategic reorientation during this period can be summarized as follows:
[T]raditional blue water navies are taking an increasing interest in littoral warfare and
navies, which so far have focus upon operations in their national brown waters, may
be seeking to improve their blue water capability in order to offer their littoral warfare
experience in other parts of the world.442
It just so happens that this concept has been put into question as of late. This is most
noticeable within the U.S. naval community, which has largely revoked its previous naval
strategy focused on
littoral warfare in light of
China’s naval buildup.
The U.S. Navy has
ramped up its sea-control
and anti-A2/AD
capabilities by adding
additional destroyers and
attack submarines to its
fleet instead of the
formerly planned large
number of littoral combat
ships.443
Furthermore, resurgent Russian naval activities have painfully exposed Europe’s
shortcomings in conducting ASW and ASuW warfare, a métier the European allies used to
take great pride in. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in the penultimate chapter.
Returning to Denmark’s growing blue-water capability, it is safe to say that the
construction of the five large surface combatants has strained the small Danish defense budget
to such an extent that as a consequence some vital capabilities were relinquished outright.
442
Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 92 443
Eight Block III Virginia-class attack submarines are on order with a class of 30 being planned. Four
additional Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are being constructed and nine more have been ordered. See Ezio
Bonsignore et al., “United States of America,” Military Technology: The World Defense Almanac 2014, Issue 1
(2014): 36.
134
Although Danish defense planners had made tentative provisions for a replacement of the
nation’s ageing submarine fleet (a class of three or four AIP submarines were to be bought as
part of the trilateral Viking program between Norway, Denmark and Sweden444
), the
underwater flotilla was disbanded in 2004 and it is highly unlikely that we will see her return
anytime soon.445
Considering Denmark’s dependence on commercial shipping and its exposed
position at the entrance to the Baltic Sea, more cautious observers may be tempted to question
the decision to abandon the submarine program.
In 2003, the keel of the first 4,500 ton Absalon-class flexible support ship was laid
down in the Maersk Odense Staalskibsvaerft. At a length of 137 meters and a width of 19.5
meters this class of warship was much larger than the Niels Juels-class corvettes in service,
which throughout their service life had suffered under their “inherent size handicap which
basically is reflected in a limited endurance”.446
Not only was the Absalon much larger, it was
an entirely different kind of ship, and in many ways one of a kind. The relatively large
superstructure was designed to reduce the ship’s radar cross section and houses a
multipurpose ‘flex deck’ which can carry various modules. Main battle tanks can be
transported as well as containerized hospital modules for HADR operations. Two landing
craft can be embarked and up to 46 vehicles can be taken aboard via the stern ramp. Even
more flexibility is provided by the weapon modules installed amidships. Four quad Harpoon
SSM launchers and three 12-cell Mk56 VLS find space between the main mast and funnels
and are able deploy a total of 36 ESSM missiles in addition to the 16 Harpoon SSMs. A single
127mm/62 cal Mk 45 gun is mounted in the ‘A’ position on the bow which is overlooked by
an Oerlikon 35mm CIWS. A second CIWS is mounted above the hangar. Finally the Absalon-
class can engage enemy surface and subsurface threats with its ship and helicopter-launched
torpedoes.447
Due to their impressive capabilities, these ships can rightfully be compared to
other modern frigates, despite being appointed mainly to support duties.448
The reorganization of Denmark’s defense sector continued throughout the first decade
of the new millennium. The Danish Defense Agreement 2005-2009, highlighted that
“[c]hanges in the international security environment require[d] the Danish Defence to
strengthen its capacities in two central areas: 1) Internationally deployable military capacities
444
See Baker III, Combat Fleets, 738. 445
See Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 95. 446
Ibid., 94. 447
Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 158. 448
Ibid., 158.
135
and 2) the ability to counter terror acts and their consequences.”449
As mentioned, the short-
range submarine force disbanded and a number of StanFlex 300 and minelayers were phased
out in order to gain sufficient funding for the rest of the fleet to actively take part in NATO’s
Standing Naval Forces and Response Force.450
At the same time, the country committed itself
to the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. In January 2002 the Danish Parliament decided to
deploy its troops to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Its main battle
tanks, infantry units and Special Forces were heavily engaged over the course of the mission
to Helmand Province and among all contributors, the country suffered the highest percentage
of casualties.451
With its sister services suffering painful casualties fighting the insurgencies in
Afghanistan, the Royal Danish Navy has been spared such losses. It has, however, regardless
of its size been no less active in conducting joint maneuvers, providing its warships to
NATO’s joint forces, or participating in naval operations. The list of Danish deployments is
long: From Operation Desert Shield, the aforementioned Operations Sharp Guard in the
Adriatic, Operation Iraqi Freedom to the current deployments as part of the multinational
Combined Task Force 150 and 151, where the Absalon has served as the task force’s flagship.
She and her sister ship have also been part of the NATO anti-piracy operation around the
Horn of Africa, called Ocean Shield. (The Combined Task Force 151 is a multinational
operation that cooperates closely with the European Union’s Operation Atalanta and NATO’s
Operation Ocean Shield.)452
It is worth noting that Denmark has shown estimable willingness to participate in
military as well as peace-keeping operations beyond its shores. Apart from its previously
mentioned naval activities and ongoing assistance to the Afghan Government,453
the Danish
Air Force also took aggressive action in Libya in 2011. Surprisingly, the small number of
Danish F-16 combat aircraft accounted for roughly 11 percent of all sorties flown against the
Gaddafi regime. Considering that this is more than Italy, who had the Giuseppe Garibaldi
449
Danish Parliament, The Danish Defense Agreement 2005-2009, Preliminary translation, June (Copenhagen,
2004): 2. 450
Parliament, Preliminary, 7. 451
18,000 troops deployed over the course of 11 years, around 750 deployed at any given time. 43 were killed.
See “Operation Enduring Freedom,” iCasualties.org.
http://icasualties.org/oef/Nationality.aspx?hndQry=Denmark. 452
See “CTF-151: Counter-piracy,” Combined Maritime Forces, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-
counter-piracy/. 453
Denmark will provide 700 million kroner in aid annually, see “Norway Cuts Afghan Aid over Lack of
Progress on Women’s Rights,” TOLOnews, 5 October (2013).
http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12168-norway-cuts-afghan-aid-over-lack-of-progress-on-womens-
rights.
136
carrier stationed off the Libyan coast, this is quite a remarkable figure.454
The latest defense
documents published by the Danish government indicate that the nation is willing to continue
this effort, notwithstanding the significant shortage in personnel:455
“[T]he demand for Danish
military contributions will not be diminished”,456
the document makes clear. The Danish
Armed Forces, therefore, need to be able to conduct operations ranging from “armed conflict
[to] stabilization tasks and international policing.”457
The production of the newest class of
frigates, the much-discussed Iver Huitfeldt, constituted a vital step to “[enhance] the ability of
the Navy to participate in international operations, to support ground operations and to
perform tasks in the North Atlantic and the Arctic”.458
The Iver Huitfeldt multi-purpose frigate is one of the most discussed warships at the
moment. It owes this flattering instance to the heated debate that is currently revolving around
the U.S. Navy’s new frigate, also known as the littoral combat ship. Lightly armed and facing
numerous teething problems, the current production variants of the LCS (the monohull LCS-1
Freedom-class and the trimaran LCS-2 Independence-class) have fallen out of favor in U.S.
naval quarters. Despite their innovative design, which includes missions modules that are
planned to be prepositioned in order for the ships to quickly be able to adapt to new tasks in
combat theaters, the rebalancing to the Asian-Pacific region has led former Secretary of
Defense, Chuck Hagel, to curtail their production. In a recent DoD press briefing, Hagel
underscored these doubts by stating that “[r]egarding the Navy's littoral combat ship [LCS],
[he was] concerned that the Navy is relying too heavily on the LCS to achieve its long-term
goals for ship numbers. Therefore, no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go
forward”.459
Quickly, many defense analysts and armchair strategists were making the case
for the United States’ dropping the LCS altogether and preferably buying the Danish Iver
Huitfeldt instead. I do not intend to join the debate and would rather refer the reader to the
numerous articles provided in the footnote.460
454
Cernuschi, “Marina Militare,” 85. 455
Danish Parliament, Danish Defense Agreement 2010-2014 (Copenhagen, 2009): 2 & 7. 456
Ibid., 2. 457
Ibid., 3. 458
Ibid., 9. 459
Department of Defense, Remarks by Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey on the fiscal year 2015 budget
preview in the Pentagon Briefing Room, Transcript, 24 Feb. (2014).
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5377. 460
See T.X. Hammes, “Getting Our Money’s Worth: LCS VS Iver Huitfeldt-class,” War on the Rocks, 6 Aug.
(2013). http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/getting-our-moneys-worth-lcs-vs-iver-huitfeldt-class/.
Steven Wills, LCS Versus the Danish Strawman,“ CIMSEC, 19 Feb. (2015).
http://cimsec.org/lcs-versus-danish-strawman/14974.
Sam LaGrone, “Navy Asks Industry for Input for Follow-on to Littoral Combat Ship,” USNI News, 30 Apr.
(2014).
http://news.usni.org/2014/04/30/navy-asks-industry-input-follow-littoral-combat-ship.
137
The latest addition to the Navy’s fleet, however, deserves a closer look. Guy Toremans
provides an excellent chapter on the Iver Huitfeldt-class in the 2014 issue of the Seaforth
World Naval Review.461
In his opening remarks he underscores what has been stated thus far
in regard to the Danish Navy’s reorganization over the past two decades:
With the introduction of the Iver Huitfeldt class frigates , as well as the two Absalon-
class flexible support ships, the RDN has been transformed from a ‘small-ship’ navy –
focused on its adjacent waters – to a small ‘big ship’ force geared towards
expeditionary operations at range from its home bases.462
The second version of the Flexible Støtteskibe or Flexible Support Ship project
capitalized on the experiences made with the successful Absalon-class. Given the tight
defense budget the total number of ships was reduced to three instead of four and the
advantages of the StandFlex system were utilized to the extreme. The hull is somewhat
shorter than comparable ships of other European navies, such as the German Sachsen or
Dutch Zeven Provinciën-class, but therefore visibly broader. Even though as many off-the-
shelf components as possible are used to keep costs low, the frigates exhibit all aspects of a
state-of-the art warship. This includes “a comprehensive approach to signature reduction”
with the missile launchers and other weapons installed behind a flushed superstructure in
order to reduce the ship’s radar cross section.463
One of the main missions of the frigate is air
defense. The modularity of the StanFlex weapons containers has proved expedient, and thus
the Iver Huitfeldt could conceivably deploy two Mk56 VLS for ESSMs in the ‘E’ and ‘F’
positions flanking the central Mk41 VLS centrally located between the main mast and the
ships’ funnels. The latter is able to fire a total of 32 Raython Standard SM-2 Block IIIA
missiles and could also be updated to fire the SM-3 (capable of ABM defense) and
Tomahawk cruise missiles. In combination with its APAR active phased-array radar (also
AESA) search and track radar and SMART-L long-range volume search radar the ships’ air
defense capabilities can rightfully be considered among the best in the world. What is more,
the radar system can be upgraded to track ballistic missile targets as the Dutch efforts have
shown. In August 2014 the Danish Government decided to go forward with its plans to join
the NATO ABM missile shield and will invest around $70 million into modifying their
SMART-L radar. However, there are no plans to procure the SM-3 missile “the intention
461
Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 105-119. 462
Ibid., 105. 463
Ibid., 107.
138
being that missile targets will be passed to other sea or land-based interceptors for
engagement”.464
Money remains an issue within the Danish Navy, which is not surprising given the
country’s sustained defense spending of only around 1.4 percent of GDP over the last ten
years. The three Iver Huitfeldt frigates have also proved to be quite costly, despite their
relatively modest production costs. As the Danish Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Frank
Trojahn elaborates in a recent issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings, “[t]he high-end
frigates/littoral combat ships are focused on international missions [They] have been heavily
engaged [and the] operational tempo is likely to remain high”.465
This puts great strain on
both men and material. Given the declared “manpower problems”466
the ships have all been
designed to operate with a much smaller crew than their foreign counterparts. While the
German, Dutch, and Italian frigates all require between 150 and 200 able-bodied men and
women onboard, the Iver Huitfeldt was envisioned to get by with a crew of 100. Yet
Commander Fjord-Larsen has pointed to the infeasibility of such lean ‘manning’. “The high
level of specialization has potential problems because there is less slack available in the
complement if someone goes sick or on leave. Personally, I think that we are at the lower end
of the manning limit.”467
Lt. Commander Kenneth Jensen, deployed on the third unit of the
class, the Niels Jung, acknowledges that the number was somewhat overoptimistic. (The case
with the American LCS is similar). According to him, 17 more crew members are being hired
in order to effectively operate the vessels.468
Given the Armed Forces’ manpower shortages,
“the RDN may […] face [increasing] manpower issue […] because the current Danish
defense agreement does not currently provide the resources needed for three full crews.”
Toremans concludes.469
More signs of the austere financial environment can be made out when one takes a
closer look at the current fitting of the ships. The two 76mm guns in the ‘A’ and ‘B’ positions
are an interim solution until funds for the intended 127mm/62 cal Mk 45 gun and Oerlikon
CIWS are found. The Mk41 VLS is not yet armed, as the Navy is waiting for the procurement
464
See Footnotes Friedman, “Missile Defense,” 191.
The discussion concerning the possible expansion of the Navy’s air defense capability can be found as early as
2007. Both SM-3 and SM-6 missiles were proposed in Joris Janssen Lok’s article; neither have been procured
though. See Joris Jansen Lok, “Danish Decision,” Defense Technology International, April (2007), 17. 465
Frank Trojahn, “The Commanders Response: Royal Danish Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings, March
(2015). http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/commanders-respond-royal-danish-navy. 466
Parliament, Danish Defense, 14. 467
Quoted in Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 115. 468
Christopher Cavas, “Aboard Danish Frigate, Clean Lines and Room to Grow,” Defense News, 17 Nov.
(2014), 11. 469
Toremans, “Huitfeldt,” 115.
139
of the Standard SM-2 missiles from the United States, while the two Mk52 VLS have neither
been bought nor installed; and finally, the CIWS on top of the helicopter hangar is in fact a
dummy.470
The ship’s potential is unquestioned. However, both the incremental fitting of new
combat systems and continuous deployment will heavily burden the crews as well as the
defense budget.
The Royal Danish Navy has made great strides since the days of President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev. Over the last twenty-five years, the Odense Steel Shipyard has
spearheaded the art of constructing multi-purpose warships that can quickly and easily be
reconfigured to conduct different tasks. From the Navy’s small Thetis patrol boats to its large
frigates, the StanFlex module fittings can accommodate anything from hydraulic cranes and
towed sonar systems to rapid-fire guns and ESSM SAM launchers. What is more, the Danish
Navy, despite its small size, has taken part in numerous multinational operations for over two
decades, not least as an active participant in anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations in the
Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. The fleet’s capable surface combatants also contribute to
NATO’s standing naval and mine-countermeasure forces.
Unfortunately, the fiscal realities over the last decades have ruled out the possibility of
entertaining a balanced fleet. With the defense budget steadily decreasing throughout the
1990s and subsequently hovering at around the 1.4 percent mark, the Danish Armed Forces
did what they could to modernize their fleet. A deliberate decision was made, namely to phase
out the fleet’s numerous smaller combatants as well as its submarines and instead to build
large multipurpose warships. As a result the Danish fleet has been able to drastically increase
its power-projection, amphibious warfare, as well as air defense capabilities. Questions,
however, remain as to its ability to deploy these platforms in an increasingly contentious
maritime environment. The melting of the polar caps will create profound geostrategic ripples
which are likely to be felt in Copenhagen as well as in Amsterdam and Washington D.C. The
possibility of a North East Passage opening up for commercial shipping is both exciting and
vexing news for Europe’s northern states. With Denmark’s industry heavily invested in
commercial shipping – just barely maintaining their lead in this very competitive market –
and the expansive EEZ around Greenland and the Faroer Islands demanding vigilance, it will
have to be seen if Denmark’s small navy can protect the country’s national interests, when
push comes to shove.
470
Cavas, “Frigate,” 11.
140
10.2) The Netherlands
When the struggle between the Warsaw Pact and NATO drew to a close in the early
1990s, the Royal Dutch Navy had rightfully earned its place among the world’s most
powerful navies. Its large fleet had been a force to reckon with in both sides contingency
planning and had provided the Western allies with important sea-control capabilities. It is no
wonder that in his authoritative almanac, The Naval Guide to the Combat Fleets of the World,
Bernard Prézelin mentions the Dutch Navy in the same breath as the U.S., Soviet, Japanese,
Italian, and Chinese navy.471
Designed to defend the critical strategic lines of communication in the North Sea and
through the English Channel, the Dutch Navy fashioned a large fleet of capable warship. In
1990, five domestically designed diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) were in service with the
production of a follow-on class of four state-of-the-art boats underway. Two large guided-
missile destroyers (the Tromp and De Ruyter), easily recognizable by their large dome-
construction housing the SPS-01 3D radar, armed with both Sea Sparrow and Standard SM-1
MR missiles had served in the air defense role and as the fleet’s flagship since the mid 1970s.
Two of the ten Kortenaer-class frigates had been sold to Greece in the early 1980s and were
replaced by a modified version of the design which brought additional air defense capabilities
to the table.472
A large class of minehunters was put into service throughout the 1980s and
added significant capabilities to the already respectable MCM flotilla. Two large
replenishment ships provided necessary fuel and supplies to the fleet conducting operations
on the high seas. However, amphibious and littoral warfare capabilities were limited due to
the geographical and strategic realities of the Cold War security environment. On the other
hand, the Royal Dutch Navy operated a total of 13 P-3C Orion anti-submarine and maritime
surveillance aircraft, and 22 WG-13 LYNX helicopters,473
thereby providing the Navy with a
highly capable aviation element.
Like most NATO allies, the Dutch Navy relied heavily on American weapon systems,
in particular for AAW and ASW. However, the domestic defense industry had established
itself as one of Europe’s leaders in the field of electronics and sensor technology in the later
years of the Cold War. Over the course of time the Hollandse Signaal Apparaaten, or simply
Signaal, established itself as a powerhouse in the design and manufacturing of combat
systems and radars. Among others, the APAR and SMART-L radars already discussed, as
471
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, xvi. 472
Ibid., 377-391. 473
Ibid., 375.
141
well as other highly successful systems, were developed by what is now known as Thales
Naval Nederland.474
The Netherlands were also able to maintain the capability of constructing
very large vessels in its shipyards at Vlissingen, Rotterdam and Amsterdam and have
cooperated closely with other European states to build very fine warships. The trilateral
frigate project between Holland, Germany and Spain is but one example. It is therefore safe to
say that the ships built for the Royal Dutch Navy have no need to shun comparison with the
best warships on the market.
Without wanting to sound boringly repetitive, a big BUT has to follow the
aforementioned remarks. The Netherlands have a substantial industrial base, able to build and
fit out modern warships, but the general reluctance of its political leadership to invest in its
armed forces has, over time, substantially eroded the Navy’s capabilities. To exemplify this
supposition, a brief analysis of the procurement policy over the last two decades is necessary.
Though one runs the risk of confusing the procurement process of the Danish and
Dutch naval forces since the end of the Cold War given the similar numbers, there are some
considerable differences between the two states. Interestingly, the Danish long-term
procurement plan in 1999/2000 recommended the decommissioning of 17 ships and
replacement by six (ultimately 5) new multi-purpose ‘frigates’ by 2011.475
In the same period
of time, the Dutch Navy took 17 frigates from service adding only four! new escort vessels to
the fleet.476
The main difference in the outcome of this process is that while the Danish Navy
nevertheless has been able to expand its naval capabilities in some important areas (owing to
the obsolescence of its older warships), no such testament can be made for the Dutch fleet. As
Conrad Waters laments, “Once one of the more significant European maritime forces, the Royal
Netherlands Navy has been progressively reduced in size and stature since the end of the Cold War
until it barely ranks amongst Europe’s second-tier fleet.”477
This remarkable decline can, for the most part, be ascribed to the austere financial
environment during the decade following the Soviet dissolution in which the defense budget
plummeted from 2.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP as Figure 17 shows. At the same time, the
Royal Danish Navy was heavily invested in replacing its submarine and surface fleet. Four
new Walrus-class submarines and eight Karel Doorman, or ‘M’-class frigates entered service
between 1990 and 1998.478
In addition, the Rotterdam amphibious transport ship (a joint
474
An interesting article from the President of Thales Nederland can be found in: Arno Peels, “New Thinking in
Netherlands Defense,” Military Technology, Vol. 25, 12 (2001): 93-96. 475
Harboe-Hansen, “Modernisation,” 93. 476
Waters, “Europe 2010,” 98. 477
Ibid. 478
The Karel Doorman-class is described in more detail in Chant, Kriegsschiffe, 79.
142
project between Spain’s E.N. Bazán and Netherlands’ Royal Schelde) was commissioned in
1998 and provided the Navy with the ability to deploy a battalion of marines from a single
ship.479
(It goes without saying that the financial investments during that time were
substantial.) Such capabilities, as has been pointed out, also allow naval forces to participate
in multinational peacekeeping operations, as well as to project military power over great
distances. Accordingly, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Vice
Admiral Luuk Kroon identified such tasks as the primary function of the Armed forces:
In order to fulfill these primary tasks [of crisis management as well as national and
allied territorial defense] the Dutch armed force will be capable of: Maintaining a
capacity for simultaneous participation in a maximum of four peacekeeping operations
under the aegis of the United Nations or the OSCE. In either case the contribution will
have the size of a battalion, or equivalent; [as well as maintaining] rapidly deployable
assets in peacetime for the protection of the NATO treaty area and for adequate
contribution to peace-enforcing operations.480
Admiral Kroon also stressed that although the new security environment the Navy found itself
in “has its impact on the RNLN, the structure of the Navy [would] be unaffected.”481
Almost
twenty years on, his predictions have long been forgotten in Dutch naval quarters.
Initially however, only small reductions in the fleet’s size were made while the
organizational structure was rearranged, shedding some unnecessary ballast in the process.
Furthermore, a somewhat more upbeat financial development at the end of the 1990s provided
the Armed Forces with an additional NLG 50 million (around €20 million) in funding.482
The
two Tromp-class destroyers and four Kortenaer frigates were scheduled for withdrawal and, at
the same time, the four new De Zeven Provinciën air defense frigates were laid down while
further modernization to the fleet’s ageing ships and aircraft seemed to be secured. The
acquisition of a second LPD as well as the procurement of the new NH-90 helicopter by 2007
was also put forward in the Dutch Defense White Paper in 2000.483
However, in hindsight, the
principle goals of the white paper, namely to increase the Armed Forces’ combat readiness
and ability to sustain power projection operations over longer periods of time, were probably
479
Two units of these ships were ordered by the Spanish Government as the Galicia-class. Up to 611 marines
and their equipment can be embarked. See: Ibid., 88. 480
Luuk Kroon, “Roles, Missions and Force Structure of the Royal Netherlands Navy,” Naval Forces, Special
Issue (1996): 4. 481
Ibid., 6. 482
Ministry of Defence, Summary of the Defence White Paper 2000 (The Hague, 2000). 1. 483
Ibid., 18.
143
Illustration 24: The backbone of the future Royal Netherlands Navy: The large Holland-class offshore patrol vessel, the Karel Doorman multi-purpose support ship and, the Zeven Provinciën frigate from left to right. Despite these additions the Dutch Navy will be relatively less capable than two decades ago.
overly optimistic and could only be met to a limited degree under the given fiscal restriction
and political myopia.484
Marcial Hernandez of the American Enterprise Institute provides some insight into the
momentous decline of the Netherlands’ Armed Forces throughout the last decade.
[W]ith the exception of the bump in the Dutch base defense budget in 2001, the
increase in defense expenditures has largely gone to Dutch operations needs connected
with the Netherlands’ deployment to Afghanistan. With the base defense budget […]
remaining essentially flat until [2014] and with the government’s [recent decision] to
cut planned defense spending substantially, the result is a Dutch military that falls well
short of the 2000 white paper’s goals.485
A brief glance at the military force structure is telling. In 1990 the Dutch Army had
468 Leopard 1 and 445 Leopard 2 main battle tanks. Now the army has nil – having sold its
remaining units to Finland in 2014.486
The air force has lost more than half of its F-16 fighters
484
NMoD, Paper 2000, 1-24. 485
Marcial Hernandez, “Dutch Hard Power: Choosing Decline,” American Enterprise Institute, 3 April, (2013):
np. http://www.aei.org/publication/dutch-hard-power-choosing-decline/. 486
Bonsignore, “Finland,” Military Technology. The World Defense Almanac 1990, Issue 1 (1990): 116-117.
“Finland is Buying Dutch Leopards for €200 Million,” DefenseUpdate, 19 January, 2014.
http://defense-update.com/20140119_finland_buys_dutch_leopards.html#.VQSkpuFY5ew.
144
and the Navy was stripped of all its P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. Last but not least, the
Navy’s escort fleet has been reduced from 15 frigates and destroyers to a total of merely six
ships.487
This process has been accompanied by a reduction of the active-duty force from
103,000 to 53,300 by 2014. Alone since 2011 over 12,000 jobs have been cut. That such
measures will have long-term effects on the Netherlands’ military capabilities should be
evident even to the most casual observer.
Before we dismiss the Netherlands’ naval capabilities outright, let us take a look at the
latest additions to the Navy over the last decade. Firstly, the decommissioning of all but two
Karel Doorman-class frigates (two were sold to Belgium with which the Netherlands have a
joint defense agreement488
) left a large gap in the Navy’s escort fleet. This gap has partly been
filled by introducing De Zeven Provinciën-class air defense frigates, formally known as the
LCF (Luchtverdedigings en Commando Fregat). The trilateral cooperation between Spain (F-
100), Germany (F-124) and the Netherlands (LCF) has been discussed at length. The ships’
capabilities are largely on par with the two foreign designs and can be considered among the
best frigates in service today. In contrast to the Spanish Álvaro-de Bazán-class, which uses the
Aegis combat system, the Dutch ships rely on the SEWACO IX combat system as well as the
APAR and SMART-L radars, all built by Thales. The above-mentioned upgrades to the long-
range radar in order to track (and engage) ballistic missiles are underway and scheduled to be
completed by 2017.489
Akin to the decisions of Germany, Spain and Denmark, the Dutch
government has not shown any intention to buy the Standard SM-3 missile, rather relying on
U.S. ABM-capable ships in the region. These four ships, however, represent the only possible
high-tier alternative to the Navy’s air defense destroyers.
Secondly, based on “NATO’s perspective of naval operations and […] on the views of
[the Netherlands’] main Allies [the U.S., U.K., and Belgium]”490
the Royal Dutch Navy
continued to enhance its amphibious capabilities in order to deploy brigade-sized elements in
high-intensity operations.491
The 28,000 ton Karel Doorman is arguably the most obvious
result of this effort. Fighting an uphill battle against unabated defense cuts during the height
487
Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” n.p. 488
The defense agreement was established in July 1994 between the two states. The Belgian naval staff is
integrated with the Dutch staff at Den Helder (NL). Although a commemorable effort among two European
neighbors, the crux, despite a closer cooperation, remains that ultimately “command of each nation’s ships,
however, remains with their respective national government. Each government reserves the right to deploy their
ships independently, for instance for operations in former colonies. Dutch warships remain homeported in
Zeebrugge and den Helder, respectively and the Belgian Navy will keep a command centre in Zeebrugge for its
own national tasks.” See Guy A. H. Toremans, “Belgian-Dutch Naval Cooperation,” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 6
(1994): 18-24. 489
Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 475-476 490
Ministry of Defence, Netherlands Defence Doctrine (The Hague: Defense Staff, 2005): 6. 491
Ibid., 39, Footnote 25.
145
of the European economic crisis, the completion of the Karel Doorman was under question as
Waters points out: “[A]dditional reductions in defense spending revealed in September 2013
[threatened] to see the new JSS joint support ship […] sold before she had even entered into
service.”492
Fortunately this pending decision was revoked and she formally entered service in
2014, adding power projection and HADR capabilities to the Dutch fleet.
The third, high profile acquisition was the four Holland-class patrol vessels
commissioned between 2011 and 2013. At a total displacement of 3,750 tons, these ships
exhibit characteristic features of the current trend towards larger and more sophisticated
offshore patrol vessels. Though being lightly armed, these new OPVs are well-suited for their
respective mission environment. In fact, designed for low-intensity operations, they constitute
the “workhorse of the maritime security mission.”493
With no need for expensive long-range
weapon systems and powerful propulsion for sustained high speeds, they are far cheaper to
build. Moreover, the systems onboard the latest OPV’s, such as the Holland-class, are
specifically designed to conduct anti-terrorism, anti-piracy and other constabulary tasks on the
high seas.494
Deploying an exorbitantly expensive air defense destroyer to stop and search a
rogue motorboat in the Gulf of Aden, despite being common practice, does not represent the
most efficient way of doing things. Therefore, the new patrol boats offer the Royal Dutch
Navy much needed capabilities in low-threat environments. Conversely however, they do not
qualify as ‘first-rate’ warships. Therefore, they also cannot provide the necessary deterrent
and operational advantages a ship of similar size but heavier armament, such as former
frigates (Karel Doorman) could.495
Considering the Netherlands’ self-imposed liabilities and
the country’s continued effort to play an active role in multinational operations across the
intensity spectrum, the decision to reduce the escort fleet to only six frigates can rightfully be
viewed with reservation.
Since 1990, the size and capability of the Royal Dutch Navy has decreased
substantially. While a similar development can be observed in nearly all other Western navies,
over the last two decades successive Dutch governments have failed to successfully adapt to
the post-Cold War security environment. As of now, the Dutch military and its naval branch
are both smaller and less well-balanced than their equivalent twenty-five years ago.496
Despite
492
Waters, “Europe 2015,” 70. 493
Joris Janssen Lok, “On the Beat: Robust Ocean Patrol Vessels Maintain Law and Order on the Seas,” Defense
Technology International, Nov. (2007): 33-39. 494
Operational environment include the North Sea, Atlantic, Caribbean and waters near their former colonies. 495
See Wertheim, Combat Fleets, 476. 496
This was predicted by a RAND study conducted in 2012. See Larrabee, Austerity, 52.
146
efforts to cooperate more closely with other NATO allies and to restructure its naval forces
and military administration, these measures were not sufficient to outweigh the negative
effects the fiscal restraints have had on the Armed Forces. This is not to say that the
Netherlands should return to their former war footing, given the general security the country
enjoys. “Obviously, no one expects the Netherlands to sustain a military the size and character
of the one it had during the height of the Cold War”,497
Marcial Hernandez makes clear.
However, a country with the fourth highest GDP per capita in Europe,498
which spends more
than 50 percent of its budget on health care and social services,499
it can be argued, should be
expected to allocate a little more than 1.4 percent to its national defense. However, according
to a poll from 2012 a mere 8 percent of the Dutch population considers an increase in defense
spending necessary.500
That the Netherlands are inevitably dependent on the security of the global SLOCs in
order to maintain their wealth was pointed out at the beginning of the chapter but does not
seem to strike a chord with the Dutch people and their leaders. More than in other states, the
prosperity of Dutch citizens depends on the unimpeded flow of commerce to and from its
ports. A slight hiatus in the global supply chain could possibly have detrimental effects on a
country that is so dependent on the sea. However, making a case for increasing the navy’s
capabilities in order to better protect the nation’s interests at sea would be an honorable yet
futile effort in any election campaign.
497
Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” np. 498
Only Luxemburg, Norway and Switzerland, have a higher per capita GDP. 499
Hernandez, “Dutch Power,” np 500
Ibid.
147
11) FINLAND, SWEDEN, NORWAY: Scandinavian Navies Sticking to their
Guns
Figure 19
Figure 20
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2
% o
f G
DP
1990-2013, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 19 Finland: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
% o
f G
DP
1990-2013, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 20 Sweden: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
148
Figure 21
Figure 22
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatants 0 0 5
Submarines 12 9 5
Assault/Amphibious 0 0 0
0 2 4 6 8
10 12 14
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 21 Sweden: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
% o
f G
DP
1990-2013, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 22 Norway: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
149
Figure 23
The three Scandinavian countries described in this chapter provide a good example of
how smaller European navies have successfully adapted to the changes in the global security
environment since the end of the Cold War. Although the graphs above indicate a steady
decrease in the countries’ defense budgets, the navies of Norway, Sweden and, to a somewhat
lesser extent, Finland are far more capable than twenty-five years ago. Unlike some of their
European partners, the governments in Oslo, Stockholm, and Helsinki have not succumbed to
the general fallacy that the end of the Cold War has heralded an age of reduced threats and
hence reduced needs. On the contrary, the political and military leaders of the three countries
have made wise choices in the recent past in how to best modernize their fleets under the
current fiscal conditions. Defense cooperation has been stressed at least to the same extent as
the development of leap-ahead technologies. As a result, Finland maintains a relatively small
flotilla of fast-attack craft and minehunters, sufficient in size to provide a respectable degree
of defensive capabilities, while the navies of Norway and Sweden unquestionably rank among
the most powerful and innovative small navies in the world.
A major reason not to include Denmark in this chapter, but rather to draw comparisons
between the Dutch and Danish navies, is founded in each state’s underlying strategic doctrine.
As has been repeatedly pointed out, many European navies underwent a fundamental strategic
reorientation after the close of the Cold War. The principle of sea-control, so it seemed, was
slowly being replaced by the idea of expeditionary operations in the littorals of distant regions
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatants 5 5 11
Submarines 11 10 6
Assault/Amphibious 0 0 0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 23 Norway: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
150
of crisis. Both Denmark and the Netherlands made what they believed were necessary
adjustments to their defense policies and built large (and expensive) warships capable of
conducting amphibious operations, but consequently had to cede other capabilities in return.
None of the other Scandinavian states pursued such a course in the aftermath of the Soviet
breakup. Geographic realities, arguably, trumped the idea of expeditionary peace-keeping in
distant regions of the world; a concept which, in fact, has already been called into question as
of late.
11.1) Finland
Finland has one of the smallest naval forces of all the European states who have access
to the ocean. One reason for this is that Finland is it demographics. Much of its territory is
covered by lakes and its geographic location between the 60th
and 70th
latitudes has
encouraged most of the 5.5 million inhabitants to live in the southern municipalities. Finland’s
economy is heavily dependent on its wood industry and its electronics and machinery sector.
However, the country is only ranked 41 in the world in total GDP and creates 250 billion less
per year than Norway and roughly 300 billion less than Sweden.501
What is more, up until 1990, the size of the Finnish navy was subject to the provisions
of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Its fleet was limited to a total displacement of 10,000 tons
and was banned from operating submarines and torpedo boats.502
Given its strategy of
territorial defense503
no drastic changes were made to the fleet structure after the end of the
Cold War. As a non-aligned state it maintained a military force of both western and eastern
equipment. Manfred Sadlowski makes a point in stating “[w]hat is different in Finland from
other countries [is] the fact that Finland […] is a bridge between Eastern, Northern and
Western Europe.”504
In accordance with its political stance and its defense-oriented strategy, the Finnish
Navy largely operated small corvettes, guided missile patrol boats and mine warfare vessels in
the shallow waters of the Baltic Sea. Four of these small attack craft were the 250 ton
501
“List of countries by GDP nominal,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29. 502
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 129-130.
Also see Corporal Frisk, “Where are the Finnish Submarines?” Corporal Frisk Wordpress, 3 January, 2015.
https://corporalfrisk.wordpress.com/2015/01/03/where-are-the-finnish-submarines/. 503
As stated by the Finnish Minster of Defense. See Anneli Taina “National Defence Vitally Important to
Finland,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 3 504
Manfred Sadlowski “What is different from Finland,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence In
Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 2.
151
Helsinki-class boats built during the 1980s which were armed with highly potent, RBS-15
long-range anti-ship missiles from Saab Bofors Sweden. Interestingly, the four Soviet-design
Osa II-class, attack craft were armed with the famous Styx anti-ship missile providing a nice
comparison between the capabilities of the early era Soviet anti-ship missile and the state-of-
the-art Swedish design.
Throughout the 1990s, the Finnish government strengthened its cooperation with
many of its neighbors. “For obvious geographic and historical reasons, one of our special
goals is to promote the development and expansion of Nordic cooperation […] in defence
material”, Eero Lavonon stated.505
Finnish maritime forces also participated in joint exercises
with NATO forces and the Russian Navy, while its army contributed to U.N. peacekeeping
missions, for example in the Golan Heights.
By the turn of the millennium the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced that
“[e]quipment procurement in the Navy [would] focus on replacing essential vessels and
improving the mobility of coastal defence.”506
Four stealth Rauma 2000 patrol craft were
added to the fleet while the recent additions to the Navy, such as the Hämeenmaa-class
minelayers and Helsinki II-class attack craft were steadily upgraded. With Europe enjoying a
period of peace increased cooperation with the Russian Federation, the MoD saw little need in
making adjustments to its defense posture. As a non-aligned state, Finland did not participate
in many recent U.S.-led combat operations,507
nor was the country affected by the growing
instability surrounding the Mediterranean, although a growing number of fugitives have been
seeking refuge in Scandinavian countries. Strategic territorial defense remained a valid
concept as the 2004 Defense White Paper underscores: “The Navy must be able to compile
and maintain a recognized maritime picture, conduct surveillance of territorial integrity, repel
any violations of territorial integrity, protect sea lines of communication and repel attacks
from the sea in cooperation with the other services.”508
More recent events, however, have caused alarm among the Finnish government and
military brass. Russia’s incursion into Georgia in 2009 can be considered a turning point in
the hitherto quite amicable relationship between the European states and Russia. Finland’s
505
Eero Lavonen, “Finland’s International Cooperation For Defence Material,” Military Technology: Special
Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 6. 506
“Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001: Report by the Government to Parliament.” 13 June (2001): 50. 507
Finland did send around 100 peacekeepers to Afghanistan. See “Finland’s participation in NATO-led crisis
management operations,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=115832&contentlan=2&culture=en-US. 508
Prime Minister’s Office. Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004: Government Report 6/2004, (Prime
Minister’s Office Publications, 2004): 112.
152
strained history and its long border with the Russian juggernaut provided sufficient reason for
Finland to reevaluate its national defense policy.
When it comes to Finland’s security environment, the most important questions relate
to Russia’s political and economic stability and to the evolution of its international
relations. Russia has political, economic and military interests in our neighbouring
areas. Russia’s most stable neighbouring areas border on Finland and other countries
in Northern Europe. Still, the possibility of change in the security situation of our
neighbouring areas cannot be excluded, nor can the possibility of armed aggression or
the threat thereof. During the Georgia crisis Russia demonstrated that it is willing and
able to use military force in defending its interests. The crisis may have created long-
term tensions in Europe, further complicating security cooperation. The crisis in
Georgia also demonstrated that events even far from us can impinge on the EU-Russia
relationship and thereby also affect Finland [emphasis in the original].509
With Russia showing aggressive irredentism – annexing Crimea and supporting the
secessionist movement in Ukraine – it is likely that Finland will be encouraged to strengthen
its ties with the West. Already now its close defense cooperation with Norway, Sweden,
Denmark and the Baltic states (all apart from Sweden are NATO members and, save Norway,
all are part of the E.U.) has secured numerous defense arrangements with the respective
countries and institutions. “For example, Finland gains access to strategic airlift capabilities
through a collaborative arrangement that encompasses ten NATO nations, Sweden and
Finland.”510
Moreover, Finland has also pledged to support the European Rapid Reaction
Force as part of the “mutual assistance obligation and the solidarity clause.”511
In comparison
to other European armed forces, so far Finland, however, has for the most part only been able
to deploy its Army for “crisis management operations.”512
In the future, the capability of her
sister services, the Navy and the Air Force, will have to be expanded, in order to satisfy the
need of power projection by air and sea.513
In general, the future for the Finnish Armed Forces looks quite promising. Close
cooperation with its larger European partners will compensate for some of the shortcomings
the country’s military, in particular its navy suffer from. Moreover, there are tentative plans to
expand naval capabilities by building a class of larger surface combatants. This seems to be a
509
PMO. Defense 2009, 66-67. 510
Ibid., 113.
A more general description of the collaboration can be found in NATO, “NATO’s relations with Finland,”
March 4, 2015.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm. 511
PMO, Defense 2009, 109. 512
Ibid., 113. 513
Ibid.
153
Illustration 25: Almost surreal looking, the Visby-class provides the Swedish Navy with increased brown and blue-water capabilities.
wise decision, considering Finland’s exposed geographic position and the need to entertain
capable armed forces in order to provide credible deterrence. Unfortunately, the continuation
of a relatively low level of defense spending would likely cut short any effort to create a more
robust Finnish Navy in the near future.
11.2) Sweden
In October of 2014, a number
of eye-witnesses reported
suspicious underwater activity
near the Stockholm
archipelago. In the days that
followed the Swedish military
conducted one of the largest
submarine hunts since the end
of the Cold War. To date, the
identity of what was believed
to be a small submarine
remains a mystery. This incident, however, came at a time of increased tensions between
Europe and Russia due to the forceful annexation of Crimea and Russian support to the
separatists in eastern Ukraine. Western media was quick to point to Russia’s aggressive naval
buildup as the logical source of the incursion. Be it as it may, the incident provided the
Swedish Armed Forces with an opportunity to display its credible naval capabilities.
For over three decades, the Royal Swedish Navy has gone to great lengths to build and
maintain a small but highly capable fleet. Similar to Finland, Sweden cannot look to any allies
for help in case of war514
but has to be able to defend its territory and people on its own. As a
result, the country’s national defense strategy has relied on the same strategic principle as its
514
Armed neutrality has a long history in Sweden. In particular during the Cold War, the Swedish government
made a case to portray itself as a beacon of peace between the two blocks. However, secretly political
reassurances were made with NATO for the case of war. “[I]n Sweden’s case, the official interpretation of the
Cold War is not the whole story. Official armed neutrality was complemented by secret bilateral cooperation
with the United States and select NATO countries that guaranteed Western support in case of a war with the
Soviet Union. That duality worked for a long time, and Sweden’s political elites has been comfortable seeking
security through informal bilateral ties to the United States and other European countries, rather than through
official membership in NATO.”
Jan Joel Andersson, “Nordic NATO. Why It’s Time for Finland and Sweden to Join the Alliance,” Foreign
Affairs, April 30, 2012.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141377/jan-joel-andersson/nordic-nato.
154
neighbors to the east and west; namely territorial defense. The Navy’s job over the larger part
of the Cold War had been to defend the country from aggression from the sea. For that
purpose the fleet was conceived as a sea denial force. Even after the end of this monumental
conflict, the Navy remained focused on protecting Sweden from invasion. While other
European nations were quickly lulled to sleep by the ostensible economic benefits of the
peace-dividend, the Swedes remained vigilant. This attitude is reflected in the remarks of Vice
Admiral Peter Nordbeck in an interview from 1996. Although the Chief of the Swedish Navy
pointed out that, at the time, there was no direct threat to Swedish sovereignty, caution was
well advised:
The fact remains […] that Europe is still resolving many areas of conflict and that all
nations do indeed value military strength to support their international security
politics. Therefore we cannot, within the foreseeable future, neglect the risks of war
and that Sweden could be subject to an armed aggression. [The] main task for the
Swedish Armed Forces is to demonstrate such a wartime operations capability that it
deters an aggressor from planning or executing any armed attack against our
country.515
With these directives in mind, the Swedish Navy was designed to “[1] deny the aggressor
secure sea lines of communication to Sweden; [2] establish full control over [Swedish]
territorial waters; and [3] defend [Swedish] ports and naval bases.”516
To understand the evolution of the Swedish naval forces we have to go further back in
time, to another fateful naval incident that occurred in October 1981. Hans Harboe-Hansen
observes, “Seldom has a single peacetime event had such profound an impact on the
development of a navy”.517
Supposedly having lost its ability to navigate, the Soviet S-363
Whiskey-class submarine ran aground only ten kilometers from a Swedish naval base. To
many, the ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’ incident provided evidence that the Soviet Union was
regularly conducting illegal intrusions into Swedish territorial waters. As a result, a vigorous
effort was made to modernize the Swedish fleet. In particular, the Navy’s anti-submarine
warfare capabilities were to be enhanced and also a more balanced approach towards ASuW
and MCM capabilities was conceived. New submarines and larger corvettes were to
515
Admiral Peter Nordbeck interviewed by Naval Forces, “Preparing the Navy For the Next Century,” Naval
Forces Special Issue: The Royal Swedish Navy – Today and Tomorrow 2 (1996): 5. 516
Ibid. 517
Hans Harboe-Hansen, “Swedish Naval Trends and Programmes,” Military Technology, Vol. 17, 12 (1993):
20.
155
Illustration 26: Territorial defense has been a principal part of Norway, Sweden, and Finland’s strategic planning during larger parts of the Cold War. Coastal guns, such as this one near Stockholm, are a reminder of this doctrine.
complement sophisticated sea denial network composed of underwater acoustic sensors,
minefield, and coastal artillery.518
By 1990 the Swedish Navy
had evolved into an effective
fighting force, operating within
the confined waters of the Baltic
Sea and adjacent North Sea. Its
domestically produced submarine
fleet consisted of four new
Västergötland-class, three
Näcken-class, and five older, but
still capable, Sjöormen-class
submarines. Pioneering the
concept of air independent
propulsion, the Kockums
shipbuilder in Malmö installed an additional Stirling closed-cycle diesel engine into a six-
meter hull extension onboard the Näcken. This not only enabled the boat to carry out
operations at much lower acoustic levels, but increased the time it could stay submerged to
almost two weeks.519
The surface fleet consisted of nearly three dozen fast-attack craft, armed with
torpedoes, Saab RBS-15 SSMs, the Norwegian Penguin Mk2 SSM, as well as 57mm Bofors
guns. The RBS-15 was a fire and forget weapon and therefore no large ship-borne target
illuminators had to be installed. Moreover, the Navy was designed to operate under the
umbrella of the Swedish Air Force; hence anti-aircraft weapon systems (apart from the Bofors
gun which could also be used against aerial threats)520
were also considered superfluous. As a
result warships could be rather small in size and because the Navy was designed to operate
close to Sweden’s coast, none of the ships needed a powerful propulsion system for high
speed transitions over long distances.
Worth noting is Sweden’s maritime intelligence gathering effort. Few navies,
especially not small ones, are willing to invest their money in ships specifically designed to
518
For more information see Harboe-Hansen, “Trends,” 20-24.
Also see Torbjörn Hultman, “Reforming the Swedish Navy,” Military Technology: Special Supplement: Defence
Procurement in Sweden – FMV: The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, (1993): 62-71. 519
Chris Bishop (ed.), The Encyclopedia of World Sea Power. A comprehensive Encyclopedia of the World’s
Navies and their Warships (London: Guild Publishing, 1988): 52. 520
Explained in more detail in Bishop, Encyclopedia, 239.
156
conduct intelligence operations, i.e. collecting signal intelligence. In most cases regular naval
vessels are assigned with such duties. Submarines, for example, lend themselves particularly
well for conducting intelligence operations, as they can operate almost unimpeded and gain
vital information regarding the enemy’s strength, movement and intent. In some cases
submarines were also used to tap or cut underwater communication cables.521
However, it
goes without saying that despite their cost, specialized vessels will be more effective in
conducting these tasks. Thereby, the Orion intelligence gathering ship is one of very few such
vessels in service among European navies.
Based on the experiences gained with the Sterling propulsion in the Näcken, three AIP
Gotland-class submarines were delivered to the Royal Swedish Navy in the later 1990s,
underpinning the already renowned underwater capabilities. In his interview Admiral
Nordbeck expands on the new class’ capabilities:
[T]he greatest threat against conventional submarines occur when they are forced to
snort when charging their batteries. With the Gotland class we are receiving the first
non-experimental AIP conventional submarine in the world. In combination with the
diesel-electric machinery we are doubling the operational time at sea. [However this]
is no reason to reduce the total […] number of submarines […].522
The second major procurement project underway in the early years of the new
millennium was the YS2000 corvette. This radically different type of surface combatant can
rightfully be described as a leap-ahead naval ship design. Already preliminary drawings of the
ship hinted at the uncompromising application of state-of-the-art technology. Unlike the ships
she would replace, the YS2000 would break new ground in nearly all areas of naval
shipbuilding. Signature reduction across the entire spectrum lies at the heart of the corvette’s
clean but sharp lines. Water jets, powered by a combined diesel or gas (CODOG) propulsion
system, enables the ship to reach sprint speeds of up to 35 knots while long-duration missions
are also possible at lower speeds. Substantial automation has also reduced the size of the
crew. This is an important factor on a ship that displaced no more than 650 tons fully loaded.
Despite the relative scarcity of space, “[t]he living conditions and accommodation provided
for the complement of six officers, twenty petty officers and seventeen ratings is excellent”523
,
Toremans points out. “This is partly a reflection of the specialist nature of the crew,” he goes
on, “who have to maintain high standards of efficiency and flexibility to operate and
521
Parry, Highway, 47. 522
Nordbeck, “Next Century,” 5-6. 523
Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships: Sweden’s Visby Class Corvettes: Stealth at All Levels,” in Seaforth
World Naval Review 2012, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2011): 161.
157
understand multi-task software and to handle extremely complicated instruments and
sensors.”524
The sensor and weapon suit of each vessel is impressive to say the least. Most systems
on board are of Swedish design. The ship’s Sea Giraffe radar, for example, is built by Saab
Systems, as well as the CEROS 200 fire-control director (also by Saab) which is necessary to
direct the Bofors 57mm/70 Mk3 cannon. The gun is mounted in a stealth turret in order to
minimize the ship’s radar cross section. Additional AAW capabilities have been tentatively
planned for the future. However, for the moment, the reported price tag of $150 million for
five South African Umkhonto SAM systems seems too high for the MoD to proceed with the
purchase.525
Significant air defense capabilities will be necessary once the Visby-class ships
increase their deployments further away from home. With the proliferation of advanced sea
skimming anti-ship missiles in many regions of the world, “[s]uch a capability is an essential
requirement for the Royal Swedish Navy if it is to participate in international naval
activities.”526
The main reason to include the Visby-class in the graph above (although it cannot be
classified as a ‘large surface combatant’ per se) is founded on the ship’s ability to effectively
operate in littoral waters, as well as on the open seas, as Commander Erik Uhren remarks:
“[The latest improvement, which include a sonar system and landing system for Lynx
helicopter] are intended to allow the corvettes to participate in EU and NATO task groups on
‘out-of-area’ operations and exercises.”527
Its modular design enables it to quickly adapt to
any new threat that might arise and will give these multi-purpose surface combatants
sufficient room to grow in the future.
As we have heard, cooperation between Sweden and its neighbor has grown
significantly over the last two decades. As mentioned, the Nordic defense cooperation
between the Scandinavian countries (which includes Iceland) has been greatly expanded and
although the NORDEFCO is based on “a cooperation structure, not a command structure”528
a
very high degree of political and military collaboration has been achieved. Moreover, the
Swedish defense policy has highlighted the need to increase the Armed Forces’ participation
in international operations and to provide significant capabilities to the European Rapid
524
Toremans, “Visby,” 161. 525
Leon Engelbrecht, “Fact file: Denel Dynamics Umkhonto naval short-range surface-to-air missile,”
defenseWeb, 3 November 2008.
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=610. 526
Guy Toremans, „Sweden’s High Speed Stealthy V-Force,” Warships, Jan (2014): 31. 527
Commander Erik Uhren quoted in Ibid., 30. 528
Quote from the official website: “The basics about NORDEFCO,” Nordic Defense Cooperation.
http://www.nordefco.org/The-basics-about-NORDEFCO.
158
Reaction Force.529
Of particular interest in this context is Sweden’s defense cooperation with
Finland. Already outlined in the defense white paper ten years ago,530
Sweden’s Defense
Minister, Karin Enström, reiterated this fruitful effort in a recent interview with Defence
News:“As regards defense cooperation between Sweden and Finland, both countries signed an
action plan for deepened cooperation in May [2014]. This plan aims at increasing capabilities
and efficiency through combined use of resources, increased interoperability and a closer
dialogue on common challenges.”531
Moreover, Sweden is strengthening its partnership with the Baltic States and,
consequently, also with NATO in general. Although public support for joining the Alliance
remains well below the 50 percent margin, this step remains a matter of discussion, not least
because of Russia’s recent military action.532
Currently, Swedish forces are already
contributing to NATO operations as part of the Partnership for Peace initiative and can be
rightfully considered “NATO’s most active and most capable partner”.533
Moreover, Jan Joel
Anderson also points to the fact, that “[m]any in the political and military establishments in
Sweden and Finland have grown increasingly positive about the idea.”534
Ultimately,
however, any such decision will have to stem from popular support among each country’s
citizens, the majority of which remains skeptical towards the issue.
Despite some analysts’ remarks that Sweden’s admission into NATO is a “no-
brainer”,535
it is still not likely that the country will join NATO in the near future.
Consequently, the Swedish Armed Forces will continue to invest in their robust navy to
protect the country’s territorial integrity and increase its participation in multinational peace-
keeping operations. In contrast to many other countries, Sweden has shown no interest in
building an amphibious capability worth noting. Should the Swedes, however, become more
engaged internationally, the need is likely to arise to create an even more balanced fleet.
Costly provisions would have to be made to effectively project power over great distances as
well to entertain a fleet capable of conducting sea-denial and sea-control.
529
Government Offices of Sweden, Swedish Government Bill 2004/05:5, Our Future Defence – The focus of
Swedish defence policy 2005-2007 (2004): 13. 530
Ibid., 14. 531
Karin Enström interviewed by Defense News, “Interview Karin Enström. Sweden’s Defense Minister,”
Defence News, 18 August (2014), 22. 532
Viribus Unitis, “Nordic NATO Nominees,” CIMSEC, 9 May, 2014.
http://cimsec.org/nordic-nato-nominees/11192. 533
In fact, Sweden was the only country not part of the Arab League or NATO to participate in enforcing the no-
fly zone over Libya in 2011.
“Sweden sends eight fighter jets to Libya,” The Swedish Wire, 29 March, 2011.
http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/9146-sweden-sends-eight-fighter-jets-to-libya. 534
Andersson, “Nordic NATO,” np. 535
Ibid., np.
159
Illustration 27: The destructive firepower of anti-ship missiles has been demonstrated in a number of live-firing exercises by the Norwegian Navy.
For the time being, small but important steps are being made to steadily modernize the
existing force. The introduction of two new A-26-class submarines is scheduled for the end of
the decade, while the latest fitting of mine-clearance equipment onboard the Visby-class will
contribute to the Navy’s mine warfare capabilities. In addition, $40 million are being
allocated towards the procurement of a new SIGINT ship to replace the ageing Orion.536
With
defense spending reaching an all-time low in 2014, the Swedish government has recently
announced that is willing to invest over 700 million dollars over the next five years in order to
strengthen its armed forces.537
It is fair to say that in the near term Sweden’s defense industry
will be able to maintain its technical prowess and innovative naval craftsmanship and thus
will allow the Royal Swedish Navy to live up to the high standards it has set itself.
11.3) Norway
The last navy that will be discussed in detail in this thesis is the Royal Norwegian
Navy. From a naval perspective, the defense of Norway would have provided a litmus test for
the United States’ effort to
repel a Soviet attack on the
West during the Cold War.
Even if the initial thrust of the
Red Army through central
Europe could have been
stopped, or at least slowed
down, the European allies were
dependent on reinforcements
from America via the strategic
lines of communication across the Atlantic to win a possible war of attrition against a
numerically superior enemy. The Soviet’s Navy, so it was feared, would utilize their large
submarine fleet to rush out from their sea bastion at the Kola Peninsula and raise havoc
among the convoys crossing the Atlantic.
While the U.S. Maritime Strategy during the 1970s had focused on the protection of
these convoys and envisioned small carriers (such as the Principe de Asturias later built by
536
Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norway, Sweden Spending Billions To Secure Surrounding Seas,” Defence News, October
17 (2011): 19. 537
Charlie Duxbury, “Sweden Plan to Increase Military Spending,” Wall Street Journal, 12 March, 2015.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-plans-to-increase-military-spending-1426198507.
160
Spain) to provide the necessary protection, John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy during the
Reagan Administration, decidedly objected to any such defensive plans. Under his auspices, a
new American Maritime Strategy was drafted, which was designed to put full-forward
pressure on the Soviet Union’s flanks: the Mediterranean and North Sea, (as well as in other
theaters of war – such as the Pacific.) Moreover, areas of Soviet sea-control, i.e. the sea-
bastions in the High North, would be challenged by the deployment of large elements of U.S.
naval forces, directly threatening the Soviet ballistic missile submarines, and thereby relieving
pressure from the central front.538
Norway was crucial in this effort, also because Soviet naval
forces had to be confined to the waters north of the GIN-gap (Greenland-Iceland-Norway) in
order for NATO forces to reinforce the northern and central front.539
In fact, provisions were
made for American, Canadian, British, and Danish ground forces to support the Norwegian
army against the likely attempt by the Soviet Union to occupy as much of the Norway as
possible. To this end, territorial defense lay at the heart of Norwegian defense planning.
The concept of territorial defense was also reflected in the composition of the Royal
Norwegian Navy (RNoN) at the end of the Cold War. Ten modernized German Type 207
submarines were operational with a class of six Ula (Type 210) boats entering service
between 1990 and 1992. The five Oslo-class missile frigates were based on an older U.S.
design, and exhibited robust ASW, AAW, and ASuW capabilities. The two Sleipner-class
corvettes had been in service were over 35 years old. Although they were “attractively
modelled corvettes, [they were] obsolescent even in the coastal protection role,”540
Chant
notes. The opposite can be said about many of the Navy’s guided missile patrol craft. Their
primary task was to defend the shores from an enemy invasion fleet. In this role alone their
highly potent Penguin SSM qualified them as a significant deterrent force. The Norwegian
naval shipbuilding industry also invested heavily in mine warfare vessels. A class of air-
cushion minesweepers was under construction in the early 1990s representing a first step in
Norway’s revolutionary utilization of this technology.541
Even after the seismic shift in world politics that occurred at the end of the Cold War,
the aforementioned defensive strategic mindset remained prevalent among Norway’s political
and military leaders. From the perspective of Norway’s defense planners, the country would
538
See Watkins, “Strategy 1984,” 69-85. 539
Moreau, “Presentation,” 29. 540
Chant, Ships, 166. 541
Prézelin, Combat Fleets, 401-410. For a more detailed description of the program see the article in Naval
Forces: “MICOS – The New Mine Countermeasure Systems for the Royal Norwegian Navy,” Naval Forces
Special Issue: Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 38-42.
161
have to become more self-reliant when it came to national defense, as Admiral Torolf Rein,
Chief of Defense of Norway, elaborated in the mid 1990s.
From being situated at a pivotal point of opposed superpower interests, in the eyes of
our allies, Norway is in the process of being reduced to an ally of marginal interest,
located at the outskirts of the current events. […] With this background I, therefore, do
not see any development that entails a fundamental change in the assessment of the
challenges our defense forces could be faced with.542
The threat of invasion and the necessary provisions to “prevent an enemy from quickly
gaining a foothold on Norwegian soil”543
continued to dictate the shape of the Royal
Norwegian Navy.
Although the defense budget had been reduced considerably by the mid-1990s, the
size of the fleet remained largely intact. More importantly, however, as Admiral Rein stressed
at the time, was the quality of the fighting force. “For the Navy [this meant that] the
maintenance of a high quality submarine [and surface] force [was] essential for [Norway’s]
ability to counter an amphibious assault and to prevent enemy naval domination of [her]
territorial waters.”544
Consequently, weapon systems were continuously upgraded and naval
personnel kept at a high level of readiness.545
In regard to its territory, a brief look at a map of Norway will allow us to easily
identify the country’s inherent strategic vulnerabilities. While the southern tip is 1750 km
from the northern shores, most of its territory only expands a few hundred kilometers inland
from the coast. The Norwegian hinterland is largely dominated by rough mountainous terrain,
thus forcing the population to live close to the sea. Moreover, the few land lines of
communication, running from north to south would be under jeopardy in the case of war. This
means that the “coastal Sea Lines of Communication are of the utmost importance […] and
protecting [them] is therefore one of the major missions of the RNoN.”546
In order to protect the SLOCs a new class of frigates was to be delivered to the Navy
between 2004 and 2010. After the Oslo (F-300) had run aground and sunk in 1994, only four
ships of the Oslo-class were in service in 2000 and all were reaching the end of their service
542
Torolf Rein, “The Quality of Our Forces Remains a Primary Condition,” Naval Forces Special Issue:
Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 4. 543
Ibid. 544
Ibid. 545
During the Cold War Norwegian forces were at a constant alert readiness of less than 30 min. See Kjell
Amund Prytz interviewed by Naval Forces, “The Way Ahead,” Naval Forces Special Issue: Norwegian Naval
Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 18. 546
Rein, “Quality,” 4.
162
life. Their successors were planned to be far larger (4,900 tons compared to 1,670 tons) and
also far more capable in all areas of warfare. Initially, proposals from three different
manufacturers were considered, but in the end, Spain’s Empresa Nacional Bazán (now
Navantia) was awarded with the $1.6 billion contract to build five ships.547
Right from the
start it was clear that this project would be immensely expensive for a country such as
Norway, whose entire yearly defense budget amounted to approximately $5.5 billion.548
In
comparison, the most expensive procurement project in the history of the U.S. Navy has been
the latest order of ten Virginia-class submarines worth $17.5 billion, while the proposed
defense budget for FY2014 was set at over $600 billion.549
While many foreign frigates were either too expensive or did not provide the desired
capabilities, the Navy Material Command Norway decided “not to procure an off-the-shelf
design from abroad”,550
but instead to buy a ship that satisfied the Navy’s needs. The result of
this effort is the five Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates which entered service with only a year’s
delay. In comparison to other European frigates, e.g. the Dutch Zeven Provinciën, the German
F-124, or the FREMM-class, the Norwegian vessels are somewhat smaller and less heavily
armed. However, their sophisticated sensors and combat systems nonetheless make them very
capable warships.
The Nansen’s design is similar to that of the Spanish Àlvaro de Bazán, which is not
surprising considering the fact that both types were designed and built by Navantia. While the
Spanish frigate, as we have heard, is the smallest vessel to carry the American SPY-1D radar,
the Norwegian frigate, being even smaller, also uses the Lockheed Martin Aegis system.
However, it has to rely on a scaled-down version of the radar – the SPY-1F. It could
conceivably be used to fire the Standard SM-2 missile, yet only the Evolved Sea Sparrow
missile is currently deployed in a single, eight-cells Mk 41 VLS. Furthermore, the ship relies
on the Italian Oto Melara 76mm 62 cal gun to engage air, surface and land targets. (Note that
many foreign frigates already have larger 127mm guns.) Its hull-mounted sonar is provided
by Thales and the new NH-90 helicopter can be deployed for ASW operations in addition to
the ship’s Stingray torpedoes. Further space has been reserved for two quad SSM launchers,
547
Baker III, Combat Fleets, 503. 548
See SIPRI Fact Sheet.
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/milex_dat
abase. 549
See “General Dynamics Awarded $18 Billion by U.S. Navy for 10 Virginia-Class Submarines,” General
Dynamics, April 28, 2014.
http://www.generaldynamics.com/news/press-releases/detail.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1811=19222. 550
Eivind Hauger-Johanessen, “The Navy Materiel Command Norway: Facing A Historic Challenge,” Military
Technology, Vol. 21, 12 (1997): 37.
163
Illustration 28: Specifically, designed for operations among the vast littorals of the Norwegian fjords, the new air-cushion attack craft, however, can also be deployed in blue-water operations.
firing the Kongsberg’s stealthy Naval Strike Missile. Despite having undergone successful
testing at last year’s RIMPAC exercise,551
the missile is not yet installed on any of the ships.
What is more, no CIWS system has been fitted either. Notwithstanding these shortcomings,
the Fridtjof Nansen-class has enabled the Royal Norwegian Navy to become a significantly
more effective naval force.
Such improvements, however, come with a substantial price tag. At the end of the day,
the entire project will have cost more than $2 billion, putting the Navy under substantial
financial pressure. Already in 2013, rumors surfaced that the third ship of the class, the Otto
Sverdrup, was no longer operational because it was being stripped for spare parts in order to
keep the rest of the class in front-line service.552
Arguably, the stagnant defense spending over
the last years has not been helpful in the Navy’s effort to maintain a capable naval fighting
force.
On a more positive note,
after a long-pending decision, all
six Skjold air-cushion attack
missile craft were ordered.
Initially planned as a class of 24
to replace the ageing fleet of small
surface combatants, the highly
complex stealth craft underwent
“comprehensive testing with focus
on speed, sea-keeping,
[electromagnetic compatibility],
signature and functionality, as well as the operational reliability tests – mainly in northern
Norway [where the sea-conditions are particularly demanding].”553
These tests were necessary
as the design of the Skjold probed unknown ground in ship-design and it took ten years for the
second unit of the class to be commissioned.
Already at first sight, it becomes obvious that these warships differ in most aspects
from what we have seen in naval shipbuilding thus far. The largest parts of this catamaran are
made of carbon fiber to increase its stealth features. The propulsion system is based on the
experience gained with the Navy’s air cushion minesweepers and is designed around four gas
551
RIMPAC is hosted by the United States annualy and represents the largest naval exercises in the world. 552
“Frigate Berthed for its spare parts,” NEWS in ENGLISH.no, 30 Sept. 2013.
http://www.newsinenglish.no/2013/09/30/frigate-berthed-for-spare-parts/. 553
Guy Toremans, “Significant Ships: Skjold Class FACs: Norway’s Fighting Cats: Stealth Reigns Supreme,” in
Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, ed. Conrad Waters (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014): 126-127.
164
turbines driving two water-jets (similar to those in the Swedish Visby-class). In order to
maintain speeds of over 40 knots (75 km/h) two lift fans in the bow blow air into the pocket
between and under the catamaran’s hull. The front and back of the ship are sealed by rubber
flaps, thus enabling the ship to ride on a cushion of air (also known as surface effect). Speeds
of up to 60 knots (>110 km/h) have been reached, making it the fastest naval vessel in the
world.554
At the same time these ships pack a powerful punch. A single 76mm/62 cal gun is
installed on the ship’s deck, while two retractable quad launchers for the Naval Strike Missile
are located aft of the bridge. Portable Mistral SAM launchers can also be installed for point
air defense. Although these ships are quite small, they are among the most innovative
warships designed to date. They can rightfully be considered an essential element of
Norway’s fleet of surface combatants555
and are “capable of contributing substantially to a
wide range of operations in both the littoral and in blue water”, as Toremans points out.
“Although designed to patrol Norway’s littoral waters,” he continues, “the units have already
proved to be amongst the most flexible [naval] assets.” A lengthy deployment as part of the
U.S. Navy in 2002 and 2003 proved that long-distance out-of-area operations were not only
possible, but that “[the ship’s] top speed of 60 knots could prove quite useful to the EU or
NATO counter-piracy operations.”556
As Norway slowly moved away from its somewhat parochial concept of territorial
defense towards a more multinational-oriented defense policy, so did the Royal Norwegian
Navy. Consecutive defense white papers in the mid-2000s stated that, apart from securing
Norwegian sovereignty, the contribution to multinational crisis management, which included
multilateral peace operations, was to be strengthened.557
“Our security cannot be maintained
through a one-sided focus on the conventional defence of Norwegian territory.”558
A further
publication in 2008 emphasized the latter point by postulating that “Norway’s most important
contribution to the strengthening of international, and therefore Norwegian security, is active
and constructive participation in the UN and NATO.”559
As a result of these decisions,
Norway’s shore defense artillery was disbanded560
and its naval forces engaged more actively
554
Toremans, “Skjold,” 129. 555
Note that these ships have been included in the graph. Norway therefore has a total of 11 capable surface
combatants. 556
Toremans, “Skjold,” 139. 557
Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Norwegian Defence 2006 (2006): 3-4. 558
Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Norwegian Defence 2004 (2004): 7. 559
Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Norwegian Defence 2008 (2008): 5. 560
See Ezio Bonsignore et al. “Norway,” Military Technology: The World Defense Almanac 2004, Issue 1
(2004): 149.
165
in a number of multinational operations, such as the E.U. anti-piracy operations off the coast
of Somalia and the joint exercises with its Scandinavian and Baltic neighbors, while its sister
services have since been deployed to Afghanistan, Mali, South Sudan and the Middle East.
In the long term, the focus of Norway’s concern, however, will remain directed
towards the High North and the Arctic. Fittingly, in 2010, the Armed Forces’ Joint
Headquarters was moved to Bod , inside the Arctic Circle and will lead all military
operations from there.561
This move was spurred by growing security concerns in the region.
Conflicting commercial interests, largely over fishing rights and the exploitation of natural
resources on and under the seabed, have led to disputes between the different parties in the
region while the possibility of increased instability and even hostility persist. In the future, the
fundamental question regarding the freedom of the seas will become more pressing, in
particular in the light of a possible sea route via the northern passage and the recent behavior
of Russia’s resurgent Northern Fleet.
“I worry about the question of the freedom of the seas”, the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice
Admiral Kjell Amund Prytz stated as early as 1995. “During the Cold War, [the] threat of
piracy was negligible”, he continued. “[L]awlessness at sea increases everywhere [and the]
Coast Guard has fired more shots in anger during the last six months than during the entire
duration of our neutrality guard operations in World War One.” 562
In the long term, the Royal
Norwegian Navy is likely to be confronted with increasing challenges across the intensity
spectrum. So far, it has been able to adapt to the diverse security environment of the post-
Cold War era. As long as the country’s leadership does not succumb to sea blindness, as is the
case with numerous other European nations, the Norwegian Navy will remain a relatively
small, yet credible naval force in the region.563
561
See Homepage of Norwegian Armed Forces: “Norwegian Joint Headquarters.”
http://mil.no/organisation/about/norwegianjointheadquarters/Pages/default.aspx.
Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norway Maintains Littoral Focus on High North,” Defence News, 10 January (2011): 12. 562
Prytz, “Way Ahead,”19. 563
Sloggett, “Norway Leads,” 23.
166
PART THREE
12) Analysis and Observations – Quo Vadis Europe?
After having outlined the mainstay of European naval capabilities, it is time to place the
development of European sea power within the larger picture. Purely by numbers, Europe, as
a whole, could be considered at least as powerful as the United States. The continent is more
populous than the U.S. and has a higher gross domestic product, thus making it the greatest
combined economic power in the world. In terms of per capita GDP, Europe’s wealth
becomes even more tangible: Thirteen of the twenty richest countries in the world are
European. Furthermore, two of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members are from
Europe (France and Britain) – both of which have nuclear forces – and together with Germany
and Italy represent half of the former G8 members. All European armies combined have more
military personnel than the U.S. Armed Forces and even its accreted naval forces, at first
glance, would seem more than sufficient in size to protect its interest at sea: Europe can
deploy a powerful nuclear aircraft carrier with an air-wing of highly capable aircraft, two
smaller carriers operating the venerable Harrier jump-jet, 15 amphibious warships able to
project aerial and naval assets over great distances and onto distant shores, eight strategic
ballistic missile submarines, a mix of 12 nuclear attack submarines and 50 diesel-electric
boats – some of which are the quietest submarines in the world – , over a hundred mine
countermeasure vessels compared to the United States’ 13, highly sophisticated missile attack
craft, stealthy corvettes and an escort fleet of more than 130 destroyers and frigates. How can
one speak of brinkmanship and decline in light of such impressive numbers?
Over thirty years ago, then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, famously asked: “Who
do I call if I want to call Europe?”564
And in fact, Europe’s strategic weakness lies in its
heterogeneity. Its power seems to be diffused and divided. The great amalgamate of strikingly
different states (take Finland and Turkey for example) with distinct cultural, religious and
social backgrounds naturally affect Europe’s foreign policy. Although cooperation, in
particular between the NATO members during the Cold War, had fostered close ties between
the individual armed forces, recent events have shown how little agreement can be found
between the political and military leadership of each country regarding military intervention
564
The precise wording of the quote is not known. However, in an interview with Der Spiegel Kissinger
acknowledges having asked such a question.
Henry Kissinger interview by Spiegel, “SPIEGEL Interview with Henry Kissinger: ‘Europeans Hide Behind the
Unpopularity of President Bush’ Spiegel Online International, February 18, 2008.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,535964,00.html.
167
and a common security and defense policy. As was noted, throughout the last decade U.S. or
NATO-led campaigns often consisted of an ad hoc coalition of more or less willing European
states, while other members watched from the sidelines. This disunity has led some defense
analysts to even question the deterrent nature of NATO’s Article 5 mutual-defense
agreement.565
Despite being a mighty force on paper, European sea power has been in steep decline
since the end of the Cold War. As my case studies revealed, the large majority of naval fleets
have been significantly reduced in size and many have ceded important capabilities as a result
of the post-Cold War peace-dividend and years of continued austerity measures.
Notwithstanding technological advancement in shipbuilding, far fewer warships are available
to deal with the current abundance of maritime tasks. The British Fleet, for example, has been
reduced by nearly 60 percent while the French Marine Nationale has to rely on a fleet half the
size of that in 1990. Italy’s forces will be stretched thin by the nation’s interests in the greater
Mediterranean theater and the increasing burden of mass migration and Spain is barely able to
maintain its multi-purpose fleet due to one of the lowest defense budgets in all of Europe.
Greece continues to be caught in the quagmire of the financial crisis and it is therefore
questionable if the country will be able to sustain its comparatively high defense expenditure
in the future. As a result, the Hellenic Navy is unlikely to retain its current capabilities.
Turkey, on the other hand, has been able to establish itself as a major naval power in the
Black Sea and the Aegean Sea and, maybe more importantly, over the past twenty-five years
has developed the ability to design and manufacture its own warships.
On Europe’s northern flank, the Netherlands, one of the richest countries in the world,
has cut its surface fleet by more than half, while its next-door neighbor Germany shows few
signs of stepping up to the plate. As the world’s fourth largest economy and Europe’s
industrial powerhouse, the Germans operate some of the most capable frigates in the world.
However, compared to other medium-sized powers such as the U.K. or France, it has
remained unwilling to align itself with the general trend towards operating a well-balanced
multi-purpose fleet.
565
Etienne de Durand, “NATO in an Era of Global Competition, Defending Borders,“ min: 52:00.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VLZSQjBpHNk.
168
Illustration 29: Although the French/Italian Horizon project ultimately delivered four highly capable air-defense destroyers, they replace a much larger fleet of AAW vessels. This fact has limited both navies’ ability to put more than a single task-force to sea at any given point in time.
On a somewhat more positive note, the Scandinavian navies have shown some
encouraging signs of effectively adapting to the post-Cold War environment. They have not
only modernized their armed forces but strengthened cooperation and interoperability in the
High North as well as the Baltic Region. However, with growing Russian military posturing
in the region and the forceful annexation of Crimea, Sweden and Finland as well as the
Poland and the Baltic states, remain largely oriented towards territorial defense. The latter
countries have not been included in this study as they operate comparatively small naval
forces. While Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia
have modest defense
budgets and only a handful
of small warships, Poland,
despite efforts to expand
its capabilities in the
waters of the Baltic Sea,
will also have difficulties
in securing funding for
new surface combatants
and submarines. Its
borders with Russia’s ally
Belorussia and the Russian
exclave Kaliningrad are reason enough for the land component of the defense strategy taking
precedence over naval matters. As Waters notes, “[t]he overall future of the Polish Navy
continuous to look relatively bleak, […] given the increasing obsolescence of the two FFG-7
type [O.H. Perry-class] frigates and four Sokól class submarines that form the core of the fleet
and the priority given to financing army and air force.”566
Notwithstanding the possibility of
further Russian aggression in the theater, the aforementioned countries are unlikely to
significantly increase their defense expenditure but will rather want to rely on strengthening
cooperation with better-equipped partners.567
This, in turn, will put additional stress on those
European navies, which, such as in the case of Norway, are already having difficulties in
maintaining their current pace of operations.
566
Waters, “Europe 2015,” 93. 567
Gerard O’Dwyer, “Nordic Support for Baltic Littoral Defenses,” Defense News, 9 Jan. (2012): 11.
More recently in Iain Ballantyne, “NATO Boss Make Vow TO PROTECT BALTIC,” Warships, Jan. (2015): 2.
169
In many instances the navies no longer have sufficient means to conduct their current
tasks in a period of relative peace. In the case of major conflict, little or no surge capabilities
are extant and no large-scale military operation can be maintained without the indispensible
assets of the United States. As has been noted, it is important for the European citizens to
realize the profound nature of the defense cuts over the past two decades. The austere
financial environment after the Cold War has forced many navies to continuously adapt to
new and more numerous challenges with less and less money, or as Parry puts it, “[t]he peace
dividend was spent a long time ago and, in some cases, many times over.”568
The end of the Cold War also heralded a period of strategic naval reorientation. The
principle of sea-control in the waters of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean against the
Soviets was replaced by the understanding that a modern navy also needed to be able to
conduct expeditionary warfare. The numerous stability operations and humanitarian
interventions during the 1990s called for naval forces to assume an expeditionary, out-of-area
role. Large investments were made to build amphibious assault ships and landing platform
docks. Both the U.K. and France had already maintained such forces at the end of the Cold
War and continued to expand these capabilities. By the year 2000, the Netherlands, Spain and
Italy, among others, had followed suit and today even small fleets, such as the Royal Danish
Navy, operate large warships for expeditionary warfare. However, these very expensive
capital ships account for a significant part of each navy’s budget and also need very large
crews to operate. At the same time, the shortage of manpower has become at least as pressing
of an issue as the limited number of warships, as most European armed forces have shifted
from mandatory service to a volunteer force. For that reason they almost all states in Europe
are finding it increasingly difficult to attract young citizens to join the military.
At the same time the predictions of the future are not encouraging. Not only are naval
forces called upon to conduct the entirety of military operations, from drug interdiction to
deploying special forces into hostile areas far from home. Naval sea power is also very likely
to become an even more important factor in an increasingly competitive world – one in which
the access to the ocean’s vital resources of fish, oil, gas, and raw materials is likely to become
even more heavily contested. Conflict between regional powers in Asia, in particular
regarding numerous islands in the South and East China Sea and the promise of large
exclusive economic zones in the region, are harbingers of these growing tensions at sea. In
this strategic environment, cooperation will be of the essence in order to avoid conflict and to
encourage peaceful economic and political exchange.
568
Parry, Highway, 329.
170
Both the European Union and NATO represent the foundations on which European
sea power is based. With the United States shifting its attention towards the Asian-Pacific
Region, the North Atlantic Alliance, Is likely to remain the defining element in Europe’s
security architecture. As Parry argues, “NATO will remain critical in maintaining equilibrium
in the Western hemisphere, just as suitable arrangements for the USA and its allies to provide
assurance and to support their friends (and interests) will be critical in the Eastern
hemisphere.”569
However, some prudent decisions will have to be made over the next years.
For European navies in particular, ground needs to be made up. The slow drawdown
from the Cold War and a succession of wars of choice by US and other leading
democracies diverted attention away from the sea. This strategic myopia was
compounded by the ways in which developed world governments introduced largely
incoherent defense reductions, with little regard for strategic coherence and the
balance of forces.570
One of the most promising developments over the last two decades has been the ability of
many European states to successfully join forces in building state-of-the-art ships and weapon
systems. Although some areas of high-end defense technology could not be sustained, British,
French, Italian, and Danish warships and their sensors, radars, missiles, artillery and
electronic countermeasures can rightfully be considered among the best in the world. “NATO
helps to reduce defense duplication and prevents the renationalization of defense. Without
NATO, the individual Alliance members would be forced to spend considerably more money
on defense than they currently do.”571
A number of these cooperative efforts have been addressed. In this day and age, it is
exorbitantly expensive to build a warship from scratch and quite frankly no European
country’s defense industry is able to provide all the necessary parts for such an undertaking.
Therefore, joint ventures such as the Franco/Italian Horizon and FREMM projects, the
trilateral cooperation between Spain, Germany and the Netherlands for a new air defense
frigate, the multi-national NH-90 helicopter program and the construction of the
Rotterdam/Galicia-class LPDs are high-profile examples of the successful and necessary
measures European governments have made so far.
In terms of interoperability, the European navies have made great strides in being able
to conduct a wide range of maritime missions with naval detachments from other countries.
NATO’s Standing Maritime Groups are continuously at sea, constituting an immediate
569
Parry, Highway, 103. 570
Ibid., 329. 571
Larrabee , Austerity, 106.
171
reaction force and a conventional deterrent. European warships, operating as part of
multinational naval operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Atalanta,
provide an excellent basis for trust-building and interoperability among European and foreign
navies. Such increased interoperability also allows each navy to specialize in specific
capabilities to a greater degree. Chris Pegenkopf explains that
[w]ith enhanced coordination of the alliance’s operational capabilities, member states
[conceivably] could completely cede certain mission areas in which they struggle to
maintain a competency because of a scarcity of resources. This would allow them to
reallocate funding to focus on becoming a world-class capability leader in their
assigned mission areas. As a result, the overall NATO force would be more integrated
and effective, as it would be a confluence of capabilities leaders rather than a
collection of independent militaries that are jacks of all trades but masters of none.572
Although a trend towards more specialized navies is noticeable in some areas of operation,
both political as well as operational considerations have been a limiting factor in such a
process. Frankly, a highly specialized navy would find it more difficult to adapt to a rapidly
developing security environment and might be caught off guard, having invested large sums
of money in the wrong areas. At the same time the country’s leadership would realize that it is
utterly dependent on other states to conduct many principal missions its own navy cannot
perform. Italy, for example, would have found it very difficult to operate near the shore of
Libya in 2011 had it not commanded a well-balanced fleet able to defend its aircraft carrier
from air, surface and subsurface threats. Were Italy to decide to assign its submarine
protection duties to, say, the French Navy in order have sufficient funds to operate two
aircraft carriers instead of one, it would have to hope that France is also willing to take
military action in a future conflict. In times of ad hoc coalitions and alliances such a plan is
inherently risky. As has been pointed out, many naval scholars, therefore, disagree with
Pagenkopf and rather argue that operating a general purpose fleet – and be it small – is still
the best choice for most European navies.
A well-balanced multi-purpose navy can adapt to changes in the strategic
environment more easily and thus reduce the risk of having backed the wrong horse while
being left to its own devices by its supposed allies. In the Asian-Pacific Region a number of
states are actively engaged in building such naval forces. India, China, South Korea, Japan
and Australia are all strengthening their blue-water capabilities and are in the process of
creating more powerful multi-purpose navies, despite experiences major difficulties along the
572
Chris Pagenkopf, “Cooperation is the Key to NATO’s Future,” Naval Institute Proceedings, September
(2014): np. http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-09/cooperation-key-natos-future.
172
Illustration 30: The overall reduction in numbers has also affected the force of support and replenishment vessels – a key necessity in any form of naval operation today. Note the size of the replenishment vessel in the middle in comparison to the LPD and frigate.
way.573
In particular, the construction of aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, large
surface combatants and long-range submarines are the most obvious signs of this trend. The
graphs in the Appendices provide a valuable comparison between the rise of naval power in
the Asia-Pacific and the apparent decline of European sea power.574
In contrast, only four countries in Europe can claim to operate a modern, general
purpose naval force. Although some states, such as Norway and Denmark, are shifting from
littoral to blue-water operations, and others, like Turkey, are seeking to operate more
powerful fleets, their navies are limited by both smaller budgets and more limited strategic
interests than their Asian counterparts. It is, therefore, pivotal for the European navies to
retain as many capabilities as possible, and be they marginal. Even if short-term fiscal
restrictions are limiting factors in putting such capabilities into full effect, in times of crisis
they could be reestablished (although this process would possibly take considerably longer
than imagined). From a platform-centric point of view, provisions have to be made so that
surface combatants, submarines and aircraft can be incrementally upgraded over time.
Luckily, modern European warships have considerable room to grow. Many frigates and
destroyers, such as the Norwegian Nansen, the French La Fayette, and British Daring-class
are relatively lightly armed when compared to their Asian and American equivalents.
However, they have room
for additional weapons
systems and their sensor
suits can be updated if
necessary.
The ability to
quickly shift priorities at
sea is already visible in
operations in the North
Atlantic where European
anti-submarine warfare
capabilities are being put
to the test by Russian
573
A brief illustration of the malaise India’s naval sector finds itself in can be found in: Dave Sloggett, “India’s
Navy Falter,” Warships, July (2014): 12-13. 574
It is worth noting that the respective Asian navies already operated relatively large fleets in 1990. However,
many of the vessels at the time were obsolete while today a large part of these fleets is comprised of modern
warships.
173
naval operations. Formally a forte of the northern European states, in particular the United
Kingdom, twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War naval strategy and tactics for sea-
control have to be relearned. At the same time constabulary duties on the southern flank as
well as ongoing crisis throughout North Africa and the Middle East have put considerable
strain on the European navies operating in this theater.
What is more, Europe remains largely dependent on American key capabilities. This
includes the U.S. Navy’s auxiliary forces. Without these support vessels, large naval
operations are not sustainable. Unfortunately, current trends indicate that the so-called teeth-
to-tail ratio of combat ships to supply and replenishment vessels is becoming increasingly
critical. The same is the case in regard to Europe’s sea-lift capabilities. While European
powers were able to field, deploy, and sustain division-sized units in the war against Iraq in
1991, such an operation has become impossible today.575
In addition, even the two most
powerful amphibious forces in Europe, the French and the British, are “unlikely to be
deployed in a high-threat environment without considerable U.S. force protection.”576
In
essence, despite the strengthening its amphibious forces, Europe’s military lacks the ability to
get significant forces to the scene of action and it does not have the necessary sustainable
high-end capabilities to sufficiently protect them from harm once they get there. In particular
in the areas of air defense, close-air support, airborne-early warning, aerial-refueling,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and long-range precision strikes577
Europe is far
from claiming military parity with the U.S. Armed Forces.
That the U.S. military might, and especially its naval power, stems from a sustained
defense expenditure of nearly four percent of the national GDP, more than twice that of the
average European state,578
seems to be more of a welcome convenience to the Europeans
rather than a goal worth aspiring to. In the long-term, the United States is likely to become
increasingly frustrated by its allies’ tendency to free ride on the backs of U.S. taxpayers. With
the United States’ focus of attention already shifting towards China and the greater Asian-
Pacific Region, Europe will have to carry a larger share of the security burden in the Western
Hemisphere as well as being more self-responsible for protecting its interests in other regions
575
Larrabee, Austerity, 7. 576
Ibid. 86. 577
As a matter of fact, nearly every single air-campaign since the end of the Cold War has shown that Europe’s
arsenal of precision ammunition was quickly depleted. Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, “NATO runs short on
some munition in Libya,” The Washington Post, April 15, 2011.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in-
libya/2011/04/15/AF3O7ElD_story.html. 578
In 2013 the U.S. spent a total of $735 million on the NATO defense budget compared to a total of $288
million of all other allies. See Pagenkopf, “Cooperation,” np.
174
of the world. That it will have to do so with much smaller and often less capable naval forces
than twenty-five years ago seems to have been overlooked by Europe’s leadership.
13) Conclusion
It seems fair to say that by any reasonable estimate sea power will be one of the
defining elements in the future of world affairs. In principle, the twenty-first century will be
governed by various powers at sea, interacting with each other in both peaceful cooperation as
well as bloody conflict, just like the centuries before. While I have gone to great lengths to
provide substantial evidence for the ability to influence decisions on land by means of
economic and military power at sea, an important question has so far only been alluded to –
namely which actors will be able to utilize the maritime realm to a greater extent than the
others and thereby accrue wealth and power. Or in other words: Whose sea power will it be?
For now three basic trends are likely to remain extant in the foreseeable future. Firstly,
the United States will be able to maintain its global naval dominance by a considerable
margin for at least another thirty years. The U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain sea-control will
however be challenged by the emergence of increasingly sophisticated anti-access/area-denial
networks in close proximity to the shores of Russia, China, and to a lesser degree Iran and
North Korea. Moreover, the emergence of large blue-water navies in the Indian Ocean and the
Pacific will force the United States to rethink its current maritime strategy. Ultimately,
however, the U.S. Navy (and the Marine Corps) is likely to remain the only naval force able
to project significant power in any region of the world and sustain a military confrontation
over a longer period of time.
The second trend also coincides with arguably one of the most profound geopolitical
developments in modern history, the consequences of which will not be understood for some
time. Already in the mid-1980s maritime trade between the U.S. and Asia had eclipsed that of
trans-Atlantic trade. However, it has been the incredible ascent of previously poor countries
such as India, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam and (most importantly) China which, for the
first time in more than five hundred years, has caused the geopolitical focus of attention – in
particular that of the United States – to shift away from Europe and the Atlantic towards the
Asian-Pacific Region (APR). In many counties in the APR the maritime domain has taken a
prominent position. This is exemplified by Chinese naval scholars studying the writings of the
most renowned naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett, while many navies in
175
the region are trying to emulate U.S. maritime capabilities. Apparently, the leaders in Peking,
Seoul and New Delhi have understood the strategic gains to be made by entertaining a large
commercial fleet as well as a strong navy to protect the country’s political and economic
interests at home and abroad. These efforts have been highly profitable for the
aforementioned states, strengthening the domestic shipbuilding industry as well as the
commercial market. However, the possibility of conflict looms large as the current naval arms
race among the conflicting actors in the region is joined by the United States and its military
in a contest over who will have the most to say in this part of the world.
The third trend allows us to infer which role Europe will play in this maritime century.
Over the course of the preceding chapters I have described the development of Europe’s
navies since the end of the Cold War in much detail. Every lager navy has been discussed at
length, paying particular attention to how each individual naval service has dealt with the
paradigmatic changes to the security environment that have come to pass. During the later
years of the Cold War, most European states were NATO members and thus part of the
overarching maritime strategy against the Soviet Union. Therefore, each navy had specific
tasks to fulfill, such as mining critical choke points through which the Soviet forces had to
pass in the case of war, defending the European flanks from Soviet incursion, or protecting
the strategic lines of communication between the United States and Europe on which the
essential reinforcement for the besieged European allies would be transported. The enemy’s
naval forces, in particular his submarines, had to be destroyed in order to maintain command
of the sea. This principle of sea-control formed the basic strategic tenet of Europe’s naval
forces. The Americans, for their part, would use combined aircraft carrier battle groups and all
available attack submarines to put full forward pressure on the Soviet flanks in the North
Atlantic and the Mediterranean (as well as in the Pacific).
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War these plans were
shelved as the emergence of new forms of conflict necessitated novel approaches to maritime
warfare. Amphibious warfare capabilities were expanded in order to conduct military
interventions, stability operations and peace-keeping missions in distant regions of the world.
Soon, many European navies operated expeditionary forces, such as amphibious assault ships
and other large multi-purpose surface combatants capable of projecting power from sea onto
land. However, for strategic reasons, some states like Greece or Finland remained focused on
territorial defense in the brown-waters closer to shore.
Yet, of even greater relevance to European sea power was the fact that large sums of
money which would have formerly been allocated to national defense could now be invested
176
elsewhere. As part of the so-called ‘peace dividend’ the large standing armies in Europe
underwent drastic reductions. While ships were becoming more expensive to build, military
budgets were reduced incrementally, making it difficult for most European navies to
modernize their fleets. This process has continued for nearly twenty-five years and has been
exacerbated by the global economic crisis which took hold of Europe after 2008. As a matter
of fact, only days before submitting this thesis, the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research
released the figures for the global defense expenditures in 2014. Despite the Islamic State
waging war across Iraq and Syria; unabated conflict in North Africa – causing an influx of
refugees trying to make their way to Europe; Russia forcefully annexing Crimea, continuing
its hybrid warfare in support of the rebel forces in Eastern Ukraine and flexing its growing
military muscle along the European periphery; and, lastly, the Americans shifting their focus
of attention towards the Asian-Pacific Region, it is unlikely that we will see any significant
increases in European defense spending any time soon. As the data reveals, many countries
have, quite frankly, continued to make cuts to their defense budgets.579
Although the same can be said for the United States (the budget was reduced from 3.8
to 3.5 percent in 2014), it has again rushed to Europe’s assistance, re-deploying heavy
mechanized forces and combat aircraft as a response to Russia’s actions. To be fair, many
NATO members have also been actively engaged in confidence building measures across the
Alliance’s eastern border. Furthermore, the three Baltic States, Poland and possibly Germany
will be under pressure to increase their defense spending in the short term. Ultimately, such
provisions will however have little effect on the overall decline of European sea power. This
is partly due to the fact that in this theater of operation robust military forces for air and land
warfare are considered the quintessential linchpin in deterring Russia from further coercive
measures against the West.
[Therefore,] NATO’s pivot to Russia will shift attention away from the maritime
domain back to the continent. Armies and air forces will receive, once again, much
more attention than navies. While Putin’s aggression increased the importance of
NATO for its member states, maritime security’s relevance for member states and,
therefore, for the Alliance will [likely] decrease. In consequence, theaters like the
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean will become of much less concern for NATO.580
579
“Baltische Länder erhöhen Militärausgaben,” news.ORF.at, 13. April, 2015.
http://orf.at/stories/2273071/2273070/. 580
Felix Seidler, “NATO’s PIVOT TO RUSSIA: COLD WAR 2.0 AT SEA?” CIMSEC, April 25, 2014.
http://cimsec.org/natos-pivot-russia-cold-war-2-0-sea/10723
177
Illustration 31: Joint maneuvers, such as the RIMPAC exercise held by the US Navy every year, provide valuable opportunity to build trust among states which otherwise have conflicting interests at sea. Such efforts will be particularly important in the Asian-Pacific Region.
As was pointed out, the defense budgets of the other NATO members meanwhile have either
remained stagnant or have been reduced even further. The armed forces of France, Greece,
Italy, and the Netherlands all have had to find ways of doing more with less money. Of the 28
NATO member states only four (apart from the United States) spend more than 2 percent of
their GDP on defense.
This figure has been stated on numerous occasions throughout this thesis as if it were
some sort of panacea to all of Europe’s defense ailments and in fact there is a consensus that
such a benchmark would constitute the best compromise in terms of feasibility and national
security within the Alliance. In consecutive NATO summits the European members have
pledged to “move towards the 2% guideline”,581
by increasing their defense budgets within a
decade: “These decisions will further strengthen the Transatlantic Bond, enhance the security
of all Allies and ensure a more fair and balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities,” the
official statement after the most recent NATO summit in Wales underscored.582
Unfortunately
these promises seem to remain merely lip
service as governments throughout Europe
and, maybe more importantly, the countries’
citizens are unwilling and unable to make
such financial concessions.
Although the security and prosperity
of all European states relies heavily on
maritime security and the unimpeded flow of
commerce on the ocean’s ‘great highways’,
the average person on the street will be
difficult to convince that more money has to
be allocated to the naval forces in order to
protect Europe’s interests and prosperity.
Therefore, it lies in the responsibility of the
current political and military leadership in
Europe not to continue down the current road
of brinkmanship. At the end of the day, the
581
NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, 5 September, 2014: np.
http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. 582
Ibid., np.
178
real issue is neither Russia’s rearmament nor the state of the transatlantic relationship, but in
fact money.583
After more than two decades of almost continuous cuts to national defense,
many European armed forces no longer have the capability to effectively deal with the
growing number of security challenges that confront them.
In numerous strategic defense papers discussed in this thesis, Europe’s naval forces
are not only called upon to fulfill their primary military function – to attack, to defend, or to
deter – but far more often are used for diplomatic and policing duties. At any given point in
time, the navies are conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, be it after
the earthquake in Haiti or by saving passengers from a sinking cruise ship in the
Mediterranean. British, Spanish and German destroyers and frigates, designed to protect an
entire battle group from the onslaught of enemy anti-ship missiles, regularly conduct anti-
piracy operations against small motorboats and modern-day freebooters armed with AK-47
rifles off the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, smaller, less sophisticated and less expensive ships,
which would be better designed for such tasks, are spread thin over the vast oceans,
conducting constabulary duties such as drug interdictions and fishery protection in their
countries’ territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. That this can be quite a
challenging undertaking in an area of over 11,000,000 km² with only a handful of ships, such
as in the case of France, needs no further explanation.
I have also made a point to stress the ramifications the reduction of naval capabilities
will likely have on Europe as a political entity as well as for its population. Over the past five
hundred years most major powers in the world have understood the utility of sea power, both
in economic as well as military terms. Colin S. Gray even goes so far as to argue that, “[g]reat
sea powers or maritime coalitions have either won or, occasionally, drawn every major war in
modern history.”584
Ultimately, however, it was the successful marriage of commercial and
military might (on which Mahan based his understanding of sea power) that put successive
European powers ahead of the rest of the world, enabling them to accumulate vast territorial
gains and in return secure wealth and political influence. After the end of the Second World
War the United States succeeded the British as the preeminent sea power and has remained
the “claviger and steward”585
of international trade regime while Europe’s economies
continue to free ride on the maritime security that the United States Navy has upheld for
nearly seventy years. In the future it is likely that this practice will no longer suffice. As we
583
The current problem of financing NATO operations in the Baltic States and Poland is discussed in detail in
De Durand, “NATO,” min: 14:00. 584
Gray, Leverage, Prologue. 585
Bobbitt, Consent, 537.
179
speak, the oceans are becoming an increasingly contested area of interests: “[S]tates will seek
to extend their jurisdiction, control and regulation over offshore areas up to the limits of their
exclusive economic zones (EEZs)”. They will try to “exploit the resources that lie on and
below the seabed and in the water column”,586
Parry warns. China’s current effort to build
artificial islands and archipelagos in the South China Sea provides evidence for this
proposition.587
Located considerably further from Chinese mainland than from Vietnam or the
Philippines, the Spratley Islands are one of the many areas in the PRC’s vicinity in which the
aforementioned maritime contest is taking shape. Being one of the most profitable fishing
grounds in the world, it is not surprising that numerous states want to claim sovereignty over
the small sandy islets in these waters, thereby expanding their EEZ.
While the United States has to carefully weigh its interest and response to these
developments in the Asia-Pacific, Europe will largely be incapable of having any direct
influence on the events unfolding in the region. Although “[t]he debate about a European role
in an East Asian major war is largely hypothetical, it teaches us three lessons,” Seidler points
out.588
Firstly, Europe’s political and military power has become severely weakened.
Considering the current trend towards further defense reductions, Europe’s ability to secure its
interests abroad will likely be limited even further. Secondly, the principal cause for this
development is the inability of the political leadership in many European countries to make
prudent decisions in times of fiscal austerity, the population’s aversion towards military
intervention, and their unwillingness to make sacrifices in both blood and money for the
greater good of their respective country. Lastly, Europe is becoming increasingly irrelevant in
geopolitical and strategic terms outside of its own sphere of influence and even within it will
be challenged to a greater extent than before. 589
Growing instability on Europe’s southern flank has been discussed at length in this
thesis. More funding will be needed to deal with the security challenges the influx of illegal
immigrants from Africa and the Middle East is causing. At the same time, on Europe’s eastern
border we are witnessing the reemergence of Russia as an important player in international
politics – a player skillfully applying hard power to expand his sphere of influence by
resorting to a strategy of hybrid warfare and fait accompli. Meanwhile, on Europe’s northern
flank the steady melting of the polar caps will likely make commercial shipping between
586
Parry, Highway, 215. 587
Sui-Lee Wee, “China explains why it’s building islands in the South China Sea,” Business Insider UK, April
9, 2015.
http://uk.businessinsider.com/china-explains-why-its-building-islands-in-the-south-china-sea-2015-4?r=US. 588
Seidler, “Europe’s Role,” np. 589
Ibid.
180
Europe and Asia via the North West Passage possible in the future. This circumstance would
reduce the distance between China’s production sites and the European market by 10,000
km.590
According to various predictions, vessels travelling on these routes will, however, still
need the assistance of icebreakers for many decades to come. Currently, “Russia maintains a
decided advantage in Arctic operations in its ownership of […] seven nuclear-powered
civilian vessels and nineteen diesel-powered variants, with six more planned in the near
future.”591
The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are all
largely dependent on seaborne trade and would profit immensely from the emergence of this
new trade route. However, it would also place an additional burden on their naval forces, in
particular if Russia was to use its geographical and military advantage as political leverage.
To the reader it might seem as if I have drawn an overly drastic picture in the hope of
making a case for an increase in defense spending and the strengthening of the military forces.
This has not been my intention. Quite frankly, all observations have been based on factual
assertions of previous developments and current political and maritime trends. Many
European states still maintain robust naval forces – considered to be among the best in the
world – exhibit industrial prowess as well as technological ingenuity and also maintain large
commercial fleets. Europe as a whole would have all the ingredients to make it a truly great
sea power were it not for the apparent differences and incongruities among its member states.
Sadly, notwithstanding the common defense agreements within NATO and the growing
military cooperation as part of the European Union, the continent remains a conglomerate of
highly diverse states, all of which have their individual foreign and domestic interests to
satisfy. Nowhere does this instance become more apparent than when the lives of young men
and women, as well as substantial amounts of money are at stake.
During the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, basically every single European state (save
the neutral ones) provided military assistance to the U.S.-led campaign against Saddam
Hussein. Only a few years later, in the Balkan Wars, it took the European powers much longer
to agree on a common course of action. As a result of this inaptitude the United States had to
take the lead in the military campaign against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. After the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 the world again briefly gathered behind the United States. However,
as the hope of classical military victory turned out to be ephemeral in quagmires of
Afghanistan and Iraq, Europe’s commitments in many instances became somewhat half-
hearted. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 provided a turning point for the Western community.
590
Parry, Highway, 146. 591
Ibid., 146-147.
181
While Britain joined the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, Germany and France ruled out any
military engagement on their part and Spain withdrew from Iraq in 2005 after having been hit
by massive terrorist attacks on its capital. More recently Germany again abstained from
committing military forces to the NATO air-campaign against Libya’s long-time ruler
Muammar Gaddafi, despite the U.N. Security Council having passed a resolution that
legitimized the use of force in order to protect the Libyan population from repercussions. This
time Britain, France and Italy took the lead with even neutral Sweden participating in the
enforcement of the no-fly zone over Libya.
The apparent rifts within Europe and in particular its NATO members are not likely to
disappear any time soon, as the current effort to degrade and destroy ISIS in Syria and Iraq
exemplifies. While American and French combat planes are flying strike missions from
aircraft carriers stationed in the Persian Gulf, most other European countries have shown little
interest in stepping up to the plate in military terms. Meanwhile, the Italian Navy is heavily
engaged in humanitarian assistance operations in the Mediterranean. Yet to date, no
comprehensive approach in dealing with this human catastrophe has been put forward by the
European Union. Again, contradicting political views among the various states are a major
limiting factor in an effort to use military forces to full effect.
So is this divided Europe going to be relegated to the fringes of a world centered on
the Asian-Pacific Region as I postulated at the outset of this thesis? Perhaps the somewhat
encouraging answer is: not necessarily. The developments we have witnessed over the past
years are not irreversible. However, “[c]ountries need to be prepared for the long haul and the
long view, in anticipation of risks and opportunities.”592
This means that sufficient
investments have to be made to provide the respective populace with security and access to
the amenities of the global market. In the 21st century, sea power in the form of commercial
trade and naval forces will continue to represent the most effective tool in achieving both.
Much has been said in regard to burden sharing and strengthening cooperation among
the European partners. The progress that has been made in this area is laudable and should be
vigorously pursued. However, to date, even the most powerful European militaries first look
to Washington instead of Brussels for a response when conflict arises somewhere in the
world. As long as this is the case there will be little incentive for the European states to make
any cuts to, let us say, their welfare system, in order to strengthen their defense sector.
Unfortunately, given the drastic reductions of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold
War, even the aforementioned efforts by many states to streamline their force structure and
592
Parry, Highway, 33.
182
effectively engage with friends and allies to somewhat alleviate the burden that is placed upon
each individual navy have only slowed the process of overall naval decline. Unless the
propensity apparent among Europe’s leadership to reduce the size, readiness and capabilities
of the naval forces is revoked and a comprehensive budget increase is put into place,
European naval power will continue to diminish.
The 21st century will in all likelihood be one of American sea power, challenged by
the rise of Asian sea power. On the basis of the past, current and future global trends analyzed
in this thesis, it is questionable if it will also be a century of European sea power.
183
Appendices
Figure 24
Figure 25
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 24 United States: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 15 11 10
Large Surface Combatants 205 104 98
Submarines 126 73 74
Assault/Amphibious 50 37 29
0
50
100
150
200
250
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 25 United States.: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Miilitary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
184
Figure 26
Figure 27
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 26 Japan: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 2
Large Surface Combatants 60 49 48
Submarines 16 17 16
Assault/Amphibious 6 5 4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 27 Japan: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
185
Figure 28
Figure 29
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 28 South Korea: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatants 15 15 24
Submarines 0 7 12
Assault/Amphibious 6 10 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 29 South Korea: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
186
Figure 30
Figure 31: Note that many vessels, in particular a large number of submarines, had already been obsolete by 1990 and have since been put out of service.
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 30 China: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 0 0 1
Large Surface Combatants 41 50 24
Submarines 93 91 47
Assault/Amphibious 19 10 14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
100
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 31 China : Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Military Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
187
Figure 32
Figure 33
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 32 India: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
1990 2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 2 1 2
Large Surface Combatants 15 16 16
Submarines 16 14 14
Assault/Amphibious 2 3 6
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 33 India: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mililtary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
188
Figure 34
Figure 35: Note that these are highly tentative figures. The actual readiness of Russian warships is rather difficult to assess.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
% o
f G
DP
1990-2014, Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Figure 34 Russia: Defense Spending in % of GDP
Military Spending
2000 2014
Aircraft Carriers 2 1
Large Surface Combatants 51 34
Submarines 69 55
Assault/Amphibious 32 22
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Nu
mb
er
of
Ve
sse
ls
Figure 35 Russia: Number of Major Vessels
Sources: The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Mililtary Technology Almanac, World Naval Review
189
Selected Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Official Publications and Defense White Papers
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Defense Policy Guidlines for the responsibility of the
federal Minster of Defense. Berlin: 2003.
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Weißbuch 2006, Zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands
und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Berlin: 2006.
Bundesminsterium der Verteidigung. Defense Policy Guidlines. Safeguarding National
Interests – Assuming International Responstiblity – Shaping Security Together. Berlin: 2011.
Bundeswehr. “Die Operation Enduring Freedom.” December 4, 2013. Accessed 16.04.2015.
http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw.
Combined Maritime Forces. “CTF-151: Counter-piracy.” Accessed 11.04.2015,
http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/.
Danish Parliament. Danish Defense Agreement 2010-2014. Copenhagen: 2009.
Danish Parliament. The Danish Defense Agreement 2005-2009, Preliminary translation.
Copenhagen: 2004.
Departamento De Securidad National, Presidencia Del Gobierno. The National Maritime
Security Strategy 2013: Sharing a Common Project. Madrid: 2013.
Department of Defense, Africa Command. “African Partnership Station.” Accessed
11.04.2015, http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/security-cooperation-programs/africa-
partnership-station.
Department of Defense. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power. Washington
DC: 2007.
Deparment of Defense. A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Sea Power. Forward,
Engaged, Ready. Washington DC: March 2015.
Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014. Washington DC: 2014.
Department of Defense. Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership,
Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington DC: GPO, 2012.
Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
of China - 2010. Washington DC: 2010.
190
Department of Defense. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. Washington DC:
2009.
Department for Transport. Statistical Release – Shipping Fleet Statistics 2014. 18 February,
2015. Accessed 28.03.2015, https://www.gov.uk/.../shipping-fleet-statistics-2014.pdf.
Directive 001/2000 Admiral Chief of Staff of the Navy. “GRUFLOT is created.” Ministerio di
Defensa. Accessed
19.04.2015,http://www.armada.mde.es/ArmadaPortal/page/Portal/ArmadaEspannola/conocen
os_organizacion/prefLang_en/03_Flota--02_Flota-Fuerza-Accion-Naval--023_COMGRUP2--
02_historia_grup2_es
Finnish Government. Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001: Report by the Government
to Parliament. 2001.
Government Offices of Sweden. Swedish Government Bill 2004/05:5, Our Future Defence –
The focus of Swedish Defence Policy 2005-2007. 2004.
Hellenic Ministry of Defense. White Paper 2014. Directorate of National Defense Policy:
2015.
Hellenic Ministry of National Defense. White Paper for the Armed Forces 1996-1997.
Accessed 07.04.2015,available at http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/d000007e.htm.
Kelley, P.X. and James D. Watkins. “Amphibious Strategy.” In: U.S. Naval Strategy in the
1980s, Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, 105-136.
Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008.
Lehmann, John F. “The 600–Ship Navy.” In: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected
Documents, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, 246-258. Newport RI: Naval
War College Press, 2008.
Ministère de la Défense. French White Paper, Defense and National Security 2013. Paris:
2013.
Ministére de la Dèfense. Livre Blanc sur la Défense 1994. Paris: 1994.
Ministére de la Dèfense. The French White Paper on defence and national security. Paris:
2008.
Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica. Strategic Defence Review. Madrid:
Imprenta Ministerio de Defensa, 2003.
Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Téchnica. White Paper 2000. Madrid: 2000.
Ministry For Foreign Affairs of Finland. “Finland’s participation in NATO-led crisis
management operations.” Accessed,
16.04.2015,http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=115832&contentlan=2&cult
ure=en-US.
Ministry of Defence. Netherlands Defence Doctrine. The Hague: Defense Staff, 2005.
191
Ministry of Defence: Summary of the Defence White Paper 2000. The Hague: 2000.
Ministry of Defense. Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defense White Paper.
London: 2003.
Ministry of Defense. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, The Strategic Defence and
Security Review. London: The Stationary Office, 2010.
Ministry of Defense. Strategic Defense Review. London: 1998.
Minsterio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica. Defense White Paper 2000. Madrid:
Centro de Publicaciones, 2000.
Moreau, Arthur. “Maritime Strategy Presentation (for the Secretary of the Navy, 4 November
1982).” In: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, Selected Documents, edited by John B.
Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, 19-44. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008.
NATO. “NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard, IFOR Final Factsheet.” 1996. Accessed
10.03.2015,http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm.
NATO. “NATO/WEU: Operation Sharp Guard.” 1996. Accessed
10.03.2015,http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm.
NATO. “NATO’s relations with Finland.” Accessed
25.03.2015,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm.
NATO. Alliance Maritime Strategy. 2011. Accessed
18.03.2015,http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm.
NATO. Wales Summit Declaration. 2014. Accessed
11.04.2015,http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
Nordic Defense Cooperation. “The basics about NORDEFCO.” Accessed
11.04.2015,http://www.nordefco.org/The-basics-about-NORDEFCO.
Norwegian Armed Forces. “Norwegian Joint Headquarter.” Accessed 11.04.2015,
http://mil.no/organisation/about/norwegianjointheadquarters/Pages/default.aspx.
Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Norwegian Defence. 2006.
Norwegian Ministry of Defense. Norwegian Defence. 2004.
Norwegian Ministry of Defense. Norwegian Defence. 2008.
Prime Minister’s Office. Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004: Government Report
6/2004. Prime Minister’s Office Publications, 2004.
Prime Minister’s Office. Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009: Government Report.
Prime Minister’s Office Publications, 2009.
192
Royal Navy. “Cougar 14.” Accessed 11.04.2015,http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-
latest-activity/operations/mediterranean-and-black-sea/cougar.
Taylor, Claire. A brief guide to previous defense white paper. House of Commons Library,
2010. Accessed 24.03.2015, www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05714.pdf.
Trost, Carlisle A.H. “Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy.” In: U.S. Naval Strategy in the
1980s, Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, 259-267.
Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 2008.
Turkish Ministry of Defense. White Paper 2000. Ankara: 2000.
Watkins, James D. “The Maritime Strategy, 1984.” In: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s,
Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz. 45-104. Newport, RI:
Naval War College Press, 2008.
West Jr., F.J. et al. “Sea Plan 2000.” In: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s – Selected
Documents, edited by John Hattendorf, 103-124. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press,
2007).
Interviews and Official Statements Listed by Date
Bayazit, Vural. “A Secure Turkey – A Secure Alliance.“ By Naval Forces. Naval Forces
Special Supplement: Turkish Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1992): 2-8.
Bathurst, Benjamin. “The Royal Navy in the 1990s.” Naval Forces, Vol. 14, 4 (1993): 14-21.
Hultman, Torbjörn. “Reforming the Swedish Navy.” Military Technology: Special
Supplement: Defence Procurement in Sweden – FMV: The Swedish Defence Materiel
Administration, (1993): 62-71.
Prytz, Kjell Amund. “The Way Ahead.” By Naval Forces. Naval Forces Special Issue:
Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 18-23.
Rein, Torolf. “The Quality of Our Forces Remains a Primary Condition.” Naval Forces
Special Issue: Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 4.
Boehmer, Hans-Rudolf. “… Today, the Navy is Better and More Capable Than Ever Before.”
Naval Forces, Special Issue 5 (1996): 6-10.
Kroon, Luuk. “Roles, Missions and Force Structure of the Royal Netherlands Navy.” Naval
Forces, Special Issue (1996): 4-7.
Nordbeck, Peter. “Preparing the Navy For the Next Century.” By Naval Forces. Naval Forces
Special Issue: The Royal Swedish Navy – Today and Tomorrow 2 (1996): 4-8.
Guarnieri,Umberto. “Roles, Missions and the Force Structure of the Italian Fleet.” By Naval
Forces. Naval Forces, Special Issue 1 (1997): 10-16.
193
Hauger-Johanessen, Eivind. “The Navy Materiel Command Norway: Facing A Historic
Challenge.” Military Technology, Vol. 21, 12 (1997): 32-40
Mariani, Angelo. “A Strategic View of the Italian Navy.” Naval Forces, Special Issue 1
(1997): 6-8.
Lavonen, Eero. “Finland’s International Cooperation For Defence Material.” Military
Technology: Special Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 6-8.
Taina, Anneli. “National Defence Vitally Important to Finland.” Military Technology: Special
Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 3.
Hinden, Alan. “La Fayette Ship Profile (I).” By Naval Forces Naval Forces. Naval Forces,
Vol. 19, 2 (1999): 45-47.
Di Paolo, Giampaolo. “Il Concetto Stregico del Capoi die Stato Maggiore dell Difesa. 2005.” Acccessed 19.04.2015, mercury.ethz.ch/.../Files/.../Italy_Eng-2004.pdf.
Bangar, Manohar K. “Nobody asked me but… The Royal Navy: Whither Goes Thou?”
Proceedings, March (2008). Accessed 15.03.2015,
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-03/nobody-asked-me.
Kissinger, Henry. “SPIEGEL Interview with Henry Kissinger: ‘Europeans Hide Behind the
Unpopularity of President Bush’ By Spiegel. Spiegel Online International, February 18, 2008.
Accessed 23.04.2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,535964,00.html.
Branciforte, Bruno. “The Commanders Respond: Italian Navy.” Naval Institute Proceedings,
March (2012). Accessed 22.04.2014, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-
03/commanders-respond-italian-navy
Di Paola, Giampaolo. “L’evoluzione della Difesa italiana negli ultimi trent'anni.“ Ministerio
Della Difesa. 28 September, 2012. Accessed
14.04.2015,http://www.difesa.it/Il_Ministro/Articoli/Pagine/LEVOLUZIONEDELLADIFES
AITALIANA.aspx
Department of Defense. “Remarks by Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey on the fiscal year
2015 budget preview in the Pentagon Briefing Room, Transcript.” 24 February, 2014.
Accessed 13.04.2015,
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5377.
Enström, Karin. “Interview Karin Enström. Sweden’s Defense Minister.” By Defense News.
Defence News, 18 August (2014), 22.
Trojahn, Frank. “The Commanders Response: Royal Danish Navy.” Naval Institute
Proceedings, March (2015). Accessed 1.04.2015,
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-03/commanders-respond-royal-danish-
navy.
194
Secondary Sources:
Monographs and Editions
Alifantis, Stelios, and Christos Kollias. “Greece,” In: Arms Procurement Decision Making
Volume II: Chile, Greece, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Taiwan, edited by Ravinder
Pal Singh, 39-66. Oxford: University Press, 2000.
Baker III, A.D. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 2000-2001. Their
Ships, Aircraft, and Systems. Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
Ballard, John R. et al. From Kabul to Baghdad and Back. The U.S: at War in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 2012.
Beedall, Richard. “The Royal Navy: Mind the Gaps,” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2014,
edtied by Conrad Waters, 77-87. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013.
Bernard, Prézelin, Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1992-93. Their Ships,
Aircraft, and Systems. Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
Bishop, Chris (ed.). The Encyclopedia of World Sea Power. A comprehensive Encyclopedia of
the World’s Navies and their Warships. London: Guild Publishing, 1988.
Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent, The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. New York:
Anchor Books, 2009.
Bush, Steve. British Warships & Auxiliaries. Liskeard, Cornwall: Maritime Books, 2013.
Cernuschi, Enrico and Vincent P. O’Hara. “Fleet Review – Italy: The Marina Militare: A
Well-balanced Force in Time of Crisis.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, edited by
Conrad Waters, 79-89. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012.
Cernuschi, Enrico and Vincent P. O’Hara. “Significant Ships – The Aircraft Carrier Cavour:
Doctrine and Sea Power in the Italian Navy.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, edited
by. Conrad Waters, 116-131. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009.
Chant, Chris. Kriegsschiffe Heute. Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 2006.
Chant, Chris. Ships of the World’s Navies. London: Brain Trodd Publishing House, 1990.
Childs, Nick. Britain’s Future Navy. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2014.
Corbett, Julian S. Principles of Maritime Strategy. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications 2004,
(1911).
195
Coticchia, Fabrizio. “Il Lungo Sentiero sul Lago di Ghiaccio: L’Evoluzione della Politica di
Difesa Italiana dalla Fine della Guerra Fredda all’Operazione Leonte.” PhD diss., Lucca:
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, 2009.
Dokos, Thanos P. and Panayotis J. Tsakonas. “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War
Era” In: Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A political Economy
Perspective, edited by Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen, 10-35. New York: Nova
Science, 2003.
Ferguson, Niall. Civilization: The West and the Rest. New York: Penguin Books, 2011.
Friedman, Norman. “Technology Review. Ballistic Missile Defense and The USN.” In:
Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, edited by Conrad Waters, 184-191. South Yorkshire:
Seaforth Publishing, 2012.
Friedman, Norman. “Technological Reviews – Naval Sensors and Weapons.” In: Seaforth
World Naval Review 2010, edited by Conrad Waters, 167-176. South Yorkshire: Seaforth,
2009.
Friedman, Norman. The Fifty Year War. Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War. London:
Chatham Publishing, 2000.
Grant,R.G. Battle at Sea: 3,000 Years of Naval Warfare. London: Dorling Kindersley
Limited, 2008.
Gray, Colin S. The Leverage of Sea Power, The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War. New
York: The Free Press, 1992.
Hess, Sigurd. “Die konzeptionelle Planung der Marine 1989-2002.” In: Die Wende. Die
Deutsche Marine auf dem Weg in die Einheit, edited by Stephan Huck, Hartmut Klüver, 21-
30. Bochum: Dieter Winkler Verlag, 2007.
Holsti, Kalevi J. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Hury Myron, et al. Interoperability, A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations.
Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000.
Kaak, Ulf. Die Schiffe der Deutschen Marine: 1990 bis heute. München: GeraMond Verlag,
2013.
Koda, Yoji. “Naval developments in Japan.” In: Olso Files on Defense and Security: The rise
of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, edited by Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø,
53-66. Oslo: Dec 2012.
Kollias, Christos and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen (eds.). Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century:
Conflict or Cooperation. A political Economy Perspective. New York: Nova Science, 2003.
Krüger, Dieter, and Felix Schneider (eds.). Die Alpen im Krieg: Historischer Raum, Strategie
und Sicherheitspolitik. Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 2012.
196
Larrabee, F. Stephen et al. NATO and the Challenges of Austerity. Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2012.
Lewis, William J. The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy. London: McGraw-Hill,
1982.
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Mahan On Naval Warfare. Selections from the Writing of Rear
Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. Edited by Allan Westcott. Mineola NY: Dover Publications, 1999
(1941).
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Mineola: Dover
Publications, 1890. Accessed 13. 04. 2015. https://archive.org/details/seanpowerinf00maha.
Meyer, Berthold. “Von der Entgrenzung nationaler deutscher Interessen. Die politische
Legitimation weltweiter Militäreinsätze.” HSFK-Report 10/2007. Frankfurt a.M: 2007.
Moulin, Jean. “France: The Marine Nationale: The Bare Minimum for the Job.” In: Seaforth
World Naval Review 2015, edited by Conrad Waters, 76-87. South Yorkshire: Seaforth
Publishing, 2014.
Nye Jr, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics. New York: Public
Affairs, 2004.
Øystein Tunsjø. “Maritime developments in Asia: implications for Norway,” In: Olso Files on
Defense and Security: The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, edited by Bjørn
Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø Tunsjø, 93-104. Oslo: Dec. 2012.
Parry, Chris. Super Highway, Sea Power in the 21st Century. London: Elliot and Thompson
Limited, 2014.
Polmar, Norman. The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 15th
Edition. Annapolis M.A: Naval institute Press, 1993.
Polmar, Norman. The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 19th
Edition. Annapolis M.A: Naval institute Press, 2013.
Reynolds, Clark G. Command of the Sea. The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires.
Malabar: Krieger Publishing, 1985 [1974].
Roberts, John. Safeguarding the Nation: The Story of the Modern Royal Navy. Barnsley:
Seaforth Publishing, 2009.
Rommetveit, Karl and Bjørn Terjesen. “Introduction.” In: Oslo Files on Defense: The Rise of
naval power in Asia and Europe’s decline, edited by Bjørn Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø, 9-
16. Oslo: December 2012.
Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin,
2005.
Tangredi, Sam J. Anti-Access Warfare, Countering A2/AD Strategies. Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2013.
197
Till, Geoffrey. “A global survey of naval trends: the British approach.” In: Oslo Files on
Defence and Security, The Rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, edtied by Bjørn
Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø, 17-28. Oslo: December 2012.
Till, Geoffrey. Seapower. A Guide for the Twenty-First Century: Revised and Updated Third
Edition. New York: Routledge, 2013.
Toremans, Guy. “Significant Ships – Braunschweig Class Corvettes. Eagerly awaited by the
German Navy.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, edited by Conrad Waters, 128-147.
South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012.
Toremans, Guy. “Significant Ships – Iver Huitfeldt Class Frigates: Spearhead of the Royal
Danish Navy.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2014, edited by Conrad Waters, 104-119
South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013.
Toremans, Guy. “Significant Ships – Skjold Class FACs: Norway’s Fighting Cats: Stealth
Reigns Supreme.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, edited by Conrad Waters, 124-139.
South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014.
Toremans, Guy. “Significant Ships – Sweden’s Visby Class Corvettes: Stealth at All Levels.”
In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2012, edited by Conrad Waters, 148-165. South Yorkshire:
Seaforth Publishing, 2011.
Tsilikas, Stergios. “Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and Its Implications
on Greek-Turkish Relations.” Master Thesis, Monterey: U.S. Navy: Naval Postgraduate
School. 2001. Accessed 14.04.2015, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a397555.pdf.
Tsypkin, Mikhail. “The challenge of understanding the Russian Navy,” In: Olso Files on
Defense and Security: The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, edited by Bjørn
Terjesen and Øystein Tunsjø, 79-92. Oslo: December 2012.
Waters, Conrad. “Significant Ships – Italian Fremms: Carlo Bergamini (General Purpose) and
Virginio Fasan (Anti-Submarine) Frigates.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2015, edited by
Conrad Waters, 88-107. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014.
Waters, Conrad. “Regional Review – Asia and the Pacific.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review
2014, edited by Conrad Waters, 62-76. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013.
Waters, Conrad, “Regional Review – Europe and Russia.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review
2010, edited by Conrad Waters, 86-106. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009.
Waters. Conrad. “Regional Review – Europe and Russia.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review
2014, edited by Conrad Waters, 62-76. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013.
Waters, Conrad. “Regional Review – Europe and Russia.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review
2015, edited by Conrad Waters, 60-75. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2014.
Waters, Conrad. “Significant Ships – France’s Aquitaine: First French FREMM Heralds a
Renaissance for Its Surface Fleet.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2013, edited by Conrad
Waters, 90-107. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2012.
198
Waters, Conrad. “Significant Ships – Germany’s Type 212A Submarines: Cutting-Edge
Technology Drives German Maritime Transformation.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review
2014, edited by Conrad Waters, 137-154. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013.
Waters, Conrad. “Significant Ships – HMS Daring: The Royal Navy’s Type 45 Air-Defence
Destroyer.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review 2010, edited by Conrad Waters, 132-149. South
Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009.
Wertheim, Eric. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World. 16th
Edition. Their
Ships, Aircraft, and Systems. Annapolis MA: Naval Institute Press, 2013.
Xia, Dawei. “China – The People’s Liberation Army Navy.” In: Seaforth World Naval Review
2010, edited by Conrad Waters, 56-65. South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2009.
Journals and Newspapers
“‘Grupo Alfa’ – the Spanish Navy’s Main Fighting Force.” Naval Forces, Vol. 12, 5 (1991):
16-28.
“‘Optimar 95’ For The French Navy.” Military Technology, Vol. 16, 9 (1992): 52.
“France and Italy Launch Joint Frigate Programme.” Military Technology, Vol. 27, 2 (2003):
64-68.
“Mare Nostrum: Commando e Controllo e Operazioni Aeronavali.” Foto X-tra’gli speciali di
Revista Italiana Difesa, 10 (2014).
“MICOS – The New Mine Countermeasure Systems for the Royal Norwegian Navy.“ Naval
Forces Special Issue: Norwegian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow (1995): 38-42.
“Ship Construction and New Projects.” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 4 (1997): 27
“The Italian Naval Industry.” Naval Forces, Special Issue 1 (1997): 36-46.
“Turkish Navy – Reasons to Celebrate.” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 4 (1994): 23-24.
“La Fayette Frigate Programme: A Major Success.” Naval Forces. Special Issue: French
Naval Technology (1994): 21-22.
Annati, Massimo. “European Aircraft Carrier Programmes.” Military Technology, Vol. 29, 10
(2005):42-49.
Annati, Massimo. “German and Dutch AAW Frigates at Sea.” Military Technology, Vol. 26,
3-4 (2002): 102-108.
Ballantyne, Iain. “NATO Boss Make Vow TO PROTECT BALTIC.” Warships International
Fleet Review, Jan. (2015): 2.
199
Ballentyne, Iain. “The Big Interview, First Sea Lord of the RN.” Warships International Fleet
Review, September (2009): 4-7 & 32-33.
Beaufort, Francis. “French Chiefs ‘In Revolt’.” Warship International Fleet Review, July
(2014): 3.
Bekdil, Burak Ege and Umit Enginsoy. “Mediterranean Littoral Dispute Challenges Turkish
Navy.” Defense News, 9 January (2012): 10.
Bonsignore, Ezio et al. “Finland.” Military Technology. The World Defence Almanac 1990.
Issue 1 (1990): 116-117.
Bonsignore, Ezio et al. “Germany.” Military Technology. The World Defence Almanac 2014,
Issue 1 (2014) 125-136.
Bonsignore, Ezio et al. “Indonesia.” Military Technology. The World Defence Almanac 1992-
1993, Issue 1 (1993): 189-191.
Bonsignore, Ezio et al. “Norway.” Military Technology. World Defence Almanac 2004, Issue
1 (2004): 147-149.
Bonsignore, Ezio et al. “United Kingdom,” Military Technology. The World Defence Almanac
1995-96, Issue 1 (1996): 167-171.
Bonsignore, Ezio et al. “United States of America.” Military Technology. The World Defence
Almanac 2014, Issue 1 (2014): 28-44.
Busquets i Vilanova, Camil. “The Spanish F-100 Frigates.” Naval Forces, Vol. 17, 5 (1996):
24-30.
Cavas, Christopher. “Aboard Danish Frigate, Clean Lines and Room to Grow.” Defense
News, 17 November (2014): 11.
Dudney, Robert S. “Verbatim.” Air Force Magazine, July (2013): 45.
Eberle, James. “Maritime Strategy,” Naval Forces, Vol. 8, 2 (1987): 38-49.
Enginsoy, Umit and Burak Ege Bekdil. “Does Turkey Need an Aircraft Carrier?” Defense
News, 7 May (2012): 13.
Enginsoy, Umit and Burak Ege Bekdil. “Turkey Seeks Full Littoral Defense Architecture.”
Defense News, 10 January (2011): 13.
Ezio, Bonsignore et al. “United Kingdom,” Military Technology. The World Defense Almanac
1995, Issue 1 (1995): 156-167.
Freeman, Sam Perlo et al. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2012.” In: SIPRI Fact
Sheet, April (2013).
200
Freeman, Sam Perlo et al. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014.” In: SIPRI Fact
Sheet, April (2015).
Giorgerini, Giorgio. “The Italian Navy in the 1990s.” Military Technology, Vol. 14, 5 (1990):
47-54.
Grolleau Henri-Pierre. “RAFALE Demonstrates Interoperability.” Military Technology, Vol.
32, 10 (2008): 94.
Guarnieri, Umberto. “Roles, Missions and the Force Structure of the Italian Fleet.” Naval
Forces, Special Issue 1 (1997): 10-16.
Harboe-Hansen, Hans. “Swedish Naval Trends And Programmes.” Military Technology, Vol.
17, 12 (1993): 20.
Harboe-Hansen, Hans. “The Royal Danish Navy’s Modernisation Programme.” Naval Forces,
Vol 18, 6 (1997): 92-95.
Herwig, Michael. “Trilateral Cooperation for a Frigate Programme – Spain, the Netherlands,
and Germany.” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 5 (1994): 35-38.
Hooton, E.R. “’Delivering Security in a Changing World’: UK Defence White Paper 2003.”
Military Technology, Vol. 28, 2 (2004): 76-78.
Hooton, E.R. “Britain’s Strategic Defence Review: Smiles All Around.” Military Technology,
Vol. 22, 9 (1998): 32-36.
Hooton, E.R. “Britain’s Type 45 Destroyers Advantage.” Military Technology, Vol. 25, 6
(2001): 57-60.
Ikenberry, John G. “The Illsuion of Geopoltiics. The Enduring Power of Liberal Order.” In:
Foreign Affairs, May/June (2014): 80-91.
Kopp, Carlo. “COIN reorientation – too far or not far enough.” Defence Today, Vol. 9, 2
(2011): 24-27.
Lefebvre, Jean-Charles. “The French Navy in a Phase of Transition.” By Naval Forces. Naval
Forces, Vol. 13, 5 (1992): 37-41.
Lok, Joris Jansen. “Danish Decision.” Defense Technology International, April (2007): 17.
Lok, Joris Janssen. “On the Beat: Robust Ocean Patrol Vessels Maintain Law and Order on
the Seas.” Defense Technology International, November (2007): 33-39.
MacKenzie, Christina, and Andy Nativi. “Mission Ready: Amphibious Ship Designs Meet
Diverse Operational Needs.” Defense Technology International, Vol. 3, 3 (2009): 34-35.
Maninger, Stephan. “Der Schattenkrieg – Ergänzungen zur „Counterinsurgency“ – Debatte,”
Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 3 (2013): 301-306.
201
Mead, Walter Russel. “The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of Revisionist Power.” In:
Foreign Affairs, May/June (2014): 69-79.
Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” International
Affairs, Vol. 86, 2 (2010): 333-353.
Nativi, Andy. “Mission Ready: Italy’s New Carrier Has Multiple Roles.” Defense Technology
International, Vol. 2, 8 (2008): 19-20.
O’Dwyer, Gerard. “Nordic Support for Baltic Littoral Defenses.” Defense News, 9 January
(2012): 11.
O’Dwyer, Gerard. “Norway Maintains Littoral Focus on High North.” Defence News, January
10 (2011): 12.
O’Dwyer, Gerard. “Norway, Sweden Spending Billions To Secure Surrounding Seas.”
Defence News, October 17 (2011): 19.
Peels, Arno. “New Thinking in Netherlands Defense.” Military Technology, Vol. 25, 12
(2001): 93-96.
Philippe, Jean-Paul. “The CHARLES DE GAULLE Takes Shape.” Military Technology, Vol.
16, 10 (1992): 44-52.
Preston, Antony. “France’s Naval Industry in the 1990s.” Naval Force, Vol. 13, 5 (1992): 14-
24.
Preston, Antony. “The Italian Navy Today.” Naval Forces, Vol. 14, 6 (1993): 28-32.
Preston, Antony. “Warship Design for the French Navy.” Naval Forces, Vol. 13, 1 (1992):
16-22.
Promé, Jean-Louis. “The French 1992-94 Military Programme Law: A Case of ‘Let’s Wait
and See’ While Adapting.” Military Technology, Vol. 16, 9 (1992): 42-43.
Rhades, Jürgen. “The German Navy Faces the Future.” Naval Forces, 6 (1992): 18-22.
Rubel, Robert C. “Straight Talk on Forward Presence.” Naval Institute Proceedings, March
(2015): 24-29.
Sadlowski, Manfred. “What is different from Finland.” Military Technology, Special
Supplement: Defence In Finland, Vol. 22, 6 (1998): 2.
Scholik, Nikolaus. “Mahan oder Corbett: Das maritim-strategische Dilemma ‚Chinamerika‘
im indo-pazifischen Raum.” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Vol. 2 (2013): 140-151.
Schubjé, Pierre. “UNIFIL: Deutsch-libanesische Kooperation – Ein Zwischenbericht.” Marine
Forum, 1-2 (2014): 14-16.
Sloggett, Dave and Ian Ballantiyne. “Franco Russian Carrier Saga.” Warships International
Fleet Review, January (2015): 13-14.
202
Sloggett, Dave, and Iain Ballantyne. “Charting a new course for the ‘Special Relationship’ at
sea.” Warships International Fleet Review, March (2015): 18-19.
Sloggett, Dave. “India’s Navy Falter,” Warships International Fleet Review, July (2014): 12-
13.
Sloggett, Dave. “Norway Leads Where Others Should Follow.” Warships International Fleet
Review, May (2009): 22-23.
Sloggett, Dave. “Norway Leads Where Others Should Follow.” Warships International Fleet
Review, May (2009): 23
.
Stöhs, Jeremy. “Intelligence and Deterrence at Sea. The Role of US Naval Information
Technology During the 1980s and Today.” JIPPS, Vol. 8, 2 (2014): 73-91.
Stöhs, Jeremy. “US Defense Policy Since the End of the Cold War: The Difficulty of
Establishing a Balanced Force Structure.” JIPSS, Vol. 8, 1 (2014): 139-141.
Thalassocrates, Alcibiades. “A Fateful Name – Horizon.” Naval Forces, Vol. 18, 2 (1997):
14-15.
Thalassocrates, Alcibiades. “Glimmer on the HORIZON.” Military Technology, Vol. 19, 7
(1995): 10-17.
Toremans, Guy. “Belgian-Dutch Naval Cooperation.” Naval Forces, Vol. 15, 6 (1994): 18-24.
Toremans, Guy. “Sweden’s High Speed Stealtyh V-Force.” Warships International Fleet
Review, Jan (2014): 29-31.
Articles and General Information from Digital Sources
“Amphibious transport dock.” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. Accessed 14.04.2015,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_transport_dock.
“Baltische Länder erhöhen Militärausgaben.” news.ORF.at, 13 April (2015). Accessed
15.04.2015, http://orf.at/stories/2273071/2273070/.
“Egypt Close To Buying 22 Rafale Fighters, 2 FREMM Frigates Worth Euro 6 Billion.”
DefenseWorld.net, 16 January (2015). Accessed 14.04.2015,
https://www.defenseworld.net/news/11936/Egypt_Close_To_Buying_22_Rafale_Fighters__2
_FREMM_Frigates_Worth_Euro_6_Billion#.VTTqZZMaZew.
“Exclusive Economic Zone,” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. Accessed 14.04.2015,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone.
“Finland is Buying Dutch Leopards for €200 Million.” DefenseUpdate, 19 January (2014).
Accessed 14.04.2015, http://defense-
update.com/20140119_finland_buys_dutch_leopards.html#.VQSkpuFY5ew.
203
“France deploys aircraft carrier in Arabian Gulf for ISIL fight.” The National World, 23
February (2015). Accessed 14.04.2015, http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/france-
deploys-aircraft-carrier-in-arabian-gulf-for-isil-fight.
“Frigate Berthed for its spare parts.” NEWS in ENGLISH.no, 30 September (2013). Accessed
10.04.2015, http://www.newsinenglish.no/2013/09/30/frigate-berthed-for-spare-parts/.
“General Dynamics Awarded $18 Billion by U.S. Navy for 10 Virginia-Class Submarines.”
General Dynamics.com, 28 April (2014). Accessed 14.04.2015,
http://www.generaldynamics.com/news/press-
releases/detail.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1811=19222.
“List of countries by GDP nominal,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Accessed
14.04.2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29.
“Mistral-class amphibious assault ship.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Accessed
14.04.2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mistral-class_amphibious_assault_ship.
“Norway Cuts Afghan Aid over Lack of Progress on Women’s Rights.” TOLOnews, 5
October (2013). Accessed 15.04.2015, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12168-
norway-cuts-afghan-aid-over-lack-of-progress-on-womens-rights.
“Operation Enduring Freedom.” iCasualties.org. Accessed 14.04.2015,
http://icasualties.org/oef/Nationality.aspx?hndQry=Denmark.
“Port of Rotterdam.” Accessed 14.04.2015, http://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/Port/port-in-
general/Pages/default.aspx.
“Series 70 Galerna-type submarines.” globalsecurity.com. Accessed 10.03.2015,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/s-70.htm.
“Sweden sends eight fighter jets to Libya.” The Swedish Wire, 29 March (2011). Accessed
11.04.2015, http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/9146-sweden-sends-eight-fighter-jets-to-
libya.
“UK: BAE Systems Secures $1.92 Bln Submarine Deal.” Navaltoday.com, 11 December
(2012). Accessed 25.02.2015, http://navaltoday.com/2012/12/11/uk-bae-systems-secures-1-
92-bln-submarine-deal/.
“Vom Flugzeugträgerverband verabschiedet - Fregatte "Hamburg" macht
Heimatumdrehungen!” Presseportal. 18 June (2013). Accessed
11.04.2015,http://www.presseportal.de/pm/67428/2495613/vom-flugzeugtr-gerverband-
verabschiedet-fregatte-hamburg-macht-heimatumdrehungen.
Agence France-Presse, “Italy Removes Aircraft Carrier from Libya Campaign,” Defense
News, 7 July (2011). Accessed 18.04.2015,
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20110707/DEFSECT05/107070311/Italy-Removes-
Aircraft-Carrier-from-Libya-Campaign.
204
Andersson. Jan Joel. “Nordic NATO. Why It’s Time For Finland and Sweden to Join the
Alliance.” Foreign Affairs, 30 April (2012). Accessed 14.04.2015,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141377/jan-joel-andersson/nordic-nato.
Chuter, Andrew. “Cameron: UK Will Operate 2 Aircraft Carriers.” Defense News, 5
September (2014). Accessed 21.03.2015,
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140905/DEFREG01/309050019/Cameron-UK-
Will-Operate-2-Aircraft-Carrier.
Council on Foreign Relations. “U.S. War in Afghanistan, 1999-Present.” Accessed
14.04.2015, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018.
Davies, Lizzy and Arthur Neslen. “Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue mission ‘puts thousands at
risk’.” The Guardian, 31 October (2014). Accessed 11.04.2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/italy-sea-mission-thousands-risk.
DeYoung, Karen and Greg Jaffe. “NATO runs short on some munitions in Libya.” The
Washington Post, 15 April (2011). Accessed 18.04.2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in-
libya/2011/04/15/AF3O7ElD_story.html.
DeYoung, Karen and Greg Jaffe. “NATO runs short on some munition in Libya,” The
Washington Post, 15 April (2011). Accessed 06.02.2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in-
libya/2011/04/15/AF3O7ElD_story.html.
Duxbury, Charlie. “Sweden Plans to Increase Military Spending.” Wall Street Journal, 12
March (2015). Accessed 29.04.2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-plans-to-increase-
military-spending-1426198507.
Engelbrecht, Leon. “Fact file: Denel Dynamics Umkhonto naval short-range surface-to-air
missile.” DefenseWeb, 3 November (2008). Accessed 14.04.2015,
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=610.
Frisk, Corporal. “Where are the Finnish Submarines?” Corporal Frisk Wordpress, 3 January,
(2015). Accessed 14.04.2015, https://corporalfrisk.wordpress.com/2015/01/03/where-are-the-
finnish-submarines/.
Gonzáles, Miguel. “España intervendrá con cuatro cazas F-18, una fragata F-100, un
submarino y un avión de vigilancia maritime.” El País International, 19 March (2011).
Accessed 15.03.2015,
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/03/19/actualidad/1300489214_850215.html
Gonzalez, Jose Alberto. “La Armada da de Baja el ‘Siroco’ y Centra Sus Esfuerzos en Los
Submarines S-80 [The Navy Withdraws the ‘Sirocco’ and Focuses Its Efforts on the
Submarine S-80].” La Verdad, 8 May (2012). Accessed 24.03.2015,
http://www.laverdad.es/murcia/v/20120508/cartagena/armada-baja-siroco-centra-
20120508.html.
205
Hammes, T.X. “Getting Our Money’s Worth: LCS VS Iver Huitfeldt-class.” War on the
Rocks, 6 August (2013). Accessed 11.04.2015, http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/getting-
our-moneys-worth-lcs-vs-iver-huitfeldt-class/.
Hernandez, Marcial. “Dutch Hard Power: Choosing Decline.” American Enterprise Institute,
3 April (2013). Accessed 14.04.2015, http://www.aei.org/publication/dutch-hard-power-
choosing-decline/.
“Spada (Flugabwehrsystem).” Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. Accessed 14.04.2015,
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spada_%28Flugabwehrsystem%29.
Ing, David and Fenella McGerty. “Update: Spain to Increase Defence Spending.” IHS Janes
360, 1 October (2014). Accessed 19.04.2015, http://www.janes.com/article/43968/update-
spain-to-increase-defence-spending.
Jones, Ben. “Franco-British military cooperation a new engine for European defence?”
Occasional Paper 88, February (2011). Accessed 14.04.2015., www.iss.europa.eu/.../op88--
Franco-British_military_cooperation--a_new_engine_for_European_defense.pdf.
Kingston, Tom. “Italy Closing in on Patrol Vessel Deal.” Defense News, 26 October (2014).
Accessed 14.04.2015,
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20141026/DEFREG01/310260018/Italy-Closing-
Major-Patrol-Vessel-Deal.
LaGrone, Sam. “Navy Asks Industry for Input for Follow-on to Littoral Combat Ship.” USNI
News, 30 April (2014). Accessed 11.04.2015, http://news.usni.org/2014/04/30/navy-asks-
industry-input-follow-littoral-combat-ship.
Lert, Frédéric. “Egypt to acquire FREMM frigate.” HIS Jane’s 360, 23 February (2015).
Accessed 23.03.2015, http://www.janes.com/article/49163/egypt-to-acquire-fremm-frigate.
Lowe, Joch. “EU Migration: why has the Home Office opposed rescuing migrants?”
Prospect, 28 October (2014). Accessed 11.03.2015,
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/blogs/prospector-blog/eu-migration-why-has-the-home-
office-opposed-rescuing-migrants.
McGrath, Bryan. “NATO at sea: Trends in allied naval firepower.” American Enterprise
Institute, 18 September (2013). Accessed 07.04.2015, http://www.aei.org/publication/nato-at-
sea-trends-in-allied-naval-power/.
Merrill, Jamie. “MoD asks for American help in searching for Russian submarine near
Scotland.” The Independent, 1 April (2014). Accessed 15.03.2015,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mod-asks-for-american-help-in-searching-for-
russian-submarine-near-scotland-9966080.html.
Müller, Albrecht. “New Frigate Underscores Germany’s Shift From Cold War Naval
Combat.” Defense News, 13 January (2014). Accessed 23.03.2015,
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140113/DEFREG01/301130031/New-Frigate-
Underscores-Germany-s-Shift-From-Cold-War-Naval-Combat.
206
Nitschke, Stefan and Stephen Elliott. “Under Water.” Naval Forces. Accessed 19.04.2015,
http://www.nafomag.com/2015/01/under-water-faq-on-submarines.html.
O’Dwyer, Gerard. “Sweden Plans Defense Spending Boost.” Defense News.com, 15 October
(2013). Accessed 11.04.2015,
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20131015/DEFREG01/310150017/Sweden-Plans-
Defense-Spending-Boost.
Pagenkopf, Chris. “Cooperation is the Key to NATO’s Future.” Naval Institute Proceedings,
September (2014). Accessed 17.03.2015, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-
09/cooperation-key-natos-future.
Puente, Íñigo. “Plan Alta Mar: ¿sueño de lo que pudo ser o anticipo de lo que será?” Revista
Naval, December (1997). Accessed 29.03.2015, http://www.revistanaval.com/www-
alojados/armada/especial/planalta.htm.
Salisbury, Cascyone Cecil. “From a letter to Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 1st Earl of Lytton.” 15
June (1877). Accessed, 24.04.2015,
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Robert_Gascoyne-Cecil,_3rd_Marquess_of_Salisbury.
Seidler, Felix. “Europe’s Role in an East Asian War.” Center for International Maritime
Security, 11 June (2014). Accessed 17.03.2015, http://cimsec.org/europes-role-east-asian-
war/11576.
Seidler, Felix. “NATO’s PIVOT TO RUSSIA: COLD WAR 2.0 AT SEA?” Center for
International Maritime Security, 25 April (2014). Accessed 19.04.2015,
http://cimsec.org/natos-pivot-russia-cold-war-2-0-sea/10723.
Smith, Gary J. “Italian Hard Power: Ambitions and Fiscal Realities.” American Enterprise
Institute, 1 November (2012). Accessed 18.04.2015, http://www.aei.org/publication/italian-
hard-power-ambitions-and-fiscal-realities/.
Tanchum, Micha’el. “Turkey Vulnerable to Rising Russian Power in the Black Sea.” The
Turkey ANALYST. A Biweekly Briefing on Current Affairs, 9 April (2014). Accessed
02.04.2015. http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/101-
turkey-vulnerable-to-rising-russian-power-in-the-black-sea.html.
Unitis, Viribus. “Nordic NATO Nominees.” Center for International Maritime Security, 9
May (2014). Access 14.04.2015, http://cimsec.org/nordic-nato-nominees/11192.
Wee, Sui-Lee. “China explains why it’s building islands in the South China Sea.” Business
Insider UK, 9 April, 2015. Accessed 18.04.2015, http://uk.businessinsider.com/china-
explains-why-its-building-islands-in-the-south-china-sea-2015-4?r=US.
Wills, Steven. “LCS Versus the Danish Strawman.” Center for International Maritime
Security, 19 February (2015). Accesssed 14.04.2015, http://cimsec.org/lcs-versus-danish-
strawman/14974.
Salisbury, Cascoyne Cecil. From a letter to Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 1st Earl of Lytton, 15 June
(1877).
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Robert_Gascoyne-Cecil,_3rd_Marquess_of_Salisbury.
207
Videos
Se Durand, Etienne. “NATO in an ERA of Global Competition, Defending Borders.”
Accessed 17.04.2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VLZSQjBpHNk.
Friedman, George. “A forecast for the 21st century: George Friedman. ANU.” Accessed
14.04.2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiMRAhupqE0.
Mearsheimer, John. “Imperial by Design.” Accessed 11.04.2015,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKFHe0Y6c_0.
Posen, Barry. “Panel Discussion: A Moment of Transition.” Accessed 17.04.2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIg_ZDHeoJg.
RUSI “Debating Continuous-at-Sea Deterrence: Britain's Nuclear Security.” Accessed
11.04.2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jC3-
TPRnXhM&list=PLFAgO2TZWpwBH9t3LB4CJscyDOo5M3dt9
Willett, Lee. “The Strategic Defence and Security Review, A Preliminary RUSI Assessment.”
Accessed 11.04.2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yt0NOuFL_Ss.
List of Illustrations
All accessed on the 24.04.2015
Illustration 1: Arguably the most renowned naval strategist: Alfred Thayer Mahan, in:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c7/Alfred-Thayer-
Mahan.jpg/640px-Alfred-Thayer-Mahan.jpg ........................................................................... 15
Illustration 2: Map of Chinese Lines of Defense, Military Power of China 2009, in:
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ .................................................................................................. 26
Illustration 3: Map of main trade routes to China, Military Power of China 2009, in:
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ .................................................................................................. 27
Illustration 4: Picture of an American Carrier Battle Group under way in the Pacific, in:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Marcd30319/Marcd30319_original_Carrier_Strike_Group_
Three_rev_2#/media/File:US_Navy_090320-N-9928E-
304_The_aircraft_carrier_USS_John_C._Stennis_%28CVN_74%29_and_ships_of_the_John
_C._Stennis_Carrier_Strike_Group_are_underway_in_formation_with_naval_vessels_from_t
he_Republic_of_Korea.jpg ...................................................................................................... 29
Illustration 5: Danish warships being dissasembled, in: http://i.imgur.com/fIXBeGb.jpg ...... 31
Illustration 6: British destroyers are conducting operations on both ends of the intensity
spectrum, in: http://i.imgur.com/vqMT0e2.jpg. ...................................................................... 35
208
Illustration 7: The HMS Sheffield burns after being hit by Argentinean anti-ship missiles, in:
http://belgranoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/HMSSheffieldBurning1.jpg .......... 38
Illustration 8: An artist’s impression of the cancelled Nimrod MRA.4 maritime patrol aircraft,
in: http://www.airforceworld.com/others/gfx/nimrod/nimrod_mra4_1.jpg. ........................... 40
Illustration 9: HMS Queen Elizabeth under construction, in: http://www.hornby.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/HMS-Queen-Elizabeth_Photo-Credit-Lee-Howard-Photography.jpg
.................................................................................................................................................. 43
Illustration 10: The Singapore version of the French La Fayette stealth frigate, in:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Singapore_Navy#/media/File:Singapore_Navy_gui
ded-missile_frigate_RSS_Steadfast.jpg ................................................................................... 55
Illustration 11: General Dempsey and Pierre de Villiers on French aircraft carrier, in:
http://l2.yimg.com/bt/api/res/1.2/iXWYwkStEhpvDet5Vh1wSw--
/YXBwaWQ9eW5ld3M7Zmk9ZmlsbDtoPTM3NztpbD1wbGFuZTtweG9mZj01MDtweW9m
Zj0wO3E9NzU7dz02NzA-
/http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/afp.com/6e74d87cb9a8c5e195af8b109c9338c7a59a4274
.jpg ............................................................................................................................................ 58
Illustration 12: French are troops are being stretched thin in numerous operations, such as the
one in Mali, in: https://metrouk2.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/ay102016400epa03549933-
fren.jpg ..................................................................................................................................... 60
Illustration 13: A picture of the French Mistral-class LHD also built for Russia, in:
http://www.lopinion.fr/sites/nb.com/files/2014/03/vladivostok_4.3.14_bp_0.jpg .................. 63
Illustration 14: Italian Maestrale frigate with Albatros SAM system, in:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/ITS-Maestrale-F570.jpg. ................... 70
Illustration 15: HADR in the Mediterranean, in: http://www.unhcr.org/thumb1/532c494c6.jpg
.................................................................................................................................................. 79
Illustration 16: European aircraft carriers at the end of the Cold War, in:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/66/551-R11-Foch-esDragon-
Hammer92b.jpg ........................................................................................................................ 86
Illustration 17: A cut-away drawing of the Juan Carlos-class LHD, in:
http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/SHIP_LHD_Canberra_Class_Concept_Cutaway.jp
g ................................................................................................................................................ 90
Illustration 18: Turkish Milgem-class frigate being launched: http://www.trdefence.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/milgem1-1.png ............................................................................... 103
Illustration 19: Hellenic guided-missile attack craft, in: http://www.defencegreece.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/EKI_0059_Medium.jpg ................................................................. 107
Illustration 20: Cut-away drawing of the German Type-214 AIP submarine, in:
http://media.defenceindustrydaily.com/images/SHIP_SSK_U-214_Cutaway_lg.jpg ........... 118
209
Illustration 21: German F-124 air defense frigate, in: http://defense-update.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Sachsen_f124.jpg ........................................................................... 120
Illustration 22: Dutch Frigate turns hard while a Danish container ship passes by, in:
https://rogueadventurer.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/hnlms-evertsen.jpg ........................... 130
Illustration 23: Illustration of the highly flexbile Danish StanFlex system, in:
http://www.navalhistory.dk/images/Skibene/FLYV_projektet/FLYVEFISKEN-klassen-er-
modu.jpg. ................................................................................................................................ 133
Illustration 24: Artists Impression of the future backbone of the Dutch Fleet, in:
http://www.defensie.nl/binaries/content/gallery/defensie/content-
afbeeldingen/onderwerpen/materieel/schepen/joint-logistic-support-ship-jss/joint-logistic-
support-ship-jss.jpg ................................................................................................................ 143
Illustration 25: Visby-class corvette, in: http://www.mapps.l-
3com.com/photo_gallery/pg_VisbyClassCorvette.jpg ........................................................... 153
Illustration 26: Swedish coastal Artillery, in: http://coldwarsites.net/country/sweden/arholma-
nord-arholma-battery/. ............................................................................................................ 155
Illustration 27: Ship being hit by Königsberg Naval Strike Missile, in:
http://i.ytimg.com/vi/xJuoqu62K-4/maxresdefault.jpg .......................................................... 159
Illustration 28: The Skjold air-cushion warship operating amon Norwegian Fjords, in:
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Skjold-Class-
Corvette.jpg ............................................................................................................................ 163
Illustration 29: All four Horizon-class air-defense destroyers, in:
http://www.deagel.com/library1/medium/2009/m02009050700006.jpg ............................... 168
Illustration 30: T Fleet Replenishment at high sea, in: https://s-media-cache-
ak0.pinimg.com/736x/27/37/28/273728d26362a60827424c8843038908.jpg. ...................... 172
Illustration 31: Chinese and Japanase commanders having a discussion during RIMPAC, in:
http://i.imgur.com/nCJevap.jpg .............................................................................................. 177
In the case of illustrations without common license, reproduction has been made without the
approval of the owner.
Recommended