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COG Official Use Only
Excellence through Collaboration
Performance Improvement Through Collaboration
Robert C. Morrison President and CEO
Workshop on Good Practices in Heavy Water Reactor Operation – Buenos Aires – November 2013
2
COG Mission and Vision
• To improve the performance of CANDU stations worldwide through member collaboration.
Mission
• CANDU Excellence Through Collaboration Vision
3
The Company
• Is a Federally Incorporated Not-for-Profit Corporation
•President is accountable to a Board of Directors
•Board is accountable to the Shareholders
COG:
• Voting Non Voting
• OPG, Canada NPCIL, India
• AECL, Canada KHNP, Korea
• Bruce Power, Canada TQNPC, China
• NB Power, Canada NASA, Argentina
• SNN, Romania PAEC, Pakistan
Members are:
• AMEC NSS; Kinectrics; B&W; CAMECO; CPUS; GE Hitachi; Candu Energy; Aecon
There are also Supplier Participants:
4
CANDU Reactors in the World
COG Members Operational
Units
Installed
CANDU
Capacity
(Mw(e))
Laid-up Units Units under Construction
or Refurbishment
8 4772
0 675 In Progress
1 680
10 6980 2
20* 4360* 1* 6 Const.*
4 2867
2 1411 2 Const.
2 1400
1 648
1 137
TOTAL 49 23930 4 8
*2 CANDUs – the other units are indigenous PHWRs
5
Supplier Participant Program
COG provides access to the Information Exchange Program to some key CANDU Suppliers
They use it to stay familiar with the issues in the Industry and to take Industry OPEX back into the design of the equipment they supply
Current Members of the COG Supplier Participant Program are:
Aecon Nuclear
AMEC Nuclear Safety Solutions
Babcock and Wilcox
Cameco
Candu Energy
CPUS (Canadian Power Utility
Services)
GE Hitachi
Kinectrics
6
The Business
Approximately a $75M annual business that is designed to bring value to the Industry by:
Leveraging investments by identifying common needs and initiating Joint Projects
Solving Industry problems by either linking Members to solution sources or facilitating solutions
Looking across the Industry to identify opportunities for collaboration and avoidance of duplicated effort
Managing CANDU operationally focused R&D investment – so that each Member gets leveraged investment and benefit
Providing OPEX – Events, Pattern Analysis, Alerts, Good Practices
Linking Members to a warehouse of Information
7
COG Organization
Information Exchange
Nuclear Safety & Environmental Affairs
Research & Development
– OPEX
– CANTEACH
– EPRI Interface
– Communications
– Workshops and Conferences
– Supplier Participants
– Knowledge Management
– Nuclear Safety
– Environmental Affairs
– Risk Informed Regulation
– Regulatory Issues Support and Information Exchange
– Fuel Channels
– Safety & Licensing
– Health, Safety & Environment
– Chemistry, Materials & Components
– Industry Standard Tool Set
Business Services
President & CEO Robert Morrison
– CANPAC
– CIQB
– Fuel Channel Life Management
– Joint Projects
Strategic Planning & Transition Office Services Information Technology
Joint Projects & Services
8
Fukushima
Fukushima
COG is continuing to support Canadian and international member collaboration
Severe Accident Joint Project well underway with OPG, Bruce Power, SNN, and NB Power
Pakistan, NA-SA, China and Korea will be taking part
Scope Includes:
Shutdown and Low Power Events, Multi-Unit Events
Containment Integrity, In-Vessel Retention, Inst & Equip Survivability
Habitability, Update of TBD and SAMG
9
CANDU FLEET PERFORMANCE
10
International CANDU Fleet Performance Trend Information
11
17 CANDU Reactors in Upper Quartile
12
Performance Trends for Indian Reactors
13
Trend on Reactor Trips
14
CANDU Performance 2012
15
INFORMATION EXCHANGE
16
“CANDU Excellence Through Collaboration” COG Operating Model
Member Value*
CANDU OWNERS GROUP INC.“To improve the performance of CANDU stations
worldwide through member collaboration”
Leadership Solutions
(Training, Knowledge Management &
Regulatory Affairs)
Lessons Learned Collaborative
Improvement
Joint Project Collaborative
Technical Solutions
Collaborative R&D Solutions
Services
(Information Exchange, CANPAC,
CIQB)
Member Operating
Experience
Non-Member Operating
Experience (incl. INPO/
WANO/NRC/EPRI/NEI/IAEA)
Stretch Objectives to
Operate CANDU Reactors
at Extended Life
Major Events
Requiring Consistent
Response
Station Problems
Requiring Technical or
R&D Solutions
Peer Group Issues &
Opportunities
Improved Station
Performance
Industry Teams
Regulatory Issues
Sharing Information and Collaborative Effort
*Member Value:
· Safety ↑· Cost ↓· Leveraged Investment
· Production ↑· Regulatory Certainty
· Equipment Reliability ↑· Human Performance ↑· Refurbishment Success ↑
Strong Member
Support
Industry-wide Proactive Initiatives
Supplier
Performance
Screening &
IdentificationPrioritize Alternatives
Optimal
Solutions
· Input from other Industry
Groups
· Knowledge & Experience
· Critical Capabilities
· Ownership for Improvement
· Best Practices
· Industry-Wide Perspective
· Industry “Catalyst” for
Collaborative Action
FOUNDATION OF VALUE DRIVEN PEOPLE
· Thought leadership
· Consultative Support
· Project Management
· Group Facilitation
· Training
· Centre of Excellence
· Leveraged Purchaser
Added Value Integrated Solutions
Value Added Solutions for
all COG Members
17
COG Information Exchange
By the Numbers
One stop shopping for relevant OPEX across the CANDU fleet and the nuclear industry
80...COG Facilitated peer groups, technical committees and task teams coordinate our approach to issues our members say matter most
50,000...entries in the fully searchable OPEX database, including select INPO and WANO reports
18
Plant Managers and Support
Functions Forum
Operations Managers PG
Health & Safety PG
Outage Managers PG
Work Control Managers PG
Maintenance Managers PG
Fuel Handling PG
Radiation Protection Managers PG
Supply Chain Managers PG
Training Managers PG
Fire Protection PG
Chief Nuclear Engineers Forum
Engineering Managers PG
• Piping NDE PG
• Equipment Reliability PG
• Pressure Boundary PG
• Procurement Eng/Supply PG
• Environmental Qualification TT
• Plant Computer TT
• Electrical Safety TT
• ISI TT
• Design Basis TT
Nuclear Safety PG
• Safe Operating Envelope TT
• NOP/ROP TT
• Risk and Reliability TT
• BEAU Methodology TT
• SAMG Implementation TT
• CANDU Safety Issues TT
• Safety Analysis Improvement TT
Fukushima CANDU Industry Integration
Team (CIIT)
Reg. Affairs VPs Forum
Regulatory Affairs Managers PG
• Integrated Safety Review TT
• New License & LCH Approach TT
• Performance Indicators TT
• OP&P’s TT
• Hours of Work TT
Nuclear Environmental Affairs PG
• Environmental Management Systems TT
COG-IAEA Interaction Framework
Improvement Team
R&D/Technology Forum
Fuel Channels TC - R&D - Projects
• PT Crack Initiation WG
• Deformation WG
• Corrosion & Deuterium Ingress WG
Health, Safety & Environment TC
Chemistry, Materials & Components TC
• SG Non-Destructive Examination WG
• SG Material Integrity WG
• Concrete WG
• Steels WG
• Chemistry WG
Safety & Licensing TC
• Physics WG
• Containment & Severe Accident WG
• Thermalhydraulics WG
• Fuel Normal Operating Conditions WG
• Fuel and Fuel Channels WG
Industry Standard Toolset SC
• Physics Codes User Groups
• Containment and Severe Accident Codes User Groups
• Thermalhydraulics Codes User Groups
• Fuel and Fuel Channels Codes User Groups
Plant Refurbishment
Forum
19
Information Exchange
Meetings & Workshops at COG
Meeting Title Meeting Date Meeting Facilitator and Contact Info
NSCR - Knowledge Management Meeting May 22-24, 2013 John Sowagi john.sowagi@candu.org
NPDS Meeting June 2-21,2013 John Sowagi john.sowagi@candu.org
COG Work Control Managers Peer Team Meeting June 4-6, 2013 Ken Keown ken.keown@candu.org
Engineering Managers Peer Group Meeting June 11, 2013 Patrick Chan patrick.chan@candu.org
Ice Plug Workshop July 9-10, 2013 Aki Tanaka aki.tanaka@candu.org
Radiation Protection Conference Aug 19-21, 2013 Kerry Clemen kerry.clemen@candu.org
NPDS Meeting September 8-27, 2013 John Sowagi john.sowagi@candu.org
Pressure Boundary Peer Group Meeting September 10-11, 2013 Patrick Chan patrick.chan@candu.org
Engineering Managers Peer Group Meeting September 16, 2013 Patrick Chan patrick.chan@candu.org
Liquid Zone Workshop September 25-26, 2013 Ken Keown ken.keown@candu.org
Equipment Reliability Peer Group / CBM Meeting October 2-3, 2013 Patrick Chan patrick.chan@candu.org
Training Manager Peer Group Meeting October 21-22, 2013 Kerry Clemen kerry.clemen@candu.org
The Operating License Meeting - Knowledge
Management October 23-24, 2013 John Sowagi john.sowagi@candu.org
Fuel Handling Peer Group Meeting November 4-6, 2013 Kerry Clemen kerry.clemen@candu.org
S-99 - Knowledge Management Meeting November 20-21, 2013 John Sowagi john.sowagi@candu.org
Nuclear Valve Conf/Workshop December 2-4, 2013 Kerry Clemen kerry.clemen@candu.org
Regulatory Issue Mgmt Meeting December 4-5, 2013 John Sowagi john.sowagi@candu.org
Engineering Managers Peer Group Meeting December 9, 2013 Patrick Chan patrick.chan@candu.org
FAC Workshop December 12, 2013 Aki Tanaka aki.tanaka@candu.org
The Operating License Meeting - Knowledge
Management October 24, 2014 John Sowagi john.sowagi@candu.org
20
The Information Exchange Process
21
Information Exchange Process
A weekly OPEX screening meeting is held at COG
Includes OPEX experts from CANDU Member organizations, selected technical resources and WANO participation (PWR and BWR info)
Participants agree on significance, further distribution and follow-up
22
Information Exchange OPEX Weekly Screening Results
In 2012:
1,045 events were reviewed and analyzed from CANDU stations Nuclear Industry, and others
43% of these select events were deemed Actionable by the COG Member sites
23
MAJOR EVENTS
24
Major Events for CANDU/PHWR 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item”
Turbine Lube Oil Purification
System Fire
On January 1, 2013, while
Pickering Unit 1 was in an
outage, a turbine lube oil
purification system skid fire
occurred.
A station emergency was
declared for the fire, and the
turbine hall was evacuated.
Emergency response team
members responded to the
fire, which was declared
extinguished 20 minutes
after it was reported.
One of the three
heating elements in the
heater for the
purification system
remained energized
when its associated
switch was in the “off”
position
The fire caused
extensive damage to
the turbine lube oil
purification skid and
overhead cable trays,
as well as ancillary
damage to a nearby
hydrogen system panel
Damage to the
overhead cable trays
led to 45 additional
days of outage work for
replacement
INPO IER
Level 3 (1 is
highest)
COG Action
WANO
Noteworthy
Awaiting
feedback
INPO IER Level 3
events may be
reviewed at Peer
Review
25
Turbine Lube Oil Fire Photos
Lube Oil Purification Skid
Cable Tray Fire Damage
26
Major Events for CANDU/PHWR 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item”
Loss of One Phase of Off-Site Power
Causes Loss of Maintenance Cooling
(Rev 1)
The maintenance cooling system
(MCS) pump at Bruce A Unit 1
tripped on electrical protection.
Operators attempted to restore
maintenance cooling using the
alternate MCS pump, but it failed
to start. After several attempts,
neither MCS pump could run for
more than several minutes before
tripping on electrical protection,
and a loss of maintenance cooling
was declared. At this point, the
time to reach 90 degrees Celsius
was more than seven hours.
The direct cause of the
loss of maintenance
cooling was an
ungrounded open
phase condition on a
230-kV drop line to the
in-service system
service transformer
The high-voltage
ground fault alarm
credited to monitor for
open phase or
imbalance conditions
on the in-service TSS
did not alarm and
indicate a fault.
There was an
insufficient review of
previous operating
experience
INPO IER
Level 3
COG Notable
WANO
Noteworthy
2 of 5 members
27
Major Events for CANDU/PHWR 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item” Rupture of Calandria Over Pressure
Relief Devices Due to a Moderator
Cover Gas Explosion IAEA IRS 8216
(OPEX #49946
Tarapur Unit 4 – On June 9, 2011, just
after completion of maintenance work
involving replacement of Self Powered
Neutron Detectors in Vertical Flux Control
Unit, an explosion took place in the cover
gas space leading to simultaneous
rupture of all the OPRDs. The reactor was
in Guaranteed Shutdown State at that
time. A combination of factors like an
increase in conductivity of the moderator,
a stoppage of the re-combiner units and
non-sampling of cover gas, led to build up
of deuterium in the cover gas space.
Maintenance activities on Vertical Flux
Units allowed air ingress into the cover
gas and provided oxygen for an
explosion. Following the incident,
inspections and functional tests were
carried out to ensure healthiness of Safety
System Components (SCC) especially
critical components located inside the
calandria. No abnormality was found in
any of the SSCs
Addition of gadolinium
nitrate to moderator
increases the moderator
conductivity and
enhances the rate of
radiolytic decomposition
of moderator even during
reactor shutdown due to
the presence of a
radiation field.
This can lead to an
increase in deuterium
concentration in the
cover gas space
COG Notable 2 of 5 members
28
Major Events for CANDU/PHWR 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item” Report on Feeder Pipe Crack of
Channel S-11
2011-10-05 (OPEX #49461)
KANUPP - During a planned outage, Channel S-11 was isolated with freeze plugs to investigate why it had been indicating a higher temperature than surrounding channels. The Grayloc seal flange was opened and a bolt was found in the orifice. The system was then normalized with core cooling through the standby cooling system. After three hours the B/R MPCa high alarm for a D2O leak near south reactor face floor was received. A D2O stream was coming out from S-11 feeder pipe near the point at which ice plug was formed. After the leak was controlled, about 1200 Kg D2O was collected in drums
The crack in the
feeder pipe
developed due to
expansion of trapped
water in between the
two ice plugs made
side by side, due to
lack of knowledge
and thus wrong
judgment of the
personnel executing
the job
COG Notable Actioned by COG
(event was prior to
collation of member
responses)
29
Major Non-CANDU/PHWR Events 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item” Lessons Learned from Long-Term
Flood
WANO MER ATL 12-157 (OPEX
#50251)
Fort Calhoun (FCS) – Personnel learned many lessons as they prepared for and dealt with flood mitigation, due to snow melt and historic amounts of rain which increased runoff in the Missouri River basin. This necessitated water releases from dams upstream of the FCS that were more than double previous releases. On June 6, 2011, while the station was in a refuelling outage, the Missouri River level at FCS approached 1,004 feet, at which point FCS declared a Notification of an Unusual Event (NOUE). Maximum water level at FCS peaked at 1,006 feet 10 inches on June 25. FCS exited the NOUE on August 29. FCS is designed for a flood level of 1,014 feet. The river level is typically below 1,000 feet.
Ensure that an adequate
site elevation survey is
available
Review flood response
plans to ensure sufficient
off-site power is
maintained
Ensure plans take into
account safety-related
electrical and plant
service systems
COG Notable
WANO
Noteworthy
1 of 5 members
30
Major Non-CANDU/PHWR Events 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item”
Reactor Scram and Loss of Offsite
Power at Wolf Creek WANO EAR ATL 12-001 Wolf Creek experienced a catastrophic failure of a turbine generator output breaker that locked out the 345-kV switchyard East Bus and main generator, resulting in a scram and generator trip. Transfer from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) to the Start-up Transformer (SUT) occurred as designed. The SUT protective relaying unexpectedly tripped on phase differential, resulting in the loss of the switchyard West Bus and a loss of off-site power (LOOP). Both Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded, supplying power to both Emergency Buses. A natural circulation cool down was initiated because the Reactor Coolant Pumps were unavailable. Off-site power was subsequently restored to the non-vital buses using back feed through the UAT 98 hours later. Initial troubleshooting did not identify the cause of the 13 January SUT trip, and the Start-up Transformer tripped again on 13 February 2012 during an attempt to start a Reactor Coolant Pump. The response to the failure was complicated by a water hammer, degraded equipment and difficulties in restoring fire water
• An unusual event was declared as a result of a LOOP for more than 15 minutes
• The cause of the generator output breaker failure could not be definitively determined based on the extent of damage
• The output breaker was less than three years old. The suspected cause was particulate foreign material from the manufacturing process
COG Notable
WANO Noteworthy
3 of 5 members
31
Major Non-CANDU/PHWR Events 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes
Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item” Station Blackout and Loss of
Shutdown Cooling Event Resulting
from Inadequate Risk Assessment,
WANO SER 2012-3 (OPEX #50234)
Kori-1 was in a refuelling outage with reactor coolant system temperature at 36.9 deg C. During testing of generator protection relays, the main transformer circuit breaker tripped open, leading to a loss of offsite power. The emergency diesel generator failed to start as designed, due to the failure of the start-up air supply solenoid valves. As a result, power was lost to the operating residual heat removal pump. Power was restored within 12 minutes. The licensee did not report the station blackout event and subsequent loss of shutdown cooling to the regulatory body in a timely manner, reporting one month after the event occurred. Outage work activities required to be performed in a particular sequence during an outage should have a clearly identifiable link or easily identified relationship between the activities.
• Failure to declare an emergency alert or inform the regulator in a timely manner.
• Inadequate rigour in risk assessment and outage schedule management was identified.
COG Notable
WANO SER and
Noteworthy
4 of 5 members
32
Major Non-CANDU/PHWR Events 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item”
Performance Issues with Seismic
Instrumentation and Associated
Systems for Operating Reactors, NRC
IN 2012-25 (OPEX #51125) NRC –
Performance Issues with Seismic Instrumentation and Associated Systems for Operating Reactors – Recent occurrences where seismic instrumentation and associated monitoring and alarm systems did not provide reliable indications or alarms, preventing plant operators from promptly determining if the ground motion levels exceeded the Operating Basis Earthquake levels. Plant operators rely upon the proper calibration and functioning of seismic instrumentation and the associated seismic alarm system to enable them to make timely decisions about whether a plant may continue to operate and whether it fully conforms with the licensing basis during and following an earthquake. In addition, the examples in this IN illustrate the importance of licensees understanding the design, operation and performance of their seismic instrumentation
• By evaluating the performance of seismic instrumentation and associated alarm systems and considering the appropriate actions, licensees can assure more accurate earthquake ground motion recording and better information for plant operators during any seismic activity at their plant sites.
COG Notable 1 of 5 members
33
Major Non-CANDU/PHWR Events 2012 and 2013
Event Impacts and Causes
Industry Significance
COG Member Follow-up as an
“Actionable Item”
Increase in Loss of Decay Heat
Removal (DHR) Events,
WANO WER ATL 12-0586 (OPEX
#50744) This report addresses increased losses of Decay Heat Removal (DHR) in reactor vessel shutdown cooling (SDC) and spent fuel pool cooling (SFPC) during outages. Eleven losses occurred in the first half of 2012 compared to 10 in the previous year. In addition, 8 losses of SDC occurred in 2011, increasing from 5 in 2010. The major causes of these events are human error and design vulnerabilities. Industry representatives from stations experiencing a loss of DHR in the last 12 months met to determine if there are gaps in industry guidance that, if corrected, could reverse the adverse trend in loss of DHR events
• The number of losses of SDC and SFPC increased during the past year.
• This report describes industry insights and recommended actions from that review, as well as additional insights from detailed analyses of the events.
COG Notable
34
Notable OPEX Q3 2013
Post-Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident Lessons Learned (R1). WANO SOER 2013-2. Implementation of recommendations is expected and will form part of the 2014 WANO evaluations
Discovery of Non-Compliant Environmental Qualification Connectors 2 Units SD. Event will be discussed later in the presentation.
High Pressure ECCS Unavailability due to Gas Isolation Valves Failure to Open. Test results exceptions need to be thoroughly investigated
Boiler Safety Relief Valves Fail To Operate During Test. The PM did not include the pressure switches which drifted and failed to protect the design basis
35
Notable OPEX Q3 2013
Offsite Notification due to Electrical Fault in Switchyard Resulting in Personnel Injuries. Personnel were inadequate trained and failed to wear the proper PPE for the task.
Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture WANO report. The reports identifies the traits and behaviours required for a positive Safety Culture.
Guidelines for the Excellence in Fire Protection Program Implementation, WANO report. Guide is to be used to assess the health of the program, improve ownership and accountability and ensure readiness of personnel and equipment to respond to fires
36
EXAMPLE OF COST SAVINGS
37
Information Sharing Means
Cost Savings
Pt. Lepreau GS OE
On Oct.10, 2011 at Qinshan Unit 1 during a normal fuelling sequence when the closure plug was being reinstalled into channel it was observed that the jaws of the closure plug could not be released and the reactor was forced into an unplanned outage (6 days)
It was confirmed that the internal mechanical transmission system of the latch ram failed and that 6 shoulder screws of the ram worm were broken off
38
Sketch Picture of Bolts Connection
Information Sharing Means
Cost Savings
39
Broken Bolts Remained in Internal Gear (marked in red)
Information Sharing Means
Cost Savings
40
Point Lepreau Fuel Handling completed an applicability review of this OE:
notifications and subsequent work orders were raised
the six bolts were changed out in each of the four rams
Information Sharing Means
Cost Savings
41
Point Lepreau as Found Condition
Information Sharing Means
Cost Savings
42
Information Sharing Means Cost Savings
Lepreau likely avoided a possible issue which could have delayed start up or possibly caused an unplanned outage when fuelling resumed
Cost of an outage to complete this repair app. $ 4 - 6 million.
Actual cost of repair $6000
43
PREVENTING REPEAT EVENTS
IMPACT OF SHARING IN PEER GROUPS
44
Information Sharing Means Preventing Repeat Events
COG monitors what follow-up actions are taken
encourages all Members to take action on the most important events
Follow-up is reviewed and shared
promotes best and most effective actions
A quarterly ‘Top-Ten’ OPEX for Executives
to help them check that the important issues are being adequately addressed in their organizations
Key events reviewed at Peer Team meetings
and lessons learned and root cause reviews are routinely shared.
45
Impacts of Sharing in the Peer Forums Example 1: Human Performance
The Human Performance PEER Group
Focused on Human performance precursors
Developed a list of HP precursors which if monitored can be used to prevent HP events
HP precursors were developed from indicators sites are already monitoring
Prepared a Guide to identify the precursors and included an implementation recommendation
Results
Guide used to reduce HP events . Issued 2013.
46
Impacts of Sharing in the PEER Groups Example 2: EQ Maintenance
47
Impact of Sharing in the PEER Forums Example 2: EQ Maintenance
Field surveillance by the System Engineer revealed EQ was not being maintained
In the photo the 2 red dots need to line up – they were offset
Extended condition review discovered other non-conformance issues
Resulted in a 2 Unit Shutdown
48
Impacts of Sharing in the Peer Forums Example 2: EQ Maintenance
Effective Workshops and PEER teams generate networks/contacts that share info and provide support
The as found EQ issue site was quickly communicated to PEERs
Other Stations did immediate surveillances to determine if they had the problem
The contacts were working on the issue before any official OPEX was issued
Feedback was received that several hundred items had been checked and no issues were discovered at the other sites
49
Impact of Sharing in the PEER Groups Example 2: EQ Maintenance
EQ PEER Group is preparing a EQ field book -95% complete
Booklet used to train new EQ Engineers and provide a guide during field surveillance
Booklet will be of value to Maintenance planning and Execution as it has descriptions and photos on what good looks like
50
Example 3 – Post Fukushima Peer Group Discussion – 7 Members
3. Modifications
Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 Member 6 Member
7 3.1. Are you installing an external water line to the calandria?
No Yes No No. Not currently planned.
Not currently planned.
Yes
3.1.1. Vault? Yes Yes Yes. Yes Under consideration.
Under consideration.
Yes
3.1.2. Ends shields?
Yes Yes No. No Would be part of 3.1.1 Vault.
Would be part of 3.1.1 Vault.
Yes
3.1.3. Steam generators?
Yes Yes Already present through ECCS.
Yes Yes. Yes. Yes
3.1.4. PHT system?
Yes No Already present through ECCS.
Yes Yes. Yes. Yes
3.1.5. Spent Fuel Bay?
No.but a emergency plan to make up water to SFB has been issued.
Yes Yes. Yes Yes. Yes. Yes
3.1.6. Scheduled in-service dates for each?
31-Dec-11 I/S Plant Operation after refurbishment
Expected in-service date is December 2013.
31 December 2014 for 3.1.1 & 3.1.2 above. 31 December 2012 for 3.1.3, 3.1.4 & 3.1.5 above.
31 December 2015 for 3.1.1 & 3.1.2 above. 31 December 2012 for 3.1.3, 3.1.4 & 3.1.5 above.
2013
51
Example 3 – Post Fukushima Peer Group Discussion – 6 Canadian Stations
3. Modifications 3.1. Are you
installing an external
water line to the
calandria?
Yes Yes Yes – Moderator Yes – Moderator Yes –
Moderator
Complete
3.1.1. Vault? Makeup line to
shield tanks under
consideration.
Makeup line to shield
tanks under
consideration.
No Yes Yes Complete
3.1.2. Endshields? Would be part of
3.1.1 Vault.
Would be part of 3.1.1
Vault.
No Yes Yes Complete
3.1.3. Steam
generators?
Yes. Yes.. Yes Yes Yes Yes
3.1.4. PHT
system?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3.1.5. Spent Fuel
Bay?
Yes. In Service. Yes. In Service. Capability exists,
will add specific
provision
Yes Yes High
volumetric
flow rate fire
water supply
system already
installed
Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 Member 6
52
CANDU HISTORY LESSONS
53
CANDU History Lessons
1
NRX Reactor
Accident (1952)
Ref#1 Jimmy Carter
Ref#2 AECL 7760 Clean Up
Ref#3 IAEA TECDOC 1335
Ref#4 INPO 06-002
Ref#5 INPO 06-002
Ref#6 Lewis Report
Ref#7 CNSC R8
Ref#8 INPO SOER 91-1
2
Darlington Loss
of Primary Heat
Sink (1993)
Ref#1 Root Cause Investigation
Ref#2 NRC IN 90 25 Vogtle
Ref#3 INPO SOER 85-4
Ref#4 SOER 88-3Rev1
Ref#5 NEA 2006 International Experience
Ref#6 NUMARC 91-06
Ref#7 IAEA 75-INSAG-4
Ref#8 UK H&S Executive Safety Culture
Ref#9 INPO Principles for Enhancing
Professionalism of Nuclear Personnel
Ref#10 WANO SOER 2010-1
3
Fire Protection Ref#1 NEA Core Damage Frequency
Fire
Ref#2 Windscale Fire
Ref#3 Chernobyl Accident
Ref#4 Browns Ferry Fire 1975
Ref#5 Vandellos Fire 1989
Ref#6 Chernobyl Unit 2 Fire
Ref#7 Norora Fire 1993
Ref#8 Salem Unit 2 Fire 1991
Ref#9 Fermi 2 Fire 1993
Ref#10 DC Cook Fire 2008
Ref#11 Pickering Unit 2 TG Fire SER
91-0086
Ref#12 CSA N293-07 Amended 2008
Ref#13 Bruce Unit 3 Cable Fire 1979
Ref#14 Point Lepreau Carpentry Shop
Fire 1985
Ref#15 Pickering Trailer Fire 2004
Ref#16 Pickering Unit 4 RB Fire 1988
Ref#17 Pickering Unit 5 CER Fire 1994
Ref#18 NPD Chem Lab Fire 1986
Ref#19 Oak Ridges Welding Fatality
1997
Ref#20 Darlington Oxygen Fire 1999
Ref#21 Oxygen Fire at CRL 2006
54
CANDU History Lessons
4 Foreign Material
Exclusion
Ref#1 WANO FME Guidelines 2009
Ref#2 EPRI FME Guidelines 2005
Ref#3 INPO FME Examples TR4-36
Ref#4 INPO CEO Letter 2006
Ref#5 Fermi 1 Core Melt 1966
Ref#6 Bruce Unit 2 Lead Blanket 1991
Ref#7 Bruce Unit 2 Repeat Lead Blanket
1992
Ref#8 Bruce Unit 3 Feeder Chain 1980
Ref#9 KANUPP Grayloc Blockage 1991
Ref#10 Kaiga Washer in Feeder 2000
Ref#11 IAEA Trends in Fuel Performance
Ref#12 CANDU Fuel Performance 1996
Ref#13 Bruce B Debris Fretting Failures
Ref#14 Cernavoda Unit 2 Fuel Failures
Ref#15 Bruce A Fuel Failures
Ref#16 Pickering Unit 1 Fuel Fretting
Ref#17 PL Pump Failure 1995
Ref#18 Pickering Unit 6 Generator Failure
Ref#19 Pickering Unit 6 Boiler Damage
Ref#20 Gentilly 2 Moderator HX
Ref#21 Atucha Mod HX
Ref#22 Wolsung Unit 1 Turbine Trip
Ref#23 Pickering MCC
Ref#24 Pickering Unit 5 ABFP Damage
Ref#25 Darlington Standby Generator
Ref#26 Embalse Gad Tank
Ref#27 Gentilly 2 Condenser
Ref#28 Darlington SG FME Plug
5 Pickering Unit 2 Small
Loss of Coolant Accident
Ref#1 SER 94-009
Ref#2 NEA Report
Ref#3 INPO 06-003
Ref#4 Root Cause Report
Ref#5 SER 75-0087
Ref#6 SER 77-0063
Ref#7 SER 77-0146
Ref#8 NK21 SER 79-079
Ref#9 NK21 SER 79-090
Ref#10 NK21 SER 79-089
Ref#11 NK29 SER B95-037
Ref#12 Extract from COG JP Report
Ref#13 WANO-EAR-TYO-95-003
Ref#14 EAR-TYO-09-001
Ref#15 CSA N286_2_00
Ref#16 INPO_90-009
Ref#17 ACAD_98_004
Ref#18 INPO_05_002
Ref#19 INPO_SOER_94_1
Ref#20 COG_JP_95_001
55
CANDU History Lessons
6 Darlington Unit 3 Steam
Bleed Valve Fails Open
Ref#1 WANO ENR ATL 01-021
Ref#2 Event Investigation Ops
Ref#3 Event Investigation Eng
Ref#4 PRV Failure Investigation
Report
Ref#5 Wolsong 1 Event
Ref#6 Rasmussen Paper
Ref#7 INPO 06-003
Ref#8 WANO GP ATL 08-003
Ref#9 WANO Simulator Guidelines
Ref#10 NK29 SER B95 037
Ref#11 IAEA TECDOC 1169
7 Bruce Unit 1 Radiation
Overexposure Recovery of
Damaged Fuel Bundle from
Channel P13
Ref#1 Bruce Overexposure
Investigation Report (1979)
Ref#2 Pickering Overexposure
Event Presentation
Ref#3 AA Rod Over Exposure
Dosimetry Report
Ref#4 WANO SOER 2001-1
Ref#5 INPO SOER 91-1
56
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
57
RECENT CHANGES IN SHARING OF CANDU EVENTS
58
Recent Changes in Sharing of CANDU Events
Introduction
Recent Changes in Sharing of CANDU Events
Discussion of Background / Reasons
Potential Impact on COG OPEX Products
Options to Increase Sharing of CANDU Event / Equipment Failure Information
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
674 736
10541191
10681258 1247
1153 11671061
866
389
68112
304
627
517
555798
885 932
863
948
62265
59
53
83
46
13
108 4356
2544
34Ev
en
ts
Year
OPEX Events Reviewed
Misc. Events Reviewed
Industry Events Reviewed
CANDU Events Reviewed
59
OPEX Events 2011 to Q1 2013
60
Missed Opportunities
As an Industry, constant effort is required
to ensure that the right information
gets to the right people
at the right time
to solve operational issues
61
Missed Opportunities
Are we as an industry sharing all that we can to ensure and strengthen our nuclear safety and performance?
Second-Quarter INPO RP Talking Points RPD 2013-02
“We have recent examples in which internal events were not known until the INPO points of contact conducted their quarterly discussions with the utility representatives. Plant issues, challenges, and near misses should be evaluated for operating experience…”
62
Missed Opportunities
Example 1: Fuel Channel Closure Plug “stickiness” issues
recently suffered at Point Lepreau after refurbishment
it was uncovered that others had been through a similar issue but had not reported it
Result
Significant cost because of power de-ratings and potential for debris in Heat Transport
63
Missed Opportunities
Example 2: Annulus Gas System Flow Issues
A system for monitoring the integrity of the Pressure Tube or Calandria Tube
Partial system flow issue due to incorrect field installation encountered after refurbishment at one station
Required regulator involvement to approve restart with lower than design flowrates
Experience has not been shared
Result
Lessons Learn for others will not be available for those next entering Refurb
64
Missed Opportunities
Example 3: Calandria Tube to LISS Nozzle GAP Inspection
Information was not shared directly
but once learned in a COG Peer Group meeting it was entered by COG personnel into the formal OPEX process
Result
Calandria Tube integrity and safety issue
If it was not known possible fuel channel inspections/ models would be missed
65
Events like these are no longer being reported as they do not meet the WER criteria
Sample of CANDU Lower Threshold Events at Sig. 1 and 2
OPEX #
Title Event Description Consequence/Important Points
47068 Groove Wheel Wear and Washer Extrusion on the Fuel Handling Power Track
Intermediate rollers of a Fuel Handling power track, T12, have experienced groove wheel wear, extruded washers and thinning flanges. T12’s chain sag is the major cause for the trolley’s short coast.
Power track roller side load is the root cause of power track intermediate roller groove wheel wear and extruded washers. It is created primarily by sagged chain that has been allowed to accumulate and not being replaced on a timely basis.
45529 Fuelling Machine Control, 24 VDC Power Supply, 63597-PWS1 Does Not Have a Back-Up Supply
Fuelling Machine Control, 24 VDC power supply, 63597-PWS1 does not have a back-up supply. If this power supply were to fail, essentially all Fuelling Machine operations and panel indicators will be disabled.
Consequence of failure: All Auto and Manual controls of Fuel Handling System are lost. The age of the power supplies that are presently in service is approximately 35 years.
46393 Fuelling Machine (FM) Damaged Due to Use of the Snout Clamp Preloaded Mechanical Ring Force Gauge
Unit 1 West FM was damaged due to use of the snout clamp preloaded mechanical ring force gauge
The damaged FM was unavailable for three days to replace the lever arm assemblies and perform calibration.
44194 35230-NW HEAD 8B NOT FILLING HEAD-Functional Failure due to Vapour Lock of Fill Pump
Fuelling Machine Head H8B on the North-West quadrant could not be filled with D2O. It appears that air is being trapped at the suction side of the Fill Pump which results in the inability to fill the F/M Head and maintain the proper D2O level.
If spent fuel was on board the F/M Head, this could result in spent fuel being left in air and possible fuel failures. The fault appears to be a design deficiency, not a maintenance issue. Design change proposals have been issued, but not yet installed on all heads
44072 Recurrent Thermal Trip of Fueling Machine Catenary Motor
The south fuelling machine (F/M) catenary trolley refused to move due to abnormal friction with the electromechanical brake.
Recurrent catenary break issue which could ultimately lead to a station outage if such an event would occur with spent fuel on board.
43792 Modified CIGAR Closure Plug Failed Its Channel Leak Test
During a test installation of a shimmed CIGAR Modified Closure Plug (MCP) into channel S04 East End Fitting, the Fuelling Machine could not lower it's head D2O level prior to it's leak test operation.
This event resulted in requiring a repeat S04E shimmed MCP install test and approximately one day of additional critical path time.
42611 NorthEast (NE) Fuel Machine Head Level Indication Lost During Fuel Discharge - Head Flooded With Bay Water (downgraded)
When discharging irradiated fuel (I/F) to the Primary Irradiated Fuel Bay (PIFB), the ability to raise and therefore control head level was lost.
Overhaul of the valve actuators during the Unit 3-4 restart project using the latest actuator chrome sleeves would have prevented the hardened belleville washers from digging into the softer carbon steel guide .
Fuel Handling
66
INPO and WANO Event Reporting Differences
67
Considerations for Sharing
Why would we not share?
Do we forget our obligation to our industry peers?
Do we perceive it costs too much to take time to report our experience to others?
Is there an embarrassment factor?
A Competiveness factor ---commercial or IP factor?
Are we concerned about our relationships with our stakeholders, shareholders and Vendors?
Concerns with legal issues?
Are persons who approve the sharing not as familiar with the criteria as they should be?
Are the criteria not as tight or specific as they should be?
68
Recommendation to Reduce Missed Opportunities
Focus on reporting additional lower level events related to CANDU specific systems, equipment and issues
We do not want to go back to where we were with potentially excessive reporting
We are looking for CANDU specific equipment failures to share with other members
69
The Path Forward
Continue to share knowledge that has impact through the various networking forums
Encourage All utilities to look at their processes for eliminating those barriers for “timely” and “right information” and to “champion” sharing
Seek out and benchmark with those industries and utilities that are doing a good job at sharing
70
CANDU Excellence through Collaboration
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