Immigration Policy Opinion and the 2016 Presidential Vote

1

Center for Immigration Studies

1629 K Street, NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20006 • Phone 202.466.8185 • Fax 202.466.8076 • www.cis.org

C I S

CIS Letterhead_Layout 1 7/26/12 4:34 PM Page 1

December 2017

Summary Points

• Approachingthe2016election,immigrationpolicypolarizedopinionbypartisanidentitymorethanatanyothertimeincontemporaryhistory.

• ElectionsurveyssuggestthatimmigrationpolicyopinionwasresponsibleformovingcrossovervoterstoDonaldTrumpinthe2016presidentialelection,improvinghisperformanceoverMittRomneyin2012.

• Contrarytothepost-electionconclusionsofRomneyadvisers,Romneywouldlikelyhavedonebetter,notworse,bycampaigningmorevigorouslyforimmigrationcontrol.

• WomenweremorelikelytobemovedtovoteforTrumpasaresultofimmigrationpolicyopinionthanmen.WorkingclassmenweremorelikelytosupportTrumpthanRomney,butthedifferenceisnotas-sociatedwithimmigrationpolicyperse.

• VotersathigherlevelsofeducationvotedforTrumpoverRomneywhentheyweremoreconservativeonimmigration.

• Democratic voters supported Trump more than Romney when they were more conservative onimmigration.

• TrumpdidworsethanRomneyamongsomegroupswhoheldliberalimmigrationviews,includinghigh-erincomeRepublicans.

IntroductionAsapolicyissue,immigrationplayedanunusuallyprominentroleinthe2016election,onethatissuesdonotregularlyplayinpresidentialcontests.DonaldTrumpmadeimmigrationacentralthemeofhiscampaign,rais-ingthesubjectfrequentlyatmajorralliesandinwidelycoveredspeeches.Itwasonetopicofconsistentmessagedisciplineinanorganizationthatmanycalleduntidyandhaphazard.

Justasimportant,themediahasalsopaidagreatdealofattentiontohispledgesonimmigration.Tobesure,manystorieshavebeenwrittenidentifyingthepresident’sviewsoninfrastructure,taxes,andotherissues,butimmigra-tiontriggersintensereactionsamongbothsupportersandopponents.Wallbuilding,bordersecurity,andendingDACAdrawlargeandopinionatedaudiences,whereasroadbuilding,thesolvencyofSocialSecurity,andtradepolicydonot.

Immigration Policy Opinion and the 2016 Presidential Vote Issue relevance in the Trump-Clinton election

By James G. Gimpel

1629KStreet,NW,Suite600•Washington,DC20006•(202)466-8185•center@cis.org•www.cis.org

James G. Gimpel is a professor of government at the University of Maryland, College Park.

2

Center for Immigration Studies

BackgroundThepolarizationofimmigrationalongpartylinesisnotsomethingthatbeganwiththe2016electioncycle,norwithTrump’sannouncementspeech.TurningtoGallup’speriodicsurveys,thereisabundantevidencebackto2000ofamarkedpartisandifferenceinsupportfor increased/decreasedimmigration.Theopiniontrendindicatesthat,after2001,thegapinpartysupportforimmigrationwidenedfortheremainderofthatdecade,thoughtheoverallpercentagecallingfordecreasedim-migrationdiddeclineatfirst.

TheblankspaceintheGallupsurveyseriesinFigure1appearsbecausethestandardquestionaboutimmigrationlevelswasnotaskedin2009,2010,or2011.Whentheytookupthequestionagainin2012,therewasasurgeinthepercentagecallingfordecreasedimmigration,withanevidentpartisangulfthatwidenedfurtherintheyearsleadinguptothe2016election.1AsIindicatedinapreviousCISBackgrounder,theTrumpcampaignseemstohaveclearlycomprehendedthesetrendswhilerivalGOPcandidatesremainedwillfullyblind,deaf,andmute.2

Figure 1. Percentage of Democrats and Republicans Favoring Decreased Immigration, 2001-2016

Source:Galluppolls,combined,2001-2016.

2001

R Decreased

D Decreased

45.5%

59.6%

23.4%

63.2%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0

Question Not Asked

Thepartisangulfinthemostrecentpollingcanbeseenjustasclearlyinthegrowinggapbetweenthepartybasescallingforincreasedimmigration(seeFigure2).Onethingisforcertain,theincreaseinsupportformoregenerousimmigrationoverthelastfouryearscomesoverwhelminglyfromwithintheDemocraticParty,notfromRepublicans.

3

Center for Immigration Studies

Figure 2. Percentage of Democrats and Republicans Favoring Increased Immigration, 2001-2016

Source:Galluppolls,combined,2001-2016.

2001

R Increased

D Increased

9.5%

17.8%

10.0%

28.4%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0

Question Not Asked

Immigrationnowpolarizesthemasspublictoanextentnotseenincontemporarytimes.3NooneconteststhattheTrumpcandidacyinthe2016electionwasasourceofthisheightenedinterest.Buttherearelegitimatequestionsaboutwhatroleimmigrationplayedinvotechoicecontrollingfortraditionalinfluencesonvoting.Foronething,thereissomedoubtaboutwhetherissuesreallymattertovotersoncewecontrolfortheirdeeplyrootedpartisanidentities.IfallthepeoplefavorabletorestrictionistimmigrationpolicywouldhavevotedforDonaldTrumpbecausetheyareRepublicans,thenmaybehispolicypositioningdidn’tmakethedifferencesomeobserversclaim.Onceresearcherscontrolforpartyidentification,theremaybenoremainingroleforissuestoplayinexplainingvotechoice.Ontheotherhand,giventheRepublicannominee’swidelyal-legedappealtonon-traditionalRepublicanconstituenciesandtovoterswhorefusedtosupportMittRomneyin2012,therearereasonstothinkthatTrump’spolicypronouncementscausedrealpoliticalmovement.

Asdetailedbelow,dataanalysisbasedontheDemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupsurveyreleasedinJune2017suggestthatimmigrationpolicyattitudesdiddrivevoterstosupportDonaldTrump,controllingfortheirpartyidentification,sex,age,raceandethnicity,income,andeducation.4Perhapstheimpactofimmigrationonthiselectionappearsobvioustomanyobservers,butitisnot.Messagingcommonlythoughttobeessentialtoacandidate’svictoryoftenturnsoutnottobebecausethoseissuesarealreadyembracedenthusiasticallybyacandidate’ssupporters.Nomatterhowmuchanomineediscussesthem,theyhavenopersuasivepower,andattractnocrossoversupport.

ToconductaplausibletestoftheimpactofimmigrationopiniononTrumpsupport,asensiblestartistocreateanadditiveindexoutoftheresponsestothreesurveyitemstappingimmigrationopinion.Becauseimmigrationisamulti-facetedareaofpublicpolicy,researcherscommonlycombinesurveymeasuresratherthanrelyuponasingleitemtogaugeopinion.Thesethreeitemsreadasfollows,andthecross-tabulatedresultsbypartyidentificationarereportedintheappendixtables:

• Overall,doyouthinkillegalimmigrantsmakeacontributiontoAmericansocietyorareadrain?

• Doyoufavororopposeprovidingalegalwayforillegal immigrantsalreadyintheUnitedStatestobecomeU.S.citizens?

• DoyouthinkitshouldbeeasierorharderforforeignerstoimmigratetotheUnitedStateslegallythanitiscurrently?

Asconstructed,thismeasurerangesfrom1to8,where8indicatesthemostrestriction-orientedresponseand1representsopinion-holdingfavorabletogenerousimmigration.5In2016,about29percentofallrespondentsscoreda7or8onthescale.Onthegenerousendofthecontinuum,about18percentscoreda1or2.Similarresultswereobtainedwhenthesameques-tionswerecombinedinascalefortheearlierwaveofthesurveyconductedin2011.6

4

Center for Immigration Studies

Asforpresidentialpreference,higherscorersonthisscalearepronouncedlypro-TrumpwhenitcomestotheirNovember2016vote(seeFigure3).ComparisonsofthesameimmigrationopinionscaleagainsttheRomneyvoteshowthatopinioninthe2016electionwasmorepolarizedthanin2012.Intruth,thetwoGOPnomineesdidnottakewildlydifferentpositions.ThedifferencewasthatRomneywasadvisedtoremainquietaboutthesubjectonthecampaigntrail,havingbeenrepeatedlywarnedthathisviewswouldalienateHispanicvoters.Throughoutthefall,theRomneycampaignwasobservedtobefearfulofdiscussingimmigration,avoidingthetopicandabruptlycutting-offquestionsaboutit.7Consequently,manyotherwisein-formedvotersreachedNovemberof2012barelyawareofRomney’sviewsonavarietyofimmigrationoptions.Hiscampaignchief,MattRhoades,waswidelyreportedtoadmitregretsaboutmovingthecandidatetowardamorerestriction-orientedimmigrationpolicyintheprimary.8

Figure 3. Estimated Percent Voting for Romney and Trump by Immigration Position

Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.

Generous 2

5 710

37

62

81 81

90

11 1215

43

61

70 71 70

Perc

ent V

otin

g R

epub

lican

3 4 5 6 7 Restrictive

100%

90% Percent Trump

Percent Romney80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0

TheTrumpcampaigntookaverydifferentcourse,announcingimmigrationrestrictionasamajorthemeonhisfirstdayintherace.9Thecandidate’saggressivepositioningontheissuearguablycausedtheClintonteamtoembraceracialandethnicidentitypoliticstoanevengreaterextentthantheyhadinresponsetotheprimarychallengebyrivalBernieSanders.TheendresultwasfargreaterpolarizationbetweenthetwomajorpartycandidatesonimmigrationpolicybyNovember,asshowninFigure3,where90percentofthoseatthemostconservativepolevotedforTrump,comparedtojust5percentatthemostliberalpole.Figure3alsoshowsthatthoseembracingrestrictionistviewsweremuchmorelikelytovoteforTrumpthantheywereforRomney.

Notably,exitpollingindicatesthattheGOPnomineedidnotsufferamarkedlynegativereactionamongLatinovotersforboldlycallingforimmigrationcontrol.10Hispanicturnoutreportedlysurged,andyetthepresident-to-bestilloutperformedRomney.Inhindsight,Romney’sadviserslooktohavebeenwronginpushinghimtoremainsilentonimmigrationforfearofalienatingHispanics.ThisbadadvicewasbasedontheassumptionthatHispanicsthinkandvotealike,andareuniformlyfavorabletowardliberalimmigrationpolicies.Butthismustbewrong-headedifDonaldTrumpcanwin28-30percentofthemwithoutagreatdealofoutreach.11

5

Center for Immigration Studies

Networkexitpollsaredisparagedwhenevervariousgroupswindupdislikingtheirestimates,butalternativemethodsofobtainingestimatesalsohaveshortcomingsandsourcesoferror.12SomepollsshowgreaterTrumpsupportamongLatinos,others less,butcertainly therewasnoseveredrop-offofHispanicsreportingRepublican loyalty.13SomeHispanicvotersvaluedotheraspectsoftheTrumpcandidacy,ignoringhisstatementsonimmigration.Othersmayhavetakenanintensedislikingtohisopponentorsimplyfellbackontheirpartyidentificationlikesomanyothervotersdo.ThevariousreasonsofferedfortheirchoicepresshomethepointthatLatinosarenotsingle-issuevoters,andthatthesameexplanationsthataredeployedtoaccountforhownon-LatinovotersbehaveapplytoLatinovotersaswell.14Talkingaboutthemasiftheyareasingle-mindedblocdoesnotmakeitso,butneitheraretheypoisedtosurgeintotheRepublicanParty.Theemergentpictureisoneofanenduringpoliticaldivisionrangingfromabout25percenttothehigh30sinsupportforRepublicancandidatesnationally,withlowerturnoutbolsteringGOPprospects.

Middle-Income Voters Amajorityofelectionpost-mortemshavesettledonlower-middle-incomevotersasthesinglemostimportantgroupthatdecidedtheelectioninTrump’sfavor.Thisisapopulationthoughttobeanimatedbyassociatedconcernsincludingasloweconomicrecovery,asteadyinfluxofillegalandlegalimmigrants,andlong-termeconomicrestructuringwithconsequentlossofstatus.15

Figure 4. Probability of Men in Middle Income Brackets Voting for Romney (2012) and Trump (2016) by Immigration Opinion

Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.

Generous

Generous

Generous

Generous

0.212

0.248

0.238

0.277

0.305

0.295

0.272

0.295

Men 2016

Men 2016

Men 2016

Men 2016

Men 2012

Men 2012

Men 2012

Men 2012

0.833 0.852

0.885

0.914

0.889

0.900

0.903

$40,000 to $49,999

$60,000 to $69,999

$50,000 to $59,999

$70,000 to $79,999

Restrictive

Restrictive

Restrictive

Restrictive

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0

0

0

0

6

Center for Immigration Studies

Researchersmightacquireaclearersenseofhowmuchimmigrationpolicymatteredtoworkingclassmenin2016bylook-ingatestimatesofTrumpvotingbysexandincome,controllingforpartyidentification,age,education,andrace.Fromthesefigurescanbeinferredapolicy’simpactonaspecificgroup’svotingcontrollingfortheseothercharacteristics.Asdescribedabove,theDemocracyFund dataprovidedbyYouGovarethebasisforthisevaluation.16

Figure4displaysgraphssummarizinghowmeninseveralmiddle-incomebracketsvoted,bytheliberalorconservativena-tureoftheirimmigrationviews.Acoupleofaspectsofthecomparisonsinthesefiguresstandout.First,asexpected,acrossallthemiddle-incomegroups,holdingconservativeimmigrationviewspredictshighvotepercentagesforbothRomneyandTrump,whileliberalviewsalignvoterswithDemocratsinbothelections.

Second,meninthetwo lowermiddle-incomebracketswereuniformlymorelikelytovoteforTrumpthanforRomneyateverypositionontheimmigrationscale,evenattheliberalend(Figure4,top).Fromthisevidenceareasonableconclusionisthatimmigrationwasnottheonlythingthatattractedmiddle-incomementoTrump,asthosewhoweremoreliberalonimmigrationalsofavoredhimoverRomney.Inthetwo uppermiddle-incomebrackets,ontheotherhand,menwereverysimilarintheirvotinginbothyears(Figure4,bottom).Asincomerises,differencesinvotingfromoneelectionyeartothenextgrowconsiderablysmalleramongmen.Immigrationpolicypositioningmatterstovotechoiceamongmen,butnotthatmuchmorein2016thanin2012forthoseinuppermiddle-incomebrackets.

WomenImmigrationlikelymadealargerdifferencein2016forwomenthanformen(Figure5).Womenwhofavorimmigrationrestriction,andaboutone-thirdofthemdo,votedforTrumpatanestimatedrateof86percent,comparedto2012whentheyvotedforRomneyatabout68percent,asubstantialdifferenceof18percentagepoints.Notably,Trumplostthevotesofwomenoverall,collectingonly42percentsupport,comparedwithClinton’sestimated54percent.17ButFigure5indicatesthatimmigrationwasbothmoredivisiveforwomenin2016thanin2012,anddrovemorewomentowardTrumpthanawayfromhim.

Figure 5. Probability of Women Voting for Romney (2012) and Trump (2016) by Immigration Opinion

Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.

Generous Restrictive

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

0.102

0.857

0.040

0.678

2016

2012

7

Center for Immigration Studies

African American and Hispanic VotersBynowitisnosecretthatAfricanAmericansexpressmanyofthesamereservationsaboutimmigrationthatnative-bornwhitesdo.18Giventhistruth,weshouldnotbesurprisedthatahard-linestanceonimmigrationwonTrumpsomevotesinunusualplaces.AmongblackvotersthereisgreaterevidenceofTrumpsupportathigherlevelsofrestrictiveopinionin2016(75percent)thanin2012(32percent).Thesearenottrivialdifferencesasabout20percentofAfricanAmericanrespondentsexpressedoppositiontoimmigrationata7or8ontheeight-pointscalein2016.Ifthree-fourthsofthoserespondentsvotedforTrump,black support amongthat group would have been atabout 15 percent, compared toonly about 8 percent for blackvotersoverall.19Blackswithreser-vationsaboutimmigrationcanbesaidtohavecontributedmodestlytotheTrumpvictory,whileblackssupportive of open immigrationwereaboutashostiletoTrumpastheyhadbeentoRomney.

As indicated above and in otherresearch,Latinosarenotuniform-lypro-immigrationandareespe-cially divided on undocumentedimmigration.20 The DemocracyFundsurvey indicates thatabout23 percent of Hispanic respon-dents can be placed in the threemost conservative categories onthe immigration scale. Estimatesfromthisanalysisalso show thatthis subgroup was supportive ofTrump, slightly more than theywereofRomney(seeFigure6).

Ontheotherhand,Latinosonthegenerousendoftheopinionscaleare decidedly pro-Clinton, simi-lartoAfricanAmericans.Trumpseemstohavealienatedmorepro-immigration Latinos than Rom-neydid,whilewinninga slightlylargershareofthemostconserva-tiveLatinos.ForalloftheTrumpemphasis on immigration andwall-building,thenetchangewassurprisingly small. Across elec-tions,LatinosupportforRepubli-cansrisesorfallsmarginallywhensupportforGOPcandidatesrisesor falls among the broader elec-torateofwhichtheyareapart.To

Figure 6. Probability of African Americans & Hispanics Vot-ing for Romney (2012) & Trump (2016) by Immigration

Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.

Generous

Generous

Restrictive

Restrictive

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0

0

0.025

0.112

0.747

0.749

0.020

0.020

0.324

0.699

2016

2016

2012

2012

African American

Hispanic

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Center for Immigration Studies

theextentthattheycanbecharacterizedasagroupatall,theirbehaviorrunsmoreconsistentwithelectoraltidesthanagainstthem.

Strong and Weak PartisansDespitethepartisandivideonimmigrationidentifiedabove,wedoseestrongRepublicansandstrongDemocratssupport-ingTrumpathigherlevelswhentheyarefavorabletoimmigrationrestrictionthanwhentheyarenot.FromFigure7,forexample,anestimated26percentofDemocraticrestrictionistsvotedforTrump,comparedtoonlyaround11percentwhosupportedRomneyfouryearsearlier.

OntheRepublicanside,somefall-offinTrumpsupportisalsovisibleattheleftendoftheopiniondistribution(seeFigure7).StrongRepublicanswhofavoredamoregenerous immigrationpolicyvotedforTrumpatarateofabout18percent,comparedtothe40percentwhosupportedRomneyin2012.Attheconservativeendofimmigrationopinion,thestrongRepublicanswereaboutthesameintheirsupportfortheRepublicannomineesbothyears(seeFigure7).

Figure 7. Probability of Strong and Weak Partisans Voting for Romney (2012) and Trump (2016) by Immigration Opinion

Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.

Generous

Generous

Generous

Generous

0003

0.179

0.691

0.006

0.401

0.034

0.720

2016

2016

2016

2016

2012

2012

2012

2012

0.1040.113

0.265

0.925

0.463

0.980

Strong Democrat

Strong Republican

Weak Democrat

Weak Republican

Restrictive

Restrictive

Restrictive

Restrictive

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0

0

0

0

0.007

0.969

9

Center for Immigration Studies

Amongweakpartisans, it isprettyclearthatweakDemocratswerecross-pressuredbyimmigrationin2016toanextentthattheywerenotin2012.Figure7showsthattheprobabilityofweakDemocratsvotingforTrumpsteadilyrisesastheycometoholdmorerestrictionistviews.Anestimated46percentoftheseDemocratssupportedtheRepublicannomineein2016,comparedwithonly11percentfouryearsearlier.Thisresultsuggestsconsiderableprescienceonthepartofpoliticalscientistswritingin2014whofoundimmigrationpoliticstobeanongoingsourceofwhiteDemocraticdefection.21WasthissupportbyDemocratsdesiring immigration limitscounterbalancedbyRepublicanswhoheldmore liberalviewsonimmigration?No.Whiletherewassomedrop-offinTrumpsupport,amuchsmallershareofweakRepublicansdefectedtoClintonthanweakDemocratssupportedTrump.

EducationSofar,thesesurveydatasuggestthatimmigrationwasanidealexampleofawedgeissuethatbenefittedtheTrumpcandidacy,movingmanyordinaryDemocraticvotersovertotheTrumpsidewhilealienatingfewerRepublicans.Whatabouteduca-tion?Votersinthehighesteducationcategories(e.g.,bachelor’sdegree,post-graduateeducation)areprettycommonlysplitbetweentheparties,orevenleanDemocratic.NetworkexitpollingawardedClintonanine-pointlead(52percentto43percent)amongcollegegraduatesandthedatareportedheresuggestedaDemocraticleadaboutsixpointsgreateramongthosewithpost-graduatedegrees(i.e.,M.A.,M.S.,JD,Ph.D).Evenso,thechoiceforpresidentamongthebetter-educatedwasclearlyrelatedtotheirimmigrationviews(Table1).Asvotersmovetothemorerestriction-orientedendoftheopinionscale,weseeanotableuptickinsupportforTrumpacrossallthreeoftheselevelsofeducation,withanotableshifttowardTrumpinthetwomostconservativeopinioncategories(seeTable1).

Immigration Opinion

1-Generous2345678-Restrictive

Table 1. Estimated Percentage Voting for Donald Trump in 2016 by Education Level and Immigration Opinion

Source:EstimatesderivedfromDemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupDatabyYouGov,releasedJune2017.

Two-Year College

2.4%4.7%9.1%

17.0%29.4%45.8%63.2%77.8%

Four-Year College

2.6%5.2%

10.0%18.5%31.5%48.4%65.6%79.5%

Post Graduate

2.1%4.3%8.3%

15.5%27.2%43.1%60.7%75.8%

10

Center for Immigration Studies

Thosewithpost-graduatedegreesweremuchmorelikelytosupportTrumpthantheywereRomneywhentheyweremoreconservativeonimmigration(Figure8).ButsimilarvoterswhowereliberalonimmigrationwereaboutequallylikelytosupportClintonin2016as theywereObamain2012.Thesecomparisonssuggest thatevenamongthehighlyeducated,PresidentTrumpwonmanyvoterswhohadvotedforObamain2012,andthattakingsuchaprominentstandonimmigra-tionprobablycontributedtothatsuccess.Anytrade-offsinelectoralsupportresultingfromhiscontroversialviewsworkedmoreinhisfavorthanagainsthim.

Figure 8. Probability of Post-Graduate Degree Holders Voting for Romney (2012) and Trump (2016) by Immigration Opinion

Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.

Generous Restrictive

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

00.041

0.758

0.441

2016

2012

0.021

11

Center for Immigration Studies

Summary and ConclusionsIntheaboveanalysisIhavetakenstockofseveralwaysinwhichopiniononimmigrationshapedvotingbehaviorinthe2016election.Thiscontestwasassociatedwithanunprecedentedlevelofpartisandivisiononmanytopics,includingthesubjectofimmigration.ThepartisandividebothprecededtheTrumpcampaignasavisibletrendinavailablepolls,andwasheight-enedbyit,asthecampaignwasaninformationsourcedrivingopinion-holdingontheissue.ThePewResearchCenter’slatestreport(2017)suggeststhatthispolarizationhasonlybeensustainedoraugmented10monthsintothepresident’sfirstterm.22

Notaddressedhereistheimpactofthe2016campaignonturnoutlevelsforthecandidates.CertainlytheTrumpcampaignmighthavealsoimprovedonRomney’sperformancebasedonthehigherturnoutofcertainelectoralsubgroups,andthediminishedenthusiasmofothers.BecausetheDemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupdataconstituteapanelofvoters,withfewnon-votersincluded,itisnotasuitableresourceforstudyingdifferencesinparticipationacrossthetwoelections.Thesedataalsohavealloftheweaknessesofotherobservationalstudies,includingambiguityaboutcasualdirection,andthepos-sibilitythatimportantexplanatoryvariableshavebeenomitted.Evenso,theresultshereforimmigrationpolicyopinionaretoorobusttobetheconsequenceoffalsepositivity.

ApparentlytappingintowidespreaddiscontentwiththetrajectoryofU.S.immigrationpolicywasawinningstrategyin2016,asevidencedbyTrump’simprovementoverRomneyamongvoterswithconservativeconvictions.TheRepublicannominee’semphasispushedtheDemocratsintoadifficultcornerinwhichtheywereforcedtochoosebetweenwhiteworkingclassvotersandracialandethnicidentitypolitics.Thatfatefulchoice,andtheelectionresult,indicatesthatimmigrationwasawedgeissueinthecampaign,andonethatDemocratswillstruggletoaddressgoingforward.23Likeotherwedgeissuesinpastcampaigns,however,itisunlikelytobepermanent,aselectoralcircumstanceschangeandpartiesadapt.24

ImmigrationpoliticshadanotableimpactontheimprovementoftheTrumpvoteovertheRomneyvoteforthefollow-ingsubgroupsofthepopulationwhentheywerefoundtoadheretoconservativeimmigrationpolicies:thewell-educated,women,AfricanAmericans,andweakDemocrats.Atthesametime,whenvoterswereproponentsofgenerousimmigra-tionpolicy,TrumpdidworsethanRomneyamongthefollowinggroups:Hispanics,strongRepublicans,andhigherincomevoters.TrumpalsodidbetterthanRomneyamonglower-middle-incomemen,butthisimprovementrunsacrosstheentirerangeofimmigrationviewpoints,andsocannotbeattributedtoimmigrationrestrictionperse.RelatedresearchhasshownthattheshiftofworkingclassmentowardRepublicansisalong-termphenomenon.25OnlyfurtheranalysiswillrevealwhatotherspecificissuesmighthavebeenasourceofTrumpsupportamongmen.

Anycampaignstrategyemphasizinganincendiarywedgeissuewillproducetrade-offsinsupport,asacandidatemaylosevotersthatanalternativecandidatefromtheirpartymighthavewon,while improvingonsupportfromotherblocsthatanothercandidatewouldhavelost.Fromtheevidenceassembledhere,thegainsfromafocusonimmigrationrestrictionappeartohavebeenconsiderablylargerthanthelosses(seeFigure3).

Whatanycampaignmanagerhopesisthatthegroupscrossingovertobenefittheircandidatewillbelargerthanthosede-fectingtheotherway.Alienatingafewaffluentandliberal-leaningRepublicansturnedouttobeasmallpricetopay,atleastforacampaignthatwasnotrequiredtobegformoney.Thesesameaffluentelitesarenowscramblingtoregaincontroloftheirpartyfromapopulisthijacking.Successwillrequirethattheytakealesslibertarianviewofthenation’sborder,favoringmodestbutreasonableimmigrationcontrolmeasures.ImmigrationisnottheonlyissueonwhichRepublicaneliteswillhavetomakeadjustmentsinDonaldTrump’sdirection,butdoingsowillbeastepbacktowardregainingthatmostimportantofpoliticalresources:electoraltrust.

12

Center for Immigration Studies

Appendix Tables

Response

MostlymakeacontributionNeitherMostlyadrainDon’tknowTotal

Response

FavorOpposeNotsureTotal

Response

MucheasierSlightlyeasierNochangeSlightlyharderMuchharderDon’tknowTotal

Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain?

Do you favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens?

Do you think it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the US legally than it is currently?

Table A1. Responses to Democracy Fund Questions on Immigration Policy, 2011 & 2016 from YouGov Survey

Source:Frequencytablefromsurveyitems,DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupSurveybyYouGov,releasedJune2017.Dataareweighted.

Number

2,0171,0254,090803

7,935

Number

3,1613,0081,7657,935

Number

7181,3881,8191,4151,904680

7,923

Number

2,833972

3,461673

7,939

Number

3,8322,7941,3227,948

Number

6811,1042,1351,4531,955606

7,953

Percent

25.2%12.8%51.1%10.0%

Percent

39.5%37.6%22.1%

Percent

9.0%17.3%22.7%17.7%23.8%8.5%

Percent

35.4%12.2%43.3%8.4%

Percent

47.9%34.9%16.5%

Percent

9.3%15.1%29.1%19.8%26.7%7.6%

2011

2011

2011

2016

2016

2016

13

Center for Immigration Studies

Independent Variable

ImmigrationOpinionScale(highismorerestrictive)StrongDemocratDemocratLeanDemocratLeanRepublicanRepublicanStrongRepublicanIncome$20-29,999Income$30-39,999Income$40-49,999Income$50-59,999Income$60-69,999Income$70-79,999Income$80-99,999Income$100-119,999Income$120-149,999Income$150,000andaboveHighSchoolSomeCollege2-YearDegree4-YearDegreePostGraduateDegreeBlackHispanicAge65UpAge18-29Female

Table A2. Odds Ratios Associated with Clinton-Trump Voting in the 2016 November Election

Source:DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupSurveybyYouGov,releasedJune2017.Dependent variable: 0=Clinton vote; 1=Trump vote; third party voters have beenexcluded.CellentriesareoddsratiosshowingbyhowmuchtheoddsofvotingforDonaldTrumpincrease/decreaseforeachoneunitchangeinx,holdingothervariablesconstant.Statisticalsignificancelevels:1p≤.052p≤.01.Example:Foreachadditionalincreaseontheimmigrationrestrictionopinionscale,theoddsofvotingforRomneyincreaseby1.52,andforTrumpby2.03,holdingallothervariablesconstant.

2012 Vote

1.52.01.18.03

24.855.72

68.191.242.021.651.942.632.102.121.852.773.12.41.34.25.27.24.16.88

1.23.55.66

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

2

2

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

2

1

2

2

2016 Vote

2.03.02.14.05

13.215.31

37.111.752.523.133.352.932.862.711.581.482.04.55.51.44.44.36.38.40

1.30.29.70

14

Center for Immigration Studies

Independent Variable

ImmigrationOpinionScale(highismorerestrictive)

StrongDemocrat

Democrat

LeanDemocrat

LeanRepublican

Republican

StrongRepublican

Income$20-29,999

Income$30-39,999

Income$40-49,999

Income$50-59,999

Income$60-69,999

Income$70-79,999

Income$80-99,999

Income$100-119,999

Income$120-149,999

Income$150,000andabove

HighSchool

SomeCollege

2-YearDegree

4-YearDegree

PostGraduateDegree

Black

Hispanic

Age65Up

Age18-29

Female

Constant

LogpseudolikelihoodN%CorrectlyClassifiedNullModel

Table A3. Complete Logistic Regression Model of Clinton-Trump Voting in the 2016 November Election

Source:DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupSurveybyYouGov,releasedJune2017.Dependentvariable:0=Clintonvote;1=Trumpvote;thirdpartyvotershavebeenex-cluded.Cellentriesarelogisticregressioncoefficients(standarderrorsclusteredbystate)Statisticalsignificancelevels:1p≤.052p≤.01.

2012 Vote

0.416(.030)-4.282(.229)-1.734(.151)-3.375(.232)3.213(.265)1.744(.225)4.222(.320)0.212(.311)0.704(.302)0.499(.323)0.661(.225)0.968(.356)0.743(.442)0.750(.331)0.615(.322)1.019(.388)1.137(.361)-0.899(.437)-1.092(.458)-1.395(.444)-1.328(.410)-1.435(.448)-1.852(.490)-0.132(.186)0.206(.152)-0.592(.326)-0.415(.119)-1.556(.537)

-880.9734,46292.052.5

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2016 Vote

0.710(.040)-4.186(.333)-1.996(.225)-3.043(.256)2.581(.303)1.670(.235)3.614(.375)0.557(.309)0.924(.255)1.141(.255)1.208(.298)1.075(.285)1.051(.306)0.998(.343)0.456(.271)0.393(.309)0.712(.313)-0.590(.388)-0.675(.403)-0.817(.406)-0.830(.421)-1.016(.389)-0.978(.393)-0.929(.321)0.258(.157)-1.233(.756)-0.359(.106)-3.906(.549)

-847.1124,83789.450.5

15

Center for Immigration Studies

End Notes1SeeBradfordS.JonesandDanielleJ.Martin,“Path-to-CitizenshiporDeportation?HowEliteCuesShapedOpiniononIm-migrationinthe2010USHouseElections”,Political Behavior,39:1:177-204,2017;andChristopherP.Muste,“TheDynam-icsofImmigrationOpinionintheUnitedStates,1992-2012”,Public Opinion Quarterly77:1:398-416,2013.

2JamesG.Gimpel,“ImmigrationOpinionandtheRiseofDonaldTrump”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder,July2016.

3“ThePartisanDivideonValuesGrowsEvenWider”,PewResearchCenter,October5,2017.AccessedOctober12,2017.

4“2016VOTERSurveyDataSet,TopLines,andCrosstabs”,DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroup,June2017.AccessedOc-tober17,2017.ThesurveywasconductedbyYouGov,ofPaloAlto,Calif.

5TheseitemsscaleatreliabilityvalueCronbach’salpha=.66.

6This scale is also highly correlatedwith other indicators of immigration policy opinion, such as the desire to see theRepublicanandDemocraticpartiesadoptmorerestrictivepositionsonimmigration.

7BrettLoGiurato, “MittRomney IsTerrifiedOfTalkingAbout Immigration”,Business Insider, June20,2012; andEvanMcMorris-Santoro,“FollowingObama’sMove,HowWillMittRomneyBreakHisSilentTreatmentOfImmigration?”,Talk-ingPointsMemo,June15,2012.AccessedOctober16,2017.

8Forexample,see:JonWard,“MittRomneyCampaignManagerMattRhoadesLamentsHard-RightShiftOnImmigration”,HuffingtonPost,December3,2012,accessedOctober16,2017;andJeffZeleny,“RomneyCampaignManagerSaysHeRe-gretsImmigrationStance”,The New York Times,December3,2012,accessedOctober17,2017.

9JamesG.Gimpel,“ImmigrationOpinionandtheRiseofDonaldTrump”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder,July2016.

10SeeHarryEnten,“TrumpProbablyDidBetterWithLatinoVotersThanRomneyDid”,FiveThirtyEight,November18,2016,accessedOctober18,2017.

11Forexamplepost-electionstoriesaboutTrumpandLatinovoting,see:KevinDrum,“TrumpReallyDidWin28%oftheLatinoVote”,Mother Jones,March6,2017,accessedOctober18,2017; MarcelaValdes,“‘We’reLookingataNewDivideWithintheHispanicCommunity’”,The New York Times,November16,2015,accessedOctober18,2017;ThomasB.Edsall,“TheDemocrats’ImmigrationProblem”,The New York Times,February16,2017,accessedOctober18,2017;andAlejandraMatos,“OntheElPasoborder,Trump’sappealwithLatinosdefiesexpectations”,The Washington Post,December9,2016,accessedOctober18,2017.

12Grace Sparks, “PollstersCan’tAgreeOnHowLatinosVoted In 2016”,HuffingtonPost,December 12, 2016, accessedOctober18,2017.

13 See, for example: “LatinosWillNeverVoteForARepublican,AndOtherMythsAboutHispanicsFrom2016”,NPR’s“MorningEdition”,December22,2016,accessedOctober18,2017;FranciscoNavas,“WhatHispanicpeoplethinkofTrump:USLatinosgiveawiderangeofanswers”,The Guardian,January23,2017,accessedOctober18,2017;and,BrittnyMejia.“Despitescornandcriticism,theseLatinovotersdon’tregretvotingforTrump”,Los Angeles Times,January17,2017,accessedOctober18,2017.

14AngelSaavedraCisneros,ed.,Latino Identity and Political Attitudes,London,UK:PalgraveMacmillan,2017.

15JustinGest,The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2016.JeffManzaandNedCrowley,“WorkingClassHero?InterrogatingtheSocialBasesof theRiseofDonaldTrump”,The Forum,15(1),pp.3-28,2017.ShannonM.MonnatandDavidL.Brown,“MorethanaRuralRevolt:

16

Center for Immigration Studies

LandscapesofDespairandthe2016PresidentialElections”,Journal of Rural Studies55:227-236,2017.L.Collingwood,T.Reny, andA.A.Valenzuela, “Flipping forTrump: Immigration,NotEconomics,ExplainsShifts inWhiteWorkingClassVotes”,July7,2017.ShadTurney,FrankLevy,JackCitrin,andNeilO’Brian,“WaitingforTrump:TheMovetotheRightofWhiteWorking-ClassMen,1968-2016”,The California Journal of Politics and Policy,UCBerkeley,InstituteofGovernmentalStudies,2017.AccessedOctober17,2017.

16FormoreontheDemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupproject,seehere.AccessedOctober16,2017.

17In2012,Obamawon55percentofwomenandRomney44percentaccordingtoexitpolling;see“PresidentExitPolls”,The New York Times,undated.AccessedOctober18,2017.

18VincentL.Hutchings andCaraWong, “Racism,GroupPosition andAttitudes about Immigration amongBlacks andWhites”,Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race11:2419-442,2014.

19AlecTysonandShivaManiam,“BehindTrump’sVictory:DivisionsbyRace,Gender,Education”,PewResearchCenter,November9,2016.AccessedOctober16,2017.

20AngelSaavedraCisneros,ed.,Latino Identity and Political Attitudes,London,UK:PalgraveMacmillan,2017.MarkHugoLopez,RichMorin,andPaulTaylor,Illegal Immigration Backlash Worries, Divides Latinos,Washington,D.C.:PewHispanicCenter,October28,2010.S.M.Rouse,B.C.Wilkinson,andJ.C.Garand,“DividedLoyalties?UnderstandingVariationinLatinoAttitudesTowardImmigration”,Social Science Quarterly,91:3:856-882,2010.

21ZoltanHajnalandMichaelU.Rivera,“Immigration,Latinos,andWhitePartisanPolitics:TheNewDemocraticDefection”,American Journal of Political Science,58:4773-789,2014.

22“ThePartisanDivideonValuesGrowsEvenWider”,PewResearchCenter,October5,2017.AccessedOctober12,2017.

23PeterBeinart,“HowtheDemocratsLosttheirWayonImmigration”,The Atlantic,July/August2017.AccessedOctober18,2017.ThomasB.Edsall,“TheDemocrats’ImmigrationProblem”,The New York Times,February16,2017.AccessedOctober18,2017.WilliamA.Galston,“ThePopulistMoment”,The Journal of Democracy,28:2:21-33,2017.

24D.SunshineHillygusandToddG.Shields,The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns,Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009.

25ShadTurney,FrankLevy,JackCitrin,andNeilO’Brian,“WaitingforTrump:TheMovetotheRightofWhiteWorking-ClassMen,1968-2016”,The California Journal of Politics and Policy,Berkeley,Calif.:UCBerkeley,InstituteofGovernmentalStudies,2017.AccessedOctober17,2017.