Improving Internet Availability with Path Splicing Nick Feamster Georgia Tech

Improving Internet Availabilitywith Path Splicing

Nick FeamsterGeorgia Tech

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“It is not difficult to create a list of desired characteristics for a new Internet. Deciding how to design and deploy a network that achieves these goals is much harder. Over time, our list will evolve. It should be:

1. Robust and available. The network should be as robust, fault-tolerant and available as the wire-line telephone network is today.

2. …

Can the Internet be “Always On”?

• Various studies (Paxson, etc.) show the Internet is at about 2.5 “nines”

• More “critical” (or at least availability-centric) applications on the Internet

• At the same time, the Internet is getting more difficult to debug– Scale, complexity, disconnection, etc.

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Availability of Other Services

• Carrier Airlines (2002 FAA Fact Book)– 41 accidents, 6.7M departures– 99.9993% availability

• 911 Phone service (1993 NRIC report +)– 29 minutes per year per line– 99.994% availability

• Std. Phone service (various sources)– 53+ minutes per line per year– 99.99+% availability

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Threats to Availability• Natural disasters• Physical device failures (node, link)

– Drunk network administrators

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Threats to Availability

• Natural disasters• Physical failures (node, link)

– Drunk network administrators– Cisco bugs

• Misconfiguration• Mis-coordination• Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks• Changes in traffic patterns (e.g., flash crowd)• …

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Availability: Two Aspects

• Reliability: Connectivity in the routing tables should approach the that of the underlying graph– If two nodes s and t remain connected in the

underlying graph, there is some sequence of hops in the routing tables that will result in traffic

• Recovery: In case of failure (i.e., link or node removal), nodes should quickly be able to discover a new path

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Where Today’s Protocols Stand

• Reliability– Approach: Compute backup paths– Challenge: Many possible failure scenarios!

• Recovery– Approach: Switch to a backup when a failure occurs– Challenge: Must quickly discover a new working path– Meanwhile, packets are dropped, reordered, etc.

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Multipath: Promise and Problems

• Bad: If any link fails on both paths, s is disconnected from t

• Want: End systems remain connected unless the underlying graph has a cut

ts

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Path Splicing: Main Idea

• Step 1 (Perturbations): Run multiple instances of the routing protocol, each with slightly perturbed versions of the configuration

• Step 2 (Slicing): Allow traffic to switch between instances at any node in the protocol

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Compute multiple forwarding trees per destination.Allow packets to switch slices midstream.

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Outline• Path Splicing

– Achieving Reliabile Connectivity• Generating slices• Constructing paths

– Forwarding– Recovery

• Properties– High Reliability– Bounded Stretch– Fast recovery

• Ongoing Work

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Generating Slices

• Goal: Each instance provides different paths• Mechanism: Each edge is given a weight that is

a slightly perturbed version of the original weight– Two schemes: Uniform and degree-based

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3

3

“Base” Graph

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3.5

4

5 1.5

1.5

1.25

Perturbed Graph

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How to Perturb the Link Weights?

• Uniform: Perturbation is a function of the initial weight of the link

• Degree-based: Perturbation is a linear function of the degrees of the incident nodes– Intuition: Deflect traffic away from nodes where traffic

might tend to pass through by default

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Constructing Paths

• Goal: Allow multiple instances to co-exist• Mechanism: Virtual forwarding tables

a

t

c

s b

t a

t c

Slice 1

Slice 2

dst next-hop

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Forwarding Traffic

• Packet has shim header with forwarding bits

• Routers use lg(k) bits to index forwarding tables– Shift bits after inspection

• To access different (or multiple) paths, end systems simply change the forwarding bits– Incremental deployment is trivial– Persistent loops cannot occur

• Various optimizations are possible

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Putting It Together

• End system sets forwarding bits in packet header• Forwarding bits specify slice to be used at any hop• Router: examines/shifts forwarding bits, and forwards

ts

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Evaluation

• Defining reliability

• Does path splicing improve reliability?– How close can splicing get to the best possible

reliability (i.e., that of the underlying graph)?

• Can path splicing enable fast recovery?– Can end systems (or intermediate nodes) find

alternate paths fast enough?

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Defining Reliability

• Reliability: the probability that, upon failing each edge with probability p, the graph remains connected

• Reliability curve: the fraction of source-destination pairs that remain connected for various link failure probabilities p

• The underlying graph has an underlying reliability (and reliability curve)– Goal: Reliability of routing system should approach that of the underlying graph.

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Reliability Curve: Illustration

Probability of link failure (p)

Fraction of source-dest pairs disconnected

Better reliability

More edges available to end systems -> Better reliability

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Reliability Approaches Optimal• Sprint (Rocketfuel) topology• 1,000 trials• p indicates probability edge was removed from base graph

Reliability approaches optimal

Average stretch is only 1.3

Sprint topology,degree-based perturbations

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Recovery: Two Mechanisms

• End-system recovery– Switch slices at every hop with probability 0.5

• Network-based recovery– Router switches to a random slice if next hop is

unreachable– Continue for a fixed number of hops till

destination is reached

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Simple Recovery Strategies Work Well

• Which paths can be recovered within 5 trials?– Sequential trials: 5 round-trip times– …but trials could also be made in parallel

Recovery approaches maximum possible

Adding a few more slices improves recovery beyond best possible reliability with fewer slices.

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What About Loops?

• Persistent loops are avoidable– In the simple scheme, path bits are exhausted from

the header– Never switching back to the same

• Transient loops can still be a problem because they increase end-to-end delay (“stretch”)– Longer end-to-end paths– Wasted capacity

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Significant Novelty for Modest Stretch

• Novelty: difference in nodes in a perturbed shortest path from the original shortest path

Example

s d

Novelty: 1 – (1/3) = 2/3

Fraction of edges on short path shared with long path

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Splicing Improves Availability

• Reliability: Connectivity in the routing tables should approach the that of the underlying graph– Approach: Overlay trees generated using random link-

weight perturbations. Allow traffic to switch between them.– Result: Splicing ~ 10 trees achieves near-optimal reliability

• Recovery: In case of failure, nodes should quickly be able to discover a new path– Approach: End nodes randomly select new bits.– Result: Recovery within 5 trials approaches best possible.

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Extension: Interdomain Paths• Observation: Many routers already learn multiple

alternate routes to each destination.• Idea: Use the forwarding bits to index into these

alternate routes at an AS’s ingress and egress routers.

• Storing multiple entries per prefix • Indexing into them based on packet headers• Selecting the “best” k routes for each destination

Required new functionality

ddefault

alternate

Splice paths at ingress and egress routers

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Open Questions and Ongoing Work

• How does splicing interact with traffic engineering? Sources controlling traffic?

• What are the best mechanisms for generating slices and recovering paths?

• Can splicing eliminate dynamic routing?

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Conclusion• Simple: Forwarding bits provide access to

different paths through the network

• Scalable: Exponential increase in available paths, linear increase in state

• Stable: Fast recovery does not require fast routing protocols

http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~feamster/papers/splicing-hotnets.pdf

Network-Level Spam Filtering

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Spam: More Than Just a Nuisance

• 75-90% of all email traffic– PDF Spam: ~11% and growing– Content filters cannot catch!

• As of August 2007, one in every 87 emails constituted a phishing attack

• Targeted attacks on the rise– 20k-30k unique phishing attacks per month– Spam targeted at CEOs, social networks on the rise

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Problem #1: Content-Based Filtering is Malleable

• Low cost to evasion: Spammers can easily alter features of an email’s content can be easily adjusted and changed

• Customized emails are easy to generate: Content-based filters need fuzzy hashes over content, etc.

• High cost to filter maintainers: Filters must be continually updated as content-changing techniques become more sophistocated

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Problem #2: IPs are Ephemeral

• Hijack IP address space• Send spam• Withdraw route

~ 10 minutes

• Spammers use various techniques to change the IP addresses from which they send traffic

• Humans must notice changing behavior• Existing blacklists cannot stay up to date

One technique: BGP Spectrum Ability

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Our Approach: Network-Based Filtering

• Filter email based on how it is sent, in addition to simply what is sent.

• Network-level properties are more fixed– Hosting or upstream ISP (AS number)– Botnet membership– Location in the network– IP address block

• Challenge: Which properties are most useful for distinguishing spam traffic from legitimate email?

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SpamTracker: Main Idea and Intuition

• Idea: Blacklist sending behavior (“Behavioral Blacklisting”)– Identify sending patterns that are commonly used by

spammers

• Intuition: Much more difficult for a spammer to change the technique by which mail is sent than it is to change the content

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SpamTracker Design

• For each sender, construct a behavioral fingerprint

• Cluster senders with similar fingerprints

• Filter new senders that map to existing clusters

Approach

Email

Cluster

Classify

IP x domain x time

CollapseLookup Score

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Building the Classifier: Clustering

• Feature: Distribution of email sending volumes across recipient domains

• Clustering Approach– Build initial seed list of bad IP addresses– For each IP address, compute feature vector:

volume per domain per time interval– Collapse into a single IP x domain matrix:– Compute clusters

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Clustering: Output and Fingerprint

• For each cluster, compute fingerprint vector:

• New IPs will be compared to this “fingerprint”

IP x IP Matrix: Intensity indicates pairwise similarity

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Classifying IP Addresses

• Given “new” IP address, build a feature vector based on its sending pattern across domains

• Compute the similarity of this sending pattern to that of each known spam cluster– Normalized dot product of the two feature vectors– Spam score is maximum similarity to any cluster

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Summary

• Spam is on the rise and becoming more clever– 12% of spam now PDF spam. Content filters are

falling behind. Also becoming more targeted

• IP-Based blacklists are evadable– Up to 30% of spam not listed in common blacklists at

receipt. ~20% remains unlisted after a month– Spammers commonly steal IP addresses

• New approach: Behavioral blacklisting– Blacklist how the mail was sent, not what was sent– SpamTracker being deployed and evaluated by a

large spam filtering company