Information Flow Control

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Information Flow Control

Nick FeamsterCS 6262

Spring 2009

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• Denning's axioms• Bell-LaPadula model (BLP)

• Biba model

Lattice-Based Models

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Denning’s Lattice Model

< SC, , >

SC set of security classes

SC X SC flow relation (i.e., can-flow)

SC X SC -> SCclass-combining operator

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Denning’s Axioms

< SC, , >

1 SC is finite

2 is a partial order on SC

3 SC has a lower bound L such that L A for all A SC

4 is a least upper bound (lub) operator on SC

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Implications

• SC is a universally bounded lattice

• there exists a Greatest Lower Bound (glb) operator (also called meet)

• there exists a highest security class H

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Lattice Structures

Unclassified

Confidential

Secret

Top SecretHierarchical

Classes

can-flow

reflexive and transitive edges are implied but not shown

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Lattice Structures

Unclassified

Confidential

Secret

Top Secret

can-flowdominance

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Lattice Structures

{ARMY, CRYPTO}Compartmentsand Categories

{ARMY } {CRYPTO}

{}

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Lattices Structures

{ARMY, NUCLEAR, CRYPTO}

Compartmentsand Categories

{ARMY, NUCLEAR} {ARMY, CRYPTO} {NUCLEAR, CRYPTO}

{ARMY} {NUCLEAR} {CRYPTO}

{}

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Lattice StructuresHierarchicalClasses with

CompartmentsTS

S

{A,B}

{}

{A} {B}

product of 2 lattices is a lattice

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Challenges

• Implicit information flow– Conditional statements can implicitly leak information

• Implementing a system that explicitly controls the flow of information

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Static Binding: Run-Time

• Objects are statically bound to classes• Can operate either at runtime, or at compile-time

• Run-time mechanisms– Each process has a mechanism that specifies the

highest class p can write from and the lowest class p can write to

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Static Binding: Compile-Time

• Certify program at compile-time• Advantages

– Security guarantees before execution– Does not affect the execution speed

• Disadvantages– Flows not specified by the program cannot be verified– Hardware could malfunction

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Static Binding, Run-Time

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Dynamic Binding

• Objects can dynamically change their classification

• One approach: Update the class of an object whenever data flows into it– Nondecreasing class mechanisms– Main problem: requires explicit flow to update the

class of an object

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Possible Applications

• Confinement– No leaking information about confidential processes

• Databases– Control information flow for different classes of

information in the database

• Decoupling right of access from right of control

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Taint Tracking

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Motivation• Malicious software sneaks onto computers

– Collects users’ private information– Causes havoc on Internet

• Slows performance• Costs to remove

– Reputable vendors violate users’ privacy• Google Desktop• Sony Media Player

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Traditional Malware detection

• Signature-based– Cannot detect new malware or variants

• Heuristics– High false positives– High false negatives

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Panorama Approach• Input

– Suspicious behavior• Inappropriate data access, stealthfully

• Process– Whole-system, fine-grained taint tracking

• Marking data– Operating-system-aware taint analysis

• What touches the tainted data and how

• Output– Taint Graphs

• Tracked tainted data

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Taint Graph

• Information flow that shows the process that accessed the tainted data

• Make policies based on Taint Graph

• Compare unknown samples against Taint Graph– Automatic– Numerous categories

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Taint Graph generation• Similar to a mapped out logic/process tree

– Conceptually, horizontal branching

• 9 different types of Root taint sources– Text, password, http, https, icmp, ftp, document, and directory

• Non-root entries can be– OS objects (processes, modules)– OS resource (such as a file)

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Conceptual Structure• Works with closed code

– Windows OS– FireFox

• Monitors the whole system in a processor emulator

• Shadow memory stores taint status of– Each byte of physical memory– CPU’s general purpose registers– Hard disk and network interface buffer

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Taint Sources• Test information is inputted and marked as taint

source

• Inputted from hardware such as– Keyboard– Network interface– Hard disk

• Tainting at hardware level– Malware could hook before input reaches the software

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Taint Propagation

• Monitors CPU instructions and DMA operations dealing with tainted data

• OS-Aware taint tracking– Developed a kernel module

• Authenticated communications to taint engine

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OS-Aware Taint Tracking

• Resolving process and module information– Which process does an operation come from?– Module notifier– Tampering?

• Mapping file and network information to taints– File system forensics– Mapping connections back to processes

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Code Identification

• Identifying the code under analysis and its actions– Entire code segment is labeled

• Dynamic or Encrypted code is labeled too• A similar method labels trusted code

• What does the analysis do about various derivatives of the code– Dynamic generation– Calling trusted code

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Three Categorized Behaviors

• Anomalous information access– MS Paint accessing passwords

• Anomalous information leakage– BHO reporting home about surfed websites

• Excessive information access– Repeatedly accessed directory to hide rootkit

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Malware detections

• 42 real-world malware samples• 56 benign applications were tested• Only 3 false positives, no false negatives

– 2 from a personal firewall– 1 from a browser accelerator

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Summary

• A new system to detect malware– System-Wide Information Flow

• Taint tracking– Data access and process tracking

– Taint graphs• Policies

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Contributions• Unified approach to detect and analyze diverse

malware

• Designed and developed a functional prototype

• Detected all malware samples– Keystroke loggers, password sniffers, packet sniffers,

stealth backdoors, rootkits, and spyware

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Weaknesses• Performance Overhead

– Using Cygwin utilities– Prototype is not optimized– Slowdown average is 20 times– Intended as a offline tool

• Evasive malware– Time bombs– Selective keystroke loggers– Virtual environment detection

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How to Improve• Optimize the code

• Automate taint graph analysis and policy implementation

• Virtual environment shielding– Or switch out of emulated environment

• Implement mentioned improvements– Unicode conversion- switch case issue