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(ection 27: Passage of Bills; ItemVeto)
1.CIR vs CTA
FACTS: Section 42 of house bill 17839 which became RA 6110 imposed a caterer’s tax on
various operators of restaurants. President Marcos however, vetoed the portion of Section 42
which imposed a 20% caterer’s tax on restaurants operated by hotels, motels, and rest houses.
Private respondent, Manila Golf and Country club, claims that the assessment of petitioners to let
them pay the imposed taxes is without basis because of the veto done by the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto was valid?
RULING: Yes, the veto was valid. An item in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section
imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of tax and the tax rate.
( par.2) Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990)
FACTS: On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items
included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional
provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for
consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and
declared the same to have become RA 6688. In the process, seven Special Provisions and
Section 55, a "General Provision”, were vetoed.
Senator Neptali Gonzales, together with 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality
of President Cory Aquino’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89,
and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90).
Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills
is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when
she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power
but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the
1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution/ WON
the President has the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the
exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming
arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and
Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
“inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s
veto power.
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez 235 SCRA 506 (1994) GR 113105
A. FACTS:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An
Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1
to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the President and vetoed some of
the provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation
for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of
the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the
Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art
XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National
Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special
provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s,
DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?
C. HELD:
1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres.
w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have
direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing
the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income
& creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte
State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres.
merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for
maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the
Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to
the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO
VOID.
4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of
Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any
prov. blocking an admin.action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be
subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment
pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may
exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed.VETO VALID.
6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the
compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an
amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act
cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.
BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
BENGZON VS. DRILON
G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree
repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired
justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by
Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted
men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB
16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in
1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the
veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its
publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was
superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of
HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to
the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.
HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its
funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to
constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated
to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the
ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired
Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional
provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are
declared valid and subsisting.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
ART VI, SEC 28
CIR vs Lingayen
MAIN POINT: Charters and Special Laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the
nature private contracts.
Facts:
Pursuant to RA 3843 (Franchise Act), BIR assessed and demanded against respondent the
company deficiency franchise tax and surcharges it failed to pay. The respondent asked for
reinvestigation, however, it was denied.
Issue:
WON the court can inquire into the wisdom of the act
Held:
The Court does not have the authority to question the wisdom of the Act.
Tolentino Sec. of Finance
Petitioner alleged that RA 7716 (VAT law) was unconstitutional on the grounds that it did not
originate from the House of Representatives as required by Art VI, Sec 24. It is in fact a result of
the two consolidated bills
WON RA 7716 violated the Constitution
MAIN POINT
A bill is deemed to have originated from HR provided that it is filed prior to the filing of the Bill
in the Senate, even if in the end, the Senate approved its own revision.
HELD
No. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the HR. The court said that the exclusivity of the prerogative of the HR means
simply that the House alone can initiate the passage of a revenue bill. Such that, if the House
does not initiate one, no revenue law will be passed.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
President issued an EO to have ad valorem tax on crude oil and other oil products. Tariff
Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the president for
appropriate action.
Whether the president may issue an EO which is same as enacting a bill
in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
The enactment of appropriation of revenue and tariff bills is within the scope of legislative rather
than the executive department. However, it doe
not follow that executive order nos. 475 and 478 characterized as revenue measures are
prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Pursuant to Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution,
Congress, may by law, authorize the president to fix within specified limits tariff rates import
and export quotas and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and
Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the
President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is
CIR VS SANTOS
taxation policy of the government. Petitioners also impugn the decision by asserting that there was no showing that the tax laws on jewelry are confiscatory
Guild of Phil. Jewellers questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the NIRC and Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. It is their contention that present Tariff and tax structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers uncompetitive against other countries. In support of their position, they submitted what they purported to be
an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian countries, in comparison to tax rates levied in the country. Judge Santos of RTC Pasig ruled that the laws in question are confiscatory and oppressive and declared them INOPERATIVE and WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT insofar as petitioners are concerned. Petitioner CIR assailed decision rendered by respondent judge contending that the latter has no authority to pass judgment upon the
ISSUE WON RTC has authority to pass judgment upon taxation policy of the government
HELD
SC held that it is within the power of the legislature whether to tax jewelry or not. With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subject) and situs (place
No. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary OF TAXATION
Southern Cross vs. Phil Cement
FACTS: Philcemcor filed with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) a petition seeking for
the imposition of safeguard measures on Gray Portland cement, in accordance with the SMA
(Safeguard Measure Act). After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure, the application
was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation, in order to determine whether
or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. After public
hearings and conducting its own investigation, the Tariff Commission came out with a negative
finding. Notwithstanding such finding, the DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure. The Secretary of Justice opined that
the DTI could not do so under the SMA, and so the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision
wherein he expressed the DTI’s disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but
at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcor’s application for safeguard measures on the
ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commission’s negative findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power to tax can be delegated?
RULING: Yes, under conditions laid down in Section 28(2). [“The Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix within the specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, Tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the National Development Program of the
Government.]
This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by
the Constitution itself. At the same time, the Constitution also grants the delegating authority the
right to impose restrictions and limitations on the taxation power delegated to the President. The
restrictions and limitations imposed by the Congress take on the mantle of Constitutional
Command which the executive branch is obliged to observe.
Article VI Sec 28
Abra Valley College vs Aquin
Petitioner is an educational corporation, its building and lot was issued a "notice of seizure" and
a "notice of sale" for failure to pay taxes. Petitioner argues that they should be tax exempt since
it's for educational purpose despite the fact that the 2nd floor was being used as residential and
the ground floor was being leased to another corporation.
W/N petitioner should the tax exempt for being an education corporation
It is mentioned in the Constitution that when used for educational purposes, it should be
exempted from paying taxes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption to
facilities which are incidental for the accomplishment of its main purpose. however it cannot be
said that the lease of the ground floor to another corporation is to be incidental for the
accomplishment of the main purpose. therefore they should not be exempted from paying taxes.
Llandoc v. CIR, 14 SCRA 292
FACTS: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash
to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr.
Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was
spent for such purpose.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29,
1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the
Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical
personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.
HELD: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section22(3) Article VI of the
Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as
Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the
property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a
property by way of gift inter vivos.
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of
the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIV VS DAR
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA G.R. No. 124043, October 14, 1998
Facts: Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various
programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to
its religious, educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned an income from leasing out a
portion of its premises to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax,
deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency
withholding tax on wages. YMCA protested the assessment.
Issue: Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA from rentals of small shops and
parking fees is exempt from taxation
Held: YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution exempts charitable institutions
from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. The Court
is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of the framers of the
Constitution reveal their intent. Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional commissioner,
stressed during the Concom debate that what is exempted is not the institution itself; those
exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent
authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that
the exemption created by said provision pertained only to property taxes. In his treatise on
taxation, Justice Jose Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption covers property taxes only.
Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the
Constitution.
YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution claiming that YMCA is a non-stock,
non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The
Court reiterates that YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on
the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.
Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be
granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial
evidence that: 1. it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and
2. the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by
YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites.
YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the
Constitution. The term “educational institution,” when used in laws granting tax exemptions,
refers to a school, seminary, college or educational establishment. Therefore, YMCA cannot be
deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the said constitutional provision.
Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the
subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
John Hay v. Lim
GR No. 119775
March 29, 2005
Facts: The John Hay Peoples’ Aternative Coalition et al filed a petition in the Supreme Court
regarding its previous decision in favor of respondents BCDA et al to invalidate Section 3 of
Proclamation No. 420, which granted tax exemptions to the John Hay Special Economic Zone.
The Section in question states that the John Hay SEZ shall enjoy duty-free privileges, and the
Proclamation was issued by then-President Ramos.
Issue: W/N the President, in giving tax-free incentives to the John Hay SEZ, violated Art VI Sec
28 Par 4 of the Constitution, which states that “no law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress.”
Held: Yes, Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was in violation of Art Vi Sec 28 Par 4 of the
Constitution. While the President is allowed to impose tariff rates and import and export quotas,
among others, under Art VI Sec 28 Par 2 of the Constitution, Par 4 of the same Section expressly
states that only Congress can pass laws relating to tax exeptions.
grant of tax exemption rests upon the theory that it will benefit the body of people and not upon
the idea of lessening the burden of individual corporate owners.
Lung Center v. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004
Planters Products Inc v. Fertiphil Corp, GR No. 166006, March 14, 2008
Section 29. Fiscal Powers of Congress; Limitations; Special Funds
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 PHIL. 331, 1960-61
PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works
particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE: WON the incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, 1991
Guingona vs. Carague
FACTS: The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967 which authorized the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential decrees are violative of Section 29 (1) Article VI of the Constitution?
RULING: No. Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are
made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626, 1988
Taxed were levied on sugar production for the purpose of creating the sugar stabilization fund
administered by PHILSUCOM. Proceeds from the fund were used to capitalize republic planters
bank. Sugar producers petitioned the court to compel republic planters bank and PHILSUCOM
to transfer the shares to the names of the producers who are allegely the true owners of the shares
Gaston vs Republic Planters Bank
W/N the funds referred in the case are regarded as public funds.
Yes, they are public funds. The funds collected here were in the nature of a tax with a special
regulatory purpose. Hence they may only be used for a public purpose. Therefore the shares
cannot be considered to be owned by private individuals
Section 30. Appelate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519, 1994
First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519, 1994
FACTS: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from
decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a
few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be
directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No.
1-91 which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the BOI.
SC’s Second Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction
of the CA in this present case. Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the Second
Division’s ruling which provided:
“….although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a substantive right which cannot
be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner
the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court has the power to
regulate.”
They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded
Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).
ISSUE: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions
from the Board of Investments?
HELD: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February 2, 1987.
Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is
invalid and therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was no sought in
its enactment. Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The
exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.
Section 32. Initiative and Referendum
Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279, 1994
Article VII: Executive Department
Section 1. Executive Power; Privileges; Immunities
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 1989; MR, 178 SCRA, 1989
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1
and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter
one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by
the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after
the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Laurel v. Garcia 187 SCRA 797, 1990
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 186450, December 13, 2011
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 191805, November 15, 2011
Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, 1988
Soliven v. Makasiar
Section 1. Executive Power; Privileges; Immunities
Main Point: While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting
suit. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's
behalf.
Facts: President Aquino sued Beltran for libel for having written that the President hid under the
bed during an attempted coup.
Issue: WON a President can sue, since she cannot be sued.
Ruling: Affirmative. Privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of the
office, and can be invoked only by the holder of the office, and not by any other person. An
accused in a criminal case cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense. Also, nothing can
stop the President from waiving said privilege.
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS: The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project However, On September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464] and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President." Thus this petition to declare EO 464 as unconstitutional as petitioners contend that the President has exercised grave abuse of Executive privilege in issuing it.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is a valid exercise of Executive privileg?
RULING: The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege becaue A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected.
Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. 170516, July 16 2008
Petitioner seeks to have the full-text of the Japanese-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement(JPEPA). They emphasized that it is a matter of public concern and public interest.
Respondent invoke its executive privilege.
Akbayan vs Aquino
W/N the agreement can be covered by the executive privilege
To be covered by the right of information, the information must be a matter of public concern
and must not involve matters of national security. The petitioners demand of the full-text has
been declared moot and academic since it was already made accessible to the public. However
the petitioners failed to show "sufficient showing of need", therefore as for their demand of
having the full-text was denied and respondents claim of executive privilege was valid
Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008; MR, Sept. 4, 2008
Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008; MR, Sept. 4, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project for U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The project was to be financed by the People’s
Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hours and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused
to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order
for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised
executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than the others.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. Third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. However, petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Prov. Of North Cotabato v. Government, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506
Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652
Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
SENATE vs ERMITA
MAIN POINT: The teaching on executive privilege may be culled from.
Facts:Various officials of Exec.Dep’t, and Military after being invited to appear as resource speakers on the issue of “Gloriagate”, wire-tapping, electoral fraud, and etc. were not able to make it due to prior commitments. Thereafter, the President issued EO 464, (Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution and for Other Purposes) and Ermita sent a letter to the Senate President informing him of the EO and that the resource persons from the executive departments would not be able to attend without the consent of the president.
Issue: WON EO 464 is valid? What types of information are covered by executive privilege?
Held:Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch, whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it mus be respected.
The types of information include those which are of a nature that disclosure would subvert military or diplomatic objectives, or information about the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law, or information about internal deliberations comprising the process by which government decisions are reached.EO 464, sec 2 enumerated the following as privileged:
1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the Public official covered by this EO;
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should be divulged;
3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements;
4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings;5. Matters affecting national security and public order.
Neri v. Senate, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008, September 4, 2008
Section 2. Qualifications
Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Section 3. Vice President
Section 4. Election and Canvass
Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
Macalintal v. COMELEC
Section 4. Election and Canvass
Main Point: The proclamation of presidential and vice-presidential winners is a function of
Congress and not of the Comelec.
FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are
unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioner’s right to file the instant petition, stating in
essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated
for the implementation of said law.
The petitioner argues that Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim
the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President
and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as
winners only by Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its
duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority
to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
Lopez v. Senate and House, GR No. 163556, June 8, 2004
Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee, June 22, 2004
The final adjournment of the Congress' session does not affect its non-legislative functions. In
fact it is stated in the Constitution, under Article VII Section 4, that both Houses of Congress
convened by express directive to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the President and Vice-
President and cannot adjourn until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated task
W/N petitions is with merit.
Petitioner Senator Pimentel Jr. seeks to a writ of prohibition directing respondent to cease and
desist from conducting further proceedings. He argues that the term of the Congress got expired
on its last session and therefore passed out of legal existence and should terminate all pending
proceedings.
Macalintal v. PET, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010
Macalintal v. PET, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010
FACTS: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition that questions the constitution of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of
the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the
President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution. Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 1793, which provides that: "There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines."
ISSUE: Whether or not PET is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely
conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result
of the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of
such ordinary courts of first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts,
and those of courts of domestic relations. The explicit reference of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas
categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the
Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are
more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions.
Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of
the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the
imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court. We have previously
declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
Legarda v. De Castro, PET Case No. 003, March 31, 2005
LOREN B. LEGARDA v. NOLI L. DE CASTRO
P.E.T. Case No. 003, 18 January 2008, Presidential Electoral Tribunal, (Quisumbing, J. )
MAIN POINT
We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and
discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue
the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
ACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Loren B. Legarda filed before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal a petition to annul
the proclamation of Respodent Noli L. De Castro as the Vice-President of the Philippines. The
protest filed by Legarda consisted of two aspects. The First Aspect covers the alleged erroneous,
manipulated and/or falsified results of the election. While the Second pertains to the revision of
the ballots of the precincts specified in the protest. The Second Aspect was earlier dismissed by
the Supreme Court for the failure of Legarda to pay the required deposit for the expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner clearly and convincingly proved the presence of manipulation or
falsification of election results
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging
her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or
withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest
involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. The most relevant precedent on
this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, a decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held that:
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three
of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May
1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago’s term if she would
succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In
assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this
protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her “determination to protect
and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.”
Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the
dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty
as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial political
stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election
protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest
implications thereof, on the following grounds:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing
of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly
legible.
Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in
a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After
which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if
an election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly
stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.
In the case at bar, protestant’s tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of the Vice-
Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest.
On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the protestee that the protestant
had not adequately and convincingly rebutted the presumption that as public documents, the
Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for the proclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are
authentic and duly executed in the regular course of official business. The evidence adduced by
protestee to show that the supposed security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs
and the COMELEC/NAMFREL’s copies are different, did not categorically establish that the
Congress-retrieved ERs are fake and spurious. To overcome the presumption of regularity, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Absent such
convincing evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In fact, the records show that even the
witnesses presented by the protestant testified that they were able to discern security features and
markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs. The records also show that witnesses were not made to
examine all Congress-retrieved ERs in making observations relative to security features and
markings, but only a sample set thereof was utilized, resulting in grave insufficiency in the
evidence presented by protestant.
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996
Section 5. Oath
Section 6. Official Residence; Salary
Section 7. Vacancy at the Beginning of the Term of the Presidency
Section 8. Vacancy During the Term of the Presidency
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001
ESTRADA vs DESIERTO
Nature: Petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Republic of the Philippines by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Facts: Erap was elected as President of RP with GMA as his VP. Because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding was started against Erap which was cut short as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying people in the streets of Manila. Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as a candidate but to quell the “wave” against him. Negotiations were made between Erap’s camp and GMA’s, and at 12nn of 20 January 2001, GMA took her oath which was acknowledged by both Houses of Congress as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang.
Issue: WON Estrada resigned as President
Held:Yes, impliedly. On reading Executive Secretary Angara’s diary published in the Phil. Daily Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner impliedly resigned because 1) he did not want to be a candidate in the proposed snap election 2) he did not object to Sen. Pimentel’s “dignified exit” proposal and 3) on Erap saying that he only had 5 days to a week to stay in the Palace. Also, from what the court eventually calls his “resignation letter”, Erap 1) acknowledged GMA’s oath-taking as President 2) he did not mention any intent on re-assuming his position as President and, 3) his gratitude on the letter is on a past opportunity he served as a President.
Lozano, et al v. Macapagal-Arroyo, February 6, 2001
Section 9. Vacancy in the Vice Presidency
Section 10. Vacancies in Both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency
Section 11. Incapacity of the President
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356, SCRA 108, 2001
Section 12. Serious Illness of the President
Section 13. Prohibitions
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, 1991
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
Section 13. Prohibitions
Main Point: While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office and employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when EXPRESSLY authorized by the Constitution itself.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987 which according to them allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions. The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s
constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those
provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding
any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1.
The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of
Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries
or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions
in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8
Art. VIII.
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354, 1989
Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a Motion to Quash the information against him for his violation of RA 3019 where respondents contend that he willfully and unlawfully have direct or indirect financial interest in the Doromal International Trading Corporation, an entity which transacted or entered into a business transaction or contract with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower and Youth Council., since according to him, he has not signed any document related to it.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Motion to Quash is with merit?
RULING: There is no merit in petitioner's insistence that the information should be quashed because the Special Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan that he does not possess any document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after he became a PCGG Commissioner. That admission allegedly belies the averment in the information that the petitioner "participated' in the business of the DITC in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by law from having any interest. (Sec. 3-h, RA No. 3019).The petitioner "can rightfully be charged ...with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "Pursuit of private business ... without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service.
Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993
Flores vs. Drilon
Main Point: The appointing authority that the congress gives to the President is an exclusive
prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by the Congress.
Facts:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon
of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this case. Paragraph (d) provides that the
President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget,
who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority. Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from
the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. One of the contentions of the petitioners is that
it violates Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . .
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through
the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor (provision on the first
year of operations) to the subject posts.
ISSUE:
WON the provision in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violatesl Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by
providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall
assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives
to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of
whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
Bitonio v. COA, G.R. no. 147392, March 12, 2004
Bitonio v. COA, G.R. no. 147392, March 12, 2004
FACTS: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the
Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he
attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement
transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the
Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet
members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of
compensation therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997,
implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509.
In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its
earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case, which limits the prohibition to Cabinet
Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a
Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of
Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.
He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties
Union case became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per
diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the
constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.
ISSUE: WON COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
HELD: Yes. The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings
sitting as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.
The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as
representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from
receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise
applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the
Constitution. No law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a
statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason
why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. The option of designating
representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the
payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering
that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.
Public Interest Group v. Elma, GR No. 138965, June 30, 2006
Section 14. Appointments of Acting President
Section 15. Prohibited Appointments
In Re Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta, AM No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998
Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban
De la Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010
and May 1, 2010
DE CASTRO vs JBC
MAIN POINT: This case was filed with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election.
Facts:JBC commenced the proceeding for the selection of the nominees to be included in a shortlist to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to
submit the list to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next president makes the situation ripe for judicial determination.
Issue: WON Sec 15 of ART 7 applies to appointments to the judiciary.
Held:No. Prohibition under Section 15 of ART 7 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the SC or to other appointments to the Judiciary. As can be seen, Article 7 is devoted to the Executive Department, and among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. One of the reasons underlying the adoption of the provision was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive.
Section 16. Power to Appoint; Commission on Appointments
Government v. Springer 50 PHILS 259, 1927
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999
Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993
Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 1260, 1989
Bautista vs. Salonga
FACTS: On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December of the same year, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. However, Commission on Appointments averred that Bautista cannot take her seat w/o their confirmation. Cory, through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA communications about Bautista’s appointment on 14 Jan 1989. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoA’s review hence she filed a petition before the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautista’s appointment, Bautista should be removed. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to CoA’s confirmation?
HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself.
Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, 1987
Petitioner filed a motion to prohibit respondent from performing his duties as the commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that respondent's appointment was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
W/N the appointment is considered to be valid.
Yes, it is valid based on Article VII Section 16 of the Constitution, which states that appointments made by the President that requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments are those belonging to the first group such as the Ambassador. The commissioner of the Bureau of Customs however does not belong to the first group, therefore it does not anymore need the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments to be valid.
Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, 1989
Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, 1989
FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the
Constitution. Due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on
Appointments, who insisted that the respondent Commission must first confirm sectoral
representatives before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the
In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on April 25,
1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on
Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives.
Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.
appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since “no attempt was
made to subject the sectoral representatives already sitting to the confirmation process, there is
no necessity for such confirmation, and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be
discriminatory”.
ISSUE: WON the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House
of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?
HELD: No. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Since
the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it
is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the
first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).
Petitioner’s appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2
which gives the President ”the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The
records show that petitioner’s appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in
recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of
Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her. Implicit in the invocation of paragraph
2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the
President as appointing authority, that petitioner’s appointment requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. As a matter of fact, the President had expressly submitted
petitioner’s appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that
Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on
petitioner’s appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant
to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and “unless resubmitted shall not again be
considered by the Commission.”
Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, 1992
Manalo v. Sistoza, GR No. 107369, August 11, 1999
Manalo vs Sistoza
On November 5, 2010
312 scra 239
Appointments
Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.
Matibag v. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002
Rufino v. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13
RUFINO vs ENDRIGA
MAIN POINT: When the authority is given to the head of collegial bodies, it is to the chairman that the authority is given and not to the body. He can appoint only officers “lower in rank”, and not officers equal in rank to him.
Facts:Petitioners contended that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees and that Section 6b of PD 15 (Created Cultural Center of the Philippines) authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional.
Issue: WON Sec 6b of PD 15 is unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. Section 6b of PD 15 is inconsistent with Sec 16 of Art VII. Sec 6b of PD 15 empowered the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Sec 16 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution allowed heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or board to appoint only “officers lower in rank” than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Thus, in so far as it authorized the trustees of the CCP board to elect their co-trustees, Sec 6b of PD 15 was unconstitutional because it violated Sec 16 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, GR No. 164978, October 13, 2005
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Section 17. Power of Control
Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano 21 SCRA 395, 1967
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Jose Paño, et. al.
Main Point: The power of control has been given to the President over all executive officers.
Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. At the case at bar, as the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the
President, his decision is that of the President’s.
FACTS:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
situated in Davao. On 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above
public land to the plaintiff. On 1954, the same was officially released from the forest zone as
pasture land and declared agricultural land. On 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants
applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff in turn filed its own sales
application covering the entire released area. The Director of Lands, following an investigation
of the conflict, rendered a decision on 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff
corporation. When the case was elevated to the President of the Philippines, Executive Secretary
Juan Pajo, by authority of the president, declared that it would be for public interest that
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers, be allocated that portion on which the petitioner
have made improvements.
ISSUES:
May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the
Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources?
HELD:
YES. The President’s duty to execute the law and control of all executive departments are of
constitutional origin. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority
to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. It may also
be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of control
over the executive departments. He may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in person. As the Executive Secretary acts by
authority of the President, his decision is that of the President’s. Such decision is to be given full
faith and credit by our courts, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.
Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr 197 SCRA 771
Roque v. Director of Lands, L-25373, July 1, 1976
Petitioner questions the decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary of the President for sustaining the decision of the Director of Lands and overruling the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources. He Claims that the Assistant Executive Secretary of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion
W/N there is grave abuse of discretion
No, it is stated in the Constitution that the President shall have control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. The assistant executive secretary was merely acting on behalf of the president, therefore it is understood that whatever decision the assistant executive secretary gives comes from the President himself.
Ang-Angco v. Castillo 9 SCRA 619, 1963
NAMARCO v. Arca 29 SCRA 648, 1969
Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135, 1994
Drilon vs Lim
9 May
GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS:Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,” while the second is “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.”
ISSUES:The issues in this case are
(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and
(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government
HELD:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.
Jason v. Torres 290 SCRA 279, 1998
Dadole v. COA, GR No. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002
DADOLE vs COA
MAIN POINT: The power of the president over local governments is only one general supervision.
Facts: The Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, in excess of the amount authorized by Local Budget Circular No. 55 of DBM which provided that, “xxx additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities be granted xxx “. Petitioner judges argue that Local Budget Circular No. 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue by dictating a uniform amount that an LGU can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein. They maintained that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore went beyond the supervisory powers of the President.
Issue: WON LBC 55 of the DBM is void for it goes beyond supervisory powers of the President? Does LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement?
Held:The Court declared LBC 55 to be null and void.
Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to LGUs, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President.
LBC no 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement. Section 458 of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges “when the finances of the city government allow.” The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of LBC 55 had no legal basis.
DENR v. DENR Employees, GR No. 149724, Aug. 19, 2003
Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710
Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA, GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007
Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA
Main Point:
The express grant of the power of control to the President justifies an executive action to carry
out the reorganization of an executive office under a broad authority of law.
Facts:
DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda to reform the local health system. Executive Order
102 was the order to redirect the functions and operations of the Department of health which
provided for the changes in the roles functions and organizational processes of the DOH. Under
the assailed order, DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to
being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of being the
devolution of basic services to local government units. Petitioners alleged that this EO is in
excess of the Presidential Authority.
Issue:
WON EO no. 102 violates Section 17, Article 7 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The argument that the EO 102 is in excess of the presidential authority due is without basis.
The constitution clearly states that the president shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Furthermore, DOH is among the cabinet level departments enumerated
under the Book IV of the Administrative code mainly tasked with the functional distribution of
the work of the president.
Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007
Orosa v. Roa, GR No. 14047, July 14, 2006
Phillips Seafood v. BOI, GR No. 175787, February 4, 2009
Biraogo v. Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010
Section 18. President’s Powers as Commander in Chief
Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590
IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000
Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780-81, 147799 and 1477810, May 10, 2001
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 2006
Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Main Point:
The President may call the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state
of national emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members
of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered
the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and
present danger. Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24,
2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the office of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was
perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25,
2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the
security guard of the building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a
composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of PP 1017 is Constitutional.
Ruling:
PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress Lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.
However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power to
issue decrees to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as decrees promulgated by the President; and to impose standards on media or any form
of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
section 17, article XII of the constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot
take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
David v. Ermita, GR No. 171409, May 3, 2006
Gudani v. Senga, GR No. 170165, April 15, 2006
Ampatuan v. Puno, 651 SCRA 228
Section 19. Executive Clemency
Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 PHIL 34
Llamas v. Orbos 202 SCRA 844, 1991
People v. Salle 250 SCRA 581, 1995
Drilon v. CA, 202 SCRA 378, 1991
Torres v. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272, 1987
Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, 1989
Sabello v. Department of Education, GR No. 87687, December 26, 1989
People v. Salle, Jr GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995
Garcia v. COA, 226 SCRA 356, 1993
Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice, GR No. 132601, Jan 19, 1999
Section 20. Foreign Loans
Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, GR 106064, October 13, 2005
Section 21. Foreign Relations: Senate Concurrence in International Agreements
USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer, 105 PHIL 1030, 1959
World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
Bayan v. Executive Secretary Zamora, 343 SCRA 449, 2000
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, 2005
Lim v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, GR No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244
Article VIII: Judicial Department
Section 1. Judicial Power
Santiago v. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (2970)
Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405
Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, 57 PHIL 600
Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, 33 SCRA 494
In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989); MR, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)
US v. Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974)
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001); MR, 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
ESTRADA vs DESIERTO
Nature: Petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Republic of the Philippines by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Facts: Erap was elected as President of RP with GMA as his VP. Because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding was started against Erap which was cut short as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying people in the streets of Manila. Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as a candidate but to quell the “wave” against him. Negotiations were made between Erap’s camp and GMA’s, and at 12nn of 20 January 2001, GMA took her oath which was acknowledged by both Houses of Congress as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang.
Issue: WON Estrada resigned as President
Held:Yes, impliedly. On reading Executive Secretary Angara’s diary published in the Phil. Daily Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner impliedly resigned because 1) he did not want to be a candidate in the proposed snap election 2) he did not object to Sen. Pimentel’s “dignified exit” proposal and 3) on Erap saying that he only had 5 days to a week to stay in the Palace. Also, from what the court eventually calls his “resignation letter”, Erap 1) acknowledged GMA’s oath-taking as President 2) he did not mention any intent on re-assuming his position as President and, 3) his gratitude on the letter is on a past opportunity he served as a President.
Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997)
Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC, GR No. 159139, January 13, 2004
Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, GR No. 166886, July 30, 2008
Villarosa v. HRET, GR No. 144129, September 14, 2000
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010
Garcia v. Board of Investments, GR No. 92024, November 9, 1990
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 132601, January 19, 1999
Torrecampo v. MWSS, 649 SCRA 482
Liban v. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244
Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, GR No. 171101, November 22, 2011
Sana v. CESB, GR No. 192926, November 15, 2011
Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690
Section 2. Role of Congress
Mantruste Systems v. CA, 179 SCRA 136 (1989)
Malaga v. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516 (1992)
Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)
Section 3. Fiscal Autonomy
Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 SCRA 429 (1950)
Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992)
Section 4. Composition; En Banc and Division Cases
Fortich v. Corona, 312 SCRA 751 (1999)
People v. Dy, GR 115236-37, Jan. 16, 2003
People v. Ebio, GR 147750, Sept. 29, 2004
Firestone Ceramics v. CA, GR No. 127245, June 28, 2000
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court
Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)
Judicial Review
Lina v. Purisma, 82 SCRA 344 (1978)
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 PHIL 139 (1936)
Macasiano v. NHA, 224 SCRA 236 (1993)
Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 678 (1972)
PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 PHIL 806 (1955)
Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975)
Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993)
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 246 SCRA (1995)
Anti Graft League of the Philippines, 260 SCRA 250 (1996)
Telecom v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)
Bayan v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000
Automotive Industry Workers v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005
White Light Corp v. City of Manila, GR No. 122846, January 20, 2009
Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR No. 140835, August 14, 2000
Sandoval v. PAGCOR, GR No. 138982, November 29, 2000
Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998)
IBP v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000)
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44
De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971)
David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162
People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 540
Mariano Jr. v. COMELEC, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, GR No. 102782, December 11, 1991
Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
PNB v. Asuncion, 60 SCRA 321
Santero v. CFI Cavite, 153 SCRA 728
Damasco v. Lagui, 166 SCRA 214
People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 262
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494
People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (1970)
In Re Cunanan, 94 PHIL 534 (1953-1954)
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, January 19, 1999
Bustos v. Lucero, 81 PHIL 648 (1948)
In Re Admission to the Bar: Argosino – Bar Matter 712, 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
Fabian v. Desierto, GR 129742, September 16, 1998
In Re: De Vera (2003)
Baguio Markets Vendor v. Judge, GR No. 165922, February 26, 2010
Republic v. Gingoyon, GR No. 166429, February 1, 2006
Maniago v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 104392, February 20, 1996.
Javellana v. DILG, GR No. 102549, August 10, 1992
Bar Matter No. 1222, February 4, 2004
Garrido v. Garrido, AC No. 6593, February 4, 2010
In re Letter of the UP Law Faculty, 644 SCRA 543
Section 6. Supervision of Courts
Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)
Caoibes v. Ombudsman, GR 132177, July 19, 2001
Escalona v. Padillo, AM P-10-2785, September 21, 2010
Section 7. Qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court; Lower Courts
In re JBC v. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
Kilosbayan v. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007
Topacio v. Ong, GR No. 179895, December 15, 2008
Section 8. Judicial and Bar Council; Membership
Section 9. Appointments of Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of Lower Courts
Section 10. Fixed Salary
Nitafan v. CIR, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)
Section 11. Security of Tenure; Power to Discipline
Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 PHIL 297 (1948)
De La Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)
People v. Gacott, 246 SCRA 52 (1995)
Section 12. Prohibition to Be Designated to Any Agency Performing Quasi-Judicial or
Administrative Functions
In re Judge Manzano, 166 SCRA 246
Section 13. Conclusions of the Supreme Court – How Reached?
Consing v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78272, August 29, 1989
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
People v. Escober, 157 SCRA 541 (1988)
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
People v. Bravo, 227 SCRA 285 (1993)
Hernandez v. CA, 208 SCRA 429 (1993)
Nicos v. CA, 206 SCRA 127 (1992)
Borromeo v. CA, 186 SCRA 1 (1990)
Francisco v. Pernskul, 173 SCRA 324 (1989)
Velarde v. Social Justice Society, GR 159357, April 28, 2004
Section 15. Period for Making Decisions
Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan – AM No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov. 28,
2001
Edano v. Asdala, AM No. RTJ-06-2007, December 6, 2010
Sesbreno v. CA, GR No. 161390, April 16, 2008
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