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Selfish behavior in networks
Game theory in networks an area in itself
Today: Three case studies BitTorrent Selfish routing
• Overlay routing• Interdomain routing
BitTyrant as a Sybil attack
c_1 >= c_2 >= … >= c_(s-1) are the rates required to makeit to the i’th slot in the auction.
Nash equilibrium
A state where no player has an incentive to unilaterally change their strategy
Classic example: Prisoner’s dilemma
Does BT reach a NE?
BitTorrent has not been shown to reach NE under a reasonable game model Example from 4.2 in [QS04]
What about PropShare? Best-response not prop-share, so not
guaranteed to reach NE
Price of selfish routing [RT02]
Assuming one unit of flow, what is the “price of anarchy” here? With linear cost functions, this is about as
bad as it gets
Selfish routing in Internet-like environments [QYZS06]
Underlay: OSPF or MPLS Overlay
Independent source routing Cooperative routing in each overlay
Link latency functions: M/M/1 and others Summary: Selfish routing
Achieves near-optimal average latency while overloading some links
Interacts poorly with traffic engineering
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