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Editor’s Note:Hurricane Sandy,
also known as Super
Storm Sandy, Tropi-
cal Storm Sandy, or
just plain Sandy,
hit New York City
and the surrounding
areas on October 29,
2012. Storm-related
deaths totaled 285,
while cleanup costs are estimated at $71.4 billion,
making Sandy the second costliest storm to have
hit the United States. A year later, recovery efforts
are still underway in some areas.
Set against a backdrop of emergency prepared-
ness planning in America’s largest city, this article
describes the role that The City University of New
York’s (CUNY) Office of Environmental, Health,
Safety, and Risk Management (EHSRM) played in
helping to plan for and respond to this extreme
event. As the article makes clear, effective emer-
gency planning and risk management involves
constant refinement and reassessment to protect the
public, vital infrastructure, and the environment.
Hurricane SandyWhen Joseph Bruno, New York City’s Com-
missioner of the Office of Emergency Management
(OEM), speaks about coastal storms, he speaks
with the authority
of someone who de-
serves a great deal
of credit for the re-
siliency and conti-
nuity that the city
demonstrated in the
wake of Hurricane
Sandy. So when he
addressed a forum
at New York’s Time-
Warner Conference Center and explained the city’s
resilience during Sandy by saying simply, “Plan-
ning and preparedness is what we do,” (Bruno,
2013), a typical audience might be struck by the
understatement. Sandy was not your typical storm.
However, this was no typical audience, either.
It was a collection of hardened risk managers and
business continuity planners from major institu-
tions throughout New York with whom Commis-
sioner Bruno’s message clearly resonated.
Sandy struck New York City on Monday,
October 29, 2012, 14 months after New York
City’s Coastal Storm Plan (CSP) was tested by
Hurricane Irene (New York City OEM, 2013a).
But unlike Irene, which flooded some low-lying
areas and left relatively little lasting damage
in the city (Dolnick, 2011), Sandy inundated
Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 61
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com)DOI: 10.1002/tqem.21361
Howard N. Apsan
Resiliency and Continuity: Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York
Environmental, Health, and
Safety (EHS) managers shoulder
additional responsibilities with
storm preparedness planning—
and play host to storm evacuees
Howard N. Apsan62 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem
to Hurricane Katrina, which struck the city of New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast of the United States in
2005, and had an estimated impact of $108 billion
(Blake, Landsea, & Gibney, 2011).
Sandy Hits New YorkAs late as October 24th, forecasters still expected
Sandy to turn east and run its course over the
Atlantic Ocean. However, two days later, it became
clear that Sandy was turning west and heading full
force into the New York Bight (Exhibit 1). The
New York Bight is a natural, geographic feature, an
streets, basements, subway tunnels, and electri-
cal vaults and left large swaths of the city with-
out power.
Sandy affected seven different countries and
24 states in the United States, and it caused severe
damage to coastal areas in New Jersey and New
York. It was responsible for 285 documented storm-
related deaths, 44 of which occurred in New York
City (The New York Times, 2012; The New York
Times News Service, 2013). And with a cleanup
cost estimate of $71.4 billion, it was the second-
costliest storm in recorded US history—second only
Exhibit 1. The New York Bight
Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 63Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York
in preparing for and responding to this signifi-
cant coastal storm event.
Risk Management and Business Continuity at CUNY
CUNY is the United States’ largest urban
university system and the third largest university
system in the country. CUNY consists of 24 col-
leges, graduate schools, and professional schools,
and it serves approximately 540,000 matriculated
and nonmatriculated students. It also has 35,000
faculty members and other employees and more
than 23 million square feet of space in almost
300 buildings located
throughout New York
City’s five boroughs,
as Exhibit 2 shows.
CUNY is responsible
for keeping a popula-
tion of around 600,000
(including visitors and
passersby) safe under
normal circumstances.
In the event of an
emergency, this task
becomes ever more
daunting (Apsan, 2008).
At CUNY, as at other universities, risk man-
agement and business continuity are widely
shared responsibilities. Naturally, Chancellor
Matthew Goldstein and Allan Dobrin, CUNY’s
executive vice chancellor and chief operating
officer, are ultimately accountable. Nevertheless,
as noted in a 2008 article in the Annual Journal of
the University Risk Management and Insurance
Association (URMIA), the integrated structure of
the university fosters reliance on local campus
leadership, as well:
Although CUNY is an integrated univer-
sity, each campus is encouraged to take
advantage of its unique characteristics
indentation where the New York and New Jersey
coastlines meet to form a near-right angle. Unfor-
tunately, when hurricanes strike, the bight serves
to funnel storm surges into New York City.
Ultimately, Sandy generated a storm surge
of 13.88 feet—almost four feet higher than the
previous record documented during Hurricane
Donna in 1960. The storm generated two mil-
lion cubic yards of debris and forced 600 million
gallons of water into the city’s underground in-
frastructure. It knocked down 20,000 trees, dam-
aged or destroyed 40,000 homes, 3,500 cars, and
72 boats, and left more than 700,000 residences,
which were occupied by millions of people, with-
out power for an extended period.
The population in the flood zone evacuation
area was approximately 2.3 million—less than the
worst-case scenario of three million, but still the
size of a major city. For those with nowhere else to
go—approximately 7,000 people and 197 pets at
the peak of the displacement—evacuees were sent
to one of the city’s 65 evacuation shelters, ten of
which are located at the CUNY campuses, or to
one of the eight special medical needs shelters
(SMNS), five of which are located on CUNY cam-
puses. These facilities were staffed by more than
4,000 city employees and volunteers who, in addi-
tion to monitoring the shelters, served more than
four million meals (New York City OEM, 2012).
Sandy tested the resilience of New York
City—and CUNY. It also prompted a thorough
review of the city’s existing CSP as well as a se-
rious reexamination of New York’s waterfront
development planning in anticipation of a future
in which climate change may contribute to more
frequent and intense coastal storms.
Much has been written about the sustainabil-
ity of coastal cities (Cohen, 2011), and the impact
of Sandy on the New York metropolitan area will
doubtless generate much more. This article has a
more modest scope. It highlights the synergistic
relationship between New York City and CUNY
Sandy tested the resilience of New York City—and CUNY. It also
prompted a thorough review of the city’s existing CSP as well as
a serious reexamination of New York’s waterfront development
planning in anticipation of a future in which climate change may
contribute to more frequent and intense coastal storms.
Howard N. Apsan64 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem
they have been tasked with establishing
local campus risk management commit-
tees to focus on campus-specific concerns
and serve as the liaison to the CUNY Risk
Management Council (Apsan, 2008, p. 52).
An Expanded Role: Office of EHSRM Takes on Additional Responsibilities
That said, the day-to-day responsibility of co-
ordinating the university’s risk management and
business continuity efforts falls to CUNY’s Office
of EHSRM. As the quote in the previous two para-
graphs explains, EHSRM was established in 2006,
shortly after the horrific active-shooter incident at
another school in the United States, Virginia Poly-
technic Institute and State University, by adding the
because they benefit each college and the
university as a whole…. Although many
decisions are made consultatively (e.g.,
closing the campus because of a snow
storm), the college president is ultimately
accountable for… an emergency decision
that requires immediate and often unilat-
eral action (e.g., activating the CUNY alert
emergency notification system).
As a result, the college presidents are asked
to play a pivotal role in CUNY’s risk man-
agement effort. They have been asked to se-
lect their designee to the Risk Management
Council, and they seem to have all given the
selection due consideration. Additionally,
Exhibit 2. CUNY's Campus Locations Throughout New York City (College of Staten Island not shown on this map)
Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 65Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York
A University of the City Joins the City’s OEM in Storm Planning
CUNY is not a New York City agency, but it
is of the city, and therefore, like a good neigh-
bor, it is often called upon to lend a hand. So
when the CSP team at New York City’s OEM
asked for assistance, CUNY was there. CUNY
has a number of large, accessible campuses—
with gymnasiums, showers, and cafeterias—
that are outside the flood zones and well
suited for evacuation centers and shelters.
Alas, as Sandy highlighted, CUNY also has a
number of campuses that are located within
the flood zones and also exposed to coastal
storm risks.
As a world-class city, New York City has
its share of emergencies, and its OEM, by
extension, has had a
lot of practice in disas-
ter preparedness and
recovery. In fact, the
experiences associ-
ated with the Septem-
ber 11, 2001, attacks
on the World Trade
Center established OEM as a national leader in
disaster planning and coordination. Further, as
America’s largest coastal city, New York has a
long history of hurricane planning, as explained
in a page from OEM’s website, which appears in
Exhibit 3.Much of the current version of the CSP was
developed by OEM in 2000. However, because of
the lessons learned in New Orleans and elsewhere
during and after Hurricane Katrina, which struck
the Gulf Coast of the United States in 2005, OEM
revised its plan significantly in 2006. Further,
the Mayor’s Office and OEM’s “Hurricane Sandy
After-Action Report” recommended updating the
evacuation zones and upgrading the city’s 311
telephone lines (Office of the Mayor, City of New
York, 2013).
risk management function to the existing CUNY
Office of Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS).
Just as the formerly named Office of EHS worked
to integrate environment, health, and safety through
standard-setting, auditing, training, and communi-
cation—and using technology as well as monthly
meetings of CUNY’s environmental, health, and
safety council to reinforce the message—EHSRM
tried to replicate previous successes by developing
equivalent risk management tools. These included
a CUNY risk management website, campus risk
assessment plans and templates, and monthly risk
management council meetings that include des-
ignees from each campus and representatives of
each of the university’s functional divisions.
EHSRM responsibilities continued to evolve
as university vulnerabilities were identified. Over
time, EHSRM was asked to play a key role in
business continuity (also referred to as continu-
ity of operations) and to organize an emergency
preparedness task force. Continuity of operations
plans and templates have been developed and
monthly meetings of a dedicated CUNY-wide busi-
ness continuity committee, which has since been
consolidated into a joint risk management and
business continuity council, has been established.
In addition, CUNY’s emergency preparedness
task force, whose members are predominantly
senior CUNY executives, meets monthly to ad-
dress significant incidents that have occurred and
prepares for anticipated future events. Modeled
after the crime-data-driven New York Police De-
partment (NYPD) CompStat program, campus
officials are often invited to share details and
lessons learned from incidents that transpired on
their campuses (Buntin, 1999).
Finally, EHSRM is tasked with developing
crisis-specific plans. These have included routine
threats, such as snow storms, power outages,
and transit disruptions, as well as extraordinary
threats, such as pandemic flu, student unrest, and
of course, coastal storms.
As a world-class city, New York City has its share of emergencies, and
its OEM, by extension, has had a lot of practice in disaster preparedness
and recovery.
Howard N. Apsan66 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem
Exhibit 3. New York City Office of Emergency Management Website Provides Essential Information on Planning for Emergencies
One of the toughest challenges in imple-
menting the CSP is the evacuation and shelter-
ing of coastal area residents. Because of New
York’s densely populated waterfront neighbor-
hoods, the scope of an evacuation can be stag-
gering, depending on the severity of the storm.
The onomatopoetic SLOSH maps—SLOSH
stands for Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from
Hurricanes (United States Department of Com-
merce, NOAA, 1992)—are included in the CSP
and provide an illustration of the potential
range of impact.
Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 67Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York
evacuation plans. Exhibits 5 and 6, respec-
tively, show the populations affected by evacu-
ations based on the severity of the storm and
fact-and-figure estimates for the CSP. Exhibit 7
shows a map of the evacuation zones.
An example of a SLOSH map appears in
Exhibit 4. The computer modeling that defines
the locations likely to experience storm surges
and supports the SLOSH maps is updated regu-
larly, which helps officials prepare and update
Exhibit 4. SLOSH Map of New York City During Category 1 to Category 4 Hurricanes (The legend shows which areas are susceptible to storm surges for each Hurricane Category)
Howard N. Apsan68 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem
Authority (MTA), and other governmental, cor-
porate, and not-for-profit organizations that may
play a response or recovery role. Virtually all of the
key players have a seat at OEM’s Emergency Op-
erations Center (EOC) during catastrophic events.
Countdown to Sandy’s LandfallOnce OEM begins its regular alerts and confer-
ence calls and prepares to activate the CSP, CUNY
and other key participants commence their own,
similar, internal procedures. For CUNY, this typi-
cally includes a series of university-wide confer-
ence calls an hour or so after the OEM call to
share and update information among campus
officials. In the case of Sandy, this process began
in earnest on Wednesday, October 24, five days
before the storm’s landfall.
On Thursday, October 25, OEM activated the
CSP and began to prepare for the implementa-
tion of its evacuation and sheltering components
(New York City OEM, 2012). Exhibit 8 shows
The Art and Science of Storm PlanningIn most cases, coastal storms do not reach
New York without warning. The United States’
federal meteorological agencies can identify most
major storms from their inception and track
them as they advance along the Atlantic coast
(Office of the Mayor, City of New York, 2013).
State and local emergency agencies are kept in-
formed, and the information is then shared with
other agencies. In New York City, OEM begins to
communicate storm information with relevant
agencies as soon as the storm is identified.
Initially, most of the communication is done
through e-mails and web-based alerts. However,
as the storm approaches and it becomes apparent
that there will be some impact, OEM begins to con-
duct citywide agency conference calls. These calls
include most city agencies as well as other partici-
pating institutions, such as CUNY, the American
Red Cross, the area’s electrical utilities, such as
Consolidated Edison, the Metropolitan Transit
Exhibit 5. Coastal Storm Evacuation Estimates by Hurricane CategoryCSP Evacuees by Zone
Order Scope Evacuees
Zone A (Category 1) 272,331
Zone B (Category 2) 677,940
Zone C (Categories 3 and 4) 1,380,388
Subtotal zone evacuees 2,330,659
Other evacuees 714,162
Total potential evacuees 3,044,821
(New York City OEM, 2009)
Exhibit 6. Estimated Facts and Figures of Coastal Storm PlanPopulation expected to evacuate 3.0 million
Population expected to seek public shelter 605,000
Evacuation centers 65
Hurricane shelters 501
Special medical needs shelters 8
Staffing requirement for a 24-hour period 34,000
Training requirement for shelter staff 68,000
City tax levy funds dedicated to logistics planning and supplies $20 million
Number for prepositioned start-up kits in schools 600
(New York City OEM, 2009)
Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 69Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York
the UORC serves as the “air traffic controller”
for the shelters. CUNY had representatives at
the EOC and at the UORC, and Don Winters of
CUNY’s Office of Public Safety provided overall
coordination.
Throughout the weekend, CUNY continued
to monitor information from the US National
Hurricane Center and review OEM’s situation
a timeline for this process. The CSP has a set
structure for its sheltering system, as shown in
Exhibit 9. This structure includes the EOC, the
united operations and resource center (UORC),
the evacuation centers, and the hurricane shel-
ters, which include the SMNS and transitional
shelters. Although the mayor and his commis-
sioners discuss strategy and set policy at the EOC,
Exhibit 7. New York City Coastal Storm Evacuation Zones
Howard N. Apsan70 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem
agers could share critical information on issues
such as supplies and staffing resources. The
ability to communicate among the shelters be-
came especially important as unexpected chal-
lenges arose, such as the power outage south of
40th Street in Manhattan, which affected the
shelter at Baruch College and four other CUNY
campuses in lower Manhattan, and fuel shortages
that threatened CUNY buildings, vehicles, and
emergency generators.
reports, which were issued every few hours dur-
ing the storm and detailed essential health,
evacuation, and resource information. On Satur-
day, October 27, when evacuees began to arrive,
CUNY distributed shelter updates, keeping all
CUNY shelter leaders abreast of conditions at
each shelter. Exhibits 10 and 11 show two of
the CUNY shelters during the hurricane.
Because each CUNY shelter had at least one
CUNY manager and point-of-contact, these man-
Exhibit 8. OEM's CSP Shelter Timeline
Exhibit 9. Shelter System Organizational Structure Overview
Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 71Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York
Exhibit 10. York College Special Medical Needs Shelter During Hurricane Sandy
Exhibit 11. Queens College Evacuation Shelter During Hurricane Sandy
Photo Credit: H. N. Apsan, 2012
Photo Credit: H. N. Apsan, 2012
Howard N. Apsan72 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem
On Sunday, October 28, one day before Presi-
dent Obama signed the emergency declaration
qualifying state and local governments for federal
assistance, New York Governor Cuomo ordered
the closure of the MTA, suspending all subway,
bus, and commuter rail service in New York City
(Office of the Governor, State of New York, 2012).
Finally, New York City’s Mayor Bloomberg or-
dered the evacuation of residents in “Zone A”
(Office of the Mayor, City of New York, 2012).
Sandy reached New York City on Monday,
October 29. The storm surge flooded neighbor-
hoods, left millions
without power, and
trapped those who
could not or would not
evacuate. Although
most “Zone A” evac-
uees made their way
to friends and family
on high ground, the
7,000 or so who had no such options arrived at
CSP Shelters, with 2,700 going to CUNY facilities.
Evacuees Stay Longer Than ExpectedUnder the CSP, planners had anticipated that
evacuees would remain in the shelters for a few
days at most, and then return to their homes.
However, that scenario assumed that residents’
homes would be habitable when the storm re-
ceded. That clearly was not the case with Sandy.
Entering the third week—two weeks after
Sandy had passed—CUNY still had 900 evacuees
in four remaining shelters, and classes could not
resume in those areas until the shelters were
closed. The challenge was not restricted to the
presence of the evacuees. Early on, there was a
shortfall of shelter volunteers and serious con-
cern that the shelters would be understaffed.
However, as the storm subsided, a vast number
of volunteers arrived. City employees, com-
munity emergency response teams, health and
hospital corporation personnel, federal disaster
medical assistance teams, and public health ser-
vice officers descended on the CUNY shelters.
In all cases, these additional hands were much
appreciated, but they had to be coordinated, and
in some cases, redirected to other shelters. At
times, certain shelters had more volunteers than
evacuees.
As the evacuees began to return home and
the shelters began to close, Mayor Bloomberg ad-
dressed New Yorkers and thanked them for their
efforts and perseverance during Sandy. When he
spoke about the shelters, he said that he must:
particularly thank [CUNY], which has
been a great partner to us in this effort.
The volunteers and city employees man-
ning these shelters have done a phenom-
enal job and they deserve all of our thanks
(CUNY Newswire, 2012, para. 3).
With still-open shelters and evacuees re-
luctant to leave, the congratulations were a bit
premature. It took another week before all CUNY
campuses were out of the sheltering business
and able to resume fully their higher education
missions.
Finally, on Sunday, November 18, CUNY
campuses were slowly returning to normal. Now,
in addition to resuming college activities, it was
time to conduct the postmortems for Sandy and
begin to assimilate lessons learned for the next
emergency. As CUNY’s executive vice chancellor
and chief operating officer Allan Dobrin said:
The one thing you can be sure of is you’re
going to have emergencies. You just don’t
know what they’re going to be. . . . So it’s
very important to have processes in place
that cover everything you can imagine,
and to make constant improvements
(CUNY Matters, 2013, para. 7).
Entering the third week—two weeks after Sandy had passed—CUNY still had 900 evacuees in four remaining shelters, and classes could not resume in those areas until the shelters were closed.
Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 73Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York
to serve as emergency housing for several days, at
most, were forced to remain open for weeks. The
stress on shelter leaders, volunteers, coordinators,
and the evacuees themselves, led to mounting
pressure.
Second, the resources needed to accommodate
long-term sheltering tested the mettle of the EOC,
the UORC, and the many organizations that pro-
vided support. As a result, CUNY shelters began to
rely on each other for resources and help.
Third, the facilities, including the gymna-
siums, cafeterias, and bathrooms and showers,
began to suffer from over use. CUNY quickly
began a reassessment process with OEM to de-
termine whether certain facilities continue to be
appropriate for sheltering, especially for extended
periods.
Fourth, CUNY and
OEM had to develop
a better endgame to
ensure that, once the
shelters have com-
pleted their humani-
tarian mission, the
evacuees will return home or be moved to
alternative facilities so that CUNY campuses
could return to their roles as places of higher
education.
Additional ChallengesFor CUNY, though, the ultimate challenge
is exemplified by institutions such as Hunter
College. Hunter’s East 68th Street campus served
as a key shelter on the Upper East Side of Manhat-
tan, as shown in Exhibit 12. At the same time,
CUNY’s Brookdale Campus, located on East 25th
Street near the East River, was flooded by the
storm surge and lost electrical power along with
most of the rest of lower Manhattan. Its dormi-
tory was evacuated, its research labs were dam-
aged, and the impact to the building components
was dramatic.
ConclusionsFor CUNY and for the rest of New York, the
recovery from Sandy has been a long and arduous
process that is still incomplete a year later. Dur-
ing the planning process, it was uncertain how
the CSP would acquit itself when tested. Hurri-
cane Irene, which struck New York City in 2011,
was the CSP’s first real test; it passed—but not
without many hard lessons learned. In the “hot
washing” process—an after-action discussion and
evaluation of an agency’s performance following
an exercise—Irene was often referred to as the
“live fire” drill—a realistic scenario used to test
specific equipment and training—for the CSP,
and it raised the level of confidence in the plan.
Sandy’s devastating impact did not undermine
that confidence, but it reminded us squarely of
how unpredictable nature can be.
Citywide, Hurricane Irene provided valuable
lessons in logistics, communications, and man-
agement that mitigated the impact of Sandy. For
example, compared with Irene, during Sandy, the
delivery of supplies was generally much smoother
and better coordinated; communication between
the EOC and the UORC, and between the UORC
and the shelters was improved; and shelter man-
agement was better organized and, at least at
CUNY, led by campus managers and staff who
knew the facilities and had a stake in them. By
most counts, the needs of the city’s most vulner-
able—special medical needs evacuees, hospital
patients, and nursing home residents—were ad-
dressed more effectively during Sandy than dur-
ing Irene.
Lessons Learned Regarding Sheltering Evacuees
Within CUNY, lessons emerged, as well. First,
because Sandy’s effects were much more severe
than Irene’s, and many evacuees could not return
home for weeks after the storm, the sheltering
system was seriously strained. Shelters designed
For CUNY and for the rest of New York, the recovery from Sandy has
been a long and arduous process that is still incomplete a year
later.
Howard N. Apsan74 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem
storms like Sandy and for other emergencies that
the future holds.
EpilogueWe began this article with Commissioner
Bruno’s comment on emergency planning, so it
is fitting to end with another discussion that was
prompted by his presentation: the role of climate
change in future coastal storm planning. There
appears to be consensus that, regardless of the
extent of climate change, future planning must
address the possibility of an increasing frequency
and intensity of coastal storms. Specific research
about this linkage is included in the report of the
New York City Panel on Climate Change, which
was co-chaired by CUNY (Office of Long-Term
Planning and Sustainability, City of New York,
2011).
In addition to the challenges that the Hunter
College shelter faced, the Baruch College shel-
ter had to be evacuated because of the power
outage, and Kingsborough Community College
and Borough of Manhattan Community Col-
lege, both of which are on the waterfront, were
severely flooded. Striking a balance between
operating shelters and simultaneously caring
for storm-affected facilities had already been
acknowledged as a special CUNY challenge,
but the severity of Sandy has raised the level of
concern.
Despite these difficulties, CUNY remains
committed to the city’s CSP, and it will continue
to play an integral role in the planning and
evaluation process by sharing lessons learned and
striving for continuous improvement. After all,
that is the essence of resiliency and continuity in
Exhibit 12. Hunter College Served as a Special Medical Needs Shelter During Hurricane Sandy
Photo credit: H. N. Apsan, 2012
Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 75Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York
AcknowledgementsThe author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Jordan Fox and Krystal
Laymon of the CUNY Office of EHSRM.
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Cohen, S. A. (2011). Sustainability management: Lessons from and for New York City, America, and the planet. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
CUNY Matters. (2013, January 8). Day of the deluge. Retrieved from http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/forum/2013/01/08/day-of -the-deluge/
CUNY Newswire. (2012, November 1). Shelter from the storm: CUNY aids Sandy’s victims. Retrieved from http://www1 .cuny.edu/mu/forum/2012/11/01/shelter-from-the-storm -cuny-aids-sandy%e2%80%99s-victims/
Dolnick, S. (2011, August 28). New York spared brunt of storm: Suburbs hit hard. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/nyregion/wind-and-rain-from -hurricane-irene-lash-new-york.html?pagewanted=all
Eisenhower, D. D. (1957, November 4). Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference. National Defense Executive Reserve Conference in Washington from White House. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://thinkexist .com/quotation/in_preparing_for_battle_i_have_always_found _that/10642.html
New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). (2009, March). New York City hazard mitigation plan coastal storms: Multi-hazard analysis for New York City. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/downloads/pdf/hazard _mitigation/section_3f_coastal_storm_hazard_analysis.pdf
New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). (2012). The coastal storm plan. The coastal storm plan and the sheltering
This report contains a number of recommen-
dations directly related to future coastal storm
planning. These include:
• The evacuation zones must be reevaluated
with some regularity. Demographic changes,
along with residential and commercial devel-
opment, must be reflected accurately in future
evacuation scenarios.
• Construction and land use changes should
be incorporated in storm resiliency planning.
Buildings in low-lying waterfront areas could
be elevated; boardwalks, levees, and other vul-
nerable structures could be strengthened; and
the remaining marshland and riparian buffers
that protect the uplands naturally should be
protected.
• Infrastructure repairs and future projects
should incorporate flood-resistant technology.
Electricity, steam, telecommunication, and
subway lines in New York City proved to be
too vulnerable.
• The stockpiling and delivery of essential emer-
gency materiel—such as the back-up generators
and the fuel to run them—has to be reassessed.
Sandy hit New York City and CUNY pretty
hard, but it could have been much worse. After
all, it wasn’t just a storm; it was the equivalent of
a storm, a transit strike, a gasoline shortage, and
a blackout all rolled into one. The event even
included a one-day snowstorm. The fact that the
City and CUNY were so resilient, and that the re-
covery is well under way, is a tribute to the many
who served and battled through Sandy. As for the
next storm, it would serve us well to remember
former US President and Army General Dwight
Eisenhower’s oft-quoted admonition:
In preparing for battle, I have always
found that plans are useless but planning
is indispensable (Eisenhower, 1957).
Howard N. Apsan76 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem
Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, City of New York. (2011, April). Climate change. PlaNYC 2030. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/publications /publications.shtml
Office of the Mayor, City of New York. (2012, October 2012). Mandatory evacuation order for all people in Zone A: Mayor Bloomberg issues order for mandatory evacu-ation of low-lying areas as hurricane Sandy approaches New York City. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/portal /site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0 /index.jsp?pageID=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc _name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012b%2Fpr377-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1
Office of the Mayor, City of New York. (2013, May). Hurricane Sandy after action: Report and recommendations to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www .nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf
United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (1992, April). SLOSH: Sea, lake and overland surges from hurricanes (NOAA technical report 48). Silver Spring, MD. Retrieved from http:// slosh.nws.noaa.gov/sloshPub/pubs/SLOSH_TR48.pdf
system. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html /planning_response/planning_coastal_storm_plan.shtml
New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). (2013a, April). NYC hazards: NYC hurricane history. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/hazards/storms _hurricanehistory.shtml
New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). (2013b, April). Planning for emergencies: coastal storm plan. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/planning _response/planning_natural_hazards.shtml
The New York Times. (2012, November 17). Mapping hurri-cane Sandy’s deadly toll. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/nyregion/hurricane -sandys-deadly-toll.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
The New York Times News Service. (2013, June 27). Sandy claims 44th victim, NYC man’s body undiscovered for months. Newsday. Retrieved from http://us.covertimes.com /news/newsday-us_2013--06--27/sandy-claims-44th-victim -nyc-man-s-body-undiscovered-for-months/758480
Office of the Governor, State of New York. (2012, October 28). Governor Cuomo announces MTA to suspend service in advance of hurricane Sandy. Retrieved from http://www .governor.ny.gov/press/10282012mtasuspension
Howard N. Apsan, PhD, serves as the University Director of Environmental, Health, Safety, and Risk Management (EHSRM) for The City University of New York, the largest urban university system in the United States. He also teaches at Columbia University, is a member of the Editorial Board of Environmental Quality Management, and writes and lectures regularly.
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