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Failures in Communication During the Skybolt Crisis September-December 1962
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In the 1960's, the Cold War was beginning to reach a period of heating up. The
Western Hemisphere was constantly trying to combat the Soviet Union's advances in
nuclear technology. Whether that meant preventing the placement of Russian missiles in
land close to the West or developing their own missiles to counter the Soviet equivalents,
America and its allies were looking to gain the upper hand on Khrushchev. During the
Eisenhower administration, England was looking to develop its own nuclear deterrent
called Blue Streak. Blue Streak would be attached to England's V-bomber and would be
an air-to-surface missile. Despite a partnership with Australia, England chose to cancel
due to the costly development and partner with America on its missile, called Skybolt.1
The U.K. joined America in the production of Skybolt in 1960 at Camp David.
Initially, Prime Minister Macmillan, the Conservative party leader, desired the Polaris
missile but after touting Skybolt heavily, the United States was able to persuade
Macmillan to take it. A "memo of understanding" was then signed after the meeting
where England would buy one thousand Skybolt missiles without their warheads once
they were completed, which was estimated to be sometime in 1965.2
By September of 1962, the fate of the Skybolt missile was already being called
into question. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara presented to the President and
Secretary of State Dean Rusk the issues with the missile, which was still in development.
Two separate reports were done by the Controller of the Pentagon, Charles Hitch, and
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Harold Brown, per request of
McNamara. Hitch and Brown both came to the same conclusion: Skybolt as a part of a B-
1 Raymond Williams, "Skybolt and American Foreign Policy," Military Affairs 30 (3), 153, Accessed November 23, 2015, doi:10.2307/1985370. 2 Ibid, 153
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52 force is inferior to the missile programs already in place at the time. Hound Dog
missiles could easily be attached to the fleet of B-52's for a smaller amount of money and
act as defence suppression or primary attack missiles in conjunction with the Minuteman
missiles. With Hound Dog completed and Minuteman nearing completion at the end of
1962, Skybolt did not make fiscal sense. Another problem with Skybolt noted in the
Brown and Hitch reports was the low reliability. They note,
Skybolt will take another two years...the difference in schedule is likely to be
reflected, as well, in a lower reliability for Skybolt....that risk that Skybolt will fail to
work at all is very low; the risk that it will not be a highly reliable...system until the
late 1960's is quite large.3
From this point on, the future of Skybolt had been sealed. The United States
would terminate production of the missile and instead focus its efforts on submarine
launched missiles, like Polaris. Cancellation of Skybolt would affect England more so
than it would the United States. England was relying on Skybolt to be its nuclear
deterrent in the 1960's. Without the missile, England's plan for a V-bomber central
defence would be null. No nuclear deterrent would also create a serious problem as Prime
Minister Macmillan attempted to convince Charles de Gaulle to allow England to enter
the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the European Union.
How to satisfy both the needs of Macmillan's Tory government and the needs of
the United States became the main focus of JFK's cabinet. Fresh out of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, Kennedy left the issue of Skybolt to members of his own cabinet who ultimately
3 Report to the President, "Skybolt and Nassau: American Policy-Making and Anglo-American Foreign Relations," 15 November 1963 in Richard E Neustadt, Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective, 1st ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999, 27-28
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passed the issue down to their own staff. Lack of communication between superiors and
their staff, or "Chiefs and Indians" as Neustadt refers to the relationship in the Report to
JFK, was what ultimately lead to the mishandling of foreign relations between England
and the United States.
With the reports from different branches of the government, it seemed as if
Skybolt was going to be cancelled in September. The U.S. was looking for a way to break
the news to England or at least tell them that it was a possibility that production of the
missile may stop. Great Britain's Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft made his way
across the pond to visit the United States in mid-September. Skybolt was discussed
between Thorneycroft, Kennedy, and McNamara but the whole truth was kept from
Thorneycroft. McNamara painted an optimistic picture to the Minister of Defence, saying
that production funds had just been released Skybolt.4
Despite that piece of news, Thorneycroft still warned the Kennedy administration
that Skybolt was pivotal to the U.K.'s defence plan and that the U.S. needed to hold up its
end of the deal made at Camp David under Eisenhower. The lack of information at this
stage was because there was no definitive answer on the fate of the missile. McNamara
could not give an answer to Thorneycroft because he himself did not know and nor did
official Washington. Official word would not be given until October 15th. More pressing
matters came up the day before on October 14th. Skybolt would have to take a backseat
to the Cuban Missile Crisis.5
4 Report to the President in Report to JFK, 31-325 Ibid, 32-33
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When the Cuban Missile Crisis was at its peak on October 26th, a memorandum
was sent from Budget Director Bell to McGeorge Bundy. Originally, the memorandum
had been drafted for JFK himself but due to the situation at hand, Bell advised his staff to
change the addressee. It stated, "...the current reviews in Defense in connection with the
1964 budget will lead to a firm recommendation by the Secretary that development of
Skybolt be cancelled."6 Finally, official word had been sent that Skybolt was highly likely
to be cancelled. In that same memo, Bell warned that
cancellation is likely to create internal political problems for the British...our actions,
up to now...have clearly implied an intention to proceed...It would seem important that
suitable arrangements be made for advance notification...and consultation prior to the
time that a decision becomes known publicly or through Air Force channels....7
Bundy, heavily involved in Cuba, barely saw this memo. It was instead passed on
to his secretary, Carl Kaysen, who was acting as "Bundy-for-everything-else." A Chief
had passed down the workload to an Indian. It was then up Kaysen and the rest of the
Indians not working on Cuba to sort this out. Kaysen turned to his colleagues working at
the British National Affairs desk, a department used infrequently as the president and his
colleagues often act as the liaison between Britain and the U.S. The men of the British
National Affairs chimed the same warning as the others: Tell Macmillan the news with
enough time to prepare.8
With the cancellation of Skybolt now all but certain, the U.S. was faced with
breaking the bad news to its ally. America was well aware of the importance of the
6Director of Budget Bell to McGeorge Bundy, October 26, 1962, Memorandum, in Report to JFK, 337 Ibid8 Report to the President in Report to JFK, 34-35
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missile to England. In a memorandum from Executive Secretary from William H.
Brubeck to Karl Kaysen, a staff member of the National Security Council, the
ramifications for Her Majesty's Government are outlined. England was relying on its fleet
of V-bombers to be its main strike force in the 1960's while the U.S. was instead turning
its focus to submarine based missiles. With Polaris being launched from under the sea
and Hound Dog already completed, the U.S. did not see a need to continue with the
missile.9
Politically, cancellation would have serious impacts for Prime Minister
Macmillan's government. The Tory party in England had won election by promising the
nation that they could deal with both defence and the Americans. Failure to acquire
Skybolt would be both a failure in the defence department and a failure in dealing with
the Americans. With an election scheduled in November, Macmillan could not risk losing
seats in the House of Commons to the Labour party because of Skybolt.10
"The special U.S.-U.K. relationship" was also seen to be at risk. As stated in the
memorandum, "Without beating the drums too much, it might be pointed out that a far
more important ingredient in this relationship than the peculiar provisions of our atomic
legislation is the degree of mutual trust and confidence which exists between the two
countries."11 This trust between the two nations was what allowed the level of
cooperation in military affairs. Since the U.S. would sell the U.K. Skybolt, the U.K.
9 Executive Secretary Brubeck to Kaysen, through Bundy, by request of Kaysen, October 31, 1962, Department of State Memorandum in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, 1961–1963, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 398, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d39810 Ibid11 Ibid
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allowed the U.S. to use Holy Loch and Christmas Island to house missiles and
submarines. An estrangement with America's oldest and closest ally might leave a black
mark on the U.S. and cause other nations to be weary of trusting them. This would have
been a major blow to the whole alliance system. The memorandum warns, "We should
carefully consider the possible consequences of an estrangement of this relationship."12
What the memorandum ultimately suggests is to communicate with the British
and try to solve the problem. It says if a decision on Skybolt has not been made, then
there should be a consultation between the two nations. If the U.S. has already decided to
cancel production of the missile, Kennedy should send Macmillan a letter explaining the
fiscal and military reasons for its cancellation while also allowing Macmillan time to
prepare for backlash when the decision does go public.13
On November 7th, the Washington finally decided to send word to London.
Eleven days after the climactic Sunday of the crisis in Cuba, the men of the Kennedy
administration felt like they could tackle any problem so they shifted their attention,
albeit briefly, to Skybolt. McNamara's cancellation of Skybolt would save America $2.5
billion over several fiscal years with a fifth of it being saved in the next fiscal year alone.
The issue was no longer what to tell the British whether the project had been cancelled or
not but what kind of compensation would be offered to Great Britain now that it was.
McNamara and Rusk both stated that the Skybolt crisis was "so serious as to make the
Government fall" in London.14 Without a substitute, their prediction may have just very
12 Ibid13 Ibid14 Report to the President in Report to JFK, 36
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well came true. The discussion of Skybolt at the meeting ended quickly and it was
decided that Sir David Ormsby Gore, the British Ambassador, would tell Macmillan.15
On November 8th, Secretary of Defense McNamara saw Gore and told him all he
was able to. Skybolt was very likely to be cancelled due to increasing costs. All that was
needed to give Skybolt the final nail in the coffin was the recommendations from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. McNamara tried to reassure Gore that he had time and that no
decision would be made for three to four weeks. Gore returned to the embassy stunned. A
compatriot noted that on that day Gore "was like a man who'd learned the Bomb was
going to drop...and he doubted he could stop it."16
McNamara called Minister of Defence Thorneycroft on November 9th to discuss
the news Ambassador Gore broke to him only a few days ago. McNamara told
Thorneycroft, "Prior to any U.S. decision to cancel I would be quite willing to come to
London to discuss the matter...I estimated that the decision would be not made here
before approximately December 10."17 But December 10th was not the date McNamara
expected a decision. November 23rd was and December 10th was instead the date
McNamara expected the decision to be leaked. This was not done to confuse London but
to give McNamara leeway.18
Thorneycroft was not as dramatic as his colleague Gore was. He appreciated the
warning from McNamara. Thorneycroft decided to have his department reassess how the
V-bomber force could be of use without Skybolt and how Washington and London
15 Ibid, 3716 Ibid, 3717 Ibid, 3818 Ibid
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should announce to the public should the program be cancelled. Near the end of the
conversation, Thorneycroft implied, according to McNamara, that Her Majesty's
Government "would wish to consider a sub-launched missile if the V-bomber would be
made obsolete by the loss of Skybolt."19 By Thorneycroft's own recollection, "I did more
than intimate; I used the word 'Polaris.' I said I thought we'd have to start from there. I
assumed he'd get the message."20
Despite this initial wave of communication, discussions between the U.S. and the
U.K. were few and far between in the rest of November. Prime Minister Macmillan did
not feel it was his place to push the U.S. to a decision and he was hoping the U.S. would
not make any decisions until after the election for members of the House of Commons.
Macmillan could handle any criticisms the Labour party threw at him provided the Tories
held the majority.21
On November 15th, Macmillan cabled Gore in Washington with the instructions
to present three matters of procedure to President Kennedy. First, Macmillan needed to
make sure there would be no press leaks before consultation. Second, no decisions on
Skybolt or alternatives could be made until after consultation. Finally, that the
consultation mentioned should take place as soon as possible. Macmillan also asked Gore
whether or not he should call JFK. Gore didn't reply until a week later on the 21st which
is an interestingly long time. Gore said that calling Kennedy now would be premature
19 Ibid, 38-3920Ibid, 39 Besides that last quote from Minister of Defence Thorneycroft, the recollection of the conversation between McNamara and Thorneycroft came from McNamara. According to Neustadt, both square with each other except on the point of Polaris. McNamara said Thorneycroft only hinted at it with the sub-based missiles.21 Ibid, 59
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and that it should wait until after the Thanksgiving holiday. Calling now would make
Macmillan look weak.22
Both sides were curious why nobody called each other at this point. Neither
London or Washington wanted to seem like it was being pushy. The election in London
proved to be less than desirable for the Tory party with six seats being lost to the Labour
party on November 22nd. Throughout November, messages were exchanged between
London and Washington but they did not discuss Skybolt. At last, on November 27th, it
was decided a meeting would be arranged in Nassau in three weeks on December 18th
with the goal of coming up with a solution for Skybolt.23
Previous to the decision to meet in December, the U.S. was planning on
alternatives to what they would offer Macmillan since Skybolt had been terminated.
Three options were drafted for Great Britain. First, the British could continue with the
research of Skybolt through cut-back production in the U.S. or through production in
England with U.S. technology. This option would cost $375 million dollars, or $175
million more than the U.K. was planning on spending on Skybolt. Second, England could
buy Hound Dog missiles to use on V-bombers. The problem was that V-bombers would
need further modifications to carry that missile and by the time those were completed,
they would be obsolete. The third option would be participation in a sea-based, medium
range ballistic missile (MRBM) force under multilateral manning. At this point in time,
the U.K. wanted to avoid discussion of this until after EEC negotiations were over with
22 Ibid, 59-6023 Ibid, 60-61
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de Gaulle. Secretary Rusk wanted to " make quite clear to the British that there is no
possibility of our helping them set up a nationally manned and owned MRBM force."24
The problem Secretary Rusk saw with giving England MRBM's was the potential
jealousy amongst Europe of the "special U.S.-U.K. relationship." The U.K. had been
denied entrance to the European Economic Community by France previously on grounds
that it relied too heavily on the U.S. in regards to defence. A multilateral force would
only make that reliance seem stronger. The U.S. had also been denying the Federal
Republic of Germany access to MRBM's on the basis that putting nuclear missiles so
close to the Soviet Union's borders would spark another situation similar to Cuba.
Granting England a force of Polaris armed submarines could spark demands that the
Federal Republic of Germany should receive equal treatment. Rusk ends his letter by
saying that the options presented to England must be limited to those listed and that if
Polaris is offered, it has to be part of a multilateral force, not an independent deterrent.25
By the time of the Nassau meeting, tensions had been high. Poor communication
up until this point had left both sides practically in the dark about each other's plans.
Macmillan did not know for sure what the Kennedy was going to offer and Kennedy did
not know if Macmillan would accept any of the three offers his cabinet had devised.
Macmillan had just returned from unsuccessful talks with Charles de Gaulle in regards to
24 Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara, November 24, 1962, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, 1961–1963, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 400, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d40025 Ibid
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entry to the EEC. By December 18th, Macmillan had already decided he would not
accept a British continuation of the Skybolt and instead wanted Polaris.26
Talks began the following day in the morning. Present at the conference was
Kennedy, Secretary McNamara, Prime Minister Macmillan, Minister of Defence
Thorneycroft, Ambassador Ormsby Gore, and others. Macmillan opened the meeting by
discussing the cooperation that existed between the two nations since Roosevelt when it
came to matters of nuclear weapons. He reminded Kennedy of the Camp David
agreement made under Eisenhower which stated that England agreed to take Skybolt with
the stipulation that the U.S. was able to have a submarine base at Holy Loch. Macmillan
then moved immediately to Polaris, saying that if the U.K. received that missile, he felt
that France and the FRG would not feel slighted.27
Kennedy did not offer the Polaris missile on the first deal. He instead offered
Macmillan the chance to buy the research from America and continue on with Skybolt.
They could acquire all of it for $100 million, a package Kennedy said was worth $450
million worth of work. Kennedy said he wanted to use the time in Nassau to create a
multilateral force that could satisfy the needs of both nations. Macmillan declined that
offer outright, with the retort, "The girl has been violated in public."28 Kennedy was
mostly worried about upsetting the other European nations, mainly France and the FRG.
26Report to the President in Report to JFK, 89 27Memorandum of Conversation on Skybolt between The President, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Ball, Ambassador Bruce, Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, The Prime Minister, Lord Home, Mr. Thorneycroft, Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Mr. de Zuleta, and Mr. Bligh, December 19, 1962, Nassau, The Bahamas, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, 1961–1963, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 402, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d40228 Report to the President in Report to JFK, 90
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He did not want to give them the same deal as England out of fear that the nations would
then expect U.S. aid.29
On day two, the final deal was decided. Macmillan got Polaris and the submarines
but still had to be a part of a multilateral force. Macmillan was prepared to put in all of
his part of a Polaris force provided the Queen had the ultimate power and right to call
back the submarines in case of a dire emergency, similar to that in 1940. England would
get its independent nuclear deterrent while still satisfying America's need for a
multilateral force. Macmillan made an interesting comment towards the opening of
discussion. He said,
Actually, the whole thing is ridiculous. What do seven or eight UK units add to the
existing nuclear strength, which is enough to blow up the world? So why does the UK
want it? It is partly a question of keeping up with the Joneses...30
Macmillan knew that the question of having missiles was not just about having a
deterrent, but also about keeping up an image on the international stage. Without the
"latest and greatest" weapon, a nation would be seen as weak. It was also decided at
Nassau that France would be offered the same deal England was offered, which they
ultimately rejected.31
29 Memorandum of Conversation on Skybolt between The President...in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, 1961–1963, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 402, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d40230 Memorandum of Conversation on Skybolt between The Prime Minister, Lord Home, Ambassador David Ormsby Gore, Sir Robert Scott, Mr. Thorneycroft, Mr. Bligh, The President, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Ball, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Ambassador Bruce, and Mr. William R. Tyler, December 20, 1962, Nassau, The Bahamas, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, 1961–1963, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 406, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d40631 Ibid and Report to the President in Report to JFK, 101
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Throughout the whole Skybolt Crisis, communication between departments and
nations could have allowed the situation to not have been so tense at times. In the
conclusion in the Report to the President, Neustadt makes mention of the letter that
outlined the three options for England,
But might-have-dones are not confined at high levels. At lower levels one finds more
enduring problems....One of the most revealing things in this entire story...is the State
Department letter of "instruction" to Defense...For what this indicates is that at upper
official levels, where staff work was confined, State's Indians who took the lead in
drafting neither grasped the "British problem," nor took time for though about, nor
faced up to the dilemma it created for their chiefs.32
The main issue Neustadt sees with the relationship between Chiefs and Indians is the
narrow-minded view of policy and "low tolerance for listening." The report recommends
that an interdependency needs to be created in the administration so that all departments
will be working together in order to do their jobs effectively.33
There were numerous times throughout the crisis where a faster reply or even just
a telephone call or letter informing Great Britain the intentions of the United States could
have saved both sides a load of headaches in the end. Because of the lack of
communication, the trust between England and America was violated and the "special
relationship" suffered because of that. Though there was cooperation on the staff level,
the Chiefs did not listen to the constant warnings of their Indians to simply contact
32 Report to the President in Report to JFK, 113 33 Ibid, 115
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Macmillan. Kennedy was unable to see the changes in Neustadt's report through. A few
days after reading the report, he was assassinated in Dallas.34
34 The Report to JFK was one of the last documents JFK read. On Sunday, November 17th, he spent the day by the pool reading it at his family's home in Palm Beach. He gave it to his wife and said, "If you want to know what my life is like, read this." It was the first government document Kennedy had given Jackie and she was so struck by it, she kept it on her person, reading portions while on their trip to Texas.
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Works Cited
PrimaryReport to the President, "Skybolt and Nassau: American Policy-Making and Anglo-
American Foreign Relations," 15 November 1963Foreign Relations of the United States. 1961–1963. Volume XIII. Western Europe and
Canada, 1961–1963. eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010.) Documents 398, 400, 402, and 406. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/ch7
SecondaryEllison, James. "The Special Relationship and Its Critics." The American Interest. June
17, 2015. Accessed November 29, 2015. http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/17/the-special-relationship-and-its-critics/.
Neustadt, Richard E. Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective. 1st ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Williams, Raymond C.. 1966. “Skybolt and American Foreign Policy”. Military Affairs 30 (3): 153–60. doi:10.2307/1985370.
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