Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regimeby Joseph S. Nye;...

Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime by Joseph S.Nye; James A. Schear; International Space Policy by Daniel S. Papp; John R. McIntyreReview by: Gregory F. TrevertonForeign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 5 (Summer, 1988), p. 1117Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043590 .

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RECENT BOOKS 1117

SEEKING STABILITY IN SPACE: ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AND THE EVOLVING SPACE REGIME. Edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and James A. Schear. Washington: University Press of America, 1987, 167

pp. An Aspen Strategy Group Publication. INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLICY. Edited by Daniel S. Papp and John

R. Mclntyre. Westport (Conn.): Quorum Books, 1987, 328 pp. $47.95. Both these volumes depart from the premise that space is the next

frontier, and together they amount to a useful primer on the military and civilian uses of space. The Nye-Schear volume addresses the military di

mension (satellites and weapons that might threaten them); the contributors are a roster of distinguished experts. The Papp-Mclntyre book also takes

up military questions but is most useful on the civil side, and, especially, in

sorting out the clashing military and civilian interests in the framing of

space policy.

DEADLY PARADIGMS: THE FAILURE OF U.S. COUNTERINSUR GENCY POLICY. By D. Michael Shafer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, 331 pp. $34.50.

Counterinsurgency, now joined with the newer label "low intensity conflict," is back in official fashion, but serious studies of the subject remain few. This effort to remedy that lack relies on three case studies?Greece, the Philippines and Vietnam before 1965. It is thought-provoking, much

more so in its discussion of cases than in its broad conclusions, which sound like the liberal cant about Vietnam: American policymakers "have misun

derstood the sources of insurgency . . . and overestimated the United States'

role as an outside promoter of security and development."

ASSESSING THE VIETNAM WAR. Edited by Lloyd J. Mathews and Dale E. Brown. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, 254 pp.

This collection of articles from Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War College, is a handy summary of the military's reappraisal of its role in Vietnam. It includes a pithy summary of Harry G. Summers' On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (noted in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982/ 83). His critique is broad: the United States mistook the war for a revolution and so focused on the Viet Cong instead of the real enemy, North Vietnam ese regular forces. Summers' article makes intriguing reading together with

Hung Nyugen's discussion of Hanoi's war plan, which argues that an enclave

strategy would have played to Hanoi's Achilles' heel?the necessary links

among locals, guerrillas and main force units?and also with Norman B. Hannah's The Key To Failure (noted in Foreign Affairs, Spring 1988).

HEDLEY BULL ON ARMS CONTROL. Selected and introduced by Robert O'Neill and David N. Schwartz. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 302

pp.

Hedley Bull's death in 1985 at the age of 52 deprived strategy studies of one of its most unconventional, innovative thinkers. This volume is a reminder of just how great the loss was. His The Control of the Arms Race,

published in 1962 when he was still in his twenties, is a classic; even when he turned out to be wrong?for instance, in underestimating just how stable the superpower nuclear balance would be?he reminds us how much the concepts we now take for granted owe to him. He was, as Michael

Howard said, "the delight and terror of every conference he attended."

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