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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT (ACF) BASIN. By: Steve Leitman. LAKE LANIER. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee- Flint Basin AREA = 20,000 SQUARE MILES. FEDERAL STORAGE RESERVOIRS. AVERAGE FLOW = 25,000 cfs 5 th LARGEST IN US. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT (ACF) BASIN
By:
Steve Leitman
#
#
#
#
Flint River
# Apalachicola River
Atlanta
Albany
Columbus
Gulf of Mexico
AtlanticOcean
#
Chattahoochee River
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint BasinAREA = 20,000 SQUARE MILES
FEDERALSTORAGE RESERVOIRS
LAKE LANIER
AVERAGE FLOW = 25,000 cfs5th LARGEST IN US
THE APALACHICOLA RIVER
ELEVATIONIN FEET PROFILEPROFILE
APALACHICOLA APALACHICOLA AND AND
CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVERSCHATTAHOOCHEE RIVERS
Head of NavigationHead of Navigation
BUFORD DAM (Lake Sidney Lanier)
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER
400
200
0
WEST POINT LAKE
WALTER F. GEORGE L&D
GEORGE W. ANDREWS L&D
JIM WOODRUFF L&D
500 400 300 200 100 0
APALACHICOLA RIVER
MILES
Atlanta, GA
Columbus, GA
Median Monthly Flows (1939-2001)
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
month
flo
w (
cfs)
CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER at Columbia,
FLINT RIVER at Bainbridge,
APALACHICOLA RIVER at Chattahoochee, Florida
Monthly Low Flows (90% Exceeded) (1939-2001)
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
month
flo
w (
cfs)
CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER at Columbia, Ala
FLINT RIVER at Bainbridge, Ga
APALACHICOLA RIVER at Chattahoochee, Florida
TOTAL CONSUMPTIVE DEPLETIONS FROM FLINT AND CHATTAHOOCHEE BASINS
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
VOLU
ME
(CFS
)
2000 DEMANDS
90% EXCEEDED FLOW (1939-2001)
MINIMUM FLOW (1939-2001)
A problem with water management in our society is that there seems to
be an expectation that we can support infinite demands from a
finite supply.
Although some speak to “market solutions” to such problems, the management of water seems to follow an economic paradigm of
commonizing the costs and privatizing the profits, not that of a
“free market”.
Jim Woodruff Dam and Lake Seminole
THE ACF “WATER WARS”
In listening to my critiques of how the three states and federal
government have handled the ACF issue it must be remembered that this effort was a prototype. Earlier
Compacts did not deal with the issue of environmental flow needs.
The ACF Basin Water Wars: A Brief History
1989: Atlanta applies to the Corps for increased water withdrawals and Alabama sues the Corps. States already had contentious relationship over federal navigation project for over a decade. 1992-1997: Comprehensive Study of water use in the basin conducted after negotiated agreement.
1998: ACF Compact approved by Congress and three states requires development of a Water Allocation Formula by December 1998. First such Compact in the southeast and first in US since passage of major environmental laws in the 1970s.
1999 – 2003: Compact negotiation extended 14 times when agreement could not be reached by three States.
The ACF Basin Water Wars: A Brief History
2003: Memorandum of Understanding between States on principles of Water Allocation Formula and then the termination of ACF Compact.
2004-2005: Multiple lawsuits relating to the ACF water management proceed through courts in Washington, D.C., Birmingham and Atlanta.
2006: Corps of Engineers and U.S. Fish and Wildlife present Interim Operating Procedures (IOP) for managing ACF reservoir system.
2007: Severe drought requires modifying IOP to include Emergency Drought Operations (EDO) as the Apalachicola River experiences record low flows and endangered species are threatened. Court case consolidated to single court.
2008: District Court of Appeals rules in favor of Florida and Alabama on case relating to water supply withdrawals from Lake Lanier. Georgia appeals decision. Corps of Engineers announce preparation of new Water Control Plan for ACF basin.
To address basin wide water quantity issues in a multi-state basin
in the U.S., there are four options:
1) A lawsuit through the U.S. Supreme Court,
2) Federal legislation requiring interstate management,
3) Creating an Interstate Water Compact, and
4) Pretend you have no problems and pass them on to unsuspecting
future generations.
OBSERVATION 1: IT TAKES A CRISIS OR MAJOR EVENT TO
INITIATE AN EFFORT TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF A WATERSHED. THE 1989 LAWSUIT PROVIDED THIS
INCENTIVE.
CRISIS CAN BE SEEN AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE. JUST
BE PATIENT BECAUSE THE NEXT CRISIS IS ON ITS WAY AND IF YOU HAVE A VISION DURING A CRISIS OF WHAT TO DO YOU TYPICALLY
ARE THE ONLY ONE.
In the ACF Compact legislation, the three States were required under the Compact to negotiate an Allocation Formula instead of including such a formula in the Compact legislation.
OBSERVATION 2: WE NEED TO LEARN FROM OUR FAILURES, NOT
HIDE FROM THEM OR PRETEND THEY ARE NOT OCCURRING.
In Working Through Environmental Conflict, Daniels and Walker have defined a fundamental paradox in making water decisions which is applicable to the ACF situation:
The paradox is that although citizens demand technically sound decisions and their involvement, as situations become more complex, fewer people
have the technical competence to either contribute to the decision or
even critique the decision.
It is a curious fact that the university community was for the most excluded from this complex
decision-making process, although in hindsight it is obvious that the expertise in the university system
would have been helpful.
OBSERVATION 3: MANY OF OUR PROBLEMS ARE IN THE PROCESS,
NOT IN THE AVAILBILITY OF ADEQUATE INFORMATION OR
KNOWLEDGE.
To illustrate this problem I want to discuss the response to several
issues. The first is the use of models in the process and the
second the lowering of Lake Lanier in the summer of 2007.
EXAMPLE 1
THE USE OF MODELS IN THE PROCESS
0.0
0.0 1.0
?
UseAllStorForBLMin
0.000
0.000 1.000
?U
BUOffPeakSwitch
Andrews Target
eqn on
0.00 1.00
?~
WPMinFlwSupFraction
eqn on
0.00 1.00
?~
WFGMinFlwSupFraction
0.00
0.00 1.00
?~
BUMinFlwSupFraction
WFGMin Cont
?
Zone1ResRel
?U
Zone2ResRel
?U
Zone3ResRel
?U
Zone4ResRel
?U
0.500
0.000 1.000
~
WP RES VOL RATIO
1.000
0.000 1.000
~
LANIER RES VOL RATIO
2.000
1.000 3.000
?U
ZONE RELEASE SWITCH
1.0
0.0 1.0
?U
ZONE DEF SWITCH
COMPOSITE STORAG…
?U
NEWTON MONTHLY R…
-2.290
-3.000 -1.000
PHDI INDEX TRIGGER
-1.400
-2.000 0.000
SPI INDEX TRIGGER
100.00%PTCReliability
Relief Zone 4
Relief Zone 1
Relief Zone 3
U
0.00PTCVulnerabilty
Relief Zone 2
100.00%COLReliabilityZone 1 Max Aug
U
Zone 2 Max Aug
U
Zone 3 Max Aug
U
0.00COLVulnerabilty
0.25BLVulnerabilty
ColumbusReliefTargetFlow
U
0%BLReliability
0PTCShortCount
0COLShortCount
1BLShortCount
0NewtonShortCount
0Whitesburg Short Count
100.00WhitesburgReliability
0.0Whitesburg Vulnerabilty
100.00NewtonReliability
0.0NewtonVulnerabilty
Whitesburg Zone 1 Tar
?
Whitesburg Zone 2 Tar
?
Whitesburg Zone 3 Tar
?
Whitesburg Zone 4 Tar
?U
WPMin Cont
?
BUMinOffPeakBase
?
ColumbusTarFlow cfs
?U
JWMin
?
PtreeCrkTarFlow cfs
?
3
1 4
?U
BlountMinSwitch
BUOffPeakMult
?U
DROUGHT TRIGGER SETTINGS
AUGMENTATION
RELIEF MINIMUM
Number of failures, reliability and vulnerability of min flows with reference to the selected target. Reliability (%). Vulnerability (cfs).
Whitesburg Target
Instream Flow Controls
NON RELIEF MINIMUM FLOWSNAVIGATION
WATER MANAGEMENT MODELS WERE CREATED INBOTH STELLA AND HEC-5
Vertical Cross-section of Salinity on an Ebb and Flood Tide
OBSERVATION 4: IT OFTEN ASSUMED THAT TECHNICAL PEOPLE KNOW EVERYTHING THERE IS TO BE KNOWN TO
EFFECTIVELY MANAGE A WATERSHED. THEY JUST NEED TO BE ASKED THE RIGHT QUESTION.
LEARNING AND ADAPTING MANAGEMENT EFFORTS TO WHAT
IS LEARNED MUST BE PART OF THE PROCESS.
OBSERVATION 5: DEFINING HOW TO EVALUATE OUTPUT FROM
MODELING EFFORTS IS JUST AS CHALLENGING AND DIFFICULT AS
DEVELOPING MODELS TO SIMULATE THE SYSTEM.
EXAMPLE 2
THE DROPPING OF ELEVATIONS AT LAKE
LANEIR
#
#
#
#
Flint River
# Apalachicola River
Atlanta
Albany
Columbus
Gulf of Mexico
AtlanticOcean
#
Chattahoochee RiverLake Lanier
IN 2006-2008 THE ACF BASIN HAS EXPERIENCED A MAJOR DROUGHT EVENT
LAKE LANIER ELEVATIONS (2006 - 2008)
1035
1040
1045
1050
1055
1060
1065
1070
Jan-06 Apr-06 Jul-06 Oct-06 Jan-07 Apr-07 Jul-07 Oct-07 Jan-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Oct-08
EL
EV
AT
ION
(F
T)
BOTTOM OF CONSERVATION POOL
Storage between 1035 and 1050 = 193,000 cfs-daysor 380,000 acre-feet (125,000 MGD)
GEORGIA RESPONSES TO DROUGHT
1. Prayer meetings2. Move border north
3. Reduce downstream flows
PRO-RATING OF CAUSAL FACTORS FOR CHANGES IN LANIER ELEVATION IN 2007
1,030
1,035
1,040
1,045
1,050
1,055
1,060
1,065
1,070
1,075
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000 700000 800000 900000 1000000
STORAGE VOLUME (dsf)
Ele
va
tio
n (
ft)
DIRECT WITHDRAWALS AND EVAPORATION FROM LAKE LANIER
RELEASES TO SUPPORT CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVERWATER QUALITYAND METRO ATLANTA WITHDRAWALS
RELEASES TO SUPPORT FARLEY NUCLEAR
RELEASES TO SUPPORTAPALACHICOLA RIVERFLOW
ACTIVE STORAGE REMAINING
INACTIVE STORAGE
70% OF THE DRAWDOWN CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE METRO ATLANTA REGION AND <10% TO RELEASES TO APALACHICOLA RIVER
SUMMARY OF CUMULATIVE FLOW DEFICIT FROM AVERAGE OBSERVED FLOW DURING MAJOR DROUGHT EVENTS
-400000
-350000
-300000
-250000
-200000
-150000
-100000
-50000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
MONTHS INTO DROUGHT
FLO
W D
EFIC
IT (c
fs)
1950'S DROUGHT
1980'S DROUGHT
1999 -2002 DROUGHT
2006 - 2007 DROUGHT
-35.00
-30.00
-25.00
-20.00
-15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
MONTHS INTO DROUGHT
PR
EC
IPIT
ATI
ON
DE
FIC
IT (i
nche
s)
1950'S DROUGHT
2006 - 2007 DROUGHT
COMPARISON OF CUMULATIVE PRECIPITATIONDEFICITS DURING 1950s AND CURRENT DROUGHTS
Georgia governmental interests have contended that Georgia has not
impacted flows in Florida.
OBSERVATION 6: IN AMERICA, WE ALSO NEED TO USE OUR
TRACTORS APPROPRIATELY.
For the balance of this presentation I would like to focus on the reasons for the termination of the Compact negotiations and where to go in the
future to address these observations.
A major reason for the termination of the Compact was a breakdown in
trust among the negotiating parties.
This breakdown in trust was caused by multiple factors including:
1. The insertion of new data and information into the negotiating
process which was not put through the same collaborative process as
was called for in the Comprehensive Study.
2. The State of Georgia entering into a negotiated agreement on litigation
which involved use of the storage pool at Lake Lanier while
simultaneously being involved in negotiations on the Allocation
Formula for use of the same water.
3. The process for developing and content of a Memorandum
Agreement in 2003 which was intended to define the boundaries of
an acceptable agreement.
Another major problem was the negotiators failure to define what
constituted a successful agreement.
This created the dilemma where there was ample data and tools to
evaluate alternative Allocation Formula alternatives, but no agreed upon standards to evaluate results
against.
Deciding on what constitutes an acceptable results is a policy
decision that needs to be made by negotiators and policy decision-
makers, not a decision to be left to technical staff developing and
running models.
Many of the process problems in the Allocation Formula negotiations
could possibly have been avoided if there had been a neutral facilitator or
mediator who was responsible for the negotiation process.
WHERE TO FROM HERE?
1. The boundaries of an interstate agreement need to be defined by the
three states (e.g. environmental flows for the Apalachicola River,
acceptable reservoir elevations, etc.)
2. A group of technical people need to define multiple options of
reservoir management and demand management using modeling tools
to meet defined boundaries.
3. A program to monitor system performance and implementation of agreements to be established and
sustained.
4. The limits of the system need to be understood and adhered to and the paradigm of commonizing the costs and privatizing the profits
abandoned.
Recommended