Stat Con

How should penal laws be constructed or interpreted?

Penal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused. 6 However, this rule may be invoked only where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its interpretation. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for the application of this rule. 7

G.R. No. 12262, U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243 Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCFebruary 10, 1917G.R. No. 12262

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS, defendant-appellant.

Quirino Abad Santos for appellant. Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The appellant here is accused of violating the Internal Revenue Law. He was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of P10. He appealed.Section 185 of Act No. 2339 (now section 2727 of the Administrative Code) reads as follows:A person who violates any provision of the Internal Revenue Law or any lawful regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue made in conformity with the same, for which delinquency no specific penalty is provided by law, shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.Pursuant to the authorization in the Internal Revenue Law, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Circular No. 467, the third section of which reads as follows:

3. Printers, publishers, contractors, common carriers, etc. — Each printer, publisher, contractor, warehouseman, proprietor of a dockyard, keeper of a hotel or restaurant, keeper of a livery stable or garage, transportation contractor and common carrier by land or water, and so forth, subject to the tax imposed by sections 42, 43, and 44 of Act No. 2339, shall keep a day book in which he shall enter in detail, in English or Spanish, each amount of money received in the conduct of his business. Before being used for said purpose, the pages of the book must be numbered serially in a permanent and legible manner, and the book itself presented to an internal revenue agent or office for approval. In this book the cash receipts of the owner thereof shall be entered under the corresponding date within the twenty-four hours next following the date the money was received. If no money is received on any day, then that fact shall be noted in the book within the said twenty-four hours under the corresponding date.

The appellant is the owner of a printing establishment called "The Excelsior" and as such was required by law to keep a book in which he should make the entire required by the above quoted regulation. It is charged in the information that he violated the provisions of said regulation in that he failed to make any entry for the 5th day of January, 1915, indicating whether any business was done on that day or not.

We are of the opinion that the accused must be acquitted. It appears undisputed that he regularly employed a bookkeeper who was in complete charge of the book in which the entries referred to should have been made and that the failure to make the entry required by law was due to the omission of the bookkeeper of which appellant knew nothing.We do not believe that a person should be held criminally liable for the acts of another done without his knowledge or consent, unless the law clearly so provides. In the case before us the accused employed a bookkeeper, with the expectation that he would perform all the duties pertaining to his position including the

entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It is undisputed that the accused took no part in the keeping of the book in question in this case and that he personally never made an entry in it. He left everything to his bookkeeper. Under such circumstances we do not believe that the mere proof of the fact that the bookkeeper omitted to make the entries required by the Internal Revenue Circular for the 5th day of January, 1915, is an act upon which the conviction of the accused can be based. No knowledge on his part was shown with regard to the bookkeeper's omission and the Government does not contend that he had any knowledge. Nor is it contended that the bookkeeper omitted the entry under the direction of the accused or with his connivance. No connection between the accused and the omission of the bookkeeper is shown or claimed. On the contrary the board contention is that the accused is responsible for the acts and omissions of his bookkeeper, and that, if any act or omissions of his bookkeeper, violates the criminal law, the principal is responsible criminally.

With this we cannot agree. Neither the statute nor the circular of the Collector of Internal Revenue, nor both together, expressly require such a result nor can we say from the circular or the law that the intention to do so was so clear as to leave no room for doubt. Courts will not hold one person criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed without his knowledge or consent, unless there is a statute requiring it so plain in its terms that there is no doubt of the intention of the Legislature. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. (U. S. vs. Madrigal, 27 Phil. Rep., 347.)The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted. Costs de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur. Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent.

G.R. No. L-9598 August 15, 1956 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. YU HAI alias " HAYA", Defendant-Appellee.Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres for appellant.Eduardo de Leon Jr., Jose L. de Leon and Nicolas V. Benedicto Jr., for appellee. REYES, J.B.L, J.:On October 22, 1954, Yu Hai alias "Haya" was accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for having allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof, in the municipality of Caloocan on or about the 26th day of June 1954. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action or liability therefor had already been extinguished; and the Justice of the Peace of Court, in its order of December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in two months. The provincial fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the information. Wherefore, the provincial fiscal appealed directly to this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The sole issue is the period for prescription of the offense charged, punishable under Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200. The lower court held that the crime charged is a light offense as defined in Article 9 of the Code, and prescribed in two months; while the Solicitor General argues that as the crime charged may be punished by a maximum fine of P200 (a correctional penalty under Article 26),the same prescribe, also under Article 90, in ten

years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The pertinent legal provisions of the Revised Penal Code are:ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. -x x x           x x x           x x xchanrobles virtual law library Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in six months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The crime of libel or other similar offenses prescribe in two years. The offense of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Light offense prescribe in two months.x x x           x x x           x x xchanrobles virtual law library ART. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies, and light felonies. -x x x           x x x           x x xchanrobles virtual law library Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their period are correctional, in accordance with the above mentioned article.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Light felonies are those infraction of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both, is provided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ART. 26. Fine, when afflictive, correctional, or light. - A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it be less than 200.Under Article 90, supra, "light offenses prescribe in two months". The definition of "light offenses" is in turn to be found in Article 9, which classifies felonies into

grave, less grave, and light, and defines "light felonies" as "those infraction of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is provided ". The offense charged in punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos (Article 195). Hence, it is a "light offense" under Article 9 and prescribes in two months under Article 90.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Solicitor General argues that as the crime charged may be punished by a maximum fine of P200, which under Article 26 is a correctional penalty, the time for prescription thereof is ten years, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 90. This argument is untenable. In the First place, while Article 90 provides that light offense prescribe in two months, it does not define what is meant by "light offenses" , leaving it to Article 9 to fix its meaning. Article 26, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the definition of offenses, but merely classifies fine, when imposed as a principal penalty, whether singly or in the alternative into the categories of afflictive, correctional, and light penalties. As the question at issue is the prescription of the crime and not the prescription of a penalty, Article 9 should prevail over Article 26.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the second place, Article 90 could not have intended that light offenses as defined by Article 9 would have two prescriptive periods - two months if they are penalized by arresto menor and/or a fine of less than P200. and ten years if penalized by a maximum fine of P200. Under the theory of the Solicitor General, the difference of only one peso in the imposable fine would mean all the difference of nine years and ten months in the prescriptive period of the offense. And what is worse, the proper prescriptive period could not be ascertained until and unless the court decided which of the alternative penalties

should be imposed; which the court could not properly do if the offense had prescribed, for then it could no longer be prosecuted. These absurd results the law-makers could not have wittingly intended, especially since more serious offenses as those punishable by arresto mayor (a correctional penalty) prescribe, also under Article 90, in five years, while other "less grave" offense like libel, and oral defamation and slander, prescribe in even shorter periods of times, tow years and six months respectively. As held in the case of People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil., 679, there is no reason to suppose that the law-maker would raise the prescriptive period for certain light offenses over other light offenses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It should also punishable by arresto menor of a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both. Now, if we are to follow the argument of the Solicitor General that Article 26 should prevail over Article 9 if the offense is punishable by a maximum fine of P200 we would again have the absurd situation that an offense penalized by arresto menor or fine not exceeding P200 in the alternative, would be a less grave felony, while the more serious one, which the law penalizes with both imprisonment of arresto menor and a fine not exceeding P200, remains only a "light offense".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Finally, criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. As it would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply the definition of "light felonies" under Article 9 in connection with the prescriptive period of the offense charged, being a light offense, prescribed in two months. As it was allegedly committed on June 26, 1954 and the information filed only on October 22, 1954, the lower court correctly ruled that the crime in question has already prescribed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-12011-14             September 30, 1958THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.ALFONSO GATCHALIAN, defendant-appellee.Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for appellant.Ishmael Rodriguez for appellee.BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:Alfonso Gatchalian was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga with a violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 602 in four separate informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 2206, 2207, 2208 and 2209) committed as follows:That on or about August 4, 1951, up to and including December 31, 1953 and within the jurisdiction of this Court, viz, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, the above named accused, owner or manager of the New Life Drug Store, a business establishment in the City of Zamboanga and having under his employ one Expedito Fernandez as salesman in the said establishment, did then and there willfully, and feloniously, pay and cause to be paid to said Expedito Fernandez, a monthly salary of P60 to P90 for the period above-mentioned which is less than that provided for by law, thereby leaving a difference of an unpaid salary to the latter in the total amount of P1,016.64 for the period above-mentioned.When arraigned on June 19, 1956, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. On August 29, 1956, his counsel, in his behalf, filed a written motion to dismiss based on two grounds which in substance merely consist in that the violation charged does not constitute a criminal offense but carries only a civil liability, and even if it does, the section of the law alleged to have

been violated does not carry any penalty penalizing it. On September 25, 1956, the City Attorney of Zamboanga filed his answer to the motion to dismiss contending that the law which was violated by the accused carries with it both civil and criminal liability, the latter being covered by Section 15 which provides for the penalty for all willful violations of any of the provisions of the Minimum Wage Law. On December 3, 1956, the Court, after hearing the arguments of both parties, as well as some members of the local bar, issued an order dismissing the informations with costs de oficio and cancelling the bail bond filed by the accused. The court in the same order directed the Regional Representative of the Department of Labor to immediately institute a civil action against the erring employer for the collection of the alleged underpayment of wages due the employees. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Government took the present appeal.The pertinent portion of Section 3 of Republic Act 602 under which appellee was prosecuted, reads as follows:.SEC. 3. Minimum wage. — (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is employed by an enterprise other than in agriculture wages at the rate of not less than —(1) Four pesos a day on the effective date of this Act and thereafter for employees of an establishment located in Manila or its environs;(2) Three pesos a day on the effective date of this Act and for one year after the effective date, and thereafter P4 a day, for employees of establishment located outside of Manila or its environs: Provided, That this Act shall not apply to any retail or service enterprise that regularly employs not more than five employees.Section 15 of the same law, which treats of "penalties and recovery of wages due", likewise provides:SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act. —(a) Any person who wilfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than two thousand pesos, or, upon second conviction, to imprisonment of not more than one year, or to both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

(b) If any violation of this Act is committed by a corporation, trust, partnership or association, the manager or in his default, the person acting as such when the violation took place, shall be responsible. In the case of a government corporation, the managing head shall be made responsible, except when shown that the violation was due to an act or commission of some other person, over whom he has no control, in which case the latter shall be held responsible.(c) The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or the wages found owing to any employee under this Act.(d) The Secretary may bring an action in any competent court to recover the wages owing to an employee under this Act, with legal interest. Any sum thus recovered by the Secretary on behalf of an employee pursuant to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and shall be paid, on order of the Secretary, directly to the employee or employees affected. Any such sums not paid to an employee because he cannot be located within a period of three years shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.(e) Any employer who underpays an employee in violation of this Act shall be liable to the employee affected in the amount of the unpaid wages with legal interest. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any competent court by anyone or more employees on behalf of himself or themselves. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee which shall not exceed ten per cent of the amount awarded to the plaintiffs, unless the amount awarded is less than one hundred pesos, in which event the fee may be ten pesos, but not in excess of that amount. Payment of the amount found due to the plaintiffs shall be made directly to the plaintiffs, in the presence of a representative of the Secretary or the Court. In the event payment is witnessed by the court or its representative, the Secretary shall be notified within ten days of payment that the payment has been made.(f) No employer, attorney, or any other person, other than the employee to whom

underpayment are found due, shall receive any part of the underpayment due the employee; and no attorney shall receive any fee in excess of the maximum specified herein.(g) In determining when an action is commenced under this section for the purpose of the statute of limitation, it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant on the date when the complaint is filed if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint, or if his name did not so appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is added as a party plaintiff in such action.It is clear from the above-quoted provisions that while Section 3 explicitly requires every owner of an establishment located outside of Manila or its environs to pay each of its employees P3.00 a day on the effective date of the Act, and one year thereafter P4.00 a day, Section 15 imposes both a criminal penalty for a willful violation of any of the above provisions and a civil liability for any underpayment of wages due an employee. The intention of the law is clear: to slap not only a criminal liability upon an erring employer for any willful violation of the acts sought to be enjoined but to attach concurrently a civil liability for any underpayment he may commit as a result thereof. The law speaks of a willful violation of "any of the provisions of this Act", which is all-embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. A study of the origin of our Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602) may be of help in arriving at an enlightened and proper interpretation of the provisions under consideration. Our research shows that this Act was patterned after the U. S. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, and so a comparative study of the pertinent provisions of both would be enlightening.The pertinent provisions of the U. S. Fair Labor Stardards Act of 1938, as amended, follow:MINIMUM WAGES.SEC. 6. (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following rates —(1) not less than 75 cents an hour;

x x x           x x x           x x xPROHIBITED ACTSSEC. 15. (a) After the expiration of one hundred and twenty days from the date of enactment of this Act, it shall be unlawful for any person —(1) to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 6 or section 7, or in violation of any regulation or order of the Administrator issued under section 14; . . . .(2) to violate any of the provisions of section 6 or section 7, or any of the provisions of any regulation or order of the Administrator issued under section 14;(3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or cause to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee;(4) to violate any of the provisions of section 11 (c) or any regulation or order made or continued in effect under the provisions of section 11 (d), or to make any statement, report, or record filed or kept pursuant to the provisions of such section or of any regulation or order thereunder, knowing such statement, report, or record to be false in a material respect.x x x           x x x           x x xPENALTIESSEC. 16. (a) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 15 shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a line of not more than P10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense under this subsection.(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be,

and in additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant costs of the action.The pertinent provisions of Republic Act 602 read:SEC. 3. Minimum wage. — (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is employed by an enterprise other than in agriculture wages at the rate of not less than —x x x           x x x           x x x(2) Three pesos a day on the effective date of this Act and for one year after the effective date, and thereafter P4 a day, for employees of establishments located outside of Manila or its environs: Provided, That this Act shall not apply to any retail or service enterprise that regularly employs not more than five employees.SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act. —(a) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than two thousand pesos, or, upon second conviction, to imprisonment of not more than one year, or to both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.x x x           x x x           x x x(e) Any employer who underpays an employee in violation of this Act shall be liable to the employee affected in the amount of the unpaid wages with legal interest. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any competent court by anyone or employees on behalf of himself or themselves. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee which shall not exceed ten per cent of the amount awarded to the plaintiffs, unless the amount awarded is less than one hundred pesos, in which event

the fee may be ten pesos, but not in excess of that amount. Payment of the amount found due to the plaintiffs shall be made directly to the plaintiffs, in the presence of a representative of the Secretary or of the Court. In the event payment is witnessed by the court or its representative, the Secretary shall be notified within ten days of payment that the payment has been made.An examination of the above-quoted provisions of the two Acts will show that while in substance they are similar, they however contain some differences in their phraseology and in the apportionment of their provisions. Thus, while Section 15 (a), paragraph 2, of the Fair Labor Standards Act makes it unlawful for an employer not to pay the minimum wage prescribed therein, our Minimum Wage Law does not contain a similar provision. Again, the Fair Labor Standards Act enumerates in one single section all those acts which are declared unlawful and are not spread out in different sections as done in our law. Thus, the acts that are declared unlawful by the former law as enumerated in Section 15(a) are: (1) to transport or deliver any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of Section 6 or Section 7, or in violation of any regulation or order of the Administrator; (2) failure to pay the minimum wage; (3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee who has filed a complaint against the employer in relation to the Act; and (4) failure to keep the record or report required by law or to make a false record or report. On the other hand, our law declares unlawful the following acts, to wit: (1) to pay wages in the form of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens or any other form alleged to represent legal tender [Section 10 (a) (1)]; (2) to make any deduction or withhold any amount from the wages of an employee, or induce any employee to give part of his wages by force or intimidation [ Section 10 (g)]; (3) to commit any act of discrimination against an employee because of certain complaint he has filed or caused to be filed against the employer (Section 13); and (4) to make any false statement, report or record to subvert the purpose of the Act (Section 14), which acts are contained in separate sections mentioned

therein. The failure to pay the prescribed minimum wage is not declared unlawful in our law.It should also be noted that while Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act which provides for the penalties to be imposed for any willful violation of the provisions of the Act specifically states that those penalties refer to acts declared unlawful under Section 15 of the same Act, our law does not contain such specification. It merely provides in Section 15 (a) that "Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon conviction" be subject to the penalty therein prescribed. This distinction is very revealing. It clearly indicates that while the Fair Labor Standards Act intends to subject to criminal action only acts that are declared unlawful, our law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law. One such provision is undoubtedly that which refers to the payment of the minimum wage embodied in Section 3. This is the only rational interpretation that can be drawn from the attitude of our Congress in framing our law in a manner different from that appearing in the mother law. Indeed, the main objective of the law is to provide for a rock-bottom wage to be observed and by an employers of an agricultural and industrial establishment. This objective would be defeated were we to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the above penal clause, for an employer who knows that he cannot be amenable to a criminal action would be prone to subvert the law because if he is detected it would be easy for him to pay the underpayment and the corresponding interest as would be the case were he to assume merely a civil liability. This would be a mockery and a derision of the law not contemplated by our lawmaker which would certainly render it nugatory and abortive. We are not prepared to adopt an interpretation which would give such adverse result to a legislation conceived in the lofty purpose of protecting labor and giving it a living wage. If the law is to survive, it must be real, militant and effective.

The establishment of the maximum wage benefits directly the low-paid employees, who now receive inadequate wages on which to support themselves and their families. It benefits all wage earners indirectly by setting a floor below which their remuneration cannot fail. It raises the standards of competition among employers, since it would protect the fair-minded employer who voluntarily pays a wage that supports the wage earner from the competition of the employer, who operates at lower cost by reasons of paying his workers a wage below subsistence. If, in fact, the employer cannot pay a subsistence wage, then he should not continue his operation unless he improves his methods and equipment so as to make the payment of the minimum wage feasible for him; otherwise the employer is wasting the toil of the worker and the material resources used in the employment. Second methods of operation, progressive and fair-minded management, and an adequate minimum wage go hand in hand. (Explanatory Note to H.B. No. 1476).Counsel for appellee however entertains a different interpretation. He contends that if Section 15(a) should be interpreted in a manner that would embrace a willful violation of any of the provisions of the law we would have a situation where even the officials entrusted with its enforcement may be held criminally liable which is not contemplated in the law. Thus, he contends, the Secretary of Labor may be criminally prosecuted for willfully not using all available devices for investigation [Section 4 (c)], for not presenting to the Wage Board all the evidence in his possession relating to the wages in the industries for which the Wage Board is appointed and other information relevant to the establishment of the minimum wage [Section 5 (p)], and for not doing all other acts which the law requires him to do under Section 6. This, he emphasizes, is absurd and should not be entertained.To begin with, the Minimum Wage Law is a social legislation which has been adopted for the benefit of labor and as such it contains provisions that are enjoined to be observed by the employer. These provisions are substantive in nature and had been adopted for common observance by the persons affected. They

cannot be eluded nor subverted lest the erring employer runs into the sanction of the law. On the other hand, the provisions adverted to by counsel are merely administrative in character which had been adopted to set the machinery by which the law is to be enforced. They are provisions established for observance by the officials entrusted with its enforcement. Failure to comply with them would therefore subject them merely to administrative sanction. They do not come under the penal clause embodied in Section 15(a). This is clearly inferred from Section 18(c), of Republic Act No. 602, which provides: "Any official of the Government to whom responsibility in administration and enforcement has been delegated under this Act shall be removable on the sustaining of charges of malfeasance or non-feasance in office." This specific provision should be interpreted as qualifying the penal clause provided for in Section 15(a).It is true that Section 3 under which appellee was charged does not state that it shall be unlawfull for an employer to pay his employees wages below the minimum wage but merely requires that the employer shall pay wages not below the minimum wage. But failure of such declaration does not make the non-observance of the provisions less unlawful than otherwise, for such provision embodies precisely the raison d'etre of the law itself. Indeed, Section 3 is the very provision on which all the other provisions of the law are built. Thus, the prohibition against discriminating against any employee because he has filed a complaint or caused to be instituted one against the employer is just a means to insure the effective enforcement of that provision (Section 13); and so the prohibition against the making of a false statement, report or record required to be filed or kept by the law (Section 13); the prohibition against the payment of wages in the form of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens, or any other form to represent legal tender (Section 10, par. a, sub-paragraph 1); and the prohibition against making deductions or withholding any amount from the wages of an employee (Section 10, par. g). These are acts which were declared unlawful because they may be resorted to by unscrupulous employers with the evident purpose of subverting or

defeating the payment of the minimum wage. If these supplementary provisions are mere safeguards established by the lawmaker to close every avenue to trickery or subversion on the part of the employer, they cannot be more important and imperative as the central provision fixing the minimum wage without which the law will have no reason to exist. We cannot therefore entertain the claim that because said provision was not declared unlawful it cannot be subject to the penal sanction embodied in Section 15.It is likewise true that the informations under which the accused was charged only mention Section 3 of the law as the one violated and this section does not contain a penal clause, but this does not make the informations defective. There is no law which requires that in order that an accused may be convicted the specific provision which penalizes that act charged be mentioned in the information. The Rules of Court do not require such designation. In fact, the rule provides that an information, to be sufficient, should state only the name of the defendant, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed (Rule 106, Section 5). The rule does not require that it should mention the particular penal provision penalizing the offense.The final claim of appellee is that inasmuch as the provisions of the law under which he was prosecuted are ambiguous and there is doubt as to their interpretation, that doubt should be resolved in his favor because a penal statute should be strictly construed against the State. This contention must also fail if we are to be consistent with our interpretation of the provisions of Section 15 (a) of the law. We have stated that that section is clear and unambiguous and covers the provisions embodied in Section 3 of the law, and if such is the case then there is no room for the application of the principle invoked by appellee.We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the court a quo erred in dismissing the informations filed against the appellee and,

consequently, its order of December 3, 1956, subject of this appeal should be set aside.Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. It is ordered that these cases be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings, with costs against appellee..Paras, C. J., Padilla, and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Separate OpinionsCONCEPCION, J., concurring:I concur in the foregoing opinion, as well as in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes (J. B. L.).

REYES, J. B. L., concurring:I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Bautista Angelo, particularly in view of the provisions of Sec. 10, paragraph g of the Minimum Wage Act which reads as follows:.SEC. 10 (g). It shall be unlawful for any person, including but not restricted to, any employer . . . to make any deductions or withold any amount from the wages of an employee . . . by force, intimidation, threat, or procuring dismissal or in any manner whatsoever.If the act declares unlawful to withhold in any manner whatsoever any amount from the wages of an employee, it must necessarily be unlawful not to pay him the wage called for by the Minimum Wage Act. What is the difference between not paying the minimum wage and withholding part of the wage so the balance is below the minimum wage? To underpay is to withhold part of the wage.The act complained of, therefore, is an offense penalized under the Act. Our duty being to interpret the Act in consonance with its primary purpose to benefit the laborer, we should consider that the only sanction for not paying the minimum wage were to be the payment of interest on the unpaid salary, the situation of the wage earner would have been in no way advanced and the Minimum Wage Act would be practically nullified, for a laborer is in no position to engage in protracted litigation with his employer. As pointed in the opinion of Justice Bautista Angelo the criminal liability is the only effective sanction under the circumstances. The rejection of the Tañada amendment merely proves that the Legislature was against heavier penalties at the start, not

that it desired to shield anyone from prosecution.It is not for us to speculate upon the secondary effects of the Act on industry. To foresee them is the task of the Legislature. If it desired to immunize employers against criminal prosecution, as an exception to the general penalty, it could have clearly so stated. On the other hand if it wished to be ambiguous in order to content both Capital and Labor, I think the Court would be advancing the cause of good government by driving home the necessity that laws be carefully framed and clearly worded.The function of statutory interpretation, in my opinion, is to cure involuntary mistakes and supply inadvertences; not to ferret out of ambiguities a policy that legislators may be afraid or unwilling to express. If it is unconstitutional for the Judiciary to invade the sphere of the Legislature, it is just as unlawful for the legislators to shirk their own duty and divert to the Judges the odium of unpopular measures. Que cada palo aguante su vela — each mast should bear its own sail.

BENGZON, J., dissenting:Concurring in the dissent of Mr. Justice Montemayor, I wish to emphasize that as applied to this case, Sec. 15, subsections (a) and (e) should be read together substantially as follows:Any person who violates any provision of this Act shall be punished with fines, etc. . . . except that where the violation consists in paying the employee less than the minimum wage, the employer shall be punished by requiring him to satisfy the difference, plus attorney's fees.I believe subsection (e) punishes the particular "violation" of paying less than the minimum wage. It is a special provision, which under well-known rules of construction, should prevail over the general provision in subsection (a). In other words, although the Act does not expressly say so, subsection (e) is an exception1 to subsection (a).I think it is a mistake to suppose that this interpretation fails to punish the employer who disregards the Act; because the liability imposed by subsection (e) is unquestionably a

sanction, penal in nature, which except for the law, would not be demandable. If Juan De la Cruz, by contract, employs Pedro at P3.00 per day in Manila where the law fixes a minimum daily wage of P4.00, Pedro could not recover P4.00 instead of P3.00 (except for this law) because Pedro agreed to the 3-peso wage. Nevertheless, this subsection (e) says, despite such agreement with Pedro, Juan must pay him at the rate of P4.00 a day, plus attorney's fees. He is required to pay what he did not contract to pay, or could not afford to pay. Is not this a punishment imposed on Juan? Remember that fine, which is also a punishment consists in the disbursement of money.But such payment is insufficient penalty, I hear others argue. This case will easily disprove such argument: Under subsection (e) this appellee would have to pay necessarily P1,016.00, plus attorney's fees; whereas under subsection (a) he might be fined P200.00 only.2

However, the majority will counter, we hold that the employer, is liable under subsection (e) in addition to his liability under subsection (a).Therein lies the trouble; the words "in addition" or words of similar import, were not inserted in subsection (e), as they could have been inserted.Additional liability, is their prevailing idea. And yet, why should the law impose on the employer (who pays in accordance with a contract freely entered into), additional burdens not imposed on the other employers willfully violating other fundamental provisions of the Act.It may be argued that subsection (e) is not really a sanction independent of subsection (a), or additional thereto, because it merely repeats the well-known principle that "every person criminally liable is also civilly liable." My answer is twofold: first, attorney's fees are not usually included in such principle — a robber is not required to pay attorney's fees; second, the employee is not really the injured party because he accepted the employment under a contract: "Scienti et volenti nulla fit injuria." There is no violation of any right of the employee for which reparation is due. In the example given, Pedro had no right to require Juan to employ him at P4.00. There is only a

breach of the statute, for which the Government can choose, and did choose the proper sanction, namely, payment of the salary differential under subsection (e). The Congress did not choose more than that; contrary to what it did in analogous situations. Take the Usury Law, for instance; it provides "without prejudice to the proper civil action for the recovery of usurious interest paid, violations of this Act shall be subject to criminal prosecution and the guilty person, etc." (Sec. (10).In the absence of a clear, unmistakable statute, we should not approve two punishments for one and the same misconduct.

MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:To my knowledge, this is the first time that the Minimum Wage Law is being interpreted by this Tribunal, as regards the compass and scope of the penalty provided in Section 15 of said law, so that on this subject matter, this will be the first case and a leading one. The trial court in its order dismissing the information said that it had carefully considered its ruling or order because "it believes that any resolution, one way or another, would be precedent-setting, because until now, the Supreme Court has not directly ruled upon the point."Under the interpretation given by the majority, any employer who underpays his employees in violation of the Minimum Wage Law (Section 3) would be subject to criminal prosecution. I am afraid that if that is the law, the prosecuting attorneys and fiscals would have on their hands not only the prosecution of thousands of private employers who may be paying their employees and laborers amounts less than the minimum wage, however small the deficiency, but also hundreds and thousands of provincial and municipal officials, particularly the latter, who are paying their employees, not excluding peace officers like municipal policemen and patrolmen, salaries which are way below the minimum wage of P4.00 a day. It is a well known fact that in this respect, the Government is the first and worst offender. Even first class municipalities cannot afford and naturally do not pay their employees and peace officers the minimum wage; with more reason cannot second class and third class municipalities do so.

The majority opinion will have such far-reaching and to me, unforeseen consequences, at once baneful, undesirable, and hurtful to industry, and disastrous to local government officials who, strictly speaking, are not to blame, that I am constrained to voice my dissent and explain the reasons therefor.For a better understanding of the adoption of the minimum wage in this jurisdiction, it is well to remember that it was not of the initiative, idea or volition of this country. It was recommended by the Bell Mission which made an economic survey here and in its report, recommended its establishment. Not only this, but it would appear that the enactment of this Minimum Wage Law was made a condition precedent to economic aid to be given to us by the United States of America.1

In connection with the discussion and enactment of this piece of legislation, not only our economists but also our legislators expressed their fears, doubts and misgivings, fully realizing that the country was not perhaps prepared economically for its adoption and operation. But because of our commitment with America,2 and possibly realizing also the necessity of establishing a fair minimum standard of wages for laborers and employees, the Legislature enacted this law in the nature of an experiment, carefully watching and observing in its operation, execution and observance, its good points and its shortcomings as well, with the idea of later making the necessary changes and amendment. The Legislature was, as it were, venturing out on an uncharted sea; so it had to be conservative and move with measured steps. Since the law was merely being tried out as an experiment, its provisions could not have been made and intended to be strict and severe, in the sense that because of their severity and strictness, compliance therewith would be difficult, if not impossible, and would result in their non observance, and the consequent punishment by fine and prison sentence of those defined as employers who are unable to comply with said provisions. The net result would be the unjust punishment of innocent government officials and the discouragement and destruction of infant and small industries..

From the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 202, we may have an idea of the attitude of the Legislature on this particular point:One thing to be remembered is that the country has not yet attained that degree of industrialization where wages can be set at fully satisfactory levels from the viewpoints of human values. Compromises must still be made until this full industrial status is attained. Another thing is that hasty and unjudicious action in passing minimum wage laws may be deterrent to private capital which, on the contrary needs to be encouraged to invest in local industries if the industrialization of our country must someday be a fact. (Emphasis supplied).As the majority opinion correctly observes, our Minimum Wage Law is patterned after that of the United States Fair Labor Standards Act (F.L.S.A.) of 1938, as amended. As I have already stated, the establishment of this minimum wage in this country being a sort of experiment, it being the first time that it was being tried out, and not knowing whether or not it would be a success, it is to be presumed that the Legislature acted cautiously and warily, and even while adopting as a pattern the United States F.L.S.A., it did not wish or Intend to make our law more stern and strict in its enforcement and application, particularly as regards its penalties. But the majority opinion would make our law more rigorous and severe, more comprehensive and more devastating in the application of its penal provisions. For instance, while the F.L.S.A. in Section 16(a) penalizes only specific violations of its provisions expressly enumerated, our law as interpreted by the majority opinion, would punish any violation whatsoever, whether enumerated specifically or not. Moreover, while Section 15(a) of the F. L. S. A. makes it unlawful for an employer not to pay the minimum wage prescribed by it, our Minimum Wage Law does not contain a similar provision. What our law declares unlawful are certain positive and affirmative acts, such as, paying wages in the form of promissory notes, vouchers, etc.; making deductions or withholding any amount from the wages of an employee, or inducing any employee to give part of his wages by force or intimidation;

committing any act of discrimination against an employee because of a certain complaint he had filed against the employer, or making any false statement in any report or record to subvert the purposes of the Act. These acts must have been regarded by the Legislature as serious and so expressly declared them unlawful. However, the mere failure to pay the prescribed minimum wage is not, in our law, declared unlawful. I believe that what the Legislature intended to penalize with fine and prison sentence were only those acts which it enumerated and declared unlawful, not the mere failure to follow and comply with the obligations imposed upon an employer, such as, the nonpayment of the minimum wage.It will be noticed that our law expressly provides that any employer underpaying an employee in violation of the Act shall be liable to said employee in the amount of the underpayment, with legal interest, plus a reasonable amount for attorney's fees. This amount may be recovered not only by the employee himself, but by the Secretary of Labor on his behalf. In my opinion, this civil responsibility to be enforced with the aid of the Department of Labor, was regarded as sufficient punishment and deterrent on the employer. Being a civil action, the employee only needs preponderance of evidence to win his suit. The Legislature may have been of the belief that application of the penal sanction in the form of fine and prison sentence would be too radical a measure, would scare and discourage new and infant industries, besides inducing violators to resort to underhanded but effective measures to hide and conceal infringement of the law, to say nothing of the added difficulty in securing conviction, which requires not only preponderance of evidence, but proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.To show that the Legislature did not intend to be too severe and stern in the application of this new law which was merely being tried out, while House Bill No. 1732 was being discussed in the Senate, Senator Tañada believing that the bill was too lenient for those who violated its provisions by providing for a fine of only not more than P1,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than six months, he proposed that the fine be increased to not more than P10,000.00

— half the amount of the fine provided in Section 16(a) of the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act; but the committee sponsoring the bill, through Senator Torres, objected to the proposed amendment as being too excessive and severe, specially at the beginning of the operation of the law, upon which Senator Tañada withdrew his amendment, with the understanding that in a year or so after the promulgation of the law, it will be amended:.

SENATE

December 22, 1950.

ENMIENDA TAÑADASENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President for another amendment, On page 18, Section 15 provides for penalties. Mr. President, I believe that the bill is too lenient for those who violate the provisions of this measure. It only provides for a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not more than six months, or both. In order to really protect labor we must make the penalty stiffer than what is provided in this bill. So I propose the following amendment: In line 22, delete the word "one" between the words "than" and "thousand", and insert in its place the word "ten"--not more than ten thousand pesos".EL PRESIDENTE. Que dice el comite?EL SENADOR TORRES. Señor Presidente, el Comite siente no poder aceptar la enmienda, en vista de que considera demasiada excesiva la pena, sobre todo, en los comienzos de la vigencia de la ley.SENATOR TAÑADA. I then, Mr. President, withdraw my amendment with the understanding that in a year or so after this Law has been in force, we shall amend it.EL PRESIDENTE. Se da por retirada. (Senate Journal, Jan. 5, 1951, pp. 5-6). (Emphasis supplied).Going back to the violation of this Minimum Wage Law by the Government itself, it is a matter of public knowledge that employees like clerks in the office of the Municipal Treasurer, and municipal policemen receive as low as P40.00 or P50.00 a month, way below the minimum wage prescribed by the law. Under the interpretation given by the majority, since the word "employer" in the law includes the

Government3 and government corporations, then the municipal mayor, the municipal councilors and the municipal treasurer who knowingly and wilfully pay to their employees and policemen salaries way below the minimum wage, would all be subject to criminal prosecution. Multiply this number of municipal officials by the number of such towns and municipalities in the Philippines which do not and cannot pay the minimum wage to their employees and municipal policemen, which towns and municipalities can be counted by the hundreds, and we shall have an idea of the number of government violators of the law which we have and must prosecute criminally under the majority opinion. Could such mass and wholesale prosecution have been contemplated and intended by the Legislature? And let it not be said that with respect to said Government officials, the only punishment is by administrative action and removal, as provided in Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d), which read as follows:(c) Any official of the Government to whom responsibility in administration and enforcement has been delegated under this Act shall be removable on the sustaining of charges of malfeasance or nonfeasance in office.(d) Any person engaged in the administration and enforcement of this Act who is found to have accepted any bribe from or on behalf of any party in interest under this Act shall be summarily dismissed, and criminal action shall be instituted against such person. (Emphasis supplied).because those provisions clearly refer only to those government officials entrusted with the administration and enforcement of the law, such as, the Secretary of Labor the members of the Wage Administration Service, and others.But the majority opinion says that not to apply the penal sanction to an employer underpaying his laborers or employees —. . . would be a mockery and a derision of the law not contemplated by our lawmaker which would certainly render it nugatory and abortive. We are not prepared to adopt an interpretation which would give such adverse result to a legislation conceived in the lofty purpose of protecting labor and giving it a

living wage. If the law is to survive, it must be real, militant and effective. (Emphasis supplied).In other words, the majority of this Tribunal on its own initiative would make the Minimum Wage Law militant and effective by a blanket and indiscriminate application of Section 15(a) to all violators of its provisions, whether or not such violation is expressly or specifically declared unlawful by the law itself. Stated otherwise, this Tribunal steps in, nay, rushes in to put teeth in a legislation which it considers toothless and would make effective and militant what it regards would otherwise be ineffectual and inadequate. This Tribunal would, like one unlicensed to practice medicine, prescribe a cure for a supposed legislational malady. I am afraid that is not and has never been the province, much less, the prerogative of the Judiciary. Otherwise, the courts would be indulging in judicial legislation.If the Minimum Wage Law is found to be inadequate and ineffective, let the Legislature make the necessary changes and amendments. In fact, that was the legislative plan from the beginning — observe the operation and working of the law and then make changes, if deemed necessary. But evidently, the Legislature is satisfied with the operation and mode of application of the law, because although approved on April 6, 1951, and made effective 120 days thereafter, in other words, after a seven-year operation, it (Legislature) has not seen fit to introduce any major changes,4 specially in the application of the penalty.Anyway, after all is said and done, the least that could be said about the applicability of Section 15(a) of the Minimum Wage law to violations of Section 3 is doubtful. Even brushing aside and not considering the grave doubts entertained by the undersigned as to the applicability of said Section 15(a) to violations of Section 3, we have in evidence the opinion of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and according to it, the opinion of the major sector of the Zamboanga bar, sustaining the view that Section 15(a) is not applicable to violations of Sections 3 of the Minimum Wage Law. We have the well settled principle in the interpretation of penal laws that

in case of doubt, the interpretation favorable to the accused should be adopted. Authorities in support of this principle are not wanting.Laws creating, defining, or punishing crimes, and those imposing penalties and forfeitures, are to be construed strictly against the state or the party seeking to enforce them, and liberally in favor of the party sought to be charged. They are not to be enlarged by implications, nor extended to persons or cases not plainly within the meaning of the language employed. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 451).Said this Court in U. S. vs. Abad Santos, 35 Phil. 243:Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly; no person should be brought within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so.In view of the foregoing, I hold that the penal sanction of the Minimum Wage Law applies only to certain violations of its provisions, that is to say, those acts which are expressly declared by the law itself as unlawful; and that mere nonpayment of the minimum wage is not included in the said penal sanction, the Legislature evidently believing that the civil responsibility of the employer for the amount of the underpayment with legal interest and attorney's fees to be enforced with the aid of the Department of Labor, is enough punishment and deterrent on employers.

REYES A., J., dissenting:As the majority opinion itself says, "failure to pay the prescribed minimum wage is not declared unlawful in our law" (Rep. Act No. 602). On the other hand, it is doubtful if the penal sanction prescribed in section 15(a) of that Act — presumably for the acts and practices therein declared unlawful — could be rightfully applied to the act of underpaying an employee, since paragraph (e) of that same section already provides a specific remedy therefor. Considering that penal statutes are strictly construed against the state and in Case of doubt courts must adopt the construction favorable to the accused, I vote for the affirmance of the order below and also say that courts should not presume to legislate by putting into the law more teeth than the Legislature has already put into it.

G.R. No. 90301 December 10, 1998THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JUANCHO GATCHALIAN, accused-appellant. MENDOZA, J.:This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, finding accused-appellant Juancho Gatchalian guilty of murder for the killing on January 23, 1986 of Arthur Aumentado and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Arthur Aumentado in the amount of P38,000.00 and to pay the costs of suit. 1

As is usual in cases of this nature, the parties present conflicting versions of the incident. The question is which version is the more credible, given the rule that the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.The prosecution version is based mainly on the testimonies 2 of Luisito Reyes and his father Agapito Reyes. Luisito said that at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of January 23, 1986, he went to the store of Aling Paro at the corner of Perla B and Pavia Streets in Tondo, Manila, to buy cigarettes. While he was there, he saw accused-appellant Juancho Gatchalian and Boyong Hagibis pass by. They came from the direction of Sevilla Street and they were walking towards Perla C Street. The both seemed drunk. Accused-appellant's head appeared bloodied. Neither of them was carrying a weapon. The two had reportedly been drinking and accused-appellant had gotten into a quarrel at Sevilla Street with a certain "Eddie" and also one "Pedro".After accused-appellant and Boyong Hagibis had passed by, Arthur Aumentado, a co-worker and neighbor of Luisito Reyes, came to the store to buy cigarettes. Luisito's father, Agapito Reyes, also dropped by the store. He was on his way to a neighbor's house and his purpose in stopping by was to tell his son to go home soon.Luisito Reyes told the court that shortly after he had seen the two, accused-appellant

Juancho Gatchalian and Boyong Hagibis passed by the store again. This time, accused-appellant was armed with a jungle bolo, about 2 1/2 feet long, while Boyong Hagibis was armed with an iron pipe, about a foot long and an inch in diameter. At that point, Arthur Aumentado walked a few meters away to go to an alley to try to see what was going on at Sevilla Street where earlier there had reportedly been a commotion. Although Arthur Aumentado's back was turned towards them, accused-appellant and Boyong Hagibis nonetheless recognized him. Luisito heard Boyong Hagibis say to accused-appellant. "Pare, Pare, may kaaway tayo." (Pal. we have an enemy.) When Arthur Aumentado turned around to return to the store. Boyong Hagibis struck him on the head with the iron pipe. Arthur Aumentado fell to the ground, whereupon, accused-appellant stabbed him, once in the breast and again in the abdominal area with his jungle bolo. Boyong Hagibis then fled towards Perla C Street, followed by accused-appellant who brought with him the jungle bolo he used to stab the victim.Luisito Reyes and his father, Agapito Reyes, saw the entire incident. Luisito Reyes was barely five (5) meters away, while Agapito was about four (4) arms length away from the scene of the stabbing. The place where the stabbing occurred was well lighted by a string of electric bulbs used during the last fiesta and by Meralco posts. There was a commotion as a result of the incident. Agapito Reyes went home while Luisito Reyes asked somebody to call for Arnold Aumentado, a brother of the victim. When Arnold Aumentado arrived, he and Luisito Reyes took Arthur Aumentado to the Mary Johnson Hospital in Tondo, Manila. However, he was already dead when they arrived at the hospital at about 6:50 that evening.Meantime, police investigators, headed by Pat. Feliciano Cristobal, arrived, following a call from a security guard of the Mary Johnson Hospital. The police officers encountered Luisito Reyes at the hospital who told them that he had witnessed the stabbing and pointed to accused-appellant Juancho Gactchalian and Boyong Hagibis as the culprits. The police also learned that Agapito Reyes

likewise saw the incident and that accused-appellant was at the Tondo General Hospital for treatment. They were not able to interview accused-appellant, however, as he was still under sedation. Meanwhile, both Luisito Reyes and his father. Agapito, went to the Western Police District on United Nations Avenue. At 9:45 that evening, Luisito Reyes gave his written statement to Pat. Rodolfo Rival. Later that evening, at 10:10, Agapito Reyes gave his written statement to Pat. Feliciano Cristobal. 3

Accused-appellant categorically denied he stabbed Arthur Aumentado. He claimed he did not know a person named Boyong Hagibis. The defense presented evidence 4 showing that, on January 23, 1986, at about 6 o'clock in the evening, accused-appellant was in the house of his compadre Batotoy on Pavia Street. He was there, according to him, to get jewelry to sell on commission. While he was in the house of Batotoy, he was fetched by his aunt because his child fell sick. On her way to Batotoy's house, accused-appellant's aunt. Myrna Conje, noticed two (2) men near the alley at the corner of Pavia Street. One of the men, whom she later came to know was Arthur Aumentado, held a jungle bolo, while the other, whom she later came to know was Artemio (Temy) Aumentado, a brother of Arthur Aumentado, had a gun tucked at his waist.Myrna Conje said that upon reaching Batotoy's house, she called accused-appellant who lost no time going home with her. On their way back, they saw from about four (4) to five (5) meters away, Artemio Aumentado aim his gun at accused-appellant's direction and fire it. As accused-appellant tried to run, he found himself and his aunt surrounded. Behind them, blocking a small alley, were three (3) men: Arnold Aumentado (brother of Arthur Aumentado), who had a jungle bolo; Luisito Reyes, who had a foot long knife; and Elmer Aumentado (another brother of the victim), who was holding a jungle bolo. Arthur Aumentado then went to the middle of the street and demanded to know why accused-appellant and his aunt were "blocking" the street ("Bakit kayo paharang-harang?"). Without waiting for an answer, accused-appellant said, Arthur Aumentado struck him with a jungle bolo, hitting him (accused-

appellant) on the right side of the head and causing him to fall on his back. Thereupon, he claimed Artemio Aumentado, Arnold Aumentado, Elmer Aumentado, and Luisito Reyes rushed toward them and started attacking him. At this point Arthur Aumentado, his brothers, and Luisito Reyes were surrounding the accused-appellant and Myrna Conje who behind him. He tried to parry the blows of his attackers with the use of his feet and by rolling on the ground. In the process, the first interdigital web of his foot was cut.During the attack, accused-appellant said he fell unconscious. He was pulled away from the group by his aunt and brought home. He was then taken to the hospital. Accused-appellant claimed the attack lasted about thirty (30) minutes.Accused-appellant was taken to the Tondo General Hospital shortly before 7 o'clock that evening. He was found to have sustained a lacerated wound, three (3) centimeters on the first interdigital web of his left foot, and an avulsion of the scalp, parieto-occipital (right) with an area of five (5) centimeters by four (4) centimeters. He also tested positive for alcohol. He was placed under sedation and discharged from the hospital the following day. 5

On January 27, 1986, he was taken to the Western Police District on United Nations Avenue. In the presence of his counsel, Atty. David Paz, accused-appellant and his aunt. Myrna Conje, gave statements to the police investigators. Atty. David Paz filed a letter, dated January 27, 1986, with the Office of the Superintendent of the Western Police District requesting for the investigation of Artemio (Temy) Aumentado and others, including Arthur Aumentado, for the injuries suffered by accused-appellant. On April 11, 1986, he filed a complaint for frustrated murder against Arthur Aumentado. Artemio Aumentado, Elmer Aumentado, Arnold Aumentado, and a John Doe with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. On July 21, 1986, however. Assistant City Fiscal Cesario del Rosario, with the concurrence and approval of the City Fiscal, found the complaint to be without merit and accordingly dismissed the case filed by accused-appellant against Arthur Aumentado. Instead, the filing of an

Information for murder against accused-appellant was ordered. 6

Accordingly, on August 29, 1986, an Information 7 for murder was filed against accused-appellant Juancho Gatchalian. 8 After trial, he was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, in a decision, dated December 8, 1987. 9

Hence, this appeal.Accused-appellant raises the following errors in his brief: 10

ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE BY THE ACCUSED DESPITE CLEAR EVIDENCE ON RECORD SUPPORTING THE SAME.IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, NAMELY LUISITO AND AGAPITO BOTH SURNAMED, REYES WHO BOTH HAVE INTEREST IN THE CASE.IIITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE WEAK EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.IVGRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF ARTHUR AUMENTADO, EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE CRIME WAS NOT ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF MURDER.We find the foregoing contentions to be untenable.First. The first three assignments of errors involve basically a question of credibility. The time-honored rule is, of course, that when the of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This is so because the trial judge heard the witnesses testify and had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and manner of testifying. 11 As we explained in People v. Cayabyab: 12

. . . Having the advantage of directly observing witnesses, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and

prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-rate signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a read reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of these observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.There is no reason for departing from this salutary rule. The defense version that accused-appellant was attacked while he and his aunt were walking home simply defies credibility.(1) The medical certificate 13 presented by accused-appellant shows that he sustained the following injuries: "lacerated wound, 3 cm. first interdigital web, left foot." and "avulsion of the scalp, 5x4 cm. parieto-occipital (right)." Although he was advised to remain at the hospital for one night, it was primarily because he was intoxicated. According to Dr. Gan, who examined him, accused-appellant could have made his way home immediately after suture of his wounds. 14

(2) The trial court expressed disbelief that accused-appellant would have sustained only minor injuries which required less than nine (9) days of treatment if, as the defense claimed, accused-appellant had been attacked by five men, all heavily armed with a gun, jungle bolos, and a knife, who, if the defense were to be believed, were out to do him serious harm, if not to kill him. Accused-appellant's story is all the more difficult to believe because the attack allegedly lasted for about half an hour. 15 How accused-appellant survived such an attack with only two minor injuries is incredible.Second. Another puzzling matter is the claim that accused-appellant's aunt was able to pull him away from his assailants. Why would his

alleged attackers gang up on him and yet half an hour later allow, without protest, his aunt to take him away? Myrna Conje said she cried for help but no one came to their aid. 16 What is even more incredible is that while accused-appellant was allegedly attacked by five fully armed men, it was one of the latter, victim Arthur Aumentado, who ended up dead after the alleged assault.Indeed, a perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that the respective testimonies of accused-appellant and his aunt are inconsistent with each other. Accused-appellant claimed it was only the victim who had actually struck at him because the other four men merely surrounded them. 17 This is inconsistent with the testimony of his aunt that all five men ganged up on him. 18 This is a substantial aspect of the defense theory. Moreover, the defense witnesses gave their statements only after four days had elapsed since the killing of the victim while the prosecution witnesses gave theirs on the very day itself, a few hours later. Lastly, the trial court observed that witness Myrna Conje initially tried to deny any knowledge of Boyong Hagibis but later admitted to being familiar with him. 19 Such being the case, the trial court could not be faulted for not giving credence to their testimonies.In contrast, witnesses presented by the prosecution were categorical and consistent in saying that they saw accused-appellant stab Arthur Aumentado after the latter was rendered helpless by accused-appellant's companion who first hit the victim on the head with an iron pipe. All three corroborate the substantial aspects of each other's accounts. The said witnesses have stood firm by their accounts of the killing of the victim from the time they were first questioned up to the time they testified in court.Luisito Reyes testified: 20

FISCAL FORMOSO:When you noticed Boyong and Juancho [Gatchalian] approaching, how far were you?WITNESS:About 5 meters, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:What did you observe when Boyong and Juancho were approaching?

WITNESS:They had a quarrel with somebody, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:What else did you observe?WITNESS:Boyong was carrying an iron pipe and Juancho was carrying a bolo, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:How long was this pipe which Boyong was carrying?WITNESS:About one foot long, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:What kind of a pipe is that?WITNESS:It is a water pipe, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:Now, this Gatchalian, who (sic) long the bolo that he was carrying?WITNESS:About two feet, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:After seeing these two persons, what happened next?WITNESS:Kuya Arthur was hit by an iron pipe thrown on his head, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:Who threw this iron pipe on the head of Arthur?WITNESS:Boyong Hagibis, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:And what about Juancho, what did you notice to (sic) him?WITNESS:I saw Juancho struck (sic) Arthur with a bolo when Arthur fell, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:How far were you from the place where Arthur, Juancho and Boyong were?WITNESS:About 5 meters, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:What was the lighting condition when the incident happened?WITNESS:The place was lighted, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:Where were the lights come from?WITNESS:There were lines of bulbs in our place, sir.

FISCAL FORMOSO:Are there Meralco posts there?WITNESS:Yes, sir.COURT:Aside from the Meralco post, are there other sources of lights in that place?WITNESS:Yes, the bulbs that are lined in that place, sir.COURT:Why was it lighted in the way?WITNESS:Because those bulbs were left, there whenever there were fiestas there in that place, Your Honor.Luisito Reyes account of the killing was duly corroborated by another prosecution witness. Agapito Reyes, who was also at the scene of the crime at the time the incident occurred. Agapito Reyes testified: 21

FISCAL FORMOSO:While in the store to call your son, did you notice unusual incident that happened?WITNESS:Yes, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:What was that about?WITNESS:I saw Juancho Gatchalian and Boyong Hagibis, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:Where did you see Juancho and Boyong?WITNESS:Also in the store near Perla "B", sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:How far were you from these two when you saw them?WITNESS:More or less, four arms length, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:What happened when you saw these two?WITNESS:I saw Boyong hit Arthur, and after that Juancho struck Arthur with a bolo, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:What instrument did Boyong use in hitting Arthur?WITNESS:I saw it was a pipe, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:What kind of a pipe was that?

WITNESS:It was an iron pipe, sir.xxx xxx xxxFISCAL FORMOSO:You said that Boyong hit Arthur with a piece of. lead [iron] pipe. What happened to Arthur after that?WITNESS:He fell down on the ground, sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:After that when Arthur fell to the ground, what did the accused do?WITNESS:He struck the victim, sir.COURT: (to the stenographer)You insert the word used by the witness, "tinaga".FISCAL FORMOSO:How many times did he hit the victim with a bolo?WITNESS:Two times but the other one was "pasak-sak", sir.FISCAL FORMOSO:While the Accused was stabbing the victim, what was Boyong doing at that time?WITNESS:None, but after that they ran away, sir.The medico-legal certification of Dr. Marcial G. Ceñido and his testimony support the accounts of the aforementioned witnesses that the victim had been hit on the head with a water pipe (a blunt instrument) and stabbed with a bolo (a pointed bladed weapon).There can be no doubt that the prosecution witnesses could positively identify accused-appellant. The place where the killing took place was well-lighted by street lights and rows or electric bulbs set up during a recent fiesta celebration. 22 The witnesses and accused-appellant were all neighbors and hence the former were familiar with accused-appellant whom they used to see loitering around the neighborhood. 23

Accused-appellant contends, however, that prosecution witnesses Luisito Reyes and Agapito Reyes had ill motives in testifying against him. 24 Yet he has not shown to any satisfactory degree, that the said witnesses were impelled to testify against him by reason of false or ill motives. The presumption is that

witnesses are not actuated by any improper motive absent any proof to the contrary and that their testimonies must accordingly be met with considerable, if not conclusive, favor under the rules of evidence. 25 In fact, accused-appellant admits that there was no misunderstanding or quarrel between himself and the said witnesses. 26

We therefore find no reason to hold that the trial judge erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.Another telling factor which detracts from the credibility of the defense is the inconsistency in its theory of self-defense. Accused-appellant claims that he was merely defending himself from an attack by Arthur Aumentado and his group, and yet also claims that he did not kill the victim. 27 He claims that when he was pulled to safety by his aunt, Myrna Conje, what began as an attack on him became a free-for-all fight and that he does not know who killed Arthur Aumentado.Anyone who claims sell-defense impliedly admits the killing of the victim. But how can accused-appellant invoke self-defense when he does not admit killing the victim because he claims the victim was killed in the melee that followed after he had been rescued by his aunt? We agree with the Solicitor General that "the absence of logic in appellant's defense reflects its weakness."The trial court then correctly gave no weight to the version of the defense. Aside from being replete with inconsistencies, the evidence for the defense is incredible and cannot pass the test of simple logic. 28

As for accused-appellant's contention that the prosecution should have presented the weapons allegedly used to commit the crime, we have already ruled that:For purposes of conviction, it is enough that the prosecution establishes by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and the accused is the author thereof. The production of the weapon used in the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of such burden, for the same may not have been recovered at all from the assailant. (People v. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 (1990). 29

With three credible eyewitnesses and documentary evidence which corroborates their testimonies, the prosecution has clearly discharged its burden of proving accursed-appellant's guilty beyond reasonable doubt.Third. We come now to the question what crime the accused-appellant committed. Accused-appellant contends that assuming arguendo he is guilty of killing Arthur Aumentado, the crime he committed is homicide and not murder because there was no treachery. 30 It is not clear from the appellant's brief why he claims that the qualifying circumstance of treachery should not be appreciated. It would seem that his theory is that the hacking of Arthur Aumentado was done to vindicate a past wrong committed by the latter. Hence, there can be no treachery because the victim knew that his enemies would try to get even with him.There is no merit in this contention.In the first place, as we have already said, there is no showing that there was such prior altercation between accused-appellant and the victim. Moreover, Luisito Reyes and Arnold Aumentado (a brother of the victim), on rebuttal, categorically denied accused-appellant's allegations. 31 Although Luisito Reyes and Agapito Reyes said they saw accused-appellant with injuries in the head, the explained that the injuries were sustained as a result of a prior fight with other people. 32 Accused-appellant's effort to implicate the victim, his brothers, and the witness Luisito Reyes appears to be an afterthought. Accused-appellant claims that he filed a complaint against Arthur Aumentado, but it was ignored by the police. The fact is, however, that it was never really followed up by him, as Pat. Cristobal said on cross-examination. 33 It is noteworthy that accused-appellant's counsel filed the letter requesting an investigation of his claim only four days after the incident. Accused-appellant was released from the hospital the day after he was brought there. He could thus have easily reported the matter to the police. The fact is, however, that his claim is so incredible the police could not believe it. Consequently, when accused-appellant was still at the hospital, he was handcuffed by the

police, and neither he nor his aunt ever protested this. 34

In the second place, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently proven by the prosecution. This circumstance requires for its application the following requisites; (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution. 35

In this case, there is no doubt that the first requisites present. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that the victim Arthur Aumentado was attacked in such a manner as to foreclose the possibility that he would defend himself. He was unaware of the oncoming attack since he was merely buying some cigarettes from the store and was looking toward Sevilla Street where a fight had earlier taken place when suddenly he was struck on the head with an iron pipe by Boyong Hagibis and then subsequently stabbed by accused-appellant while he was lying on the ground, hurt and helpless.As regards the second requisite, the following facts lead us to no other conclusion than that the accused-appellant and his companion consciously adopted a mode which would ensure the realization of their purpose without danger to themselves; the accused-appellant and Boyong Hagibis were already carrying weapons when they first saw the victim; when they saw the victim, Boyong said. "Pare, may kaaway tayo"; they approached the victim when his back was to them and hit him with an iron pipe as he turned towards them; the victim was stabbed when he was already lying on the ground, hurt and helpless; the victim was first hit on the head and thus already defenseless before he was stabbed, they purposely approached the victim after Boyong saw that he was an enemy; lastly, the victim was hit on the head and stabbed in the chest. The manner in which the victim was killed and the aforementioned external manifestations of the accused-appellant and his companion clearly show that they consciously and deliberately

adopted the particular method or form of attack to insure the accomplishment of their purpose. 36

The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, however, was not sufficiently proven. This circumstance qualifies killing to murder if the following elements are shown: (1) the time when the offender determined to kill his victim: (2) an act of the offender manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination to kill his victim; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the killing. 37 The trial court correctly held: 38

. . . The Court believes and so finds that the killing was not qualified by evident premeditation. The Prosecution has not adduced evidence to prove when the Accused and Boyong Hagibis decided and resolved to kill Arthur Aumentado for the Court to ascertain whether the Accused has had ample time and opportunity to reflect on the consequences of the crime he committed. Extant such evidence, the Court cannot appreciate against the Accused the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. (People v. Mamerto Narvaez, 121 SCRA 339, 404).The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the accused is guilty of murder by virtue of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There being no aggravating circumstance, any abuse of superior strength being absorbed by treachery, nor any mitigating circumstance, the trial court rightly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The civil indemnity for the victim's death, however, should he increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with current rulings of this Court.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the indemnity for the victim's death is increased to P50,000.00.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-8919.  September 28, 1956.]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellees, vs. AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN alias GUINITA, DIONISIO SARMIENTO, ARCADIO BALMEO, PATRICIO GONZALES, FLORENTINO FLORES, CRISPIN

ESTRELLA, FELIPE CALISON, PEDRO VILLAREAL, CLAUDIO REYES, “PETER DOE” and “JOHN DOE” Defendant, AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN, Appellant. D E C I S I O NFELIX, J.:At about 11:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 o’clock in the evening of November 5, 1953, the reports of gunfire awaked the spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Cipriana’s mother, Monica del Mundo, in their house at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Whereupon, Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons were going up their house and then hid himself inside the ceiling.In the meantime, someone broke the wall of the kitchen at the back of the house, and a few moments later a person suddenly entered the dining room and shouted that the door leading to the living room be opened. As no one of the house members obeyed, the intruder removed 3 board pieces in the wall and through the opening thus made he entered the living room. The intruder who was armed with a hunting knife was recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan, who was previously known to her. Agustin removed the iron bar from the door leading to the balcony and after opening said door, 2 persons whose identity has not been ascertained entered. Agustin then approached Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from her neck one necklace valued P50 and also took from her person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in silver coins. Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders searched the person of Monica del Mundo and took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued at P200. But not contented with the loot, the same individual asked from Monica del Mundo to give her diamond ring which the latter could not produce, and for this reason, he strucked her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. One of the small children of Vicente Pacson who was terrified called to his mother and that unidentified person, irked by the boys impudence, made a move to strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her right arm. At this juncture, the second unidentified individual put his companion aside

the climbing on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling. Afterwards, Appellant and his two unidentified companion left the place.After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and receiving no answer she climbed the ceiling and she found him lying face downward already dead. According to Dr. Vicente P. Llado, who performed the autopsy, Vicente Pacson sustained the injuries described in his autopsy reports, which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryNovember 6, 1953TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryPost-mortem findings on cadaver Vicente Pacson, age-37 years, married, of barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.Time take:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 8:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary20 a.m.1.  Entrance — fracture of the frontal region of head due to gunshot wound.Exit — wound at left side of the head, about the upper portion of the left ear.2.  Entrance — gunshot wound, left lateral side of the left middle arm.Exit — gunshot wound inner side of left arm.3.  Entrance — gunshot wound, left lateral of the left forearm.Exit — gunshot wound, left inner side of the left forearm.4.  Entrance gunshot wound around 2 inches more or less above the middle of the right clavicle.Exit — gunshot would at the back in the region of the spinal cord between the two scapula.Cause of death — severe hemorrhage due to go gunshot wound of the frontal region of the forehead.(Exhibit C).The incident was reported to the police authorities that same evening and in the ensuing investigation Cipriana Tadeo informed the Chief of Police that Agustin Mangulabnan was one of the malefactors who entered their house. When the latter was investigated, he readily and voluntarily subscribed before the Justice of the Peace of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, an affidavit admitting his participation in the robbery and killing of Vicente Pacson (Exhibit A and B). Much later, however, he

subscribed to another affidavit before the Clerk of Court wherein he exculpated from any participation Crispin Estrella, one of those he implicated in his previous affidavit, though admitting the truth of the other allegations contained therein (Exhibit D).As the result of the investigation conducted by the authorities a complaint was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, against Agustin Mangulabnan alias Guinita, a surrendered Huk and 10 other unidentified persons. But the complaint was amended on January 13, 1954, to include Dionisio Sarmiento, together with Arcadio Balmeo, Patricio Gonzales, Florentino Flores, Crispin Estrella, Pedro Villareal, Claudio Reyes, “Peter Doe” and “John Doe”, who were still at large, as Defendants. After the preliminary investigation the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija where Defendants were accused of robbery with homicide. In that Court, Agustin Mangulabnan was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Monica del Mundo in the sum of P400; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryCipriana Tadeo in the sum of P132; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP6,000 to the heirs of Vicente Pacson, and to pay the costs. Defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was acquitted while the information as against the other Defendants who continued to be at large was dismissed for lack of evidence, with the proportionate part of the costs de officio.Agustin Mangulabnan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence his appeal which is now before Us.The motion for a new trial was based on the affidavits of Dr. Numeriano D. Lustre, Marino Ventura, Marcosa Mudlong and Patricio Gonzales but they were not really newly discovered nor could they alter the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. As stated by the Solicitor General, it is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) That the evidence was discovered after trial; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) That such evidence

could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence (U. S. vs. Tan Jonjua, 1 Phil. 51; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. 269; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 188; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Zamora, 2 Phil. 582; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Torrente, 2 Phil. 1); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) That is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching (U. S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343), and of such a weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted (U. S. vs. Zamora, supra; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Alvarez, 3 Phil. 24; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Luzon, supra.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Hernandez 5 Phil. 429; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Tongco, 2 Phil. 189; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Cu- Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand People vs. Reyes, 71 Phil. 598). The motion for new trial did not comply with these requisites and was properly denied by the trial Court.Appellant’s objection to the admissibility in evidence of post- morten report (Exhibit C) is evidently untenable. The fact that it is a mere carbon copy is of no amount, for it has been signed by the physician who executed the same and his signature was identified by him at the witness stand. Furthermore, Appellant did not offer any objection to its admission when it was presented in evidence at the hearing. His objection now comes too late (Hodges vs. Salas et al., 63 Phil. 567; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Ong Shiu, 28 Phil. 242).The lower court did neither err in rejecting Exhibit 1 for the defense. This is an affidavit purportedly executed by Sgt. Adan Fernando of the Philippine Constabulary. The main portion of it (quoted in Appellant’s brief, page 32, and appearing on page 21 of the record), is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary“The Chief of Police of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, who first arrived at the scene of the crime, have already picked up the empty shells of Cal. 30, Carbine type and were delivered to

Cpl. Lopez, one of the investigators of our unit. Information revealed that Civilian Commando of barrio Pulo, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, has something to do with the crime committed, so I proceeded to barrio Pulo to confiscate their arms. Among those arms confiscated were those registered under Pedro Villareal and Claudio Reyes and upon examination of the Ballistic Experts in Camp Crame, it appeared positive as per Ballistic Report” (Exhibit 1).As may be seen, the latter part of the aforequoted testimony of Sgt. Adan Fernando is hearsay and, anyway, it is of no moment in the case at bar, because 2 of the 3 persons who entered the dwelling of the spouses Pacson were unidentified.There is no denial that the crime of robbery with homicides was committed as described in the information. By Appellant’s own admission (Exhibit A and B) and the testimony of Cipriana Tadeo, we cannot have any doubt as to Appellant’s participation in the execution thereof. And as pointed out by the Solicitor General, Appellant and the rest of the malefactors came together to the house of the offended parties to commit the robbery perpetuated therein and together went away from the scene of the crime after its perpetration. This shows conspiracy among the offenders which rendered each of them liable for the acts of the others (People vs. Delgado, 77 Phil. 11).Moreover, the record shows that Appellant participated in the criminal design to commit the robbery with his co-Defendants (People vs. Flores, et al., G. R. No. L-231, August 21, 1946), and it is settled rule in this jurisdiction that unity of purpose and action arising from a common design makes all parties thereto jointly liable (U. S. vs. Matanug, 11 Phil. 188), each being responsible for the result, irrespective of the character of their individual participation (U. S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil., 434).It may be argued that the killing of Vicente Pacson undertaken by one of the 2 unidentified persons who climbed up a table and fired at the ceiling, was an unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of the amount and possibly without any idea that Vicente Pacson was hiding therein, and that the English version of Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code,

which defines the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide only punished any persons guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, but this English version of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary“1.  ° Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio.”We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason of on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo’s Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryOctober 22, 1907; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryApril 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon’s Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).The crime committed in the case at bar, of which Appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is a co-participant, is the crime of robbery with homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua to death. The commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength and with the aid of armed men, and in consonance with the provisions of Article 63, No. 1 of the same legal body, Appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment, as recommended by the Solicitor

General. However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been secured in this case, the penalty to be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or reclusion perpetua (Section 9, Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948).Wherefore the decision appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed with costs against Appellant. It is SO ORDERED.Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-13899             September 29, 1961THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PABLO BLAZA and FRANCISCO MANGULABNAN, defendants, FRANCISCO MANGULABNAN, defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Manansala and Saturnino for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:In an amended information subscribed by the Provincial Fiscal and filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Pablo Blaza alias Fernandez and Francisco Mangulabnan alias Ellen were charged with the crime of kidnapping Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and Buenaventura Fernandez on 23 April 1953, for the purpose of extorting ransom from them, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18 (crim. case No. SC-161). Their alleged confederates are those named defendants in crim. case No. SC-120 of the same Court, to wit: Lope Cunanan alias Perla, Ruperto Esquillo aliases Sergio and Alex, Raymundo Abesamis aliases Rading, Reddy, Mike, Manding, Uto, Ben, Pepe and North. 1 Upon arraignment the defendants Blaza and Mangulabnan, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.

On 5 November 1957 the defendant Mangulabnan by counsel de parte, Attorney Emilia C. Saturnino, filed a motion to quash the information against him, claiming that he is one of the defendants in crim. case No. 1940 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, People vs. Guillermo Paquinto, et al., for "the complex crime of Rebellion with Multiple Murders, Robberies, Arsons and Kidnapping," on 27 counts of atrocities allegedly committed on different dates in the provinces of Pampanga, Pangasinan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Laguna (Exhibits 1 & 1-A); that in criminal case No. 15909 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, People vs. Apolinar Oracion, et al., for rebellion complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, rape and kidnapping, the kidnapping of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and Buenaventura Fernandez on 23 April 1957 (for which the defendant Mangulabnan was separately charged in crim. case No. SC-161) was for the purpose of raising funds for the HMB organization and a necessary means of committing the crime of rebellion (Annex B to motion to quash); that on 17 December 1956 the said court, rendering judgment in the latter case, held that "such act was in furtherance and a mere ingredient of the offense of rebellion" and "cannot be punished separately from the latter (rebellion) or complexed with it" (Annex C to motion to quash); and that the Supreme Court in the cases of People vs. Hernandez, 52 Off. Gaz. 5506; People vs. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, 23 October 1956 and People vs. Togonon, G.R. No. L-8926, 29 June 1957, has held that "the crimes of murders, arsons, kidnappings, etc., when committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate crime;" and contending that the defendant Mangulabnan having been charged with the principal offense of rebellion in crim. case No. 1940 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is twice put in jeopardy of being punished for the same offense in crim. case No. SC-161 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, prayed that the information in the latter case be quashed. After hearing, during which counsel de parte for the defendant

Mangulabnan and the Provincial Fiscal appeared and orally argued in support of their motion and objection, on 5 November 1957 the Court denied the motion to quash and set the case for trial on 29 November 1957 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. However, the Court cancelled the trial set for 29 November 1957 and reset it for trial on 12 December 1957 at the same time. On 11 December 1957 the defendant Mangulabnan filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his motion to quash and on 12 December 1957 the Provincial Fiscal, an objection thereto. On the same day, 12 December 1957, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration and set the case for trial on 27 January 1958 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.On 16 January 1958 the defendant Mangulabnan by counsel de parte filed a petition praying that the case be reset for trial on 25 February 1958 on the ground that a petition for certiorari testing the legality of the denial of the defendant's motion to quash would be filed in the Supreme Court after the needed amount for filing and attorney's fees shall have been raised by the defendant.On 22 January 1958 the defendant Blaza filed a motion praying for separate trial in view of the delay in the trial of the case due to several postponements at the behest of his co-defendant.On 23 January 1958 the Court denied Blaza's motion and reset the case for trial on 25 February 1958.On the day set for trial, 25 February 1958, the assistant provincial fiscal and counsel de parte for the defendant Blaza, Attorney Ariston Oblena, appeared but counsel de parte for the defendant Mangulabnan, Attorney Emilia C. Saturnino, did not appear despite previous notice. In view thereof the Court entered an order imposing upon the absent counsel a fine of P25, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, appointing Attorney Tirso Caballero as counsel de oficio for the defendant Mangulabnan, who prayed that he be relieved from his appointment because he is related to the offended parties, setting the case for trial on 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 March 1958 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, and appointing Attorney Celso Cabalones, Leandro Rebong, Benjamin Agarao

and Enrique Villanueva as counsel de oficio for the defendant Mangulabnan, should counsel de parte fail to appear on the first day of the trial.On 28 February 1958 counsel de parte for the defendant Mangulabnan filed a petition in the trial court explaining that her failure to attend the trial of the case on 25 February 1958 was due to a sudden indisposition that she felt of which there was no material time to notify the Court and prayed that she be excused for failure to attend the trial of the case on that date, and alleging that a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to be filed in the Supreme Court was being prepared to test the sufficiency and legality of the information filed against her client in criminal case No. SC-161 and that she had received subpoenas from the City Attorney of Quezon City, Courts of First Instance of San Pablo and Cabanatuan Cities and the City Fiscal of Manila to appear before them as counsel on 3, 4, 5 and 7 March 1958, prayed that the trial of the case be postponed indefinitely until the Supreme Court shall have decided her client's petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. On 1 March 1958 the same counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order entered by the Court on 25 February 1958 imposing upon her a fine of P25, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, reiterating the same reasons stated in her petition filed on 28 February 1958.On the date set for trial, 3 March 1958, counsel de parte for the defendant Mangulabnan did not appear. Whereupon the Court denied her motion for indefinite postponement of the trial of the case in behalf of her client and proceeded with the trial of the case, the defendants being assisted by their respective counsel de oficio.On the second day of the trial, 4 March 1958, counsel de parte for the defendant Mangulabnan appeared and prayed for indefinite suspension of the trial of the case against her client and reconsideration of the order imposing upon her a fine of P25. The Court denied the first part but granted the second part of her prayer and proceeded with the trial of the case. After hearing the testimony of the defendant Blaza and his witness Silverio Lintak, the Court entered an order setting the continuation of the trial of the

case for 10 March 1958 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.After trial, on 14 March 1958 the Court rendered judgment, which was promulgated on 26 March 1958, finding the defendants guilty of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.On 26 March 1958 the defendant Mangulabnan filed a notice of appeal.On 2 April the defendant Blaza filed a motion for reconsideration. On 8 April the Court denied his motion for reconsideration. On 10 April the defendant Blaza filed a notice of appeal. On 14 May his counsel de oficio filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal. On 16 May 1958 the trial court approved the withdrawal of his appeal.This appeal is by the defendant Francisco Mangulabnan only.Dr. Zosimo Fernandez, his wife Dorotea, daughter Fe and cousin Buenaventura Fernandez, who was the chauffeur of the family, lived in the town of Pagsanjan, province of Laguna. At dinner time, about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of 23 April 1953, the Fernandez spouses heard a commotion and the barking of dogs in their yard and somebody knocking at the front door of the house. Dr. Fernandez asked Buenaventura to see what the commotion and barking of dogs were all about while Mrs. Fernandez peeped through an opening and saw people in army uniform. Buenaventura told the spouses that somebody who was trying to gain admission to the house wanted to see Dr. Fernandez at the behest of Captain Sebastian and that the house was surrounded by people in army uniform. Afterwards, they heard somebody knocking at the back door. Dr. Fernandez stood up, looked outside the window and asked what the man wanted. The latter answered that Captain Sebastian was sending for the doctor. The man's answer aroused Dr. Fernandez's suspicion that the visitor did not mean well because Captain Sebastian was residing in Cavinti. Dr. Fernandez slipped out of the house to ask aid and protection from the chief of police, who lived nearby, leaving behind his wife, daughter, cousin and maids. After Dr.

Fernandez had left, the inmates of the house heard somebody persistently knocking at the door and trying to force it open. Mrs. Fernandez and her daughter Fe opened the kitchen door to escape but Lope Cunanan alias Captain Mendoza grabbed Fe by the hand. Cunanan went up the house and ordered Mrs. Fernandez, Fe and Buenaventura to go down with him. Downstairs, Mrs. Fernandez saw the companions of Lope Cunanan who were about 17 in number, armed with guns and revolvers, at the stairs of the house, in the backyard and surrounding area. The band forcibly took them along and made them wade through a knee-deep river and walk through coconut groves until they reached the outpost of the band in the mountains at about 3:00 o'clock the following morning. There the three victims were confined for two days guarded by the appellant, Pablo Blaza and their companions. After two days in the outpost of the band they were transferred to the inner part of the mountains where they stayed until they were released on 8 May 1953 after paying to their kidnappers a ransom of P40,000.Turning back to the night of the incident, 23 April 1953, when Dr. Fernandez returned to his house with some soldiers and policemen and found his wife, daughter and cousin gone, he went to the army headquarters but as he found nobody there, repaired to the old municipal building, to telephone and report on the incident to the army authorities in Camp Nazareth, Pila, Laguna, under the command of Coronel Friedlander. After searching the house, Dr. Fernandez's uncle found on a table inside the doctor's room a letter signed by Captain Mendoza stating that his wife, daughter and cousin were taken for the purpose of asking ransom from him. Days after Dr. Fernandez received about five or six letters signed by the same person asking for P100,000 ransom, for the release of the three victims, which amount was reduced to P80,000, P60,000 and finally to P40,000 through negotiations with the kidnappers.1awphîl.nètOn 8 May 1953, after the ransom was finally reduced to P40,000, Dr. Fernandez asked Dionisio Almario, his son Dionisio, Jr., Juan Abaño, Conrado Velasco and one Ruperto to proceed to barrio Anibong. There, as agreed

upon, Ceferino Llamas and Eliseo Zafra delivered the money to Dionisio Almario and his companions which they divided and strapped on their respective bodies. At that juncture Ruperto, whom Dionisio Almario had earlier dispatched together with Juan Abaño to the place where the kidnap victims had been confined, arrived and reported to him that he had been assured by the kidnappers that the victims were in safe hands. Ruperto led them to where the victims were. About half an hour after arrival in the mountains, the three victims were produced to Dionisio Almario and his companions by Lope Cunanan and his band numbering about twenty. Among those in the band was the appellant. Dionisio gave the money to Mrs. Fernandez which was counted by some of the members of the band of Lope Cunanan in his presence. After counting, Cunanan took P10,000, gave P6,000 each to Pablo Blaza and one Pepe and distributed P1,000 each to the remaining members of the band. The balance of P4,000 was set aside for expenses of the band. After waiting for 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Cunanan allowed them to leave. The victims and the rescue party arrived in town at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening.The appellant denies complicity in the commission of the crime imputed to him. He claims that he joined the Huk organization sometime in 1948 and was with Basilio Balbos alias Commander Maning now dead; that later on he joined the unit of Tomas Calma as his security guard; that from 1950 to 1951 Calma's unit operated in the Sierra Madre Mountains; that thereafter his unit was transferred to the mountains of Bulacan and Arayat; that during the entire year 1953 his unit operated in the vicinity of San Luis, Candaba and Arayat and never left the jurisdiction of Pampanga; that his unit never operated in the province of Laguna, particularly in Pagsanjan; that he was a member of the unit of Tomas Calma until 1954; that he knew Lope Cunanan alias Commander Perla even before he joined the Huk organization because they lived in the same barrio but that he was never associated with him; and that he came to know Apolinar Oracion only in 1956 when he was brought by the army authorities to Canlubang and

confined in the stockade in connection with the Fernandez kidnapping case.The appellant's denial of complicity in the commission of the crime of kidnapping imputed to him and the members of the band of Lope Cunanan alias Captain Mendoza is ineffective in the face of the clear, direct and positive testimony of Mrs. Dorotea Fernandez, one of the victims, that he and his co-defendant Pablo Blaza were among those who stood guard over her, her daughter and cousin in-law; that she saw him with the band of kidnappers on the 23rd and 24th days of April 1953; and that he was present while the ransom money was being counted by the members of the band; and of Dionisio Almario that he saw the appellant with the band of kidnappers when the three victims were being led out from the mountains by the band on 8 May 1953 and that he was present when the ransom money was being counted by the band.The appellant assails the act of the trial court in proceeding with the trial of the case in the absence of his counsel de parte after appointing a counsel de oficio to assist him. Reviewing the various motions filed by his counsel de parte and the orders entered by the trial court thereon, we find that the appellant has no valid reason to complain. The motions for indefinite postponement of the trial of the case filed by his counsel de parte, on the ground that a petition for certiorari to test the legality of the denial of his motion to quash would be filed in the Supreme Court, but which was never filed, were plainly to delay the trial and disposition of the case. Despite receipt of notice his counsel de parte failed to appear on the first day of the trial (3 March 1958). On the second day (4 March 1958) she appeared but all that she did for her client was to reiterate his plea for indefinite suspension of the trial of the case and state that she "will just corroborate for the defense." On the third and last day (10 March 1958) she actively took part in the defense of the appellant, she herself conducting the direct examination of the appellant. The defendant was under detention and it is his constitutional right and the duty of the Court to have a speedy trial and disposition of the case. Moreover, it cannot be said that counsel de oficio who assisted the appellant in

the absence of counsel de parte on the first day of the trial was remiss in the performance of his duties. As shown in the transcript of stenographic notes, he had endeavored to safeguard the appellant's rights as a defendant on trial.As regards the appellant's complaint that he had no been afforded sufficient time to present other witnesses in his defense, it appears in the transcript of stenographic notes that after the appellant had finished testifying in his behalf, counsel de parte stated that she could not close the evidence for the defense because she wanted to secure the appearance of Apolinar Oracion as a witness. Asked by the Court what his testimony would be about, she answered "that (the) kidnapping for ransom was to secure funds for the functions of the organization." The Court denied the continuation of the trial of the case and ordered the trial closed because the testimony of Oracion would not be of any help to the appellant in view of his denial of complicity in the kidnapping of the victims. Hence, the appellant cannot validly complain and the Court did not err in its last mentioned order. Furthermore, the appellant claims to have known Apolinar Oracion only in 1956 or 1957 when he was brought to the stockade of the Second Military Area in Canlubang. The crime imputed to the appellant was committed on 23 April 1953. Therefore, whatever testimony Apolinar Oracion would give in evidence would not be of much value to the appellant's defense.The appellant raises the question of double jeopardy. He points out the fact that he had been charged with the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping in criminal case No. 1940 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes A and A-1, motion to quash); that on 8 January 1959, after pleading guilty to the crime of simple rebellion, the said Court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of one year and five months of prision correccional and to pay his proportionate share of the costs (Annex B to petition to withdraw as counsel); in criminal case No. 15909 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, People vs. Apolinar Oracion, et al., for rebellion complexed with

multiple murder, robbery, arson, rape and kidnapping, the kidnapping of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and Buenaventura Fernandez on 23 April 1957 was alleged to be for the purpose of raising funds for the HMB organization and a necessary means of committing the crime of rebellion (Annex B, motion to quash); and that on 17 December 1956, the said Court held that "such act was in furtherance and a mere ingredient of the offense of rebellion" and "cannot be punished separately from the latter (rebellion) or complexed with it" (Annex C, motion to quash). He now contends that the crime of kidnapping imputed to him being a necessary means of committing and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion, the said crime is absorbed by rebellion and that, having been convicted of simple rebellion, he is now put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The appellant's contention is untenable. A reading of the information filed in criminal case No. 1940 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes A and A-1; motion to quash) shows that the kidnapping of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and Buenaventura Fernandez had never been mentioned as an overt act of rebellion and a scrutiny of the information filed in criminal case No. 15909 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the judgment rendered therein discloses no mention of the appellant as a defendant therein. The appellant, therefore, had never been put in jeopardy of punishment for the crime of rebellion and cannot maintain that he is being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.In the instant case, the amended information filed in court against the appellant and his co-defendant was for "kidnapping with ransom" under the provisions of article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18. The information filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna against Lope Cunanan, et al. (SC No. 120) was also for the same offense. On appeal by Raymundo Abesamis, this Court found "that the kidnapping was made by Huks under the command of Capt. Mendoza, or Lope Cunanan, and Abesamis admittedly belonged to the Huk detachment under such command." Nevertheless, this court

affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance finding Raymundo Abesamis guilty of the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The herein appellant cannot be entitled to a penalty lighter than that imposed upon his confederates.The pronouncement of this Court in the case of People vs. Raymundo Abesamis, et al., G.R. No. L-13007, 23 December 1960, that the head of the band, Lope Cunanan, having been sentenced only to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same penalty should be meted out to the appellant therein, despite the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, with the assistance of armed men, and band, is equally applicable to the herein appellant.The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.