India’s Strategic Vision for the 21st Century · India’s Strategic Vision for the 21 st Century...

Professor W. Pal SIDHU

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

and Senior Fellow, New York University’s

Center on International Cooperation

India’s Strategic Vision

for the 21st Century

Grands enjeux stratégiques contemporains

Democracy Index

2012

World’s second largest and, perhaps, most diverse population:

largest Hindu, Buddhist and Sikh populations; third largest Muslim population; and significant part of the population are

also Christians

23 official languages: Apart from Hindi and English, Assamese, Bengali, Bodo, Dogri, Gujarati, Kannada, Kashmiri,

Konkani, Maithili, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Santhali, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu.

World’s largest volunteer

standing army in terms of

personnel (about 1,325,000)

in 2010.

World’s largest contributor to

UN peacekeeping missions

since inception.

Successful Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV D5) launch on 5 Jan 2014

Allahabad pop.:

2 million

Pilgrims:

~ 30 million

• More than a quarter of India’s population (about 300

million) live on less than a dollar a day. India is home to

40 per cent of the world’s poor. Around 8 per cent of the

world’s poor live in Uttar Pradesh alone.

• According to the 2013 UN Human Development Index

which ranks countries by income, health and literacy,

India stands at 136 out of a total of 186 (lowest among all

the BRICS). Its gender equality ratio worse than all South

Asian states, except Afghanistan.

India also faces serious internal security threats.

Internally, as many as one-third of the districts

are under Naxalite/Maoist control.

CORRUPTION PERCEPTION

INDEX 2013

• Presently India’s per capita GDP is the lowest among all the G-20 countries (and 50% lower than even

Indonesia).

• India has fewer doctors and nurses than the standard WHO benchmark of 23 medical personnel per 10,000

population.

• India’s 900 diplomats are around the same number as those of Singapore or New Zealand.

• 2012 UN Gender Inequality Index ranked India 132 out of 186 - lowest amongst BRICS and South Asia (except

Afghanistan).

• United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called rape in India a ‘national problem’.

WHY BOTHER WITH INDIA?

OUTLINE

• India’s history and geopolitics

• Colonial legacy and the emergence of a weak hegemon

• War and Peace in South Asia

• The current challenges and‘four deficits’

• Three strategic circles and three strategic shifts

• New Panchsheel

• Conclusion: India as a rule taker, rule breaker and rule shaper

KEY FACTORS

• India’s role as a geopolitical actor is determined by:

• Geography: Location between the Gulf and the Straits of Malacca India is the world’s seventh largest country

with a 15,000 km border, a 7,500 km coastline and a 2 mn sq. km. EEZ.

• History: Its geopolitics influenced by 5000 years of history, colonial experience as well as the experience of the

Cold war.

• Culture: India has attracted a variety of foreign invaders since 326 BC but has not expanded its power abroad

militarily.

• Economy: From dominant position in 1500s to a state controlled ‘licence raj’ economy in 1950s to a liberal

market economy in 1990s.

• Military: Shift from a traditional land-based force to a modern, three-dimensional and nuclear force. Greater

maritime focus.

SOUTHERN ASIA

STRATEGIC SEA LANES

INDIA’S EEZ

GLOBAL GDP SHARE

Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics

(OECD Development Centre, 2004)

COLONIAL LEGACY

• European enlightenment and Western liberal democracy: Westminster model

• The ‘Two-Nation’ theory: Partition, the Standstill Agreement and the Instrument of Accession; Hyderabad

and Kashmir

• Problems of artificial and poorly demarcated borders

Indo-Pakistan border (Radcliffe Line, 1947)

Indo-China border (McMahon Line, 1914)

SOUTH ASIAN WARS

• The first Kashmir war: 1947-48

• The Sino-Indian war: 1962

• The second Kashmir war: 1965

• The Bangladesh war: 1971

• ‘Civilian Militarism’ of the 1980s:

• Operation Meghdoot (1984); Operation Pavan (1987); Operation Cactus (1988); Exercise Brasstacks/ Operation

Trident; and Exercise Chequerboard (1987).

• The Kargil war: 1999

• The wars that never were:

• 1983-84; 1986-87; 1990; and 2001-2002 (Operation Parakram)

24

KASHMIR IN 1947

25

KASHMIR TODAY

26

SINO-INDIAN BORDER

PEACE EFFORTS

• No-war pacts and joint defence agreement negotiations: (1949-50, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1968, 1969, 1974, 1977

and 1980-82);

• India' s attempts at forming a confederation (1950s);

• The settlement of territorial claims (1958 and 1960);

• Agreements to normalise relations after war: Tashkent agreement (1965); Simla agreement (1972);

• Indo-Pakistani Joint Commission (1982-1989);

• Confidence and security - building measures (CSBMs) (1990s)

• On again, off again composite dialogue since the 1990s

PEACE EFFORTS

• Negotiations on disputed border (1950s)

• Agreement on Tibet or Panchshila Agreement (1954)

• Summit meetings resume in 1979 and border talks since 1981

• Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings since 1989

• Military exchanges since 1990; joint exercises since 2006

• Trade increased from US$ 120 mn in 1987 to nearly $ 20 billion in 2005 and doubled to $ 40 billion by 2008. Today

China is India’s largest trading partner with more than $ 60 billion trade.

• The CBM agreements of September 1993 and November 1996

• 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary

Question. However, cross-border tensions persist.

END OF COLD WAR

• Collapse of Soviet Union and its impact on South Asia.

• Civil war in Afghanistan and Kashmir deteriorates.

• Coalition politics in India.

• India begins economic reforms in 1991 and defence budgets fall.

• Dialogue in early 1990s; new Cold-War and no dialogue 1994-97; nuclear tests (1998); the Lahore process; Kargil and

2002 crises.

• Steady improvement in Sino-Indian relations: summit meetings; improvement in trade; CBM agreements of 1993 and

1996.

• New Indo-US engagement process begins: includes military to military cooperation and high level visits; support in

Gulf War.

• India’s ‘look East’ policy and Gujral Doctrine (of non-reciprocity).

GOING NUCLEAR

• Motives:

More complex; first ‘device’ tested in 1974; primarily threat from China and later Pakistan; indefinite extension of the

NPT in 1995 and the CTBT also played a role; end of the Cold war prompted India going nuclear. Quest for autonomy

in decision-making.

• Doctrines:

No-first use and survivable second strike arsenal with strong civilian control. De-alerted and non-deployed. May

change with sea-based deterrence.

• Non-proliferation and nuclear stability:

India has undertaken not to test, though it has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). New Delhi is

unlikely to roll-back and sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, keen to become member of

various export control regimes.

Keen to establish a nuclear restraint regime with Pakistan & China but little progress.

CURRENT CHALLENGES

• Territorial:

Pakistan: To work out a solution to the Line of Control

China: Demarcate border and resolve disputes

• Non-territorial:

Maintaining the pace of economic growth

Terrorism: Internal and External; nuclear terrorism

Democratization; Failing States

Globalization and quest for resources: food, energy security. also climate, cyber, maritime and space to

be regulated

• Non-proliferation and nuclear stability:

Prevent proliferation of WMD in region

Ensure nuclear stability both regionally and globally

• New non-traditional challenges:

HIV/AIDS and other diseases

Natural disasters (tsunami, earthquakes)

TRENDS IN ASIA

FOUR TRENDS:

• First, Asia liberated from the shackles of top-down Cold War dynamics. It is a core region and security grounded in

local/regional dynamics.

• Rise of China and its relations with others.

• Desire of US to remain pre-eminent power.

• Second, Asia’s security scenario will alter – escalation or resolution of existing conflicts (Taiwan, Korea, Kashmir) as

well as regime change (Pakistan, Korea, Iran) is likely.

• Third, while economic growth and modernization a priority, strategic competition and tensions (bilateral, regional and

global) will remain.

• Fourth, economic growth will lead to military modernization and military force will remain a key instruments in

interaction among major powers.

STRATEGIC CIRCLES

• IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURHOOD: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; China, Myanmar and

Afghanistan. India seeks primacy and veto over action of outside powers.

• EXTENDED NEIGHBOURHOOD: ‘Southern Asia’ – from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca and the

Indian Ocean, including Central Asia. Russia, China and US part of this circle. India seeks to balance the

role of other powers.

• GLOBAL STAGE: Other institutions and organisations, such as the UN, the Commonwealth and the Non-

Aligned Movement. The EU and NATO probably falls in this category. Here India seeks to become one of

the ‘poles’ in a multi-polar world and a key player in international peace and security.

• FROM REGIONAL POWER TO GLOBAL PLAYER:

Having consolidated its regional position, India increasingly seeks to move onto the global stage

both institutionally and geographically. Building on its soft power initially.

• FROM NON-ALIGNMENT TO MULTI-ALIGNMENT:

Desire to align with other poles of power especially those which will facilitate India’s rise. Apparent

in the series of bilateral ‘strategic partnerships’ and membership of the G-20, BRICS, IBSA, ARF.

• FROM MILITARY POWER TO ECONOMIC POWER:

Economic reforms are the primary objective and the security policy is now evolving to ensure a

secure and stable environment for economic development, including access to raw materials and

markets.

STRATEGIC SHIFTS

• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): India only joined ARF in 1996 after the end of the Cold War. Though ARF useful to

interact with China and the US, the main motive economic rather than security.

• Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS): New arrangement which brings together key economies. Held its

fifth summit in South Africa this year but still a work in progress.

• India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA): A subset of BRICS, these democracies are starting to differentiate themselves from

both the Western democracies and also Russia and China. This is evident in approach to Syria. However reluctant to

preach what they practice.

• G-20: The new grouping which became significant during the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. Depending

on its evolution, it is likely to become a key global governance institution.

• NSG, MTCR etc.: India also seeking membership of various non-proliferation regimes so as to contribute to preventing

proliferation.

NEW ORGANIZATIONS

• The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), formerly the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation, with

20 member states bordering the Indian Ocean. Established as Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in 1995 and formally

launched on 6–7 March 1997 with a multilateral treaty known as the Charter of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for

Regional Co-operation. (http://www.iora.net/).

• India also signatory to the Antarctic Treaty (maintains a permanent station) and an observer on the Arctic Council.

National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research (www.ncaor.gov.in/).

• India an observer on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well as the Conference on Interaction and

Confidence building in Central Asia (CICA). Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, Kyrgyz,

Mongolia, Pakistan, “State of Palestine,” Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

• BIMSTEC or the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (Bangladesh, Bhutan,

India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand)

NEW ORGANIZATIONS

IORA MAP

NEW PANCHSHEEL

• First Principle: Objective of India’s foreign policy is to create a conducive world order for India’s development

priorities

• Second Principle: India’s development prospects are now and for the future inexorably linked to the world economy

in every aspect

• Third Principle: India can hope to create a beneficial global economic and security environment for itself only by

working with all major powers

• Fourth Principle: If India wants to play a greater role at the global level then it will have to build and ensure greater

regional cooperation and connectivity

• Fifth Principle: Underlines the import of India’s values “of a plural, secular and liberal democracy” as an inspiration

to others in the world

WAY FORWARD

Will India be a:

RULE TAKER - adhering to the existing and emerging international norms and institutions

RULE BREAKER - challenging the existing order to seek greater accommodation for itself in existing global

institutions

RULE SHAPER - contributing to emerging norms and building nascent regimes – particularly in six areas:

climate, cyber, energy, food, maritime and space security