Marc Sageman May 11 06

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Global Salafi Terrorist Networks

Marc Sagemansageman@post.harvard.edu

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Evidence Based Terrorism Research

• Specific threat to the U.S.• Application of scientific method to terrorism research• Started with 9/11 Perpetrators as index sample• 400 biographies of terrorists: Open Source information

– Trial transcripts• US, France, Germany, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Canada

– Press accounts (FBIS)• English, French, German, Arabic, Spanish, Turkish, Dutch

– Academic publications– Internet (corroborated)

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Global Salafi Jihad• Violent Islamist born-again social movement• Fight for justice & fairness:

– Build a better world; utopia modeled on the community of the Prophet & his companions (Salaf)

• Four phases:– Peaceful capture of the state (al-Banna – Muslim Brothers)– Against the near enemy (Faraj – “the forgotten duty”)– Global expansion of defensive jihad (Azzam)– Global offense against the far enemy (Zawahiri & bin Laden)

• Expel the West from the Middle East• Use of violence against non-Muslim governments or

population to establish an Islamist state

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Evolution of al Qaeda• Three processes of self-selection of the most militants:

– 1988-9: the most militants, who had come to fight the anti-Soviet jihad & could not go home, stayed behind and formed al Qaeda

– 1991-2: the most militants expelled from Pakistan went to Sudan– Switch of strategy from “near enemy” to “far enemy”– 1996: 150 militants expelled from Sudan returned to Afghanistan

• 1996-2001: Golden age of al Qaeda:– Control of “Golden Chain:” exclusive funding for terrorism– Control of training camps & establishment of shelter– Staff for planning & coordination– Afghanistan, as failed state, has little ability to control al Qaeda

• Al Qaeda controlled social movement & focused it on “far enemy”

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Poverty?: Family of origin (SES)

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Upper Middle Lower

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Islam?: Devotion as youth

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Religious Secular Christian

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Madrassa?: Educational background

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Madrassa Secular Christian

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Naïve teenagers?: Age at joining

Average Age: 25.690

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10

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18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 >34

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Ignorance?: Levels of education

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<HS College MA

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Religious?: Type of education

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HS/Voc Humanities Soc Sci Tech/NatSci

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Lack of opportunity?: Occupation

020406080

100120140160

Unskilled Semi-professional

Professional

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No sex?: Marital status

020406080

100120140160180

Single Married

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No responsibility?: Family status

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No Children Children

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Just bad?: Criminal background

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No Prison Crime PoliticalActivism

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Criminal Background

• Vast Majority: no crime• Some major crime

– Robbery (Roubaix gang, Kelkal gang, JI)• Petty crime: Maghreb logistic cells

– Credit card fraud, false documents, insurance fraud– Drug traffic (more common now)

• Those least likely to do harm individually are most able to do so collectively.

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Simply mad?: Mental health

• Very little evidence of mental illness• Very little evidence of personality disorder

– No narcissism (willingness to sacrifice for the comrade & cause)

– No pathological hatred– Very little trauma in family studied: usually

overprotected youths• Overall, “good kids,” except second generation

Maghreb Arabs, who lived life of petty crime

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Place where they joined jihad

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Native Expatriate

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Diaspora

• Global Salafi Jihad is a Diaspora phenomenon– Expatriate + Second/Third Generation

• 84% of Global Salafi Mujahedin have joined the jihad, while living in a Diaspora (87% in Western Europe)

• Link between terrorism & Diaspora predated “globalization” & not specific to religion or Islam– Anarchists, IRA, LTTE, ETA

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Joining the Jihad

• Friendship (pre-existing): 68%– “Bunch of guys” collectively deciding to join– Joining childhood friends

• Kinship: 20%– Fathers, brothers, first cousins– Importance of in-laws & marriage to cement friendship

bonds• Discipleship: 10%

– Students of Sungkar & Baasyir from Jamaah Islamiyah

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Trajectory of Muslim expatriates• Upwardly & geographically mobile (“best & brightest”)• Mostly from religious, caring & middle class families• Global citizens, conversant in 3 or 4 languages, skilled in

computer technology• Separated from traditional bonds & culture• Homesick, lonely, marginalized & excluded from society• Seek friends• Drifted to mosques for companionship, not religion• Moved in together (halal food), formed cliques

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Trajectory of 2nd generation immigrants

• Two main paths– Second generation in the West– Young economic immigrants to the West

• Upwardly mobile, & completely secular background• Excluded from society

– Dropped out of school• Petty crime (false documents & drug dealing)• Drug addiction

• Discriminated by society– Resentful & activation of collective identity– Personal experience resonate with Salafi ideology

• Groups of friends, who grew up together & collectively drifted to religion to escape their situation

• Radicalized collectively

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Mobilization• Spontaneously self-organized “bunches of guys” of trusted

friends, from the bottom up• No top down Al Qaeda recruitment program

– No campaign, shura or budget dedicated to recruitment– Selection: 15-25% of volunteers accepted

• Gaps in the distribution (U.S., Palestine, Iran)• No evidence of “brainwashing”: they simply acquired the

beliefs of their friends• No evidence of “recruiter”: total proselytizing environment

they all mutually recruited each other• Social bonds came before ideological commitment• Group processes: no Robinson Crusoe narrative

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Motivation • Insidious process:• Low risk participation with an increasingly closer set of

friends• Medium risk proselytism for an ideal way of life• Importance of specific script for the global Salafi jihad: 12

Islamist institutions generated 50% of sample• Salafi ideology: new values (Islam & ummah)

– Faith & commitment grounded in intense small group dynamics– Gradual development of a collective identity– Greater jihad: “born again”, imitate Salaf through personal

example• Complete transformation of values

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In-group love• Dynamics of dense social networks promotes in-

group love• Self-sacrifice for comrades and the cause

– Secular religious– Material spiritual– Short-term opportunity long-term vision– Individual concern communitarian sacrifice– Apathy active engagement– Traditional morality takfir group morality– Worldly gains otherworldly rewards

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Out-group hate

• Grounded in everyday experience of discrimination & exclusion from highest levels of society– Endemic in Middle East & Western Europe

• Grounded in group dynamics:– “Bunch of guys” escalation of mutual complaints about

the unfairness & injustice in society– Endorse conspiracy theories

• Endorse takfir doctrine sanctions commission of crimes v. society

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Group Dynamics• Explanation in normal group dynamics, rather

than individual mental pathology• Once in the movement, difficult to abandon it

without betraying close friends & family• This natural & intense loyalty to the group,

inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists

• High risk terrorist operations– In-group love + out-group hate (under specific violent

script, often religious) mass murder + suicide

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The Network

Central Staff

Core Arab

Southeast Asian

Maghreb Arab

Clumps

Node Size

Leader

Lieutenant

Other people

FateDead

Captured

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Pre-existing social bonds

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Operational LinksBali, 2002Jakarta, 2003Singapore Plot, 2001

Strasbourg, 1999

France, 1995

LAX,. 1999

Casablanca, 2003

Morocco, 1994

Istanbul, 2003

9/11/01

Emb, 1998

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Personal v Operational Links

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Continued Evolution

• Success of Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism campaign– Elimination of sanctuary, funding, communication & key leaders– Neutralization of al Qaeda proper

• Physical break up of formal global Salafi jihad networks– Expansion of home-grown initiative due to lack of leadership &

restraints– Local autonomy, self-financing & self-training– Informal communications, difficult to monitor– Fuzzy boundaries: no formal initiation or fixed numbers– New local, more aggressive & reckless leadership

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Toward a Global “Leaderless” Jihad

• Decentralized, loosely connected network– Mobilized and motivated autonomously– No more 9/11, but lots of 3/11 or 7/7, especially in Europe– Threat to the West comes from the West

• Military role (no hard targets)– sanctuary denial in potential failed or friendly states

• Importance of the Internet– Virtual “Invisible hand” organizing terrorist operations: C2– Social transformation of the jihad– Enemy Center of Gravity:

• Vision of Salafi utopia unites the leaderless jihad• Ideological battleground (War of Ideas)