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NRC Perspectives on Quality Assurance
ASQ 35th Annual Energy & Environmental Training and Education Conference
Raleigh/Durham, North Carolina
Glenn M. Tracy, DirectorDivision of Construction Inspection &
Operational ProgramsSeptember 16, 2008
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NUREG-1055• First published in 1984• Significant quality-related concerns included:
– Inadequate management control– Lack of construction experience and false sense of
security based on prior successes– Failure to encourage problem reporting and
resolution– Failure to appropriately delegate– Lack of clear communication
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NUREG-1055 (continued)
• Continuing validity of NUREG-1055 concerns:– Olkiluoto 3 in Finland– Lungmen in Taiwan– Flamanville-3 in France– MOX facility
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Construction and Operational Experience Program
• Updated NRC-INPO MOA to include new builds• Issued a RIS on lessons learned on ITAAC reviews• Issued an IN on counterfeit parts• Drafted an IN on 3 concrete-related ConE events• Drafted an NRO office instruction on ConE process• Facilitated exchange of inspectors with Finland and
Taiwan• Significant interactions with international counterparts• Evaluated 82 operating experience (OpE) events
applicable to the design and construction of new reactors
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Example 1: Catawba AFW pump inoperability due to potential flooding protection deficiencies
• In January 2008, Catawba discovered that restrictor plates were not welded over floor drain openings (EN 43945)
• Cause: Failure of the licensee QA program and construction oversight
• OpE/ConE process results:
– Event is applicable to all new reactor designs and is safety-significant because of a loss of a “passive” flood barrier
– Identified specific improvements for NRC construction inspectionprocedures (IMC 2503 and IMC2504)
– Similar past experiences were examined and was concluded that a generic communication (information notice) is warranted
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Example 2: Unidentified Piping Weld Joints at YGN-3
• KINS inspector found an unidentified weld joint in the safety injection system piping during installation inspection (inspection of NDE of adjacent weld joints)
- Requested a radiographic examination of the weld- Verified it was an unidentified weld joint
• The inspector required the licensee to examine all piping of thesafety class and seismic category in YGN # 3 & 4
- 43 unidentified weld zones including those of the non-safety class were additionally discovered
- All of them were cut out, re-welded and documented
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piping Piping penetration
Head plate
Concrete wall
piping
Head plate type support
Unidentified Piping Weld Joints (cont’d)
– Cause• Misalignment of the final weld joint
of a piping fixed by head plate / piping weld
• Workers cut the original piping and inserted pups
• Weld joint was neither inspected nor documented
– Lesson• Importance of installation order to
avoid difficulty in fabrication
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Worldwide Construction
Argentina
Canada
France
Finland Russia
Slovakia
Iran
Pakistan
India
China
Taiwan
S. Korea
Japan
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Vendor Inspection Insights• Inadequate implementation of Part 21
requirements (IN 2007-40)• Inadequate commercial grade
dedication programs (lack of engineering involvement)
• Inappropriate use of commercial supplier surveys
• Unfamiliarity with NRC regulations (new and existing suppliers)
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International Cooperation• Active member of newly-formed Vendor
Inspection Cooperation Working Group (VICWG)
• Joint activities conducted with Korea, France, Finland, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and Japan
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Quality Assurance Topics
• Licensing Reviews• Design Verification Inspections• Standards Development Activities
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Future Activities/Initiatives• Anticipate increasing number of vendor
inspections in future fiscal years• Public workshop on NRC QA and
reporting requirements in the planning stages
• Expansion of international cooperation• Focus on programs and training to
identify counterfeit parts
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