SOVIET PENETRATION IN AFGHANISTAN Strategic...

E W M S H ONLY, 15th August. 1959 NATO SECRET

WORKING PAPER AC7Ti9-WP(59)91

COMMITTEE OP POLITICAL ADVISERS

SOVIET PENETRATION IN AFGHANISTAN Note by the Netherlands Delegation

Strategic position of Afghanistan To ge t a c l e a r i d e a of the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f p resen t Soviet-

a i d t o A f g h a n i s t a n i t i s necessary t o t a ke the s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n . o f t h i s c oun t r y i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

2 . One o f t he aims o f Russ i an p o l i c y has a lways been t o f i n d a way t o t he P e r s i a n G u l f and a g l ance on t he map showsothat t h e r e are two p o s s i b l e ways to ach ieve t h i s a im, namely:

(a) from Armenia to the valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris;

(b ) from Turkmenis tan and Uzbek i s t an t h rough A f g h a n i s t a n t o the A r a b i a n Sea.

fr1 (a) Th is way seems t o be t he e a s i e s t and the most a t t r a c t i v e

as i t o f f e r s a l s o t he p o s s i b i l i t y o f f o r c i n g a way through A r ab i a t o the Suez C a n a l . However, t he gap was c l osed b y t he coming i n t o be i ng o f t h e Baghdad Pac t w i t h Turkey, I r a n , I r a q and P a k i s t a n as p a r t i c i p a n t s . A l t hough t h i s b a r r i e r was weakened by the w i t hd rawa l o f I r a q from t h e P a c t , i t s t i l l e x i s t s .

Ad (b) S i n ce t h en , the second p o s s i b l e way has become o f an

i n c reased impor tance t o the R u s s i a n s , t he more so as t h i s passage . became more f e a s i b l e i n 1947 when B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y power a long t he South West f r o n t i e r o f A f g h a n i s t a n ceased to e x i s t . I n t h i s passage , A f g h a n i s t a n i s an e s s e n t i a l l i n k and t h e r e f o r e Russ i an e f f o r t s t o ex tend i t s i n f l u e n c e i n t h i s country a re u nde r s t a ndab l e .

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

C D

ISC

LOSU

RE

/ D

ÉC

LASS

IFIÉ

- M

ISE

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

3 . A long the A fghan-Pak i s t an i f r o n t i e r t h e re are th ree p o i n t s o f g rea t s t r a t e g i c impor tance , namely:

( a ) The IChyber Pass , the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r an i n v a s i o n i n North-Palc istan and I n d i a ;

( b ) The Pass between Kandahar and Que t t a , opening t h e way t o Sukkur i n the m idd le o f P ak i s t a n and from t he re t o Karach i and t he hea r t o f the I n d i a n s ub-con t i n en t ;

( c ) The passage i n t h e South t o Zahidan i n I r a n near the extreme Western p o i n t o f the P a k i s t a n i f r o n t i e r «

E s p e c i a l l y t h i s l a s t passage iL o f g rea t importance as ' oh idan l i e s o n l y 300 m i l e s f rom Gwadar and Chorbar on the A r ab i a n Sea« I t can be argued t h a t t h i s passage , t o o , i s b l ocked by the Baghdad P a c t , T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the f r o n t i e r between I r a n and P a k i s t a n runs from Zah idan i n a s ou t he r l y d i r e c t i o n , t hus i s o l a t i n g A f g h an i s t a n from the Arab i an Sea . I t shou ld be r e a l i s e d , howuver, t h a t i n t h i s f r o n t i e r aren t he re are p r a c t i c a l l y no communicat ions between the two Baghdad Pact c o u n t r i e s , n e i t h e r by r a i l nor by r o a d , and consequen t l y an e f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y co-ope ra t i on i s h a r d l y p o s s i b l e . For t h i s reason , t h i s area has sometimes been c a l l e d t he Heel o f A c h i l l e s o f t he Baghdad Pact and i t c o n s t i t u t e s a h i g h l y a t t r a c t i v e gap f o r a p o t e n t i a l agg resso r . Only aga i n s t t h i s background t he p resen t S o v i e t a i d t o A f g h a n i s t a n ge ts i t s f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e .

S o v i e t A i d t o A f g h a n i s t a n '

5 . The a i d programme s t a r t e d immed ia te ly a f t e r t he v i s i t o f B u l g a n i n and Khrushchev i n 1955 by g r a n t i n g a Russ i an l o a n of 100 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . The f i r s t o b j e c t under the programme was the c o n s t r u c t i o n and improvement o f an ex t ens i ve road system, i n which two highways were t o form the e s s e n t i a l p a r t , v i z . :

( a ) A road from Termez on the Russo-Afghan f r o n t i e r v i a M a z i r - i - S h a r i f and Kabul to the Khyber Pass . I n 1956, l a r g e p a r t s had a l r e ady been completed and a b e g i n n i n g had been made w i t h the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a t u n n e l t h rough the Hindu-Kush moun ta ins .

( b ) A road f rom Kushka i n North-West A f g h a n i s t a n v i a Hera t t o Farah whence i t wos to be d i v i d e d i n t o two r oads , v i z . one i n the d i r e c t i o n o f Zah idan and the o t h e r t o Kandahar .

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

C D

ISC

LOSU

RE

/ D

ÉC

LASS

IFIÉ

- M

ISE

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

6 . Bo th main highways were "to bo m u t u a l l y connected by two c ross roads : one from Herat t o Maza r- i-Sha r i f and the o ther from Kzmdahnr to Kabu l . A f t e r comp le t ion o f these p r o j e c t s there w i l l be th roughou t A f ghan i s t a n one c i r c u l a r road , no t on ly o f economic b u t a l s o o f g r e a t s t r a t e g i c impor t ance .

7 . Bes ides these road b u i l d i n g p r o j e c t s , the Sov ie t b l o c i s a l s o r e nde r i n g economic a i d i n o ther forms, ' I n 1956, the f o l l ow-i n g p r o j e c t s had been p l a n n e d , wore i n execu t i on or had even been completed : a Gzeeh cement f a c t o r y , an a s ph a l t f a c t o r y , a g r a i n s i l i , a l a r g o f l o u r m i l l and a bakery , a l l- i n or around Kabu l , a s to rage t ank i n Pa l- i-Khurnr i , a f u e l depot i n Kvabul, and the improvement o f a i r f i e l d s around Kabul and J a l a l a b a d . F u r t h e r , a Rus s i a n la.bour co l ony , a f u e l depot and a g r a i n s i l o were t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i n Hera t . i l l though these are i nnocen t economic pro-j e c t s i n t ime o f peace , they are a l s o extremely u s e f u l to advanc ing armies i n t ime of" war .

8« I t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t a t t h i s moment Russ ian economic and p o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e i s dangerous ly i n c r e a s i n g . The o r i g i n a l R u s s i a n c r e d i t has been i ncreased t o 125 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . Accord i ng t o a b a r t e r arrangement Ru s s i a i s to be r epa i d i n goods and t h a t i s why Afghan expor ts are b e i n g concen t ra ted more and more on t he Sov i e t Un ion , e s p e c i a l l y the impor tan t expor t o f c o t t o n and wool f o r which the Sov i e t Union i s ready t o pay p r i c e s which a r e 25% h i g h e r than those on the wor ld market . On t he o t he r hand , the expor t o f d r i e d f r u i t (y o f t he t o t a l expor t ) i s comp le te l y concen t r a t ed on I n d i a and P ak i s t a n b u t , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , t hese c o u n t r i e s themselves are s h o r t o f f o r e i g n exchange and can t h e r e f o r e o n l y repay w i t h consumer goods . I t i s e v i d e n t - t h a t . t he economic g r i p o f R u s s i a on A f g h a n i s t a n becomes f i r m e r a t the expense o f t h e commercia l i n t e r e s t s o f t he t r a d i t i o n a l 'vVest European s u p p l i e r s .

9* Bes ides economic a i d , A f g h a n i s t a n rece i ves m i l i t a r y a i d from the S o v i e t b l o c i n t he form o f arms, m i l i t a r y s u pp l i e s and i n s t r u c t o r s . Exact d a t a on the ex ten t o f t h i s m i l i t a r y a i d are no t known b u t i t i s e s t ima t ed a t app rox ima te ly 80 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s , w h i l e t he e s t ima t e s r e g a r d i n g the number o f i n s t r u c t o r s p resen t i n A f g h a n i s t a n va ry from 200 t o 1 , 000 .

10. The m a t e r i a l d e l i v e r e d c o n s i s t s o f r i f l e s , l i g h t a r t i l l e r y , a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns , t a nks , ammun i t i on , a i r c r a f t and a u x i l i a r y m a t e r i a l . Except f o r t he a i r c r a f t wh ich are o f t he Mig-type, t h i s m a t e r i a l i s o f a type used by the Russ i an army i n 19W+. As Russ i a i s t he s o l e s u p p l i e r o f m i l i t a r y g ood s , A f g h an i s t a n i s comp le te ly dependent on the S o v i e t b l o c f o r t h e equipment o f i t s armed f o r c e s . The t r a i n i n g o f t hese f o r ce s i s a lmos t comp le te ly en t r u s t ed to Sov i e t i n s t r u c t o r s , and the p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e o f these i n s t r u c t o r s on the young r e c r u i t s i s cons idered t o be more impor t an t t h a n the i n c r e a s i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t he army and a i r f o r c e .

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

C D

ISC

LOSU

RE

/ D

ÉC

LASS

IFIÉ

- M

ISE

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE

NATO SEGRET a c / I I 9 - W P » 9 ) 9 1

11 . The expansion o f S ov i e t i n f l u o n c e i n A f gh an i s t a n i s f u r t h e r f avoured "by the s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s between A f ghan i s t a n and i t s , n e i g hbou r s , I r a n and P a k i s t a n . W i th I r a n t he re i s an o l d d i s p u t e on t he use o f t he waters o f t he Helmand r i v e r , which has i t s ource i n C e n t r a l A f g h a n i s t a n and i r r i g a t e s one o f the most f e r t i l e r é g l o n s o f I r a n . The r e l a t i o n s w i t h P ak i s t a n a r e s t i l l t r o ub l e d by tho d i s p u t e on P a sh t u n i s h t a n and have e s p e c i a l l y d e t e r i o r a t e d s i n c e the coming t o power o f Genera l Ayub.

12 . F i n a l l y , the Premier , and the M i n i s t e r f o r Fore ign A f f a i r s appear to be g r e a t aemirers o f Sov i e t Russ i a which f a c t , of c ou r se , i n f l u e n c e s Afghan f o r e i g n p o l i c y . A symptom o f t h i s influence was, f o r i n s t a n c e , the r e a c t i o n o f t he government-c o n t r o l l e d Afghan p ress to the recent even ts i n T i b e t . "Only r e p o r t s from Ch inese sources were p u b l i s h e d and even the I n d i a n v e r s i o n was o m i t t e d .

Conc l u s i o n

13. S o v i e t p e n e t r a t i o n i n t h i s count ry i s one o f the s t ages i n the t o t a l e f f o r t o f t he Sov i e t Union t o e s t a b l i s h i t s i n f l u e n c e on the whole o f the Midd le Eas t and t o i s o l a t e the West f rom the As ian c o n t i n e n t . The above shows t h a t the West has every reason t o be deep ly concerned about the p resen t s i t u a t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n .

DE

CLA

SSIF

IED

- PU

BLI

C D

ISC

LOSU

RE

/ D

ÉC

LASS

IFIÉ

- M

ISE

EN

LE

CT

UR

E P

UB

LIQ

UE