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Keynote Welcome and
Opening Remarks
H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori
Minister of Economy and Chairman of UAE-General Civil Aviation Authority
Keynote Welcome and
Opening Remarks
Peter Baumgartner
CEO, Etihad Airways
Keynote Welcome and
Opening Remarks
Capt. Salah Alfarajalla
Senior Vice President of Security & National Pilot Development, Etihad Airways
IATA AVSEC WORLD CONFERENCENovember 2017
Captain Salah AlfarajallahSenior Vice President Security and National Pilot DevelopmentEtihad Airways
Outline
▷ Review of recent AVSEC incidents (AUIs)
▷ Impact of AVSEC Incidents
▷ AVSEC counter-measures
▷ Future AVSEC challenges
AVSEC INCIDENTS (AUIs)
Significant AVSEC incidents: last 24 months
Date AUI Location Method Suspected Perpetrator
October 2015
Destruction of aircraft in service
Metrojet aircraft inflight in Egyptian airspace
Improvised explosive device (IED)
ISIS
February 2016
Airport attack (landside)
Baidoa Airport, Central Somalia
IED in laptop and printer
Al Shabaab
February 2016
Sabotage (inflight)
Daallo aircraft in Somalian airspace
Suicide bombing Al Shabaab
Significant AVSEC incidents: last 24 months
Date AUI Location Method Suspected Perpetrator
March 2016
Airport attack (landside)
Brussels Airport Suicide bombing ISIS supporter
March 2016
Hijack (inflight) Egypt Air Dummy IED Mentally-disturbed person
June 2016
Airport attack (landside)
China’s Shanghai Pudong
Introduction of IED ‘Lone wolf’
Significant AVSEC incidents: last 24 months
Date AUI Location Method Suspected Perpetrator
June 2016 Airport attack (landside)
Ataturk Airport, Istanbul
Active shooting and suicide bombing
ISIS Supporter
January 2017
Airport attack (Airside)
Fort Lauderdale Airport
Active shooting ‘Lone wolf’
March 2017
Airport attack (Landside)
Orly Airport,Paris
Hostage taking ‘Lone wolf’
Significant AVSEC incidents: last 24 months
Date AUI Location Method Suspected Perpetrator
September 2017
Airport attack (terminal)
Hamid Karzai Airport, Kabul
MANPAD Taliban
October 2017
Airport attack (landside)
Asheville Regional Airport, North Carolina
IED ‘Lone wolf’
IMPACT AND COUNTERMEASURES
Case Study 1: Brussels Airport Attack
Impacts Countermeasures
▪ Loss of life and serious injuries
▪ Destruction of properties
▪ Damage to airport security integrity
▪ Disruption of airport operations
▪ Flight disruptions/cancellations – Brussels and
network
▪ Increased operational costs for airlines and
airport
▪ Enhanced airport landside/airside security
measures – Brussels and network
▪ Increased landside security, including off-
perimeter checkpoints
▪ Increased security awareness and vigilance
▪ Increased surveillance/monitoring activities
▪ ICAO Annex 17 Amendment 15 for new standard
for landside security
Case Study 2: Daallo Aircraft Sabotage
Impacts Countermeasures
▪ Loss of life ( the suspect) and serious injuries
▪ Damage to aircraft
▪ Damage to airport security integrity
▪ Disruption of airport operations
▪ Flight disruptions/cancellation
▪ Increase operational costs for Daallo airline and
airport
▪ More targeted screening , for example, portable
electronic devices (including laptops and
printers).
▪ Initial and recurrent vetting to address insider
threat.
▪ Aside from 100%, implementation of random
selection
Etihad Airways actions
▷ Intensified Crisis Management Training with Emergency Response Centre
▷ Etihad Airways management sought risk consultancy services to educate on
response to crisis situations
▷ Internal and external stakeholders’ workshop to strengthen coordination for
implementation of airport security measures
FUTURE AVSEC CHALLENGES
Future AVSEC challenges
▷ Use of conventional arms - weapons, MANPADs - will continue
▷ Use of homegrown crude and indigenous techniques including suicide bombs
▷ Technological knowledge and experience obtained from flight simulators and
internet use for cyber attacks
▷ Standardisation of enhanced airport landside security
Future AVSEC challenges
▷ Continuing threats from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)/Drones and lasers
▷ Increased Insider threats for those who have access to airport and airline
operations who may be involved in terrorist and/or criminal activities
▷ Radicalization of individuals for ‘lone wolf’ attacks
▷ CBRN proliferation threats in hands of terrorists
▷ Information/intelligence silo among stakeholders or states
THANK YOU
Captain Salah AlfarajallahSenior Vice President Security and National Pilot DevelopmentEtihad Airways
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Keynote Address
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Keynote Address
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Networking Lunch
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What has changed since the last AVSEC World
What has been done, what is still required?
What has changed since the last AVSEC World
What has been done, what is still required?
Moderator
Matthew Vaughan, Director of Aviation Security, IATA
Panelists
Kas Beumkes, Senior Safety Expert, ICAO
George Rhodes, Assistant Director Safety and Flight Operations (SFO), IATA
Andrew Nicholson, CEO, Osprey
Kaarlo Karvonen, Head of Security, Finnair, Chair, IATA Security Group
AVSEC World 2017Kas E. Beumkes, Senior Safety Expert ANB/ICAO
Update on the ICAO work programme on Conflict Zones and way forward
Abu Dhabi, 14 November 2017
39th ICAO Assembly Outcomes
The Technical Commission agreed that the Council should afford priority in light of the 2017 – 2019 Budget to:
Relevant highlights of following Council Sessions
Council directed ICAO Secretariat to:
Launch a survey on the availability of tools and mechanisms developed by external entities to share risk-based information, noting States’ and industry progress in developing systems - 25th AVSEC World 2016, and noting the decline in postings on the ICAO Conflict Zone Information Repository (CZIR).
The key findings of the survey were:
➢ the information provided by entities external to ICAO meets the requirements of the end-users;
➢ there is a requirement to standardize the format in which risk information is made available and there is a requirement to develop solutions allowing for timely and automated access to such information.
Relevant highlights of following Council Sessions
Council directed ICAO Secretariat to:
Discontinue the CZIR and provisionally approve modification into a library of
links to States’ own websites with aeronautical information related to risks to
civil aviation operations over or near conflict zones.
Explore ways to improve States’ risk management capabilities.
How to improve information sharing/exchange?
Ongoing Activities
Timeline
DSB MH17 recommendation: Ensure that operators are required through national regulations to make risk assessments of overflying conflict zones. (…)Annex 6
Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status
Standard for operator where conflict zones are overflown, a risk assessment shall be conducted and appropriate risk mitigation measures taken to ensure a safe and secure flight
Draft operational requirement to perform a pre-flight risk assessment of the airspace along the entire route to ensure for safe and secure flight
ICAO Secretariat supported by States and industry
An information paper was drafted for FLTOPSP/WG/4, 15-19 May 2017 to introduce the issue for Annex 6 –Operation of Aircraft, followed by a working paper for consideration in the FLTOPSP/4, 4-8 Dec 2017
FLTOPSP/4, 4-8 Dec 2017 Annex 6, Amendment 43, 2020?
Ongoing Activities TF RCZ
DSB MH17 recommendation: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict.
Annex 11Doc 9971
Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status
Building on the current provisions and guidance on contingency planning
Expand so as to enable States to meet air traffic services needs of changes in traffic flows
a. Update, as necessary, the relevant guidance material for these provisions
b. Develop, as necessary, operational requirements for the development and promulgation of air traffic flow management contingency plans and aerodrome emergency plans for implementation in the event of armed conflict and the potential for armed conflict
ICAO Secretariatsupported by States and industry
a. Amendment to Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services, for the appropriate ATS authority to conduct a safety risk assessment for activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft and mitigating measures, is being progressed by the Secretariat
b. Amendment to Doc 9971, Manual on Collaborative Air Traffic Flow Management regarding ATFM and contingency is being progressed by Air Traffic Management Operations Panel (ATMOPSP)
Timeline
ATMOPS WG (11-15 Sept 2017)ANC (Oct 2017)
a) completed by 2020b) completed by 2018
Ongoing Activities TF RCZ
DSB MH17 recommendation: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict.
Doc 9554
Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status
Development of a set of possible changes to ICAO Annexes, guidance and/or other materials so as to give effect to the recommendations made on enhancements of risk assessments for civil aircraft operations near or over conflict zones
Update, as necessary, Doc 9554, Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations
ICAO Secretariat, supported by States and industry
Amendment is being progressed by the Secretariat in coordination with appropriate expert groups
Timeline
Preliminary review 2Q 2018 Completed by 2020
Contingent upon the next Annex 11 amendment
Ongoing Activities TF RCZ
DSB MH17 recommendation: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict.
Circ 330Doc 10088
Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status
New manual content:Development of processes, including types of reliable, timely and relevant information that States require to effectively discharge their responsibilities in sovereign or delegated airspace and for the operation of their own operators outside of that airspace
Review Circular 330, Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management for coordination between military and civil aviation authorities and upgrade to a manual
ICAO Secretariat supported by States, regional organizations and industry
The development of Doc 10088, Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management is being progressed by the Air Traffic Management Operations Panel (ATMOPSP)
Timeline
Target draft publication 1Q 2018 Completed by 3Q 2018
Ongoing Activities
Timeline
DSB MH17 recommendation: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation.
Annex 15
Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status
Standard for States that a conflict zone is a reportable hazard for air navigation, including information as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of the conflict and its consequences for civil aviation
a. Include conflict zones to the list of reportable hazards for air navigation and
b. Explore possibilities to develop structured and formalized content of conflict zone related NOTAMs
ICAO Secretariatsupported by States and industry
a. Inclusion of conflict zones in list of reportable hazard for air navigation and appropriate template is being progressed by the Secretariat in coordination with appropriate expert groups
b. Tasks being progressed by the Secretariat
a) ANC, Oct 2017b) Secretariat, Q4 2017
Annex 15, Amendment 41, 2020PANS-AIM, Amendment 1, 2020
Ongoing Activities
DSB MH17 recommendations: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. (…) Amend relevant Standards so that risk assessments shall also cover threats to civil aviation in the airspace at cruising level, especially when overflying conflict zones. (…)
Annex 17
Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status
a) States keep under constant review the level and nature of threat to civil aviation within its territory and airspace above it.
b) States establish and implement procedures to share with airspace users relevant information to assist them to conduct security risk assessments relating to their operations.
Update provisions in Annex 17:a) So that besides the level of threat also the nature of threat is reviewed when flying in the airspace above conflict zone territory;b) Develop new Standard for States to share information with end users to conduct risk assessments for their operations.
ICAO Secretariatsupported by States and industry
a) Amendment 15 to Annex 17 –Security, par. 3.1.3, effective 3 April 2017.b) Amendment 16 to Annex 17, par. 3.1.3bis. Reviewed by the Committee on Unlawful Interference (UIC) and Council in June 2017, in State consultation until 6 October 2017. Final review by UIC and Council in Q1 2018
Timeline
a) Council, 23 Nov 2016b) AVSECP/28, June 2017
a) Annex 17, Amendment 15, effective 3 April 2017 b) Annex 17, Amendment 16, Q2? 2018
Ongoing Activities
DSB MH17 recommendations: Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict. (…) Amend relevant Standards so that risk assessments shall also cover threats to civil aviation in the airspace at cruising level, especially when overflying conflict zones. Risk increasing and uncertain factors need to be included in these risk assessments in accordance with the proposals made by the ICAO Working Group on Threat and Risk.
Doc 10084
Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status
a. Advise for States and operators on the risks for civil aviation of flying over conflict zones at cruising altitudes, incl. definition of conflict zones/armed conflict.
b. Risk Assessment Manual with guidance material of existing provisions and practices for States, operators and ANSPs.
a. Provide broad advice for States and operators about the risks from surface-to-air missiles and key risk factors to be considered for their own risk assessments.
b. Review and upgrade the existing Doc 10084 to include guidance material based on existing ICAO provisions and industry practices more than 3 years after MH17.
ICAO Secretariatsupported by States and industry
a. The 1st edition of Civil Aircraft Operations Over Conflict Zones (Restricted) was published in November 2016 and it was reissued in April 2017 as Doc 10084 (Restricted).
b. The new Doc 10084, Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations over or near Conflict Zones (Unrestricted) is being progressed by the Secretariat in coordination with appropriate expert groups
Timeline
WGTR/Secretariat, Q4 2014Secretariat, Q3-4 2017
1st edition: November 20162nd edition, Doc 10084: April 20173rd edition, Doc 10084: Q1 2018
ICAO
Annex 6 Annex 15Annex 11 Annex 17
Doc 9971 Circ 330Doc 10084Doc 9554
THANK YOU
What has changed since the last AVSEC World
What has been done, what is still required?
Networking Coffee Break
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What’s New on the Radar?
What’s New on the Radar?
Neil Parry
Vice-President,Service Delivery, CATSA
What’s New on the Radar?
What’s New on the Radar?
Moderator
Hugo Porter, Chair, ICAO AVSEC Panel
Panelists
Nick Careen, Senior Vice President, Airports, Passenger, Cargo & Security , IATA
Darby LaJoye, Assistant Administrator, Security Operations, TSA
Laureen Kinney, Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security, Transport Canada
Mohammad Al Tayer, Chief Policy Specialist, UAE GCAA
What’s New on the Radar?
What’s New on the Radar?
Mohammad Al Tayer
Chief Policy Specialist, UAE GCAA
What's New on the Radar ?
UAE General Civil Aviation Authority
14 Nov 2017
Introduction
Name: Mohammad AlTayer
Position: Chief policy specialist, AVSEC Affairs, UAE General Civil Aviation Authority
Contact me on: mtayer@gcaa.gov.ae
66
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About the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority
GCAA the United Arab Emirates Civil Aviation Regulator
Vision:
“To develop a leading, safe, secure and sustainable civil aviation system”
Mission:
To regulate and oversee aviation safety, security and environment; deliver air navigation services and
facilitate air connectivity through international collaboration in order to efficiently serve the general
public and civil aviation industry.
68
About the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority Cont..
• ICAO AVSEC Panel
• ICAO Facilitation Panel
• ICAO Working Group on Threat and Risk
• ICAO Working Group on Innovation in Aviation Security
• IATA Events
• Others….
GCAA Aviation Security Affairs Sector represents the UAE actively on several panels and working
groups such as:
69
Risk based approach to oversight and regulations and importance of
facilitation
• Necessity ( Risk Based)
• Flexibility ( Where Appropriate )
• Continues Improvement
Base regulations on three important pillars:
Continues Improvement
FlexibilityNecessity
70
Management of change in civil aviation
Impact Assessment should be considered as a complimentary tool to evaluate the effects of
introducing a new or modified measure on the existing aviation system on all relevant stakeholders in
the industry.
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Management of change in civil aviation Cont…
Policy Making Cycle :
• Risk Assessment
• Proposal for Change
• Review of the proposal
• Impact assessment
• Implementation
• Evaluation
Steps for Impact Assessment:
• Identification of options to be assessed (as a result
of a risk assessment)
• Desktop assessment (theoretical impact
assessment) and/or operational trials (practical
impact assessment), as appropriate
• Measurements of impacts
• Evaluation of results and
• Decision-making process (possible measures)
72
Aviation Security Culture, Human factor and Insider Threat
Humans are complex creatures of habit. We do the things we do, because that’s the way that we have
always done them. The same can be said of cultures in our society and work.
It is important to promote such culture through:
• Coordination
• Communication
• Training
• Leading by example
• Continues AVSEC Culture assessment and improvement
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Promoting Innovative Approaches
• We have to stay several steps ahead of those who wish us harm
• We have to continue to work all together in finding innovative approaches
• We need to encourage Innovation to keep up with the industry through reviewing our measures,
processes, technology and especially human factors
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Promoting Innovation
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Thank you all for listening !
Shukran !
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