Russian Economic History: An Open Area for Research Simeon Djankov Rector, New Economic School...

Russian Economic History: An Open Area for Research

Simeon DjankovRector, New Economic School

Academic Advisor, HSE-NES Econ. History Lab

European University, St. Petersburg, Oct. 10. 2014

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Why Russian Economic History

1. Rich imperial past

2. Diversity in ethnicity and culture

3. Plenty of natural experiments

• Agrarian reforms under Stolypin, 1906

• The October revolution, 1917

• The New Economic Policy, 1921-

• Deportations, 1937-

4. Good statistical sources

Why Open Area for Research

1. Largely populated by historians

2. Lacks rigorous empirical work

3. Recent advances in economic theory• Institutional economics• The influence of culture• Economic growth

4. Link between past and present• Example: privatization

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HSE-NES Lab on Econ. History

1. Established in July 2014

2. Both economists and historians

3. Main task: open the field to new researchers

4. Two immediate tasks• Create databases and make them public• Do research

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Example 1: Stalin’s Deportations

1. The effects of Stalin’s deportations on trust

2. Author: Roman Levkin, Duke University

3. History• Stalin deported 2.8 mln people to Siberia and Central Asia• Some ethnic groups, e.g., Germans, Crimean Tatars, not rehabilitated• In 1991, a referendum on the future of the Soviet Union• In 2007, survey on trust in central authority (the President)

4. Result: regions with many deportees do not trust central authority

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Deportations by 1950, Number of people

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How Large Are the Effects

1. A 1% increase in deportations decreases the percentage of votes in favor of the Soviet Union by 0.75%

2. A 1% increase in deportations decreases the percentage of trust in the President by 5%

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Example 2: Gulag Archipelago

1. The political legacy of the Gulag Archipelago

2. Authors: Natalia Kapelko, Yandex, and Andrei Markevich, NES

3. History• June 27, 1929. Decree “On the Use of Labor of Convicted Criminals”• 179 thousand prisoners in 1930• 1.9 million in 1938, 2.5 million prisoners in 1951• 158 Gulags operated in 1951

4. Result: Regions with Gulags vote anti-communist in 1996

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Gulags in 1951, map of locations

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Presidential Elections 1996, actual votes

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How Large Are the Effects

1. The past location of a Gulag camp in the neighborhood cut communist share of voters by 2 percentage points

2. Yeltsin won by 54.4% of the vote, so a significant effect

3. Would a Zyuganov win have changed Russia?

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Example 3: Governors in Tzarist Russia

1. Career Incentives of Governors in Late Tzarist Russia

2. Authors: Gunes Gokman, NES, and Dmitry Kofanov, RANEPA

3. History• Career tracks of governors in 91 provinces during 1895-1914• Intensity of peasant revolts and worker strikes• The central government rewarded better-performing governors in the

peripheral provinces• Promotion to Petersburg, State Council or Senate

4. Result: Successful dealing with revolts triples the chance of promotion

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What Do Such Studies Show

1. The effect of institutional choice on political outcomes, and from there on new institutions– For example, Stalin’s atrocities in part prevented Zyuganov

from returning Russia to communism

2. Hysteresis in policy choices too– For example, regions which did not support agrarian reform

in 1905-1906 also failed to support privatization in the 1990s

3. What is Russia’s economic path

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