The Battle of Marathon 490 B.C. Capt T. B. Pochop Marine Officer Instructor Nav Sci 421

The Battle of Marathon490 B.C.

Capt T. B. Pochop

Marine Officer Instructor

Nav Sci 421

Learning Objectives

• Understand the battle of Marathon as it pertains to the Levels of War (Policy, Strategy, Operational, and Tactical).

• Understand the 4 types of amphibious operations and how they relate to the battle of Marathon.

• Comprehend the conduct of the amphibious operation by the Persians, particularly the choice to land at Marathon.

• Relate the conduct and success/failure of the battle to the 9 Principles of War and key terms of MCDP-1 Warfighting .

General Significance

• Classic examples of:– Land power vs. sea power.– Heavy infantry shock system vs. light cavalry

missile power.– Policy, Strategy, Operational Levels of War.– 9 Principles of War.– 4 types of Amphibious Operations.

Ancient Map Orientation

Detailed Map Orientation

Marathon

Greek Hoplite

Falcata

Leaf blade ~2’

Hoplite

Hoplon 32-40” diam.

Persian Armament

Orientation

• Athenians– Led by Miltiades &

Callimachus– 10,000 troops– Phalanx formations– Heavy Infantry– Shock Action/No

firepower– No cavalry– Unbreakable front,

vulnerable flanks.

• Persians– Led by Darius

• Datis - Army Cmdr

• Artaphernes - Navy Cmdr

– 600 galleys

– 10-15,000 troops

– Light force

– Primarily cavalry

– Missile power, no shock.

Why invade the Athenians?

• Punish Athenians for supporting the Ionian revolt in 499 B.C.

• Secure west flank of Aegean Sea for Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).

• To secure south flank for attack on Scythians.

• To build the Persian Empire.

POLICY

How to get to the fight? Darius has 2 options:

• By land, supported logistically by the navy.– Persian strength -

Army

– Not limited on the number of troops

– Long, difficult, time consuming route.

• By sea, with an amphibious landing.– Direct route

– Persia is not a naval power.

– Size of invasion force limited by transport capacity.

STRATEGIC

Let’s Invade - Take 1• 492 B.C. - Darius attacks by land,

supported logistically by the Navy.– Movement halted when the navy is destroyed in

a storm off of Mt Athos.

STRATEGIC

Let’s Invade - Take 2• 490 B.C. - Darius decides to conduct an

amphibious operation.Sack Eretria first. (Amphib Raid)

STRATEGIC

Why land Marathon?

• Why land at Marathon, far from Athens? Why not land at Athens?– Intel from Hippias.– Unopposed Landing site.– Draw the garrison army out of Athens.– Conduct an amphibious envelopment on an

unprotected Athens.– Marathon supposedly has good terrain for

cavalry.

OPERATIONAL

Amphib Operations as a form of envelopment.

The influence of terrain and geography.

Force the enemy to react to you.

What happened?

• Persians land unopposed at Marathon.– Stay on beach and bivouac.

– Beach is not suitable for cavalry.

• Athenians arrive from the inland route and observe Persians encamped on the beach.– Wait for Spartans to reinforce (~2 weeks),

OR

– Attack now, before Persian plans develop further.

Seize the Initiative

Landing is rarely the key problem

Conduct of the Battle

• Athenians attack Persians on the beach.– They extend the phalanx, reinforce the flanks and thin

their center.

– They anchor the flanks along terrain obstacles.

– Persians push through the weakened Greek center.

– The strong Greek flanks destroy the lightly armed Persian flanks, and collapse on the Persian center (double envelopment).

– Hand-to-hand combat = decisive victory for Athenians.

TACTICAL

Maneuver – put the enemy at a disadvantage.

Conduct of the Battle

TACTICAL

Persians – Frontal Attack

Athenians – Double Envelopment

What happened next?

• Persian forces still attempted an amphibious envelopment on Athens.

• Successful Athenians returned to the city via inland, direct route

• Spartan reinforcements arrived• Political intrigue did not manifest in fall of Athens• End result: Persians unable to land and conduct

decisive battle

Conclusions

• Interesting attempt by Persians to use amphibious operations to draw the army out of Athens and then conduct and amphibious envelopment on Athens.

• Darius had one land and one navy commander (Split Command).

• Persian’s failure to move off the beach allowed the Athenians to seize the initiative, block exits, and choose the battlefield.

Conclusions (cont.)

• Athenians tactical control of the battle and initiative negated the strengths of the Persian army.– KIA: 192 Greeks to 6,400 Persians

• Persians forced to conduct a difficult amphibious withdrawal.