Personal and Business Networks

Personal and Business Networks

Gerrit Rooks

“no man is an island, entire of itself…” (Donne 1624).

This lecture• A few tidbits about personal networks

– How many close friends do people have? How many do you have?

– Which persons have what kinds of networks?

• The evolution of business-networks from entrepreneurial networks

• The Toyota supplier network• Alliance networks: direct and indirect ties

Social Brain Hypothesis• Ronald Dunbar (1947),

anthropologist and evolutionary biologist, University of Oxford

• Ronald Dunbar is famous for the social brain hypothesis: “human intelligence is the evolutionary result of the need for social coordination and cooperation”

Personal network size• the number of social

group members a primate can track, appears to be limited by the volume of the neocortex region of their brain.

Dunbar, R.I.M. (1993), Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4): 681-735.

Dunbars number: 150

“Social units”• Support clique: people

who we seek personal advice from

• Sympathy group: special ties, frequent contact

• Band: acquaintances, less frequent contact

• Clan: all current contacts

• Megaband + Tribe: larger social units

Any group greater than 150 will become disfunctional

Company size = 75-200 Organizations > 150 need bureaucracy…

75-200

475-1000

50,000 +

20,000 to 45,000

10,000 to 15,000

20,000 to 45,000

Is Dunbars number still valid in this new media age?

• Microblogging and online tools, on the other hand, might be analogous to a pocket calculator that, while speeding up the way we can do simple math, does not improve our cognitive capabilities for mathematics.

• We find that the data are in agreement with Dunbar’s result; users can entertain a maximum of 100–200 stable relationships. Thus, the ‘economy of attention’ is limited in the online world by cognitive and biological constraints as predicted by Dunbar’s theory.

Modeling Users' Activity on Twitter Networks: Validation of Dunbar's Number. Goncalves, Perra & Vespigani

Primitive societies and networks

Barry Wellman, 2011. "Is Dunbar's Number Up?" British Journal of Psychology 102: in press: DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02075.

Feld, Scott L. (1991), "Why your friends have more friends than you do", American Journal of Sociology 96 (6): 1464-1477, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2781907

That's why the cognitive social structure work is relevant to this question. There is evidence that we humans see networks as more structured than they actually are (see Koehly & Pattison in Carrington, Scott and Wasserman, 2005; also Kumbasar et al, 1994, which they cite.) Casciaro did some interesting work on network perception in the 1990s. More recently, have a look at Igarashi and Kashima (2011) in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, involving some network perception experimental manipulations and perceptions of "group-ness". If you get down to specific types of network ties, then Lutz and Lakey and colleagues have done some interesting work in regard to social support networks, about the factors that lead individuals perceiving that a social support tie is present.

(Explaining) variation in networks

Kalish & Robbish:Ego networks and triad census

Strong tie

Weak tie

Kalish&Robbish describe and explain the triad census

Strong tie

Weak tie

Transitivity: “the forbidden triad”

Chris

Gerrit Uwe

= strong tie

= weak tie

Chris

Gerrit Uwe

The forbidden triad is a building block in Granovetters strength of weak ties theory

Reasons for transitivity

• Frequent interaction

• Similarity

• Structural balance / cognitive dissonance reduction

Chris

Gerrit Uwe

= strong tie

Only weak ties are bridges

Chris

Gerrit Uwe

= strong tie

Bert Önder

Koen

Kalish & Robbish try to explain network differences

• Do psychological differences affect network differences?

• What kind of differences are important?

Personal and business networks

The organizational life cycle

Hite & Hesterly. The Evolution of Firm Networks: From Emergence to Early Growth of the Firm Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Mar., 2001), pp. 275-286

Social network entrepreneur = firm network

`identity’ based networkshigh proportion of ties with some type of personal or social identification

Pre-existing ties, strong embedded network high in closure and cohesion

Early / Later growth

Calculative networksTies are primarily motivated by expected economic benefits

Weak ties that are more market like, less redundant

(Partly) result of pro-actively managing networks

From embedded to balanced

• Emerging firms rely on embedded ties – Low reputation / legitimacy

• Not an attractive partner • -> reluctant banks etc.

– Limited search capabilities• Growth firms have to rely on arms

length relations as well– Firm is more attractive etc– Better search capabilites

Intentionally managed networks

• Firms and individuals (can) learn to create network value

• Creation of networks also depends on specific competences

The Medici• Policitical dynasty,

banking family, later royal family (14 century)

• The Medici produced four Popes & two regent queens of France a.o.

Padgett, John F.; Ansell, Christopher K. (May 1993).

"Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434".

The American Journal of Sociology 98 (6): 1259–1319.

The Toyata supplier network• Japanese

automobile makers are more and more productive, US is lagging

• Dyer and Nobeoka:"Creating and managing a high performance knowledge-sharing network: the Toyota case"

• One large network with core firm as hub

• Bilateral relationships• Weak ties/arm's length

relations• Structural holes

• Large network plus multiple nested networks

• Multi-lateral relationships• Strong/embedded ties in

nested networks with core firm

• Dense network

Knowledge sharing routines• Dilemmas associated with knowledge

sharing1. how can self-interested network members

openly share valuable knowledge?2. how to prevent free-rider problems?3. how to maximize the efficiency of knowledge

transfers?

Overcoming knowledge sharing dilemmas

1. how can self-interested network members openly share valuable knowledge?

– Create a network 'identity' through network-level knowledge-sharing routines

2. how to prevent free-rider problems?– Network `rules' for knowledge protection and value

appropriation3. how to maximize the efficiency of knowledge transfers?– Creating multiple knowledge-sharing processes and sub-

networks in the larger network

Why create an identity?

• Many experiments demonstrate the powerfull effects of social identity, f.i.

– Randomly assign individuals to a blue and a green group

– Individuals were unknown to each other and were told that they would not meet again

– Group members evaluated each other more positively and were more willing to cooperate with each other than non group members

How did Toyata create a network 'identity'?

• Toyota's network is known (labeled) as the `Toyota group'.

• Toyota creates a shared network identity by developing multiple groups– The supplier association– Toyota's operations management consulting division– Voluntary small group learning teams (jishuken)

Developing ties

• The supplier association (s)– Kyohokai: Toyota's supplier association was

established in 1943– Suppliers must be close to each other

• Supplier association has regular meetings, fi– Quality committees.– Visit `best practice' plants– Quality management conference held once a year

Developing ties

• Toyota's operations management consulting division– Direct free `on-site' assistance for suppliers

• Voluntary small group learning teams (jishuken)– Each group consists of roughly 5-8 suppliers– After determining theme, the group visits each

member to develop suggestions– Groups are frequently rearranged

Network rules for knowledge protection

• Creating an identity isn't enough to solve sharing and free riding problems

• Toyota sets a norm/rule by sharing its own knowledge– eliminating the notion that there is `proprietary knowledge'

• Suppliers must be willing to open their plants to other network members to other network members – reciprocal obligations: We will help you, but in return, you must agree

to help the network.– reciprocity norm is enforced by implicit threat of withdrawal of

business

Creating multiple knowledge sharing processes

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Alliance networks: Ahuja• Two types of ties• Direct ties

– knowledge sharing– complementary skills– scale economies

• Indirect ties– knowledge spillovers

Direct tie

Indirect tie

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Effects of direct ties

Many direct ties Fewer direct ties

Knowledge sharingComplementarity higher innovation output Economies of scale

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Effects of indirect ties

Many indirect ties Fewer indirect ties

Information gathering devices higher innovation output Screening device

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Effects of indirect ties depend on the # direct ties

Many direct ties Fewer direct ties

Relative addition of new resources is smaller.

When many partners have indirect ties, information is likely less valuable. since it will reach many others

What is better for innovation output of firms: structural holes or network closure?

A B

What is better for innovation output of firms: structural holes or network closure?

A B

Ahuja finds that firms embedded in a closed / dense networkoutperform firms in a open network (B) in terms of patent production