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Proliferation Pathways: Critical Indicators of WMD Pursuit

Introduction

For the second phase of the Proliferation Pathways study, Stratfor has been asked to analyze the processes state and non-state actors follow in deciding to acquire and deploy weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The second phase builds off of the first phase of the project, in which Stratfor identified the critical state and non-state actors that have the likely capability and intent to pursue the development and/or deployment of WMD.

The state and non-state actors identified in the first phase of the project as being capable of developing WMD, possessing the intent to acquire or develop WMD and posing a threat to U.S. security or interests are al Qaeda, Cuba, Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Serbia, Syria, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. In this second phase of the project, in addition to these nine state and non-state actors, we also have looked at Russia and China as potential proliferators of WMD technology or material.

In assessing the critical factors that can be identified as precursor indicators that a particular actor has started down the path of WMD acquisition or development, we looked at two elements -- technological markers and geopolitical markers.

Technological Markers

Technological markers include chemicals, biological agents, technologies, materials and equipment necessary for a successful WMD program. There are well-established lists of precursor equipment, material and expertise necessary for the development of WMD systems, from the Convention on Chemical Weapons schedules to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s lists of dual-use nuclear equipment and technology. These lists are widely distributed and well-known and the items contained within are well-monitored.

In the first phase of the project, we reduced the list of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons that could feasibly be deployed for the purpose of “mass destruction.” [should we insert here again our definitions of WMD from Phase 1?] The list was short, given the technological constraints on the systems. WMD-level chemical weapons are primarily nerve agents, including VX, soman, sarin and tabun. Biological agents with a WMD-level potential include smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, plague, botulism and anthrax. We determined that radiological weapons do not match the definition of WMD (although they can cause significant psychological and economic damage) and therefore are not included in this assessment. Nuclear devices are the one type of weapon that nearly always fits the WMD category.

But even though we shortened the list of potential devices, the number of potential precursor technologies remained vast. Through internal analysis and consultation with relevant experts and agencies, Stratfor parsed the lists looking for the “Holy Grail” of precursors, something that was available from only an extremely small number of suppliers and, if acquisition were confirmed, would offer nearly undeniable proof of the pursuit of WMD. Unfortunately, there is no such Holy Grail component.

While reference will be made in this study to these technological precursors, there is little value added in rehashing or second-guessing such existing monitoring systems. Monitoring the supply and spread of the precursor technologies and materials is a necessary step in identifying (and, if deemed necessary, preventing) the spread of WMD technologies. But many of the precursor technologies have “benign” applications as well. Identifying the transfer of such technologies, then, provides a starting point for a more in-depth assessment of the supplier and receiver, but it still leaves a very large number of items to focus on.

Geopolitical Markers

Geopolitical markers are political, security and social factors that encourage or restrain state and non-state actors from pursuing WMD or participating in the spread of such technologies. We have kept with the initial model of the Proliferation Pathways study, winnowing the list of potential proliferators to focus on the high-risk, high-threat actors. We have looked at the capability, intent, targeting criteria and operational history and principles of each of the critical actors, laid those variables against a 10-year forecast framework (or “matrix”), and sought to identify critical inflection points and behavioral cues that would indicate and increased the likelihood of WMD proliferation.

There are two simultaneous trends emerging in the international system that will make the spread of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, a more pressing concern over the next decade. The first is the shifting patterns of Russian behavior. Moscow’s push to reassert Russian influence and authority in its near abroad, and the inability or disinterest unwillingness of the United States and Europe to offer a significant counter to many of these Russian overtures, is bringing new pressures to bear. particularly in Central Asia. At the same time, there is growing competition between Russia and China over Central Asian resources and loyalties. This is raising the potential for Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to pursue WMD systems that would give them a greater sense of independence.

The second trend is a shift in global attitudes toward the expansion of nuclear weapons systems. The U.S. acceptance of India as a nuclear weapons state, the unpunished North Korean nuclear test, the open discussions of potential nuclear weapons development in Japan -- all are signs of a changing undercurrent in the nuclear weapons debate. This is shifting the perception of non-nuclear states of the potential repercussions of heading down the nuclear path. If the perceived “cost” of nuclear weapons development is lowered, the perceived benefits may outweigh the risks. The decision to pursue nuclear weapons, then, becomes easier to make.

Findings: Identifying Markers

The core purpose of the Proliferation Pathways project is to identify markers that could indicate that a state or non-state actor is pursuing the acquisition or development of WMD. Spotting such activity does not guarantee an actor is on a proliferation pathway, but it does provide a trigger for closer observation and intelligence-gathering, thus allowing for a more efficient and focused allocation of resources.

In determining where to look for potential proliferators, most studies focus on technological transfers and/or a perception of subjective intent to identify those state and non-state actors most likely to pursue WMD. We have modified this somewhat for the current study, looking at technology but shifting away from a subjective basis of intent and toward a more objective view of intent.

We have defined intent as an objective element -- not what an actor says, or whether they are perceived as “bad,” but the geopolitical realities that determine what an actor needs and enable or constrain certain courses of action. The choices, imperatives and actions of state and non-state actors are shaped by geography, ethnicity, support, alliances, resources, opponents and numerous other factors, most of them not alterable by the actor. Intent is very different from desire, and even further removed from the spoken or written word.

Technological Markers

Technological markers can be separated by the type of WMD system being pursued; chemical, biological or nuclear. In each case, the markers are a combination of technologies, precursor materials, machineries and skills or knowledge. While limited chemical, biological and radiological programs can be conducted using lesser precursors and in smaller quantities, thus largely avoiding detection, these limited systems do not meet the prior criteria laid out for WMD-class systems. Blocking all development of potentially weaponizable chemical, biological or radiological systems is an impossibility, but focusing on the most dangerous systems in the most likely proliferators offers the best opportunity to avoid a large-scale catastrophe.

CHEMICAL

Nerve agents are the only chemical weapons that can realistically effectively be used as WMD, given our definition. Nerve agents are generally divided into two categories, G-agents and V-agents. The high lethality G-agents include soman (GD), sarin (GB) and tabun (GA). The most lethal V-agent known is VX. The more lethal the agent, the fewer commercial applications its precursors have. G-agents are easier to produce than V-agents.

In any chemical weapons program, the key phases are acquisition, synthesis, formulation, testing, loading and waste disposal. While the actual synthesis steps for a particular chemical may not be especially distinctive, the handling, testing, “packaging” and disposal of these highly toxic materials often leave the most easily detectable traces. Acquisition

Many of the precursors to these agents are listed on the Convention on Chemical Weapons schedules. [need a note here that will take us to the table listing all the class 1 and 2 chemicals] Schedule 1 chemicals have no legitimate commercial uses outside of making chemical weapons. Schedule 2 chemicals have limited commercial applications. Schedule 3 chemicals are readily obtainable and have legitimate commercial applications.

The acquisition of precursor materials can be either through purchase or through chemical synthesis. All of the key precursors of nerve agents can be made from very basic starting materials, such as phosphorus, chlorine and fluorine, in facilities that are not particularly large and could be part of an existing industrial complex. One indicator of the production of these precursors is the relatively large amount of energy required. [– need more detail here. How much more energy than for non-weapon chemical programs?]

In general, all [can something be both “in general” and “all but one?” teekell needs to clarify this, and the Israeli example.] nerve agents except for tabun have a bond between the methyl group and the phosphorus group of chemicals. Therefore, there is the need for a methylphosphorus precursor or a precursor to the methylphosphorus precursor such as trimethylphosphate. [where can these be acquired? Is there a limited number of suppliers???] This means that the methyl compound can be the giveaway to nerve-agent production.

Therefore, anyone buying significant quantities of methylphosphorus compounds should be regarded with suspicion. These compounds have few industrial uses and no agrochemical uses. If a suspect already being watched is observed acquiring methyl-phosphorus compounds, this action should be regarded as very significant.

The [recent?] crash of an Israeli cargo plane in the Netherlands exemplified this tell-tale connection. Thus, when On Oct. 4, [2006?], a Boeing 747 belonging to the Israeli airline El Al crashed in the Amsterdam suburb of Bijlmer, killing 43 people. The carrying a cargo allegedly includeding 190 liters of dimethyl methylphosphonate and other precursors chemicals, it raised suspicions of Israeli production of Sarin. for sarin, leading to speculation that Israel was producing the agent.

Disposal

Disposal of by-products could be another indicator of a covert chemical weapons program. The treatment and disposal of waste products takes place during all phases of

chemical weapons production and is an important consideration for producer and monitor.

Indicators of chemical weapons by-product disposal might come from air, water or soil samples. Most by-products are toxic but not lethal, such as QF and DL [??? What are QF and DL??? – teekell, please address]. These materials can be incinerated, but this must be done at very high temperatures in order to eradicate any traces. With very volatile materials such as sarin, it might be possible to do stand-off monitoring of plant vapors by airborne spectroscopy.

A more likely approach would be monitoring sewage discharges for methylphosphonates, which are quite stable in water. An example of this approach can be found in the controversy over chemical weapons disposal operations at the Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana. Disposal of wastewater from the facility has caused considerable public concern because methylphosphonates, which result from the neutralization of VX, are very persistent in water.

Looking for spillage in the soil is more difficult. Evidence of illicit activity can be found in the soil near production sites in the form of various methylphosphonate derivatives. The CIA reportedly used this approach in detecting such compounds in soil samples from the El Shifa Pharmaceutical Co. plant in Khartoum. However, access to the suspect site is required to detect this indicator.

BIOLOGICAL

There are six biological agents that are WMD-feasible -- smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, plague, botulism and anthrax.

Many of the technologies that support the production and development of organisms and toxins into biological warfare agents are dual-use. Therefore it is very difficult to pin-point tell-tale purchases of technologies intended for the production of these agents for nefarious [nefarious??? Anything less cartoonish?] purposes.

For the purposes of conducting an offensive biowarfare program, producing high concentrations of biological organisms or performing aerosolization experiments requires a series of controls that can be identified. These include the implementation of strict scientific measures in acquiring the seed strain, in maintaining biosafety standards and in minimizing health risks in the lab.

Some of the most indicative technical precursors to the six WMD-feasible biological agents are:

Complete containment facilities maintained at Biosafety Level (BL) 3 or 4 standards [will need a chart that explains these standards, what makes them unique over “normal” facilities]

Access to the actual pathogenic microorganism seed strain: smallpox, Ebola, Marburg viruses; anthrax-contaminated soil; plague bacterium; botulinum toxin.

Access to a vaccine treatment for smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, anthrax, plague and botulism agents.

A knowledge base of Ph.D. scientists [do they need phds or just the knowledge level of working with the organisms? The degree itself isn’t the marker, right?] trained in molecular and cellular biology, virology and bacteriology who can accurately and safely conduct biowarfare research and weaponization [– this seems a little circular – to do biowarfare you need people who can do biowarfare...???].

Personal protective equipment including full or half suits that utilize a tethered external air supply and that operate under positive pressure.

Processing equipment including fermenters (bioreactors, chemostats, continuous-flow station systems), centrifugal separators, cross-flow filtration units and steam-sterilizable freeze-dryers.

Aerosol-delivery equipment such as spray booms and fogging devices capable of fine particle-size delivery and that can be attached to aircraft (manned or unmanned). [why not trucks, or just mounted on buildings? Why on aircraft? What about in ventilation systems or in arenas or stadiums?]

Acquisition of seed stock

The smallpox virus has two known stores -- secure laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and at the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology in the Novosibirsk region of Russia. The seed strain of the Marburg virus is found in infected African green monkeys in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while the Ebola virus is thought to come from infected people or gorillas and chimpanzees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, the Philippines, Uganda and Sudan. Research has shown that guinea pigs also can host the Ebola and Marburg viruses [so should folks look for the importation of guinea pigs from high-risk countries?]. All Acquisition of these non-human primates are identifiable precursors.

Handling of agents

Because BL4 conditions are required for handling extremely infectious and hazardous agents such as Ebola, Marburg, smallpox, plague and botulism (BL3 is sufficient for anthrax), complete containment facilities constructed to these standards are a critical precursor to monitor. BL4 conditions include a negative-pressure environment with airlocks and other systems to neutralize the agents in waste and exhaust air. [how can you tell these facilities from the distance? Are there limited suppliers of the

filtration or pressure systems to watch?]

Because of the high risk associated with developing biological weapons, it is critical to vaccinate people working with or around the agents. An effective vaccine is a necessary component in any biowarfare program and is therefore a significant precursor in signaling the existence of an offensive capability. With smallpox declared eliminated in 1980, there is no longer an incentive to invest time and money in developing a smallpox vaccine. Likewise, there is no vaccine treatment for plague, Ebola, or Marburg viruses. With this in mind, anyone developing a smallpox, plague, Ebola or Marburg vaccine wcould signal the intention to deliberately disseminate these agents as WMD, though there is significant room for legitimate research into vaccines for plague, Ebola and Marburg.

Since these agents are attractive as biological weapons mainly because of their high fatality rates (50-90 percent for Ebola, 23-70 percent for Marburg), and because there are no vaccines available to prevent infection (the only means of treatment is supportive medical care), attention to precursors must turn back to the use of biosafety containment facilities. While vaccine development for agents such as Ebola or Marburg would signal the intention to disseminate these agents, complete containment facilities constructed to BL3 or BL4 standards, necessary because of the lack of a vaccine treatment and the agents’ highly infectious nature, would be critical precursors to the development and weaponization of Ebola and Marburg. Facilities of this kind should be closely monitored. [this seems redundant with the first paragraph under “handling agents.” One or the other can be removed.]   In the case of anthrax and botulinum toxin, while there are treatments available -- an antitoxin for botulinum toxin and a vaccine for anthrax -- supplies and production capacity are limited and supportive care is the norm for infected people.

Botulinum toxin -- like plague, smallpox, Ebola and Marburg -- is highly unstable as an aerosol and is particularly unstable if exposed to an atmosphere of high humidity, high temperatures and direct UV sunlight. Exposure to these elements renders the agents less virulent. Smallpox is more viable and can survive as long as 24 hours in cooler temperatures and lower humidity, but it can be completely destroyed in six hours or less under unfavorable conditions (high humidity, high temperatures, direct sunlight). Anthrax spores can survive for years. [what is the purpose of this paragraph? It doesn’t seem to offer any insight into technical markers for production of the agent]

Weaponization

Technical hurdles in the weaponization process include the primary task of turning the agent into an aerosol. This requires a refined machining capability to manipulate the agent into a dry powdered form that is highly concentrated, of uniform particle size, of low electrostatic charge and treated to reduce clumping in order for the bacteria to penetrate the spaces of the deep lung.

Technological precursors also include equipment needed to deliver an aerosolized biological weapon. Such equipment includes spray booms or fogging devices that can deliver microorganisms and toxins with a particle size of less than 50 microns at a flow rate of greater than two liters per minute. [are these readily available? Are they also used for crop-dusting or insecticide or other industrial uses, like painting or powdercoating items? Where are they available, or are they commonly used in other applications?]

Medical controls are to prevent laboratory-acquired infections during the high-risk process of weaponization. For the scientists manipulating the biological agents, avoiding the risk of exposure is critical. Failure to take sufficient protective measures can eliminate the specialized knowledge base necessary for weaponizing the agents. Scientists are particularly vulnerable during the centrifugation and aerosolization process. [what is the purpose of this graph? In what way does it identify precursors or signals?]

NUCLEAR

International efforts in understanding and monitoring nuclear proliferation have actually left the world with few surprises in the last few years. Intelligence estimates raised concerns about Pakistan nearly a decade before Islamabad’s first test, as was the case with North Korea. None of the nuclear tests conducted by the newest members of the club have been truly startling. [moved]

Fissile material is the one distinguishing and ultimately limiting factor of a nuclear weapons program. It is at once the most technically difficult, time-consuming and expensive component of a nuclear device or weapon. Fissile material includes:

Weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is uranium that contains 80 percent or more of the isotope U-235.

Uranium-233 (of similar purity).

Weapons-grade plutonium (plutonium 239 with less than 6 percent of the non-fissile isotopes Pu-240 and Pu-242).

Weapons-grade HEU can be acquired, stolen, or enriched from raw ore. Open transfer is carefully monitored by the international community (a further discussion of indicators that such transfers may take place is included in the discussion of geopolitical markers below). Stealing HEU is extremely difficult, with stocks being closely monitored whether in transit or at secure sites (although monitoring measures could be improved, particularly in places like the former Soviet Union and Pakistan).

Enrichment is a path of long-term investment and focus, with many technical markers that, combined with geopolitical markers, can indicate the probability of nuclear weapons development. The secure facilities, funds and expertise necessary for such a program represent an enormous commitment of national resources for all but the most advanced

and wealthy nations, and the length of time to develop a program offers ample time for detection. The consequences of being caught by the international community are substantial, weighing on the decision-making process to pursue development.

Uranium

But because there are multiple pathways for uranium enrichment, no single definitive precursor or set of definitive precursors can be realistically identified. Furthermore, the intention to avoid international detection has driven certain actors -- Iraq, for example -- to pursue multiple pathways appropriate for the available resource base and international export controls. Potential enrichment methods include, but are by no means limited to, the following:

Thermal diffusion (only if used in conjunction with another pathway). Gaseous diffusion. Gas centrifuge. Aerodynamic separation. Chemical exchange. Electromagnetic separation. Laser isotope separation. Plasma centrifuge separation.

The challenge is one of physics -- separating U-235 from the more prevalent U-238, which are distinguishable by their slight difference in mass. It is a difficult process, and while the most common enrichment methods receive careful monitoring, more obscure and inventive solutions have been, and will continue to be, devised -- especially to work around export controls and international monitoring efforts. South Africa is a case in point. It successfully devised its own form of aerodynamic enrichment using a vortex-tube separation process that limited the process’s visibility and was appropriate to the country’s resource base. It also allowed South Africa to field six rudimentary uranium gun-type devices.

Nevertheless, no enrichment process is easily devised or quickly executed. Several processes involve the highly corrosive, toxic and heated uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), which reacts poorly to water and lubricants. Thus, in gas centrifuge enrichment, for example, centrifuges spinning at peripheral speeds in excess of 300 meters per second are connected to a hundred or more similar centrifuges in a single cascade that must remain clean, connected and sealed and maintain a vacuum. The tails [tailings? – nate?] remain highly toxic and require disposal.[is the disposal something that can be looked for and used to identify an active program?]

Plutonium

While a uranium enrichment program is a substantial investment, a plutonium-based weapons program represents a truly massive undertaking, involving the construction of a nuclear reactor, fuel-handling and storage facilities and a reprocessing plant. These

facilities require enormous investments of time, money and expertise and are simply beyond the reach of most nations. [any more here? Something about how these are the facilities easily seen? More specifics on the facilities?]

Significantly, no nuclear weapons state since France has independently constructed its first nuclear reactor. Any initial reactor built has been of foreign design and constructed abroad or has required foreign assistance in its design and fabrication.

The challenges associated with handling UF6 pale in comparison to the monumental tasks of fabricating and operating an undeclared nuclear reactor without the knowledge of the International Atomic Energy Agency, extracting spent fuel and reprocessing it to produce plutonium[wouldn’t these steps be part of operating a nuclear reactor? – nate?]. More than any specific limiting factor, it is the sheer complexity of the process and the practical, hands-on experience necessary to competently plan, design and execute the process that make [uranium enrichment? – plutonium, right? – nate?] such a daunting task.

The fabrication of the actual implosion device is similarly complex. Both the fissile core and the explosives must be crafted to a high degree of geometric precision. The simultaneous detonation of dozens of explosive lenses and the spherically symmetric compression of the core is one of the most difficult and technically challenging exercises in explosive ordnance. Sub-critical testing and careful evaluation of those tests is absolutely necessary. Full-scale testing has been done by every nuclear power fielding an implosion device with the possible exception of Israel – [I thought Israel tested off south Africa. And can pre-tests of the high explosive lenses be an indicator?].

Technology transfers[we may want to tighten this section, or at least identify from these case studies things or places to look for tech transfers]

What is perhaps most important in monitoring the path toward a nuclear weapons program is the transfer of technology and expertise, which can substantially decrease the time from program inception to completion. Sponsor-state assistance with civilian nuclear power generation has been quite common over the years, but it is direct or indirect sponsor-state assistance with military nuclear technology that has figured prominently in many successful nuclear weapons programs.

While both Israel and South Africa were involved at one point in the Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” technology-sharing initiative, it would be another nation that carried them through to full program development. Israel found the civilian assistance insufficient for its purposes and began to look elsewhere, ultimately settling on France.

In the early years of the Cold War, the United States was far outpacing the Soviet Union in almost every faucet of the nuclear arms race -- weapons, delivery systems and missile technology. Despite the fact that the first Sputnik space probe was launched on Oct. 4,

1957, the modified R-7 missile on which it rode was too expensive to field in meaningful numbers, had a long pre-launch sequence and was not accurate. Thus, Moscow was in an extremely poor strategic position vis-a-vis Washington, with its hundreds of long-range strategic bombers.

This was surely a major motivation for sharing nuclear weapons technology with China, which the Soviet Union began doing well before Sputnik. Soviet assistance went so far as to promise a sample atomic device, although such a device was probably not delivered before the two communist nations’ paths began to diverge and Soviet weapons assistance was cut in 1959. However, this direct assistance allowed the Chinese to test their first nuclear device in 1964 and their first thermonuclear weapon only 32 months later -- twice as fast as any other nation in history.

French assistance to the Israelis began militarily, following the humiliation of the 1956 Suez crisis, during which both nations received poorly veiled threats of nuclear attack from the Soviets. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet allegedly intimated afterwards that France “owed” Israel assistance with a nuclear weapon. Not only was Israel vulnerable in a hostile region with no strategic depth, but it claimed a unique right to nuclear weapons as a means of guaranteeing self-preservation following the Holocaust. Nevertheless, foreign assistance would not last long. French President Charles de Gaulle decided to end the program upon entering office in [month?] 1959, but it would not be until June 1960, only months after France’s first nuclear explosion, that de Gaulle’s will was finally implemented. By then, Israel was already well on its way to having a functioning French-built reprocessing facility at Dimona and had completed construction of its own [finished Dimona without French help].[This is confusing. We’re talking about one facility, right? We’re saying it’s French-built. Do you mean French-designed? Are we trying to say Israel was already well on its way to completing, on its own, construction of a functioning, French-designed reprocessing facility at Dimona, or that Israel was already well on its way to making, on its own, a French-built reprocessing facility in Dimona fully operational?]

Israeli assistance to South Africa and Chinese assistance to Pakistan is less well- documented, and Chinese assistance was not necessarily of a military nature. However, the now well-chronicled back-channel network of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who orchestrated the sale of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea and elsewhere, suggests the same motivation that drove Moscow and Paris to share weapons technology -- a common strategic interest.

The Khan case may be the first in which nuclear technology was shared by an individual rather than by a representative of a state. Of course, Pakistan may have approved his dealings in detail and later disavowed any knowledge of them. In any case, the world of nuclear powers and aspiring nuclear powers has become substantially less lonely since the 1960s.

One implication of the unipolar international system and U.S. dominance is that more nations have a shared interest in distracting and overloading Washington. Nuclear

proliferation has become an effective means of accomplishing this goal -- witness the way Iran and North Korea have passed U.S. ire and attention back and forth over the past few years. It has been this shared strategic interest that has motivated nuclear powers to share their ultimate weapon. The list of potential proliferators continues to grow.

Geopolitical Markers

Robust systems are in place to monitor the technological markers of WMD proliferation. There is another effective measure as well, namely the geopolitical behavior of high-risk states, which can offer clues before any technological markers become visible.  For this study, we identified al Qaeda, Cuba, Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Serbia, Syria, Uzbekistan and Venezuela as the high-risk actors/countries for WMD development over the next five to 10 years. Clearly, North Korea is already well on its way toward possessing nuclear weapons and is believed to possess chemical and biological devices. There is little that will convince North Korea to reverse its course toward nuclear weapons development now that it has already tested a preliminary device.

Iran is currently on its way toward a nuclear weapons program, following the enrichment path. Cuba and Venezuela may cooperate on the production of chemical weapons, although Venezuela is a far cry from heading down a nuclear path, limited by lack of technology and countries to assist. Moreover, any Venezuelan move toward a nuclear program would bring a swift response from the United States, given the geographic proximity of the two countries.

Syria could bolster its chemical weapons program, and could potentially pursue a nuclear capability. There also is a growing competition for influence in Central Asia by Russia, China and the United States. As this competition intensifies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which possessed nuclear weapons when part of the Soviet Union, may resume dormant programs. And Serbia, fearing ethnic isolation, may also attempt to pursue a chemical weapons program. More details of each of these cases will be addressed individually below.

Decision-making process

In the decision-making process for each of these state and non-state actors, there is a cost-benefit analysis that takes place. The pursuit of WMD has an economic, technological, social and political cost, and can lead to isolation, or even preventive military action. There must be a sense of overwhelming need to pursue a WMD program -- particularly a nuclear program -- that outweighs the risks.

Pursuing a WMD program is not a decision made lightly. There is at minimum an international ostracism that comes with new forays into WMD development, and at the extreme the development program leads to pre-emptive military action against the producer. Further, particularly with nuclear weapons, there is a very large expenditure of technology and resources, as well as substantial time necessary for the completion of a

WMD program. This requires a strong commitment to weather the international pressure and keep up the resources and attention necessary to bring a WMD program to fruition.

For state actors, then, there must be a very real sense of “need” for the weapon system to outweigh the risks and costs associated. WMD programs are pursued for the psychological impact (bargaining, changing the perception of a potential opponent), to counter another WMD system or a significant conventional threat, or for overtly offensive purposes (usually a combination of the first two). In each case there is a need for a unity of purpose in the leadership to weather the counter-effects of pursuit.

For non-state actors, pursuit of WMD capabilities is an attempt to significantly sway the balance of power and control the psychological battlefield. While there is less “risk” for a non-state actor to pursue WMD, in that it has neither state nor territory that it can lose, these same reasons make the development of true WMD systems by non-state actors nearly impossible. Rather, for non-state actors, the swiftest and most likely path to WMD capabilities comes via acquisition from a state-actor (whether bought, given or stolen).

Chemical Weapons Pursuit

In general, chemical and biological weapons programs take less time than nuclear weapons programs. Further, the use of chemical weapons does not appear to draw the same level of international reaction and condemnation as the use or even threatened use of nuclear weapons. Thus chemical weapons are systems that could be used against internal or external opponents, and even used by the aggressor in a first-strike situation. The development of chemical weapons has less of an international reaction, takes a shorter time, and requires fewer resources. Chemical weapons, then, are the “poor-man’s” WMD.

The use of chemical weapons, however, appears to largely belie their use as a WMD system. The 1995 attack against the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinryko doomsday cult is a test case for the release of a lethal nerve agent in an enclosed space – this one by a non-state actor. Members of the group punctured 11 sarin-filled plastic bags on five different subway trains, killing 12 people, injuring thousands and creating mass hysteria in Tokyo. In this case, a tech-savvy non-state actor with ample resources and time failed to bring about anywhere near the scale of a WMD attack.

The March 1988 Iraqi bombardment of Halabja with conventional and chemical weapons lasted for three nights and involved up to 14 runs per night of Iraqi bombers attacking in groups of six to eight aircraft. It is estimated that 5,000 to 7,000 people were killed outright out of Halabja’s total population of 70,000 to 80,000. While under a relatively ideal situation, where the large civilian population could not flee the attack, the sustained attack led to thousands of casualties, this was not a single device.

While not belittling their physical impact, chemical weapons are extremely difficult to deploy on a WMD scale. Their psychological impact, however, is rather great, particularly in the hands of a non-state actor, magnifying the actual death toll. While less

effective as a WMD device, and not providing a significant deterrent to potential opponents or aggressors, there are a number of reasons why a state or nonstate actor would choose to develop a chemical weapons program, rather than the more complex and costly nuclear option.

First, chemical weapons are cheaper and easier to produce than either nuclear or biological weapons, and the loss of a facility or the decision to abandon the program has less impact on the bottom line. Second, such a program could be used to mitigate the military strength of a peer state, adding a psychological element to ones one defense by making a state’s ability to inflict physical harm on its enemies appear more formidable. Further, as a force multiplier on the battlefield, while not quite a WMD-level system, chemical weapons can bolster the firepower of a state or nonstate actor.

Chemical weapons programs may also be a compromise among a state or non-state actor’s top leadership, where there is not enough cohesion or capability to pursue a more complex nuclear program. For non-state actors, chemical weapons are easier to produce and require less infrastructure, making them more desirable among the CBRN options – though most nonstate actors stick to the tried and true high explosives. Finally, chemical weapons offer a psychological element not present in conventional weapons – the idea of being asphyxiated by a chemical weapon is somehow more disconcerting than being disemboweled by conventional munitions.

For a state actor to initiate a chemical weapons program, two primary factors must be in place: The state must perceive a threat from an adversarial or peer state, or an internal dissident group. Also, the state must have the means to support a weapons development program, both in terms of finances and technology and in regards to the political will to deal with the potential political ramifications of such a program.   For a nonstate actor, autonomous development of an effective chemical weapon capable of inflicting casualties on a WMD scale is exceedingly difficult. However, compared to nuclear or biological weapons, the development of chemical weapons are much easier to conceal and complete. In particular, freedom of facility is necessary – the ability to operate in a fixed location for an extended period of time without interference, and the ability to acquire the precursors without arousing suspicion. For non-state actors, it is the additional psychological impact that is attractive in the pursuit of chemical weapons, given that even the simple deployment of conventional explosives has been shown to cause significant casualties as seen in the Madrid and London rail incidents.

Biological Weapons Pursuit

The pursuit of biological weapons is nearly as complex as that of nuclear weapons, though the infrastructure and materials necessary are significantly cheaper. Further, it is easier to conceal a biological weapons program than it is to hide a nuclear program. Like chemical weapons, biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy on the WMD scale, but gain their most currency in their psychological impact. The fear of a super-bug

has spawned numerous novels and Hollywood thrillers, but when used as a weapon, biological agents seem best suited for psychological or limited operations.

The pursuit of biological weapons, then, is primarily one of inducing fear in the potential opponent – particularly if the opponent is better armed. While chemical weapons can be deployed in a way that, mostly, targets a concentration of opponents, biological weapons by their very nature transfer between hosts with little heed to which side of the battlefield they are on. Thus the use of biological agents on the battlefield is highly unlikely. Rather, the systems, if deployed by a state actor, are more likely to target the civilian centers of production of an opponent, or the staging grounds of the military, rather than used on the battlefield.

Non-state actors have less concern for concentrations of their own supporters, and thus could target opponents and even use human vectors to deliver the biological agents (suicide infectors, as it were). However, effective deployment of biological agents on a WMD scale would require massive or widely dispersed releases of the agents. Pursuing the development of WMD-level biological programs, then, is largely beyond the reach of nonstate actors. Biological byproducts, like botulism toxin or ricin, are the exceptions, and these systems, effectively poisons rather than true biological agents, could be deployed against food supplies in a targeted attack, but massive quantities targeting simultaneous consumption would be necessary to reach WMD-scale effectiveness.

In general, biological weapons are the most dangerous to the developer and the least effective when deployed (the more lethal, the more self-limiting), unless used as an incapacitator, in which case it is not really a WMD system. Pursuit of the systems requires a strong commitment of time, resources, and often ideology, and brings minimal rewards. Perhaps even more so than nuclear weapons, the development of biological weapons systems draws the most criticism and punitive response from the international community.

Nuclear Weapons Pursuit

Nuclear weapons, since 1945, have remained out of use, though there have been several occasions where they were nearly used, and there is once again a discussion internationally about the potential limited use of nuclear weapons for specialized battlefield purposes, including their use as bunker-busters for deep CBRN facilities. The lack of use, however, has not stopped the development of nuclear weapons programs.

After the United States, Russia, France, the UK, and China quickly followed in the development of nuclear weapons. Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have all developed nuclear systems, and South Africa developed and later disabled its nuclear program. Other states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya and South Korea, have demonstrated the pursuit of nuclear weapons systems, though Iraq’s program was destroyed by Israel, Libya gave up, and South Korea was persuaded by the United States to step its development.

Nuclear weapons programs are incredibly expensive, not only fiscally, but technologically and politically. To pursue a program seriously requires a very clear reason – usually a real or perceived threat that is too large to deter conventionally, or the possession of nuclear weapons or another WMD system by a peer competitor. Due to the complexity and cost, serious pursuit of nuclear weapons is never the act of a “crazy” power – the constraints are too large not to require a continual “rational” model for pursuit (though the actor’s definition of rational may not be the same as that of the observer).

Development of a peer system is the easiest to see an understand, though the dearth of such peer development remains perhaps testament to the extreme cost and complexity of the programs, as well as the established system of international constraints. Russia developed nuclear weapons to counter a peer threat from the United States. Pakistan’s weapons were in response to Indian development. Chinese development, initially for the pursuit of influence to strengthen and preserve the regime, evolved into a semi-peer system with an eye toward Russia and the United States. British and French development were part of a Cold War peer system (though with France in particular, it was also to ensure freedom of policy direction in the face of a nuclear world).

The second path to nuclear development is regime preservation. This is the case with “small” powers – North Korea being the most obvious, but Israel’s development followed a similar motivator, given the lack of strategic depth and the geographical fact that Israel is surrounded by larger competitors. Iran’s nuclear program was initially one of regime preservation, via bargaining and to dissuade U.S. military action and provide a domestic focal point for unity and nationalism. It is evolving into a tool for national influence and power.

There are four elements that go into the decision making process to pursue nuclear weapons.

1. A sense of fundamental threat, either to the regime or to the pillars of regime support (which could include influence regionally)

2. An internal consensus that the regime should survive.3. The resources to divert to the program (fiscal, social, technological and political).4. The time to devote to the pursuit of the system.

The actual technology for nuclear weapons production, while complex, is neither new nor particularly difficult to master for a committed state actor. After all, this is more than half a century old technology, and even isolated North Korea has proven capable of development of a rudimentary nuclear device. The assistance of an existing nuclear state, or rogue elements therein, can greatly accelerate the development of a nuclear program, but it also adds a layer of political complications.

For non-state actors, the development of a nuclear program becomes an impossibility. Rather, if they pursue a nuclear weapon, it must be bought, begged or stolen. As mentioned above, many state nuclear weapons programs had or have assistance from another state, and this trend is likely to continue. Pakistan has proven a central point for

recent dissemination of nuclear technology or expertise, but Russia, China, France and at one point the United States have been the main spreaders of nuclear technology. These big powers use the spread as a way to enhance their own influence and keep other peer competitors off balance dealing with the rise of new nuclear threats.

Helping another state actor develop nuclear weapons does not bring the same international responses and ramifications as passing on nuclear devices to non-state actors. States are largely controlled by numerous internal and external forces that make the use of the systems highly unlikely (as has been seen over the past 60 years). Non-state actors, however, do not face the same constraints as state actors, and if they pursued and acquired a nuclear weapon, they would quickly use them. Thus, a state actor considers this use in its decision to spread technology or systems to non-state actors – and the state will face the consequences of the use of the device by the non-state actor.

Case Studies of High-risk Actors

In looking at each of the following high-risk cases, we consider the actor’s capability, intent, targeting criteria and operational history and principles; what could motivate the actor to pursue WMD; and the changes in the actor’s behavior that could indicate a shift in that direction.

These overall comments from Stick:

It seems to me like we spend much more time looking at that what is physically required to acquire capability than the decision-making process -- which is what we say we are analyzing. What is it that the client wants us to analyze?

We don’t define geopolitical markers very well. We spend several pages on technical markers., then we say geopolitical markers may be more useful than the technical markers at alerting us to proliferation, but then don’t really define what these markers are and what they signify. In fact, we only devote a couple of paragraphs to them. If they are indeed so significant, we need to flesh them out and explain them to the reader. What do we need to watch for?

For example, we say that “Iran is currently on its way toward a nuclear weapons program, following the enrichment path.” But we don’t provide the geopolitical markers that have been passed along that path that signify where Iran currently is with the program.

How do these markers apply to non-state actors, or to the proliferation of WMD to them?

[The geopolitical markers are discussed in depth in each of the country studies that follow.]

State and NonState Actors

IRAN

Pursuit of WMD

Iran has a proud military tradition of being the only power in the Mideast whose borders and ethno-linguistic identity have more or less stayed intact throughout the 20th Century. The country still looks at the Persian Achaemenid Empire of Cyrus the Great that began in 550 B.C. as its golden moment in history. Celebrations commemorating Cyrus the Great continue to this day, revealing the extent to which Iran is determined to reassert itself as a global player.

While Iran’s energy assets allowed the country to more or less sustain a self-sufficient economy following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, they also made the country vulnerable to foreign invasions. In line with the Islamic Revolution’s objectives, the country would no longer depend on a Western military power for its national security, and instead looked toward non-conventional means to ensure its territorial integrity through indigenous capabilities. Nuclear weapons fell squarely into this strategy as Iran outlined a path for the country to reclaim its position as the regional kingmaker.

Strategic interests drove Iran’s decision to seriously pursue a nuclear capability in the mid 1980’s But the leaders of the Islamic Revolution developed their hardened rejection to foreign intervention long before.

The discovery of oil in Iran in the early 1900s represented a major threat to Iran’s territorial integrity, culminating in the occupation of Iran in the north by the Soviets and the south by the British during WWII. (The British left with the signing of the 1943 Tehran declaration; The Soviets were largely unsuccessful in securing oil concessions and consolidating their influence in the north, leading to their withdrawal in 1946.) The occupation of Iran during this period had a profound impact on the country, as the realization set in that the country was militarily incapable of defending itself against outside powers and that its leaders had fatally squandered the country’s resources. By the end of WWII, an opening was made for the United States to become the principle foreign player in Iran and answer Iranian needs for a stronger military arsenal. Establishing a stronghold in Iran, a Shiite power that proved to be a useful counterbalance against its Sunni Arab neighbors, was key to U.S. strategy in the Mideast to secure energy assets and counter Soviet expansion in the Mideast. When Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh nationalized the country’s oil industry, the United States did not hesitate to undertake covert action to bring his government down.

The United States made arrangements for Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to secure his standing in Tehran and move forward with an agenda to establish closer relations with the West. To squash any opposition to the Shah, the CIA assisted in creating Iran’s internal

security/intelligence apparatus, the SAVAK. Most importantly, the United States supplied Iran with more than $20 billion worth of arms, ammunition, training and technical assistance/ The Iranians were receiving the most advanced and sophisticated weaponry from the US at the time. The U.S. determination to rebuild Iran into the strong power it once was reached a point to where the U.S. built Iran’s first nuclear reactor.

Eventually the marginalization of the Iranian opposition, poor economic conditions and the Shah’s unwavering alliance with the United State created a strong current of resentment, particularly among the Islamic clergy who resented the growing secularization of the country under the Shah. The United States’ plans for Iran were shattered when an Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini deposed the Shah in 1979 and set Iran on a path directly opposed to the U.S. policy. Khomeini’s revolution basically put the country back in Iranian hands with a vow to secure the country’s territorial integrity from outside powers.

At first, Khomeini rejected the Western-tainted military and nuclear reactor acquisitions of the former regime. When the Shah fell in 1979, Iran had six nuclear reactors under contract, two which were more than halfway completed. These projects came to a halt after the revolution. Iran turned its attention to reorganizing its military structure and created a new unit, the Revolutionary Guard as an ideologically-based corp to defend the interests of the revolution.

Though Iran had successfully purged the country of Western influence, it had a more immediate threat on its western flank. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein watched closely as the new Iranian regime abandoned efforts to maintain its military arsenal. He took advantage of Iran’s introspective years following the revolution and launched an air and land invasion into western Iran in Sept. 1980. Iraq’s aim was to essentially double its oil wealth with the acquisition of Iran’s western oil fields. Iran was ill-equipped and untrained to effectively stave off Iraqi forces and took a hard hit when Iraq unleashed its chemical weapons arsenal. When Iran resorted to attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian gulf, the subsequent U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s military installations dealt a serious blow to the regime’s military capability, as well as its international standing. Iran saw U.S. military support for Iraq during the war as the leading cause of its downfall in the war, which eventually ended in a stalemate in 1988.

Iran at this point became critically aware that it was a Shiite power surrounded by hostile Sunni Arab states. With U.S. assistance, Arab leaders like Saddam Hussein could be employed by Washington to reverse the Islamic revolution and threaten the clerical regime’s hold on power. Feeling politically and militarily vulnerable, Iran reactivated its nuclear program and sought out willing nuclear suppliers from Pakistan, China and North Korea. With a nuclear capability, Iran would have the means to more effectively thwart foreign intrusions and raise its status in the region. The large piece to Iran’s strategy lay in securing its western flank from Iraq, an opportunity that presented itself following the 9/11 attacks when the United States made the decision to topple the Hussein regime. Through a variety of manipulations, Iran has now positioned itself to consolidate Shiite control in Iraq.

Operational History:

When the Islamic Revolution took root, Iran had to search for new avenues to compensate for its loss of U.S. military support. There was a strong, underlying need for Iran to avoid becoming dependent on outside powers for military assistance. While Iran worked toward building up its conventional military capability, it is at this time that we see the Iranians turn toward unconventional tactics to meet its military aims:

The Basij militia – the Basij militia was a voluntary force of tens of thousands of child soldiers created during the Iran-Iraq war. Religious fervor drew these young men to volunteer in martyrdom oppositions, in which scores of these youths that were picked from the poorer ranks of society were ordered to charge the mine-filled battlefield across the Iran-Iraq border to bush back against Iraqi forces. Some were given light arms to defend themselves, but most had nothing but their Qur’ans when they went into battle. The strategy was successful in a military sense, but came at the expense of thousands of lives lost – an entire generation of Iranian men was nearly wiped out.

The Basij militia today is primarily responsible for enforcing the country’s strict Islamic code. However, these youths are on reserve for a potential military confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has raised the cost of a U.S. ground invasion from Iraq into Iran by keeping on hand nearly a million young soldiers to engage in suicide operations against invading forces. The Iranians have made it clear that the U.S. would be facing another Iraq-style insurgency if it chooses to threaten Iran by land.

Hezbollah– Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps creates created Hezbollah in the early 80’s in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Iran was able to successfully build up a militant non-state actor in the heart of the Arab world to challenge Israeli and western interference in the region. In its early days, Hezbollah was heavily engaged in suicide attacks and kidnappings. Hezbollah has now developed a strong political wing, and has demonstrated the military capability to resist a conventional Israeli offensive. While Iran’s military capability may be called into question in a conventional war against the US/Israel, it can rely on Hezbollah to get Israel to think twice before taking military action against Iran.

Badr brigade – Created by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Badr Organization was intended to serve as a conventional military force to fight against the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq war. The Badr forces formally became the military wing of SCIRI in 1983 in Tehran and are heavily reliant on the IRGC for arms, funding and training. The Badr corps were crushed in a Shiite uprising in Iraq in ’91, but were kept on reserve for the day when Saddam Hussein’s regime would fall and the Shiites could retake power from the Sunnis – provided by the US with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Badr brigades have proven to be an effective Iranian tool in Iraq – currently the most sophisticated and capable Shiite militia in Iraq. Through its control of Shiite militant actors in Iraq, the Iranian regime has made it clear that it can manipulate the security situation in the country enough to raise the cost for the US to maintain a large troop

presence in the country. Moreover, the US knows that if Israel and/or the US launched air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, U.S. forces in Iraq would take the hit from Iran’s Shiite militant assets.

Nuclear weaponization –The development of an indigenous nuclear weapons program is key to Iran’s long-term strategy to consolidate its position in the region. Iran needs the deterrent capability to ward off any threats of foreign invasion from the United States, Russia, Israel or any other foreign power that makes its way into the region. The ease in which the Iraqis invaded Iran in the early 1980’s reinforced the need for Iran to secure its western flank.

More immediately, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear weapons can be used as a bargaining chip in dealing with the United States over Iraq. Since the 2003 invasion, the Iranians have conveniently ratcheted up the nuclear threat while maintaining security guarantees from Russia and China in the UNSC whenever it wished to manipulate back-channel talks it held with the US over Iraq.

Nuclear weapons also allow Iran to assert its regional prowess and reclaim its historical position from the Arabs. By resisting Western pressure to put a cap on its program and pushing forward with its nuclear agenda, Iran wishes to earn the respect of Muslims across the Arab world. The development of Iran into a nuclear power also helps the clerical regime to maintain its hold over the country by shaping the nuclear issue into a source of national pride for Iranians.

Tehran has also adroitly maneuvered the controversy surrounding its nuclear ambitions. Iran has utilized the nuclear issue to secure gains in Iraq and vice-versa. Not only has it prevented the United States from pursuing an aggressive policy on the nuclear issue, Tehran has kept the international community divided.

Its status as an oil exporting country has allowed Iran to underwrite all these projects as well as develop itself economically and militarily. The tactics of alignment with fellow Shia, backing radical Sunni Islamists, supporting anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli agendas and befriending other anomalous entities has allowed Iran to also forge the strategic alliance with Syria. Perhaps the most rudimentary and underlying operational principle the Iranians utilize is their shrewd political acumen, which allows them to take advantage of geopolitical openings.

A key example of this is the cooperation against al-Qaeda that Tehran provided to the United States (behind the scenes) in the wake of the Sept 11 attacks. Assisting the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan created the conditions in which the two sides worked jointly to effect regime change in Iraq. Additionally, the Iranians were able to use their influence among Iraqi Shia groups and the quagmire faced by U.S. troops in the wake of the Sunni and jihadist insurgencies to their advantage. Behavioral Analysis

Iran’s core leadership has a vested interest in developing a full nuclear capability and has carefully positioned itself to achieve this objective. It is highly unlikely that Iran would capitulate on its nuclear aims unless the survival of the regime was seriously threatened. By keeping the United States militarily occupied in Iraq and Israel militarily occupied by Hezbollah, Iran is buying time to further advance its nuclear program to ensure that a nuclear Iran is accepted as part of any deal that the United States wants on Iraq. Though the pieces are falling in place for Iran to successfully complete this agenda, there are potential arresters that warrant consideration.

Israel and/or the US could decide to launch preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities to set the Iranian nuclear program back several years. Israel does not wish to be forced into a peer nuclear rivalry with the Iranians, and has a strong interest in preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons deterrent. The Iranians took careful note of Iraq’s Osirak experience and strategically dispersed its nuclear sites to decrease the chances of its programs being wiped out in a single air offensive. Israel’s options in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue are limited, given the weakened U.S. position in Iraq. Israel would much rather attack Iran in a coordinated strike with the U.S., which will be better positioned to launch tactical nuclear bunker buster strikes on Iran’s underground facilities. However, with U.S. forces exposed in Iraq and with a political resolution over Iraq still well into the distance, the United States cannot afford to take the risk of engaging Iran militarily at present.

Though Israel still has time before Iran reaches the weapons stage of its nuclear development, it has the contingency plan in place to launch these preventive strikes. The regional fallout for such action would be minimal, as the Sunni Arab states (mainly Saudi Arabia) would welcome and even privately support the crippling of Iran’s nuclear capability.

Iran is using this window of opportunity of U.S. weakness and Israeli preoccupation with Hezbollah to advance its nuclear program as much as possible. Should Iran become concerned that an Israeli strike is imminent, it could blockade the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt the world’s energy supply, which will subsequently invite U.S. air strikes on Iranian military installations – a high political and military risk for Iran to take. Iran would also activate its Shiite militant assets in Iraq against U.S. forces, in Lebanon against Israeli forces with Hezbollah and encourage Shiite uprisings in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. Iran would also rely on Hamas to launch attacks against Israel. Should Iran be able to provide sufficient security guarantees for Damascus, the Syrians could also launch attacks against Israel to force Israel to fight a multi-front war. There is also the possibility that Iran would unleash trained forces in CONUS to launch attacks and increase the costliness for the United States to engage in a military confrontation. The above would obviously be a last resort scenario for the Iranians to employ. Though Iran does have a dispersed military arsenal of conventional and non-conventional tactics, it cannot be assured it will be able to take the hit of a coordinated U.S./Israeli air campaign.

Iran will try to preempt any military action by showing its willingness to deal on Iraq. If such a crisis emerges, Iran has all the switches in places to switch gears and enter serious negotiations on Hezbollah, Hamas, its nuclear program and Iraq. In return for its cooperation, Iran would save its nuclear program from destruction. Even if the nuclear program is frozen, the Iranians would still have the means to evade regulations and sanctions to continue with its nuclear agenda.

Depending on the United States’ handling of the Iraq situation, another realistic possibility is that Iran adroitly manages to keep the US militarily constrained in Iraq and Israel’s hands tied long enough to develop a full nuclear capability.

Though unsettling for much of the international community, a nuclear Iran is unlikely to shift its operational strategy. At this point, Iran would have achieved its objective of developing a strong deterrent capability to reinforce its use of non-state actors throughout the region. Iran’s objectives of consolidating influence in Iraq will also likely be met by the time Iran develops this capability. With the cards in place, Iran will have positioned itself as the powerhouse of the Islamic world. The reality of a nuclear Iran will have already set off a nuclear arms race in the region, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the lead to develop their own nuclear programs to counter Iran. For the Sunni Arab states, they cannot be assured that Iran’s march in the region will stop at Iraq. Saudi Arabia in particular will be concerned for the safety of its oil fields and its claim to Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina. Given Israel’s lack of strategic depth, the cost would be too high for Israel to engage Iran in a nuclear confrontation at this point. Nuclear proliferation in the world’s most volatile region will undoubtedly have a major impact on world energy markets. Though Iran would have nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the deterrent utility of its nuclear program will allow the country to stick to its modus operandi of employing non-state militant actors and conventional military tactics to achieve its strategic interests.

SYRIA

Pursuit of WMD

Ever since Syria became a state entity in the wake of the Ottoman defeat in World War I, it has sought to dominate the Levant. Arab nationalism remained the basic tool of the Syrians through the periods of French domination, its independence in 1946 and the following three coup-ridden decades. But it wasn’t until the Baath Party dominated by the country’s minority Alawite sect consolidated its hold on power in 1970 that Syria had the internal focus to vary its MO.

The al-Assad clan, which is a further subset of the Alawite sect and the Baath Party, has emerged as the ruling elite in the country with Syrian President Bashar al Assad currently at the helm. As a minority Shiite government in a majority Sunni Arab country, Syria under the al Assad regime has been an anomalous power in the region. The al Assad goverment has consistently kept its distance from surrounding Arab neighbors, while

developing a warming relationship with its Shiite allies in Iran. Through its support of the Iranian-created Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Syrian regime has essentially bought insurance from the Iranians to help safeguard its national interests. Syria’s rebellious nature and willingness to support militant actors in the region make it particularly vulnerable to a military confrontation, thus raising the need for Syria to bolster its deterrent strength through the production of WMD, with chemical weapons currently falling within its realm of capability.

The country’s main objectives include preserving the Alawite-Baathist regime, maintaining its territorial integrity (securing the return of the Golan Heights from Israel, suppressing Kurdish and Sunni domestic opposition, preventing the deteriorating security situation Iraq from posing a larger security threat through Kurdish and jihadist non-state actors), consolidating influence in Lebanon for its own financial and political interests (losing control in Lebanon would financially impact Syria’s ruling elite and military generals, thus posing a threat to regime security) and finally, developing Syria into stronger and more influential player in the Middle East (Syria competes with Saudi Arabia and Egypt for influence), which involves a desire to engage the United States and pull the regime out of diplomatic isolation.

Operational History

Over the course of the last 37 years, the Syrian police state has pursued its objectives through a variety of means:

Syria has maintained a monopoly over Iran Lebanon to economically sustain the Syrian regime and national security through the use of its military and intelligence apparatus and by playing off inter-communal and intra-communal rivalries among Lebanon’s principal confessional groups (Shia, Sunni, Maronites, Druze). A preferred intimidation tactic by the Syrians is the use of car bombings in political assassinations against anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon..

Syria has developed a chemical and biological weapons programs as a deterrent to Israel’s military superiority and the nuclear arsenal of the Jewish state. Syria currently does not have the capability to develop a nuclear program, and has thus opted for the “poor man’s nuke” in developing a robust chemical weapons capability.

Syria has supported radical Palestinian groups, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Lebanon’s radical Shiite Islamist movement Hezbollah to exert pressure on Israel. Syria’s support for Hezbollah also helps to ensure that Syrian interests in Lebanon are maintained and counter Saudi attempts to edge its way into the Levant. Syria’s support for the Palestinian groups allows Syria to challenge Egyptian primacy as the leading Arab mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Syria has supported Sunni nationalist guerillas and facilitated the movement of jihadists in Iraq as a way to block any potential U.S. moves to effect regime change in Damascus.

Syria has sought a closer relationship to Iran as it is becoming increasingly clear that Iran is on the rise in the region. Iran for Syria presents a useful alternative to developing a working relationship with the West for regime security. Syria, as a police state, has brutally suppressed domestic opposition forces including

Islamist, secular, and Kurdish forces.

Behavioral analysis

Syria’s chemical weapons capability is unlikely to act as a solid deterrent against a potential incursion by a foreign adversary (most likely Israel). Syria realizes the need to bolster its WMD capability and has considerations in place to pursue the nuclear path. Syria’s decision to pursue a nuclear capability will primarily depend on Iran’s ability to successfully complete its nuclear program. There is a strong potential for Iran to share nuclear technology with the Syrians and for Syria to exploit its close military relationship with Russia to begin to develop such a capability. Should Iran succeed in securing its claim as a nuclear power, there is a strong chance that Syria could begin development of an indigenous nuclear program within an 8-10 year time frame with Iranian assistance.

But Syria faces considerably greater constraints in developing a nuclear program than Iran. Israel keeps a close eye on the Syrian regime and is better equipped to take military action against Syria given its proximity. Though Syria relies on Hezbollah to counter Israeli aggression, the group is not a sole proxy to the Syrian regime and is unlikely to face its own destruction to protect Syrian interests.

Though Syria has an interest in regaining the regional influence it once had under the late Syrian President Hafez al Assad, it will take extreme caution in pursuing a nuclear capability. The Syrian-Iranian alliance appears strong from the outset, but Syria will look after its own interests first. Iran knows it cannot completely rely on Syria to wage attacks in the event of a US/Israeli strike on Iran. At the same time, the Syrian government knows Iran is unlikely to directly defend the Syrians in event of an attack on Syria. Should Israel change its course and decide to pursue a negotiated settlement with Syria as it did with Jordan and Egypt to return the Golan Heights and seriously pursue peace talks, the Syrian government could end up distancing itself from Iran in exchange for security guarantees from the United States and Israel. In the end, the Iranians know Syria’s loyalties are flexible and that the al Assad regime cannot be genuinely trusted. It is this weakness in the relationship that the United States could potentially exploit to wean Syria away from the Iranian orbit and thus decrease the likelihood that Syria would make a decision to seriously pursue a nuclear weapons capability.

Israel is extremely distrustful of the al Assad regime and is unlikely to pursue a peace settlement unless it received solid guarantees that Syria would end its support for anti-Israeli militant assets in the region. Similarly, Syria does not trust that the Israelis will make good on their promises and thus has an interest in preserving its militant proxies. This atmosphere of distrust on both sides makes a Syrian-Israeli peace settlement unlikely in the near future. If Iran succeeds in establishing itself as a regional nuclear

power and the United States and Israel continue a policy of isolating the Syrian regime, the probability of Syria more aggressively pursuing WMD capability will rise.

A number of scenarios should be considered in determining Syria’s propensity to deploy chemical weapons:

1. Israel threatens the survival of the Syrian regime with attacks

Lacking any good opposition alternatives, Israel currently prefers to keep the al Assad regime intact. Syria is more than a nuisance for the Israelis, but is viewed as more of a manageable threat than other pressing concerns in the regions, including Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian militant groups and the weakened U.S. position in Iraq. However, should Iran manage to consolidate its gains in Iraq and become a member of the nuclear club, Israel will put its efforts into making sure Syria doesn’t become a larger WMD threat. If Israel takes military action against Syria that runs a serious risk of toppling the al Assad regime, there is a high probability that the Syrian military would employ the use of chemical weapons to counter an Israeli offensive. Syria’s defense would also be backed up with Hezbollah and Palestinian attacks against Israel.

2. Syria uses chemical weapons against Israel and/or supplies a non-state proxy with chemical weapons

Syria learned its lesson from its participation in the 1948, 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, and understands the military and political risk of directly engaging Israel militarily. This is what led to Syria’s preference in supporting proxy militant actors to counter Israel. Syria does not wish to invite an Israeli attack on its soil, and has taken great care to avoid getting directly involved in regional flare-ups. For this reason, it is unlikely that Syria would supply its non-state allies with chemical weapons to attack Israel. Israel would be forced to respond to a chemical attack by Hezbollah or a Syrian-supported Palestinian group with a direct attack on Syria.

3. Syria directly attacks U.S. forces in the region in an offensive strike

Syria uses a dual approach in dealing with Israel – while it maintains its non-state militant assets, it also keeps the window open for back-channel negotiations. Syria has used the same strategy in dealing with the United States. The arrival of U.S. forces across the Syrian-Iraqi border presented a threat and opportunity for Damascus – a threat in the sense that U.S. forces, if given the bandwidth, could use their position in Iraq to cross into Syria and threaten the regime; an opportunity in the sense that Syria could potentially bring the United States to the negotiating table once it recognized Syria as an integral player of the region with the influence to restore order in Iraq. Syria demonstrated its direct involvement in the security situation in Iraq by facilitating the movement of insurgents across the Syrian border in to Iraq. In addition to keeping the US too occupied to think about Syrian regime change, this allowed Syria to give the Americans a reason to negotiate with the al Assad government. Just as Syria is careful to avoid becoming

militarily engaged with Israel, it will take even greater precaution to avoid U.S. military action. For this reason, it is highly unlikely that Syria would directly target U.S. forces in the region or supply groups with chemical weapons to target U.S. forces in the region in the interest of preserving the regime and keeping the door open for negotiations down the road.

3. Israel and/or the US launches preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities

Though Syria has increasingly relied on Iran as its main strategic ally, it will not necessarily act on behalf of Iranian interests if the stakes are too high. Should Israel and/or the US launch an air offensive to cripple Iran’s nuclear capability, Syria will avoid inviting air strikes on its own soil and is more likely to rely on the support of its non-state allies to launch attacks on Israel. Syria and Iran may be close allies, but the Syrian regime knows Iran would be unlikely to directly act in defense of Syria if the al Assad regime were threatened. Both Syria and Iran will rely on the use of proxy groups to defend each other.

4. The al Assad regime falls

Should Syria make a serious miscalculation and the al Assad regime lose its grip over the government, the country will undergo a great deal of instability, and will likely return to its coup-ridden history. The prevention of a viable opposition force to develop in the country severely limits the ability of a new government to exert influence over the long-standing military and security establishment. Moreover, any Western-inserted Syrian leader is unlikely to earn the backing of the military and the Syrian public at large. Opening the country up to free elections runs the risk of creating a strong Islamist presence in the government, which could use less restraint in employing the country’s military assets. A deteriorating security situation caused by the fall of the regime could also allow militant Islamist elements to take root in the country. The instability that would ensue would delay any Syrian effort to develop a nuclear capability.

AL QAEDA

Pursuit of WMD

Al-Qaeda, despite the global war on terror, and because of the outcome of the U.S. move to effect regime-change in Iraq, continues to exist as the largest and most potent non-state actor. In fact, its status as a transnational militant Islamist entity has been enhanced because of its devolution where al-Qaeda the organization has spawned a wider jihadist movement. Al-Qaeda the movement is composed of branches in countries and regions, groups affiliated with the network, independent entities, and lone-wolf jihadists.

Not only is proliferation of the group made possible by a transnational ideology and material conditions, the jihadists have demonstrated an ability to quickly adopt and perfect sophisticated means of carrying out attacks. Their modus operandi of suicide

bombings has proven highly instrumental in terms of the successful delivery of improvised explosive devices. Furthermore, al-Qaeda has been highly innovative when it comes to overcoming the challenges posed by the asymmetry that exists between its own military capabilities and those of its opponent state actors.

By targeting transportation systems (airliners, buses, trains, and ships) and periodically coming up with newer methods of staging attacks, the jihadists have proven that they have an adaptive capability, and can come up with newer more creative ways of staging terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda has also focused on inflicting large number of casualties, and hence has an interest in a weapon capable of inflicting mass destruction.

In fact, there is ample evidence that al-Qaeda has invested a considerable amount of resources in acquiring WMD capability especially chemical and nuclear weapons technology. While it has yet to perfect any of these skills, the jihadist movement has also fully exploited the internet as a medium for proliferation of technology and training. This shows just how dangerous it would be for WMD technology to fall into jihadist hands. Al Qaeda is a truly independent creation, and does not face the same political constraints that other non-state actors have with state sponsors. Finally, al-Qaeda’s transnational cause and international reach makes it a singularly unique phenomenon within the universe of non-state actors. For these reasons, Stratfor believes that al-Qaeda is the one non-state actor that could potentially develop and deploy WMDs.

Al-Qaeda has already crossed certain geopolitical markers towards the development of WMD capability. First of all it is present in countries (Pakistan, Iraq, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and to a to lesser degree the United Kingdom and France, etc) with access to technology and the political, regulatory, and security circumstances are lax enough to where jihadists can potentially gain access to material, technology, and space to where they can make significant strides towards developing WMD capabilities, especially chemical weapons.

Furthermore, radical and militant Islamism has spread in certain areas to where there is a pre-existing environment in which they can make in roads through like-minded individuals with the know-how and who are working in technologically sensitive institutions. The jihadists also have access to significant amount of finances which further enables them to move ahead towards the development of WMD capability. Another antecedent that is an immensely important enabler, which al-Qaeda has had success in obtaining is linkages to security and intelligence apparatuses in a number of countries. The fact that the jihadists are even able to maintain sanctuary and operate within states like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, etc underscores a significant degree of penetration of the country’s intelligence and security agencies on the part of Islamist militants. They also have a much broader social support network, which enables their ability to operate.

National, regional, and global political environments informed by anti-Americanism, poor socio-economic conditions, dissatisfaction with current governments and/or political systems, perceptions of a U.S.-led western war against Islam and Muslims have reached critical mass, and can hence facilitate the jihadists’ quest to develop WMD capabilities.

Essentially, jihadists have access to most of the moving parts required to embark upon the development of WMD technologies. They are, however, constrained by the logic of opportunity cost and scarcity of resources, which together prevents them from undertaking a serious drive towards WMD development.

The global dragnet in the form of the U.S. and international efforts to hunt down al-Qaeda and the need of the jihadists to sustain their operational capability limits the amount of resources that they can direct be made towards developing WMD capability. Furthermore, the need for a high degree of operational security constrains the extent to which al-Qaeda can indulge in such a quest. This is true both in terms of extending its operational tentacles as well the need for secure areas to engage in developing such weapons.

There is also the question of necessity where the jihadists conclude that the acquisition of CBRN capability is critical in achieving their objectives – without them they can not realize their strategic objectives. In other words, the situation arises where CBRN capability no longer remains a luxury for al-Qaeda which if it can attain would make them better. Rather circumstances come to a point where the jihadists feel they need to have CBRN capability in order to further their aims.

Given the high costs associated with the move to acquire the technology, al-Qaeda would have to deem the endeavor as worth the risk. The jihadists will need to have reached a state where they feel that they have a lot at stake, which needs to be protected – a nascent state. Moreover, they feel that by acquiring CBRN capability not only will they be able to protect their gains but also have an ability to enhance their power and consolidate themselves, they will invest in such technologies. But this also assumes that they will have the opportunities to engage in such an undertaking.

If the jihadists feel that they are making reasonable progress towards their objectives within their current conventional weapons capability then they will not divert their resources away from their current projects and risk a decline in operations. The cost of doing so has to outweigh the benefits in that there has to be a sufficiently high level of expectation in terms of success for the jihadists to risk a drop in operations. Thus, under the current circumstances, the best that they can do is allocate small amount of resources in terms of money, personnel, and time towards the acquisition of WMD, which they can spare, with no immediate expectation of success.

Operational History

The first major behavioral shift within the jihadist movement occurred when they moved away from fighting individual Arab/Muslim states to attacking their support base, the United States and the West. This also caused them to move away from being religious nationalists operating in specific countries to becoming a transnational force seeking the creation of supranational polity.

This happened with the birth of al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Mohammed Atef sometime in the early to mid 1990s in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The result of this was attacking the United States by striking at its interests – U.S. military facilities/personnel in Saudi Arabia, diplomatic facilities in East Africa, and its naval presence in the Middle East.

In 1998, the jihadists engaged in a second shift by adopting suicide bombings as a modus operandi. This took place in the twin bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Until then, the jihadists were using standard time-detonated IEDs or remote-controlled detonations. This allowed them to more successfully and effectively engage in bombings.

Realizing that hitting U.S. interests within the Muslim world was not going to be sufficient, al-Qaeda decided to strike in the continental United States, which constituted a third shift in operational behavior of the jihadists. The botched Millennium Plot and Sept 11 attacks as well as several other failed attempts were all part of this strategy.

The fourth shift occurred when al-Qaeda lost Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training base, which resulted in the devolution of the organization into a broader movement. The apex leadership given that physical security for the organization was the priority had to concede a high degree of operational control to regional and local leaders. While this allowed the network to expand its operational reach and perhaps even increase the quantity of attacks, it led to decline in quality of operations.

Al-Qaeda underwent a fifth behavioral shift after the U.S. invasion of Iraq when an independent jihadist operator Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was able to put together the most active jihadist group Jamaat al-Tawheed wa al-Jihad, which surpassed the operational capabilities of al-Qaeda forcing the aQ prime to join forces with al-Zarqawi’s group and further risk control over what had by then become a movement. The benefit to al-Qaeda was that they now had a steady flow of activity against the United States and its allies. Iraq to a great degree has replaced its lost sanctuary in Afghanistan. It has also brought al-Qaeda back into the Arab Middle East, given that the movement for the longest time had been based in southwest Asia (Afghanistan/Pakistan).

At present, the confidence of the jihadists has gotten a major boost given that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have gone very badly for the United States. The jihadists feel that their current course of action is bearing fruit and hence do not see the need to drastically alter their current operational behavior, especially their ability to effect a shift in operational principle is constrained.

Quintessentially, al-Qaeda has shown a propensity to adhere to tactics that it has mastered and what it can manage, which has allowed the network to be a more inventive non-state actor. Training operatives to fly airliners, for example, is more manageable for al Qaeda than working toward CBRN production.

Behavioral Analysis

Certain patterns can be discerned from the shifts in the operational history of al-Qaeda, which reveal the conditions under which the jihadists have altered their behavior. One such condition has emerged when the jihadists were unable to make headway towards their objectives with an existing approach. This led them to alter their strategy.

A glaring example of this is when they moved from expending their resources solely at fighting the regimes in the states in which they were operating. The realized that they would not be able to topple the incumbent regimes without undercutting the support they get from the United States. This is why they began to direct their attacks against Washington’s interests. Before al-Qaeda came on the scene with its global jihadist campaign, jihadists were fighting in different countries such Egypt from the mid 1970s to 1997 and Algeria during the early 1990s.

A second condition in which the jihadists have altered their tactic is if they found a way to enhance their fire power at very little cost. This happened when al-Qaeda employed suicide bombers as a means of delivering IEDs. The East Africa embassy bombings and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole was made possible by the involvement of operatives willing to sacrifice for the cause. Hijacking commercial aircraft and ploughing them into buildings in the Sept 11 attacks was another example of this shift. Hitting at transportation systems also allowed them to enhance their fire power as was the case in the 2004 train attacks in Madrid and the July 2005 London attacks.

The need to fight the United States and/or its European allies directly as opposed to hitting at western interests, e.g., embassies, military facilities and assets, etc. is another condition which led to the jihadists altering their operational principal. The consequence of which led to the Sept 11 attacks, the Madrid train bombings, and the London bombings

U.S. military action in the Muslim world - Afghanistan, Iraq, and the operations in other places like Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, etc - are also a potential antecedent that contributes to al-Qaeda altering its operational principles. If U.S. forces enter a country where al-Qaeda has a pre-existing presence, this forces al-Qaeda to engage in evasive maneuvering and improvisation in the way it operates as we saw when the network lost its global headquarters in Afghanistan. In this case the jihadists go into defensive mode. But when the U.S. military action takes place in a country where al-Qaeda is not present such as Iraq, the invasion allows the jihadists to take advantage of the ensuring anarchy to setup shop in country. This gives them an opportunity to expand their operations and compensate for losses incurred elsewhere.

It is important to note that even in the latter case, the U.S. inability to stabilize a country where it had intervened to destroy jihadist infrastructure ultimately does not eliminate the jihadist ability to operate in the country. Moreover, jihadists have demonstrated a capability to exploit crisis like situations to effect risings (albeit to varying degrees of success). In fact, al-Qaeda was born in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War with the merger of radical Wahhabis from the Saudi Arabia under the leadership of Osama bin Laden with Takfeeri Egyptian Islamists led Ayman al_Zawahiri. This was made possible

because of the serious opposition in the Arabian Peninsula to the stationing of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia before and after Operation Desert Storm.

Behavioral Analysis

A drop in operations by al-Qaeda (and here we mean those planned by aQ prime – the network’s central leadership – Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al) over a long period of time – going beyond the normal operational cycle – could be an indication of a shift in behavior, possibly indicating that the group is in the middle of planning a major attack perhaps using non-conventional weapons. This of course assumes that the leadership infrastructure led by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri remains intact.

In the past, while al-Qaeda planned the 9/11 attacks it had the facilities in Afghanistan and the pre-9/11 global atmosphere at its disposal, which allowed it to stage smaller operations – U.S. military facilities in KSA (1995/96), East Africa Embassy bombings (1998), U.S.S. Cole (2000), and other botched operations, while it pressed ahead with the preparations for the Sept 11 attacks. Al-Qaeda no longer has the same bandwidth and is constrained due to the global war on terror. Therefore a prolonged period of inactivity on the part of the aQ prime in terms of an attack in the west could be an indication that the movement has shifted gears and is preparing for a new type of strike, and possibly involving a weapon of mass destruction.

From the point of view of intent, al-Qaeda is much more likely to use a WMD and/or CBRN device given that it is an independent non-state actor. Unlike other major Islamist non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas, al-Qaeda is not controlled or influenced by any state actors. Although, al-Qaeda has ties to elements of the states in which it operates (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) it is not an instrument of states pursuing their foreign policy goals. This allows al-Qaeda significant freedom of intent and capability in that it does not have to rely upon the intentions of its state sponsor.

But this does not mean that there are no constraints on aQ with regards to intent. The jihadists realize that if they resort to the use of WMD against the United States or its interests around the world, it will elicit a massive response from Washington. This is because the United States will not tolerate such an attack from a state actor let alone a non-state one and hence will go to great lengths to respond to such an attack from a non-state actor.

Not only will a U.S. response be destructive for the jihadists it will also have a devastating impact on the Arabs/Muslims in the area targeted by the United States in the retaliatory strike. Given that such a strike would be in response to a WMD attack by the jihadists, the move will hurt aQ’s position in the Muslim world for bringing death and destruction upon the Muslim world. This was part of the calculus when Osama bin Laden rejected the suggestion to target a nuclear facility in the United States in the Sept 11 operation. The argument made was that such a strike could not be contained in terms of its impact and the consequences.

What this means is that the most likely scenario in which aQ would engage in an attack involving CBRN systems would be if they could successfully justify the move as being in response to a large attack on Arab/Muslims by U.S. forces.

Of course this assumes that aQ has acquired WMD and/or CBRN capability, which is the major impediment to a WMD CBRN type strike by jihadists. This is why the likely scenario may not be a WMD but still could involve the use of chemical or radiological technology in an improvised conventional explosive device.

Iraq, given the state of anarchy and the ease of availability of materials required to fashion such a device, is the most likely area in which jihadists could acquire such a capability. Elsewhere there are too many constraints and risks attached to acquiring the technology. Furthermore, the need to conduct research, testing, storage, and training further limits the probability that a non-state actor such as the jihadists who are the focus of a global war effort could find the time and space to engage in the pursuit of chemical and radiological devices.

More importantly is the pressure to shift current tactics using conventional explosives delivered by suicide bombers to CBRN type weapons. Given the current geopolitical situations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global perception that the U.S. is loosing the war with the jihadists al-Qaeda is not in any pressure to up the ante. Moreover, it is well known that the jihadist objectives are based on very long-term strategies and are willing to exercise a considerable degree of patience with their modus operandi before they engage in a shift.

Therefore, given the lack of pressure to effect a shift in tactics because of the confidence that current strategies are bearing fruit, it is unlikely that al-Qaeda will incur a opsec risk by investing in the acquisition of CBRN specific systems.

How al-Qaeda will conduct itself over the course of the coming decade depends upon a number of factors. First, the outcome of the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan will greatly determine the overall operational capability of the jihadist movement. If negotiated settlements can be made in both countries, which will facilitate the destruction of transnational jihadist forces then, al-Qaeda would be sufficiently weakened, and not be in a position to seek CBRN capability. The same is true if their top leadership – central and regional is removed from the scene.

If, however, the situation spirals out of hand leading to a U.S./western disengagement or decline in initiative on the part of the U.S. and/or NATO forces, then this will allow the jihadists to consolidate themselves. In the event that they begin moving from being non-state actors to state ones, they will want to secure their gains and consolidate themselves.

Cognizant of how important it is for them to retain control over areas in which they operate, they will need to develop a defense mechanism, which could potentially offer them protection from U.S. attacks. They are also aware that this is not possible using conventional means. In such a scenario, it will be come crucial for the jihadists to obtain

CBRN technology in the hope that this will complicate attempts to militarily deal with them.

Acquisition

Pakistan is a state that could potentially become a source from which al-Qaeda could obtain the materials to develop a WMD, especially a nuclear one. This is because of three reasons – 1) Pakistan is the only Muslim nuclear state; 2) Top Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan ran an extensive global proliferation network, dismantled in 2004; and 3) Al-Qaeda’s global headquarters are based in northwestern Pakistan.

Considering that Pakistan is under fire for being al-Qaeda’s main sanctuary and the controversy surrounding the A.Q. Khan network, Islamabad has been under intense pressure to demonstrate that its nuclear assets and facilities are secure and will not be the source of future proliferation, especially to non-state actors such as the jihadists.

The threat that it could loose its nuclear weapons arsenal and/or program forced the Pakistanis to undertake significant measures, in order to demonstrate that the country was a responsible nuclear state and those who had been engaged in “unauthorized” proliferation had been dealt with. Moreover, it had to show that it had greatly enhanced security to prevent future such incidents where sensitive technology was being siphoned off to both state and non-state entities.

Additionally, Islamabad also faces a threat from al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies and is currently engaged seeking to roll back the radical/extremist tide. Furthermore, considering the limited degree of influence that Islamist political forces enjoy in the country and the fact that the military – an ideologically liberal institution - is the de facto state it is unlikely that the government will be the source of proliferation.

Weak control mechanisms and the presence of conservative religious elements who may sympathize with the jihadists within the country’s scientific and security communities, however, can lead to a certain level of leakage from the system. But this level of leakage will not be sufficient to result in a WMD falling into the hands of al-Qaeda. This is because of the need for elaborate facilities in which a nuclear device can be fashioned, which are very few in the country to begin with.

Beyond the apex leadership, local and regional level al-Qaeda operatives can have access to facilities and materials in their respective countries. These include both in the Arab/Muslim world such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco as well as in the West, e.g., United Kingdom, France, Spain, etc.

Because of the need for highly specialized knowledge, sophisticated facilities, and rare materials, it would be exceedingly difficult for al-Qaeda to get their hands on a nuclear or biological weapon. On the other hand a chemical weapon or a chemical-laden improvised explosive device is much more attainable for al-Qaeda. Theft of an existing weapon is a

possibility but even then issues related to circumventing security protocols, transporting the device or storing it significantly reduce it as a viable means of acquiring a WMD.

Hence, considering that al-Qaeda doesn’t have the space, time and resources to develop CBRN capability from the ground up, they are more likely to acquire devices than develop them from scratch.

Kazakhstan

Pursuit of WMD

Kazakhstan, due to a Soviet-era legacy, has an extremely high capability for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. As the USSR did not keep very good track of its assets, Kazakhstan could very well have nuclear warheads on its territory that have not been accounted for. Dangerous bacteria and chemicals, as well as toxic waste products, continue to be stored in the country, but adequate security can not be currently guaranteed for these facilities. Kazakhstan is also a large country with a relatively small population, as well as a substantial Russian minority. As such, it is vital to Russia for the defense of its periphery, and gives Moscow the opportunity to dominate Astana. Kazakhstan manages its precarious situation by remaining politically loyal to Russia while engaging in economic cooperation with Russia, China, and Western and Asian companies, particularly in its lucrative energy sector. However, the likelihood of increasing Russian influence is the top reason Kazakhstan could resort to re-activating its CBRN capabilities, particularly nuclear weapons, either at the service of Moscow or against it.

Kazakhstan has previously possessed CBRN and may still have either high-level precursors or nearly-completed CBRN devices, as well as skilled personnel and appropriate facilities, all legacy of the USSR. While the redevelopment of CBRN is hindered by Kazakhstan’s geopolitical situation (mainly, the presence of Russia and China, who would not allow such action), its existing technology and supplies would allow a quick path to nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

Kazakhstan could once again launch on the path of development of CBRN -- most of the scenarios that would prompt such a course involve Russia. For example, Russia’s unilateral aggression toward Kazakhstan, if such were to take place, could prompt CBRN weapons development. The state of Russia’s relationship with China is also going to affect Kazakhstan’s geopolitical situation. Increasing confrontation between Russia and China would place Kazakhstan into one of several possible scenarios:

a. Kazakhstan siding with Russia and possibly having CBRN, especially nuclear WMD stationed on its territory to be used at Moscow’s behest. Kazakhstan is already politically aligned with Russia, but still wants to maintain its sovereignty. However, this would be the safest way to ensure any kind of survival for the Kazakh regime, as Russia

will want to retaliate against anything it perceives as betrayal by a vital part of its periphery.

b. Siding with China and acquiring CBRN with or without Chinese help to deter Russia. This would have to be done secretively so as to prevent Russia attacking Kazakhstan in order to pre-empt any CBRN development. As an alternative, China could share its technology with Kazakhstan, but only if it is prepared to provide security guarantees.

c. Attempting to stay out of it and acquiring CBRN in order to assure neutrality. This scenario would also apply if Russia and China were to ally and try to gang up on Kazakhstan. CBRN development would have to take place in utter secret, so as to prevent a Russian pre-emptive strike.

As Kazakhstan is an important part of the Russian periphery, Moscow may attempt other techniques in bringing Astana closer into the fold. As a subsequent step in that process, Russia may eventually station CBRN on Kazakh territory in order to extend its influence, whether or not Moscow is engaged in a conflict that would necessitate such a step.

An alternative scenario would ensue if Kazakhstan were to split into a northern, ethnic-Russian populated portion, and the Turkic south. The large country is sparsely populated and has a relatively clear ethnic divide, bringing the possibility of a split if a weaker, less centralized leadership emerges. In this case, Russia would subsume the northern portion and rule it as part of its territory, possibly stationing CBRN there. If the southern part comes under the control of China and tense relations continue between the two giant neighbors, either side could station CBRN in the now-former Kazakhstan as deterrent.

Increasing nationalism, either in its secular or religious varieties, could cause Kazakhstan to attempt to thwart foreign, especially Russian influence and acquire CBRN as a deterrent to the likely challenge from Russia. Revenues from the energy sector and other sources could fuel a notion of self-reliance in Kazakhstan, and the centralized nature of the leadership could turn that into a nationalist slogan.

Kazakhstan’s historic rivalry for regional leadership with neighboring Uzbekistan could turn into an arms race, if either country chooses to develop CBRN. Russia and China are the most influential factors on whether the two Central Asian neighbors do engage in an arms race; it is possible that Russia and Kazakhstan will together side against Uzbekistan and China. However, the larger powers are the driving factors in such a conflict.

Kazakhstan is currently shifting away from CBRN development, as in its current geopolitical position, it benefits from disassembling its CBRN capabilities and production facilities. In that context, Astana has a positive relationship the Western powers, and appears less threatening to Russia and China while on its current course of disarmament. Additionally, security guarantees from multiple partners and economic ties with them help assure the leadership to continue on its current course.

Operational history:

In its 15 years of independence, Kazakhstan has never entered into interstate conflict, nor used CBRN. Kazakhstan’s modus operandi is to balance its interests and seek to accommodate as many significant regional players as possible. Astana remains politically loyal to Moscow and the two have an extensive economic, trade and business relationship. At the same time, Kazakhstan has significant relations with China, Europe, the United States, Middle Eastern and other Asian countries, particularly in the energy sector. Astana has used energy to ensure not only the financing of its regime, but also the indispensability of Kazakhstan to its partners. Although Kazakhstan can be considered the regional leader in many regards, particularly banking, the state has not been belligerent in imposing its primacy in Central Asia.

Behavioral Analysis:

Much of Kazakhstan’s movement toward or away from development of CBRN will be influenced by the activities of its larger neighbors, Russia and China. If Kazakhstan succumbs to Russian influence, Moscow may take the step in stationing CBRN, particularly nuclear weapons, on its territory. As Russia moves to gain influence in Central Asian states such as Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan may succumb to Russian pressure. Breaking ties with Asian or Western partners could be indicative of increasing Russian influence.

There are also several internal indicators of Kazakhstan moving toward CBRN reactivation. Kazakhstan stopping cooperation with disarmament organizations or restricting their access to CBRN production and storage facilities is an ominous sign. Change of regime is also something to be watched: A belligerent stance toward China, Russia or the West may indicate future CBRN redevelopment. Any change in how the regime balances its relations with its partners is indicative of a more fundamental shift of the geopolitical position, since the balance is very delicate.

Kazakhstan leaning toward a more nationalistic course may be indicated by spurning international partnerships, nationalizing energy or other economic assets, assertiveness toward Russia in Central Asian affairs or imposing more direct control over the large sparsely-populated country. A more nationalist Kazakhstan may choose CBRN redevelopment in order to secure its sovereignty in light of Russia’s regional ambitions.

Expansion if the civilian nuclear program could indicate a possible resumption of a nuclear weapons program. Likewise, increased activity at chemical or biological research facilities, such as an uptick in import of precursors, would also be cause for concern.

Uzbekistan

Pursuit of WMD

Uzbekistan has rather extensive CBRN facilities left over from the Soviet era, as well as some skilled individuals and relatively advanced facilities. While it is not as likely to have remaining nuclear missiles as neighboring Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan did have advanced chemical and biological facilities installed by the USSR, and it retains a significant amount of highly-enriched uranium as well as a nuclear research reactor. The country is under the authoritarian regime of President Islam Karimov, suffers to some degree from an Islamist insurgency, and security can not be adequately guaranteed for any storage or production facilities. Given the paranoid nature of Karimov, the transition from him to the next regime may be nasty, as he is prone to eliminate any possible successor who would challenge his power in the meantime. Uzbekistan also harbors ambitions to be Central Asia’s regional leader, as it is the most populous country and the only one that borders the other four. However, its financial or political situation does not currently allow for progress in this regard.

Uzbekistan has already possessed CBRN under the Soviet Union, mostly chemical and biological weapons, but also highly-enriched uranium and nuclear facilities. Skilled personnel and adequate facilities remain in the country as it slowly proceeds with dismantlement. Although the redevelopment of CBRN hindered by Uzbekistan’s geopolitical situation (mainly, the presence of Russia and China, who would not allow such action), its existing technology and supplies would allow a quick path to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

If Uzbekistan were to set off down a path to CBRN redevelopment, it would likely be prompted to do so either by external factors, such as the large regional players, or by changes in the existing regime.

Russia’s increased presence in the region and challenge to Uzbekistan’s regime could prompt redevelopment of CBRN as deterrent designed to protect the country’s sovereignty. Alternatively, Uzbekistan could succumb to Russia and the victor could station CBRN, nuclear weapons in particular, on Uzbek territory. These scenarios become more likely if Russia subsumes other Central Asian states.

Uzbekistan could also deepen its relationship with (and thereby dependence on) Russia if the internal stability of the country deteriorates. Whether because of economic downturn or militant activity, Uzbekistan may very well become weak enough to require Russian involvement, and Moscow would happily step in, possibly leading to Russian CBRN being stationed on Uzbek territory.

Uzbekistan would also feel insecure if neighboring Kazakhstan expands its ties with China, particularly if Sino-Russian relations come to tense. If Uzbekistan comes to

Russia for help and protection, acquiring CBRN under Russian tutelage or being supplied the systems by the Russians may be the next step in such a situation.

Uzbekistan’s increased ambitions for regional leadership could lead to challenging Kazakhstan, possibly with the development of CBRN. If Kazakhstan were to develop CBRN, Uzbekistan could engage it in an arms race.

Uzbekistan also has tense relations with neighboring Tajikistan. If Dushanbe develops a closer relationship with Tehran, up to and including acquiring Iran as a patron and getting in on its nuclear program, Uzbekistan may either acquire CBRN (possibly with Russia’s support) in order to stave off its neighbor. Alternatively, Russia may do the same with Tajikistan, likewise heightening Uzbek concerns over its southern border.

Given Uzbekistan’s history of changing partners whenever it suits its purposes, a change in alliances is also possible. A scenario where Tashkent attempts to spurn Russian influence may be accompanied by the redevelopment of CBRN as a deterrent to Russian retaliation. However, the survival of the CBRN program and possibly the entire regime would have to be guaranteed by Uzbekistan’s new patron.

As Uzbekistan’s current regime is unlikely to give up power voluntarily, a coup, a palace coup or a complete deterioration of control followed by a militant takeover are all possible. The installation of an Islamist or militant regime may bring the intent to reacquire CBRN, but Russia is not likely to allow such a development on its periphery -- quick and decisive action will be taken against the upstarts.

Uzbekistan’s current policy is to cooperate with Western agencies on disarmament. Continuation of that strategy is in itself a shift away from proliferation. Security guarantees may also lead to continued disarmament, but those guarantees would have to be significant, given Uzbekistan’s propensity to change partners.

Operational history:

Uzbekistan has not entered into international armed conflict since independence in 1991. Vacillation between partners and shopping for the best deal are all methods of the current Uzbek regime. Whereas siding with the United States during its Afghan campaign was advantageous, abandoning its Western partner for Russia was preferable after the crackdown in Andijan. Uzbekistan’s regime is also notorious for its repression of domestic dissent and persecution of non-state-sanctioned practice of Islam, labeling many religious people as terrorists in order to prosecute them.

Given President Karimov’s policy to remove competitors, the regime is inherently unstable. Should something happen to Karimov, there is a chance that chaos in competition for power will ensue. However, the country’s security apparatus is in itself a powerful entity and may come to take over.

Behavioral Analysis:Uzbekistan’s movement toward or away from development of CBRN would be influenced mostly by the actions of regional players, such as Russia, China and Kazakhstan, but also somewhat by the behavior of its regime.

While increasing conflict between Russia and China would first affect Kazakhstan, it would soon come to affect the dynamics of the entire region. Uzbekistan would be in a position to take sides and possibly to develop CBRN or have weapons systems stationed on its territory. Alternatively, Uzbekistan may want to develop CBRN to protect its sovereignty from Russia or China. Uzbekistan would be especially likely to do this if Kazakhstan falls to either adversary.

Russia’s increasing presence in Uzbekistan’s neighbors Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan is also something that would cause Tashkent to be concerned for its sovereignty. If Moscow tries to rule Central Asia with a heavy hand, Uzbekistan may turn to CBRN as a deterrent. However, one caveat to this development is that if Uzbekistan does not manage complete secrecy in this project, Russia will strike preemptively to destroy any such weapons.

If Uzbekistan acquires a non-Russian ally that could give it security guarantees (maybe China or the United States, if it deems involvement strategically salient), Tashkent could turn away from Moscow. Subsequently, if the security guarantees may prove unreliable, Uzbekistan could return to CBRN as deterrent against attack by the angered Russia.

If Uzbekistan’s regime becomes increasingly unable to control an escalating Islamist insurgency, the regime and the country may become destabilized. That could lead to a decision to restore CBRN in order to show strength. Alternatively, a sudden change in regime, as in a coup or Karimov’s death, may mean a sudden change in policy, possibly seeking to challenge regional leaders such as Russia and China.

Russia

History of sharing technology:

Russia has been officially documented as exporting or planning to export nuclear reactors and fuel, equipment used in production and testing of ballistic missiles, as well as dual-use technology and materials to Iran, China, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Egypt, and India. It is also possible that Russia has or is still cooperating with North Korea, Iraq, Cuba, Libya, and Syria in nuclear technology. Russia also has inadequate security mechanisms and protocols, enabling theft and smuggling of nuclear technology and supplies.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has made an effort to return all of its nuclear technology from its republics. However, the USSR was very secretive and did not keep coherent records of what was stored where -- undocumented caches of nuclear missiles and other materiel have since been discovered. Moreover, skilled individuals are also “unsecured” -- after the fall of the USSR, Soviet nuclear scientists frequently found themselves without a salary or a job, and very much desired for employment by other countries.

Russia may increase sharing of its weapons technology if it either wanted to instigate or perpetuate a proxy conflict (as with its Cold War ideology) or to support a regime that opposes its adversary, in this case the United States and NATO. This is likely the case with Russia’s support to Iran’s nuclear program. If it suits Russia’s interest, it would support the programs of other U.S. opponents, such as Syria, even if there is a chance that those countries could later turn against Russia.

Currently, Russia continues to share and sell nuclear technology, ostensibly for civilian or defensive purposes. It serves both financial and geopolitical purposes, the latter designed to infringe on its adversary’s interests. The research, knowledge base and reactor construction components for a civilian or a weapons program appear much the same in the early stage of the process, and allow Russia a legitimate-looking front for its activities.

Russia could choose to re-station CBRN, most likely nuclear weapons, in the former Soviet republics, as it seeks to gain increasing control over lost Soviet Union territory. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and other republics could all regain their arsenals as Russia gains increasing influence in those countries.

Russia may also clandestinely transfer weapons and technology to its own adversary, in order to precipitate a Russian attack on them. For example, Russian secret services could, perhaps through an intermediary, provide a low-yield nuclear device to the Chechen insurgents, in order to justify another campaign to destroy the rebels.

Behavioral Markers:

Russia feels threatened by NATO encroachment, especially on its Western flank. Russia’s moves to increase its presence in Ukraine and Belarus would be indicative of a behavioral shift. For example, Russia has recently returned to upgrading Russian missile detection system radars stationed in Sevastopol and Mukacheve, Ukraine -- any significant upgrades to clearly offensive systems would be indicative of such a shift.

Increasing tensions between Russia and China could signal an escalation that could lead to CBRN proliferation in the regional states as well as a heightened state of alert for the two adversaries.

Central Asian states, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are highly capable of developing their own CBRN programs. If proliferation in that region is imminent or present, Russia would seek to escalate its own state of readiness, as well as watch more carefully what China is doing and gauge its response on that. Russia is highly likely to destroy any unsanctioned CBRN program, including by use of its own nuclear WMD.

If China seeks to expand its influence in Central Asia, Russia would also likely take steps to show strength and prevent Chinese expansion. Russia may share CBRN technology with Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, or possibly Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan (depending on their political situation at that time) in order to offset China.

Russia and Japan are still technically at war, having never signed a peace treaty. As Japan may move toward acquiring nuclear capability, Russia may restore and increase its own abilities in the Pacific region. Currently, there are significant radar deficiencies in the Russian Far East, and if Japan was to demonstrate progress toward arming, Russia would be posturing as well, likely by emphasizing upgrading those systems.

Iranian actions could cause a change in Russia’s behavior. There are several possibilities: Competition over influence in Central Asia, once Iran settles its Iraq border and wishes to divert resources north; disagreement over Russian actions relating to Bushehr nuclear reactor -- if Russia is seen as sabotaging progress; competition over Caspian energy resources and possible conflict over territorial issues.

There is a possibility that a conflict would emerge in the Caucasus, where Turkey supports Azerbaijan and Russia supports Armenia. As the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan may escalate, the two patrons may take sides, even if indirectly. However, Turkey is a member of NATO, and its actions would be constrained by the organization, and the United States would likely have to become involved as well.

Changes in Russia’s political landscape may also be indicative of a change in CBRN policy. If the national-security oriented siloviki gain control over the Kremlin, defense strategy, offense posture and weapon sharing policy would change, increasing the possibility of proliferation.

The Russian military is in a state of upgrading its weapons and equipment, and emphasis is already on the strategic systems. Any decrease in funding or redirection of funding to

other systems could indicate Russia shifting focus away from nuclear systems. However, it is strategically salient for Russia to upgrade the systems, and the Kremlin is unlikely to shift priority away from those programs.

Cuba

Pursuit of WMD

Cuba’s history of chemical weapon development indicates that Cuba could be driven to further pursue the development and/or proliferation of chemical weaponry. Cuba is a strongly militaristic society that exists in relative isolation and secrecy. Highly defensive, scientifically capable, and strategically located, Cuba has the potential of producing, proliferating, and stockpiling chemical weapons. Cuba’s long running ties to Russia and China have afforded the island opportunities to cooperate with these global players in the development of various chemical weapons. In addition to alliances with Russia and China, Cuba’s growing relationship with Iran could indicate future cooperation on many fronts – including the proliferation of chemical or biological weapons. Its experience, isolation, and scientific capacity make Cuba an ideal location for the development of chemical or biological weapons.

Cuba has produced chemical and biological weapons in the past, both independently and through alleged collaboration with Russia, China, and Vietnam. Cuba’s Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology is outfitted with high-grade equipment and highly trained scientists. Cuba is capable of producing pathogens and culture media and has sold culture media to various countries. Past production and scientific capacity indicates that Cuba is more than likely capable of proliferation in a rather short time.

Cuba maintains close scientific ties with China and has supplied Iran, China, India, Algeria, Brazil and Venezuela with biotechnology products. Iran has collaborated with Cuba to establish a biotechnology center in Tehran and there are unconfirmed reports that Cuban scientists presently work at the Iranian establishment. Should any one of Cuba’s biotechnology partners, such as Venezuela, Iran or China, feel the need to apply some pressure on the United States, Cuba could be prompted to expand its biotechnology and chemical capabilities.

Cuba’s capabilities, combined with its highly defensive nature, could prompt the island toward proliferation. Cuba maintains an adversarial relationship with the United States. Aggression or perceived aggression from the United States could prompt Cuba to proliferate chemical or biological weapons as a defensive maneuver in preparation for an invasion. In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s illness and surgery, Cuba held large military demonstrations and released statements saying Cuba was ready to face invasions – intimating that the United States was planning to pounce on Cuba while Castro recovered. If Cuba were to perceive an immediate threat from the United States, it could be pushed toward proliferation.

Operational HistoryThough Cuba has not recently engaged in any armed conflict, the island does possess a well-equipped, highly organized military. In terms of conventional weapons, Cuba’s capabilities are significant, as Fidel Castro has prioritized militarization and has well-funded the army. Cuba relies on strategic alliances to maintain its borders. No longer funding other regional revolutions, Cuba now serves as in ideological model for leftist movements throughout the region. Cuba has excelled in guerrilla warfare tactics.

Though leader Fidel Castro denies the existence of any WMD programs in Cuba, Cuba’s history of chemical and biological weapon development is well known. The island’s geographic position makes it relatively vulnerable to attack. Because of the difficulties of defending an island, Cuba

has relied on guerrilla warfare and, according to some indications, the development of chemical and biological weapons.

There are unconfirmed reports of Cuba allegedly deploying a chemical weapon, though these accusations appear to be unfounded. Cuba is believed to have numerous chemical weapons, including tabun, sarin, soman, yellow rain, novichok, phosgene oxime, arsine trihydride, and hydrogen cyanide. It is not known whether any of these chemical weapons are stockpiled on the island but it is likely that Cuba is presently capable of producing them. Cuba has many chemical plants, with most are located in and around Havana.

Though Cuba’s relations with the United States are contentious, development of chemical or biological weapons for usage against US interests is unlikely. Warming US-Cuban relations – needed by Cuba to redeem its failing economic situation – would be severely impacted; as long as the threat from the United States remains low, Cuba will likely avoid proliferation with the US or its interests as a target.

What is far more plausible is that any development of chemical or biological weapons in Cuba will be driven by outside powers. China, Russia, Iran, Algeria and Venezuela already have close ties and biotechnological partnerships with Cuba and could prompt proliferation via cooperative projects.

Behavioral Markers Various behavior shifts could indicate a step toward proliferation in Cuba. Any increased hostility between Cuba and the United States could indicate a change in Cuba’s chemical or biological weapons programs. At present, both sides seem to be warming to each other; acting leader Raul Castro has engaged the United States to a degree and seems more willing than his brother, ailing President Fidel Castro, to mend US-Cuban ties. A significant deterioration or any marked hostility between the US and Cuba could lead to proliferation in Cuba.

Changes in Cuba’s international relationships are also indicators of Cuba’s chemical and biological weapons status. Particularly in the case of Iran and Venezuela, any significant increases in commerce, bilateral accords, or technology transfer are indicators that Cuba could be proliferating or developing its chemical and/or biological programs.

In addition to US relations, domestic shifts in Cuba could indicate a shift toward proliferation. The Cuban people are strongly nationalistic and the island is highly militarized; any uptick in nationalism and/or militarization in Cuba, particularly after the death of Fidel Castro, could signify a move toward proliferation. Such proliferation could be used to boost nationalism and motivate the army.

In sum, Cuba may seek to increase its chemical or biological weapon capabilities to bolster domestic support, as a defense against increased hostilities in Cuban-US relations or perceived threats from the US, or in collaboration with other nations, particularly those at odds with the United States.

Venezuela Pursuit

Venezuela seeks regime security; regardless of President Hugo Chavez’s bold behavior, the regime is highly insecure. Emboldened by his December 2006 reelection, Chavez seeks to preserve his leadership at all costs. He has announced intentions of pushing a constitutional change that will abolish term limits – effectively paving the way for him to be president for life.

Venezuela, of late, has turned its eyes toward improving military and defense capabilities. At present, the nation has made significant purchases from Russia, including light arms, military planes and supplies. Venezuela has also attempted to purchase military planes from Spain; however, that purchase was blocked by the United States.

While Venezuela’s focus is currently directed at conventional weapons, regime insecurity and impending tensions with neighbors could push Venezuela toward the pursuit of chemical weapons as its next line of defense.

At present, Venezuela has no capabilities for the production or proliferation of WMD. There have been allegations that Venezuela has purchased chemical weapons from Spain. While these reports have been proven to be partly erroneous – Spain did sell defense materials to Venezuela, but the only chemical involved was chlorobenzylidene malonitrile which is used to produce tear gas – it is not implausible that Venezuela would seek to acquire chemical weapons via its relations with other nations with chemical weapon capabilities.

An alliance with Cuba and the Castro brothers – Chavez’s ideological role models – could provide a venue for Venezuela’s foray into the world of chemical weapons. Cuba’s experience with chemical weapons could lead to cooperation between the island and Venezuela.

Venezuela’s increasingly tense relations with Colombia could also push Chavez to acquire or proliferate chemical weapons. US-backed Colombia has long running tensions with Venezuela, which has refused to recognize the leftist guerrilla group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as a terrorist group and has even overtly aided FARC, much to Colombia’s discontent. Colombia is also engaged in a diplomatic row with Ecuador, an ally of Venezuela, which could lead Chavez to a show of strength against Colombia.

Chavez’s attempt to assert leadership is the most likely motivator for chemical weapon proliferation. Diplomacy, world tours, and an attempt to secure a seat on the United Nations Security Council have all failed to establish Venezuela as a world, much less regional, leader. In turn, Chavez could resort to the chemical weapons as a display of force and national security.

Operational HistoryVenezuela has little experience in launching attacks of any kind and has not recently engaged in any armed conflicts. Its military is well equipped, though not as powerful or well-armed as other regional armies. Regardless of the military’s power, Venezuela remains ultimately a defense based system with a strongly conventional background. Recent acquisitions from Russia have better equipped the armed forces; however there is no indication that Venezuela possesses any capabilities past conventional arms.

Chavez uses civilian militias to preserve domestic calm. These militias, well funded by the government, largely provide domestic protection. Venezuela’s primary state interest is oil and Chavez protects Venezuela’s lifeblood through nationalizations, project sharing agreements with foreign firms, and sky-high taxes and fees applied to international companies involved in oil projects. Chavez also uses oil to buy allegiance, as his July 2006 world tour illustrates.

Venezuela has been accused of acquiring chemical weapons from Spain. While the purchase was only for a tear gas chemical component, it does indicate that Venezuela has the potential of purchasing chemical weapons. Venezuela’s relationship with Cuba could be a source for chemical weapon acquisition. It should be noted that Venezuela currently lacks the facilities to store chemical weapons or the labs to develop them internally.

Though Venezuela’s relations with the United States are contentious, Chavez’s anti-US rhetoric is just that; it lacks any real significance as Venezuela relies heavily on the United States for oil export. Any acquisition or proliferation of chemical weapons by Venezuela would be met with a

strong response from the United States. Regardless of Venezuela’s potential acquisitions, it should be noted that any weapons would be for defense, not first strike, purposes. Venezuela lacks first strike experience and would be ill-equipped to deal with the resulting response from the US if it were to develop or deploy chemical weapons.

Behavioral Markers

Much of Venezuela’s behavior toward chemical weapon acquisition will be strongly tied to its regime stability. If the regime maintains a more stable status, it is unlikely that Chavez would turn to the unpopular and heavily loaded choice of chemical weapon proliferation. If the regime weakens significantly, however, Chavez may feel forced to take action to assert his authority and strength. Chemical weapon acquisition would reinforce his position, but the costs of proliferation – namely a major US backlash – would make this choice rather farfetched.

Venezuela’s main vulnerability is its dependence on oil revenues for regime sustainability. Once the price of crude oil falls below $50 a barrel, Chavez will have to begin making cuts to his budget, which becomes particularly threatening if he can no longer afford to support his paramilitary units, the Chavistas, who could turn their back on him. An issue to pay particularly close attention to is Saudi Arabia’s plans to massivevly expand its production and refining capacity over the next five years.  The country that will suffer the most from the Saudi expansion will be Venezuela, a country alone among the major oil producers that has chosen to limit its ability to produce more crude. Under Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Venezuelan oil output has slid from about 3.7 million bpd to 2.4 million bpd, with future reductions in the cards, largely due to mismanagement, underinvestment and loss of technical capacity. Add in a Chavzien tendency to spend any income the moment it comes in the door and any price drop -- and the Saudi plan will undoubtedly lower prices -- could spell doom for the Chavez government.

The crisis that Chavez will end up facing in battling falling oil prices will likely do more good than harm in terms of Venezuela’s propensity to develop a chemical weapons program, however. The Chavez regime will likely be too preoccupied in stemming domestic opposition when the impact from the drop in revenues spreads throughout the country. Unlike a nuclear program, the development of a chemical weapons program will not be as effective in stirring up nationalist sentiment to preserve the regime. While Venezuela’s conventional arms buildup seems to indicate that the country’s goal is to better its armed forces and defense capabilities through traditional means, it is not entirely implausible that Venezuela would seek chemical weapon capabilities. Cuba would be an ideal collaborator, as it already possesses chemical weaponry and could share said technology with Venezuela.

In sum, Chavez’s insecurity would be the primary factor that could push Venezuela toward proliferation. Its alliance with Cuba offers an opportunity to do so, but Chavez’s strength – or lack thereof – is the determining rationale.

North Korea

State objectives: Regime survival. North Korea will do whatever it takes to preserve the regime, indiscriminate of where aid comes from or whether lack of aid results in the starvation of its own people. Second regime goal is strengthening of state, primarily internally, to allow for regime and nation survival. Third goal is reunification, preferably peacefully, under DPRK system.

State alliances: China is currently North Korea’s largest ally, and the perception of being able to influence North Korea gives China greater leverage in the global community. Russia also maintains relations with North Korea, and somewhat competes with China for influence and the global leverage that would result. It also has alliances with other states in the non-aligned movement, namely Iran. South Korea wants to see a peaceful state and hopes for eventual unification; therefore it frequently runs interference for the DPRK within the international community and against strict sanctions imposed from the U.S. and Japan. State targets:

UNITED STATES – The North Korean Taepodong 2 missile supposedly has the capability to reach the mainland United States, but North Korea’s test of the missile in July 2006 resulted in an unimpressive landing in the Sea of Japan after suspected staging problems. In theory, though, the United States is within reach and could be attacked, though this is unlikely because it would result in the North Korean regime being destroyed. North Korea has yet to demonstrate the ability to miniaturize and ruggedize a nuclear warhead. Miniaturization and ruggedization are necessary in order for a successful ICBM attack. North Korea does not have the capability to attack the U.S. on its own soil with WMD, but could target U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan. They could also target U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan with conventional weapons. Furthermore, the U.S. flies reconnaissance missions over and near North Korea, which could be targeted. They would do this if the regime felt threatened by an imminent attack or if they were put on the defensive, otherwise, they prefer posturing to obtain their goal of regime survival.

SOUTH KOREA – North Korea uses the possibility of leveling Seoul as a deterrent for

action taken against it by the international community. An attack could happen despite

both countries being Korean and ambitions for reunification. DPRK wants reunification,

but the survival of the DPRK elite is their aim in reunification, and if the regime was

threatened, it might attack. It views a unified Korea under leadership from the South as a

threat. They still have naval clashes and small incident along the DMZ with South

Korea.

JAPAN – North Korea could attack Japan if tensions escalated rapidly. There is a long-standing Korean concern with Japanese actions, past and future. U.S. forces in Japan are also a major target. North Korea would attack Japan preemptively or in defense. However, an offensive attack is unlikely because they know that Japan and the U.S. would react with the goal of the destroying the regime. However there are frequent chances for small-scale conflicts, as Japan steps up its participation in Proliferation Security Iniative, which would allow Japan to search planes an ships that are suspect of carrying illegal weapons or missile technologies. There have also been naval skirmishes in the past.

CHINA – North Korea could become actively aggressive toward China if Beijing’s distrust turned into destabilizing manipulation or military action to preserve its interests in North Korea. China has plans to invade North Korea if it chooses to do so. This would only be a preemptive attack in the case of an immediate threat or defensive attack.

Operational History: North Korea has never used WMD in combat, although it has been suggested that they have tested biological weapons on their island territories. Prior to the Korean War they relied on guerrilla forces to infiltrate the south with security guarantees from Russia and China, the outbreak of war came as the north led a full-frontal invasion on the south. After the war, North Korea had the security guarantees of Russia and China’s nuclear umbrella and undertook destabilizing infiltrations of the south, including assassination attempts on leaders. Near the end of the Cold War they changed survival tactics, and started their nuclear program as a deterrent. Their primary mode of operation is to play on international fears. It is mainly posturing to ensure regime survival and the eventual unification with the south under DPRK rule. They often antagonize the south by firing into the DMZ or putting more troops on their side of the fences. There have also been some skirmishes in the disputed territorial waters between the south and the north. Their military build-up is meant to be used as a deterrent, but they would be used in a preemptive attack. Finally, they use what Stratfor calls the Crazy Fearsome Cripple Gambit—They present an image of instability and unreliability to sow doubt among U.S., South Korean and Japanese policymakers. Then they raise the specter of developing and deploying nuclear weapons. Finally, they simultaneously project an image of weakness, on the verge of collapse, a collapse that would have dire consequences for its neighbors. This strategy is meant to get its neighbors and the U.S. to continue to support North Korea for fear of a collapse, without threatening Pyongyang with a military attack.

Potential Usage of WMD: North Korea would attempt to use nuclear weapons in an open conflict, however they have not weaponized their nuclear devices, making effective deployment difficult, but not impossible (they could put a device in a truck or ship and explode it). They would use chemical or biological weapons on domestic factions that

threaten to destabilize the regime and could also use such weapons against South Korea, Japan or U.S. military targets in both countries. Such an overture however would threaten their regime survival and increase the likelihood that other states would attack North Korea. This is not in Pyongyang’s interests. Therefore, the most likely use of CBRN would be nuclear devices, and only in a defensive posture. However, they could use chemical and biological weapons on their own soil defensively to defend the regime and make the DPRK unusable—denying the enemy the space to maneuver, and allowing them to revert to guerilla tactics.

North Korea does not have the ability to use biological weapons on a large scale, and lacks the technology for deployment and storage. They have produced chemical weapons and could potentially do a potent chemical attack—they have both the agents and the delivery capability. Again, such an attack would only be defensive. They are most interested in preserving their regime and being able to flaunt nuclear weapons is part of their strategy. Actually attacking a country, outside of a few minor conventional skirmishes, is not their objective. However, if they did feel like they were going to be attacked, they would react. Chemical weapons would not be their first weapon of choice, but they may resort to some chemical weapons attacks in Seoul or U.S. military bases in South Korea.

Finally, North Korea is unlikely to sell its nuclear weapons. They are primarily used for defensive or deterrent purposes and as a bargaining chip. If they start to sell weapons, this would increase the likelihood that they would be attacked, defeating their purpose.

Serbia

Unlike most of the other countries that we will be examining for P4, Serbia’s policy changes are imminent. As such there are few things that can at this point be inserted into the regional dynamic which could change Serb actions one way or another. Events will begin quickly -- parliamentary elections are on Jan. 21 -- and should the Serbian Radical Party win they will come to power by Feb. 21 at the latest.

At present it is impossible to predict the results of the Serb elections. The Radicals are the single most popular party among likely voters, although that support level is only at about 30 percent. Yet because parties must gain 5 percent of the popular vote to gain representation in the parliament, currently there are even odds that the Radicals will gain majority control (or a coalition with a tiny party that can push them over the majority threshold).

Assuming for the moment that the Radicals do not control the next government, Serbia is extremely unlikely to follow a WMD/CBRN path. The leading pro-Western parties -- the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia -- have worked together before with additional parties and would actually be more likely to form a stable coalition (by Balkan standards) in 2007 than they were in 2003. The main goals of such a pro-Western government would be eventual membership in both the European Union and

NATO. The prime stability question in this circumstance would not emanate from Serbia, but from Kosovo where international efforts to manage Albanian Kosovar expectations may falter. While such a situation would be complicated and likely bloody, it would not involve WMD/CBRN -- certainly not on the part of Belgrade.

But should the Radicals take over government an extremely different picture arises. Among their top goals would be formal integration with the Serb portion of Bosnia -- Republika Srpska. Despite the potential for follow on actions by the Serbs, this is a move that the international community is unlikely to counter with anything more than diplomatic efforts. Western militaries are overextended in Afghanistan and Iraq, and no European power is likely to want to draw a proverbial line in the sand -- especially since all the Serbs of Bosnia are requesting is the same right to self-determination that Montenegro and Kosovo sought.

Flush with success, the Radical’s next likely step will be to attempt to use ethnic Serb militias to stir up problems in the border regions of Republika Srpska that Belgrade believes should be Serb regions. Barring robust responses from the international community -- and considering how thinly spread Western military force is, such responses are unlikely -- they will expand this effort both within Bosnia and to Montenegro, another location where ethnic Serbs are a sizable proportion of the population.

Should all these operations prove relatively successful and painless for the Serbs, the next logical target is Kosovo with regular Serb forces likely to first move into the northern portions where ethnic Serbs predominate. After that, it is an open question whether Belgrade will simply attempt to retake all of Kosovo. The effort the Serbs put forth will be inversely proportionate to Western actions to date.

Aside from the (para)military angle, the Serbs have one other very definite policy they will follow. Belgrade will do everything in its power to first solidify a partnership with the Russians. The two Slavic peoples share a great deal of affinity for one another that goes well beyond ethnic ties. A core defining principle of both cultures is their persecution and entitlement complexes. Russia feels the Europeans own them because Russia suffered so much under Mongol rule, believing that if Russia had not suffered so greatly that the Mongols would have gone on to conquer Europe. Serbia feels the same about another power: Ottoman Turkey. Bound together by language, ethnicity, culture and this complex, the two have been allies throughout most of modern history.

In the case of a Radical victory in the Jan. 21 elections this relationship would take a more ominous -- and somewhat familiar -- turnn. During Milosevic’s rule Russia regularly provided diplomatic cover for Serb actions throughout the Yugoslav war, occasionally using its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to hobble Western initiatives at a time when the West was attempting to actively intervene in the war. In 2007 with Western forces scattered and a Russian resurgence in progress, such diplomatic cover could prove even more effective.

WMD -- specifically chemical weapons -- could provide one more bit of cover. Serbia retains military forces capable of striking at all of its neighbors and potentially Italy as well. Should Serbia follow the path of militancy, a chemical weapons deterrent could prove useful to dissuading NATO from intervening on behalf of the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims or Kosovar Albanians. Serbia sported an advanced and fielded chemical weapons program during the Cold War that was developed indigenously. Most of its output came from Serbia’s Pancevo facility which remains operational. The state retains majority ownership of Pancevo***. All that remains for Serbia to relaunch a chemical program is a political decision from Belgrade.