LEARNED ABOUT RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF...

LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT

RESILIENCE AND

SUSTAINABILITY OF CRITICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE

T.D. O’RourkeThomas R. Briggs Professor

of EngineeringCornell University

TOPICS• Critical Infrastructure and

Resilience

• Case Histories• Christchurch• San Francisco• Los Angeles• New York City

• Key Issues

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: EVOLVING CONCEPT

• 1980s: Emphasis on Public Sector (e.g., highways, bridges, airports, public transit, airports, & solid/hazardous waste facilities)

• After 911: Expansion to 17 Sectors in US National Infrastructure Protection Plan

NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (2006)

• Agriculture/food• Defense industries• Energy systems• Public health• Nat’l monuments• Banking/finance• Drinking water• Chemical facilities• Commercial

• Dams• Emergency services• Nuclear power• Information tech• Telecom systems• Postal/shipping• Transportation• Government

LIFELINE SYSTEMS• Electric Power

• Gas and Liquid Fuels

• Levee and Flood Protection

• Telecommunications

• Transportation

• Wastewater Facilities

• Water Supply

Water Supply

Electric Power

Telecom

Gas/Liquid Fuels

Transportation

Waste Disposal

INSTITUTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCIES

RESILIENCE• Governmental Policies,

Community Planning, Infrastructure Management

• Rockefeller Fndn Review (2011)• Engineering Resilience• Systems Resilience• Complex Adaptive Resilience

DARFIELD & CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKES

Christchurch EQ

Darfield EQ

DARFIELD & CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKES

• 2010 Darfield Earthquake• 7.0 Mw

• No deaths, ~ $ 4 billion losses

• 2011 Christchurch Earthquake• 6.1 Mw

• Hundreds dead, Christchurch CBD destroyed

• Combined earthquake losses > $20 billion losses, potentially > 15 - 20% GDP

CHRISTCHURCH LIQUEFACTION

Cubrinovski (2011)

CHRISTCHURCH GAS DISTRIBUTION

Gas Distribution System Areas of Severe Liquefaction

GAS SYSTEM INTERDEPENDENCIES• Telecommunications

• Communication during emergency response

• Transportation System• LPG delivery at Port and by truck/train

• Electric Power• Heated water to vaporize LPG

• Water Supply• Water for LPG vaporizer• Sprinkler system for fire protection

LESSONS ABOUT RESILIENCE• Engineering Resilience

• HDPE pipelines with fusion welds

• System Resilience• Dispersion & redundancy of key facilities• Gas storage within system• Contracts for emergency works

• Adaptive Resilience• Bicycles not trucks in heavy traffic• Isolation of CBD from gas

BURWOOD (HORSESHOE LAKE)

• Replaced Damaged AC and PVC Piping After Darfield EQ with HDPE Pipelines

• No HDPE Pipelines Damaged After Darfield EQ

Severe Liquefaction

Moderate Liquefaction

NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE

• Prior to EQs, Residential Building Insurance Provided by National Government

• After EQs, Reinsurance Industry Reluctant to Securitize Risk

• Four-fold Increase in Insurance Rates, with More Projected

LAND USE POLICY(Christchurch EQ Recovery Authority)Land Repair Prolonged & Uneconomic

As of 27 June 11 Christchurch

infrastructure uninsurable

200 km

N

San Francisco

5 km

120 km2

Zones of Soil Liquefaction

Zone of liquefaction induced deformation

=

N

0 1 km

Zones of Soil Liquefaction

1906 SAN FRANCISCO PIPELINES

• >300 Breaks in Distribution Network

• Ruptured Trunk Lines at Locations of Liquefaction (Especially Along Mission Creek)

• 23,200 Severed Service Connections

AUXILIARY WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM (AWSS)

WATER SUPPLY & FIRE MODELING

• NSF-supported Research

• AWSS Hydraulic Model (Cornell)

• Fire Model (EQE)

• Bond Measure Passed to Upgrade AWSS

• Portable Water Supply System (PWSS)

0 1 km

Zone of liquefaction induced deformation

Marina

South of Market

Foot of Market

Mission Creek

1989 LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE

AWSS

0 1 km

Zone of liquefaction induced deformation

Marina

South of Market

Foot of Market

Mission Creek

1989 LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE

MARINA

1989 LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE

FIRE

FIRE

LESSONS ABOUT SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE

• 1986 Bond Issue for AWSS Upgrade

• 2010 Bond Issue for AWSS Upgrade

• For 24 Years Depended on the Stewardship of a Handful of Individuals

• Transfer from Fire Department to Public Utilities Commission

• Need to Harmonize Institutional Cultures

200 km

N

Los Angeles

40 km

• 4.0 Million Customers• 12,000 km Pipelines

LOS ANGELES

DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM• Simulates 12,000 km

pipelines & facilities• Comprehensive seismic

& geohazards• Special software for

damaged hydraulic network analysis

• System risk & reliability• Water & electric

interaction• Economic/social impacts

MULTI-MODAL SIMULATION

Combined Simulation for Permanent Ground

Deformation & Seismic Wave Effects

Probabilistic Simulation for System-wide Seismic

Wave Effects

Simulation for Ground Failure, Accidents,

Human Threats

SHAKEOUT SCENARIO

• 7.8 Mw EQ onSan AndreasFault

• Largest USCivil DefenseExercise

• 5.4 MillionParticipants

SYSTEM SERVICEABILITY INDEXSSI is the ratio of water available at all system nodes

after the EQ to water available before the EQ

LA Reservoir

Encino Reservoir

Hollywood Reservoir

Stone Canyon Reservoir

13.6 M m314.8 M m3

13.6 M m3

5.4 M m3

Disinfectant By-Products

10 km10 km

N Highest Population

Density

LESSONS ABOUT RESILIENCE• Impact of Environmental Regulations

on System Operations

• Community Impact on System Operations

• Advanced Simulations of Key Importance for System and Adaptive Resilience

• Emergency Response Strategy for Major Earthquakes

NEW YORK CITY

10 km

800 sq km

NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY

Delaware Aqueduct

NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY

• 18 Reservoirs & 3 Controlled Lakes

• > 5000 km2 of Watershed

• 1.2 Billion gallons/day

Delaware Aqueduct

Catskill Aqueduct

LESSONS ABOUT SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE

• Water Supply is the Most Critical Infrastructure for NYC

• 3rd NYC Water Tunnel under Construction from 1970 -2020

• Requires 50 Years of Persistent Political and Economic Support

• Long Term Commitment under Highly Variable and Changing Conditions

LEADERSHIP & PUBLIC OUTREACH

KEY ISSUES• Improve Concepts of Critical

Infrastructure

• Institutional Cultures and Interdependencies Critically Important for Resilience & Sustainability

• Need to Account for Socio-Political Processes

• Advanced Simulations of Key Importance for System and Adaptive Resilience

KEY ISSUES

• Insurance Critical for Infrastructure Sustainability

• Political Leadership Essential

• Backstop All Models with Case Histories or Observations of Actual System Performance; Be Involved in Real Projects and Real Organizations