Minorities and Democratization

Minorities and Democratization

David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran

Columbia UniversityBahar Leventoglu

SUNY – Stonybrook

Project Background Interested in Racial Gerrymandering in the US

In the 1990’s, saw many Republican-Black Democrat coalitions in redistricting

Makes sense electorally: concentrating black voters in a few districts helps elect Republicans elsewhere

But not for policy – one side has to do better

So do this with numbers Estimate plans that maximize substantive represen-

tation, and those that maximize descriptive rep. Are they the same, or is there a tradeoff?

Findings In the 1970’s & 1980’s, maximize substantive

representation by electing blacks to office But starting in 1990’s, do better by creating

districts of no more than 45% black At that point, good chance of electing minority

rep. But don’t lose too much influence elsewhere

On the other hand, maximize # of minorities elected by concentrating up to 75% BVAP Not the same as maximizing substantive rep. So a Pareto Frontier has emerged over time

Lessons: AP Version Districting can give minority voters:

A lot of influence in a few districts, or Less influence in more districts

At times one strategy is best, at times the other may be superior

In the US, the answer changed due to: Decreased polarization in the electorate Increased polarization in Congress

Lessons: CP Version In a majoritarian system, minorities

must form coalitions to influence policy There are two ways to do this:

In elections, via encompassing parties, or In the legislature, via vote trading

Political institutions can favor one of these alternatives over the other This holds true for all types of minorities

Segue into this paper… So, within majoritarian systems:

institutions coalitions min. influence But of course, many systems are not

majoritarian This is itself an object of choice and change Minorities don’t always do better

w/democracy Voting to Violence

Important issue now in many places

Questions – Reciprocal Effects How does the presence of ethnic

factionalization affect democratization? Does it make it easier or harder to

transition to democracy? Does it matter if the ruling party is from

the majority or minority group? How does democratization affect

minorities? More discrimination, or less?

Model – Acemoglu & Robinson

• Society with two classes: upper (U) and lower (L)

• Group i is proportion i of the population, with L>U

• Total wealth x in society, U starts with x, U

U

L

Model – Acemoglu & Robinson

U

L

L

• Only issue is degree of redistributive taxes ()• U, of course, wants L would tax rich & transfer

• At first, only U members can vote, but can democratize

Game TreeU: Democratize?

Y N

L: Set L U: Set U

L: Revolt?

Y N

U

Nature

U

Success Not

R

Note: For A&R,revolutionaryoutcome destroysproportion of economy, and Ugets 0 utility.

For us, lose as before, but then move to democracy.

“RevolutionaryOutcome”

Model – ELO

U

L

1 2

• To A&R model, we add a second ethnic group

• Assume L>U, and 1>2 (so L1 is largest group)

• Groups decide independently whether to uprise.

Revised Game Tree

Model – ELO• So now, two taxes are possible: economic and ethnic

• Ethnic tax 2 yields “discrimination rents” to majority

U

L

1 2

e

2

Note: 1 is always 0 in equilibrium.

Model – ELO

U

L

1 2

• In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {e, 2}

• If L1 has a majority, proposal passes

• Otherwise, form coalition:

Model – ELO

U

L

1 2

• In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {e, 2}

• If L1 has a majority, proposal passes

• Otherwise, form coalition: L1-U1 (ethnic)

Model – ELO

U

L

1 2

• In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {e, 2}

• If L1 has a majority, proposal passes

• Otherwise, form coalition: L1-U1 (ethnic) or L1-L2 (class)

Note: Reversionpolicy in case of disagreement is e=2=0.

Equilibrium In autocracy, U1 sets {e=0, 2=1} No way to credibly commit to any

e>0 other than democratization Check equilibrium under democracy

and see which U1 prefers If L1 > 50% of the population, then

it sets {e=1, 2=1} So focus on L1 < 50% case

Implications Less peaceful democratization the

larger is 2, the size of the minority Peaceful democratization occurs at

intermediate levels of uprising cost

Either both L1 and L2 revolt together, or L2 alone revolts

Probability of transition independent of size of the economy (x)

Extensions Power Sharing in Autocracy

U1 can attract L1 or U2 as coalition partner

Democracy can be worse for minorities U2 starts off in power

Makes peaceful transitions less likely Two-period model with class mobility

Induces upper-lower class sympathy Increases likelihood of transitions with

anti-minority coalition in democracy

Conclusions Ethnic diversity reduces the

probability of peaceful democratic transitions Upper class loses discrimination rents

Lower class does well in: Autocracy violence potential Democracy numbers

Addresses question of when politics revolves around an ethnic dimension