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Road to War. World scene changing. Soviets and China split (appeared to be headed for war). Hanoi and China grow closer. Soviet and U.S. relations improving. With Diem gone, South Vietnam appeared to be heading toward political chaos. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Road to War
Lyndon Johnson takes over
World scene changing. Soviets and China split (appeared to
be headed for war). Hanoi and China grow closer. Soviet and U.S. relations improving.
With Diem gone, South Vietnam appeared to be heading toward political chaos.
France trying to reassert itself as a world leader (anti-American).
Upheaval in Latin America and Africa.
Johnson appeared to be more concerned with domestic policy, relied heavily on advisors for foreign policy. Great Society program (war on poverty).
Johnson committed to a “democratic” South Vietnam, however he only wanted to maintain an advisory relationship. Believed military intervention would hurt
domestic program and 1964 election.
He did approve covert operations in Laos and North Vietnam.
Oplan-34A – Raids by South Vietnamese on coastal areas of North Vietnam.
DeSoto Patrols – Surveillance by U.S. ships on North Vietnam (in U.S. recognized international water).
NSAM 273 (National Security Action Memorandum), November 1963-purpose of U.S. intervention was to help South Vietnam defend itself against external communist conspiracy.
South Vietnam after Diem Military Revolutionary Council (MRC), the
ruling junta led by General Minh, was unable to consolidate fragmented political factions.
Communist Central Committee called for increased insurgency plus preparations made to send North Vietnamese regular army troops south (PAVN-People’s Army of Vietnam).
MRC surprised U.S. by wanting a negotiated settlement.
Rivalries existed among ARVN leaders. Major General
Nguyen Khanh plotted another coup, occurred January 30, 1964, eager to cooperate with the U.S.
Opened coup season-5 coups and 7 governments in 1964.
Things looking bad in early ’64. Viet Cong controlled ½ of land and
population. ARVN support became less effective. Popular support for GVN dropped.
NSAM 288 (March 17, 1964)-Increased U.S. aid and U.S. commitment and outlined “domino theory”.
Johnson hoped efforts would be enough to stabilize South Vietnam, did not want military intervention.
Gulf of Tonkin
Morning of August 2, 1964-3 North Vietnamese patrol boats fired on U.S. destroyer, U.S.S. Maddox (minor damage).
Evening of August 4, 1964-U.S.S. Maddox and C. Turner Joy “attacked” again. Attack was blips on a radar screen. Some sailors reported wakes from torpedoes. Pilots claimed no ships in the vicinity.
Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes (Operation Pierce Arrow) and got Congress to enact a resolution.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (passed the Senate 88-2, House 416-0). Allowed Commander in Chief to “take
all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks”, either against U.S. forces or S.E. Asian ally.
Johnson wanted a message of solidarity sent to the region as well as silencing Presidential challenger Rep. Barry Goldwater.
Goldwater was suggesting escalation, Johnson was now the peace candidate.
Johnson won a landslide victory. Johnson still hoped to maintain a free
South Vietnam without U.S. military intervention.
Great Society more important.
Crisis Deepened By fall of 1964, South Vietnamese
government in shambles, NLF had made significant gains and it seemed a communist victory may be a possibility.
November 1, Viet Cong launched an attack on Bien Hoa Airport outside Saigon, killing 4 Americans, wounded 72, and destroyed 5 U.S. planes, damaging others.
Johnson’s advisors presented 3 solutions to the Vietnam problem. 3 options.
Existing policy-no escalation or regular bombing.
“Fast squeeze”-rapid escalation and bombing (to drive Hanoi to the bargaining table).
“Slow squeeze”-gradual escalation and bombing (gradually increasing pressure would convince Hanoi to stop supporting the NLF, plus would keep China and the Soviets out).
Option 1 advocates concerned: Did not believe North’s morale
would die. Feared invasion by North Vietnam
as response. Were not convinced China and the
Soviets would not enter. Not sure South Vietnam could defeat
the NLF even if North Vietnam left. Feared escalation, once started you
could not stop.
November 27, 1964, Johnson accepted plan to implement option 3.
Phase 1 (30 days)-Bombing infiltration routes and reprisal strikes against North Vietnam.
Phase 2-when South Vietnam stabilized, aerial war of rising intensity would be carried out in the North.
Johnson delayed implementation until political order restored in the south.
February 7, 1965-Viet Cong attacked U.S. airfield at Pleiku.
9 killed, 137 wounded, 22 airplanes and helicopters destroyed or damaged.
Johnson ordered retaliation (Operation Flaming Dart).
February 10, 1965-V.C. attacked hotel housing U.S. soldiers at Qui Nhon (23 killed, 21 wounded).
February 13, 1965-Johnson authorized Operation Rolling Thunder (began March 2). Campaign failed.
Seemed to strengthen northern morale plus allowed them to escalate ground war, did not drive them to the peace table.
Did not help the out of control southern government.
Did not prevent sending in of U.S. troops.
March 8, General Westmoreland asked for 2 battalions of Marines to guard airbase at Danang (feared NLF attack and did not trust ARVN protection).
Many opposed ground troops. Feared once introduced, escalation
would continue. Within a few weeks, Westmoreland
asked for 2 Army divisions to protect the Central Highlands and Saigon.
April 6, 1965, NSAM #328-20,000 additional troops sent, air war expanded.
Johnson trapped-”War Hawks” on one side demanded war and “Doves” demanded withdrawal (anti-war movement begins).
April 20-troop strength increased to 40,000. By the end of 1965-179,000 troops in
country. Refused to expand bombing for fear of
Chinese intervention.
Johnson did not want politicize the war by mobilizing the Guard & Reserves, declaring a national emergency, or raising taxes. Did not want to harm the coalition
formed to pass the Great Society. U.S. quickly slid toward war without
notice.
U.S. Strategic Failure
Failed to develop an effective strategy for a limited war. Had won every major war since the Civil
War by superior manpower, material, and technology.
Superiority minimized importance of strategy.
Limited war (to prevent the entrance of China and Soviets) meant limited resources. Did not come up with an alternative to
massive mobilization.
William Westmoreland, commander of MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam), took control in Summer of 1965.
Developed 3 phase strategy of attrition in July 1965.
Phase 1-U.S. troops protect developing logistics system.
Phase 2 (1966)-U.S. forces take initiative and eliminate enemy's base camps and sanctuaries.
Phase 3 (1967)-mopping up exercise.
Combat
June 28, 1965-Army troops searched for enemy outside of Saigon. V.C. chose not to engage-1 U.S.
killed, 8 wounded. August 15, 1965-3rd Marine
Amphibious force attacked 1st V.C. Regiment near Chu Lai (Operation Starlite). V.C. destroyed, 700 killed to
marine losses of 50 killed, 150 wounded.
Fall 1965, most important action of 1965 took place in the Central Highlands. U.S. felt need to move against PAVN. Wanted to also test the
new concept of Air Mobility (1st Cavalry Division).
Battle of the Ia Drang 1st Phase (October 18th to November
14th, 1965). Series of search and destroy
missions. By November 10th, PAVN forced to
regroup. U.S. planned assault on entire force
located at Chu Pong Mountains near the Cambodian border.
Phase 2-1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division landed at Landing Zone X-ray, ended up being the middle of PAVN staging area.
Very savage fight raged for 3 days.
November 16th, PAVN forces retreated into Cambodia.
Sporadic fighting continued until November 24th.
Estimated PAVN casualties were 3,000 dead and 1,000 wounded (out of 6,000); U.S. lost 300 killed.
Results of battle. High loss/kill ratio convinced
Westmoreland that attrition and search and destroy missions worked (locked in as U.S. strategy).
Proved air mobility concept (became mainstay of U.S. tactics).
Showed ability of green U.S. troops against battle-hardened enemy.
Reaction question for “We Were Soldiers”.
Traditionally, U.S. soldiers of the Vietnam War are portrayed as drug addicts, war criminals, and undisciplined warriors. How does the movie “We Were Soldiers” refute that belief?
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