View
216
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
May 23, 2018 Midwest Reliability Organization
380 St. Peter Street, Suite 800 Saint Paul, MN 55102
Midwest Reliability Organization 2018 Spring Reliability Conference
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS Page 1 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Logistics Wednesday, May 23, 2018
Breakfast A catered hot breakfast will be provided from 7:00 a.m. – 8:00 a.m. in the lounge of the conference area. If you have any dietary restrictions, please see a person at the registration table or the server in the lounge.
Beverages Beverages will be available in the conference room, as well as in the lounge. Please help yourself.
Lunch A catered lunch will be provided. If you have any dietary restrictions, please see a person at the registration table or the server in the lounge. Please follow the emcee’s instructions for dismissal to lunch.
Restrooms Restrooms are located outside of the conference room, as well as on floors 7 and 10. If you choose to use a restroom on another floor, please take the elevators. The staircases only open on the first floor.
Conference Etiquette As a courtesy to presenters and conference participants, please observe the following rules of conference etiquette: • Silence all of your electronic devices prior to sessions• Please defer to speakers’ preferences for questions;
however, when you ask your question, please wait fora microphone runner to come to you first, for thebenefit of those that are located in the overflow room
• Be seated prior to the beginning of each session
Name Badges Please wear your name badge at all times.
Conference Evaluation Your feedback is appreciated; a feedback form is included in this packet. Please complete the form and leave it at your seat or place it in the feedback form box at the registration table.
Luggage Storage for any size travel luggage can be found in MRO’s lobby by the registration desk. Please ask MRO staff at the registration desk for assistance.
Lost and Found An MRO representative will always be in the meeting room; however, personal belongings are left at your own risk. If you find or lose an item, please visit the registration desk. After the conference, please contact Chris Adam at: CM.Adam@MidwestReliability.org
Power Power will be supplied at the tables. Please refrain from plugging into floor outlets to minimize the hazard from tripping. Power strips are also available at the two counters within the conferencing space.
Videos/Photographs MRO may take videos or photos of its conferences and events for use on the MRO website or in MRO publications or other media produced by MRO. MRO reserves the right to use any image taken at any event sponsored by MRO, without the express written permission of those individuals included within the photograph and/or video. To ensure the privacy of conference attendees, images will not be identified using names or personal identifying information without the express written approval from the individual shown. If you do not wish to have your image taken for future publication, please notify MRO event staff. By participating in this MRO event or by failing to notify MRO of your desire to not have your image taken by MRO, you are agreeing to allow MRO to use your image as described. Thank you for your understanding and cooperation!
Page 2 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
7:00 am – 8:00 am Registration & Breakfast 8:00 am – 8:10 am Welcome
Sara Patrick, Interim President &CEO, MRO
8:10 am - 8:20 am Introduction and Conference Logistics
Emcee: John Seidel, MRO
8:20 am – 9:00 am Keynote Speaker- Opening Comments and NERC Reliability Issues Steering Committee
Lloyd Linke, MRO Board Member and NERC Operating Committee Chair
9:00 am – 9:45 am Substation Equipment Failure Modes and Mechanisms
Richard Hackman, Sr. Reliability Advisor, Reliability and Risk Management, NERC
9:45 am – 10:00 am Morning Networking Break 10:00 am – 10:45 am Transmission System High Voltage Conditions and Mitigations
Chuck Lawrence, Planning Compliance Manager, American Transmission Company
10:45 am – 11:15 am Real Time Assessment
Doug Peterchuck, Manager, Transmission Operations, Omaha Public Power District
11:15 am – 12:00 pm EMS Applications and the Impact of Unavailability
Venkat Tirupati, Manager, Market Systems, Colorado River Authority
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch/Networking 1:00 pm – 1:45 pm Managing Generation Availability in Real Time
Kevin Vannoy, Director of Market Design, Midcontinent ISO
1:45 pm – 2:30 pm SPP-RTO: Operational Characteristics
Derek Hawkins, Supervisor, Real-time &Current-day Engineering, Southwest Power Pool RTO
2:30 pm – 2:45 pm Afternoon Break 2:45 pm – 4:00 pm Human Performance and Skilled Workforce
James Merlo, Vice President of Reliability and Risk Management, NERC
4:00 pm – 4:30 pm Wrap Up/Questions/Feedback Forms/Adjourn
Conference Agenda
Page 3 of 78
MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
Welcome
JohnSeidel
2018SpringReliabilityConferenceEmceeSeniorManagerofOperationsandReliability,MRO
ja.seidel@midwestreliability.org
Page 4 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
KeynoteSpeaker‐OpeningCommentsandNERCReliabilityIssuesSteeringCommittee
LloydLinke
VicePresidentofOperations,UpperGreatPlainsRegionofWAPA
lloyd@wapa.gov
Lloyd Linke is currently Western Area Power Administration’s Vice President of Operations for the Upper Great Plains Region. In his current position he is responsible for the operation, planning of the Upper Great Plains Region’s transmission.
Lloyd served as the Administrator of the Alaska Power Administration prior to returning to Western. In this position he served as CEO and was responsible for all functions and business lines of the Alaska Power Administration. He has worked in several areas within the electrical power industry including maintenance, construction, power billing, marketing, and operations of high voltage transmission systems and hydroelectric generation facilities.
Lloyd has over thirty-five years of experience in the electrical power industry and received a degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from the North Dakota State University. He currently is a director on the Midwest Reliability Organization Board; on the NERC Members Representative Committee, the Chair of the NERC Operating Committee and member of the Southwest Power Pool Markets and Operations Policy Committee. He has served as a Board member of the Pacific Northwest Security Coordinator, Chair of the MAPP Reliability Committee and Regional Reliability Committee, member of MRO initial Bylaws Committee and MRO transition team.
Lloyd is happily married, with two wonderful children, and lives in Watertown, SD.
Page 5 of 78
Subject, Office or event
Opening Comments and RISCLloyd Linke, VP of Operations for UGPR
May 23, 2018
MRO Reliability Conference
St Paul, MN
Subject, Office or event
What is Western?
2
Subject, Office or event
Part of DOE
• One of 4 power marketing administrations, under DOE
• Wholesale electricity supplier
• 457 long‐term/firm power preference customers when agency formed in 1977
• Nearly 700 customers today
3
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 6 of 78
Subject, Office or event
A PMA
4
Subject, Office or event
WAPA’s Regions
5
Subject, Office or event
The Upper Great Plains Region
Covers Six North Central States - South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska
378,000 square mile Service Territory
7750 miles of Western transmission lines. Operate approx. 2800 miles of transmission owned by others.
250+ Western owned and non Western owned Substations and Taps.
6
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 7 of 78
Subject, Office or event
Where UGP Gets Its Power …. Pick‐Sloan Missouri Basin, Eastern Division
7
Subject, Office or event
NERC Reliability Issues Steering Committee (RISC)• February 2012 Standards Process Input Group recommended formation of RISC
• RISC First public meeting on October 22, 2012
• Develop of framework for thinking about risk
• Using framework to prioritize set of risk areas where NERC could apply significant resources
• First report presented to NERC Board in February and August 2013
8
Subject, Office or event
Reliability Risk Priorities Report
• Strategically defines and prioritizes risks to the reliable operation of the BPS
• Supports ERO Enterprise strategic and operational planning
• Key inputs• RISC subject matter expertise• Reliability Leadership Summit• FERC Technical Conference• Pulse Point Interviews• Review of NERC Technical Studies• DOE Grid Study
9
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 8 of 78
Subject, Office or event
Risk Profiles
10
Subject, Office or event
Changing Resource Mix
• Continued to evolve with the addition of emerging technologies.
• May not have sufficient time to develop and deploy plans in response to reliability considerations resulting from the new resource mix.
11
Subject, Office or event
Bulk‐Power System Planning• Transitioning from centrally planned and constructed resources based on forecasted load to planning based on the integration of new resources and technologies.
• Lack of visibility, certainty, and speed that these resources are being integrated, planners may lack the ability to timely update or create system models and scenarios of potential future states toidentify system reliability needs, driving the need for more real‐time operating procedures.
12
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 9 of 78
Subject, Office or event
Resource Adequacy and Performance• The resource mix and its delivery is transforming from large, remotely‐located coal and nuclear‐fired power plants, towards gas‐fired, renewable energy, DER, and other emerging technologies.
• These changes are altering the operational characteristics of the grid and will challenge system planners and operators to maintain reliability.
• Failures to take into account these changes can lead to insufficient capacity, energy, and ERS to meet customer demands.
13
Subject, Office or event
Increasing Complexity in Protection Control Systems• Failure to properly design, coordinate, commission, operate, maintain, prudently replace, and upgrade BPS control system could negatively impact system resilience and result in more frequent and wider‐spread outages.
• Asset management strategies are including greater amounts of digital network based controls for substation introducing cybersecurity risks.
14
Subject, Office or event
Human Performance and Skilled Workforce• The BPS is becoming more complex and it will have difficulty staffing and maintaining necessary skilled workers.
• The addition of significant internal procedural controls needed to maintain compliance has brought additional complexity to many skilled worker positions.
• Inadequate human performance (HP) makes the grid more susceptible to both active and latent errors, negatively affecting reliability and may hamper an organization’s ability to identify and address precursor conditions to promote effective mitigation and behavior management.
15
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 10 of 78
Subject, Office or event
Loss of Situational Awareness
• Inadequate situational awareness can be a precursor or contributor to BPS events.
• Loss of situational awareness can also occur when control rooms are not staffed properly or operators do not have sufficient information and visibility to manage the grid in real‐time.
• Insufficient communication and data regarding neighboring entity’s operations is a risk as operators may act on incomplete information.
16
Subject, Office or event
Extreme Natural Events
• Severe weather or other natural events are one of the leading causes of outages. Severe weather can cause BPS equipment damage, fuel limitations, and disruptions of voice and data communications, which can cause loss of load for an extended period.
17
Subject, Office or event
Physical Security Vulnerabilities
• Intentional damage, destruction, or disruption to facilities can cause localized to extensive interconnection‐wide BPS disruption potentially for an extended period.
18
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 11 of 78
Subject, Office or event
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
• Cybersecurity vulnerabilities can potentially result in loss of control or damage to BPS‐related voice communications, data, monitoring, protection and control systems, or tools.
• They can damage equipment, causing loss of situational awareness and, in extreme cases, can result in degradation of reliable operations to the BPS, including loss of load.
19
Subject, Office or event
Resilience Framework
• NERC Board asked RISC to:• Develop a common understanding and definition of the key elements of Bulk Power System (BPS) resilience
• Understand how key elements of BPS resilience fit in the existing ERO framework
• Evaluate whether additional steps are needed to address key elements of BPS resilience within the ERO framework
20
Subject, Office or event
Understanding and Defining Resilience
• National Infrastructure Advisory Council’s (NIAC’s) resilience framework• Robustness
• Absorbs shocks and continue operating• Resourcefulness
• Skillfully detect and manage a crisis as it unfolds
• Rapid Recovery• Get services back as quickly as possible in a coordinated and controlled
manner
• Adaptability• Incorporate lessons learned from past events to improve resilience
21
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 12 of 78
Subject, Office or event 22
Bulk Power System Resilience*
Subject, Office or event
RISC Next Steps
• Incorporate input from standing committees and recommendations from Members Representative Committee
• Monitor FERC proceedings
• RISC Webpage• https://www.nerc.com/comm/RISC/Pages/default.aspx
• RISC priority report• https://www.nerc.com/comm/RISC/Related%20Files%20DL/ERO‐Reliability‐_Risk_Priorities‐Report_Board_Accepted_February_2018.pdf
23
Subject, Office or event 24
Thank you
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 13 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
SubstationEquipmentFailureModesandMechanisms
RichardHackmanSeniorReliabilityAdvisorofReliabilityandRiskManagement,NERC
richard.hackman@nerc.net
Rick Hackman is with NERC Event Analysis, leading the Lessons Learned program and Failure Modes and Mechanisms development. Previously, he spent eight years with American Electric Power’s Transmission Substation Engineering and Regulatory Compliance groups. He built a complete Root Cause Training course with case studies and videos for AEP Transmission and NATF Operating Experience group. Before that, he had twenty-nine years of Nuclear Power experience including Licensed Reactor Operator, Radiochemist, Shift Technical Advisor, Nuclear Power Systems Trainer for Professionals, Engineering and Management, Contract Root Cause Analyst for Organizational, Management, Human Performance, and Equipment Failures, and Director Root Cause Analysis for Failure Prevention Incorporated. He wrote symptom based power plant equipment failure diagnostic assistance software for EPRI. He has a BS in Chemistry and Biology from Harding University Searcy, AR.
Page 14 of 78
Failed Substation EquipmentFailure Modes & Mechanisms
Rick Hackman, NERCMay 23, 2018
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY2
NERC Event Analysis Website
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY3
NERC Event Analysis Website
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference
Page 15 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY4
NERCTV
Placeholder slide for FMM Intro Video
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY5
Failure Modes and Mechanisms (FMMs)
Improve Equipment Reliability by Learning from Failures
• Failure Modes are what gets your attention
• Failure Mechanisms are how the equipment gets going on the path to a failure
• Equipment Failures have logical cause-and-effect relationships behind them.
• Physical Evidence Examination and Root Cause Analysis can reveal what Failure Mechanisms were involved.
• Aging is not a ‘cause.’ It is just a catch-all term for slow moving FailureMechanisms.
• Failure Mechanisms are detectable. Many can be stopped, or at least slowed down so they can be corrected before causing a failure.
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY6
Combine Failure Modes & Mechanisms w/Other EA Tools
• Improve “Addendum for Events with Failed Station Equipment”usefulness
• Capture Equipment FM&M data to discover trends and patterns just like Event Cause Codes
• Discover which FM&Ms impact Reliability most to help prioritize prevention efforts
• Develop Failure Mechanism detection methods to spot issues prior to failure
• Cross Reference FM&M with Lessons Learned (and vice versa)
• Provide a equipment failure analysis resource for engineers andfield workers
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 16 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY7
Cause Code Tree Structure
Many people involved in the Event Analysis Program are already familiar with the Cause Codes used in Event Analysis
FMM allows more equipment -specific coding.
https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/EA%20Program%20Document%20Library/CCAP_Manual_January_2018_Final_Posted.pdf
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY8
Addendum for Events with Failed Station Equipment
The Addendum for Events with Failed Station Equipment is being revised to capture FMM data.
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY9
New Draft Addendum for Events with Failed Station Equipment
Dropdown selections for Equipment Types and Failure Mechanisms
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 17 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY10
Generic Failure Modes & Mechanisms Layout
OrOr
1
1
LL20180101
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY11
Bushing Failure Modes & Mechanisms
Developing issue often
visible prior to failure
Developing issue often
visible prior to failure
Drought conditions can make this more likely
(accumulation not washed off by rain)
Developing issue often
visible prior to failure
DRAFT Bushing Failure
Approaching loss of margin to failure may
be detectable by testing or Infrared
Oil leak may be externally
visible
AND
Connection to a higher voltage source, phase to phase fault, lightning…
An External Fault on a nearby phase can
create high voltage stress on another
Beyond Design Voltage Stress
External Fault
Contamination
OR
Contains conductive uric
acid and salts
Salt
Bird Excrement
Local Pollutants
UV
HeatErosion
(usually wind driven grit / sand)
Issues for Polymer Bushings
Ass
ists
Bu
ild-u
p
Cleaning Maintenance does not keep up with
contamination (maintenance not done, not
timely, or contaminant builds up abnormally fast)
OR
Issue for Porcelain or
Polymer Bushings
Glaze / Coating deterioration
(easier to stick to)
Snow / Ice Coating
Animal
Blown objects
Bridging by object
Thrown objects
Vegetation Growth
Grading Resistor or
Choke Failure
Mechanical Failure
ImpactMechanical
Overload
Cyclic Mechanical Loading
Blown objects
Gunshot
Vehicle
Attached Weight
Line Tension
Misaligned assembly
Strong Local Vibration
Source
Wind (line movement)
Seismic Events
Seismic Events
Work in Area
Bus / Device / Support / Other
Structure Foundation Movement / Failure
Erosion
Concrete Issues
Flooding
LTA site preparation
Seismic Events
LTA footing
LTA assembly
Generic Bushing Failure Modes and Mechanisms
This includes not just the end seals, but housing defects,
bushing failures, tank (can) weld failure,
internal pressure, or other boundary
failures.
May be caused by impact, assembly
error, corrosion, LTA material choice, temperature (or
pressure) extremes or cycling
Corrosion of metal if both are present
Machining / Cutting Oil has sometimes been found in
bushings – it slowly breaks down under voltage stress
providing carbon for tracking
Seal failure
Other Foreign Material
Salts
OR
OR
ORAND
Locally Available Contaminants /
Foreign Materials
Not Necessarily Locally Available Contaminants /
Foreign Materials
Moisture intrusion
Foreign Materials left
inside by Manufacturer
Material Defects from Manufacturer
While polymer or oil impregnated paper dielectric does not ‘leak out,’ it can wick up moisture from a seal failure, increase voltage stress, and become
contaminated by other foreign matter as well. See also transformer FMM for paper breakdown products.
Leakage of Dielectric(SF6 or Oil)
Voltage stress induces Breakdown of Carbon bearing
materials
Voltage stress lines up small amounts of conductive material deposits for tracking. Otherwise they would remain at point of
entry or fall by gravity…
Contamination of Solid Dielectric
(Paper or Plastic)
Increases Voltage Stress Locally
Conductive Material where it should not
be
Voltage Stress (Plenty is available when the device is in service)
Voids
GaseousByproducts
Tracking
Internal Fault
AND
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY12
SF6 Breaker Failure Modes & Mechanisms
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 18 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY13
Oil Filled Transformer Failure Modes & MechanismsFu
ran
s in
oil
as 2
-fu
rald
ehyd
e, p
arts
per
mill
ion
Co
rre
spo
nd
ing
Dep
oly
me
riza
tio
n (
DP
) V
alu
e
Pap
er
Bre
akd
ow
n B
ypro
du
cts
Vol
tag
e c
reat
ed
from
de
cay
ing
ma
gne
tic f
ield
in
an in
duct
or
The
se 2
are
mor
e
of a
pro
ble
m f
or
pol
ym
er
bus
hin
gs
Ass
ists
Con
duc
tive
Ma
teri
al n
ot
whe
re it
sho
uld
be
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY14
Failure Modes & Mechanisms
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY15
Failure Modes & Mechanisms
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 19 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY16
Failure Modes & Mechanisms
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY17
Surge Arrester Failure Modes & Mechanisms
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY18
Capacitor Bank Failure Modes & Mechanisms
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 20 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY19
We need Reviewers, Improvement Ideas, Test & Rollout Champions
• Standardized FM&M diagrams anddefinitions
• FM&M User Guide Development
• Revised Addendum for Events with FailedStation Equipment
• Prioritize additional development
• Failure Mechanism Detection and PreventionMethodologies
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY20
FM&M Volunteers
• 1 from MRO
• 1 from BPA
• 1 from WAPA
We need more!
Volunteer Diagram Reviewers so far
Please volunteer to be part of this important industry reliability improvement process
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY21
Failed Station Equipment Failure Modes & Mechanisms
Send Failure Modes and Mechanisms Improvement Comments, Corrections, Additions, Lessons Learned, Diagnostics / Symptom Monitoring Ideas, & Failed Equipment Photos to:
Richard HackmanSr. Reliability Advisor, Reliability Risk ManagementNorth American Electric Reliability Corporation3353 Peachtree Road NE, Suite 600 – North TowerAtlanta, GA 30326404-446-9764 office | 404-576-5960 cellEmail Richard.Hackman@nerc.net
Questions? Volunteers?
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 21 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
TransmissionVoltageControlChallenges
ChuckLawrenceAmericanTransmissionCompany
clawrence@atcllc.com
Charles Lawrence is presently the Planning Compliance Manager at the American Transmission Company. He has over 35 years of experience in the electric utility industry, 20 years of experience in the Transmission Planning area, 12 years in the role of Principal Engineer, and 10 years of experience in NERC Transmission Planning compliance. Chuck has experience with performing multiple types of power system studies including steady state, dynamics, transients, harmonics, and frequency analysis. Over the years, he has been active in MRO, MISO, NATF, IEEE, EPRI, CEATI, PSERC, and ECAR activities, which included several publications. Chuck received his BSSE and MSEE degrees from Cleveland State University in Cleveland, Ohio and he is a Professional Engineer in the state of Wisconsin.
Page 22 of 78
atcllc.com
Transmission System High Voltage Conditions and Mitigations
Chuck Lawrence, Planning Compliance ManagerAmerican Transmission Company
May 23, 2018
atcllc.com 2
Overview
• Emerging Causes of Transmission System HighVoltage Conditions
• Identification of High Voltage Conditions and Causes
• Measures to Reduce Transmission System HighVoltage Levels
• Specific Examples
Transmission System High Voltage Conditions and Mitigations
atcllc.com 3
• More miles of transmission lines• More leading power factor at distributioninterconnections
• Less local generation dispatched at low system loadlevels
• More local generation is being retired than is beinginstalled
Emerging Causes of Transmission System High Voltage Conditions
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 23 of 78
atcllc.com
Identification of High Voltage Conditions and Causes
• Collect and analyze various types of historicaldata.
• Collect selected types of transmission,generation and distribution equipmentinformation.
• Model and analyze the study area under lowarea load conditions.
4
atcllc.com
Collect and analyze various types of historical data.
• Collect and analyze two or more years of varioustypes of hourly historical voltage data in the selectedstudy area. These types of data include:
– Total of the real power load in the study area– Transmission voltages, reactive power flows, and
voltage regulating device operating actions– Distribution interconnection reactive power levels– Generation interconnection reactive power levels
5
atcllc.com
Collect selected types of equipment information.
Collect selected types of equipment information including:
– Transmission• Transformer no load tap settings
• Transformer LTC controller settings– Distribution
• Reactive power device operating modes – Generation
• Reactive power capability limits
6
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 24 of 78
atcllc.com
Model and analyze the study area under low area load conditions
• Model and analyze the study area under low areaload conditions with historically adjusted reactivepower operating levels
• Run simulations and monitor these voltage andreactive power values
– Transmission voltages, reactive power flows andvoltage regulating device operating actions
– Distribution interconnection reactive power levels– Generation interconnection reactive power levels
7
atcllc.com
Measures to Reduce Transmission System High Voltage Levels
• Change transformer no-load tap settings
• Change transformer LTC controller settings
• Change capacitor bank operating modes orsettings
• Add inductor (reactor) banks
8
atcllc.com
Specific Examples
• Scenario #1 – More miles of transmissionlines
• Scenario #2 – Local generation displaced byremote generation at low system loadconditions
• Scenario #3 – More leading power factor atdistribution interconnections
9
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 25 of 78
atcllc.com
Scenario #1 – More miles of transmission lines
• In the past, there were fewer miles of 345 kV and 138 kV lines in an area and 138 kV system voltage levels needed to be raised. The 138 kV area voltages were raised by setting the no load taps of 345/138 kV transformers to the 2.5% boost position.
• Over time, more miles of 345 kV and 138 kV lines were added in the area and on occasion 138 kV area voltages became too high.
• Mitigating actions included: changing the no load tap settings of 345/138 kV transformers in the area to the nominal (neutral) tap position.
10
atcllc.com
Scenario #2 - Local generation displaced by remote generation at low system load conditions
• In the past, 138 kV system voltage levels in an area needed to be raised. The 138 kV area voltages were partly raised by setting the no load taps of 345/138 kV transformers to the 2.5% boost position and local generation helped regulate voltage at low system load conditions.
• Over time, remote generation displaced local generation at low system load conditions and 138 kV area voltages became too high.
• Mitigating actions included: changing the no load tap settings of 345/138 kV transformers in the area to the nominal (neutral) tap position and adding a local transmission inductor (reactor) bank.
11
atcllc.com
Scenario #3 - More leading power factor at distribution interconnections
• In the past, 69 kV system voltage levels in an area needed to be raised. The 69 kV area voltages were partly raised by setting the no load taps of 138/69 kV transformers to the 2.5% boost position and transmission, as well as distribution, capacitor banks were added to help regulate voltage at low system load conditions.
• Over time, the power factor of 69 kV distribution interconnections became more leading, particularly at low system load conditions.
• Mitigating actions included: changing the no load tap settings of 138/69 kV transformers to the nominal (neutral) position, changing the operating mode of distribution capacitor banks, and adding local transmission inductor (reactor) banks.
12
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 26 of 78
atcllc.com 13
Questions?
Transmission System High Voltage Conditions and Mitigations
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 27 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
Real Time Assessment Compliance Implementation Guidance
Doug Peterchuck
Manager, Transmission Operations, OPPD
dpeterchuck@opp.com
Doug Peterchuck is currently the Manager of Transmission Operations at the Omaha Public Power District. Previous work at OPPD included being the Manager of Reliability Compliance for 6 years and was an engineer within System Protection for 10 years. Previous to OPPD, Doug worked within the Substation Department at MidAmerican Energy and within the Quality Control Department at the switchgear manufacturer E.A. Pedersen Company. Doug is currently a Municipal Sector voting member of the NERC Operating Committee. Doug earned his BSEE from Iowa State University in 1993, his MSEE from Kansas State University in 2000, and an MBA from the University of Nebraska-Omaha in 2015. Doug is a registered professional engineer in the State of Nebraska and is a member of IEEE.
Page 28 of 78
NERC OCReal-time Assessment Implementation GuidanceDoug Peterchuck – NERC OC and RTATF ChairMay 23rd, 2018
RTA Implementation Guidance
NERC OC Motion to form a Task Force to
1) Investigate the compliance andreliability concerns regarding a Real‐timeAssessment (RTA) per TOP‐001‐3 R13and IRO‐008‐2 R4
2) Discuss how RTAs are completed whenthere is a loss (partial and full) of EMS
3) Develop any necessary guidance
Real-time Assessment Task Force
• Doug Peterchuck, Omaha Public Power District –RTATF Chair• Doug Hils, Duke Energy• Paul Johnson, AEP•Michelle Rheault, Manitoba‐Hydro• Saad Malik, Peak Reliability• Alan Bern, Oncor• Stephen Solis, ERCOT• Rich Hydzik, Avista• Christopher Pilong, PJM• Vinit Gupta, ITC• Steve Crutchfield, NERC ‐ Manager of OC Support• Craig Struck, NERC
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 29 of 78
•Guidance documents cannot change the scope orpurpose of the requirements of a standard.
• The contents of guidance are not the only way tocomply with a standard.
• Provide specific examples of complying with a specific requirement, otherwise Compliance Guidance approval will be denied
Principles for Compliance Guidance
•CMEP Practice Guides provide direction to EROEnterprise CMEP staff on executing compliance and enforcement activities
• Registered entities can rely upon the examples and be reasonably assured that compliance requirements willbe met with the understanding that compliancedeterminations depend on facts, circumstances, and system configurations.
Compliance Guidance Policy
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 30 of 78
https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/DraftImplementationGuidanceDL/TOP-001-3%20R13%20and%20IRO-008-2%20R4%20Real%20Time%20Assessment.pdf
RTA Compliance Guidance
Outline of RTA Implementation Guideline
• RTA Definition• RTA Under “Normal” Conditions• RTA with Loss of State Estimator/Security
Analysis• RTA – Complete Loss of EMS
RTA Compliance Guidance
RTA Definition“Evaluation of the system conditions using Real‐time data to assess existing (pre‐Contingency) and potential (post‐Contingency) operating conditions..”
• Definition does not describe “how” to dothis
• An Entity should consider developingprocesses defining how an RTA isperformed
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 31 of 78
RTA Compliance Guidance
RTA Definition“…inputs including…known Protection System and Special Protection System status…”
• The paper breaks down ProtectionSystems and Special Protection Systems(RAS)
RTA Compliance Guidance
RTA Under “Normal” Conditions• Real‐time data monitoring (SCADA)‐ Alarming (Analogs, Digitals, etc.)
• Real‐time Contingency Analysis (RTCA)‐ Self‐produced or use of 3rd party
• Use of Line Outage Distribution Factors• Off‐line studies (Using Real‐time data and
reflecting System Conditions)• Monitoring of Protection Systems and RAS
RTA Compliance Guidance
RTA – Loss of State Estimator/RTCA• Real‐time data monitoring (SCADA)‐ Alarming (Analog, Digitals, SE Status, etc.)
• RTCA (Via 3rd Party Results)• Use of Line Outage Distribution Factors• Off‐line studies (Using Real‐time data and
reflect actual System Conditions)• Monitoring of Protection System/RAS• No System Changes
‐ Referenced within Rationale of Standard‐ Should define limits within Op Plan
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 32 of 78
RTA Compliance Guidance
RTA – Complete Loss of EMS• EOP‐008‐2 R1.5 does not exempt an
entity from completing a 30‐minute RTA• Off‐line studies or applications‐ How do you supplement with Real‐
time Data and ensure the study is reflective of Real‐time Conditions
• Communication and agreements with RCsand/or neighboring TOPs
RTA Compliance Guidance
Areas of Emphasis from FERC/NERC/REs• Applicable entity must show that an RTA
was completed once every 30 minutes –In all situations
• When using offline studies to complete anRTA, the following must be met:‐ Based off Real‐time data‐ “Studies” should represent Real‐timesystem conditions
RTA Compliance Guidance
Areas of Emphasis from FERC/NERC/REs• When using a 3rd Party to complete an
RTA, an agreement should be createdbetween the entities
• Unless a Compliance Agreement (e.g.CFR) is in place, burden of proof is stillapplicable TOP
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 33 of 78
Questions?
RTA Compliance Guidance
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 34 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
EMS Applications and the Impact of Unavailability
Venkat Tirupati Manager, Market Systems, Colorado River Authority
venkata.tirupati@lcra.org
Venkat Tirupati is currently the Manager of Market Systems at Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) in Austin, TX. He serves a team that is responsible for Operations, Administration & Maintenance of Generation Management System (GMS) and several mission/business critical ERCOT Market Applications. Previously at LCRA, he was the Supervisor of EMS and Advanced Applications, serving a team responsible for all things EMS. He is also a Cyber Security Coordinator, ensuring compliance to LCRA Cyber policies and procedures. He has previously worked as Senior Reliability Engineer in the Reliability Risk Management Group at NERC in Atlanta, GA and as a Senior Software Applications Engineer at Siemens Smart Grid Division in Minneapolis, MN. Venkat’s interests include IT/OT Line of Business systems architecture, design and support and also Power Systems Engineering.
Venkat earned his Bachelor of Engineering in Electrical Engineering from University of Mumbai, India and a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering from Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago.
Page 35 of 78
EMS UNAVAILABILITY – RISK AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES
VENKAT TIRUPATI
MAY 23, 2018
Agenda
• Intro to Energy Management System (EMS)
• Risk in losing EMS
• Risk mitigation strategies
• Planning Restoration Absent SCADA or EMS
2
• Server Infrastructure- SCADA FEP/DAC
- ICCP
- Application
• Network Equipment- Firewalls/Switches
• Workstations/Consoles
• Communication Links
• Remote Terminal Unit
Components of EMS
3
• Software Applications
• Reliability Real-Time Tools
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 36 of 78
Availability of EMS
• Extremely reliable – 99.99% but….
• Outages increase the risk to reliability of grid
• Several failure modes possible
• ERO Event Analysis Process (EAP) since 2010
• Average Restoration time of 60 mins
• Lots of Lessons Learned
4
Unavailability of EMS – Risk to Reliability
• Loss of Situational Awareness
• Alarms/Real Time Calculations
• Loss of ability to remotely control
• Loss of Real Time Reliability Tools
• Potential Market Implications
• Impact on field work/schedules
5
EAP Category 1h EventLoss of monitoring or control at a Control Center such that it significantly affects the entity’s ability to make operating decisions for 30 continuous minutes or more.
Some examples that should be considered for EA reporting include but are not limited to the following:
i. Loss of operator ability to remotely monitor or control BES elements
ii. Loss of communications from SCADA Remote Terminal Units (RTU)
iii. Unavailability of ICCP links, which reduces BES visibility
iv. Loss of the ability to remotely monitor and control generating units via AGC
v. Unacceptable state estimator or real time contingency analysis solutions
6
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 37 of 78
EAP Category 1 (All vs. EMS Events)
7
8
*318 EMS events reported between October 2013 and April 2017
Contributors to Loss of EMS
9
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 38 of 78
Mitigation – Systems
10
• Pro-Active rather than being Reactive
• Architecture/Design
• Application/Server/Switches/Firewalls Backups
• Monitoring – Apps, Servers, network etc.
• Testing – after patching/fixes/features
• Disaster Recovery Test
• Good relationship with vendors
• Relevant Training
Mitigation – System Operations
• Get help from neighbors/RC
• Dispatch folks to key substations
• Conservative operations
• Plans in place for generation units
• Various means of communication
• Mock Drills
11
Mitigation – Real Time Tools
• Overlapping network models
• Offline studies
• PMU tools
• Simulator Tools
12
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 39 of 78
Planning Restoration Absent SCADA or EMS
• Planning for backup communications measures
• Planning for personnel support during system restorationabsent SCADA
• Planning backup power supplies for an extended period oftime
• Analysis tools for system restoration.
• Incorporating loss of SCADA or EMS scenarios in systemrestoration training
13
Reference Documents
• Risks and Mitigations for Losing EMS Functions
• https://www.nerc.com/comm/OC/ReferenceDocumentsDL/Risks_and_Mitigations_for_Losing_EMS_Functions_Reference_Document_20171212.pdf
• Planning Restoration Absent SCADA or EMSReport
• https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2017/06-09-17-FERC-NERC-Report.pdf
14
THANK YOU
Venkat.Tirupati@lcra.org
15
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 40 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
ManagingGenerationAvailabilityinRealTime
KevinVannoyDirectorofMarketDesigns,MidcontinentISO
kvannoy@misoenergy.org
Kevin Vannoy has over twenty-three years of Management and Consulting experience in the electric utility industry, including Regional Transmission Organizations, and regulated and deregulated markets. He has been with the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) since 2005. He is currently MISO’s Director of Market Design.
He was MISO’s Director of Forward Operations Planning from June 2015 to September 2017, his responsibilities included; Transmission and Generation Outage Coordination, Tariff Administration and Scheduling, Forecast Engineering and Seams Administration.
He was MISO’s Director of Market Administration from 2010 to June 2015, responsible for administering Auction Revenue Rights (“ARRs”), the Financial Transmission Rights (“FTR”) Markets, the Day-Ahead Energy and Operating Reserves Markets, Resource Adequacy including the Planning Resource Auction, Forecast Engineering as well as administering for the Forward Reliability Assessment Commitment and Real-Time Ex-Post Locational Marginal Pricing functions.
Kevin managed Market Services starting in 2005 following the launch of the Midwest Energy Markets. He led Market Quality and Dispute Resolution, Market Settlements, Tariff Pricing and Transmission Settlements until 2010.
Kevin has been involved with numerous Market development and improvement initiatives at MISO, including the Ancillary Services Markets implementation, Revenue Sufficiency Guarantee Allocation Redesign, Financial Transmission Rights Funding efforts, Transmission Multi-Value Project Auction Revenue Rights Allocation, Annual Resource Adequacy Auctions, and Extended Locational Marginal Pricing.
Kevin holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Florida. Prior to joining MISO, he held management roles with both the Structure Consulting Group LLC in their Regional Transmission Organization Consulting Practice, and Accenture (formerly Andersen Consulting) in their Utilities Industry Practice. Prior to joining Andersen Consulting in 1995, he served as a Commissioned Officer in the United States Navy.
Page 41 of 78
MRO Spring Reliability ConferenceMay 23, 2018
Kevin Vannoy, Director Market Design
Ensuring Resource Availability meets
Need (RAN) in MISO
Purpose & Key Takeaways
Key Takeaways:
• MISO has identified five trendsimpacting the reliable conversion ofcommitted capacity to energy
• The RAN initiative will assess the needfor enhancements to tools andprocesses to ensure adequacy eachday in line with planning criteria
Purpose: Discuss MISO’s Resource
Availability and Need (RAN) Initiative
Combined effect of five emerging trends have challenged the reliable conversion of committed capacity to energy across all
hours of the year in line with planning criteria
Key industry trends
• Aging and retirement of theportfolio’s generating units
• Outage correlation
• Growth in demand side and otheremergency-only capacity as a percent of the overall portfolio
• Growing reliance on intermittentor unscheduled resources
• Growth of variable energyresources as a major element ofthe fleet
Increase transparency of resource availability & need
Refine resource availability requirements
Improve price signals
Areas for improvement in MISO processes
3
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 42 of 78
Less energy available each succeeding year combined with increased supply and demand volatility have led to increasing
reliance on non-firm and emergency energy resources
140
150
GW
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60J‐16 F‐16 M‐16 A‐16 M‐16 J‐16 J‐16 A‐16 S‐16 O‐16 N‐16 D‐16 J‐17 F‐17 M‐17 A‐17 M‐17 J‐17 J‐17 A‐17 S‐17
EcoMax no Wind Wind NSI Emerg. Range AME Peak Load
Lower MWoffers for peaks after Winter 2016
4
Less energy available each succeeding year resulting fromaging fleet and retirements
• Higher outages
• Lower average energy offersPlanning
Year
Average Energy
Offers (MWs)
Avg. Outages
(MWs)
2014/15 126,400 16,800
2015/16 125,100 18,400
2016/17 117,100 22,600
YearCombined Rate
Eq. Planned Outage Factor
Eq. Maintenance Outage Factor
2011 5.34% 4.31% 1.03%
2012 5.58% 4.21% 1.37%
2013 5.56% 4.39% 1.17%
2014 6.09% 4.83% 1.26%
2015 6.33% 5.16% 1.17%
2016 6.16% 5.06% 1.10%
5
Less energy available each succeeding year from increasing impact of outage correlation
• Outages have been a significant factor in the 12Maximum Generation Emergencies since June 1, 2016
6
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 43 of 78
Forced, Planned, and Maintenance Outages Affect Availability During the Summer
7
Less energy available each succeeding year from growth of reliance emergency-only resources like demand response
• The markets have varying levels of demand responsebut not all are emergency-only like MISO
https://ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2017/DR-AM-Report2017.pdf p.198
LMRs at MISO can have long notification times, summer only obligations and require an emergency declaration to access
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
Notification Time (mins) Obligation Meas. Method Type Emergency
LMR characteristics at MISO
Pre-Emergency
Emergency
Capacity-only
Metered
M&V
FSL
Annual
Summer
>240
121 to 240
61-120
31-60
0-30
9
>240 mins Summer Metered Capacity Emerg-ency Only
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 44 of 78
Emergency procedures increasingly requiredto access certain resources needed
to mitigate unit availability issues
Emergency Operating Procedures guide operator actions when an event has the potential to, or actually does, negatively impact system reliability
Conservative System
Operations
Severe WeatherAlert
Hot WeatherAlert
Cold WeatherAlert
Geo-Magnetic
Disturbance Warning
Maximum GenerationEmergency Procedures
Tier I Emergency
PriceOffer Floor
Tier II Emergency Price Offer
Floor
10
14,00012,00010,0008,0006,0004,0002,000
06/1/2015 9/1/2015 12/1/2015 3/1/2016 6/1/2016 9/1/2016 12/1/2016 3/1/2017 6/1/2017 9/1/2017 12/1/2017 3/1/2018
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
11
6/1/2015 9/1/2015 12/1/2015 3/1/2016 6/1/2016 9/1/2016 12/1/2016 3/1/2017 6/1/2017 9/1/2017 12/1/2017 3/1/2018
NSI
Less energy available each succeeding year means increased reliance on intermittent or unscheduled resources
• These resources regularly vary from 2 to 12 GWsWind
Less scheduled energy available each succeeding year through growth of variable energy resources
• Significant growth is expected for solar and wind asillustrated by MISO’s generator interconnection queue
12
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 45 of 78
For each topic MISO will evaluate the sufficiencyof its current tools and investigate solutions
Emergency Resources
Rule set Performance
Cleared volume
Procedures to access capacity
Timing to obtain output
Availability Management
Rule set Incentives
Performance
Off-peak management Expected summer peak
outages
Utility cash flowsState of Market recommendation
State and MISO roles
Resource Requirements
Reserve margin assumptions
Capacity accreditation PRA resource mix
Seasonal efficiencies and risks
Resource accreditation and incentives
Availabilitymanagementassumptions
Changing resource mix
13
Current Behaviors Areas to InvestigateDependencies and
ConsiderationsExisting LMR
contractsNon-summer offer
incentivesResource types
MISO is working to improve transparency and establish guiding principles in the three identified issue areas
14
MISO is interested in engaging stakeholdersin order to enhance outage coordination
Current year + 2 years:
Today: Maintenance Margin
Future: Economic scheduling or enhanced
probabilistic process informed by RAN
From 1 month to7 days out:
Today: Maintenance Margin
Future: New deterministic generator outage analysis
tool TARA
From 7 days to the operating day:
Newly enhanced Multi-Day FRAC process with
resource sufficiency alerts based on resource offers
and known outages
15
MISO’s Multi-tool process for different time horizons
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 46 of 78
Next Steps
16
• Options Underway already•
•
•
Create and integrate RAN forecasts into operations
Enable timely access to emergency-only resources
Limited enhancements to Outage Coordination underway
• Assess need and options to ensure sufficient availableenergy from committed capacity to meet planning criteria
• Assess need for additional tools, processes or marketenhancements•
•
•
More tools or market options for outage coordination?
Changes to Emergency Only Resource qualifications, Product Types, Accreditation?
Other changes to ensure committed capacity availability?
Questions?
17
Contact information• Kevin Vannoy kvannoy@misoenergy.org
Appendix
18
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 47 of 78
Maintenance MarginAccess and Overview
http://www.oatioasis.com/woa/docs/MISO/MISOdocs/Maintenance_Margin.html19
MISO’s public Maintenance Margin information Increased outages can challenge reliability outside the summer peak
‐20,000
‐10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1/1/2018 2/1/2018 3/1/2018 4/1/2018 5/1/2018 6/1/2018 7/1/2018 8/1/2018 9/1/2018 10/1/2018 11/1/2018 12/1/2018
MISO AvailableMargin
20
2018 Summer: 79% Chance of Initiating MaximumGeneration Emergency Step 2b or Higher
21
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 48 of 78
Actual performance of LMR’sDuring January 2018 Events
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0HE 8 HE 9 HE 10 HE11 HE 20 HE21 HE 7 HE 8 HE 9 HE10
Requested Delivered
22
Excess Capacity following the annual Planning Resource Auction continues to decline
23
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 49 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
SPPRTO:OperationalCharacteristics
DerekHawkinsSupervisorReal‐time&Current‐dayEngineering,SouthwestPowerPool
dhawkins@spp.org
Derek Hawkins leads a team of Southwest Power Pool engineers providing 24x7 support to the reliable operations of the nation’s power grid. Their function is key to the success of SPP's Mission: Helping our members work together to keep the lights on… today and in the future. Derek fosters relationships built on trust and integrity as he helps coordinate the integration of emerging technologies into SPP’s strategy of reliable operations.
Prior to this position, Derek served nine years as a support engineer in SPP’s operations organization focused on situational awareness, post-event analysis, and stakeholder initiatives.
Derek is a licensed Professional Engineer and NERC-Certified System Operator. He holds a BS degree in electrical engineering from Arkansas Tech University. When he's not helping to keep the lights on, you'll find him with his wife at the ball park or chasing that next adventure with their kids.
Page 50 of 78
SPP-RTO: Operational CharacteristicsDerek Hawkins, Supervisor Real Time Support
May 23, 2018
2SouthwestPowerPool SPPorg southwest-power-pool
The SPP Footprint: Members in 14 States • Arkansas• Kansas• Iowa• Louisiana• Minnesota• Missouri• Montana• Nebraska• New Mexico• North Dakota• Oklahoma• South Dakota• Texas• Wyoming
3
Helping our
members work together to keep the lights on … today and in the future.
Our Mission
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 51 of 78
4
North American Independent System Operators (ISO) and Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)
Summer Peak: 50,622 MW
Winter Peak: 43,584 MW
Minimum Load: ~20,500 MW
Operating Region • Miles of service
territory:546,000
• Population served: 17.5M
• Generating Plants: 795
• Substations: 4,929
• Miles of transmission: 66,497
• 69 kV 16,862• 115 kV 15,684• 138 kV 9,703• 161 kV 5,615• 230 kV 7,523• 345 kV 11,016• 500kV 92
5
GENERATING Capacity* by Fuel Type(87,086 MW total)
6* Figures refer to nameplate capacity as of 1/1/18
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 52 of 78
7
2017 Energy Production by Fuel Type (259,554 GWh total)
19.5%
46.3%
4.2%
22.7%
6.8% 0.6% 0.2%
Gas (19.5%)
Coal (46.3%)
Hydro (4.1%)
Wind (22.7%)
Nuclear (6.8%)
Other (0.3%)
Solar (0.2%)
8
9
Wind in SPP’s System• Wind installed today: 17,796 MW
• Maximum wind output: 15,690 MW (12/15/17)
• Wind Capacity MW (1/1/2018 – 5/8/2018) >14GW, 25 days
>14.5GW, 10 days
>15GW, 0 days
• Largest windfarm: 400 MW (Grand Prairie in Holt County, NE)
• Unbuilt wind w/signed interconnection agreements: ~10 GW
• Wind in all stages of study and development: ~60 GW
• Forecast wind installation in 2020: >20 GW (more than SPP’s current minimum load)
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 53 of 78
561 2171 01146
3827 3328
1877
52567427 7427
857312400
1572817750
1775020326
25391
30456
1775018958
22300
30650
39010
2022
4805947190 45394 45302
45873
50622 50574 50622 50718 50958
51198
16560 1670617660 18092 17370
1994820417
20465
20561
2080121041
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2020 2025 2030
Yearly Installed Capacity Total Installed Capacity Future Trend Based on 17-Year History
Future Trend Based on 9-Year History Forecasted End of the Year Installed Capacity SPP Annual Peak Load
SPP Annual Minimum Load
10
Wind Capacity Installed By Year
11
Wind Penetration
12
• Maximum wind penetration: Instantaneous: 63.96% (4/30/18) Hourly Average: 62.89% (4/29/2018) Daily Average: 54.1% (4/29/2018) Wind Penetration Highs (1/1/2018 – 5/8/2018) >60%, 6 days
>50%, 40days
• Average wind penetration (2017): ~25%
• Max wind swing in one day: >10 GW(12.5 GW to 2 GW back to 12 GW)
• Max 1-hour ramp: 3,700 MW
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 54 of 78
13
Annual Average Wind Speeds
Wind, 60,770
Solar, 17,667
Natural Gas, 1,879
Steam Turbine, 29
Storage, 1,212Pending GI Requests
14
MW Requested by Generation Type
May 11, 2018
Solar in the U.S.
15
Solar in SPP
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 55 of 78
16
Focus on renewable forecast accuracy
Offline and online VSAT
PMU siting on new generation
Flexible product evaluation
Planning process enhancements
Identify and monitor increased risk scenario contributors
Interchange Capabilities
17
2017 Congestion Patterns
18
Flowgate Name Region Flowgate Location
WDWFPLTATNOW Western Oklahoma
Woodward - FPL Switch 138 kV ftlo Tatonga - Northwest 345 kV (OGE)
NEORIVNEOBLC SE Kansas / SW Missouri
Neosho - Riverton 161 kV (WR-EDE) ftlo Neosho - Blackberry 345 kV (WR-AECI)
PLXSUNTOLYOA West Texas (Lubbock)
Plant X Sub - Sundown 230 kV ftlo Tolk - Yoakum 230 kV (SPS)
SHAHAYPOSKNO Western Kansas
South Hays - Hays 115 kV ftlo Post Rock - Knoll 230 kV (MIDW)
VINHAYPOSKNO Western Kansas
Vine - Hays 115 kV ftlo Post Rock -Knoll 230 kV (MIDW)
CARLPDLUBWOLWest Texas(Lubbock)
Carlisle - Doud 115 kV ftlo Lubbock South - Wolfforth 230 kV (SPS)
HANMUSAGEPEC Oklahoma City area
Hanncock - Muskogee 161 kV ftlo Agency - Pecan Creek 161 kV (OKGE)
SILSPRTONFLI NW ArkansasSiloam - Siloam Springs 161 kV ftlo Tonnece - Flint Creek 345 kV (CSWS-GRDA)
OSGCANBUSDEA TX Panhandle (Amarillo)
Osage Switch - Canyon East 115 kV ftlo Bushland - Deaf Smith 230 kV (SPS)
FRASPECOLMEAEastern SD /Nebraska Border
Ft. Randall - Spencer 115 kV (NPPD-WAUE) ftlo Meadow Grove - Kelly 230 kV (NPPD)
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 56 of 78
19
Flowgate Name Region Flowgate Location
WDWFPLTATNOW Western Oklahoma
Woodward - FPL Switch 138 kV ftlo Tatonga - Northwest 345 kV (OGE)
NEORIVNEOBLC SE Kansas / SW Missouri
Neosho - Riverton 161 kV (WR-EDE) ftlo Neosho - Blackberry 345 kV (WR-AECI)
PLXSUNTOLYOA West Texas (Lubbock)
Plant X Sub - Sundown 230 kV ftlo Tolk - Yoakum 230 kV (SPS)
SHAHAYPOSKNO Western Kansas
South Hays - Hays 115 kV ftlo Post Rock - Knoll 230 kV (MIDW)
VINHAYPOSKNO Western Kansas
Vine - Hays 115 kV ftlo Post Rock -Knoll 230 kV (MIDW)
CARLPDLUBWOLWest Texas(Lubbock)
Carlisle - Doud 115 kV ftlo Lubbock South - Wolfforth 230 kV (SPS)
HANMUSAGEPEC Oklahoma City area
Hanncock - Muskogee 161 kV ftlo Agency - Pecan Creek 161 kV (OKGE)
SILSPRTONFLI NW ArkansasSiloam - Siloam Springs 161 kV ftlo Tonnece - Flint Creek 345 kV (CSWS-GRDA)
OSGCANBUSDEA TX Panhandle (Amarillo)
Osage Switch - Canyon East 115 kV ftlo Bushland - Deaf Smith 230 kV (SPS)
FRASPECOLMEAEastern SD /Nebraska Border
Ft. Randall - Spencer 115 kV (NPPD-WAUE) ftlo Meadow Grove - Kelly 230 kV (NPPD)
Coordinating Congestion Management
20https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/TLR/Pages/Reliability-Coordinators.aspx
Seams Coordination
21
Congestion Management Events (CME)
Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
Reconfiguration
Operating Guides
Out-of-Merit Energy (OOME)
Market-to-Market (M2M)
• Utilize market resource dispatch to control loading
• May or may not be accompanied by a TLR
• SPP is also utilizing auto-activation for identified constraints
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 57 of 78
22
Congestion Management Events (CME)
Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
Reconfiguration
Operating Guides
Out-of-Merit Energy (OOME)
Market-to-Market (M2M)
• May be used in conjunction with CME when appropriate conditions exist:• IDC curtailable transactions• NNL impacts• External impacts
• SPP also receives notifications when another RC issues a TLR that impacts transactions sinking in BAs under SPP RC purview
23
Congestion Management Events (CME)
Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
Reconfiguration
Operating Guides
Out-of-Merit Energy (OOME)
Market-to-Market (M2M)
• In certain instances, reconfiguration of the transmission system may result in decreased loading of constrained facilities
• These options are studied by operations planning and real-time engineers*
* SPP staffs two 24x7 engineers for real-time operations support
24
Congestion Management Events (CME)
Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
Reconfiguration
Operating Guides
Out-of-Merit Energy (OOME)
Market-to-Market (M2M)
• Sometimes, local area problems warrant actions outside of the Interconnection-wide relief procedures
• SPP helps to facilitate appropriate communication, coordination, and actions needed between affected entities
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 58 of 78
25
Congestion Management Events (CME)
Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
Reconfiguration
Operating Guides
Out-of-Merit Energy (OOME)
Market-to-Market (M2M)
• Situations may arise where congestion is highly impacted by the output of non-dispatchable generation
• Operating instructions to maintain output at a certain level may be necessary
26
Congestion Management Events (CME)
Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
Reconfiguration
Operating Guides
Out-of-Merit Energy (OOME)
Market-to-Market (M2M)
• Only occurs between SPP and MISO• Initiated by either SPP or MISO• Achieve least cost re-dispatch needed
to provide the required physical relief on a flowgate
• Limited to Reciprocal Coordinated Flowgates (RCF)
27
M2M
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 59 of 78
Priority Number One: RELIABILITY
28
Safe Operating Mode (SOM) may be initiated if none of the above options
result in satisfactory flow control or do not address other reliability concerns.
Thank You
Connect with SPP:
29
SouthwestPowerPool SPPorg southwest-power-pool
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 60 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
HumanPerformanceandSkilledWorkforceJamesMerlo
VicePresidentofReliabilityandRiskManagement,NERC
james.merlo@nerc.net
James Merlo is a Vice President at NERC, leading the Reliability Risk Management department. Joining NERC in July 2011, James leads the electric reliability organization’s efforts to assess the industry status and needs with regard to events and occurrences on the Bulk Electric System and explores human performance challenges affecting bulk power system reliability. In this role, he identifies opportunities and methods for improvement based on proven methods from other industries and within the electrical industry to improve the reliability of the bulk power system. Additionally, he is responsible for ensuring that reliability based industry alerts, lessons learned, best practices and other valuable industry publications are quickly identified and communicated to the industry stakeholders and other various audiences.
James served in a variety of leadership roles in the United States Army including combat tours in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Significant positions include; Deputy Brigade Commander in Baghdad, Iraq 2004-2005 and as an assistant professor and program director at the United States Military Academy.
James has his Bachelor of Science in Human Factors Psychology from West Point, his Masters in Engineering Psychology from the University of Illinois, and his PhD in Applied Experimental and Human Factors Psychology from the University of Central Florida. He is the author of over 50 publications and book chapters on the subjects of human factors engineering and human performance.
Page 61 of 78
Midwest Reliability Organization 2018 Spring Reliability ConferenceJames Merlo, PhDVP, Reliability Risk ManagementMay 23, 2018
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY2
2017: Impacts Must be Delineated
Wind Event vs. Water Event
Hurricane Ike ‐ 2008 Wind Hurricane Harvey – 2017 Water
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY3
Two Category 5 Events to Analyze
• Hurricane Harvey’s water flooded Houston and would not quit
• Hurricane Harvey’s winds hit South Texas
85 substations damaged
225 transmission line outages
Over 850 transmission line structures downed/damaged
Over 6000 distribution poles downed/damaged
• Hurricane Irma was the largest impact storm to ever hit Florida
A record 4.45 million customers out of service for Florida Power & Light
Previous record was 3.24 million during Hurricane Wilma in 2005
Irma restoration took only 10 days versus 18 days during Wilma
22018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Conference
Page 62 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY4
• Drones hastened restoration following both Harvey and Irma with unexpected versatility
• Mutual Assistance agreements provided essential equipment and material for both Harvey and Irma restorations
• Florida and its utilities shortened Irma restoration time with strong, prior investment in system hardening
Event Analysis Key Findings & Recommendations
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY5
Events Analysis Process Capturing Faint Signals
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY6
Control Chart for the non-EMS Events (Per Month) Over Time
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 63 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY7
Control Chart for the EMS Events (Per Month) Over Time
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY8
Cause Codes
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY9
Continued Decline in Average Transmission Outage Severity
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 64 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY10
Correct Protection System Operations Rate
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY11
Misoperation Rates Continuing to Decline
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY12
Misoperation Rates Continuing to Decline
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 65 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY13
200 kV+ Outages by Cause Code
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY14
BPS Transmission Related Events Resulting in Load Loss
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY15
BPS Transmission‐Related Events Resulting in Load Loss
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 66 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY16
• Retirement/displacement of conventional generation Variable energy resources
Rapid penetration of electronically‐coupled resources
• Essential Reliability Services
Reduced inertia
Frequency Reponses
Voltage Support
Ramping and flexibility needs
• Rapid penetration of new loads
• System controls and protection coordination
• Modeling and simulation constraints
• Increasing interface with distribution‐centric resources
System Dynamic Character is Changing
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY17
Primary & Secondary Frequency Control
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY18
Human Error
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 67 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY19
Duck Curve
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY20
The Need For Flexibility:A Future, Not a Scenario
Lo
ad
& N
et
Lo
ad
(M
W)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
22,000
24,000
26,000
28,000
30,000
32,000
34,000
Load, Wind & Solar Profiles --- Base ScenarioJanuary 2020
Net_Load Load Wind Total Solar
Win
d &
So
lar
(MW
)
6,700 MW in 3-hours
7,000 MW in 3-hours
12,700 MW in 3-hours
Net Load = Load - Wind - Solar
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY21
Work as Planned
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 68 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY22
Work as Executed
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY23
Human Capital
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY24
All Trying to do the Right Thing
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 69 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY25
Sometimes it is a Human
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY26
Your Artifacts Help Define You
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY27
Risk versus Consequences
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 70 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY28
Blue Cut Fire Disturbance
• Event occurred on August 16, 2016 Not a qualified event
Entities volunteered to work with ERO
• Fire caused 13 500 kV line faults and two 287 kV line faults
• NERC/WECC ad hoc task force created to identify causes
• Published disturbance report in June 2017
• Key Findings: Use of momentary cessation
Frequency‐related tripping
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY29
Level 2 NERC Alert:Industry Recommendation
• Recommended actions: Mitigate erroneous frequency tripping
Recovery from momentary cessation
• Data collection to understand extent of condition
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY30
Clarification and Recommendation for Momentary Cessation
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 71 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY31
Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance
• Event occurred on October 9, 2017 Not a qualified event
Entities volunteered to work with ERO
• NERC/WECC event analysis, NERC IRPTF technical support
• Published disturbance report in February 2018
• Key Findings: No frequency‐related tripping
Continued use of momentary cessation
Voltage‐related tripping
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY32
Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance Aggregate Solar PV Response
~15 minutes
‐682
‐74
‐1011
Fault 1:682 – 0 = 682 MW
Fault 2:1011 – 74 = 937 MW
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY33
• No erroneous frequency tripping Actions from first Level 2 Alert appear to have mitigated identified issue
By Canyon 2 Fire disturbance, 97% of manufacturer’s BPS‐connected fleet had been updated
• Continued use of momentary cessation
Most inverters use momentary cessation (V < 0.9 pu)
Recovery following momentary cessation varies, relatively slow for grid dynamics
Updated recommendation for momentary cessation – eliminate the greatest extent possible
• Transient overvoltage tripping and application of the PRC‐024‐2 ride‐through curve
Key Findings
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 72 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY34
Key Finding: Application of Voltage Ride-Through
“May Trip Zone”
…NOT a “Must Trip Zone”
Curve is a minimum requirement, NOT design criteria.
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY35
Key Finding:Transient Overvoltage Tripping
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY36
Second Level 2 NERC Alert:Industry Recommendation
• Mitigating actions: Dynamic model improvements
Mitigation of momentary cessation
Plant control loop coordination
Mitigation of voltage‐related tripping
Information sharing among operating entities
• Planning and operations studies to ensure no potential stability risks
Response to Regional Entity of study findings by December 7, 2018
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 73 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY37
Modeling Notification: Momentary Cessation
• Issue: Existing models largely DO NOT accurately represent installed resource performance
• Identified issue that needs to be addressed for models in planning and operations studies
• Developed notification to help industry in modeling efforts
• Guidance provided as part of second NERC Alert
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY38
• Disturbance analyses and reports Blue Cut Fire, Canyon 2 Fire, (and upcoming Angeles Forest) Disturbances
• Level 2 NERC Alerts
Identifying extent of condition, and recommending mitigating actions
• IRPTF Reliability Guideline Recommended BPS‐connected inverter‐based resource performance
• Modeling and simulations
Modeling Notifications
Leading interconnection‐wide stability studies to identify potential risks
• Industry education – webinars and workshops
• Outreach to BPS‐connected non‐BES resources (e.g., < 75 MVA)
• Reliance on SGIA, LGIA, and Facility Connection Requirements
Multi-Pronged Approach
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY39
Large BES Solar Resources
Operating PV> 75 MW
Illustration Purposes Only
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 74 of 78
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY40
Operating PV> 1 MW
BPS-Connected Solar Resources
Illustration Purposes Only
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY41
Sub-cause Codes
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY42
2018 Spring Reliability Conference
Page 75 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
Wrap Up/Questions and Answers John Seidel
Senior Manager of Operations and Reliability, MRO
ja@midwestreliability.org
Page 76 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
Common Acronyms Reference Guide
BA Balancing Authority NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
BES Bulk Electric System PC Planning Coordinator
BESNet Web-based application used to submit Self Determinations and Exception Requests
RAI Reliability Assurance Initiative
CFR Coordinated Functional Registration RAM Risk Assessment & Mitigation
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection RC Reliability Coordinator
CMEP Compliance Monitoring & Enforcement Program
RRA Region-wide Risk Assessment
DP Distribution Provider SA Situational Awareness
EA Event Analysis SDN Self Determination
EMS Energy Management System SDT Standard Drafting Team
ER Exception Request SME Subject Matter Expert
ERA Entity Risk Assessment SOL System Operating Limits
ERO Electric Reliability Organization SPS Special Protection System
GO Generator Owner SRI Severity Risk Index
GOP Generator Operator TO Transmission Owner
ICCP Intercompany Communications Protocol TOP Transmission Operator
IROL Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits
TP Transmission Planner
JRO Joint Registration Organization UFLS Underfrequency Load Shed
LSE Load Serving Entity UVLS Undervoltage Load Shed
MRO Midwest Reliability Organization
Page 77 of 78
2018 MRO Spring Reliability Conference Agenda Wednesday, May 23, 2018
Thankyouforattendingthe
MRO2018SpringReliabilityConference!YourfeedbackisveryimportanttoMRO.
Pleaseremembertofilloutyourfeedbackformandplaceitintheboxontheregistrationtable.
Page 78 of 78
Recommended