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Refusing Sophistic Views of Virtue: Genuine Virtue as Preventative
of Civil War
Greg Grady
University of North Texas
Abstract: The Sophists have provided much opposition to Plato, as
much of his philosophical system responds to the Sophists’ claims on virtue
and human nature. The idea of virtue and self interest transgresses
throughout the Sophists, specifically Antiphon, Thucydides, and Callicles.
The Sophists depict virtue as fragile – in that it depends on the law, and that
virtue protects the weak and inferior. This view is particularly displayed
through the Corcyran Revolt and the plague in Athens. I argue here that
Platos response to the Sophists rejects and negates their view of virtue by
explicating that genuine virtue resides within the internal structure of the
tripartite soul, which is predominantly ruled by reason, and virtue that is
dependent on law, is in fact, not virtue at all in that it depends on external
factors. In addition, in a society where genuine virtue is employed, civil war
has the possibility of never occurring.
I. The Problem Posed for Plato
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Through the Platonic dialogues, Plato provides a critique and serves as
opposition to the Sophist’s outlook on such things as virtue, justice, and
human nature. The Sophists, on the other hand, persist to be formidable
opponents to Plato throughout his philosophy. Plato attempts to argue
against the varying views of the Sophists but struggles to find the argument
to sway them away from their conceptions of human nature and justice. In
The Republic, Plato attempts to resolve many of these problems set forth by
the Sophists. More specifically, Plato attempts to tackle the self-interest
motives that can lead to civil war, and explain how genuine virtue can play a
part within this particular construct regarding human nature. In order for
Plato to respond to the Sophists accordingly, and promote genuine virtue,
he must redefine the Sophistic thought on what is natural.
At the core of Sophistic philosophy and tradition, dwells a frame of
reference that facilitates around self-interest. Although the Sophists
mutually ascend to this notion, virtue plays a quite different role through
Sophistry itself. Through Antiphon, Thucydides, and Callicles, the
emergence of virtue takes shape, and its transformation commences as they
each contribute to the Sophist notion of virtue within their own Sophistic
frame of reference. Antiphon begins by postulating that human nature
(acting naturally) is the ultimate life-promoting tool. Thucydides then
presupposes this condition of self-interest in his observations – while
labeling virtue, along with law, ineffective in certain states of chaos. By the
time virtue reaches Callicles, virtue is portrayed as a protection to the weak
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and inferior. Protecting the feeble prevents the strong from fully and freely
cultivating nature and its assets. Ultimately, according to the Sophists,
virtue is impotent and futile within human nature.
Antiphon presents the initial notion of what is innate in human nature is
to promote life, that this is the most natural and basic function of humans.
Essentially, Antiphon reduces the human condition into this logical
approach: “Living results for them from what is advantageous, dying from
what is not advantageous. But advantages which are established by the laws
are bonds on nature, and those established by nature are free” (106).
Antiphon concludes that what is natural for humans are to live and act,
naturally and freely. This sets the pre-text that is adopted and endorsed by
Thucydides – in which Thucydides examines what is natural human
behavior.
Thucydides’ “On Justice Power and Human Nature” provides an account
of specific disastrous events within Athens and Corcyran in which he
designates what he thinks constitutes virtue. Within these events, human
nature is exposed to be a selfish and inherently self-interested species that
employs virtue instrumentally to achieve certain ends, and if there are no
ends to be reached then virtue is only dependent upon law and virtue is not
self-sustainable.
Plato’s confrontation with the Sophistic tradition poses a threat to any
notion of true virtue. In response, Plato creates an entire philosophical
system to negate the Sophistic philosophy. This does not replace the
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Sophistic insight. Plato does however; offer a solution that he thinks could
prevent an outbreak of civil war within a city. Plato’s problem emerges:
How can virtue and an ideal city be sustained if people are naturally
inclined to operate with their own interests being the primary? More
importantly – how can genuine virtue ever emerge in the Sophist view of
human nature? I argue that Plato’s proposed assertion, within this
framework of human nature - one of self-interest, is: Genuine virtue (or the
reality of virtue) not only exists, but when employed has the possibility of
preventing civil war. In order to do this, Plato will have to re-construct
human nature in a way that it resembles the tripartite soul – where reason
is the ruler.
II. The Sophists: A Progressive View on Human Nature as Seen
Through Antiphon, Thucydides and Callicles.
The Sophists particular view on human nature was characterized by
self-interest, virtue as convention, and law as unnatural to human nature
itself. Sophists spent much of their time differentiating between the natural
and artificial, the “Sophists questioned the foundations and values of the
Greek polis by emphasizing the dichotomy between the natural world and
the moral values which were at the basis of the political community”
(Saxonhouse, Polity, Vol. 10, No. 4 pp. 461-487). Sentiments provided by
Sophists, usually in debates regarding issues of morality in human nature,
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subsisted in the dichotomy between what was natural versus what was man
made conventional law. The natural world remained distinct in and of itself,
while custom, virtue, and law were superfluously added onto the natural
world by men who acted to regulate, restrict, and suppress the stronger.
These conventions prevented men from prospering and living naturally, as
human nature would have intended it.
The Pre-Socratic, Antiphon, discusses the disadvantages a man affronts
when adhering to law and custom excessively, while ignoring the physis or
the natural. Antiphon attempts to compromise between the impulse in
human nature and the convention of laws and justice. In other words, man
must find a way to maximize his profits and promote life to its fullest extent
without violating the laws of the city in a way that brings shame and
punishment to the man. As a result, Antiphon suggests in this loose attempt,
to reconcile the nomos and physis, to make the most advantage of justice by
“treating[ing] the laws as important in the presence of witnesses, and
treat[ing] the decrees of nature as important when alone and with not
witnesses present” (Curd, 105).
In this analysis, it can be seen that laws are contrary to the self interest
drive within nature (though not all), laws are implemented in such a way
that they divert one’s natural desires into what is socially acceptable and
permitted for “laws have been established for the eyes, as to what they
must see and what they must not, and for the ears, as to what they must
hear and what they must not…(106)” To clarify, whatever the ears hear
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initially- this is what is natural, while laws corrupt what is being heard - as
to what should be heard.
In the Polis, obedience will in turn be beneficial within this construct,
while citizens who abide by the law will prosper (or at least, refrain from
being shamed). Acting accordingly in the eyes of others creates a synthetic
social conditioning – that is, people artificially implement and execute virtue
or lawful acts only for approval. In turn, social acceptable behavior becomes
dependent on those who observe a man acting in sync with the law – and it
will ultimately be the guiding hand of the virtue and the virtuous. Laws
might prove successful in suppressing the natural life within the public
forum, however, within the private confines of one’s own life, the natural
life cannot be contained.
Given Antiphon’s prerogative, human nature is not necessarily
venturing to act morally insofar as it’s attempting to unravel and act
naturally; however, acting naturally will be seen by other Sophists
(specifically Thucydides and Callicles) as acting in one’s self interest. The
presentation of this dichotomy (physis / nomos) conveys man as someone
who imposes law onto human nature. In response, nature can exert
resistance against law and conventional bondage; however, it cannot
impose its own being upon the law. In Thucydides’ account of civil war and
the plague, human nature not only shows its resistance against the law, but
how human nature undermines the law entirely when self interest prevails
among all other codes of conduct. Law itself becomes a motivator for virtue
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but is unable to support it when self-interest runs rampant, thus reverting
human nature back to its original form – the life led by self-interest. By the
time that the notion of “virtue” arrives in Thucydides, it has already
transpired into something Plato would disagree with – virtue as dependent
on law. (Moulton, 1975)
Thucydides arrives at a conclusion similar to Antiphons regarding
human nature, but gives a historical account of how law, virtue, and human
nature unravel. Thucydides’ portrayal of particular events gives one an
account of virtue, as it enters the picture of nomos and physis. Thucydides
starts out by designating what he believes to be Athenian virtue and “the
way of life that has made [Athens] great (Woodruff, 40),” love of nobility,
bravery, and good acts towards others (Woodruff, 40-43). He provides
examples of how cordial Athenians act when under the helm of the law and
before the ramifications of the plague: Athenians are “lovers of nobility with
restraint, and lovers of wisdom without any softening of character” (42);
and “bravery of people who think through what they will take in hand, and
discuss it thoroughly.” Thucydides describes the setting of citizens as they
operate and function exclusively under law and order. The plague of Athens
and the Corcyran Revolt are two events that Thucydides mentions to
demonstrate the unraveling of law and virtue. . These disasters act as the
cause of social upheaval, which leads to an internal implosion of convention
and a period of provisional lawlessness. This implosion exposes human
nature as a self-interested animal in which virtue has no beneficial end
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while at the same time capsizing all previous conceptions of virtue. For
example, during civil war, lawlessness prescribes how “hesitation was held
to be cowardice” (91) and “the good of the whole was considered wholly
lazy.” (91) Man is faced with this realization - what once benefited man only
did so under the law. In this state of chaos, law can no longer ensure that
acting virtuous will reward the citizens. Therefore, virtue – whatever it
might be for the citizens of Athens, is itself, contingent on the law. In other
words, Virtue itself is only as powerful a force as are the laws that convey it.
By this time, law (unnatural and artificial to the physis), contrary to
human self-interest (the physis), has been established as something
upholding virtue. Callicles, in his discussion with Plato, elaborates on the
relationship between virtue and the inferior, by portraying virtue as a type
of sustenance for the lower types. Plato constructs Callicles’ stance within
the dialogues in such a way that the positions of both Antiphon and
Thucydides conflate into Callicles’ argument. Therefore, the Gorgias
dialogue is somewhat a summation of the previous Sophistic views with an
added twist on virtue. Plato can respond to Callicles in a way, that he is
responding to all the problems posed by the Sophistic tradition (regarding
virtue). Traces of Antiphon are found in Callicles, as he presents his
overarching view of human nature, “nature and law, are for the most part
opposed to each other” (Gorgias, 483A) and “I believe that the people who
institute the laws are the weak”(Gorgias, 483B). By the time Callicles
presents this view of law, laws are seen as motivation for virtue, and law
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itself fundamentally violates human nature – in that, it protects the weak
from the strong and prevents people from acting naturally.
In conclusion, the view of the Sophists regarding virtue can be looked
at as a progression: It is in one’s favor to act natural or in one’s own self
interest, the implementation of these laws is unnatural to man, furthermore,
what is virtuous is dependent on the unnatural law and what is virtuous, is
only regarded as such in that it protects the weak or the many. Thus, when
a city enters a state of lawlessness, as seen in the plague or the Corcyra
Revolt, law is undermined, virtue dissipates, and the self-interest nature of
the human individual prevails. Plato’s attempted rebuttal within the
Gorgias dialogues falls short, and ends in a stalemate. Plato is unable to
articulate a sufficient refutation of the Sophistic view on human nature. This
lack of refutation is problematic because Plato’s view of virtue has no way
of originating within this type of rigid naturalism – furthermore, Thucydides
writes how the revolt and the plague reveal human selfishness and self-
interest motivation, in that humans become reduced to their natural nature.
In response, Plato offers a revised picture, one that includes a recalibrated
version of human nature to account for what went wrong in the plague of
Athens and the Corcyra Revolt, and how it could have been prevented.
III. The Tripartite Soul as through Nature, Virtue, and
Preventative
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Plato “inherits” this Sophistic outlook and responds to it by
deconstructing the Sophistic tradition and the components that constitute
this developing view. Plato does not respond explicitly to specific Sophists
per say, but does so indiscriminately with certain aspects of his
philosophical system, in particular, the Tripartite Soul. The Tripartite Soul
serves as a very important function, in that, it is the focal point of Plato’s
philosophy, but more importantly, it can substitute as an alternate
explanation of human nature. The role the Tripartite Soul plays in human
nature is necessary for Plato to offer some kind of refutation that allows for
genuine virtue – meaning, the makeup of the Tripartite Soul itself allows
Plato to account for the events of the plague and the Revolt but also allows
for genuine virtue to be able to develop. The Tripartite Soul consists of
three dimensions, the rational, the spirit, and the appetites. The relationship
dynamics within the soul (which part rules as opposed to which part is
ruled), allows for Plato to give an account for human nature, an account
which differs substantially from the sophistic view insofar that it does not
simplify or reduce humans to a species whose natural instinct is to act in
ones own self interest and is only restrained by law.
Initially, the Tripartite Soul can be seen as an answer to Antiphon’s
view on the naturalness of human nature. Plato’s Tripartite Soul resides
internally and constitutes human nature itself. Rather than human nature
simply acting in one’s self interest. Plato utilizes this model to explain that
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acting and indulging one’s own selfish endeavors is merely a function of the
soul. In other words, human self-interest or selfishness (acting on the
presumption that the two can be equated) does not compose of human
nature itself, rather, human selfishness is but a mode of the Tripartite Soul -
for instance, if the appetites rule over reason. The Tripartite Soul,
essentially, can be viewed as human nature, insofar as it encompasses
explanations of human action, deliberation, thoughts, desires, etc. The
relationships and interactions among these three dimensions have
implications for the human being – this comes to assume a prominent role in
how this schematic plays out in Thucydides account of the civil war and the
plague.
One function of the Tripartite Soul is its ability to account for the
prolific events that occurred during the Peloponnesian War, in particular
the events described by Thucydides known as the Corcyran Revolt and the
plague in Athens. In these particular events, human nature is shown to be
dependent on law, or more fundamentally, virtue itself is not sustainable. In
order to rectify this, Plato must find a way to explain why virtue collapses in
the manner that it did. To address this, the imbalance and immoderation of
the Tripartite Soul is utilized as an explanation of the state of human nature
during the revolt and plague. For example, Thucydides writes “no one was
held back by fear of gods or by the laws of men,” (50) The Sophists would
extract from that – virtue dissipating under the absence of law and the
motivation of reward, Plato, however, responds to this by saying the
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Tripartite Soul implies that rather than man being observed as innately
selfish, the current condition can be seen as one in which the appetites are
ruling over both spirit and reason. In addition, Thucydides writes the
individual had a “desire to rule out of avarice and ambition.” (91) The
Tripartite Soul suggests that spirit and appetites are ruling over reason. The
disproportion in the soul implies that the spirit and appetites are
overwhelmingly alluring, in that - reason cannot constrain or keep them in
check, thus ruling out of greed or ambition
In the application of the Tripartite model, one can conclude upon
examination of these events, that the common deficiency is reason - and
here in lies the problem. In this model, Plato is able to make the argument
that it is not human nature selfish tendencies that motivates and dictates
this chaos, but rather an imbalance between the parts of the soul – for
virtue to emerge, the soul must be ruled by reason. Although the Tripartite
Soul provides an explanation for the events described in the plague and
revolt, it has not, however, provided an explanation as to how virtue does
not necessarily depend on the law to function. Additionally, The Tripartite
Soul must explain how virtue can be sustained intrinsically.
This question is one Plato must address and does so by using the
Tripartite Model, and elaborates further by explicating what qualifies as
genuine virtue –or rather, the condition of virtue itself that must be
necessary. This begins with Plato’s critique of virtue and its dependence on
law, moreover – virtue as dependent on anything external to the soul. This is
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the next point the Tripartite Soul addresses – The Tripartite soul reclaims
virtue (that is, true virtue) from its corruptive and distortive influences,
such as law, as an instrumental mean, and acting virtuous for public
recognition. If virtue finds itself employed and supported by these means or
engaged in instrumentally to reach a desired end it will be unable to sustain
when these types of securities, customs, or conditionings are under
provisional duress. In this internalization, virtue finds itself dependant on
the internal state or condition of the Tripartite Soul. In order for virtue to
emerge and develop, virtue must find itself originating internally, but it is
important to note that the Tripartite Soul itself does not designate virtue,
although it does allow for the intrinsic development and cultivation of virtue
within the soul. In order for virtue to develop accordingly, it must be
instructed, guided, and shaped by reason, any other form of virtue (as a
product of appetites or spirit) would be falsely contrived and illegitimate.
The importance of virtue residing internally, within the structure of the
Tripartite Soul, has implications on its ability to be sustained in states of
lawlessness or disorder. Plato’s emphasis on the internal nature of the
Tripartite Soul proves to be pivotal when the external conditions (such as
law) that virtue is accustomed to being dependent on, start to collapse. In
other words, with virtue being dependent on the internal composition of the
soul it will be able to sustain itself, even with no enforced law to mandate
virtue. Through this description, Plato is able to address Thucydides, and
provide an alternate explanation as to why human nature was revealed in
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the way that it was and can be regarded that, Thucydides observations were
not that of virtue at all. Thucydides account portrays virtue as dependent on
law therefore making virtue not intrinsically sound, however, this itself, is
the problem. The fact that virtue is dependent on anything at all outside of
the soul sets virtue up for failure, it becomes conditioned on the temporary
existence of external factors, and when these change, so does virtue itself.
For example, if virtue were exercised to attain a particular end, and for
whatever reason comes a time when this virtue cannot adequately attain
this end, virtue would be null. Virtue, within the Tripartite Soul has more
permanence, in that it is a product of reason and not of law. Thus, virtue
being externally grounded or used instrumentally is, to Plato, the display of
the appearance of virtue and not virtue in and of itself. (Guess, 2005)
Given this conclusion, virtue is dichotomized: The Sophistic virtue,
characterized as originating outside of the soul, a guise, external,
dependent, and instrumental then therein lies Platonic virtue construed as
real, internal, practiced for its own sake. In light of these characteristics,
the claim can be made that Platonic virtue, as seen through the rule of
reason in the Tripartite Soul, has the possibility of preventing civil uprising
within cities. Comparatively, Sophistic ideation of virtue could be regarded
as such, that it perpetuates civil uprising, in that, it serves as a temporary
fix under illusory pretenses or provisional conditions (law, benefits, custom).
As long as people are ruled by the appearance of virtue, social entropy will
serve as a potential threat. On the contrary, virtue through the Tripartite
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Soul is predominantly ruled by reason, it is done so for the sake of what is
virtuous, in that it is ruled by reason and not by the appetites or passions.
Thus, in a state of lawlessness and chaos ones virtue would not seek out
gratification of ones appetites or ruthless attempts at acquiring honor.
In addition, because Platonic virtue is not done so for the sake of other
things, it has no qualms when rewards cease to be available to it. Therefore,
civil disorder, as described by Thucydides, could have been prevented if
virtue had been illuminated in such a way that it directed people towards a
more intrinsically stable notion of virtue, as found in the Tripartite Soul.
Furthermore, with true virtue being led by reason, it can be inferred that
the aberrant response by the mobocracy would have never occurred, that
all appetites and passions that would seek fulfillment would be regulated
and disciplined by reason. Law would be irrelevant, meaning– with or
without it, reason would always be active within the soul, thus doing what is
virtuous would rein top priority, and exist even when law is in shambles. For
this to be possible human nature can no longer be limited by the narrow
scope of Antiphon’s view of human nature, it must be diversified to include
the components provided to us by the tripartite model. The model will
provide for us the components of human nature, and its interactions and
dynamics will provide explanations as to what gives rise to particular
behaviors.
To recapitulate, Plato provides an alternate explanation for human
nature, one that deviates greatly from the Sophistic tradition. He takes one
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step back to create a more complete system, the Tripartite Soul, one that
includes human self-interest as a result rather than some epitomizing
aphorism on human nature. This construct, divided into three dimensions
(reason, appetites, spirit or passion) acts as a type of referencing guide
behind human behavior. Instead of limiting human nature to a selfish one of
self -interest, it is able to be account for and articulate an explanation
behind the behaviors and actions of people, especially in conditions of chaos
(but not limited to). It also serves as a breeding ground for genuine virtue
(also contrary to Sophist belief. The idiosyncrasies of the Tripartite Soul
offer the necessary conditions that are required for genuine virtue to
develop - in particular, its internal foundation and the rule of reason.
Essentially, this enables the Tripartite Soul to have the necessary functions
to prevent civil war.
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References
Curd, Patricia, ed. A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia. Indianapolis:
Hacket Publishing Company, 1995. Print.
Cooper, Johm M., and D.S. Hutchinson, eds. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hacket
Publishing Company, 1997. Print.
Guess, Raymond. Outside Ethics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005. Print.
Saxonhouse, Arlene W. "Nature & Convention in Thucydides' History." Polity 10.4 (1978):
461-87. JSTOR. Web. 3 Nov. 2009. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234401>.
Moulton, Carroll. "Antiphon the Sophist, on Truth." Transactions and Proceedings of the
American Philological Association 103 (1972): 329-66. Web. 14 Nov. 2009.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2935980>.
Woodruff, Paul. On Justice Power and Human Nature: Selections from The History of the
Peloponnesian War. Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1993. Print.
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