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Genealogies
of
Religion
DIS
CIP
LIN
EA
ND
RE
AS
ON
S
OF
PO
WE
RIN
CH
RIS
TIA
NIT
Y
AN
DIS
LA
M
TalalAsad
Th
eJohns
Hopkin
sU
niversityP
ress
Baltim
oreand
London
t’?’13
INT
RO
DU
CT
ION
The
essaysbrought
togetherin
thisvolum
edeal
with
historicaltopics
thatvary
intim
eand
place,ranging
fromthe
ritesof
medieval
European
monks
tothe
sermons
of
contemporary
Arab
theologians.W
hatlinks
themall
togetheris
theassum
ptionthat
Western
historyhas
hadan
overridingim
portance—for
goodor
ill—in
them
akingof
them
odernw
orld,and
thatexplorations
of
thathistory
shouldbe
am
ajoranthropological
concern.It
hassom
etimes
beennoted
thatpeo
plesfrom
non-Western
countriesfeelobliged
toread
thehistory
ofthe
West
(butnot
eachother’s
histories)and
thatW
esternersin
turn
donot
feelthe
same
needto
studynon-W
esternhistories.
The
historyof
modern
Western
thought,for
example,
canbe
(andis)
written
onits
own,
but
notso
thehistory
of contem
poraryA
rabthought.
One
op
positionbetw
eenthe
West
andthe
non-West
(andso
am
odeofcon
nectionbetw
eenthem
)is
constructedhistorically
bythese
asymm
etricaldesires
andindifferences.
My
anthropologicalexplorations
intoC
hristianand
post-Christian
historyare
thereforem
otivatedby
theconviction
thatits
conceptualgeology
hasprofound
implications
forthe
ways
inw
hichnon-W
esterntraditions
arenow
ableto
growand
change.M
oreparticularly,
Ihold
thatanthropologists
who
would
study,say,
Muslim
beliefsand
prac
ticesw
illneed
some
understandingof
how“religion”
hascom
eto
beform
edas
conceptandpractice
inthe
modern
West.
Forw
hilereligion
isintegral
tom
odernW
esternhistory,
thereare
dangersin
employing
itasa
normalizing
conceptwhen
translatingIslam
ictraditions.
The
genealogyof
religionis
acentral
theme
inm
yessays.
Thus,
chaptersxand
2sketch
theem
ergenceofreligion
asa
modern
historical
aIniroductirn
object.In
thenexttw
ochapters
Iapproach
theproblem
obliquely,by
discussingin
turn
two
elements
inm
edievalC
hristianitythat
areno
longergenerally
acceptedby
modern
religion:the
productiverole
of
physical painand
thevirtue
of self-abasem
ent.F
romthe
pointof view
of theologicalm
odernism,
asw
ellas
of secular
morality,
theyare
both
archaic(“uncivilized”)
conditions.C
hapterssand
6address
aspectsof
theasym
metry
between
Western
andnon-W
esternhistories:
thefo
r
mer
dealsw
ithproblem
sof anthropological
translation,the
latterw
ith
thelim
itationsof a
non-Christian
religioustradition
when
juxtaposed
with
theE
nlightenment
doctrineof
criticalreason.
They
dealw
ith
translationin
adouble
sense:interpreting
fromone
languageinto
another,and
conveyingsacred
relicsfrom
oneshrine
toanother.
The
two
finalchapters
(and
8)w
erew
rittenat
theheight
of the
so-called
Rushdie
affairin
responseto
theangry
positionsthen
takenup
inthe
name
ofliberalism
aboutreligious
intolerance.A
llthe
chaptersthus
dealw
ithfragm
entsof
theW
est’sreligious
history,because
Iassum
e
thatthe
West’s
definitionofitself—
andtherefore
itsengagem
ent with
non-Western
cultures—includes
thathistory.
Am
onganthropologists,
“history”is
anotion
thatfew
would
nowdare
todespise.
On
thecontrary,
allof us
solemnly
acknowledge
it.B
utw
hatkind
ofhistory?
More
oftenthan
not,it
ishistory
inthe
activevoice:
everywhere,localpeople
are“m
akingtheir
own
history,”
“contesting”it,
“borrowing”
meanings
fromW
esterndom
inators,
and“reconstructing”
theirow
ncultural
existence.’T
hisnotion
of
historyem
phasizesnot
onlythe
unceasingw
orkof
human
creators
butalso
theunstable
andhybrid
characterof
theircreation.
Insom
e
versions,therefore,
thedeterm
iningcharacter
of
“world
system”
and
“dependentstructure”
isrejected;
inothers,
what
isrepudiated
are
claims
about“authenticity,”
“adifferent
people,”“a
unitaryculture,”
“traditio
n,”
andso
on.Intelligent
andinfluential
peoplew
ritingto
dayare
comm
ittedto
thisview
ofhistory
making.
Nevertheless,
I
i.A
sJ.
andJ.
Com
aroff(1
99
1,
18)put
itin
theintroduction
totheir
fascinating
accountof
missionaries
andcolonialism
innineteenth-century
South
Africa:
“Here,
then,w
asa
processin
which
signifiersw
ereset
afloat,fought
over,and
recapturedon
bothsides
of
thecolonial
encounter.W
hatis
more,
thisencounter
ledto
theobjec
tificationofth
e’
cultureof the
colonizedin
oppositionto
thatof w
hitesW
hile
signs,social
relations,and
material
practicesare
constantlyopen
totransform
ation—
andw
hilem
eaningm
ayindeed
become
unfixed,resisted,
andreconstructed—
history
ccrvw
hcre
isactively
made
ina
dialecticofo
rder
anddisorder,
consensusand
contest”
cmphasis
inoriginal).
Introductwn
3
remain
skeptical.So
Ishall
beginby
rehearsingbriefly
what
Ifind
tobe
unconvincingabout
it,and
atthe
same
time
sketch—through
aprocess
ofresistance—
alternativeconceptions
thatorient
thefo
llow
ingchapters,
eventhough
most
ofthese
conceptionsare
nottreated
explicitlyin
them.
Early
inhis
recentR
adcliffe-Brow
nlectu
re,2
Marshall
Sahlins(1988,
2—3)
declaredhis
intention“to
jointhe
anthropologicalchorus
of
protestagainst
theidea
thatthe
globalexpansion
of
Western
capitalism
,or
theW
orldSystem
so-called,has
made
thecolonized
and‘peripheral’
peoplesthe
passiveobjects
oftheir
own
historyand
notitsauthors,
andthrough
tributaryeconom
icrelations
hastu
rned
theircultures
likewise
intoadulterated
goods.”Sahlins
proceedsto
chideE
ricW
olffor
reducingthe
historiesof
non-European
peoplesto
thehistory
of
globalcapitalism
,despite
Wolf’s
proclaimed
wish
tom
akenon-E
uropeansthe
authorsof
theirow
nhistory.
The
troublew
ithW
olf,Sahlins
tellsus,
ishis
attachment
toeconom
isticM
arxism.
Ifonlyw
ehad
am
oresophisticated
Marxist
understandingof
productionas
aculturalprocess,
we
would
atonce
seethe
falsityof
assuming
that“the
world
expansionof
capitalismbrings
allothercultural
historyto
anend”
(6).
SahIinss
historiesof the
British
openingup
ofim
perialChina,
theE
uropeancom
mercial
penetrationinto
Haw
aii,and
theK
wakiutl
ap
propriationof
European
goodsare
intendedto
showhow
eachen
counterw
asguided
bythe
culturallogic
ofthelocalpeople
concerned.Sahlins’s
narrativesare
learnedand
persuasive—although
arigorous
Marxist
might
want
topoin
tou
tthat
hedraw
shis
examples
fromthe
earlyphases
ofE
uropeanexpansion,
which
makes
iteasier
toidentify
capitalismw
ithexchange
andconsum
ptionrather
thanw
iththe
trans
formation
ofproduction
andthe
reorganizationof pow
errelatio
ns.
3
2.
This
lectureelaborates
anargum
entpresented
inS
ahlins1985.
3.M
arxhim
selfw
ouldsay
thatthe
buyingand
sellingof
comm
oditiesis
asold
asrecorded
history;that
thedistinctive
featureofm
oderncapitalism
,bycontrast,
was
thebuying
andselling
oflabor
power
andthe
consequentpenetration
of
capitalinto
theproduction
processin
theunceasing
drivefor
profitat
home
andabroad;
thatat
home
thisprocess
requiredreform
of the
law,new
factorydiscipline,
andtechnologicalin
no
vation,w
hileabroad
itfueled
trade,colonization,
andim
perialreconstruction.
One
might,
ofcourse,w
anttoshrug
offwhatM
arxsaid
aboutindustrialcapitalism,
butthat
would
notbe
consistentw
ithalso
wanting
toinvoke
hisauthority—
asS
ahlinsin
factdoes.
Incidentally,auseful
discussionfrom
aneo-M
arxistperspectiveof the
inco
rpora
4IntrE
4uctionIntroduction
Ihave
now
ishto
defendeconom
isticM
arxismhere—
orW
olf,for
thatm
atter.4
What
worries
me
isthat
theargum
entsespoused
bythis
“anthropologicalchorus”
(nowjoined
bya
chorusof
historians)are
notas
clearas
theym
ightbe.
Thus,
when
Sahlinsprotests
thatlocal
peoplesare
not“passive
objectso
ftheir
own
history,”it
shouldbe
evidentthat
thisis
notequivalent
toclaim
ingthat
theyare
its“au
thors.”T
hesense
of
authoris
ambiguous
asbetw
eenthe
personw
hoproduces
anarrative
andthe
personw
hoauthorizes
particularpow
ers,including
theright
toproduce
certainkinds
ofnarrative.
The
two
areclearly
connected,but
thereis
anobvious
sensein
which
theauthor
of
abiography
isdifferent
fromthe
authorof
thelife
thatis
itsobject—
evenif
itis
truethat
asan
individual(as
an“active
subject”),that
personis
notentirely
theauthor
of
hisow
nlife.
Indeed,since
every
oneis
insom
edegree
orother
anobject
forother
people,as
wellas
anobject
of
others’narratives,
noone
isever
entirelythe
authorof
herlife.
Peopleare
neveronly
activeagents
andsubjects
intheir
own
his
tory.T
heinteresting
questionin
eachcase
is:In
what
degree,and
inw
hatway,
arethey
agentsor
patients?“W
esterncapitalism
,”Sahlins
observes,“has
loosedon
thew
orldenorm
ousforces
of
production,coercion
anddestruction.
Yet
pre
ciselybecause
theycannot
beresisted,
therelations
andgoods
ofthe
largersystemalso
takeon
meaningful
placesin
localschemes
of things”
(.).Ifthat
isso,
thenlocal
peopleshave
tobe
seenin
acrucial sense
as“the
passiveobjects
of
theirow
nhistory
andnot
itsauthors.”
Their
authorshipconsists
merely
inadjusting
consciouslyto
thoseforces
andgiving
thatadjustm
enta
meaning.
Butin
thatsense
theyare
nod
ifferent
fromlocalpeoples
inW
esternsocieties
forwhom
therelations
andgoods
of
“thelarger
system”
alsotake
onm
eaningfulplaces
inthe
localschem
eofthings.
To
takean
extreme
example:
eventhe
inmates
of
aconcentration
camp
areable,
inthis
sense,to
liveby
theirow
ncultural
logic.B
utone
may
beforgiven
fordoubting
thatthey
aretherefore
“making
theirow
nhistory.”
tionof
theO
ttom
anE
mpire
into
thew
orldeconom
yis
Islamoglu-Inan’s
(1987)co
llecnon.
Inher
intro
ductio
n,
sheoutlines
afram
ework
inw
hichthe
transfo
rmatio
no
fO
ttom
anstructures
canbe
understo
od
with
referenceto
thechanging
optio
ns
availableto
localactors
asa
consequenceof
European
economic
andcultural
pen
etration.
Al
thoughshe
rejectsthe
ideath
atin
hab
itants
of
theO
ttom
anE
mpire
were
thepassive
objectsof
theirhistory,
shedoes
notfind
itnecessary
toresort
insteadto
theidea
of
“cultu
rallogic.”
.M
ydiscussion
of W
olf1982
appearedin
Asad
1987.
To
theextent
thatw
hatSahlins
callsthe
largersystem
determines
theconditions
within
which
thingstake
onm
eaningfulplaces, allpeo
plescan
besaid
tobe
thepassive
objectsof
theirow
nhistory
andnot
itsauthors.
And
thatis
preciselyw
hatSahlins
sometim
esseem
sto
besaying:
“No
tto
suggest,then,
thatw
eignore
them
odernjuggernaut,
onlythat
itshistorical
coursebe
viewed
asa
culturalprocess”
(.).B
utw
hyessentially
asa
culturalprocess?
One
couldput
itthis
way,
per
haps:the
main
storyline
isauthored
bythe
capitalist juggernaut,and
localpeoplesprovide
theirow
ninterpretations
inlocal perform
ances.Y
eteven
herew
eare
offeredthe
thoughtthat
world
capitalismis
theprim
aryagent,
localpeoples
atbest
thesecondary
ones.In
aw
idelyread
reviewarticle
oncontem
poraryanthropological
theory(w
hichm
ustbe
includedin
theanthropological
chorusSahlins
alludesto),
Sherry
Ortner
(1984)has
written
feelinglyagainst this
veryview
:“W
hetherit
bethe
hiddenhand
of structure
orthe
juggernautof capitalism
thatis
seenas
theagent
ofsociety/history,
itis
certainlynot
inany
centralw
ayreal
peopledoing
realthings”
(144).
Her
sug
gestionseem
sto
bethat
“Western
capitalism”
isan
abstraction(a
mere
fiction,to
besignaled
byquaint
metaphors
orironic
quotationm
arks)w
hichdoes
not,therefore,
determine
thelives
of
“realpeople
doingreal
things.”T
histheoretical
objectionis
notO
rtner’sonly
com
plaint,nor
isit
always
compatible
with
othersshe
makes.
“Specifically,”
shesays
atone
point,“I
findthe
capitalism-
centeredview
ofthe
world
questionable,to
saythe
least,especially
firanthropology”
(142,em
phasisadded).
We
shouldnotassum
e,she
goeson,
eitherthat
everythinganthropologists
encounterin
thefield
must
alreadyhave
beenaffected
bythe
capitalistw
orldsystem
orthat
everythingis
bestexplained
asa
responseto
thelatter.
Now
thisin
itselfis
anem
piricalpoint
aboutthe
extentof
capitalistinfluence
throughoutthe
world.
But
itis
basedon
theassum
ptionthat
“world
capitalism”
existsand
thatits
effectscan
beconfirm
edor
deniedin
theplaces
where
anthropologistsw
ork.It
thereforealso
presupposesthe
theoreticalproblemofidentifying
world
capitalism—
whether
assom
ethingprior
to,
oras
inclusiveof,
itslocal
effects.It
suggests,especially
foranthropology,
thatsom
etheoretical
ideaof
world
capitalismis
necessaryif
itshistorical
consequencesare
tobe
recognized.T
hereis,
however,
yetanother
senseof
disquietthat
Ortner
hasaboutthe
capitalism-centered
world-view
,this
time
relatedto
thesp
e
I
6Introduction
Introduction7
cialrole
thata
fieldwork-defined
anthropologycan
playin
theacad
emy—
asite
thatitshares
with
otherhum
ansciences:
The
attempt
toview
othersystem
sfrom
groundlevel
isthe
basis,perhaps
theonly
basis,ofanthropology’s
distinctivecontribution
tothe
human
sciences.Itis
ourcapacity,largely
developedin
fieldwork,
totake
theperspective
ofthe
folks[am
ongw
homw
eresearchj,
thatallow
sus
tolearn
anythingat
all—even
inour
own
culture—beyond
what
we
alreadyknow
..
..It
isour
location“on
theground”
thatputs
usin
aposition
tosee
peoplenot
simply
aspassive
reactorsto
andenactors
ofsome
“system,”
butas
activeagents
andsubjects
intheirow
nhistory.
(i)
The
ethnographerm
aycom
efrom
anothersystem
(say,a
major
capitalist
country),but
hertask
isto
observeand
describethe
practicesof
people“on
theground,”
notto
intervenein
what
shesees.
For
Ortner,
thereis,
therefore,a
sensein
which
anthropology’sview
pointis
complem
entaryto
thatof
thesciences
thatstudy
world
capitalism,
sinceit
directsthe
attentiono
fresearchers
ata
differentlevel
of
othersystem
s.H
owever,
ifanthropology’sdistinctive
contri
butionrequires
itto
takeaground
levelviewofthings,
itis
difficultto
seehow
confiningoneself
tothat
levelis
sufficientto
determine
inw
hatdegree
andin
whatw
ayother
levelsbecom
erelevant.
The
difficultyw
iththis
kindof
talkis
thatit
employs
two
differ
entim
agessim
ultaneously—one
havingto
dow
ith“realpeople”
(which
implies
thatsystem
sare
unreal),and
theother
with
“groundlevel”
(which
concedesthat
thereare
otherlevels
butclaim
sthatthe
latterare
dependenton
theform
errather
thanthe
otherw
ayaround).
The
two
images
arethen
usedto
definethe
theoreticalautonomy
asw
ellas
thedistinctive
contributiono
ffieldwork-based
anthropology.T
hefact
isthat
allthe
human
sciencesdealw
ithreal
people(even
psychiatrydeals
with
realpeople
thinking/feelingunreal
things).It
isan
oldem
piricistprejudice
tosuppose
thatthings
arereal
onlyw
henconfirm
edby
sensorydata,
andthat
thereforepeople
arerealbut
struc
turesand
systems
aren’t.T
hereare
systematic
featuresof
human
col
lectivitiesthat
arereal
enougheven
thoughyou
can’tsee
themdi
rectly—for
example,
lifeexpectancies,
crime
ratios,voting
patterns,and
ratesofproductivity.
(You
cansee
themonce
theyare
representedas
tables,graphs,
andm
aps,on
asheet
ofpaper
ora
computer
screen:here
seeingand
manipulating
areclosely
connected.)V
ariouskinds
of
socialpractice
areinconceivable
without
suchrepresentations.
Gov
ernments,
businesses,churches,
andother
socialbodies
inthe
con
temporary
world
cannotdo
without
them—
evenin
placesas
“pe
ripheral”as
Papua
New
Guinea.
But
notethat
theissue
hereis
notw
hetheralocalculture
ispure
orderivative,
unitaryor
contested.N
oris
it beingproposed
thatthere
isa
supercausality
(thehistoricallaw
of
capitalism)
thatdetermines
howeverybody
onthe
groundm
ustlive.I
amconcerned
with
howsystem
aticity(including
thekind
thatis
es
sentialto
what
iscalled
capitalism)
isapprehended,
represented,and
usedin
thecontem
poraryw
orld.W
henquantitative
datarelating
toa
localpopulation
areaggregated,
analyzed,and
manipulated,
there
sultscan
beused
toinform
particularkinds
of
systematic
practicedirected
atthat
population.T
herepresentation
of
thedata
alsobe
comes
essentialto
adistinctive
styleofargum
entby
which
suchp
ractices
arejustified
orcriticized
.T
hesystem
with
which
Iam
con
cernedhere
thereforerelates
toa
mode
of hum
anagency
(“real peopledoing
realthings”),
onethat
conditionsother
people’slives.
The
imm
ediateobjective
of
thisagency,
however,
isnot
tocause
individualactors
tobehave
inone
way
ratherthan
another.It
isto
changeag
gre
gatehum
anconditions
(distributions,trends,
etc.)that
areprofitable
oruseful—
in,for
example,
matters
oflanded
property,disease,
andliteracy.
Itssystem
aticitylies,
therefore,in
probabilities,not
causalities
(Hacking
1990).
But itis
akind
of system
aticity(and, therefore,
of
power)
thatisnoteasily
graspedthrough
whatis
typifiedas
anth
rop
ological fieldw
ork.F
oralthough
itrepresentspeople
andtheir
activitiesat ground
level,itdoes
notm
irrorthem
.In
fairness,it
shouldbe
saidthat
Ortn
erm
aynot
reallysubscribe
tothe
empiricist
prejudiceI
haveadverted
to,in
spiteofthe
languageshe
uses.P
robablyall
shew
antsto
say,som
ewhat
likeS
ahlins,is
thatw
orldcapitalism
hasnot
homogenized
thecultures
oflocal
peoples.A
ndthat,
Irepeat,
isprim
afacie
areasonable
claim,
althoughit
doesn’ttellus
whether,
andifso
how,local
peoplesm
aketheir
own
history.T
heterm
localpeoples—now
increasinglyused
byethnographers
insteadof
theolderprim
itive,tribal,
simple, preliterate,
andso
on—can
.T
hisis
anextension
ofIan
Hacking’s
conceptof
“stylesof
reasoning”(in
turn
borrowed
anddeveloped
fromrecent
historianso
f science),which
Create,
ashe
putsit,
“thepossibility
fortru
thand
falsehood.”T
hus,the
emergence
of statistical
reasoninghas
broughtintobeing
newpropositions
ascandidates
fortrue-or-false
judgments.
SecH
acking1982.
I,I1.
8Introduction
Introduction9
bem
isleadingin
aninteresting
way
andcalls
forsom
eunpacking.
Ina
literalsense,
of
course,all
peoplem
ostof
thetim
eare
“local”in
thesense
of
beinglocatable.
Sinceanthropologists
nowgenerally
claimthat
theirdistinctiveness
restson
am
ethod(fieldw
ork)rather
thanan
object(non-E
uropeancultures),
thissense
recomm
endsitselfto
them:
fieldwork
definesprivileged
accessto
thelo
cal.6
Yetnoteveryone
who
islocal
inthis
sensehas
thesam
eopportu
nity
form
ovement,
orthe
same
practicalreach:
nationalpoliticians
inthe
Sudanese
capitaland
nomads
andpeasants
inthe
provinces;corporation
directorsin
anA
ustralianm
etropolisand
minew
orkersin
theN
ewG
uineanH
igh
lands;generals
inthe
Pentagon
andfront-line
soldiersin
thegulf,
andso
on.T
heyare
aLllocatable,but
not equallyso
byeach
other.T
osay
of
peoplethat
theyare
localis
toim
plythat
theyare
at
tachedto
aplace,
rooted,circum
scribed,lim
ited.People
who
arenot
localarethoughto
feitheras
displaced, uprooted,disoriented—
orm
orepositively
asunlim
ited,cosm
opolitan,universal,
belongingto
thew
holew
orld(and
thew
orldbelonging
tothem
).T
hus,Saudi
the
ologiansw
hoinvoke
theauthority
of
medieval
Islamic
textsare
takento
belocal; W
esternw
ritersw
hoinvoke
theauthority
of m
odernsecu
larliterature
claimthey
areuniversal.
Yet both
arelocated
inuniverses
thathave
rulesofinclusion
andexclusion.
Imm
igrantsw
hoarrive
fromS
outhA
siato
settlein
Britain
aredescribed
asuprooted;
English
offi
cialsw
holived
inB
ritishIndia
were
not.A
nobvious
differenceb
etw
eenthem
ispow
er:the
former
become
subjectsof
theC
rown,
thelatter
itsrepresentatives.
What
arethe
discursivedefinitions
ofau
tho
rizedspace?
Everyone
canrelate
themselves
(oris
allocated)to
am
ulti
plicityof
spaces—phenom
enaland
conceptual—w
hoseextensions
arevariously
defined,and
whose
limits
arevariously
imposed,
transgressed,and
reset.M
oderncapitalist
enterprisesand
modernizing
nation-statesare
thetw
om
ostim
portantpow
ersthat
organizespaces
today,d
efin
6.
Inhis
briefsketchof
thehistory
of
anthropologicalfieldw
ork,E
vans-Pritchard
(19
51
,.)w
rote:“W
ehave
nowreached
thefinal,
andnatural,stage
ofdevelopm
ent,in
which
observationsand
theevaluation
of
themare
made
bythe
same
personand
thescholar
isbrought
intodirect
contactwith
thesubject
ofhisstudy.
Form
erlythe
anth
ropologist,
likethe
historian,regarded
documents
asthe
rawm
aterialo
fhisstudy.
Now
theraw
material
was
sociallife
itself.”M
ostcontem
poraryanthropologists
havecom
eto
identifyfieldw
orkw
ithdirect
accessto
“sociallife
itself,”thereby
underwriting
theeye’s
epistemological
sovereignty.“D
ocuments”
arenot
regardedas
parto
fsocial
lifeitself
butas
(unreliable)evidence
of
it—not
aselem
entsthat
enableor
preventor
sub
vertsocial
events,only
as(incom
plete)traces
thatrecord
them.
ing,am
ongother
things,w
hatis
localand
what
isnot.
Being
locat
able,localpeoplesare
thosew
hocan
beobserved,reached,and
man
ipulated
asand
when
required.K
nowledge
aboutlocal
peoplesis
notitselflocal
knowledge,
assom
eanthropologists
havethought
(Geertz
1983).N
oris
ittherefore
simply
universalin
thesense
of
beingaccessi
bleto
everyone.A
nthropologistssuch
asSahlins
andO
rtnerassum
ethatthe
thesisof
agencyand
creativityin
thenon-E
uropeanw
orldrequires
thatthe
ideaofculturalautonom
ybe
defended.M
orerecently,a
verydifferent
argument
hasbeen
advancedfor
thatthesis.
Am
onganthropologists,
James
Clifford
isits
most
eloquentexponent:
This
centuryhas
seena
drasticexpansion
ofmobility,including
tou
rism
,migrantlabor,im
migration,urban
sprawl.
More
andm
orepeo
ple“dw
ell”w
iththe
helpofm
asstransit,
automobiles,
airplanes.In
citieson
sixcontinents
foreignpopulations
havecom
eto
stay—m
ixing
inbut
oftenin
partial,specific
fashions.T
he“exotic”
isu
ncan
nilyclose.
Conversely,
thereseem
nodistantplaces
leftonthe
planetw
herethe
presenceof“m
odern”products,
media,and
powercannot
befelt.
An
oldertopography
andexperience
oftravel
isexploded.
One
nolonger
leaveshom
econfident
offindingsom
ethingradically
new,
anothertim
eor
space.D
ifferenceis
encounteredin
thead
join
ingneighborhood,
thefam
iliarturnsup
attheends
oftheearth.
“Cultural”
differenceis
nolonger
astable,
exoticotherness;
self-other
relationsare
matters
ofpow
erand
rhetoricrather
thanof
essence.
Aw
holestructure
ofexpectations
aboutauthenticity
incu
lture
andin
artisthrow
nin
doubt.(C
lifford,ig8S
,13—
14.)
Inthis
visionofa
fractured,fluid
world,
allhum
anbeings
livein
thesam
eculturalp
redicam
ent.
7T
hereis
nosingle,
privilegednarrative
of
7.T
homas
(1991)
hasm
adesim
ilarpoints,
althoughhe
doesnot
holdto
quitethe
same
positionas
Clifford.
He
attacksethnographic
discoursefor
itsattachm
entto
“ex
oticism”
andfor
“suppressingm
utualentanglem
entand
theperspectival
andpolitical
fracturingo
f thecultures
ofboth
observersand
observed.”L
ikeC
lifford,he
doesnot
denythe
existenceofcultural
differencesbut condem
ns“ethnographic
representationso
fstableand
unitarycultures”
(30
9).
There
issom
ehesitation
inthe
positionT
homas
wants
totake,
however.
Thus,
heconcedes
that“anthropology
hasdealt
effectivelyw
ithim
plicit meanings
thatcanbe
situatedin
thecoherence
ofone
culture”but
pleadsthat
“contemporary
globalprocesses
ofcultural
circulationand
reificationdem
andan
interestin
meanings
thatareexplicitand
derivative.”T
hisseem
sto
imply
thatun
itaryculture
monographs
may
besuccessful
atrepresenting
some
thingsbut
notothers.
Yet
toIntroductw
n
them
odernw
orld,and
thereforethe
historyof
globalcapitalism
is
rejected.E
veryoneis
dislocated;no
oneis
rooted.B
ecausethere
isno
suchthing
asauthenticity,
borrowing
andcopying
donot
signifya
lack.O
nthe
contrary,they
indicatelibidinal
energiesand
creativehu
man
agency.F
oreveryone,
Clifford
insists,cultural identity
ism
ixed,
relational,inventive.
Not
allreaders
will
findsuch
representationsof
modern
history
(ofwhich
thereare
many
within
asw
ellas
outsideanthropology)
ac
ceptable.W
hatis
striking,how
ever,is
thecheerfulness
with
which
thispredicam
entof
cultureis
proffered.Indeed,
inspite
of
frequent
referencesto
unequalpow
er(w
hichis
exploredonly
inthe
contextof
fieldwork
andethnography),
we
areinvited
tocelebrate
thew
idening
scopeof
human
agencythat
geographicaland
psychologicalm
obility
nowafford.H
annahA
rendthad
avery
differentresponse
tom
obilityin
her
famous
analysiso
fE
uropeantotalitarianism
,first
publishedin
the
1950s.
There
shespoke
of
“uprootednessand
superfluousnessw
hich
havebeen
thecurse
of
modern
masses
sincethe
beginningof
thein
dustrial revolutionand
havebecom
eacute
with
therise
of im
perialism
atthe
endof
thelast
centuryand
thebreak-dow
nof
politicalin
stitu
tionsand
socialtraditionsin
ourow
ntim
e”(A
rendt.75).
Arendt’s
senseof
deeppessim
ismm
aybe
put
down
tosom
eone
who
hadherself experienced
thehorrors
of N
azism,and
her analysisof
totalitarianismm
aybe
criticizedfor
some
oversimplifications.
Sheis,
nevertheless, aware
ofa
problemthat
hasescaped
theserious
attention
ofthose
who
would
haveus
celebratehum
anagency
andthe
decen
teredsubject:
theproblem
of
understandinghow
dominant
power
realizesitself
throughthe
verydiscourse
of
mobility.
For
Arendt
is
veryclear
thatm
obilityis
notm
erelyan
eventin
itself,but
am
oment
Introductionii
inthe
subsumption
ofone
actby
another.If people
arephysically
andm
orallyuprooted,
theyare
more
easilym
oved,andw
henthey
areeasy
tom
ove,they
arem
oreeasily
renderedphysically
andm
orallysu
per
fluous.F
romthe
pointofview
ofpow
er,m
obilityis
aconvenient
featureof the
actsubsumed,
butanecessary
oneofthe
subsuming
act.F
orit is
bym
eansof
geographicaland
psychologicalm
ovement
thatm
odernpow
erinserts
itselfintopreexisting
structures.T
hatprocessis
neces
saryto
definingexisting
identitiesand
motives
assuperfluous,
andto
constructingothers
intheir
place.M
eaningsare
thusnot only
created,they
arealso
redirectedor
subverted—as
som
anynovels
aboutin
dig
enous
lifein
thecolonies
havepoignantly
depicted.T
hepositive
connectionbetw
eenm
obilityand
modernity
isfairly
wellestablished
insociologicalliterature.
Itake
oneinstructive
exam
ple.In
1958,D
anielL
ernerpublished
anacadem
icbestseller
onm
od
ernizationin
theM
iddleE
astentitledT
hePassin.g
of TraditionalSociety.
Itsthesis
was
thatm
odernityin
theW
esthaddepended
principallyon
“them
obilepersonality”—
thatis,on
atype
ofperson
eagerto
move,
tochange,
andto
invent.E
mpathy
was
saidto
becentral
tothat
per
sonality,and
Lerner
(1958,so)defined
itas
“thecapacity
tosee
oneselfin
theother
fellow’s
situation.”O
nlythe
mobile
personality,he
con
tended,was
ableto
relatecreatively
tothe
modern
condition.M
anyof
usin
Middle
East
studiescriticized
itin
the196os
and1
97
0S
forits
inadequatescholarship
andcareless
methodology.
How
ever,the
most
illuminating
engagement
with
thatbook
was
undertakenin
19
80
bya
studentof
sixteenth-centuryE
nglishliterature.
Inchapter
6of
hisR
enaissanceSelf-Fashioning,
Stephen
Greenblatt
developedthe
bril
liantinsightthat
“what
Professor
Lerner
calls‘em
pathy,’Shakespeare
calls‘lago’”
(22
5).
He
proposedthat
theidea
sharedby
Lerner’s
“em
pathy”and
Shakespeare’slago
was
improvisation:
“theability
bothto
capitalizeon
theunforeseen
andto
transformgiven
materials
intoone’s
own
scenario.”I
quotein
full:
The
spur-of-the-mom
entqualityofim
provisationis
notascriticalhere
asthe
opportunisticgrasp
ofthatwhich
seems
fixedand
established.Indeed,
asC
astiglioneand
othersin
theR
enaissancew
ellunderstood,the
improm
ptucharacter
ofan
improvisation
isitselfoften
acalcu
latedm
ask,theproduct
ofcarefulpreparation.
Conversely,all
plots,literary
andbehavioral,inevitably
havetheirorigin
ina
mom
entprior
IIhe
alsow
antsto
saythat
theynever
were
valid:“It’s
notclear
thatthe
unitarysocial
systemever
was
agood
model
foranthropological
theory,but
theshortcom
ingsare
nowm
oreconspicuous
thanever”
The
universalexistence
of cultural
borrowings
and
accretionsdem
andsa
differentapproach,
asin
thestudy
ofcreoles:
“Derivative
lingua
francahave
always
offendedthose
preoccupiedw
ithboundaries
andauthenticity,
but
theyoffera
resonantmodel forthe
uncontainedtranspositions
andtransculturalm
ean
ingsw
hichculturalenquiry
must
nowdeal w
ith”(3
17).T
homas
hasp
ut
hisfinger
onan
areaof
unclarirythat
haslong
disturbedanthropology:
howto
representhistorical
differencesand
connectionsin
aw
orldw
heresocial
identitieschange.
Leach,
it may
be
recalled,made
afam
ousattem
pttoresolve
thisproblem
bydraw
ingon
theneo-K
antian
philosopherV
aihingerand
speakingof “scientific
fictions.”
IntroductionIntroduction
13
toform
alcoherence,
am
oment
of experim
ental,aleatory
impulse
in
which
theavailable, received
materials
arecurved
toward
anovelshape.
We
cannotlocate
apoint
ofpure
premeditation
orpure
randomness.
What
isessential is
theE
uropeans’ability
againand
againto
insinuate
themselves
intothe
preexistingpolitical,
religious,even
psychicstru
c
turesof the
nativesand
toturn
thosestructures
totheir
advantage.
Professor
Lerner
isrightto
insist thatthis
abilityis
acharacteristically
(thoughnot exclusively)
Western
mode,
presentto
varyingdegrees
in
theclassical
andm
edievalw
orldand
greatlystrengthened
fromthe
Renaissance
onward;
hem
isleadsonly
ininsisting
furtherthat
it isan
actof im
aginativegenerosity,
asym
patheticappreciation
of the
situa
tionof the
otherfellow
.F
or when
hespeaks
confidentlyof the
“spread
of em
pathyaround
thew
orld,”w
em
ust understandthat he
isspeaking
oftheexercise
ofWestern
power, pow
erthat is creative
as wellas destruc
tive,but
thatis
scarcelyever
wholly
disinterestedor
benign.(227—
28)
The
poin
tI
want
todraw
ou
tfrom
thisperceptive
accountof W
estern
power
relatesnot
tothe
moral
statusof
itsin
tentio
ns
but
toits
trans
forming
work.
Inany
case,the
European
wish
tom
akethe
world
inits
own
image
isnot
necessarilyto
bedisparaged
asungenerous.
Ifone
believesoneself
tobe
thesource
of
salvation,the
wish
tom
akeothers
reflectoneself is
notunbenign,
however
terriblethe
practicesby
which
thisdesire
isput
into
effect.B
esides,in
atrad
ition
that
connectspain
with
achievement,
thein
flicting
of
sufferingon
othersis
not
initself
reprehensible:itis
tobe
condemned
onlyw
henitis
gratuitous—w
here
thepain
asm
eansis
out
ofp
rop
ortio
nto
anobjective
end(hence,
the
subjectiveenjoym
entof
painis
regardedas
both
imm
oraland
path
o
logical).B
utthe
questionI
want
toraise
hereis
this:to
theextent
thatsuch
power
seeksto
normalize
oth
erpeople’s
motivations, w
hosehistory
is
beingm
ade?N
ote
that
my
questio
nis
not
about
theauthenticity
of
individual agencyb
ut
about
thestru
cture
ofnorm
alperso
nhood
(no
r
mal
inb
oth
thestatistical
andthe
medical
sense)and
thetechniques
forsecuring
it.I
askw
heth
erim
provisationbecom
esirrelevant
when
theagents
arenon-E
uro
pean
sacting
with
inthe
contexto
ftheir
own
politicallyin
dep
enden
tstate
toim
plement
aE
uropeanproject:
the
continuousphysical
andm
oralim
provement
of
anentire
governable
populatio
nth
rough
flexiblestrategies.
Whose
improvised
storydo
theseagents
construct?W
hois
itsauthor,
andw
hoits
subject?
The
ideath
atcu
ltural
borro
win
gm
ustlead
toto
talhom
ogeneityand
toloss
of
auth
enticity
isclearly
absurd,but
theidea
of
projects’having
translatablehistorical
structu
resshould
not
beconfused
with
it.W
hena
projectis
translatedfrom
onesite
toanother,
fromone
agentto
another,versionsofpow
erare
produced.A
sw
ithtranslations
of
atext,
onedoes
no
tsim
plyget
arep
roductio
nof
identity.T
heacquisition
ofnew
forms
oflanguage
fromthe
modern
West—
whether
byforcible
imposition,
insidiousin
sertion
,or
volu
ntary
borrowing—
isparr
of
what
makes
fornew
possibilitiesof
actionin
non-Western
societies.Y
et,althoughthe
outcome
of these
possibilitiesis
neverfully
predictable,the
languagein
which
thepossibilities
areform
ulatedis
increasinglyshared
byW
esternand
non-Western
societies.A
ndso,
too,the
specificform
sofpow
erand
subjection.
Choices
anddesires
make
actionsbefore
actionscan
make
“h
istory.”
But
predefinedsocial
relationsand
languageform
s,as
well
asthe
body’sm
ateriality,shape
theperson
tow
hom“n
orm
al”desires
andchoices
canbe
attributed
.T
hat
isw
hyquestions
about
what
itis
possiblefor
agentsto
dom
ustalso
addressthe
processby
which
“n
or
mal
persons”are
constitu
ted.
Meanings
arenever
simply
generatedby
acultural
logic;they
belongvariously
toconventional
projects,occa
sionalin
tentio
ns,
naturalevents,
andso
on(see
Grice
1989).F
orth
eologians
suchas
Augustine
andal-G
hazali,they
alsorelate
toall-
encompassing
divinepurposes.
The
medieval
Christian
monk
who
learnsto
make
theabbot’s
will
into
hisow
nlearns
therebyto
desireG
od’spurposes.
Inan
imp
ortan
tsense,
them
eaningof
hisactions
isw
hatit
isby
virtueof
theirbeing
part
of
atran
scend
ent
project.(A
ndso,
too,the
actionsof
allagents
arepart
of
transcen
den
ttem
poral
structures.T
hefact
that
thefu
rther
significanceo
factions
becomes
apparentonlyw
hena
certaintim
ehas
elapsedis
oneto
which
working
historiansare
likelyto
bem
oresensitive
thanw
orkingethnographers.)
Even
among
nonbelievers,few
would
claimth
atthe
human
agentis
sovereign,although
post-E
nlig
hten
men
tm
oralth
eory
insiststh
atshe
ought
tobe
autonomous.
This
theo
ryhas
longbeen
criticizedby
conservativeas
well
associalist
writers.
Moral
considerationsap
art,it
isevident
that
theincreasingly
sophisticateddivision
of
laborand
theconsum
erculture
of
modern
capitalismrenders
individualautonom
yless
andless
feasibleas
apractical
possibility.M
orerecently,
some
radi
calcritics(particularly
thoseconcerned
with
third
world
studies)have
14.Introduction
Intro
ductio
n15
drawn
onpoststructuralist
ideasto
attackthe
Enlightenm
entidea
of
autonomy.
Athoughtful
example
isthe
IndianistRosalind
O’H
anlon,
who
questionsthe
“liberalhumanist
notionsof subjectivity
andagency”
ina
reviewof
thew
orkof
theS
ubalternStudies
groupof
historians
(O’H
anlon1988). T
hestarting
pointfor
thelatter
was
theirdissatisfac
tionw
iththe
“elitehistoriography”
of India,w
hichdenied
subord
i
natepeoples
aconsciousness
of
theirow
n,and
hencethe
capacityto
make
theirow
nhistory.
Orientalist
andfunctionalist
anthropologies
of
Indiaw
erealso
condemned
fortheir
allegedessentialism
8(N
ote
thefirst
assumption
ofthe
“history-making”
thesis:that
historyis
not made
unlesssignificant change
occurs.It
isnot sufficient for
events
tosucceed
oneanother;
something
substantialm
ustbe
transformed.)
O’H
anlonsym
pathizesw
iththe
Subaltern
historians’w
ishto
re
cover suppressedhistories
but pointsto
thetheoretical danger
suchan
agendaconceals
ofslipping
into“essentialist
humanism
.”O
nem
ust
reject,she
says,
them
yth.
..
ofthe
self-constitutingsubject,
that aconsciousness
or
beingw
hichhas
anorigin
outsideitselfis
nobeing
at all.From
sucha
rejection, we
canproceed
tothe
ideathatthough
historiesand
iden
ti
tiesare
necessarilyconstructed
andproducedfrom
many
fragm
ents,
frag
ments
which
donot
containthe
signsof any
essentialbelonging
in
scribedin
them,
thisdoes
notcause
thehistory
ofthe
subalternto
dissolveonce
more
intoinvisibility.
This
isfirstly
becausew
eapply
exactlythe
same
decentringstrategies
tothe
monolithic
subject-
agentsof elite
historiography;and
second,because
itis
thecreative
practiceof the
subalternw
hichnow
becomes
thefocus
of ouratten
tion,his
abilityto
appropriateand
mould
culturalmaterials
ofalmost
anyprovenance
tohis
own
purposes, andto
discardthose.
.. w
hich
nolonger
servethem
.(1
97;em
phasesadded)
O’H
anlon’scriticism
reachesits
target,although
occasionallyat
thecost
of
reproducingthe
ambiguity
inthe
differentsenses
of“au
thoring”that
Itouched
onearlier.
Thus,
todecenter
“subject-agents”
8.A
ndyet
some
ofthe
Subaltern
historianshave
invokedstructural-functionalist
ethnographies(ofplaces
otherthan
India)to
developtheir
own
comparative
ideas.(See,
forexam
ple,the
interestingcontributions
byPandey
andC
hatterjee,in
Guha
andSpivak
1988.)W
hatthis
indicatesis
thatno
erhnographiesare
essentiallyessentialist,that
likeall
verbalrepresentations
theycan
bebroken
up,appropriated,
andre-presented
inthe
serviceof different
intentions.
of
elitehistoriography
isnot
atall
identicalw
ithsubverting
peoplein
positionsofgovernm
entalauthority.
The
ideaof
self-constitutionis
notmerely
ahistoriographical
optionbut
aliberal
humanistp
rinci
plethat
hasfar-reaching
moral,
legal,and
politicalim
plicationsin
modern/m
odernizingstates.
That
isw
hyw
efind
O’H
anlon—as
aprogressivist_obliged
toreintroduce
thatprinciple
inorder
toau
thenticatethe
subalternsubject.
For
howelse
couldthe
subaltern’sauthentie
purposes(“his
own
purposes”)be
distinguishedfrom
thoseofhis
master’s
ifnotthrough
thestruggle
forself-constitution?
(Note
thesecond
assumption
of
thehistory-m
akingthesis:
thatan
agentcannot
make
his“ow
n”history
unlesshe
isautonom
ous.It
isnot
enoughthathe
actspurposively;
hispurposes
must
bein
conflictwith
others’.)T
heessence
of
theprinciple
of
self-constitutionis
“conscio
us
ness.”T
hatis,
am
etaphysicalconceptofconsciousness
isessentialfor
explaininghow
them
anyfragm
entscom
eto
beconstrued
asparts
ofa
singleself-identifying
subject.Y
etifwe
setasidethe
Flegelianconcept
of
consciousness(the
teleologicalprinciple
startingfrom
sense-certainty
andculm
inatingin
Reason)
andthe
Kantian
conceptof
thetranscendental
subject,w
hichH
egelrew
roteas
consciousness,it
will
haveto
beadm
ittedthat
consciousnessin
theeveryday
psychologicalsense
(awareness,
inten
t,and
thegiving
of
meaning
toexperiences)
isinadequate
toaccount
foragency.
One
doesnot
haveto
subscribeto
afull-blow
nF
reudianismto
seethat
instinctivereaction,
thedocile
body,and
theunconscious
work,
intheir
differentw
ays,m
orepervasively
andcontinuously
thanconsciousness
does.T
hisis
partofthe
reasonw
hyan
agent’sactis
more
(andless)
thanher
consciousness
ofit.
Another
parthasto
dow
iththe
subsumability
ofher
actsinto
theprojects
of
otheragents:
beyonda
certainpoin
t,an
actno
longerbelongs
exclusivelyto
itsinitiator.
Itis
preciselybecause
thisfact
isoverlooked
thatthe
historicalim
portanceofconsciousness
isexagger
arcdin
theliterature
thattakes
consentand
repressionto
bethe
two
basicconditions
of
politicaldom
ination.F
orto
explainthe
latterin
terms
of
theseconditions,
whether
singlyor
incom
bination,is
toresortto
explanationexclusively
interm
sofconsciousness.
Itis,
con
sequently,toignore
thepolitically
more
significantcondition
thathasto
dow
iththe
objectivedistribution
ofgoods
thatallows
orprecludes
certainoptions.
The
structu
resofpossible
actionsthat
areincluded
and
Intro
ductio
nIntroduction
17
excludedare
thereforelogically
independentof
theC
onsc
iousn
eS
Sof
actorsAnother
way
of
puttingthis
isto
saythat
thesystem
atick
no
wl
edge(e.g.,
statisticalinform
ation)on
which
anagent
must
drawin
orderto
act inw
aysthat
“make
history”is
not subjectivein
anysense.
Itdoes
not imply
“theself.”
The
subject,on
theother
hand,is
founded
onconsciousness
of self.
My
argument,
inbrief,
isthat contrary
tothe
discourseof
many
radicalhistorians
andanthropologists,
agentand
subject (where
theform
eris
theprinciple
of effectivity
andthe
latterof
consciousness)do
notbelong
tothe
same
theoreticaluniverse
and
shouldnot,
therefore,be
coupled.G
yanP
rakashis
atalented
Subalternist
who
appearsto
haveread
andapproved
of 0’ H
anlon’scritique.
Inan
invigoratingessay
on“p
ost
Orientalist”
historiographyof
India(P
rakash1
99
0),
heargues
fora
more
radicalpoststructuralist
positionintended
tosupersede
conven
tionalethnography
andhistoriography.’°
Anthropologists
drawn
to
theidea
of
“realpeople
making
theirow
nhistory”
will
want
toread
thisprovocative
piece,because
itexposes
metaphysical
tracesin
his
toricalnarration
that,he
argues,reproduce
thecapitalist-centered
viewofthe
world.
Prakash
isagainst
“foundational”history,
byw
hichhe
means
two
things:(t)
ahistory
whose
subject(individual,
class,or
structure)is
takento
beirreducible,
and(2
)teleological
history—for
example,
a
historical narrativeof (aborted,
delayed, or distorted)capitalism
. Fo
un
dationalismin
thesetw
oform
sis
rejectedin
orderto
widen
thespace
for“excluded
histories.”W
hilenarrative
historydoes
nothave
tobe
teleological,’it
does
presupposean
identity(“India,”
say)that
isthe
subjectof
thatnar
rative.E
venw
henthat
identityis
analyzedinto
itsheterogeneous
parts
(class,gender,
regionaldivisions,
etc.),w
hatis
done,surely,
isto
reveal
.I
haveargued
thispoint
with
referenceto
ethnographicm
atenal inA
sad1970
and
19
72
.,and
more
generallyin
Asad
1987.
so.Prakash’s
name
isacknow
ledgedin
O’H
anlon’s(1988)
text,am
ongothers.
This
doesnot
proveanything
about influence,of course;
it onlysuggests
am
easureof ag
ree
ment,
which
isconfirm
edin
noteof P
rakash5990.
That
agreement
was
short-lived,
however.
Ina
subsequentpolem
ic,coauthored
with
D.
Washbrook
(O’H
anlonand
Washbrook
1992)
anddirected
againstP
rakash,O
’Hanlon
retreatsto
am
oreco
nven
tionalM
arxism, w
hilein
hisrejoinder
Prakash
(1992)
takesup
am
oredefiant
Derridean
position.ii.
An
earlycriticism
of
teleolo
gical histories
isB
utterfield1
93
1.
itsconstitution,
notto
dissolveits
unity.T
heunity
ism
aintainedby
thosew
hospeak
inits
name,
andm
oregenerally
byall
who
adjusttheir
existenceto
its(som
etimes
shifting)requirem
ents.T
heclaim
of
many
radicalcritics
thathegem
onicpow
ernecessarily
suppressesdif
Ièrencein
favorof
unityis
quitem
istaken.Just
asm
istakenis
theirclaim
thatthatpow
eralw
aysabhors
ambiguity.
To
secureits
unity—to
make
itsow
nhistory—
dominant
power
hasw
orkedbest
throughdif
krentiatingand
classifyingpractices.
India’scolonial
historyfurnishes
ample
evidenceof
this.In
thiscontext
power
isconstructive,
notpressive.
Furtherm
ore,its
abilityto
select(or
construct)the
dif
frrencesthat
serveits
purposeshas
dependedon
itsexploiting
thedangers
andopportunities
containedin
ambiguous
situations.A
ndam
biguity—as
we
sawin
Greenblatt’s
example—
isprecisely
oneof
thethings
thatgives“W
esternpow
er”its
improvisational quality.
By
acurious
irony,Prakash’s
rejectionof“the
modernization
nar
rative”on
thegrounds
thatit
isteleological
indirectlyreveals
som
ething
aboutthesense
ofthe
phrase“m
akingone’s
own
history,”w
hichm
anyanthropologists
alsoem
ploy.F
orw
hilethe
expressionindicates
adisapproval o
f historicalnarratives
ofthe
non-West in
which
Europe
istoo
prominent
(asactor
oras
norm),
italso
concealsa
conceptof
historym
akingthatis
parasiticon
thosevery
narratives.If
them
odernizingproject
ism
orethan
merely
anaccum
ulatingnarrative
ofIndia’s
past,ifw
eunderstand
itasthe
project of co
nstru
ctuzg
“India”(an
integratedtotality
definedaccording
toprogressive
principles),w
hichrequires
thecontinuous
calculationof
India’sfu
ture,then
teleologyis
preciselyw
hatthat
projectm
ustreflect.
(Aprojectis,
afterall,
bydefm
itionteleological.)
The
careerofthe
Indiannation-state
isitselfpart
of that
project.T
osay
thisis
tosay
something
notm
erelyabout
thosew
horuled
Indiain
theeffort
tochange
itin
aparticular
directionbut
alsoabout
thosew
hostruggled
againstthem
.T
hcstruggle
iscarried
outm
oreoften
thannot
ina
newlanguage
uunaredby
theE
uropeanE
nlightenment:
liberty,equality,
reason,progress,
human
rights,and
sofo
rth,
and(m
oreim
portant)w
ithinacw
political-legalspaces
builtup
underB
ritishcolonialism
.T
ore
count thecareer
oftheIndian
nation-stateis
totry
tounderstand
howand
why
them
odernizationproject succeeds
orfails
inparticular
times
andplaces—
andhow
itconstructsand
redefinesitselfas
aproject.
One
yw
ishto
opposethat
project,and
henceto
redescribeit
interm
sthat
itssupporters
would
reject,b
utit
mustbe
understoodas
ateleology,
i8Introduction
Introductüm‘9
whose
desiredfuture,
inim
portantrespects,
isforeshadow
edin
the
presentof W
esternliberal
capitaliststates.
Itdoes
notfollow
thatthe
project isdriven
bylaw
likeforces, that its
ultimate
successis
inevitable
orthat
itcannot
bereform
ulated.H
owever,
tothose
who
havebeen
taught toregard
essentialismas
thegravest
of
intellectualsins,
itis
necessaryto
explainthat
certain
thingsare
essential tothat
project—as
indeedthere
areto
“India”as
a
nation-state.T
osay
thisis
notequivalent
tosaying
thatthe
project(or
“India”)can
neverbe
changed;it
isto
saythat
eachhistorical
phe
nomenon
isdeterm
inedby
thew
ayit
isconstituted,
thatsom
eof
its
constitutiveelem
entsare
essentialto
itshistorical
identityand
some
arenot.
Itis
likesaying
thatthe
constitutiverules
of a
game
defineits
essence—w
hichis
byno
means
toassert
thatthat
game
cannever
be
subvertedor
changed;it
ism
erelyto
poin
tto
what
determines
its
essential historicalidentity,to
imply
thatcertain
changes(though
not
others)w
illm
eanthat
thegam
eis
nolonger
thesam
egam
e.
The
projectofm
odernization(W
esternization),including
itsaim
of m
aterial andm
oral progress,is
certainlya
matter
of historym
aking.
But
itis
aproject
whose
innumerable
agentsare
neitherfully
auto
no
mous
norfully
consciousof
it.Indeed,
ina
crucialsense
itis
that
project,inaugurated
inE
uropeover
two
centuriesago,
thatarticulates
ourconcept
of
human
beingsm
akinghistory.
For
thatproject
was
intertwined
with
anew
experienceo
f historicaltim
e,and
thusw
itha
novelconception
of
historicity—historical
time
dividedinto
three
greatperiods
(Antiquity,
theM
iddleA
ges,and
Modernity),
accelerat
ingforw
ardinto
anopen
future.T
heW
estdefines
itself,in
op
po
si
tionto
all non-Western
cultures,by
itsm
odernhisto
ricitD
espitethe
disjunctionsof m
odernity(its
breakw
ithtradition),
“theW
est”th
ere
foreincludes
within
itself itspast
asan
organiccontinuity:
from“the
Greeks
andR
omans”
and“the
Hebrew
sand
Early
Christians,”
through
“Latin
Christendom
,”“the
Renaissance,”
and“the
Reform
ation,”
to“the
universalcivilization”
ofm
odernE
uropeans.A
lthoughit
is
spatiallydiscontinuous
andinternally
diverse,“the
West”
isnot
am
ere
Hegelian
myth,
nota
mere
representationready
tobe
unmasked
bya
handfulof
talentedcritics.
For
goodor
ill,it
informs
innumerable
intentions,practices,
anddiscourses
insystem
aticw
ays.T
hisis
notto
saythat
thereis
anintegrated
Western
culture,or
afixed
Western
identity,or
asingle
Western
way
of
thinking,but
thata
singularco
l
lectiveidentity
definesitself
interm
sof
aunique
historicityin
con-
trastto
allothers,a
historicitythatshifts
fromplace
toplace—
Greece,
RD
me,
Latin
Christendom
,the
Am
ericas—untilit
embraces
thew
orld.It
was
inE
urope’seighteenth
centurythat
theolder,
Christian
attitudestow
ardhistorical
time
(salvationalexpectation)
were
com
binedw
iththe
newer,
secularpractices
(rationalprediction)to
giveus
ourm
odernidea
ofprogress
(Koselleck
1988,17).
Anew
philosophyo
fagency
was
alsodeveloped,
allowing
individualactionsto
berelated
tocollective
tendencies.F
romthe
Enlightenm
entphilosophes,through
theV
ictorianevolutionist
thinkers,to
theexperts
oneconom
icand
politicaldevelopm
entin
thelatter
halfof
thetw
entiethcentury,
oneassum
ptionhas
beenconstant:
tom
akehistory,
theagent
must
createthe
future,rem
akeherself,
andhelp
othersto
doso,
where
thecriteria
ofsuccessfulrem
akingare
seento
beuniversal.
Old
universesm
ustbe
subvertedand
anew
universecreated.
To
thatextent,
historycan
bem
adeonly
onthe
backof
auniversal
teleology.A
ctionsseeking
tom
aintainthe
“local”status
quo,or
tofollow
localm
odelsof
sociallife,
donot
qualifyas
historym
aking.F
romthe
Cargo
Cults
ofM
elanesia
tothe
Islamic
Revolution
inIran,
theym
erelyattem
pt(h
ope
kssly)“to
resistthefuture”
or“to
turn
backthe
clockofhistory.”
Anthropology
isthus
insertedinto
modern
historyin
two
ways:
first,through
thegrow
thin
Europe’s
political,econom
ic,and
scientific
powers,
which
hasprovided
anthropologistsw
iththeir
means
of
pmfessional
existenceand
theirintellectual
motive;
andsecond,
throughthe
Enlightenm
entschem
atizationof
progressivetim
ethat
haspro
videdanthropology
with
itsconceptual
site:m
odernity.It
isnot
justthatanthropology
isa
modern
creationborn
outo
fEurope’s
enco
un
terw
ithnon-E
uropeans.It
isthat
them
ajorideas
ituses
tograsp
itssubjects
(nonmodern,
local,traditional)
areoften
dependenton
itscontrastive
senseofthe
modern
12
Modern
anthropology’stheoretical
focuson
human
diversityhas
itsroots
inR
enaissanceE
urope’sencounter
with
“thesavage.”
That
brutalencounter
inA
fricaand
theN
ewW
orldproduced
disturbingtheological
problems
forreflective
Christians
How
toexplain
thevariety
ofhuman
beings,given
theM
osaicaccount
of
Creation?
This
was
theprim
aryquestion
thatanim
atedscholars
who
readthe
exotic
u.
Tw
ooutstanding
examples
of
studiesby
anthropologistsin
which
suchideas
hse
beencritically
examined
areS
teiner1956
andS
chneider1984.
20
IntroductionIntroductum
25
descriptionsby
explorers,and
thegreat
rangeof
religiousbelief
and
practiceam
ongother
peoplesw
asthe
primary
objectof
theiratten
tiOfl.1
3
Itis
oftensaid
thatthe
Renaissance
“discoveredm
an,”
14
butthat
discoveryw
asin
effecta
psychologicalreconstruction
of
European
individuality.T
heaccounts
of
savagesby
explorersreturning
from
Africa
andthe
New
World
pro
duced
avery
differentphenom
enon’
5—
am
anw
hosekinship
toC
hristianE
uropeansw
ashighly
problematic.
Some
writers
evenheld
thathe
was
notquite
human.
The
eventual
solutionadopted
inthe
lateseventeenth
andearly
eighteenthcen
turies,according
toM
argaretH
odgen,w
asa
synthesisof
two
old
ideas:the
chainof
beingand
thegenetic
principle.In
thisw
ay,“a
spatial arrangement o
fforms
[was
converted]into
anhistorical,
devel
opmental,
orevolutionary
series”(H
odgen1
9ó
.,389-9
0).
Acom
mon
human
naturew
asthus
accordedto
allhuman
beings,butone
thatwas
assumed
toexist
invarious
stageso
fm
aturityand
enlightenment.
A
prehistoricperiod
was
addedto
thehistoricaltriad—
thetim
eo
f”prim
i
tive”m
an.A
ndjust
assom
econtem
poraneous“local
peoples”could
beassigned
tothe
prehistoricperiod,
othersw
ereplaceable
inthe
medieval.
The
earlypreoccupation
with
savingthe
biblicalstory
of
man’s
Creation
andFallgave
way
toa
newconcern
with
narratingthe
secularstory
of
European
world
hegemony
indevelopm
entalterm
s.’6
As
aresult
of
developments
inH
igherC
riticism,
aproblem
of
Chris-
13.See
theabsorbing
studyby
Ho
dg
en(1
964).
14
.T
hus,B
urckhardt’sclassic
(1950); part
4is
entitled“T
heD
iscoveryof the
World
andofM
an.”i.
Itw
asnot
onlyverbalaccounts
thatthe
explorersbroughtback:
“When
Ch
risto
pherC
olumbus
droppedanchor
inthe
Tagus
River
at theport
of L
isbonon
thefateful
dayof his
return
tothe
Old
World,
hebroughtw
ithhim
sevenkidnapped
Indianso
f the
so-calledT
ainoculture
of
theA
rawack
linguisticgroup.
..
.D
uringthe
yearsw
hich
followed,
Indianscaptured
byother
explorersw
ereexhibited
inother
capitalsofE
u
rope..
..T
hefirst
Indiansto
appearin
France
were
broughtby
Thom
asA
ubertin
1506.T
akento
Rouen,
theyw
eredescribed
ina
Parischronicle
assooty
incolor,
black-
haired,possessing
speechbut
noreligion.
..
.In
duringa
festivalin
Bordeaux,
300
men
at arms
conducteda
showing
ofcaptives
fromtw
elvenations,
includingG
reece,
Turkey,
Arabia,
Egypt,
Am
erica,T
aprobane,the
Canaries,
andE
thiopia.O
utsidethe
cityw
all,in
them
idstof an
imitation
Brazilian
landscape,a
veritablesavage
villagew
as
erectedw
ithseveralhundred
residents,m
anyofw
homhad
beenfreshly
abductedfrom
South
Am
erica”(H
odgen1
96
4,
ui—
ia).
16.N
otentirely
secular,though.
SeeB
owler
1989for
thew
aythe
ideao
f”pro
gres
siveevolution”—
biologicalas
well
associal—
respondedto
Christian
sensibilitiesin
the
latterpart
of the
nineteenthcentury.
hantheology
hasvirtually
evaporated,but
some
of the
ideasgenerated
toaddress
itrem
ainin
seculardisciplines,
formed
inpursuit
of a
newuniversality.
Of
course,significant
mutations
haveoccurred
inthe
historicalschem
atafor
classifyingand
explaininghum
andiversity
duringthe
eighteenth,nineteenth,
andtw
entiethcenturies.
But
therehave
beencontinuities,
too,including
historicalperiodization
anddirection.
Another
continuity,as
George
Stocking
notes,w
asthe
assumption
of
asingle
human
natureunderlying
culturalplurality
(Stocking
1987,333). In
practice,how
ever,anthropology
andorientalism
between
themdealt
conceptuallyw
ithexisting
“localpeoples”
leftbehind
inthe
progressiveevolution
of
modern
(European)
“civilization,”w
hilea
number
ofspecialistdisciplines
dealtwith
thelatter.
17In
thisw
ay,the
ideaof
asingle
naturefor
allhum
ansappeared
toconcede
thatsom
earc
evidently“m
orem
ature”than
others.Ithas
become
atruism
tosay
thatm
ostanthropologistsin
Britain
andthe
United
Statesw
ereantievolutionjst—
andtherefore
relativist—in
thefirst
halfofthe
twentieth
century.Som
ehistorians
ofthe
disci
plinehave
connectedthis
tothe
generalm
oodof
disillusionw
iththe
ideaofprogress
prevailingin
theW
estafter
World
War
1.18
This
viewis
notentirely
accurate,how
ever—atany
ratefor
British
socialanthropology.
Neither
Malinow
ski(i.s,
i-a;
1938)nor
Rad
difiè-Brow
n(1
952)
rejectedthe
ideaofhigherand
lowercultures
andof
theupw
arddevelopm
entof
thelatter.
Godfrey
andM
onicaW
ilson(1945)
sawno
difficultyin
presentingthe
evolutiono
frelations
andak
asin
Africa
“fromprim
itiveto
civilized”;nor
didM
axG
luckman
at
depictingthe
adoptionof
“White
culture”by
Africans
as“pro
Vtssiv
e.”
9L
ucyM
airspoke
unapologeticallyof
theeffects
ofE
uro
ii.E
.B
.T
ylor(1893,
805)delineated
thereg
ion
tow
hichorientalists
andan
thro
pol
apnm
arilyapplied
themselves:
“Inthe
largedefinition
adoptedby
thisC
ongress,rie
nta
lw
orldreaches
itsextrem
elim
its.It
embraces
thecontinent
of A
sia,stretch
throughE
gyptoverA
frica,and
intoE
uropeover
Turkey
andG
reece,w
hileex
tend
uthc
farE
astfrom
groupto
groupo
focean
islands,w
hereIndonesia,
Melanesia,
icxie
sia
,and
Polynesia
leadon
tothe
continentof
Australia
andits
outlier,T
asau
Imm
ensealso
isthe
rangeof
time
throughw
hichthe
culture-historyo
fthis
(irnta
iregion
may
be,ifoften
butdim
ly,traced.”
See,for
example,
thefine
studyby
Kuklick
(ii),
thoughit
shouldbe
bornein
dthat
thisdisenchantm
entdid
notsignificantly
affectthose
responsiblefor
thetn
un
en
to
fcolonial
peoples.T
herethe
effortat
them
aterialand
moral
impro
ve
to
fnon-European
subjectscontinued
infull
force.E
zemplifying
theinterdependence
ofcauseand
effectinprocesses
ofsocialchange,
22
Introductwn
Introductwn
23
peancolonial
rulein
Africa
as“the
spreadofciv
ilization,”
20
andM
aryD
ouglasreaffirm
edthe
importance
ofan
evolutionaryp
erspectiv
e.2’
Sotoo,
some
inw
aysm
oreexplicit
andothers
inw
aysless
so,did
thescores
ofanthropologists
who
attendedto
problems
ofparticularsocial
changein
thenon-W
esternw
orld.T
heirlack
of interestin
tracingthe
development
ofC
ultureas
ahum
anuniversal,
andtheir
attachmentto
theidea
of
socialsystem
sin
(temporary)
equilibrium,
didnot
mean
therejection
of
progressiveevolution
inevery
form.
Indeed,it
couldbe
arguedthat
therew
asless
concernw
ithdem
onstratingthe
prin
ciple
ofa
comm
onhum
annature,
andm
orew
ithdescribing
“normal”
historicaldevelopm
entsin
variousparts
ofthe
non-European
world.
The
major
poin
t,atany
rate,is
thatwhether
theyw
ereconcerned
with
customary
beliefsand
practicesor
with
contemporary
socialand
culturalchanges,
anthropologistssaw
themselves—
andw
ereseen
byothers—
asdealing
typicallyw
ithnonm
odernlives.
Certainly,
ifan
thropologyw
asexpected
todeal
with
political,econom
ic,religious,
legal,m
edical,poetic,
andhistorical
events,it
was
onlyw
henthese
objectsof
modern
disciplinesw
eresituated
ina
nonmodern
socialtotality.
Like
otherm
odernw
riterson
thenonm
odernw
orld,an
thro
pologistsused
adualm
odalityofhistorical
time,w
hichenabled
them
torepresentevents
asatonce
contemporaneous
andno
nco
ntem
po
raneous
(Koselleck
1988,
24.9)—and
thussom
econditions
asm
orepro
gressivethan
others.It
hasbeen
saidthat
thisfocus
hasm
adeanthropology
am
arginaldiscipline
incom
parisonto
thosethat
dealw
ithm
oderncivilization
itself,“culturally
marginal
toits
own
societyas
well
asto
thegroups
that were
thesubjecto
fethnographicfieldw
ork”(S
tocking1987,
28
9).
The
rejectionof
anthropologyby
Westernizing
elitesin
former
cob
mal
countriesis
well
known,
andthe
reasonsfor
itare
nothard
tounderstand.
But
theassum
ptionthat
anthropologyis
culturallym
arginal
tom
odernE
uropeansociety
needsto
bereexam
ined.It
istrue
thatanthropological
theorieshave
contributedvery
littleto
thefo
rm
ationof
theoriesin
politics,econom
ics,and
othersocial
sciences.A
ndyet,
paradoxically,aspects
ofanthropology’s
discourseon
thenonm
odern—those
addressing“the
primitive,”
“theirrational,”
“them
ythic,”“the
traditional”—have
beenof
centralim
portanceto
several
disciplines.T
hus,psy
cho
analy
sis,22
theologicalm
od
ernism
,23
andm
odernistlitera
ture
,24
among
others,havecontinually
turn
edfor
supportto
anthropologyin
theirattem
ptsto
probe,accom
modate,
celebrate,or
qualifythe
essenceofm
odernity.A
nthropology,then,
appearsto
beinvolved
indefinitions
of
theW
estw
hileW
esternprojects
aretransform
ingthe
(preliterate,p
recapitalist,
premodern)
peoplesthatethnographers
claimto
represent.B
othprocesses
needto
bestudied
systematically.T
ounderstand
betterthe
localpeoples
“entering”(or
“resisting”)m
odernity,an
thro
pol
ogym
ustsurely
tryto
deepenits
understandingof
theW
estas
som
ething
more
thana
threadbareideology.
To
dothat
will
includeat-
L
Gluckm
an(1958,
75)could
observequite
unselfconsciouslythat
“progressiveintelligent
men
tendto
findscope
fortheir
abilityin
educationand
Christianity,
andC
hristians,freed
fromintellectually
cloggingbeliefs
andsom
esuspicion
of
theW
hites,tend
toprogress
inthe
acceptanceof
White
culture.”In
respectto
whole
societies,too,
Gluckm
anw
asa
progressivist:“In
thisrespect
astudy
of
Lozi
law,
aso
flaw
inm
ostsim
plesocieties,validates
Maine’s
mostw
idelyaccepted
generalization,‘thatthe
mo
ve
mento
fprogressivesocieties
hashith
ertobeen
am
ovementfrontStatus
toC
ontract’i.e.
thatearly
lawis
dominantly
thelaw
ofstatus”
(Gluckm
an28).
so.“T
he[E
uropean]individuals
who
putthese
policiesinto
practicew
eresustained
inthe
difficultiesof
theirtask,
andin
over-rulingopposition,
bythe
dogma
thatciv
ilization
was
ablessing
thatitspossessors
oughttospread;just as
theycivilized
theirown
childrenby
obligingthem
todo
thingsthey
didnotw
antto,and
sometim
esby
pu
nish
ingthem
severely.A
ndnobody
todayis
sayingthat
theyought
notto
havespread
civi
lization;today’s
complaint
isthat
theydid
notspread
enoughof
it,or
theright
parts”(M
air1962,
25
3).
21.“T
herightbasis
forcomparison
isto
insistonthe
unityofhum
anexperience
andat
the
sam
etim
eto
insist
on
itsvariety,on
thedifferences
thatm
akecom
parisonw
orth
while.
The
onlyw
ayto
dothis
isto
recognisethe
natureofhistorical
progressand
thenature
of prim
itiveand
ofm
odernsociety.
Progress
means
differentiation.T
husprim
itive
means
undifferentiated;m
odernm
eansdifferentiated.
Advance
intechnology
involves
differentiationin
everysphere,
intechniques
andm
aterials,in
productiveand
politicalroles.
..
.Differentiation
inthought
patternsgoes
alongw
ithdifferentiated
socialconditions”
(Douglas
1966,
77—78).
22.
Freud’sm
ajorinterest
inthe
primitive
isto
ow
ellknown
tobe
rehearsedhere.
23.
Theological
modernism
,strictly
speaking,refers
toan
intellectualtrend
inlate
nineteenth-and
earlytw
entieth-centuryC
atholicismconcerning
methods
ofin
terpreting
Scripture:
seeV
idler1961,chap.
16.How
ever,I
useithere
toindicate
thegeneral
movem
entam
ongliberal
Christians
toapply
tothe
Scriptures
approachesin
keepingw
iththe
findingsofanthropology
andhistorical
methodology.
For
areview
of biblical
scholarshipthat
hasdraw
non
successivetheories
inanthropology
sincethe
nineteenthcentury,
seeR
ogerson1978.
a...T
heim
portanceo
fFrazerforliterary
modernism
isam
plydocum
ented.See,
forexam
ple,T.S.
Eliot’s
referencesto
him,
asw
ellas
toother
anthropologicalw
riters,in
hisnotes
to“T
heW
asteL
and.”T
heattem
ptby
modern
aestheticsto
recapturethe
freshnesso
f“childhood
perception”and
tom
akenew
beginnings(de
Man
1983,157)
ledat
onceto
anappropriation
ofa
conceptof
theprim
itiveand
toa
rejectiono
fa
conceptoftradition.
24
Introduction
tempting
tograsp
itspeculiar
historicity,the
mobile
powers
thathave
constructedits
structures,projects,
anddesires.
Iargue
thatreligion,
inits
positiveand
negativesenses, is an
essential partof that construction.
The
following
chaptersengage
with
fragments
ofW
esternhistory
approachedas
genealogies,archaism
s,translations,
andpolem
ics.
They
areintended
asa
contributionto
ahistorical
anthropologythat
takesthe
culturalhegem
onyofthe
Westas
itsobject
of inquiry.M
ore
precisely,they
explorew
aysin
which
Western
conceptsand
practices
of religiondefine
forms
of historym
aking.
Genealogies
Recommended