Presenters

Presenters

Janelle Burd, PE, LEED AP BD+CSr. Mechanical Engineer/Fuel System Specialist • 27 years of experience in fuel system design• Pipeline Integrity Management Plans (IMP- POL)• Engineering Project Planning Studies

Hassan Sahudin, PE, LEED AP BD+C, ENV SPSr. Structural Engineer/Project Manager• 25 years of experience • Specialized focus on fueling facilities • Pipeline Integrity Management Plans (IMP-POL)• Engineering Project Planning Studies

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Pipeline Integrity Management Plan(IMP-POL)

and Project Planning Studies

(PPS)

Common Deficiencies18 November 2013

PETRO Expo 2013

Agenda

• Burns & McDonnell Overview

• IMP- POL’s & Planning Studies

• Assessment Objectives

• 3 Most Common Deficiencies

Pipe Support

Thermal Relief

Containment

• Additional Deficiencies

• Conclusion

• Q &A

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Burns & McDonnell

Overview:• Founded in 1898 • 100% Employee-Owned• Over 4,300 Employees• $2B in Revenues per year • More than 30 Offices• We deliver successful DOD projects worldwide• 50+ years of experience in design, construction,

inspection and operational assistance of POL facilities• Partners include AFCEC, USACE, NAVFAC, National

Guard, Reserves, DLA HQ, DLA-Energy

Our Mission: “Make Our Clients Successful”

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U.S. POL/Fueling Project Sites

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International Fueling Project Sites

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IMP-POL: • 6 Regions total

57 sites completed 17 sites future

• Follow-On IMP: 1 site in US 2 sites in Japan

Project Planning Study (PPS): • 14 sites in US• 1 each in Italy, Greece, Gitmo

IMP-POL and PPS Sites

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What is an IMP-POL and Project Planning Study?• Funded by Defense Logistic Agency – Energy (DLA-Energy) • Two Parts of DLA-Energy’s Centrally Managed Program (CMP)• Condition assessment programs

IMP-POL and Project Planning Studies

Tank Integrity Management (API 653 & STI)

Project Planning Study (PPS)

Pipeline Integrity Management Plan (IMP-POL)

Automatic Tank Gauging

Automated Fuel Service Station

Pipeline Pressure Testing (API 570)

Terminal Automation

Pressure Vessel Inspection (API 510)

Cathodic Protection System Integrity Management

Piers and Marine Loading Arms

Rail Maintenance

Hydrant System Tuning (upcoming)

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Ultimate Goal for DLA-Energy and Installations: • Provide site specific record for each facility

Condition assessment Testing and inspection Intervals Responsible execution agency

• Plan and fund projects, improvements and repairs• Risk management

Ultimate Goal

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• Local, State, and Federal Environment Governing Standards

• API and ASME

• NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code

• UFC 3-460-01, Petroleum Fuel Facilities

• UFC 3-460-03, Maintenance of Petroleum Systems

• UFGS-01 35 29, Safety and Occupational Health Requirements

• 33 CFR 156, Oil and Hazardous Material Transfer Operations

• 40 CFR 112, Oil Pollution Prevention

• 49 CFR 195, Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline

• DESC-P-12 - DLA-E / DESC Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) Funding Policy for Fixed Petroleum Facilities

Typical Codes and Standards

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Provide DLA-E and Base Fuels Personnel with:• Assessment of facilities conditions and pipeline integrity

• Overview and understanding of existing POL infrastructure

• Record of the general integrity and condition of the piping systems

• A “road map” of integrity management and maintenance

• Identification of highest-risk elements

• Recommendations for further actions

Assessment Objectives

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• Pipe Support Issues• Thermal Relief Issues• Valve and Flange Seals – Weeps and Leaks• Soft Materials – Brass and Bronze Valves

and Piping• Galvanic Reactions – Dissimilar Metals• Soil-Air / Concrete-Air Interfaces• Coating Failure• Cathodic Protection Issues

Common Deficiencies found during

site assessments:

IMP-POL – Common Deficiencies

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• Pipe Support Issues• Thermal Relief Issues• Secondary Containment Issues • Insufficient Fuel Lab Ventilation• Corrosion/Coating Failure• Lighting Issues• Use of Sight Flow Indicators • Lack of EFSO Stations• Grounding Issues

Common Deficiencies

found during site

assessments:

Planning Studies – Issues

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Pipe Support

Thermal Relief

Secondary Containment

3 Most Common Deficiencies

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Issues: • Lack of Isolation Pads

• Concrete Saddles

• Support failure

• Temporary Supports

• Inadequate Support

• No Lateral Restraint

• Spring Can Supports Disengaged

Deficiency 1 - Pipe Support

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Lacks Isolation Pad

Metal-metal contact

Pipe Support

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Concrete Saddle

Concrete-steel contact, moisture collection

Pipe Support

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“Clamshell” anchors

Moisture collection

Pipe Support

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Metal Roller Supports

Metal-metal contact

Pipe Support

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“Spider” Supports

Corrosion, displaced support

Pipe Support

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Improper pipe supports

Lacks Lateral Restraint

Pipe Support

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Risks from Undetected/Unaddressed Issues:

• Excessive pipe movements • Pipe or joint failure • Equipment and Tank Damage • Unintended release• Environmental impact• System shut down • Impact to mission

Risks: Pipe Support

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Risk Mitigation Recommendations:• Metal to Metal contact – Teflon barriers, pads, pipe collars

• Concrete saddles – Replace with approved pipe support

• Support failure – Perform pipe stress analysis and replace

• Wood support – Replace with approved material

• Inadequate Support – Replace with appropriate style

Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up

Risk Mitigation: Pipe Support

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Issues:• Insufficient Thermal Relief • Cascading Issues• Improper Setting • Thermal Reliefs Not Tested• Closed Isolation Valves

The internal pipe pressure increase resulting from fluid thermal expansion can equal as much as 75 psi for every degree rise in the fuel temperature if not relieved!

Deficiency 2 - Thermal Relief

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Risks from Undetected and Unaddressed Issues:• Over pressurization of equipment and valves – Costly repairs and

replacement• Leaking Flanges and Joints – Increased maintenance costs• Danger to operators due to high system pressures• Potential for catastrophic failure of pipe or components

Thermal Relief Risks

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Risk Mitigation Recommendations:• Conduct a thermal relief study • Change operating procedures

– leave relief valve open

Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up!

Thermal Relief Risk Mitigation

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Regulations: 40 CFR Part 112, NFPA 30, and UFCs Issues:• Absence of Secondary Containment

• Cracks in Containment Concrete

• Joints Sealant Failure

• Liner System Problems

• Lack of Containment Curbs

Deficiency 3 – Secondary Containment

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Absence of Containment Over Water

Risk contamination of waterways

Secondary Containment

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Absence of Containment at Grade

Risk ground contamination

Secondary Containment

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Absence of Containment Below Grade

Risk groundwater contamination

Secondary Containment

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Cracks in Containment Concrete

Breach in Containment

Secondary Containment

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Joint Sealant Failure

Breach in Containment

Secondary Containment

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Liner System Problems

Ineffective Containment

Secondary Containment

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Lack of Curbing

Ineffective Containment

Secondary Containment

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Say What?

Leak Detection Plant

Secondary Containment

Risks to unaddressed problems:• Inability to detect small leaks

• Inability to contain fuel spills

• Environmental impact

• Non-compliance

Containment Risks

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Risk Mitigation Recommendations:• Repair cracks in concrete

• Seal joints with jet-fuel resistant sealant

• Provide adequately sized secondary containment or remote spill containment system

• Install perimeter curbs on equipment pads/pipe causeway

Owner Impact – Preventative maintenance is less costly than equipment repair/ replacement and potential environmental clean up!

Containment Risk Mitigation

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Additional Deficiencies:• Brass/Bronze Bodied Valves

• Sight Flow Indicators

• Soil-Air / Concrete–Air Interfaces

• Product Labeling

• Lubricated Swivel Joints

• Fuel Lab Inadequate Ventilation

• Coating Failure

• Dissimilar Metals

• Inadequate Ground Clearance

Additional Deficiencies

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Brass/Bronze Bodied Valves

Issue: Soft bodied valves and piping such as brass, bronze

and copper present in fueling system.

Risk: NFPA 30 and 30A - Metals with lower melting point

are not to be used in fueling systems.

Recommended Mitigation: Remove and replace with UFC compliant valves and

piping. UFC 3-460-01 - valves are to be CS or SS bodied.

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Sight Flow Indicators

Issue: Sight flow indicator in certain configurations are

subject to tank head pressure or system pressure.

Risks: Sight glass failure may cause significant leak UFC 3-460-01 - Sight flow indicators are not to be

provided on thermal relief piping, filtration devices, or product recovery tanks.

Recommendation: Remove sight flow indicators in these

configurations and repair the piping.

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Soil - Air Interface

Issue: Piping is not properly coated.

Risks: Deterioration of Extruded Polyethylene (UG pipe

coating) coatings due to UV exposure

Recommendation: Expose the soil/air interface, prep and coat 12

inches below grade level and 6 inches above. Heavy body, surface tolerant epoxy coating Compatible with polyethylene and the existing

aboveground pipe coating.

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Lubricated Swivel Joints

Issues: Lack of proper maintenance/lubrication may

cause seized joints Typically found at Truck Loading / Truck

Offloading. (All Products)

Risks: Compromised fuel quality (Aviation Fuel) UFC 3-460-01: Aluminum or SS non-lubricated

swivel joints

Recommendation: Replace with non-lubricated type swivel joints

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Fuel Lab Inadequate Ventilation

Issues: Inadequate ventilation rate Improper equipment

Risks: Air quality concern Explosion hazard

Recommendation: Replace with proper fume hood

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Coating Failure

Issue: Coating failure causing pipe corrosion

Risks: Leaks in pipes Failure at supports.

Recommendation: Clean and recoat Piping - UFGS Spec Section 09 97 13.27.

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Dissimilar Metals

Issues: Galvanic corrosion

Risks: Failure of bolts Maintenance issue

Recommendation: Provide isolation flange kit

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Inadequate Ground Clearance

Issues: Piping located too close to grade

Risks: Corrosion Maintenance issue

Recommendation: Raise piping 18” clearance min

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Conclusion

How thorough assessments help Bases/Installations:

• Identify items with higher risks of failure

• Recommend Mitigation Plans

• Reminder of items requiring maintenance and repairs

• Awareness of funding mechanism

A well-qualified consultant is a critical partner in your success !

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Questions / Answers

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