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JSOUReport10-1
Hunter-KillerTeams:AttackingEne
mySafeHavens
Celeski
Hunter-Killer Teams:
Attacking EnemySafe Havens
Joseph D. Celeski
JSOU Repor t 10-1January 2010
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Joint Special Operations Universityand the Strategic Studies Department
Te Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications
to contribute toward expanding the body o knowledge about joint special
operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations
o national security proessionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF)
students and leaders or consideration by the SOF community and deense
leadership.
JSOU is the educational component o the United States Special Opera-
tions Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Te JSOU
mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and
selected other national and international security decision makers, both
military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the
science and art o joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the
men and women o SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint
and interagency environment.
JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where
eort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions:
USSOCOM mission.
USSOCOM provides ully capable and enabledSOF to deend the nations interests in an environment characterized by
irregular warare.
USSOF mission. USSOF conducts special operations to prepare the oper-
ational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, aggression,
and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic eect.
Te Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum
support to Proessional Military Education institutionsthe sta colleges
and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic inuence by its interaction in
academic, interagency, and United States military communities.
Te JSOU portal is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil.
Joint Special Operations University
Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, PresidentKenneth H. Poole, YC-3, Strategic Studies Department Director
William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jerey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.;and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret. Resident Senior Fellows
Editorial Advisory Board
Alvaro de Souza PinheiroMajor General, Brazilian Army, Ret.JSOU Associate Fellow
James F. Powers, Jr.Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.Director o Homeland Security,
Commonwealth o Pennsylvania andJSOU Associate Fellow
Richard H. Shultz, Jr.Ph.D., Political ScienceDirector, International SecurityStudies Program, Te Fletcher School, usUniversity and JSOU Senior Fellow
Stephen SloanPh.D., Comparative PoliticsUniversity o Central Floridaand JSOU Senior Fellow
Robert G. Spulak, Jr.Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear EngineeringSandia National Laboratoriesand JSOU Associate Fellow
Joseph S. StringhamBrigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow
Graham H. urbiville, Jr.Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc.and JSOU Associate Fellow
Jessica Glicken urnleyPh.D., Cultural Anthropology/Southeast Asian StudiesGalisteo Consulting Groupand JSOU Senior Fellow
Rich YargerPh.D., History,Ministerial Reorm Advisor;U.S. Army Peacekeeping and StabilityOperations Institute and JSOU AssociateFellow
John B. AlexanderPh.D., Education, Te Apollinaire Groupand JSOU Senior Fellow
Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., MiddleEastern & South Asian HistoryPublic Policy CenterMiddle East Institute
and JSOU Senior FellowJoseph D. CeleskiColonel, U.S. Army, Ret.JSOU Senior Fellow
Chuck CunninghamLieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret.Proessor o Strategy, Joint AdvancedWarghting School and JSOU Senior Fellow
Gilbert E. DoanMajor, U.S. Army, Ret.,JSOUInstitutional Integration Division Chie
Brian H. GreenshieldsColonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.Senior Lecturer, DoD Analysis, NavalPostgraduate School
Tomas H. HenriksenPh.D., History, Hoover InstitutionStanord University and JSOU Senior Fellow
Russell D. HowardBrigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.Adjunct Faculty, Deense Critical Language/Culture Program, Manseld Center, Universityo Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow
John D. JogerstColonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.18thUSAF Special Operations SchoolCommandant
James KirasPh.D., History, School o Advanced Air andSpace Studies, Air University and JSOUAssociate Fellow
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On the cover
ypical American rontiersmen garb worn by independent compa-
nies o Rangers when conducting hunter-killer operations.
Te gure shown here, on display at the Kings Mountain National
Military Park museum in South Carolina, has a homespun cotton
shirt, a large-brimmed hat to keep the rain and sun o, ringed
overcoat and leggings. Rangers also wore Indian-style leggings andwore and carried spare moccasins. Rangers were equipped with
knives, hatchets or tomahawks, and either intlock-red muskets
or ries using lead ball and black powder. Powder was kept dry
in a powder horn. A haversack was used to carry ood and orage
items.
All photographs are by Joseph D. Celeski.
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JSOU Report 10-1
he JSOU Press
Hurlburt Field, Florida200
Hunter-Killer Teams:Attacking Enemy
Safe Havens
Joseph D. Celeski
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Comments about this publication are invited and should be orwarded to Director,
Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 ully Street,
Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies o this publication may be
obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917.
*******
Te JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant
to special operations or potential publication. For more inormation please contact
Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director o Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569,
james.d.anderson@hurlburt.a.mil. Tank you or your interest in the JSOU Press.
*******
Tis work was cleared or public release; distribution is unlimited.
ISBN ---
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Te views expressed in this publication are entirely those o the author
and do not necessarily reect the views, policy or position o the United
States Government, Department o Deense, United States Special
Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
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Recent Publications of the JSOU Press
Intelligence in Denied Areas, December , Russell D. Howard
Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January ,Tomas H. Henriksen
Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream,February , Jessica Glicken urnley
Disrupting Threat Finances, April , Wesley J.L. Anderson
USSOCOM Research Topics 2009
Indias Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September , Prakash Singh
What Really Happened in Northern Irelands Counterinsurgency,October , Tomas H. Henriksen
Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing
Adversary Intelligence Operations, January , Graham H. urbiville, Jr.
Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN the Thick Blue Line,February , Joseph D. Celeski
Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect
Approaches, February , Richard D. Newton, ravis L. Homiak,
Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan WhiteSpecial Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference
Manual, March
The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy: The Past as Present, the
Present as Future, April , Roby C. Barrett
Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent, May ,John B. Alexander
USSOCOM Research Topics 2010Report of Proceedings, 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference
(16-19 March 2009)
Information Warfare: Assuring Digital Intelligence Collection,July , William G. Perry
Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environ-
ment, July , Russell D. Howard
Manhunting: Counter-Network Operations for Irregular Warfare,September , George A. Craword
Irregular Warfare: Brazils Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas,September , Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro
Pakistans Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies,December , Haider A.H. Mullick
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vii
Contents
Foreword ................................................................................ix
About the Author ....................................................................xi
1. Introduction ........................................................................ 1
2. Background, Denition and Doctrine ................................... 7
3. Safe Havens .......................................................................19
4. The American Historical Experiencein Hunter-Killer Operations .................................................25
5. Principles of Hunter-Killer Team Employmentduring Counter Safe Haven Operations ...............................51
6. Conclusion ........................................................................57
Appendix. Recommended Readings ....................................... 63
Endnotes ................................................................................67
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ix
Foreword
The concept o hunter-killer operations deep within enemy territory
evokes a sense o excitement and adventure, especially or those
o us amiliar with the exploits o Robert Rogers Rangers o the
18th century or the operations o Special Forces and Rangers in Aghani-
stan today. In this monograph, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski (U.S. Army, Ret.),
argues that hunter-killer teams be routinely established as part o our
standing Special Operations Forces (SOF). He states that guidelines or their
employment should be included in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, andCeleski urther advises that the use o such orces should be a routine part o
the overall COIN eort. Te idea is to aggressively pursue the enemy within
his own sanctuaries, disrupt his operations and sustainment, and neutralize
or destroy the adversary beore he can threaten a riendly host government
or project extremist operations onto the world stage.
Celeskis operational concept or hunter-killer operations bolsters the
command vision oU.S. Special Operations Command, which seeks todevelop a orce capable o distributed operations, within an environment
characterized by irregular warare and asymmetric challenges. 1 Te hunter-
killer organization, with its strike units and teams, would be reinorced with
indigenous orces, much as we saw during the Vietnam War and the early
phases o the Aghanistan war. Tis kind o orce could contribute toward
achieving the U.S.SOF mission to act with speed, aggression, and lethal-
ity to achieve tactical through strategic eect. 2
odayU.S. national security is threatened by violent extremist groupsoperating rom sanctuaries in hard to reach areas o Aghanistan, Pakistan,
Yemen, Somalia, and similar areas in the Pacic Rim and Latin America. It
seems probable that there will be a marked increase in our need to disrupt
and destroy enemy orces in multiple sanctuaries around the globe as we
proceed to march through the 21st century. Celeskis paper provides a vision
o the uture SOF wherein hunter-killer teams could have a signicant role
to play in nding, disrupting, and destroying the enemy.
Kenneth H. Poole
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
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xi
About the Author
Mr. Joe Celeski is a senior
ellow with the JSOU
Strategic Studies Depart-
ment. His current research ocuses
on irregular warare/unconventional
warare (IW/UW) with a specialty on
counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism,
political warare, urban warare, jointSOF warighting, and senior leader
competencies. Retired rom active duty
with the U.S. Army as a Special Forces
colonel, he served in a variety o United
States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) and sta positions or over
20 years o his 30-year Army career. Prior to retirement, he commanded the3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (May
2002 to June 2004) and commanded coalition and joint SOF or two tours
in Aghanistan in support o Operation Enduring Freedom. He was a ully
qualied joint specialty ocer. Additionally, he is a Middle East area expert,
trained in the Arabic language, and has served throughout the Middle East
and the Horn o Arica regions. In his capacity as the chie o sta and deputy
commander or the U.S. Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, Colonel
Celeski was the project ocer or orce modernization initiatives, develop-ment o the commands Program Operating Memorandum input, and the
UW transormation initiatives. He was awarded the St. Philip Neri Bronze
Award rom the Special Forces community in 2002 or his career work.
Mr. Celeski is a graduate o the Deense Language Institute (Modern
Standard Arabic), the U.S. Army Command and Sta College, the U.S. Air
Force Command and Sta College, the Marine Amphibious Warare Course,
the Army Force Management School, and the U.S. Army War College. He
has a B.S. in Political Science rom Columbus College in Georgia, a Master
o Public Administration (MPA) rom Shippensburg University in Penn-
sylvania, and a Master o National Security Issues rom the U.S. Army War
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xii
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He will begin work toward his Ph.D. in
History rom the University o Georgia in the spring o 2010.
Mr. Celeski has published works on the Somalia conict and on the useo Special Forces in Joint Urban Operations in UW in the U.S. Army John
F. Kennedy Special Warare Center and School journal, Special Warare. He
has submitted his rst draf o Special Forces History in Somalia Conict,
1992-1995 or inclusion into ArmySOF in Somalia 1992-1995, a scal year
2010 proposed publication sponsored by the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command historian. In addition, Mr. Celeski has been a keynote speaker
at a variety o orums, including the Assistant Secretary o Deense or
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conict (ASD SO/LIC) sympo-sium, the Association o United States Army (AUSA), Royal Canadian
War College, the Naval War College, and the Joint Forces Sta College on
matters o leadership, urban operations, and UW. He has also lectured in
a variety o international orums to include the Polish National Deense
University regional SOF symposium, the Special Operations Command
Korea (SOCKOR) United Nations SOF symposium in Seoul, and in a variety
oJSOU-sponsored joint mobile education teams (JMEs) or combatingterrorism conducted in Chile, Jordan, and Croatia. His prior JSOU Press
publications are OperationalizingCOINin the 21st Century (September 2005)
and Policing and Law Enorcement in COINthe Tick Blue Line (February
2009).
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1
Hunter-Killer Teams:
Attacking Enemy Safe Havens
Introduction1.
Regular forces, indeed the most elite of highly professional regular
forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF), can wage war in an irregu-
lar, unconventional way. In fact, the history of warfare shows quite
clearly that if regulars are to prosper in campaigns against irregu-
lars, they are obliged to adopt at least some of the characteristics,
including the modus operandi, of the irregular enemy.3
Colin S. Gray,Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare
During September 2008, public reporting in American and Paki-
stani press told oU.S. commandos purported conduct o large-
scale raids into the Pakistani border tribal regionpresumably
authorized by the President o the United Stateswith unrestricted rules
o engagement not requiring U.S. regional command approval or acquies-
cence o the Pakistani government. Te intent o the raids, as reported, wasto penetrate into the previously inaccessible sae haven enjoyed by aliban
militants and Al Qaeda terrorists to destroy and disrupt their training bases
and to kill or capture their key leaders. U.S. military leaders and Aghan
President Karzai praised the actionthat is, the solution to a long-standing
sae haven problem and to weak eorts heretoore on behal o the Pakistani
security orces. Unortunately, raids o this nature are o short duration and
not designed or persistent presence. Although they can be highly disruptive
to the enemy, they also can contribute to the adoption o a whack-a-moletactic to deny sae havens. Eventually, the enemy will adjust to this tactic
and make it harder or uture raids to achieve success. Te best counter sae
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JSOU Report 10-1
haven line o operation involves a series o measures to achieve relentless
pressure; the line o eort has presence and persistence as attributes.
Te most challenging strategic and operational dilemma currently acingthe U.S. military in both Operations Enduring Freedom and in the Horn
o Arica region stems rom the enemys ease o withdrawal to inaccessible
areas, where he can operate rom established sae havens and create opera-
tional bases to reorm, ret, recruit, and relaunch attacks against coalition
orces. Adoption o counter sae haven measures should include the employ-
ment o hunter-killer teams as one o the options to challenge insurgent
perception o saety and invulnerability aorded by the inaccessibility sanc-
tuary oers them. When guerrillas or insurgents are challenged in theirown space, they are orced into a tempo o the riendly orces making and
ofen must abandon their base areas in order to survive. In addition, the
ear oU.S. hunter-killer teams persistently operating in and amongst ones
perceived sae space provides its own psychological eect against ones will
to continue the ght.
In any counterinsurgency (COIN) security line o operation, counterguer-
rilla activities are required as an oensive maneuver to throw o insurgentattempts to occupy space and create alternate governance. Among the rst
steps in any government response to an insurgency is holding and clear-
ing insurgent activities in the most vulnerable spots; this activity generally
requires the government to spread their resources in static holding posi-
tions, thus negating their reedom o maneuver to take on the insurgents
head-to-head. Simultaneously, it is at precisely the same time the govern-
ment is attempting to expand its security orcesmilitary, paramilitary, and
policeto overmatch the insurgents and achieve a avorable ratio o orcesto reach a tipping point o security or its population. Conversely, insurgent
movements use this window o opportunity to tie down government orces,
thereby allowing time to build up their own armed action orces or build
orces or a move to the nal, conventional oensive that would overwhelm
the government response. Tus at the operational and strategic levels it
becomes a race between the contestantswhere the side that can prevent the
growth o a measurable combat response on the part o their enemy, while
maintaining legitimacy and the will to ght, may ultimately win.
Te government response is ofen multidimensionalor example, hold-
ing and securing vulnerable portions o the country, maintaining legitimacy,
and solving grievances while simultaneously taking the oensive to the
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Celeski: Hunter-Killer TeamsAttacking Enemy Safe Havens
guerrillas. In taking the ght to the enemy, COIN practitioners adopt coun-
terguerrilla operations (a security line o operation). Tis means taking the
ght to the guerrillas, wherever they may be ound, by raising the contactrate between government orces and the insurgents. Against the insurgent
political arm, counterorganization measures are conducted to eliminate
enemy leadership and political organization. Tis includes manhunting
techniques. At the tactical level, aggressive patrolling operations to search
out guerrillas still orm one o the best means or conventional orces.
Combined with raids, the enemy is kept o balance and denied the oppor-
tunity to choose the time and place o his engagements, spoiling his oppor-
tunities to protract or prolong the ght. Counterguerrilla patrols, however,may not reach into inaccessible areas where insurgents seek to build their
bases and establish sae havens. Although conventional maneuver orces
(normally at company and battalion level) can conduct operations deep into
enemy-occupied territory, these oen have a sweeping eect and conclude
aer a short duration.
Insurgents enjoy the most reedom o maneuver in their sae havens
(bases), along their lines o communication, and in strategic rear areas, rela-tively unhindered by the day-to-day activities o counterguerrilla operations.
It is within that shroud o security the guerrillas take the opportunity to
recruit, train, ret, and grow their orces, including developing the structure
or the establishment o a main orce army. Unhindered by government
security orces intererence, complacency about security and deense on
the part o the insurgent will begin
to set in, providing the opportunity
or specialized COIN orces to oper-ate. An outstanding reerence on
this aspect o irregular warare is the
2007 publication edited by Michael
Innes, Denial o Sanctuary: Understanding errorist Sae Haven. One proven
method o disrupting insurgents or terrorists enjoying sae haven has been
the employment o hunter-killer teams.
Te purpose o this monograph is to examine the characteristics and
attributes o sae havens, explore options or counter sae haven measures,
and then ocus the analysis on the historical and contemporaryU.S. mili-
tary employment o one o those measureshunter-killer team opera-
tions. Te monograph explores previous doctrinal attempts to describe the
One proven method of disrupting
insurgents or terrorists enjoyingsafe haven has been the employ-
ment of hunter-killer teams.
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JSOU Report 10-1
employment oU.S. military units conducting counter sae haven measures
to derive a proposed denition or COIN hunter-killer operations. It also
examines the American historical use o predominantly specialized, lightinantry employed as counterguerrillas with the mission to penetrate and
operate deep into enemy sae havens.
Te overarching lessons gleaned rom the American military employ-
ment o hunter-killer operations will orm the basis or principles required
or doctrinal employment o hunter-killer operations in COIN and other
irregular warare scenarios. Te research o the monograph concludes with
a proposed recommendation on the specic orming and use o hunter-killer
organizations as a viable measure or counter sae haven activities in anyconict with irregular warare adversaries or doctrinal inclusion in uture
revisions oCOIN or irregular warare literature. Additionally, the mono-
graph provides recommendations or the establishment o ormal hunter-
killer organizations, at least within the USSOCOM component capability,
under the operational art o unconventional warare (UW).
I seen as viable, the hunter-killer concept deserves inclusion into uture
revisions o irregular warare doctrine. Currently, doctrine is lacking on thespecic proscription o counter sae haven measures that can be conducted
by specialized orces in hunter-killer congurations (procedures on the
attack and harassment against adversary morale, their sustainment system
[war-making capabilities], and their source o strength and supporta
witting populace). Tese activities are important to the COIN orce because
they can contribute to the exhaustion and erosion o insurgent orces while
they are in their sae havens.
Te research thesis is to answer the question: Is the employment ohunter-killer operations, as a counter sae haven measure in COIN, a sound
doctrinal concept or the U.S. military? Te research did not explore oreign
concepts unless they were useul to the development oU.S. doctrine, nor
the concept o hunter-killer operations used by conventional orces against
conventional orce adversaries, although they may be unorthodox (such as
operations to detect German U-boats in World War II). Tis monograph
also does not include the common usage o technological hunter-killer oper-
ationsthe so-called sensor-to-shooterconcept (such as observer aircraf
hunting or enemy tanks, then directing the eorts o the killer)in order
to ocus uniquely on COIN counter sae haven requirements.
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Celeski: Hunter-Killer TeamsAttacking Enemy Safe Havens
Logic abounds in the annals o warare on the military dictum to take
the ght to the enemy. Irregular warare is no dierent. Its deensive compo-
nentthe use o irregulars as auxiliaryis used to augment the maneuvero conventional orce or provide economy-o-orce options. Its oensive
component resembles a variety o tools in a toolkit or irregular warare
employment: counterguerrilla operations, counterorganization operations,
counter sae haven operations, pseudo-operations, manhunting, and the
most eared by irregular warare adversaries, the employment ohunter-
killerteams.
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Celeski: Hunter-Killer TeamsAttacking Enemy Safe Havens
Background, Defnition and Doctrine2.
In the guerrilla areas, the governing authorities should commencewhat we shall call a territorial offence. As in the cases of territorial
defence and consolidation, territorial offence will require assign-
ment of small military detachments to a large number of specic
zones. Although these detachments should establish local opera-
tional bases, they should not be garrisoned in posts. Rather, they
should continuously nomad, using whirlwind (tourbillon) type
tacticsas the French describe them.4
John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War
To be considered as military doctrine a warghting concept should
be accepted by military proessionals as an agreed upon means o
practical and common usage o employing military resources. Te
concept should generally solve a dilemma posed by the nature o war
or example, oense to deeat a deense, amphibious operations to gainlodgment in enemy territory, and interdiction to deny the enemy lines o
communication. Finally, the intended action should be grounded in some
theoretical aspect o war that has stood the test o time (a belie).
An objective o this monograph is to explore why hunter-killer operations
against enemy sae havens have had little doctrinal capture, particularly as
the Department o Deense (DoD) shifs its military art in recognition o
the Irregular Warare Joint Operating Concept. As a ramework or this
discussion and afer conducting the research, the ollowing denition isproposed:
Hunter-killer operations are prolonged operations conducted in
irregular warare by a unique and specically organized orce, in
conjunction with an indigenous orce, against irregular warare
adversaries by operating behind the lines or in hostile, sae haven, or
semipermissive environments, employing unorthodox tactics, or the
sole purpose o achieving attrition and punitive actions predominantlyagainst the personnel, leadership, and resources o the enemy.
Tis denition has as its base a UW solution to an unconventional prob-
lem. Te unconventional problem is the lack o access into insurgent sae
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JSOU Report 10-1
havens due to political actors, military limitations, and/or geography (and
could also include seasonal weather).
Insurgency theorists (most notably Robert aber, War o the Flea) discussthe requirement on the part o the insurgent to juxtaposition ones time,
space, and willelements o strategic artagainst the competing actions
o the government. For space, insurgents draw strength rom having bases
and sae areas to operate rom, essential to the building and development
o an action arm, a political process (alternate governance), and the ability
to hide rom security orces, thus contributing to the protraction o the
conict (and to ensure survival).
Protraction o conict has its roots in war oexhaustion and war oerosion theories, made amous by the writings o Mao. ime can be on the
side o the irregular warare adversary i used with other strategic initiatives.
Te body o conict theory is also clear that war is a clash o wills; at the
military level, using orce successully against the enemys orce becomes
one o the paths to achieve strategic objectives.
In most COIN theory, no one course o action chosen rom elemental
truths about the conduct o this type o irregular warare will guaranteesuccess; rather, the COIN leader becomes a virtuoso o applying contextually
agreed upon COIN measures, hopeully with the right mix and balance, to
achieve the political ends o the struggle. In the aggregate, these measures
historically (and doctrinally) include not only political and psychosocial
activities but also some orm o the oen mentioned clear, hold, buildand
nd, x, destroy. o clear and hold in COIN requires a static orce (the
deensive). o nd and x, then destroy requires an active orce, basically
consisting o oensive components, which include counterguerrilla orcesand other specialized orces whose purpose is to help improve the contact
rate and raise the attrition level o the insurgent to buy time or other popu-
lace security and political solutions to work.
Insurgents ofen enjoy the ability to operate at the time and place o
their choosing; when they do, COIN orces now know where they are and
their capabilities. In these cases, casualty rates tend to avor the conven-
tional, government orces. Te larger challenge, i counterinsurgents are to
deeat or neutralize the action arm and to destroy the insurgents base o
support (bases and sae havens), is to take oensive actions to thwart insur-
gent moves to operate between the seams o a countrys vital inrastructure
and its population centers, while enjoying the ability to retreat to saety.
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Celeski: Hunter-Killer TeamsAttacking Enemy Safe Havens
Properly conducted, the military line o operation in a COIN eort
becomes the blend o antimeasures, countermeasures, and oensive
measures. Tere is a range o measures available to the counterinsurgent;however, most o these measures remain at the tactic, technique, and proce-
dural level o handbooks rather than incorporated into our doctrinal knowl-
edge o irregular warare. able 1 shows a range o operations consistently
agreed upon and utilized during irregular wararea belie o how COIN
orces approach attacking insurgent time, space, and willwhile simultane-
ously providing orce-on-orce options to attrit the enemy.
Table 1. Irregular Adversary Essential Strengths
Strength Friendly Forces Counter
Time (protractedness) Counterguerrilla operationsCOIN/FID/IDAD/UW *CounterterrorismOperation tempo
Space (e.g., sanctuary, bases) Countersanctuary (raid, interdiction)Community policingComputer network attack
Border interdictionHunter-killer operations
Will (ideology, endurance) CountermotivationCounterinfluence operationsCounterrecruitmentPSYOPsPropagandaCombat attrition
Legitimacy (alternate governance) Political warfareUnconventional operations
Counterorganization (manhunting)Countermobilization
Criminal business enterprise (support) Policing and law enforcementCounternarcoticsCounterfinancing
* FID Foreign Internal Defense
IDAD Internal Defense and Development
Insurgency theory posits the strategic balance o time, space, and will
arrayed against government strengths as a means to achieve a political
victory, all based on theories o war to exhaust or erode populace support
or the government. In the modern context, legitimate and criminal busi-
ness enterprise (or external support mechanisms that may replace lack o
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external state sponsorship) are also critical to the viability o any insurgency.
Friendly military options are a mix o anti, counter and oensive measures
to spoil these ve strengths. Tese can be used to keep the enemy o balancewhile the political and civil measures o an eective IDAD plan take time
to work.
Tis discussion rests on the oensive components oCOIN and to some
extent broader applications in other irregular warare scenarios. Hunter-
killer operations are one o the options used byCOIN orces to go on the
oensive against insurgents, particularly as a counter sae haven measure.
Because there are a variety o options that can be conused with pure hunter-
killer concepts, a brie discussion o their characteristics will distinguishthem rom the COIN hunter-killer terma useul point or doctrinal distinc-
tion. Each option discussed below embodies a particular eect; hunter-killer
operations dier in that most o these eects can be combined to achieve a
synergy aimed toward one objectivecumulative activities over time that
contribute to the erosion or exhaustion o the insurgent:
Raida. is a tactical action conducted behind enemy lines (or in enemy-
controlled areas) by conventional inantry or elite or shock inantrywith a specic purpose in mind. (Tese elite units are ofen considered
commandos.) Te raid may have tactical, operational, or strategic
value. Raids generally do not achieve coup-de-main status. Raids are
intended to be short duration missions whereby the raiding orce
immediately withdraws aer the operation back to its own riendly
lines; the survival o the raiding orce is ofen predicated on this
extraction beore enemy orces respond. Raiders can hold groundmomentarily, but ofen require a linking-up action by larger conven-
tional orces i the ground, or objective, is to be secured or riendly
orces. Larger, deep-penetration raids by conventional orces can also
be conducted as punitive operations.
Interdictionb. targets enemy lines o communication and support struc-
ture in order to deny war-making capability. Interdiction operations
include various targeting methodologies, combined with detailed
intelligence and conrming reconnaissance, to increase measures osuccess. Interdiction can be perormed with direct action, airpower,
or with stando capabilities. Sabotage o war materials is one o the
unconventional measures to conduct interdiction.
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Manhuntingc. is the specic targeting o leadership and key personnel
within an enemy organization. It is a counterorganization technique.
In military parlance, manhunting is characterized by all the activitiesto conduct high value target (HV) operations against individuals to
decapitate an organization. Manhunting techniques ofen resemble law
enorcement measures used to bring a criminal to justice. Manhunt-
ing is human-intelligence (HUMIN) intensive.
Counterorganizationd. is the means used to deeat the insurgent politi-
cal arm and its organizations. In insurgency, the enemy may attempt
to establish alternate governance with their political arm, rst as a
competing option to the populaces loyalty, then as a mechanismto assume the trappings o state and secure power once victory is
achieved. In these cases, political and ront organizations are created
to counteract the legitimate symbols o state, at all levels. Te insurgent
political arm is also a necessary means to mobilize the populace. Insur-
gent politics may ultimately require the ability to handle diplomacy
at the international level. Counterorganization measures consist o
actions to identiy, penetrate, and neutralize insurgent political orga-nizations. Subversion, apprehension, or neutralization o members o
the enemys political arm, combined with a counterideology campaign,
are just some o the activities taken by a government threatened by
shadow governments. Many o the successul counterorganization
campaigns adopted the combination o military, intelligence, and
policing in joint task-orce organizations to achieve unied action
on this ront. Counterorganization should not be conused with
countermobilization (denying the orm o alternate governance) andcounterguerrilla actions (securing the populace and isolating them
rom the insurgents).
Pseudo-operationse. are most ofen paramilitary police operations
conducted to gain intelligence on the enemy. Pseudo-organizations
adopt the appearance o the guerrilla in order to gain access to the
enemys operational area. While combat may occur, this is not the
intended purpose o the operation. Te best pseudo-operations are
those that incorporate turnedinsurgents.
Te useulness o hunter-killer operations is they could achieve many o
these results within the objective o denying the enemy space and destroying
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his will through erosion and exhaustion. Hunter-killer operational utility
derives rom employing an eective economy-o-orce option, achieving
persistence by operating in the same space and conditions o the enemy,while achieving a military and psychological impact out o proportion to
its size (operational or strategic perormance is achieved).
U.S. irregular warare doctrine has never quite pinned down this concept
in detail. COIN doctrine and emerging irregular warare doctrine quite
adequately address the need to deny insurgents access to sae havens and
support (tacit/unwitting; internal/external) but lack in specics or prin-
ciples and application o the measures needed. Notwithstanding, good
counterinsurgents have always devised a means or attacking the enemy insae havens. Either these were on the spot, intuitive, individual decisions
or derived rom lessons passed rom earlier practitioners without adoption
into doctrinal literature, even though some doctrinal writings through-
out history have at least come close to describing the role o hunter-killer
teams.
Te earliest attempt to capture hunter-killer concepts evolved rom
Benjamin Churchs personal memoir o his rangingactivities with speciallyormed militia into hostile territory during King Philips War (1675 to 1676).
Tese written experiences were incorporated into techniques used by Robert
Rogers, who in the French and Indian War developed his now-amous rules
or the conduct o deep reconnaissance raids.
Much o what early counterinsurgents understood about oensive opera-
tions against irregulars in inaccessible territory may have been derived rom
reading Colonel C. E. Callwells monumental workSmall Wars: Teir Prin-
ciples and Practices, which he published in nal, revised orm in 1899. Call-well described a doctrinal approach o ying columns (superior maneuver
and mobility to the irregular) and specied the purpose o raids in irregular
warare ( kill them or to wound them, or at least to hunt them rom their
homes and then to destroy or carry o their belongings 5), combined with
the need to match the enemy and adapt. However, U.S. irregular warare
experts largely relied on the personal experiences and accounts o previous
practitioners through the venue o lessons learned passed on generationally.
U.S. Army operations against the Southwest Indians, the exas Rangers
experiences against the Plains Indians, and the COIN experience rom the
Philippine War lost doctrinal capture and appeal in the shadow and subse-
quent deployment or World War I.
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It took the cumulative experience o the U.S. Marine Corps, over many
years, to codiy military activities conducted deep in enemy territory in its
Small Wars Manual, published in 1940. Much o Callwells work appears tohave made its way into the Small Wars Manual, which also set the standard
or utilizing task-organized conventional orces to conduct these specialized
operations, such as deep raids. (Specially organized hunter-killer orces to
conduct this task were still ar in the uture.)
Te Small Wars Manualdeveloped a variation on Callwells theme; there
would be a variety o means to challenge guerrillas on their tur: ying
columns, mobile columns, and roving patrols (all still comprised o conven-
tional orces). Te mobile column diered rom a ying column only in itsrange and reliance on a base o supply. O interest was the roving patrol
concept, the clearest capturing o doctrinal employment o hunter-killer
teams:
A roving patrol (at 5-21 in the manual) is a sel-sustaining detachmenta.
o more or less independent nature. It usually operates within an
assigned zone and as a rule has much reedom o action. As distin-
guished rom other patrols, it is capable o operating away rom itsbase or an indenite period o time. Missions generally assigned
include a relentless pursuit o guerilla groups continuing until their
disorganization is practically complete.
Tis method is particularly applicable when large bands are known tob.
exist and the locality o their depredations is approximately known.
Such patrols are oen employed in conjunction with other methods
o operations.O course, World War II diminished the ascination with small wars. By
World War II, the American militia and independent volunteer system was
gone (which eliminated the U.S. pool o outdoorsmen adept at ranging) to
be replaced by National Guard and Reserve structures tailored or conven-
tional war (because armies were required to ght armies). World War II also
shifed the emphasis o elite and specialized military unit employment rom
ranging to one o reconnaissance, shock inantry, and raiding (e.g., Rang-
ers, U.S. Marine Corps Raiders, and 1st Special Service Force). Finally, the
American military was not conronted with an irregular warare enemy in
World War II, so it came out o the experience with an overall penchant or
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conventional warare, even though much had been learned by the Oce o
Strategic Services (OSS) conducting guerrilla warare activities.
Prior to the Vietnam War, it was the doctrine o other nations thatexpounded on oensive activities to challenge insurgent space. While not
American doctrinal solutions, these examples did provide some ramework
or urther U.S. military doctrinal approaches to COIN techniques. Roger
rinquiers treatise,Modern Warare: A French View o Counterinsurgency,
Sir Robert Tompsons work, Deeating Communist Insurgency, and David
Galulas Counterinsurgency Warare: Teory and Practice contain examples
or oensive actions within insurgent territory to attack bases and attrit the
enemy (e.g., intervention units, some orm o pursuit commandos, pseudo-organizations, and Ranger-type organizations).
One o the rst uniquely American-derived doctrinal approaches to
antiguerrilla activities afer World War II involving hunter-killer opera-
tions was oered by Lt Col Edward G. Lansdale during the early 1950s,
when he served as an UW liaison ocer to Ramon Magsaysay, the Philip-
pine Secretary o National Deense. Lansdale assisted in COIN eorts to
deeat the communist-inspired Hukbalahap insurgency. From observationsand ront-line experience, Lansdale consolidated his thoughts on eective,
antiguerrilla operations. While the document, Operations Against Guer-
rilla Forces (undated), was supported by the Military Assistance Advisory
Group (MAAG) chie o the U.S. embassy in Manila, its restricted nature
prevented widespread sharing among military proessional and doctrinal
institutions. Tus its tenets or oensive COIN, by orming specialized anti-
guerrilla units, did not become mainstream. Lansdale called or the creation
o special antiguerrilla units to penetrate and destroy insurgent personneland inrastructure, arguing or small-unit, broadly scoped missions and
specically warned o the need to maintain and support special antiguer-
rilla units to increase their viability or extended operations (the caveat was
against retasking conventional inantry or this purpose).6
COIN doctrine developed by the U.S. during and afer the Vietnam War
still did not address oensive actions into enemy sanctuaries as anything
other than pursuit, reconnaissance, interdiction, or raids (e.g., the actions
o Special Operations Group and the U.S. Special Forces B52 organization).
However, it was still apparent to counterinsurgents that denial o sae havens
(the term sanctuary was used in most military literature o that day) was
a key component oCOIN success. Te Department o the Army released
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Field Manual (FM) 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations on 1 October 2004.
Perhaps a limiting political actor in modern COIN may have unintention-
ally aected doctrinal approaches, then and now: the diplomatic repercus-sions o violating the sovereignty o another country.
Te one clear approach or taking the ght to enemy-dominated territory
emanated rom UW approaches developed by the U.S. Army Special Forces.
Still not explicitly stating a unique role or hunter-killer operations, FM 31-21,
Guerrilla Warare and Special Forces Operations (Headquarters, Depart-
ment o the Army, September 1961) came close in its page 130 discussion
o attrition measures and interdiction operations conducted by irregular,
indigenous orces:
Section III. Interdiction. 117. General
UWa. orces use interdiction as the primary means o accomplish-
ing operational objectives. Interdiction is designed to prevent or
hinder, by any means, enemy use o an area or route. Interdiction
is the cumulative eect o numerous smaller oensive operations
such as raids, ambushes, mining, and sniping. Enemy areas or
routes that oer the most vulnerable and lucrative targets or
interdiction are industrial acilities, military installations, and
lines o communication.
Te results o planned interdiction programs are.b.
Eective intererence with the movement o personnel, supplies,
equipment, and raw material
Destruction o storage and production acilities
Destruction o military installations; or positive results, attacks
are directed against the primary and alternate critical elements
o each target system.
Protable secondary results can be obtained rom interdictionc.
operations i they are conducted over a wide area; when the UW
orce employs units in rapid attacks in dierent and widely spaced
places, it
Makes it dicult or the enemy to accurately locate guerrilla
bases by analyzing guerrilla operationsCauses the enemy to overestimate the strength and support o
the guerrilla orce
May tend to demoralize him and lessen his will to ght.
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Although UW doctrine was specically developed to employ Special
Forces in consort with an indigenous resistance movement, the U.S. Special
Forces during the Vietnam War adapted this doctrine or use in securityorce assistance operations and created Mobile Guerrilla Forces (auxiliary)
to take the ght to the Viet Cong in their base areas. Between this approach,
borrowing o oreign doctrine, and the earlier thoughts o the U.S. Marine
Corps on roving patrols, the elements or development o hunter-killer
operations in irregular warare doctrine could have been ramed.
COINs resurgence in doctrinal appeal came to the oreront with
the involvement oU.S. orces afer 9/11 in the two insurgencies in Iraq
and Aghanistan. (We can also add Operation Enduring Freedom in thePhilippines.)
Te U.S. collective doctrinal approach to COIN is now embodied in
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 clearly describes not only the benets
that sanctuary (now reerred to as sae haven) provides insurgents but also
the doctrinal prescription: Eective COIN operations work to eliminate
sanctuaries. 7 Further in the chapter (section I-98), the ollowing is oered:
imely, resolute counterinsurgent actions to exploit poor enemy base loca-tions and eliminate or disrupt good ones can signicantly weaken an insur-
gency. Te eld manual is also quite clear that the preerred method to
achieve this disruption is through the oensive actions o land orces and
an eective targeting system. However, there exists little discussion on the
role o employing hunter-killer teams or indigenous hunter-killer teams as
part o these disruptive options. Even less are any works on the analysis and
appreciation o the ramework and characteristics o sae havens.
o achieve the level o doctrinal acceptance or hunter-killer operations,the concept must be recognized as an American way o war; it certainly has
its historical antecedents. Tere must be a set o uniying principles or its
employment, and key to doctrine, an agreed upon denition o its nature;
this monograph supports that requirement. A thorough understanding o
the characteristics and attributes o sae havens and their impact on riendly
orces is necessary to develop counter sae haven measures; see chapter 3.
o rene this thesis, a review o the American historical approaches in the
employment o hunter-killer operations is warranted, primarily to ascertain
their advantages and disadvantages, utility and to dene the boundaries or
the development o operating principles. Tis work examines the American
historical approaches on the use o hunter-killer methodologies during its
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wars by the analysis conducted in chapter 4; consolidating these examples
into derived principles is covered in chapter 5.
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Safe Havens4.
. its very clear to us that Al Qaeda has been able over the past18 months or so to establish a safe haven along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border areas that they have not enjoyed before, that they
are bringing operatives into that region for training, operatives
that wouldnt attract your attention if they were going through the
Customs line at Dulles with you when youre coming back from
overseas.
LTG Michael Hayden, CIA director, 30 March 2008
The ability o terrorists and other irregular warare adversaries to
conduct operations rom a sanctuaryhereafer reerred to in more
common usage as sae havenincreases the potential success o the
insurgent or terrorist in their struggles against government orces. Deny-
ing sae haven, thereore, is an essential part o any counterstrategy. For
instance, the use o Pakistans tribal areas as a sae haven by the alibanand Al Qaeda present allied orces with a large strategic dilemma i not
addressed (the protraction o the war and the weakening o the government
will to prosecute the campaign). Te most imposing uture security threat
may not be rogue or strong states, but rather the emergence o weak and
ailing states that can ultimately be used as sae havens by our enemies
such as we are now seeing in the Horn o Arica region, Somalia and Yemen.
Worse, the linking together o multiple sae havens creates a network o
imposing challenges to security orces charged with protection o nationalsovereignty.
Current methodologies or the creation o campaign plans have now
recognized the need or a commanders appreciation to rame the problem
prior to any sta entering the military decision-making process to develop
the architecture o the campaign plan. Tis chapter provides a way o looking
at the problem o enemy sae havens when conducting initial assessments.
The Role of Safe Havens
Tis aspect o the generational challengepersistent conict against violent
extremismposed by transnational threats operating rom sae havens was
clearly identied in the ndings oTe 9/11 Commission Report:
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A complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a
catastrophic attack cannot be mounted by just anyone in any place.
Such operations appear to require the ollowing:ime, space, and ability to perorm competent planning and staa.
work
A command structure able to make necessary decisions andb.
possessing the authority and contacts to assemble needed people,
money, and materials
Opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operativesc.
with the needed skills and dedication, providing the time and
structure required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge
their trustworthiness, and hone their skills
A logistics network able to securely manage the travel o opera-d.
tives, move money, and transport resources (like explosives) where
they need to go
Access, in the case o certain weapons, to the special materialse.
needed or a nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological attack
Reliable communications between coordinators and operatives.Opportunity to test the workability o the plan.g. 8
Afer Te 9/11 Commission Report, the U.S. Department o State (DoS)
conducted a rened study o the desired attributes that may or may not
make aplace a sae haven in order to ormulate a working denition o sae
havens. Tat denition would be useul or the conduct o diplomacy when
considering threats to national sovereignty. Te DoS denition additionally
highlighted places where the enemy could operate in relative security andperorm the unctions noted above. Regardless o the denitional sources
on the sae haven phenomenon, the ollowing denition oered by the
Interagency Intelligence Community on errorism (IIC) serves best or
the purpose o this monograph (and expanding the denition to include
insurgents):
A sae haven is an area where terrorists are able to gather in rela-
tive security and in sucient numbers to engage in activities that
constitute a threat to U.S. national security. Such activities include
attack preparations, training, undraising, and recruitment ofen
conducted in unsecured or undergoverned geographic areas. 9
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Features of Safe Havens
What are the desired eatures making a location attractive as a sae haven
or a potential uture sae haven? One o the key, critical vulnerabilities o
insurgent and terrorist organizations is the need or secrecy and security in
order to operate. Counter sae haven operations are ofen aimed at exposing
or dislodging irregular warare adversaries in these two areassecrecy and
securityto create a third vulnerabilitymovement. Another important
vulnerability is the enemys need or the support o the populace, making
isolating the populace rom the enemy an ofen-considered COIN and
combating terrorism tool. Tus, preerred eatures o the sae haven mustinclude the ability to hide in plain sight (even better i the position is near
the area o operations), to be located where it is physically nonaccessible by
government security orces, and with the ability or the enemy to operate
in a secure mannerree rom police, intelligence operatives, and legal
systems.
A supporting populace is also highly desirable in order to provide venues
or recruitment as well as needed logistical and nancial support. However,
the enemy can still operate in a sae haven without popular support; a popu-lation can be terrorized and intimidated into acquiescing to the demands o
the enemy or at least not turning the enemy over to government orces.
Another desired eature is the ability to get into and out o the sae
haven to conduct operations, requiring nonrestrictive transit routes and
transportation assets. Tis eature is urther enhanced by establishing the
sae haven near porous borders and along illicit rat lines already in use or
smuggling and other criminal activities where the participants are adept atevading law enorcement and customs agents. A nal highly desired eature
would be having connectivity to cyber systems.
Framing the Environment
Prior to consideration o any counter sae haven operation, the sae haven
area should be thoroughly analyzed with regard to its composition. Is it an
ungoverned or undergoverned area? Is it truly a sae haven that provides
sanctuary, or is it merely a base o operations? Is the area an ethnic, sepa-ratist region or is it part o the country-wide insurgency? Or like the FARC
operations in Columbia, is it an area or a criminal business enterprise?
Clear understanding o the environmental makeup o the sae haven and
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the motivations o its actors will assist in the shaping o the counter sae
haven plan.
Sae havens can also be categorized by unction and by geography. Func-tional sae havens include reugee camps, prisons, diasporas, academia,
and ideology (a supportive, cultural anity to support the terrorists or
insurgents). Geographical types (physical spaces) o sae havens include
urban, rural, and virtual.
During their analysis, counterterrorists and counterinsurgent planners
identiy issues that may place restrictions and limitations on their ability to
conduct counter sae haven operations. Imposing physical terrain and issues
o sovereignty can limit operations to only the ringes o the sae havenarea. Security orces may be nonindigenous to the area and even urther
hampered by rules o engagement. Te skills and capabilities o the security
orces require review to ascertain the correct ways and means to achieve the
ends. As an example, brute orce and repression can be used to clear a sae
haven i the security orces do not have nesse; the second and third order
eect, however, may result in huge reugee populations and a devastated
area now requiring an expensive rebuild. Clearing a sae haven could endup as a protracted operationthe government must have the will and time
needed to outlast the enemy and see the operation to its conclusion.10
Counter Safe Haven Approaches
Te ollowing approaches to denying or countering adversaries operating
in sae havens were derived rom historical examples o irregular warare
conicts since the end o World War II. One may wish or the case where
the indigenous population within the sae haven rises up against the terror-ists or insurgents, but this rarely happens. Te raming o the sae haven
environment during assessment and analysis will ofen dictate the approach
considered. Te ollowing are common approaches that can be used as a line
o eort within campaign plans (individually, or in the aggregate):
Isolate, manage, and contain the sae haven (includes bordera.
interdiction)
A policing, law enorcement, and intelligence approachb.Brute orce intervention (invasion, interdiction, sweeping)c.
International diplomacy to put pressure on the supporting countryd.
Unconventional warare.e.
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Te best approach, historically, is one in which the host nation with the
problem solves it without external assistance.
Counter Safe Haven Techniques for Security Forces
Te ollowing measures should be considered or development o a counter
sae haven plan. Te plan will be multidisciplinary, with the combination
o several o the measures applied in consort with one another:
Enhance border control, customs, and immigration services.a.
Prepare human terrain databases and social-cultural mapping, applyb.
additional population control measures (e.g., control o resources,biometrics, and identication cards), and co-opt the local populace
and solve grievances to isolate population rom the enemy.
Conduct counterorganization, counterrecruitment, and countermo-c.
tivation operations in the sae haven.
Simultaneously attack any criminal business enterprises.d.
Develop and employ specially trained orces (e.g., border interdiction,e.
hunter-killer teams, and pseudo-operations teams).
Employ an interdiction and targeting plan throughout the sae.haven.
Consider adoption o additional laws and legal measures to enhanceg.
security orce and law enorcement operations.
Engage in regional initiatives or combating terrorism and law enorce-h.
ment enhancements.
Own and control the narrative and inormation operations in the saei.
haven; counter cyber threats and capabilities o the enemy.Border barriers and ences in conjunction with interdiction measuresj.
(kinetic).
During the Algerian War, the French recognized the insurgent use o
sanctuary across the borders in unisia and Morocco. Te French applied
various techniques to isolate the National Liberation Army (ALN) inside the
sae havens through the building o an eective barrier system: theMorice
Line along the unisian border and the Pedron Line along the Moroccan
border. Te barriersbarragesconsisted o wire ences augmented with
lights and mineelds and were eventually very eective in stopping enemy
inltration with a kill rate o over 85 percent. Over 40,000 troops were
assigned to static posts along these barriers supplemented with mobile
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columns to react to penetrations. In consort with the border barrages,
French naval orces implemented a campaign o coastal surveillance and
high seas interdiction to close down arms smuggling. Tese measurestaken collectively orced the ALN to continue only with guerrilla opera-
tions while thwarting attempts to conduct more aggressive, mobile warare
operations.
Summary
Countering an adversary sae haven is a multidimensional problem, oen
with no single solution. Correctly raming the problem o sae haven (its
characteristics and environment) helps to identiy the approaches and tech-niques required to eectively achieve its elimination or at best, denial to
enemy orces. Some o the key vulnerabilities o terrorists and insurgents
who operate within sae havens are organizational security, physical secu-
rity, and ofen the need or a supporting populace. Government legitimacy,
eective security orces, and countermobilization o the population to sepa-
rate them rom the threat are among the most eective tools in eliminating
or denying sae haven creation.A wide variety o military, policing, and law enorcement measures are
available to the counterterrorist and counterinsurgent to achieve the desired
eects on adversary sae havens. One o those measures discussed here is
the employment o hunter-killer teams within the sae haven. Historically,
the U.S. military has employed some orm o this technique based on the
demands o the irregular warare environment and yet ailed to adequately
codiy this approach in doctrine. Chapter 4 reviews American military
employment o hunter-killer type ormations throughout U.S. history toderive the advantages and disadvantages o their use, to capture key lessons
learned about their operations, and to synthesize the best practices observed
and employed to capture hunter-killer team employment principles (chapter
5). An understanding o these principles will support the ormulation o
uture COIN and counterterrorism doctrinal input on this subject, particu-
larly in the wider area o counter sae haven operations.
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The American Historical Experience in4.
Hunter-Killer OperationsScouts without a peer, superb in woodcraft, the Indians fought
the total warfare of the barbarian hordes of the past and of the
civilized nations of the futures. Such was the military legacy of
the Indians to the garrison of Fort Stanwix, as to their forefathers
before them and to the soldiers who would come after them, an
invaluable bequest for all our later wars through Korea. The art of
using cover, of inltration, of ambush, and sudden surprise attack,of mobility. Ranger companies before and during the Revolution
practiced Indian tactics to the hilt, as would their counterparts on
into the twentieth century. In no small measure the Indian Wars
made the American Army the effective ghting force it became.11
Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the U.S. Army 17761865
Doctrine can be inormed by historical experience. In most scenar-ios where the American military was aced with an irregular
warare adversary, some orm o ranging or hunter-killer units
were employed as a response to take the ght deep into enemy territory. A
review o those experiences in various irregular wars ought by America can
establish the acceptance and utility o employing hunter-killer operations
as part o any American way o irregular warare.
Te U.S. military hunter-killer team employment and counter sae havenexperiences can be divided or study between the preindustrial period o
colonial and early American era to post-World War II and beyond. Some
reasons or the break and the dierences between the two periods ollow:
Rules o engagement became more restrictive and humane to limita.
harm against noncombatants (unorthodox and brutal tactics in irregu-
lar warare begin to become scorned by more proessional military
leaders).
Irregular warare engagements by theb. U.S. dwindled.
Te militia and volunteer system or the American military wasc.
replaced by the Reserve and National Guard systems, drying up
the pool o independent volunteers with the necessary independent
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attributes to range and conduct hunter-killer activities as ad hoc
ormations.
O most consequence, World War II changed the role o irregular rang-
ing skills o elite light-inantry units to creation o special raider and
commando-style units patterned upon European doctrine (even though
the U.S. Army still retained Ranger-type ormations). Unortunately, the
ranging skill o the light inantryman (independent units adopting enemy
tactics and operating or extended periods in nonpermissive areas) becomes
lost in the conventional nature o the war as they soon become shock inan-
try, raiders, and long-range reconnaissance units.
Colonial and Early American Period of Hunter-Killer Operations
Te American military experience with hunter-killer operations in enemy
sae havens began in a world in which we nd ourselves today. It was during
a clash o civilizations throughout the 1600s and 1700s where expanding,
oreign imperialism crashed into indigenous populations and culture; indig-
enous cultures were manipulated by contending states to provide irregular
warriors or the ght. It was a conict between liberally governed soci-eties, ruled under a sense o recognized legitimacy, against substate and
tribal warriors. Competing ideologies o rened culture versus savagery
and barbarism ormed the backdrop o warare amongst combatants and
noncombatants alike. Whole populations lived in terror o massacre, behead-
ings, torture, wretched imprisonment i captured, and the destruction o
homelands and economies.
Tese conditions created a unique way o early-American war on therontier and ostered the employment orangingtactics as hunter-killer
operations against irregulars in their sae havens. Te operational style o
ranging initially consisted o patrolling between rontier orts (to detect
enemy activities) as well as scouting and raiding i warranted. Tus the
name or these early hunter-killer type militia units: Rangers. Te ollow-
ing examples illustrate various roles and missions o the early Rangers and
the pros and cons o their employment as hunter-killer units. Te most
comprehensive work on this way o war and a complement to any libraryon irregular warare is John Greniers book, Te First Way o War: Ameri-
can War Making on the Frontier. Hunter-killer methods became the most
eective mode o early American irregular warare military art. Tose tasks
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Celeski: Hunter-Killer TeamsAttacking Enemy Safe Havens
required long-range penetration into enemy territory and a laundry list
o destructive measures to accomplish once there, all contributing to the
attritional nature o wars o exhaustion against irregular warriors.
Attacking and destroying Indian noncombatant populations
remained the American, particularly rontiersmen, preerred way
o waging war rom the early sixteenth through early nineteenth
centuries, even aer the ormation o the regular American Army
and its attempts to move toward the eighteenth century European
norm o limited war.12
King Philips War, 1675 to 1676. Te expanding land desires o the earlysettlers in southern New England (Massachusetts Bay Colony, Swansea,
Plymouth Colony, Rhode Island, Connecticut), combined with growing
disdain on the part o colonists or the incompatibility with European
culture and values o the various indigenous Indian tribes populating the
region, led to the rst outbreak o ormal military operations. It reached
campaign scale during King Philips War, ought between 1675 and 1676,
against the backdrop o Europes 30 Years War.King Philip (with the Wampanoag Indian name o Metacom) led the
eastern American Indian tribes o the Wampanoag, Narragansett, Nipmuc,
and others in an attack against the colonists in June 1675, in the southern
border region o the Plymouth Colony. Beore the war ended, thousands o
towns, settlements, and homes o American settlers were destroyed, over
800 lives lost amongst the settlers and approximately 3,000 losses amongst
the Native American populace (resulting in the decimation o the eastern-
American Indian tribes).13Early colonial military deense consisted o a basic sel-reliance on an
armed populace and the establishment o a mutually supporting colonial
militia system, all backed up with a series o ortied houses and blockhouses
stretching across the rontier. I attacked, the citizenry would rally into the
ortied positions and allow the militia to patrol and roam between them
in an attempt to clear away the Indians. American militias were trained in
accordance with European military tactics involving lines o inantrymen
delivering volley re. Te Indians used guerrilla-like tactics, rst raiding,
then disappearing into orests and swamps as reuge and sanctuary.
As in all insurgency-like conicts, the enemys elusiveness plagued
eorts to bring on decisive military battle. In recognition o the need to
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JSOU Report 10-1
take the ght to the Indian warriors, Governor Winslow (Plymouth Colony)
appointed Benjamin Church as the commander o the rst ull-time, inde-
pendent company o Ranger militia. Comprised o both expert rontiers-men and Indian volunteers (initially about 60 Englishmen and 140 Indian
irregulars), Benjamin Church employed his unit as the rst ocially sanc-
tioned American ranging unit with a clear mandate or a hunter-killer type
o operation:
a orce specially designed to search out the remnants o the enemy
wherever they may lurk and beat them at their own tricks o orest
warare.14
Captain Church was well knowna amous Indian ghterand had a
vast knowledge o the rontier territory. His unorthodox leadership style,
with a air or the dramatic, made him a perect leader or an autonomous
hunter-killer unit. Benjamin Church employed ranging tactics to conduct
a variety o oensive strikes against enemy sae havens. Benjamin Church
took the ranging concept to the next level, employing his Rangers deep
into enemy territory or long periods (over weeks o time) with the expressmission o destroying the hostiles and their sae haven support system. Te
Rangers ought by copying the style o Indian orest ghting and swamp-
ghting tactics.
Churchs unit almost single-handedly turned around the war eort with
a string o successes against the hostiles. His unit accounted or the death o
King Philip; the capture o Philips supporter, Annawon; and a devastating
winter raid (conducted as a combined operation with other colonial militia
units on 19 December 1675) against a ortied camp o Narragansett nearpresent-day South Kingston, Rhode Island. Dubbed the Great Swamp Fight,
this action eliminated any urther serious involvement o the Narragansett
Indians during the remainder o the war.
Benjamin Church used mixed militia and indigenous orces to his advan-
tage along with the rontiersmen knowledge o the outdoors, adoption o
Indian skulkingtactics, and well-armed units to overmatch his adversaries.
He adapted to the enemy by learning the intricacies o swamp warare in
order to expand his operations into that sae haven. His disadvantages were
limited mobility (same as his adversaryoot) and lack o means to sustain
his orces during bad weather.
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Celeski: Hunter-Killer TeamsAttacking Enemy Safe Havens
Church derived early principles rom his warare exploits utilizing
hunter-killer methodologies. His written experiences in hunter-killer types
o operations were passed on and incorporated into the style o ranging
and hunter-killer operations made amous by Robert Rogers during the
French and Indian War. Although Rogers exploits orm the lore o modern
Ranger history, Benjamin Church should rightly have the title o the athero the rst American military operations employing Rangers as unorthodox
military.
French and Indian War, Rogers Rangers. Major Robert Rogers began his
ranging career as a 14-year-old Indian ghter and went on to become the
most amous, although certainly not the rst, Ranger o the American ron-
tier. Rogers perected the art o oensive ranging with his hunter-killer units
by conducting deep penetration raids and reconnaissance missions or theBritish orces stationed along the upper state waterways o New York during
the French and Indian Wars. Rogers capitalized on integrating indigenous
orces into his units. Tey served as scouts, knowing the land well. He raised
Figure 1. Rhode Island State historical marker near the location ofthe Great Swamp Fight where Colonel Church and his Rangers par-
ticipated in a decisive winter raid against the sanctuary of the Nar-ragansett Indians (near present-day South Kingston, Rhode Island)
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JSOU Report 10-1
volunteers who were physically hardy and superb outdoorsmen, and adopted
unorthodox ghting techniques similar to the hostile Indians. With these
units he led missions into enemy territoryharassing Frenchand Indianlines, gathering intelligence, and capturing prisoners.
His most notable hunter-killer type operation was the raid against the
Abneki village on 4 October 1759, located at St. Franois in the St. Lawrence
River valley. raveling over 150 miles with 142 Rangers and indigenous
Indian irregulars, the village was ruthlessly attacked. Many o the Abnecki
warriors and noncombatants were killed or scattered, and then the whole
village was burned.15
Rogers would go on to command a Ranger contingent during the Revo-lutionary War, unortunately on the side o the British. He is most remem-
bered or his Rules or Ranging, promulgated as a result o his experiences.
Rogers expedition typied the rst derived and applied principles o hunter-
killer and ranging operations to ensure success. His men were handpicked,
including the Mohican scouts. Te rangers wore sturdy, rontier clothing
to protect them rom the elements and to blend in with indigenous popula-
tions ound in his operating area. Te Rangers were armed well enough tomatch or overmatch their adversaries. Weapons skill and care o weapons
were enorced constantly.
Te Rangers traveled ast and light (carrying extra moccasins or long-
range patrols) and ofen used canoes or boats to increase their mobility.
During winter, skates were used to rapidly transit rozen lakes and rivers,
and snowshoes were used to negotiate the eects o snow on the trails.
Combined with a cultural and geographical knowledge o their area o oper-
ations and the ability to live o the land and travel long distances behindenemy lines, the Rangers became the most eective, specialized orce in
the northeast.
Conversely, the ailing attribute o Rogers operational style was that he
was not constrained by rules o engagement when conducting his opera-
tions against combatants and noncombatants alike; i prisoners impeded
his movement, they were usually killed. Noncombatants were killed along
with warriors. Tis tactic was scorned by the conventional British Army
regulars, and Rogers was later rebuked or this operation. Te British had
made great propaganda against the French when they employed these tactics
with their Indian irregulars; the high moral ground was lost and the French
continued to allow their indigenous allies to commit atrocities.
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Celeski: Hunter-Killer TeamsAttacking Enemy Safe Havens
Operational Maneuver, Strategic Efect: Te Battle o Kings Mountain
1780. Tere are very ew examples o early American military operations
involving hunter-killer teams in achieving a strategic eect based on theoperational maneuver o its irregular orces; most hunter-killer operations
are tactical engagements. Tis eect might only be accomplished i the
hunter-killer operations are employed as the main element o a war-o-
exhaustion strategy; by the prolonged operations o hunter-killer teams to
wear down enemy insurgents; or the insurgent orce is so decimated that
victory is achieved.
Te Battle o Kings Mountain in 1780 pitted the irregular orces o the
back-country coloniststhe Overmountain Men rom ennessee and militiarom the western districts in North Carolinaagainst the proxy, provincial
irregular orces o Loyalists commanded by Major Patrick Ferguson.16
Afer stalemate in the North against Washingtons orces during the
Revolutionary War, British strategy shied to reliance on a perceived loyal
ory population in the southern states to deeat the Americans. Te English
war cabinet, in consort with its generals, believed it would be possible to
subdue the rebels in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia usingirregulars provided rom the Loyalists. Afer the attack on Savannah, British
orces overran Georgia, and then captured Charleston on 12 May 1780. From
this position o strength, British orces spread military detachments to the
countryside to consolidate their gains. In response, the American General
Gates reacted in August o that yearmaneuvering with the Continental
orces at Camden, South Carolinaand was heavily deeated. With the
absence o an American Army to thwart British gains, American patriots
turned to partisan and guerrilla warare operations to continually harassthe British.
Ferguson commanded a large, irregular orce o about 1,100 Loyalists
(which included Rangers). He was ordered by the British command into
western South Carolina (to the ort named 96, a star, earthen-work orti-
cation guarding a trade route), prepositioned to continue operations against
American Partisans in North Carolina. He soon moved his orces north,
scattering the Partisans in his wake, with the intention o linking up with
British orces in Charlotte. Ferguson believed the back country area would
provide him with a loyal populace, provisions, and terrain to support his
maneuversae haven characteristics.
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In response, militia commanders Colonels Isaac Shelby and John Sevier
mustered the largest hunter-killer operation in early American history at
Sycamore Shoals (near modern Elizabethton, ennessee) on 22 September1780. With the addition o 200 Virginians under Colonels William and
Arthur Campbell, the orce o militia and irregulars let loose rom the Shelv-
ing Rock rendezvous point as aying column to search out and destroy
Ferguson. Te column split at Catawba in order to gather more Partisans
and grew to approximately 1,400 men (later dubbed in olklore as the Ghost
Legion).
Ferguson soon had word rom local spies o this irregular orce hunting
or him and stopped at Kings Mountain to gather more reinorcements.Kings Mountain was a poor choice or a deensive position being isolated
and with very little water. Unbeknownst to Ferguson, none o his messages
calling or reinorcements were getting past the hostile population.
Te American hunter-killer orce slowed to the pace o its oot soldiers.
In rustration at the pace o movement, the orce was reorganized into a
mounted column, leaving the oot soldiers at Cowpens, and pushed ahead
to Kings Mountain with about 900 horsemen on 6 October. Local oriescaptured along the way provided intelligence, and much o the population
provided provisions or the orce as it pushed orward (to include the draw-
ing o maps).
Ferguson was soon surrounded. Te Americans, using Indian tactics,
were repulsed rom the top o the mountain several times. Soon, Loyalist
muskets could not compete with the accuracy and killing rate o American
ries; they were deeated aer Ferguson was killed. American losses were
about 30; the Loyalist orce o approximately 1,100 was decimated (about150 killed, commensurate number wounded, and over 800 taken prisoner).
Te American victory ensured the British would never operate in orce
again across the southern back country. Te victory also dampened the
enthusiasm or Loyalist support or England or the remainder o the wara
strategic victory.17
Te attributes o the hunter-killer operation lending to the success o
American irregulars came rom their superior repower (rie technology
vs. musket), superior mobility on horseback, knowledge o the terrain and
populace, the innate ability o the American irregular to live o the land, the
hardiness o the physical condition o the irregulars, and the reckless, brave,
charismatic and audacious l
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