HIMALAYAN REGION, REFUGEES AND SINO …1 TIBET AND INDIA'S SECURITY: HIMALAYAN REGION, REFUGEES...

TIBET AND INDIA'S SECURITY:

HIMALAYAN REGION, REFUGEES AND

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesNew Delhi

IDSA Task Force ReportMay 2012

Tibet and India’s Security

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system or transmitted in any formor by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of theInstitute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

ISBN: 81-86019-99-5

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First Published: May 2012

Price: Rs. 375/-

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CONTENTS

i. Preface .................................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER- 1

Introduction ................................................................................................. 9

CHAPTER- 2

Buddhism in the Himalayan Belt ............................................................. 24

CHAPTER- 3

Why Refugees and Status of the Tibetan Refugees in India,Bhutan and Nepal ...................................................................................... 72

CHAPTER- 4

Post-Dalai Lama Contingencies .............................................................. 105

CHAPTER- 5

Influence Wielded by the Tibetan Refugees in IndianSocio-political Environment .................................................................... 115

CHAPTER- 5A

Survey of Refugee Establishments: Dharamsala andDehradun in 2009 .................................................................................... 117

CHAPTER- 5B

Visits to Tibetan Establishments and Events ........................................ 132

CHAPTER- 6

The Chinese Approach to the Tibetan Question .................................... 146

CHAPTER- 7

Influence of the Monastic Organisations including the Dalai Lama'sInstitution on the Sino-Indian Border Question and Tawang ............. 154

CHAPTER- 8

Tibetan Refugees and India's Security .................................................... 159

CHAPTER- 9

Policy Suggestions and Conclusion ......................................................... 162

Epilogue and Post Script ....................................................................... 190

Index ........................................................................................................ 204

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

In April 2007 on a field visit to studythe inflow of Siang river (YarlungTsangpo in Tibet) into India, I stayedat border town Tuting and villageGelling in Siang District of ArunachalPradesh peopled by the Membas andthe Khambas. The peacefulness of thisBuddhist border region of theHimalayas was striking. This harshregion is peopled by Indians ofMongoloid ethnicity. They areadherents of Mahayana Buddhism,which is practised in Tibet and Bhutanas well. They are also sincerenationalists and have never indulged ininsurgency. Their culture and ethnicityis either Tibetan or is influenced by it.

Later that year while visiting the regionof Kinnaur in Himachal Pradesh in theborder town of Pooh to study the inflowof the Sutlej from Tibet, I experiencedthe same Buddhist culture and peacefulethos as in Ladakh where I had the goodfortune to serve for two years in the1980s. In my feedback presentation atIDSA, I concluded that it was apparentthat all along the border with Tibet,Indians practice Buddhism. Hence, it isimportant to understand the stronginfluence of Buddhism near theHimalayan border. It was also clear thatBuddhism needs to be nurtured.Tibetan refugees in India also practiceBuddhism and regard India as the landof gurus and the birthplace ofBuddhism. This soft power inherent inIndia needs further research. The idea

was thus born. A Task Force was formedwith Dr Jagannath Panda and Dr ZakirHussain volunteering as members.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Nine research questions wereidentified:

(a) What is the influence of TibetanBuddhism on the Indian Himalayanbelt?

(b) What is the status of Tibetanrefugees in India in terms of religionand political affiliations?

(c) What would be the post-Dalai Lamascenario?

(d) How much influence do Tibetanrefugees wield in the Indian socio-political environment?

(e) How do Tibetan refugees factor inSino-Indian relations?

(f) How much influence do themonastic organizations, includingthe Dalai Lama, have on the Sino-Indian border question includingTawang?

(g) Are the Tibetan refugees a threat toIndian security?

(h) What is the Chinese approach to theTibet question as well as to the post-Dalai Lama scenario?

(i) What is the role and influence ofreligion, especially Buddhism, intoday's China?

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on interviews,

Preface

fieldwork, survey of literature andtheoretical insights. Dharamsala(Himachal Pradesh), Dehradun(Uttarakhand), Mundgod (Karnataka),Ladakh (Jammu and Kashmir), Tawangand Kameng (Arunachal Pradesh),Gangtok (Sikkim), Bodh Gaya , Rajgirand Nalandan (Bihar) and Sarnath(Uttar Pradesh) were visited. Dr Pandaconducted a field-study, survey andinterview while in China. During hisvisit many experts in premier Chineseresearch institutions in Shanghai,Beijing, Sichuan and Guangzhou wereconsulted. Their views have beenincluded in relevant portions.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Assessment of this work is based onfield work and open access. No inputsfrom Research and Analysis Wing(R and AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB),Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) andthe like were sought. The research wasbottom up by field visits, interactionwith some Tibetans, survey of literatureand interactions with scholars at theIDSA and international scholars. (Yetduring research and meetings, manyTibetans thought I was from the R andAW due to the title “Analyses” in thevisiting card of IDSA).

IMPORTANCE AND POLICY RELEVANCE

OF THE SUBJECT

The following factors were consideredas being policy relevant:

(a) The Tibetan factor is inextricablylinked with the Sino-Indian borderdispute. With the ongoing Sino-Indian border negotiations coupledwith the various scenarios in Tibetand the institution of the DalaiLama, there is a need to study the

impact of Tibetans in exile on ournational security.

(b) The Tawang region of ArunachalPradesh, to which China lays claimas its territory raises crucialquestions on the security of India'sterritories in the Himalayan borderregion. There is a need for anintensive study of the identity of thelocals residing in Tawang.

(c) India has about 120,000 Tibetans-in-exile spread across 35 settlements.Refugees residing along theHimalayan border region practicevarious shades of TibetanBuddhism. Some of the exiledTibetans aim to free Tibet fromChinese rule. The politicalaffiliations and objectives of Tibetanrefugees have significantramifications for Indian security.

(d) Indian Buddhists practicing TibetanBuddhism outnumber the Tibetanrefugees. There is a need to studytheir linkages with and impact onthe post-Dalai Lama scenario.

(e) There needs to be focusedinvestigation of links betweenTibetan exiles and Indian citizenswho practice Tibetan Buddhism:religious, philosophical, spiritualand social.

(f) There are some writings on‘Tibetization’- of the IndianHimalayan belt. They point out thata large number of Tibetan refugees,most of them followers ofBuddhism, have settled all along theHimalayan belt of India. Thesegroups privately lay claim toterritories extending from Bhutan toLadakh. It has also been said thatTibetan monks have taken control

over almost all Indian monasteriesfrom Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh.These assertions need to be studied.

(g) The role of the Karmapa in theTibetan community also needsstudy, particularly in the post-DalaiLama context.

TITLE AND LAYOUT OF THE BOOK

The initial title of the task force was“Tibetan Refugees in India:Implications for Indian Security”. Lateras work progressed it was realised thatcultural and religious issues of theHimalayan region and Sino-Indianrelations were also central to theresearch. The title was changed withthat logic. After an in-housepresentation of the findings inSeptember 2009, the report titled “Tibetand India's Security: Himalayan Region,Refugees and Sino- India Relations” wassubmitted to policy makers in July 2010.The present work is based onreorganising that report in a book form,though in parts, the work still has theflavour of a report, such as field trips,in some chapters.

Chapter One introduces the subject.Chapter Two covers the influence andimportance of Buddhism in theHimalayan belt and Appendices whichinclude Buddhism in China todaybased on field work and interviews inChina in July 2009 by Jagannath P.Panda. It also includes 'The History ofthe Institute of World Religions:Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’.An earlier version of this chapter waspublished in the Bulletin of Tibetology

Vol. 44, No.1 and 2, 2008 by P.K. Gautamwhich included two boxes and“Buddhism in China” and “Ethnicityand Literature survey of the IndianHimalayan Belt and its relationship withTibet”. We thank the editor for grantingpermission of print the article. ChapterThree covers the status of Tibetanrefugees. Chapter Four is about thepost-Dalai Lama contingencies. ChapterFive covers the influence of Tibetanrefugees in the Indian socio-politicalenvironment. Chapter Five-A is theoutcome of a field visit to Dharamsalaand Dehradun where Tibetans-in-exilewere interviewed by Dr Jagannath P.Panda and Dr Zakir Hussian. ChapterFive-B pertains to visits to refugeeestablishments and events done by me.Chapter Six is about the Chineseapproach to the Tibet question. ChapterSeven dwells on how much influencethe monastic organizations, includingthe Dalai Lama's institution, wield onthe Sino-Indian border question,including Tawang. The question ofTibetan refugees and India's security iscovered in Chapter Eight. Chapter Nineconcludes with policy suggestions. Anepilogue has been added to cater fortwo important events that happenedbefore the report was offered forpublication - these were embarrassingevent in connection with the Karmapaand his organization in January 2011which then died down and the processof democratization by means ofelection in the exile community for theKalon Tripa (Prime Minister) in March2011 followed by devolution of politicalauthority.

May 2012 P. K. Gautam

New Delhi

Preface

INTRODUCTION

Current scholarship based ondocuments now available in China sincethe 1990s spells out two reasons whyChina’s leaders decided for war withIndia in 1962. They were:

(a) A perceived need to punish and endIndian efforts to undermine

Chinese control of Tibet, which wereseen as aimed at restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante there.

(b) A perceived need to punish and endIndian aggression against Chineseterritory along the border.1

The first was based on the fact thatIndia gave refuge to the Tibetans.China’s distrust of India initially arosewith asylum given by India to the DalaiLama.2 The second is the unresolvedboundary question which is also linked

to Tibet. Both matters still remaincontentious.

As regards Sino-Tibetan relations, thestatus of Tibet is at the core of thedispute. China maintains that Tibet isan inalienable part of China. Tibetansmaintain that Tibet has historicallybeen an independent country. In reality,the conflict over Tibet’s status has beena conflict over history.3 One widelyregarded Tibetan scholar writing in theStrategic Analysis in 1988 showed thatthe primary reason for the Communisttakeover of Tibet was strategic ratherthan for historical claims or ideologicalmotives.4 He elaborated later that “thecrux of the strategic rivalry between thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) andIndia is this: if the Chinese elitesconsider Tibet strategically important

1 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Twentieth Century , Seattle, Universityof Washington Press, 2001; “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962”, in Alastair IainJohnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy , Stanford:Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 86–130; Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy , Surrey, CurzonPress, 2001, Chapter 16, “The Tibet Factor in Sino- Indian Relations: The Centrality ofMarginality”, pp. 283–97.

2 Arundhati Ghose, “Emerging India: Strategic Challenges and Opportunities” , K. SubrahmanyamMemorial Lecture, Bangalore, National Institute of Advanced Studies, 2011, pp.16-17.

3 Elliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics, Policy Studies 7 , Washington DC,East-West Center, 2004. Another related book being Thomas Laird, The Story of Tibet: Conversationswith the Dalai Lama, London, Atlantic Books, 2006.

4 Dawa Norbu, “Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region”, StrategicAnalysis, 12(4), July 1988, pp. 371–95, reproduced in Strategic Analysis, 32(4), July 2008,pp. 685–702.

Chapter 1

to China, the Indian elites think that itis equally vital to Indian nationalsecurity.”5 The greatest threat to Sino-Indian relations arise from widelydiffering views of the history andultimate destiny of Tibet. For China,India’s recognition of Tibet as part ofChina seems grudging and conditional.India’s role as host of the Dalai Lamaand his ‘splittist clique’ could appearto some Chinese as a threatto their country’s cohesion.For India, Chineserepression in Tibet is painfuland many Indians hope it willultimately prove futile.6

GEOGRAPHY AND

BOUNDARIES

The Qinghai–Tibet plateau,home to approximately sixmillion ethnic Tibetans, washistorically divided intothree provinces: U-Tsang,Kham and Amdo. Today U-Tsang – the central part ofthe plateau, in which theTibetan capital Lhasa lies –has been designated as the

Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) bythe PRC and may also be referred to asXizang (XAR) in Mandarin.7 Kham andAmdo are considered separatejurisdictional units encompassedwithin four distinct Chinese provinces:Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan(See map). Tibet Data Sheet includingTraditions of Mahayana Buddhism is atAppendix.

5 Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy , Surrey, Curzon Press, 2001, p. 360.6 David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “ India and China: Conflict and Cooperation”, Survival,

Vol.52, No.1, February – March 2010, pp.137-158. Also see Rajiv Sikri, “The Tibet Factor inIndia – China Relations”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.2, Spring/Summer 2011,pp.55-71.

7 P. Christiaan Klieger, “The People of Tibet”, in Barbara A. Brower and Barbara Rose Johnston(eds.), Disappearing People?: Indigenous Groups and Ethnic Minorities in South and Central Asia,California, Left Coast Press, 2007, pp. 221–41. According to the Chinese, Tibet’s historicalstatus is a closed book. Tibet, according to the official narrative, has been a part of Chinasince the Mongol Empire of Kublai Khan in the thirteenth century. This is proved by theofficial titles and seals bestowed by the rulers of China since then. Only in the nineteenthcentury, when China was weakened and dismembered by European encroachment, did Tibet,egged on by the British, who invaded in 1904, begin to foster the historical fantasy ofindependence. When China was finally able to “stand up” after the victory of the Communistsin 1949, Tibet was “reunited with the motherland” and accorded support and special treatment(“autonomy”) by the central government in recognition of its unique and distinct cultural life.

Map 1.1. Map of TAR

INDIAN POLICY

The threat from China was one reasonIndia gave to the world for conductingits nuclear tests in 1998. Their spheresof influence overlap and they competewith each other for anything related toTibet. India hosts the TibetanGovernment in Exile (TGIE) and theDalai Lama. According to AbantiBhattacharya:

India has the largest concentration ofdiasporic Tibetans. Its attitudetowards Tibet is significantlydetermined by the dynamics of itsrelations with China. Therefore,while it grants asylum to the Tibetanrefugees, its policies since 1954 are notgeared towards an independent Tibet.India’s policy is an outcome of its ownconcerns about its northern frontiersin the 1950s. In recognising Tibet as apart of China, New Delhi in 1954 hadhoped to gain Beijing’s recognition ofIndia’s border with Tibet and buildpeaceful and stable ties with China.It also hoped that its posture wouldfacilitate Tibetan autonomy withinChina. This of course did not happen.But the Indian policy has notchanged.8

FACTORS IMPORTANT FOR INDIA

Two factors make Tibet important forIndia. First is the religious and culturalfactor. Tibet has an important place inthe Indian imagination. Unlike contactswith Han China via a trickle of scholarssuch as Hiuen Tsang or Fa Hien, non-Han Tibet hugged the Himalayas.Tibetans and Bhotias were traditionaltraders in the border region. TheHindu-cum-Buddhist holy land ofKailash Mansarovar is in Tibet and thereis a deep religious-cultural linkage ofIndians with Tibet. Indians have alwaysconsidered Tibet a nation or anautonomous region. Postindependence, though India facilitatedrecognition of the PRC as a country, italso attempted to balance its positionon Tibet, which China had claimed asits own. Since 1949 the Chinese usedmilitary force to integrate Tibet with thePRC. Insurgency commenced in the1950s. This led to further application ofmilitary force by the PRC. In 1959 theFourteenth Dalai Lama, the spiritualand temporal head of the Tibetans, fledto India with thousands of refugees.India gave them refuge and permittedsetting up of the Tibetan Government

See Anne-Marie Blondue and Katia Buffetrille (eds.), Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100Questions , Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 2008 and George Fitzherbert’s reviewessay, “Lands of Cloud”, Times Literary Supplement, June 2008, p. 7. This Chinese interpretationis not universally accepted. Tibet has a recorded history of over 2,000 years as an independentnation and possesses all conditions of statehood. See Understanding the Issue of Tibet New Delhi,Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, 2007, p. 3 and Thomas Lang, The Story ofTibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama , London, Atlantic Books, 2006.

8 Abanti Bhattacharya, “Chinese Nationalism and the Fate of Tibet: Implications for India andFuture Scenarios”, Strategic Analysis, 31(2), March 2007, pp. 237–66. The author quotes CharlesHeimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of India , Bombay: Allied Publishers , 1971,pp. 198–203.

Introduction

in Exile at Dharamsala. Thoughofficially India considers the TAR to bea part of China, the reality is that theTibet question is not settled. Rather,ever since the occupation of Tibet bythe PRC, Tibet and Buddhism haveentered the consciousness of the world.According to Sudarshan Bhutani:

If China and India were both losers,there was one winner – TibetanBuddhism. Shorn of its feudalmoorings, it has gained a followingin the world at large…. The result isa global interest in protecting theTibetan identity which has beeninseparable from its religion far longerthan Peking has controlled Tibet.9

According to Jean-Francois Mayer:

The arrival of refugees contributes tobring new components into thereligious landscape of the hostcountries; for example it is not certainthat Tibetan Buddhism would havebecome as popular and respected as itis in some parts of the Western worldwithout the influx of Tibetanrefugees.10

India is seen by the international

community with great respect forhaving looked after the Dalai Lama andthe refugees and in facilitating thepreservation of their culture andreligion.11 This is obviously at the costof good relations with China. WhatIndia has done is just and proper as acivilisational entity. This in a world ofrealpolitik provides India with achallenge in diplomacy which needs tobe converted into an opportunity. Butthe journey will be long. There is a needfor consolidated strategic thinking onthe subject.

The second factor is ecological.12 Thestrategic importance of Tibet as anecological buffer as it relates toecological security is now wellestablished. Scientific knowledge isnow challenging the earlier (andwrong) assumption that traditionallifestyles as practised by Tibetansare backward, irrational andunsustainable.13 The Qinghai–Tibetplateau is a global ecosystem – like theAmazon rainforest or the two Poles. Itsland use impacts India in particular andthe region and the world in general.Besides fresh water sources of rivers, its

9 Sudarshan Bhutani, A Clash of Political Cultures: Sino-India Relations (1957–62), New Delhi, RoliBooks, 2004.

10 Jean-François Mayer, Introduction, “In God Have I Put My Trust: Refugees and Religion”, UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol.26, No.2, 2007, pp. 6–11.

11 Thubten Samphel, “Maintaining Vitality in Exile”, Harvard International Review, XXXI(3), Fall2009, pp. 60–3 and Tenzin Geyche Tethong, “A Tale of Tibetans by One of Them”, Border Affairs,April–June 2009, pp. 15–24.

12 P.K. Gautam, “ Climate Change and Environmental Degradation in Tibet: Implications forEnvironmental Security in South Asia “, Strategic Analysis, Vol.34, No.5, September 2010,pp.744-755.

13 Katherine Morton, “Climate Change and Security at the Third Pole”, Contemporary InternationalRelations, Vol.21, No.3, May/June 2011, pp.34-55.

sustainable management is vital forclimate security. No single nation basedon the claim of sovereignty can beallowed to continue with economic andland use policies which have negativeconsequences. The Hanisation of Tibetand the resultant population growth,the infrastructure development andeconomic policies go against thelimited carrying capacity and fragilityof the region. Autonomous also impliesthat the model of development iscongruent with ‘Nature’, according tothe Buddhist tradition as obtained inTibet. One need not be a Buddhist tounderstand this. In the presentsituation this does not seem to behappening. As Wang Shiyong explains,Tibetans are poorly equipped torespond to, and to take advantage ofopportunities.14 This is due to acomplex set of factors such as political,social, cultural and environmental. InTibetan-majority areas only 20 per centof business is controlled by Tibetans.Buddhist society is monastery-centredand agriculture cum animal-husbandrybased. The emphasis is on karma, whichshuns material gains. In China’sWestern Development Programme inTibet since 1999, though livingstandards have improved, this hashappened more in urban than ruralareas. Non-Tibetans, who arenumerous, are attracted to urban Tibet.Besides, fluency in Chinese language isa passport for success. The net result isthat the locals continue to bemarginalised.15

Therefore, it is in India’s interest to havepolicies for the preservation of Tibetanculture and its Buddhist character ofliving with Nature in the harsh terrain.This is possible if the Tibet question isreassessed. The first priority is to assessour policies on the Tibetans residing inIndia, which is a live, day-to-day, directproblem.

UNDERSTANDING OF SECURITY

The Tibet question is a traditionalsecurity issue. The PRC wants itsperiphery integrated into China. Itdistrusts the Dalai Lama. It is ready touse ruthless coercive power to subduethe Tibetans and is unlikely to tolerateany large-scale covert action forsecession. But events such as the massuprising of March 2008 are indicativeof the latent power of the people ofTibet. It is doubtful whether China hassucceeded in winning the hearts andminds of the Tibetans, except a few whoare already indoctrinated in the TAR toside with China. For India, as Chapter-2 shows, Buddhism practised both inthe Indian Himalayan belt and Tibet isa binding factor. It is a soft power,which some scholars allude to asspiritual diplomacy. However,nurturing this soft power is possibleonly in the long term. As the firstgeneration of Tibetan refugees fadeaway, the second and the third (born inIndia) are unlikely to have the samepassion, zeal and idealism as the first

14 Wang Shiyong, “Policy Impact on Tibetan market participation”, Asian Ethnicity, 10(1), February2009, pp. 1–18.

15 Ibid.

Introduction

generation. This is understandable andnatural. After the Fourteenth DalaiLama, it is possible that the movementwill fizzle out or splinter. It may lackthe charismatic leadership of theFourteenth Dalai Lama, but Buddhismwill certainly survive. This suggests thatinstead of treating it as a leadershipissue, we need to reinforce theinstitutionalisation of the faith. A Tibetwith its indigenous people providesgreater security to India than HanisedTibet.

Ever since the problem arose, India hasbeen seen giving all required assistanceto Tibetans, barring allowance toengage in political activities fromIndian soil for secession. As pointed outby Dawa Norbu,16 the refugees as asecurity issue came into prominencewhen some intellectuals resented thecontrol of monasteries in Ladakh byTibetans. Their not knowing the

Ladakhi language added to theresentment.17 Tanka B. Subba objectedto some Tibetans’ remarks that Nepalilanguage and culture have invadedTibetan tongues and homes inDarjeeling and Sikkim.18 Reaching anopposite conclusion, Rajesh Kharatobserves that in Sikkim, Darjeeling andKalimpong, Tibetans have beenacculturated to such an extent that localNepalese and Lepchas areaccommodative and often intermarry.Overall, the relations in West Bengaland Sikkim are harmonious andreciprocal, but show decline inArunachal Pradesh.19 Perhaps this hasto do with perceptions. As Chapter Twoshows, Ladakh was Tibetanised wayback in history and it is a not a newphenomenon. Rather, going by the foodhabits of the young generation, Ladakhhas got Punjabised.20 Indeed, accordingto Lobsang Yeshi, Vice-President of the

16 Dawa Norbu, “Tibetan Refugees in South Asia: A Case of Peaceful Adjustment”, in S.D. Muniand Lok Raj Baral (eds.), Refugees and Regional Security , New Delhi: Konark, 1996, pp. 78–98.

17 P. Stobdan, “Tibet and the Himalayas”, Strategic Analysis, September 1991, pp. 687–702; “India’sConcerns over Tibet – I and II”, Defence & Technology, June 2006 and July 2006, pp. 36–41 and pp.38–43 respectively; “Tibet and the Security of Indian Himalayan Belt”, in K. Warikoo (ed.),Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geopolitical and Strategic Perspective , London: Routledge,2009, pp. 102–21.

18 Dawa Norbu, note 16 , mentions Dr Tanka B Subba’s Flight and Adaptation: Tibetan Refugees in theDarjeeling Himalayas (1990). For Subba’s rejoinder and clarifications to Norbu see T.B. Subba,“One or Many Paths: Coping with the Tibetan Refugees in India”, in C. Joshua Thomas (ed),Dimensions of Displaced People in North-East India , New Delhi, Regency Publications, 2002, pp.131–58. Here Subba advocates identification of issues and debate to build healthier refugee-host relations and cites the help rendered by Tibetans after the Gujarat earthquake in 2001.

19 Rajesh Kharat, “Gainers of a Stalemate: The Tibetans in India”, in Ranbir Samaddar (ed.), Refugeesand the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India; 1947–2000 , New Delhi, Sage, 2003, pp. 281–93.

20 Interaction by P.K. Gautam with Dr Tsering Phuntsog, District Sheep Husbandry Officer, Lehin September 2008.

TYC: “Everyone always says China istrying to Sinicise us, but in fact, we areourselves being Indianised.”21

Strategic literature classifies three typesof security problems that refugees maypose to the receiving country:

(a) Strategic security may bethreatened if they get armed.

(b) Structural security may bethreatened if they compete for scarceresources.

(c) Regime security may be threatenedif they vote in domestic politics.22

None of this applies to the Tibetans.

Dehradun has a Tibetan establishmenthugging the cantonment ofClementown. It is out of bounds for allranks. This is understandable as troopsmust not be allowed to mingle freelywith the population and alsounauthorised liquor may be exchanged.These are all matters of standardsecurity practices of military units.Declaring the area out of bounds for allranks does not in any way mean thatthe area is a security threat in the senseof being a threat to national security.

Some scholars compare Tibetanrefugees (of just over 0.1 million) of

possessing the potential of creatingtrouble for India like the demand forGorkhaland by Nepalis. Surely, such acomparison of a population spread outin over 30 refugee establishments (asdots in a map) and not even one percent the size of Nepalis, needs to bequestioned.23 Comparing the Tibetan’sstruggle in exile with a Gorkhaland typeof movement in India is more of arhetoric. Asymmetrical comparisonsmay only help in reinforcing theChinese perceptions and strategy onTibet.

Nevertheless, with refugees residing forlong durations, there are bound to beproblems, especially in high populationdensity locations such as Dharamsalaor when economic progress has givenrise to a stronger sense of regionalidentity which wants to shake out thehistoric baggage of a hegemonicTibetan influence.

Local tensions do exist. In 2007, someTibetans managed to obtain ScheduledTribe certificates in Arunachal Pradesh.Some local clashes have also occurredin the past. In Dharamsala in 1994 alocal Gaddi was stabbed to death by aTibetan.24 A local Himachali taxi driverin Dharamsala opined that there is no

21 Pico Iyer, The Open Road: The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama ,New Delhi, PenguinBooks, 2008, p. 202.

22 Mahendra P. Lama, “Refugees in South Asia”, World Focus, 20(1), January 1999.23 Abanti Bhattacharya, “As China prepares for post-Dalai Lama Tibet, what is India to do with

the Tibetan Exiles?”, March 25, 2010, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/AsChinapreparesforpost-DalaiLamaTibetwhatisIndiatodowiththeTibetanExiles_abhattacharya_250310 (accessed April 24 , 2010).

24 Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Tibetan Refugees in India: Religious Identity and the Forces ofModernity”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol.26, No.2, 2007, pp. 79–90. Table 3.1 notes incidents ofconflicts, which have been resolved.

Introduction

local tension and the entire touristincome and industry is thriving due tothe Dalai Lama and his exiledcommunity in the area. (He also notedthat the rowdiest were Israeli touristswho had a propensity to bequarrelsome.)25

Yet another issue is how the refugeecommunities from other countries inIndia compare themselves with theTibetans in a sort of relative deprivationtheory. A step-motherly treatment hasbeen reported for Chakma and Hajongrefugees.26 This is more to do with thefact that India lacks a clear refugee

policy and how various lobbies indemocratic India have entirely differentviews.27 According to Ella Rolfe, thereis a lot of difference in the welcomingattitude exhibited for the Dalai Lamain 1959 and that for the Karmapa in2000. The treatment of ordinary citizenshas changed since 1986. (The Indiangovernment aid now only stretches totransport to settlement areas.28) Officialand popular suspicion regardingTibetan refugees is also increasing. LokSabha debates now refer to Tibetan“political activities” and most Tibetansnow entering India are not granted legalresidence.29

25 As observed by P.K. Gautam on a visit to Dharamsala in September 2007.26 Ratna Bharali Talukdar, “State of denial”, Frontline, 25(17), August 16–29 , 2008, pp. 49–53.27 Publications by the Hindu Group, The Hindu newspaper and the fortnightly newsmagazine

Frontline, deny Hanisation and are not sympathetic to the Tibetans; see, for example, A.G.Noorani, “Tibet: A Case for Quiet Diplomacy”, Frontline, May 8, 2009, pp. 83–8. For anopposite view, see Ramchandra Guha, “Big Brother Fascination”, The Telegraph, September8, 2000. Guha refers to Vikram Seth’s travelogue, From Heaven Lake: Travels through Sinkiangand Tibet (London: Chatto and Windus, 1983), which shows disparities including Hanisation ofLhasa. In the light of books by Jairam Ramesh of the Congress Party advocating the idea of“Chindia”, one wonders why within India, attitudes on this subject among political luminariesvary. After the March 2008 uprising, Indian authorities took stringent steps against the Tibetanswhen the Olympic torch reached New Delhi. Honey Oberoi wonders about the reasons for the“apathy and outright aversion of the egalitarian Left” towards the Tibetan movement; accordingto an academic dealing with China, the Chinese fund the Communist Party in India; interestingly,the trend may be changing among the Leftists. See Honey Oberoi, “Rethinking Tibet”, Economicand Political Weekly, May 10, 2008, pp. 80–3. Politicians such as Arun Shourie of the right-leaningBharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and author Claude Arpi on the other hand want a more proactivepolicy in relation to Tibet and are very sympathetic to the Tibetan freedom movement. See ArunShourie, “Roof of the World: The Tibetan Government in Exile has completed fifty years in India,but what has India done in Tibet?”, Defence and Security of India, 1(5), pp. 22–7; Claude Arpi,“Past vs Future”, Defence and Security of India, 1(5), pp. 28–34; anonymous, “India’s Tibet Card”,Indian Defence Yearbook, 2009, pp. 193–206 and B.K.P. Singh, China’s Tibet Policy ,New Delhi, SumitEnterprises, 2009.

28 Ministry of Home Affairs ’s Annual Report 2010-2011 mentions expenditure of Rs 18.72 croreson their resettlement in a housing scheme in Uttarakhand.

29 Ella Rolfe, “Refugee, Minority, Citizen, Threat: Tibetans and the India Refugee Script”, SouthAsia Research, 28(3), November 2008, pp. 253–83.

REFUGEES AS PRO-CHINA AND

CHINESE AGENTS

Another impression linked to securityis that of refugees being pro-China andChinese agents in India. T.B. Subbadescribes this phenomenon asideological cleavages: those Tibetanswho do not agree with the views of theirown Government in Exile atDharamsala are often alleged to beagents of China, who have infiltratedtheir society to weaken their fight forindependence.30 According to P.Stobdan, the Dalai Lama’s securitydepartment suspected at least 12Tibetans to be Chinese agents. Besides,these suspicions are fuelled by the factthat the movement of people betweenTibet and India is poorly regulated inIndia, and agents can infiltrate.31 BothShugden and Karmapa controversieshave had a potentially destabilising

impact in India.32 A hypothesisregarding the Karmapa and otherrefugees being Chinese agents alsoexists.33 This suspicion was part of aparliamentary question in 1967 (seeChapter 3 Appendix D).

Surely, if the professional intelligenceagencies had evidence, action wouldneed to have been taken. Good counter-intelligence is also a principle ofsecurity. The Chinese have anadvantage that they can passthemselves off as Indians (from theNorth East or other Himalayan regions)or Bhutanese or Nepali. Imperial BritishIndia could not even enter China assurveyors and the Survey of India hadto train and disguise Nain Singh andparty from Garhwal and Kumaon aslamas for a clandestine survey of Tibetduring the heyday of the Great Game.

30 Subba, “One or Many Paths …”, n. 18.31 P. Stobdan, “Tibet and the Security of Indian Himalayan Belt”, n.17.32 P. Stobdan, “India’s Concerns over Tibet – II”, n. 17, p. 43.33 A. Maheshwari, The Buddha Cries! Karmapa Conundrum , Mumbai, Preface Books, 2002. On the

changing nature of refugee treatment, an article which captures the debate in an academicmanner, see Ella Rolfe, “Refugee, Minority, Citizen, Threat: Tibetans and the India Refugee Script”,South Asia Research, 28(3), November 2008, pp. 253–83.

Introduction

GEOGRAPHY

The cold Tibetan plateau (also calledthe Tibet–Qinghai plateau) is still information and is especially prone toearthquakes. Its mean elevation is 3600metres (12,000 feet) and it has an areaof 2.5 million square kilometres,roughly one-fourth of China’slandmass. The Tibetan AutonomousRegion is one-eighth of China’slandmass. Only one per cent of theplateau sustains regular agriculturalactivity. Nomadism in grasslands ispractised extensively. Tibetans arecategorised into Yulva (farmers),Drokpa (nomads) and Sama-drok(those engaged in agriculture/animalhusbandry). Tibetan culture is uniqueand is comparable to other greatcivilisations.

PEOPLE AND REGIONS

The division of Tibet into Inner andOuter Tibet has some colonial historybehind it (“Colonial” is in two senses:The Chinese’ gradual colonisation ofAmdo and Kham since the nineteenthcentury; the British colonial policy ofdividing Tibet into “Inner Tibet”(Amdo and Kham) which theyrecognised as being part of the Chinese

spheres of influence and “Outer Tibet”as an autonomous buffer state). Thisdivision is controversial not onlybetween China and Tibet but alsoamong the Tibetans themselves. TheChinese have carved out the TibetanAutonomous Region (TAR) which doesnot include all areas claimed byTibetans. Tibetan areas outside TAR areidentified as Tibetan AutonomousPrefectures and Tibetan AutonomousCounties. In areas outside TAR, asizeable Tibetan population resides inQinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan.These areas are also calledethnographic Tibet (see Map 1.1). TheKhampas and Amdos are the dominantBuddhist people of these areas. WithinChina, the 1990 census reported 4.6million ethnic Tibetans dividedbetween two regions – 46 per cent inthe TAR and the rest outside the TAR.The Tibetan Government in Exilemaintains that six million Tibetans arein Tibet and 140,000 are exiles – out ofwhom over 100,000 are in India. Theregion of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo isalso called Cholka-Sum by Tibetans.Historically, Tibetans havedistinguished between three majorregions of Tibet: U-Tsang (U is centralTibet and Tsang is the region west of

TIBET DATA SHEET INCLUDING TRADITIONS OF

MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

Appendix

U, with the town of Shigaste as its maincentre and the western part of the TAR),Amdo (the Tibetan area of Qinghai andGansu and the Tibetan AutonomousPrefecture in Sichuan), and Kham(Diqing, Ganzi, the TibetanAutonomous Prefecture in Sichuan,and the Eastern part of the TAR). Forsome Tibetans these regional identitiesare mutually exclusive, similar to ethniccategories. Visitors from eastern Tibetare called Khampa and not Tibetan. TheTibetan language is of the Tibeto-Burmese language family.

Tibetans possess a range ofphysiological, biochemical, andmolecular adaptation to high altitudethat are based on genes and heredity.Tibetans possess full spectrum ofadaptation, most notably in terms ofrespiratory, cardiovascular, and nervousadaptation to high altitude, whichmakes their efficiency, tolerance, qualityof life, and all manner of day to dayfunctioning superior to Chinese at thesame altitude. Tibetan also do not getaltitude related diseases such as acuteand chronic mountain sickness orintrauterine growth restrictions ofpregnancy.34

BUDDHISM

Bon is an ancient religion of Tibet. NowMahayana Buddhism is predominant,though Bon also exists. Tibetan

Buddhism is also called Vajrayana orLamaism. As a civilisation Tibetanscould also be called Mahayana TantricBuddhists. Till the mid-twentiethcentury Tibet was isolated from theWestern world because of its difficultterrain.

Broadly, the schools or traditions (somesee them as sects) are the Nyigma,Kagyu, Saskya and Gelugpa. Sects likethe Shugden deity have beenhistorically banned. Tsong Kha Pacreated the Gelug school in thefifteenth century. Gelugpa, theyoungest sect, is also called yellow hatand others as red hat, though onlynuanced differences exist. Nyigma andKagyu schools incline more towardsmeditation and mysticism, but Gelugschool is firmly rooted in debate andscholarship. Kagyu has four mainbranches – Babrom, Pagdru, Tsalpa andKarma and eight sub branches-Taglung, Trophu, Drukpa, Marstang,Yerpa, Yazang, Shugesh, and Drikung

Tibetans believe in the concept ofreincarnation (tulku) for lamas at thetop of the hierarchy and for the teachers(rinpoche). The idea of Boddhisatvaexplains the concept of tulku orreincarnation. It began with Kagyu(Karma sect). It was later followed byGelugpa and others . The spiritual headreincarnates after dying by leaving cluesbehind. Some teachers called

34 Robert Thurman, Why the Dalai Lama Matters: His Act of Truth as the Solution for China, Tibet, andthe World, New York, Atrai Books, 2008, p.91 and Note 5, p.96

Appendix

rinpoches (gurus) also reincarnate. 35

Unlike the Karmapa, neither the Dalainor the Panchen Lamas had the customof leaving written instructions.36

Another unique feature from historyis that the Seventh Dalai Lama was bornbefore death of the Sixth Dalai Lama.In other words premature and belatedbirth of reincarnation is possible inBuddhism.37 This concept of emanationor madey tulku has been referred to bythe 14th Dalai Lama as an option.38

There are centuries old divisionsbetween traditions, which theFourteenth Dalai Lama has attemptedto remove. Within Gelugpa, there wereattempts for geographic division underthe Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama.It was unsuccessfully proposed toseparate Tibet into “Back” and “Front”,the former incorporating Tsang, whichthe Panchen Lama would rule, and thelatter the area of U, to be ruled by theDalai Lama. Before the Chinesetakeover in the mid-twentieth century,the Gelugpa tradition since theseventeenth century under theFourteenth Dalai Lama was in power.The Fourteenth Dalai Lama was boththe temporal (political) and the spiritual

head, though the areas of Khampaswere more independent. Tibetansbelieve that he is the incarnation of thepatron deity of Tibet, Chenrezig(Avilokteshwara).

In terms of hierarchy, the first is theDalai Lama, followed by the PanchenLama. Both belong to the Gelugpatradition. The third is the Karmapa, thehead of the Kagyu lineage. Itsmonastery in exile has been establishedat Rumtek in Gangtok. This traditionhas the black hat.

The Tibetan monastic system had about10 to 20 per cent of lifelong malecelibate monks before the Chinesetakeover. In 1951 there were about25,000 monasteries in Tibet. The largestaround Lhasa (Drepung, Serra andGanden) contained 20,000 monks. Mostwere destroyed during the CulturalRevolution; some have been rebuilt.Currently there could be over 47,500officially registered monks and nuns inthe TAR.

BUDDHISM AND PACIFISM

Hindu nationalist ideologues of theearly twentieth century may have been

35 China asserts it has veto power over all Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation, including the DalaiLama. In mid- 2007, the State Administration for Religious Affairs announced vide Order Number5, that it held the sole power to approve any reincarnation. See Tim Johnson, Tragedy in Crimson:How the Dalai Lama Conquered the World but Lost the Battle with China, New York, Nation Books,2011, p.148 and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “ Dalai Lama Keeps Firm Grip on Reins of Succession, TheNew York Times reproduced in The Asian Age (Mumbai), Octobet 7, 2011.

36 Isabel Hilton, The Search for the Panchen Lama, London, Penguin Books, 2000, p.204.37 Ibid p.282.38 Tim Johnson, Tragedy in Crimson: How the Dalai Lama Conquered the World but Lost the Battle with

China, New York, Nation Books, 2011, p.7

responsible for the notion thatBuddhism is akin to pacifism.39 Tibethad been a nation of warriors, even afterthe spread of Buddhism. Till theseventeenth century there was anintense armed struggle till the Gelugpabecame the dominant tradition. Therehave been times in history whenTibetans conquered China. TrisongDetsen seized Changon (now Xian) andin 1647, the Fifth Dalai Lama salliedforth to Peking to demand that the Mingemperor recognise Tibet’s sovereigntyand independence, which he did.40 In1841 the Chinese-Tibetan forcesdefeated the Dogras.41

The martial prowess of the Khampas iswell known.42 Perhaps this paradox ofBuddhism has more to do with the self.Professor K.T.S Saraon, Head of DelhiUniversity’s Department of BuddhistStudies has reflected on howcollectively Buddhist nations havewaged wars and taken to coercion(Japan, Cambodia, Myanmar, etc.), yetamong individuals there is the central

concept of Ahinsa and peace.43 In SriLanka, the Buddhist Sinhalas defeatedthe Tamil rebels of LTTE inconventional combat; the monks therehad urged the society and state tomilitarise to solve the problem. Thereis therefore no evidence of a clear-cutrelationship between pacifism andBuddhism.

INDO- TIBETAN CULTURAL

RELATIONS

The harmonious relations betweenTibet and India is often described as aGuru-Sisya (teacher–pupil) relationship.Around the seventh and eighth century,the Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo sentthe scholar Thonmi Sambhota withothers to study in India . Based on theSharada script (from Kashmir), with thehelp of Indian teachers, they createdthe Tibetan writing system. The Tibetanlanguage basically belongs to theTibeto- Burmese branch of the Sino-Tibetan linguistic group or family. Thespoken language is very diverse in its

39 Authors such as Savarkar, Golwakar and Bhai Parmanand consider development of Buddhismas the first cause of India’s decline because of the sociological implications of Buddhism. Savarkarin Hinduvta considers the promotion of ahinsa (non-violence) and spiritual brotherhood as amajor factor for the invasion by the Huns and Shakas, not only because the Hindus lost theirmartial values but also because they had been taught to consider their enemies as part of thesame humanity from a universal point of view. See Christophe Jaffrelot, “The Idea of the HinduRace in Writings of Hindu Nationalistic Ideologue in the 1920s and 1930s: A Concept betweenTwo Cultures”, Chapter 11 in Peter Robb (ed), Concept of Race in South Asia ,New Delhi, OxfordUniversity Press, 1995.

40 Mohan Guruswamy and Zorawar Daulat Singh, India-China Relations: The Border Issue ,New Delhi,Viva Books/Observer Research Foundation, 2009, p. 40.

41 Ibid., p. 46.42 Michel Peissel, Cavaliers of Kham: The Secret War in Tibet ,London, Heinemann, 1972.43 Remarks of Professor K.T.S. Sarao, chairperson of session on “Globalization and Buddhism” at

Foundation of SAARC Writers and Literature, international seminar on “Buddhism as Peace-makers in Post Modern SAARC”, India International Centre, New Delhi, March 5, 2009.

Appendix

dialects. There is, however, one singlewritten script which gives immenseunity to Tibet’s literary culture. It iswritten in a phonetic alphabet that isDevanagri derived from the Brahmi andGupta scripts of India. In other words,Tibetan grammar originated anddeveloped on the basis of Sarad lipi, aKashmiri script together with theDevanagri script of the Hindi alphabet. TheTibetan script therefore has amazingsimilarities with the Brahmi and Gupta

scripts.

Norbu (2009) shows two extant andpowerful myths on the entwinedrelation with India. First is that NyatriTsenpo, who was believed to be anIndian prince, landed on the LhariGyangdo Mountain and was found laterby a group of villagers in Yurlung. Ashe spoke no Tibetan, when asked fromwhere had he come from , he pointedto the sky in the direction of India. Themeaning of this myth is that theBuddhist revolution was to begin inTibet and the legitimacy of the kingwas derived from holy India. Thesecond myth is based on the firstencounters with Buddhism that tookplace in the fourth century AD whentwo Buddhist texts fell from the skiesin the royal palace . The texts were notunderstood by the king. In the seventhcentury, evidence indicated that these

texts were Chintamani Dharni and Pang-

Koneyama brought by an Indian Panditand a Tibetan translator. In both themyths, sky is important in Bonpo andShamanistic cultures. This shows thatbesides legitimacy derived from India,Buddhist culture also came to termswith pre- Buddhist culture in Tibet. Inclassic texts translated into Tibetan, thefirst line in Tibetan mentions, Gyakar

Kadu which means “in the language ofIndia” followed by the Sanskrit title inTibetan alphabet followed by Tibetantranslation. In the huge body ofliterature of religious history calledChoejung, India has been mentionedfirst, followed by China and Mongolia.There is a popular prayer in Tibetan :rgya-gar panchem Bodola fka drin che (wethe people of Tibet owe an immensedebt and gratitude to the Maha Panditsof India).44

After the Muslim conquest, the culturalrelations between India and Tibet cameto a halt. By the time the Islamictakeover in India was complete,Mahayana Buddhism was safe in Tibetand Theravada in Sri Lanka , Burma andThailand. During the period of India’sfreedom movement, there was a beliefamong Indian intellectuals that Tibetwas the repository of lost Indiancultural treasures. Raja Ram Mohun Royattempted to go to Tibet. In the 1930s

44 It must be acknowledged that Indian spiritual masters also owe much to the environment ofTibet for deep meditation and spiritual retreat such as in the regions of Kailash Mansarovar. Ithas been observed that life of Tibetan peasants was harder than the lives of farmers, herders,tribal people, and nomads in India and Nepal. They lacked anything but the barest necessities,but they were blessed with the wealth that contentment brings. See Pandit Rajmani Tigunait, Atthe Eleventh Hour: The Biography of Swami Ram, Pennsylvania, The Himalayan Institute Press,2001, p.9 and p.147.

Rahul Sankritayan searched forSanskrit texts in Tibet. He discoveredabout 500 Sanskrit Buddhist texts. Allthe collections are now housed in K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute in Patna.

INDIAN AYURVEDA AND TIBETAN

MEDICINE

Atisa carried with him importantmedical work The Heart of Life. Thus asMahayana and Tantric Buddhism weretransplanted to Tibet so was IndianAyurvedic medicine. Vijay and Belha (awoman)were the first Indian Buddhiststo bring Ayurveda to Tibet in fifthcentury AD. 45

REFERENCES

Clifford, Terry,1984, reprint 1994, The

Tibetan Buddhist Medicine and Psychiatry:

The Diamond Healing, Delhi , MotilalBanarsidass,

Goldstein, Melvyn C. 1997. The Snow Line

and the Dragon, Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press.

–––––––. 2007. A History of Modern Tibet,

Volume 2, The Calm before the Storm,

1951– 1955, Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press.

Iyer, Pico. 2008. The Open Road: The

Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai

Lama, New Delhi, Penguin/Viking.

Johnson, Tim , 2011.Tragedy in Crimson:

How the Dalai Lama Conquered the World

but Lost the Battle with China, New York,Nation Books.

45 Terry Clifford, The Tibetan Buddhist Medicine and Psychiatry: The Diamond Healing, Delhi ,Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, reprint 1994, pp.44-52.

Kapstien, Matthew T. 2006. The Tibetans,

Malden: Blackwell.

Kolås, Åshild, 2008. Tourism and Tibetan

Culture in Transition: A Place Called

Shangri-la, Oxon: Routledge.

Namgyal, Tsetan, “Tibetan Languageand Culture Studies”, Himalayan and

Central Asian Studies,, Vol.13, No.1,January- March 2009, pp.88-101.

Norbu, Dawa.

(a) 2001. China’s Tibet Policy, Surrey:Curzon Press.

(b) 2009.” Indo- Tibetan CulturalRelations through the Ages”,Himalayan and Central

Asian Studies, Vol.13, No.1, January-March 2009, pp.33-42.

Peissel, Michel. 1972. Cavaliers of Kham:

The secret war in Tibet, London:Heinemann.

Rizvi, Janet. 1996. Ladakh: Crossroads of

High Asia, 2nd ed, New Delhi: OxfordUniversity Press.

Sautman, Barry and June Teufel Dreyyer(eds.). 2006. Contemporary Tibet,Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Thurman, Robert. 2008. Why the Dalai

Lama Matters: His Act of Truth as the

Solution for China, Tibet, and the World,New York, Atrai Books.

Tibetan Parliamentary & PolicyResearch Centre, 2007. Understanding

the Issues of Tibet, New Delhi: TibetanParliamentary & Policy ResearchCentre.

Appendix

BUDDHISM IN THE HIMALAYAN BELT AND

BEYOND

Chapter 2

INTRODUCTION

What is the importance and influenceof Buddhism on the Indian Himalayanbelt? We can answer this question frommany perspectives. As far as influenceis concerned, Buddhism as practiced inthe region has roots in India. It ispracticed in the Indian Himalayan beltin Ladakh, and in border regions ofHimachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand,Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh.1 Inneighbouring countries it is practiced

in Tibet,2 mountainous regions ofNepal and most of Bhutan.3 This vastand linear region of harsh terrain,limited resources and carrying capacityhas found an ideal location for itspractice. As far as importance isconcerned it informs India’s borderrelations with its neighbours such asChina and the Tibetan AutonomousRegion (TAR), other ethnic Chineseregion outside the TAR, Nepal andBhutan. The Tibetan spiritual

1 According to 2001 census figures on Buddhism, proportion of Buddhist are 1.1 % in Jammu andKashmir (1.13 lakhs), 1.2% in Himachal Pradesh (75, 859), 28.1% in Sikkim (1.52 lakhs), 13% inArunachal Pradesh (1.43 lakhs) and 0.1% in Uttarakhand (12,434). However, the land area ismuch larger. Ladakh is one third of Jammu and Kashmir. Buddhist border region of ArunachalPradesh likewise stretches all along the Sino-India border. All are residing in strategic andsensitive border regions.

2 According to Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2008-2009, population of Tibetan refugeesin India is 1,10,095. Figures for Tibetans in TAR and other regions of China with Tibetanpopulation in the 2000 Chinese census data is 2.41 lakhs in TAR and 4.5 lakhs in all China. SeeEncyclopedia of Contemporary Chinese Culture, Edward L. Davis (ed.), London/New York, Routeledge,2005. According to exiled Tibetan website, there are 6.1 million Tibetans worldwide whichincludes 20,000 in Nepal, 1,500 in Bhutan, 3,500 in the USA and Canada, 2000 in Switzerlandand a few elsewhere. See htpp://www.tibet.com/index.htm accessed in October 2008.

3 Nepal has 11% Buddhists in a population of 2.9 crores which is about 29 lakhs, consisting ofGurungs, Tamangs, Sherpas, Newars, and Bhots. Bhutan has a population of 6.8 lakhs with75% practicing Lamaism Buddhism. See “Socio Economic Indicators” in Ashok K. Behuria (ed.)Changing Political Context in South Asia: Implications for Regional Security, New Delhi, IDSA,November 2008, pp.237-272 and Pitambar Sharma, Unraveling The Mosaic: Spatial Aspects ofEthnicity in Nepal, Lalitpur, 2008. Bhutan has enduring friendly relations with India includingBuddhist connections. See Maj Gen Y.K.Gera (Retd), “Developments in Bhutan,” The Journal ofthe United Service Institution of India, Vol.CXXXVII, No.573, July-September 2008, pp.342-350.

leadership in-exile is now lodged inIndia. In Sino-India relations the Tibetfactor, of which Buddhism is animportant part, has and will remaincrucial. It is important to look at areligion which has for India, all theingredients of what some politicalscientists call ‘soft power’.

Historically, Indian Buddhistinstitutions such as Nalanda andVikramasila were the centres ofexcellence for propagation of Buddhistideas. Indian influence and role waspivotal in the establishment ofMahayana Buddhism in Tibet. As anextant spiritual and soft power, this linkis too important to be ignored.According to Ladakhi scholar and theformer Principal of Central Institute forBuddhist Studies Dr Nawang Tsering:

Students and pilgrims kept rushingto Tibet in quest of learning Buddhistculture and language. They camefrom all corners of its ethnic regionsof Mongolia, Bhutan, Nepal and theIndian Himalayan states for higherstudies until middle of the 20th

century when Tibet lost itsindependence in 1959. The upheavalin Tibet proved cultural setback notonly for the Tibetans but also amongits traditional cultural satellite regionsand ethnic groups. Fortunately, theTibetans received whole edifice of theIndian culture in general andBuddhism in particular beforeBuddhism disappeared from India in

12th century. In the same manner,the people of Indian Himalayanstates received complete culturefrom Tibet before the Chinese RedGuards’ destructive CulturalRevolution in 1960s.4

Two events lead to near extinction ofBuddhism from the plains of India. Oneaccount as given by Hiuen Tsang(Xuanzang) showed Buddhist crusadesof Kumarila and Sankaracharya in theeighth century were potent factors inrendering Buddhism unpopular. Thefinal blow was delivered by Musliminvaders. Muhammmad Bakhtiar Khaljiat the end of the twelfth century,destroyed Buddhist religiousinfrastructure such as Nalanda.According to author Shashi Tharoor,Nalanda was destroyed three times byinvaders, but only rebuilt twice. Thefirst time was when the Huns underMihirakula laid waste to the campusduring the reign of Skandagupta(455-67CE), when Nalanda was only afew decades old. Skanda’s successorsrebuilt it. The second destruction camea century and a half later, with anassault by the Gaudas in early seventhcentury. This time the great Hindu kingHarshavardhana (606-48) restored theBuddhist university. Nearly 800 yearsafter its founding, Nalanda wasdestroyed a third time and burned byTurkish Muslim invaders underBakhtiar Khilji in 1197. This time therewas no reconstruction.

4 Dr Nawang Tsering, “Why Bhoti Should be in the Eighth Schedule”, Border Affairs, April-June2007, p16.

Buddhism in the Himalayan Belt and Beyond

However, the knowledge and literatureof Buddhism, rather than beingavailable in India, was preserved or wemay even say, got ingrained and furtherdeveloped in Tibet before it goteliminated in India.5

The pendulum so to speak swung back.In mid-twentieth century, when thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) tookover Tibet, that very knowledge poolcame back to India with the Tibetanexiles. There is a need to revisit theaspect of how religious wisdomoriginating from India is now virtuallylodged back in India with the Tibetansin exile.

Besides, in recent times, a new trend isemerging with internationaldimensions: more and moreWesterners and people acrosscontinents are also getting attracted toTibetan Buddhism. It is getting trulyglobalised. What is unique is that Indiais now at the stage where it can facilitatethe consolidation of this great religion.That which was born in India, and itsMahayana version in the Himalayanbelt including Tibet, was the result ofthe hard work and influence of Indianmonks, philosophers and travelers inthe past such as Nagarjuna,Santaraksita, Padmasambhava,Kamalsila, Atisha Dipankara, Tilopa,Naropa and others. It must beacknowledged that the Indian state inthe present times has given all the

5 Suniti Kumar Pathak, The Indian Nitisastras in Tibet, Delhi, Motilal Banarasidas, 1974. Likewise,after expulsion from India, like Mahayana Buddhism in Tibet, in Sri Lanka Theravada Buddhismhas flourished.

6 P. Stobdam, “Chinese Checkers”, IDSA web commentary of June 13, 2008.

possible support to preserve Buddhism.There is a new momentum. Institutes ascentres of learning and preservationof the Buddhist culture exist in theHimalayas like the The Central Instituteof Buddhist Studies, Ladakh, in thewest, the Namgyal Institute ofTibetology, Gangtok and CentralInstitute of Himalayan Culture Studiesin Arunachal Pradesh in the east. Inmainland India in the plains, manyuniversities have departments ofBuddhist studies. The Varanasi basedCentral Institute of Higher TibetanStudies (CIHTS) envisioned by PanditJawahar Lal Nehru in consultation withHis Holiness the Dalai Lama, wasestablished in 1967 with a view toeducate the youth of Tibet andHimalayan border students of India. It isnow an autonomous body under theDepartment of Culture, Ministry ofEducation, Government of India. Theinstitute is achieving its goal ofexcellence in the field of Tibetology,Buddhology and Himalayan Studies.Another university of repute is theSampurnanand Sanskrit University atVaranasi. A synergy exists with otherseats of learning set up or underconsideration by the Tibetans in India.The new Nalanda university plannedwill also provide momentum.

It may be admitted that unlike the PRCwhich according to some accounts is“fast assuming the leadership role ofthe Buddhist world”6 no long-term

strategic thought has been given toIndia nurturing and then using thisspiritual and cultural power to itsadvantage. In the Indian context boththe state and society have to play amutually supportive role. The stateneeds to facilitate the religiouspractices and make institutions thatbenefit the minority communitybesides suitable economic development. Atthe same time the people in the so- calledperiphery have to be willing partners innation building. This willingness iscontingent on both top down policies bythe state and bottom up people’sparticipation.

With capitalism, it is possible that theremay be a strong revival of religion inChina. Tibetan Buddhism already existsin the region. Will the PRC encouragespread of Buddhism and religiousfreedom? It is very unlikely. Thus torecapitulate the roots of this religion,seeing how it is being practised inpresent times, both by Tibetans andIndians as well as other nationalities inthe strategic Himalayan borderlands,may give us fresh insights on a softpower which we need to nurture.

Four regions have been covered as asample case for study—Ladakh,Gangtok, Siang region of ArunachalPradesh and Kameng and Tawang.Seats of Learning at Dehradun inUttarakhand and Dharamsala in

Himachal Pradesh are two samplescovered.

PART I: LADAKH

General Information on Ladakh.

Ladakh has an area of 97,000 kms withan approximate population of 2,22,000.Languages spoken are Ladakhi, Balti,Shina, Brokskat, Changsktat. Writtenlanguages are Tibetan (Bodhi) andUrdu. People of Tibeto-Mongol, Dard,and Tibetan- Drad (Aryan) ethnicityreside here.

It needs to be noted that Buddhism firstcame to Ladakh via Kashmir in the firstcentury AD well before it had reachedTibet. Later with conversion of Kashmirto Islam and expulsion of Buddhismfrom India it spread to Tibet. Tibet inturn under the influence of Indianmonks, sages and the university systemof Nalanda and the like, adoptedBuddhism. Tibet became the centre ofthe faith. In a survey in 2004, in sevenmonasteries in Ladakh there were 96elderly monks who had been to variousmonasteries in Tibet before the takeover by the Chinese.7

Monasteries

Ladakh has about 37 monasteries ofdifferent sects spread out in the LehValley along the Indus from theinternational border till short of Kargil,Zanskar region, Nubra valley and

7 Sonam Joldan, “Traditional ties between Ladakh and Buddhist Tibet: Monastic organizationand monastic education as a sustaining factor”, The Tibetan Journal, Vol.XXXI, No.2, Summer2006.

Chushul region. In Leh valley andDurbok, broadly speaking, there are foursects with representative monasteries asunder8 :

(a) Nyingma. The oldest sect started byPadmasambhava. Thak Thogmonastery is the only type inLadakh in Shakti Village betweenKaru to Changla.

(b) Kagyupa. In Ladakh it has twoprominent sub-sects. The Changpanomads of Durbok follow the Dri-Gungpa sect and those of Nyomablock follow Drug-pa sect. InLadakh , the monasteries under thesub-sects are:

(i) Dri-Gungpa. Lamayaru,Phiyang, Shachukul.

(ii) Drug-Pa. Hanle, Hemis,Chemrey, Stakna.

(c) Saskya-Pa. Matho monastery .

(d) Gelupka. Spituk, Thikse, Likir.

Besides monasteries at Alchi,Lamayrau, Wanle, Mong-gyu andSumda which have originated due tothe influence of the great translatorRinchen Zangpo have now come underthe influence of the Gelukpa order.

It must be appreciated that with theinflux of foreign tourists and devotees,the ambience is of a very high spiritualorder. What was striking was that the14th Dalai Lama’s photograph was found

in all traditions. He had alsoinaugurated new additions in somemonasteries and had visited nearly allof them.

Hierarchy and Organisation ofMonasteries

History of Rivalry between Sects.

During the times of the Fifth DalaiLama the yellow hat of the Gelukpamonastic sect (the youngest) sect hadbeen on the ascent in Tibet. On theother hand its rival Drug Pa sect wasreceiving royal patronage in Ladakhand Bhutan. This created tensionbetween Tibet on the one hand andLadakh and Bhutan on the other. In thelast quarter of the seventeenth century,Tibet attacked Bhutan, and was beatenback. The king of Leh protested. TheDalai Lama sent his army (of Mongolstroops) to subdue Ladakh in 1679 and1680 leading to the siege of Basgo forthree years, even forcing the Ladakhisto invite the Kashmir based Mughals.Later Tibet sent a high ranking Drug-Pa monk for talks. This resulted in thetreaty of Tingmosgang of 1684. It wasthis treaty that drew borders betweenLadakh and Tibet (and between Indiaand China). Guge was wrested fromLadakh and Pangong Lake gotpartitioned between Ladakh and Tibet.The Drug Pa lama also extracted anassurance from the king that the rivalGe Lugs Pa sect would receive more orless equal treatment in Ladakh.9

8 Zanskar and Nubra are not included here as they could not be visited by the authors.9 Parvez Dewan, IAS, Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2004,pp.72-73.

The author was Commissioner of Ladakh and has good knowledge of the area having served inthe region including Zanskar.

This piece of history in no case showsany rivalry or animosity today. We havenot found in our research any dividebetween the traditions. This isimportant, as in religious affairs, onehas seen how societies, nations andpeople get divided as in Islam (Shia-Sunni), or in Christianity (RomanCatholics- Protestants and othervariations).

Hemis, Stakna and Chemrey(Kagyud Drugpa Sect)

Hemis. Hemis Monastery situatedabout 50 kms from Leh is the biggestmonastery of the Drukpa KargyuSchool of the Great Mahayana Culture.The Kargyu Order was founded byGampopa in the twelfth century. Hismaster was the singing yogi Milarepa.The monastery was founded by H.H.Tagtshang Respa Ngawang Gytso(Head of Ladakh) in 1630 under thepatronage of King Sengye Namgyal.The monastery has about 350 monks.It has branch monasteries in over 50villages all over Ladakh. His HolinessGyalwang Drukpa Rinpoche, TheTwelfth Gyalawang Drukpa is thesupreme head of this gompa. He wasborn at Rewalsar in north India in 1963.A few years earlier in 1960, the EleventhGyalwang Drukpa had passed away atthe age of 30 in a refugee camp in Buxa,West Bengal, after an arduous escapefrom Tibet on foot. Six years of searchfor the grand lama’s reincarnation,aided by rites and rituals performed atthe suggestion of Their Holiness theDalai Lama, Gyalwa Karmapa, DudjomRinpoche and Sakya Trichen, the fouryear old Drukpu was found inDalhousie, India. He was formally

enthroned by HH the Dalai Lama in 1966in Dharamsala, India and then in 1967 athis own sect’s Dotsok Monastery inDarjeeling, West Bengal. In 1974 thepeople of Ladakh invited GyalwangDrukpa to come to Ladakh and blessHemis monastery and its branches. Helater went to Ladakh every summer. In1980 he performed special rites beforea gathering of 23,000 people. He spentseven years in Ladakh including oneyear in solitary meditation retreat. HH,the Twelfth Gyalwang Drukpa is nowresponsible for numerous DrukpaKargyu monasteries in the Himalayanregion as well as Dharma centresaround the world, most notably inFrance, England, Taiwan, America andAustralia. Principal monastic seat inDarjeeling, West Bengal called Sang-ngak Choling was founded by the lateVenerable Thuksya Rinpoche, theteacher.

The Teacher Tradition

Drukpa Thuksay Rinpoche, the teacherof the Twelfth Gyalwang Drukpa wasborn in 1916. He died in 1983. His tulku(reincarnation) was born in March 10,1986 in Ladakh. In July 1987 HH theFourteenth Dalai Lama and the TwelfthGyalwang Drukpa went together toGyalwa Gotsangpa’s cave near Hemis inLadakh and authenticated thereincarnation.

Stakna- This monastery which is 25 kmsfrom Leh traces its lineage to one of theeight minor branches of Buddhism inTibet named Lingres Kagyud. It waspossibly built by Chos-rje-rMug-nZin(pronounced Choje Mugzin) in 1590.During the reign of Chosgyal SengayNamgyal, the then king of Ladakh and

Lama Zabs, Drung Ngawang Namgyal,who was spiritual and political Lama ofBhutan, became the patron priest.Stakna monastery holds the doctrine ofBhutan. Many Lamas came to Stakna asSeat-Holders and regents since 1590.The Twentyfirst who is listed in thehandbook is His Eminence NgawangDhonyod Jigdel Dorjey. The monasteryhas a newly built museum and excellentpaintings done by a local artist ofnational repute from Nimu who wasawarded the Padma Shri.10 The brochurehas a message from Rev. Kushok Thiksey(Nawang Chamba Stanzin) Ex- MP RajyaSabha in which he has noted the need topreserve and promote the valued ancientTibetan cultural heritage and tradition. Hefurther mentions that under the patronageof H.E. Stanka Rinpoche, the Staknamuseum’s preservation of BuddhistThanka and religious artifacts will enablebetter understanding of Buddha Dharmaand the Himalayan cultural values toforeign visitors and those seeking deepercomprehension of the Drukpa lineage.

Chemrey - This is also a monastery ofsplendid grandeur in Shakti village.This is the most important branch ofHemis monastery across the Indus.What is striking is the photo of theFourteenth Dalai Lama in the location.

Phyang and Shachukul (Kagyupa,Drigung- Pa Sect)

Phyang (Gang-ngon Tashi Choszong)

-The Drikung Kagyu lineage of TibetanBuddhism started with Buddha

Vajradhara, the India scholar Tilopa andNaropa. Marpa, Naropa’s disciple,translated the Kagyu teaching intoTibetan and transmitted then toMilarepa (1079- 1153), who transmittedthem to Gampopa (1079- 1170), whoselineage was continued byPhagmodrupa (1111-1170).Phagmodrupa’s intimate disciple, LordJigten Sumgon (1143-1217), thereincarnation of Nagarjuna, foundedDrikung Thil Monastery in 1179. Itbecame the main seat of the DrikungKagyu order. From Jigten Sumgon , thelineage of Drikung Kagyu has beenunbrokenly transmitted.

Currently, the continuation of theDrikung Kagu lineage is jointly headedby their Holiness the Thirty sixthDrikung Kyabgon ChungtsangRinpoche (1942-) in Tibet, and theThirtyseventh Drikung KyabgonChetsang Rinpoche (1946-) in India.500 years ago, Phyang monastery wasfounded by Chole Denma KungaDrakpa from Mount Kailash area inTibet, during the reign of Ladakhi kingTashi Namgyal. Its monasticcommunity is headed by His HolinessDrikung Kyabgon Chetsang Rinpocheand is overseen by His Eminence ChojeTokden Rinpoche and other officials.Phyang monastery is registered under theJammu and Kashmir SocietyRegistration Act-VI of 1998. It holdsancient holy Buddhist images andmurals. It is home to a 100 residentmonks. The monastery undertakes

10 Shri Tsering Wangdu. See The Hindu, Metroplus , September 10, 2009.

world tours (Europe, Asia and the US) ofVajra Mask Dances in cooperation withSwedish Tibetan Society for School andCulture in Europe with the aim of upliftingthe monastery’s trust to build its templeand hostels for the 100 monks. A RatnashriSchool has also been founded to providethe younger monks with Buddhist andmodern education. Monks study Tibetan,English, Hindi, mathematics and themonastery’s ritualistic prayers. Prominentsignposting has been done in a vast areanext to the monastery for an upcomingDrikung Institute under aegis ofDrikung Dharma.

Shachukul Monastery- In 1217, H.H.Chenga Sherup Jumney Rinpochearrived from Tibet with monks of theKagyupa sect. They concentrated atShichukul Gonpa. During the previousincarnation of HH Tokden Rinpochewho was born in the royal family ofLadakh at Tog village, ShichukulGompa further developed. It also gotseparated from Leh monasteries and allannual religious functions have beenregularly held at the present locationindependently. In the presentincarnation HH Togden Rinpoche atDurbok got further support and in 1996the new building was constructed. Tofurther bring the Gompa intoprominence, HH The Dalai Lamagraced Shichukul in 2001 with hisauspicious presence. He inauguratedthe new campus. Photographs of theDalai Lama are displayed there.

Matho (Saskya-Pa)- This is the onlyestablishment in Ladakh which followsthe Saskya-pa order, one of the Red Hatsects to be found in Tibet. Themonastery is situated on a hill in a

lateral ravine of Stok- Kangri range acrossthe Indus, some 26 kms east of Leh. Mathomonastery was established in the early 15th

century by the Tibetan Sakya scholarDorje Palsang who decided to build amonastery for the benefit of the localcommunity. The land was given by theking of Ladakh, Dragpa Bumde, whorecognized his meditative ability andsaintliness and donated a large amount ofland. In the sixteenth century, invadingMuslims almost destroyed the monasteryand imprisoned the king. Later, the kingwas released and another Sakya Lama,Chokyi Lodo, took charge of themonastery, renovating and restoring itsactivities. Previously, all monks ofMatho monastery would travel to Sakyaand Ngor in Tibet to study Buddhistscriptures and tradition, thereafterreturning to Ladakh to practice. In thisway, rituals and prayers which areconducted at the monastery havepreserved an unbroken link with oldTibetan religious tradition. It nowcontains an old and new temple, aspecial shrine housing the entireBuddhist canon, a shrine in honour ofthe Lamdre lineage of Lamas and twoshrines which house the Protectors ofthe Dharma. It has a Sakya Panditalibrary with Kanjur and Thangjurscriptures.

Thak Thog (Nyimgma)-This is the onlyNyigma sect monastery in Ladakh invillage Sakti, about 45 kms from Leh,founded in the late sixteenth century.The sect was founded byPadmasambhava, the Indian sage fromSwat. It has an old cave and a newcomplex nearby. It has treasures suchas the “The Five Pegs Advanced Course

Of the Northern Treasure : A NorthernTreasure Preliminary Practice”discovered by Rigdzin Godden. Itmentions that without the unsurpassedkindness and generosity of his HolinessTaklung Tsetrul Rinpoche the projectcould not have taken shape. It furthermentions that “As the throneholder ofDorje Drak monastery in Tibet, HisHoliness is the head of the NorthernTreasure Nyigma lineage. Born 1926 inCentral Tibet, he received his firstordination at Taklung Tse Monasterytogether with the title andenthronement of tulku at five years ofage. After escaping to India in 1959, HHfound the new Dorje Drak monasticseat in Simla, to preserve, foster andexpand the teaching of the Jang Terlineage”. A lay person has to beconscious and sensitive to realize thatthe teachings are highly evolved andesoteric. Only the initiated may be ableto understand it.

Thikse, Likir and Alchi (Gelugpa)

Thikse- On the main axis on the roadfrom Leh to Karu , this is probably themost visited monastery both byforeigners and increasingly Indianvisitors. It was founded about 550 yearsago on the site of an earlier Kadma-paestablishment. Today it is major Geluks-pa monastery with about 100 lamas. Theinformation official Tenzing Dhondupat “Thiksey Cultural and WelfareSociety” is a Tibetan. It has now addeda museum, a tea shop and medicalfacilities looked after by a doctor(amchi).

Likir- It has a new massive statue of theBuddha in the open. It is the first of itskind in Ladakh.

Alchi- Though founded by RinchenZangpo (whose walking stick is stillpreserved there) , it was taken over byGelukpa order. It has the Sumrstek/AlchiChhoskhor Temple, Lotsa temple andManushri temple. It has both Ladakhi andBuddhist artifacts being displayed for theLadakh festival including archerycompetition.

Mahabodhi International Meditation

Centre, Choglamsar- This is a newcentre set up by a former Ladakh Scoutsoldier Bhuikku Sangasena in 1986 whochose monkhood. It has an impressivecampus with most of the youngemployees from Ladakh. It is an NGOcalled Devachan. It has a residentschool that conducts meditationcourses. Its community is of about 400children, senior citizens, monks, nuns,visually impaired children and hasvisitors from all over the world. It alsohas Ladakhi cultural programmes.

This centre is a new variation inThervada Buddhist practice in Ladakhand has opened up the religion to thecommon man as an NGO of charity,inter-religious and inter-culturaldialogue. It has great potential tostrengthen the religious practices of thepeople of Ladakh. Like ashrams atPondicherry or Vipasana centres inIndia, it may better serve the rich andthe rapidly urbanizing Ladakh andIndia which may look towardsBuddhism for solace. However, it, likeothers has charity also included.

Interaction with Dr NawangTsering, Principal CentralInstitute of Buddhist Studies,Choglamsar

The Central Institute of Buddhist

Studies (CIBS), Choglamsar is now inits new sprawling campus. ThePrincipal Dr Nawang Tsering11 is aregular contributor to the journal Border

Affairs on issues of Bhoti language andthe trans Himalayan nature ofBuddhism. The institute is impressiveand is propagating Buddhist religion,art and culture in a good way. Theinstitute is under the Ministry ofCulture, Government of India. InJanuary 2009 an exhibition was held atthe National Museum at Delhi whichalso was held at Mumbai later. Overallthere may be about 1400 lamas inschools in Ladakh. At the CIBS, out of600 student population 50% are lamas.There is a post graduate course for twoyears and under graduate course forthree years. Languages taught areHindi, Sanskrit, and Bhot. There are fivevidyas viz., Vinaya Vidya, ApidharamVidya, Pramar Vidya, PrakshparimitVidya and Madhaymika Vidya. Thedifference of Nalanda School with thatof Pali Buddhism as practiced in Sri Lanka(Thervada) is that the last three Vidayasare not included in Thervada. First two arecommon.

The gist of points and his views thatemerged are:

(a) There is no impact on Ladakhisociety of politics related toKarmapa.

(b) Intermarriage between Tibetansand Ladakhis have not beensuccessful and has led to divorces.However, nomads like Changpas of

Changthang who live both inLadakh and Tibet have marriagerelations with nomads of Ladakh.

(c) It is unlikely that Tibetan refugees willbe a security threat. In life things taketheir own course.

(d) The selection of the Dalai lama isalso in a way a democratic process.As regards post- Dalai Lamascenario, there is lot of flexibility.We must remember Buddhism hassurvived since the ancient times ofKushans and will do so in thefuture.

(e) Tibetan language is Bhoti.

(f) The Dalai Lama is right when hesays Ladakh looked up to Tibet,Tibet looked up to India. It’s a fullcircle. One has to see therelationship in that context. Tibet,let there be no doubt, was therepository of all knowledge. Indialost it all. That knowledge went toTibet and got further improved.

(g) As regards the “craze” of thisreligion by foreigners, all I have tosay is this trend is not encouragedat CIBS. They have their own wavesof fads. A few years ago it was ZenBuddhism. Then was Pali and nowit is Tibetan Buddhism. This isshallow. Roots are important.

(h) Historically we need to understandthat it is the “Nalanda System ofReligion” that informs Buddhismin these parts. Though former

11 Since retired. This interaction is of 2008.

President Abdul Kalam is in thetop echelons of the management ofthe forthcoming university he hasno deep knowledge aboutBuddhism and its nuances. Theclimate, terrain and environmenthas to be conducive for Buddhism.People must be living andpractising it. In the plains theimpact and influence gets diluted.The best place for a centre of thisknowledge is Ladakh. Further, weneed to have practitioners to haveNalanda school fully operational.Though both faith and academicknowledge have their roles,absence of practitioners is a keyissue.

(i) The Principal gave a copy of theirlatest journal which had an articleon how they had received fromBaltistan a Tibetan primer whichtraces the old glorious traditions ofthe Tibetan language. The dialectused by the Baltis and Ladakhis iscloser to Tibetan classic texts ratherthan the dialect used by the Tibetansin Tibet. When a Ladakhi meets aBalti, they converse comfortably.When a Ladakhi meets a Tibetan, heneeds an interpreter. Culturalfluctuations (Islamisation of Baltistan)must not come in the way of learninga Tibetan script/language.

Future

It is with the tolerant and evolvedBuddhist practices that the people of

Ladakh are prospering. Unlike theunresolved land reform issues in mainlandplains of India, Buddhist practices ofpeople encourage them to willinglycontribute to monasteries. This isfundamental in understanding theinfluence of Buddhism. After partition,while getting rid of the zamindari system,the powers that be, also thought fit toimplement it in Ladakh. The peopleagitated. The Wazir Committee wasformed which underlined the role ofmonasteries and how people willinglycontribute their produce.12 Such lessonsshould not be forgotten and one-fits-allsolutions by policy makers may createmore problems. Now there is a need to besensitive to the changes being broughtabout by economic growth. Changesare bound to impact also the wayBuddhist practices relate to nature.

Economic prosperity has also led togreater awareness and moderneducation. The new set of Ladakhiintellectuals are now helping Ladakh todevelop and realize its potential. Onecan sense the emergence of a Ladakhiidentity which may no longer considerthe past Hindu Dogra rule or thedominance of Tibetan Buddhism ascentral.

PART II - SIKKIM

General Information on Gangtok(Sikkim)

Sikkim became the twenty second stateof India in 1975. The 2001 census placed

12 R.S. Mann, Ladakh Then and Now, New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 2002, p.294.

its population at 5.40 lakhs. It has nowbeen made one of the eight states ofNorth East India. It has a majority ofIndians of Nepalese descent (70% mostlyHindus) with Bhutia (mostly in northSikkim – Lachenpas and Lachungpas16%) and Lepchas (14% who are followersof the Nyingma tradition) making up thebalance.13

Though Sikkim may not be a Buddhistmajority state, its culture and ethos,more so in the border regions, is closelyintegrated with Mahayana Buddhism.

Namgyal Institute of Tibetology(NIT)

The importance of Buddhism inGangtok gets further fortified byinstitutes such as the Namgyal Instituteof Tibetolgy. The NIT is envisioned asa storehouse of collective wisdom of allsects of Mahayana Buddhism. It wasestablished during the reign of ChogyalTashi Namgyal. Its foundation stonewas laid by HH the Fourteenth DalaiLama in 1957. It brings out The Bulletin

of Tibetology bi-annually. Nearby are theDo-Drul Chorten, built in 1948, and theSikkim Institute of Higher NyigmaStudies (affiliated to SampurnanandSanskrit University, Varanasi), whereyoung men imbibe teaching of the

Nyingmapa tradition of Buddhism andacquire various degrees like Madhyamika,Shastri and Acharya.

The Golden Jubilee Conference of theNIT, Gangtok, Sikkim was held from1 to 5 October 2008 with the title BuddhistHimalayas: Studies in Religion, Historyand Culture. Undoubtedly, the NIT isemerging as an international nodalpoint on Tibetology and related studies.This will be in consonance with theNorth Eastern Vision Document14 whichsuggests that Sikkim can be developedas a hub linking other Buddhistdestinations in Nepal, Bhutan, TAR, andTawang to a pan-regional Buddhistcircuit.

Absence of Indian Experts

What is apparent is, more than Indianscholars, we found European/Westernscholars who had devoted their life tothe study of religion and culture of thisregion. An authority in Lepcha script isnot a Sikkimese or from any other partof India but the Danish Dr HeleenPlaisier of Leiden University, who leadsin this surge in Lepcha studies.15

Likewise New Zealander Prof TonyHuber, Professor of Tibetan Studies ofHumboldt University, Berlin is anauthority on the language group of

13 P.N. Chopra, Sikkim, New Delhi, S. Chand and Co. Ltd, 1972, Reprint 1985, p.45. According tolate Tashi Topden extant colonial data of gazetteer on Sikkim is inaccurate. See Tashi Topden,“History and the Loss of Sikkimese Culture” paper presented in the Golden Jubilee Conferenceof the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology in October 2008, Gangtok, Sikkim on Buddhist Himalayas:Studies in Religion, History and Culture (forthcoming).

14 North Eastern Region: Vision 2020, Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, May 2008,pp.131-132.

15 See “Contribution to Lepcha Studies”, Bulletin of Tibetolgy, Volume 43, No.1 and 2, 2007.

Kameng region.16 Alex McKay is an Indo-Tibetan Hisorian of repute.

It is clear that the human resource toundertake studies of the region is notavailable, barring a few. This has beenelaborated further at Appendix C on theupcoming Nalanda InternationalUniversity.

Division Within and AmongTraditions

Without a mention of Rumtek, thesurvey is incomplete. This monastery ofTibetans-in-exile near Gangtok was inthe media highlights when theteenaged Seventeenth Karmapa OgyunThrinley Dorje fled to India from Chinain 2000.17 He was endorsed as areincarnation (tulku) by the FourteenthDalai Lama after the death of thesixteenth Karmapa in Chicago in 1981and also by the PRC. Regents lookedafter the baby boy till he was grown up.Thus by 2000 or so the problem cameto public scrutiny. India gave formalpermission to him to be registered as aTibetan refugee. There is also a rival

16 Tony Huber in 2008 was getting ready with one year research permit to work in the Subansiregion of Arunachal Pradesh. On being asked by the audience as to why foreigners lead inregional studies by field work such as in the Himalayas, he wittily replied that Indian academicsare “Brahmanical” and do not relish to rub shoulders in the wild with tribals.

17 Anil Mahaeshwari, The Buddha Cries!: Karmapa Conundrum, New Delhi, UBS Publishers, SecondReprint, 2008.

18 The rival candidate is being supported by Shamar Rinpoche. This rivalry has a history. Whenthe Sixth Panchen Lama died in China of small pox there was a dispute over the treasure givenby the Qing emperor. Panchen Lama’s brother, Chumba refused to share it with his other brother,the Kagyu Lama called Shamar. Shamar was enraged and fled to Nepal, where he incited theGurkhas to invade Tibet. See Isabel Hilton, The Search for the Panchen Lama, London, PenguinBooks, 2000, p.60.

candidate. The rival camp within thesect had installed their ownSeventeenth Karmapa named ThrinleyThaye Dorje. When interacting with themonastery information office, it wasmentioned that there is even a thirdclaimant. The Dalai Lama’sendorsement, however, is generallyfinal.18

Rumtek monastery is the repository ofprecious gold, ashes of the famous andrespected sixteenth Karmapa with hisdistinctive black hat. As regards theKarmapa and his tradition, mostanalysts who wrote in the New Delhi-based media when the Karmapaescaped to India in 2000 considered thatthis controversy involves a security risk,as people of Sikkim will be affectedbecause they follow this sect. However,most Sikkmese are followers of theNyingma tradition. What securityimpact the Karmapa struggle will havethus may not be that serious for thelocals. Interaction with Principal of theCIBS at Ladakh also revealed that inLadakh there is no impact on the society

in Ladakh of politics related to theKarmapa.19

In the larger study of Buddhism in theIndian Himalayan belt, perhaps oneanswer which lays to rest concerns for theextant continuation and resilience ofBuddhism was provided by thePrincipal, CIBS when posed thisquestion. He answered that it needs tobe remembered that Buddhism hassurvived since ancient times of Kushanand will continue to do so.

PART III- SIANG REGION OF

ARUNACHAL PRADESH20

Peopling of the Region

Arunachal Pradesh is home to 26 majortribes scattered in 3,649 villages.Population of the state in 2001 censuswas about one million with populationof upper Siang over 33 thousand (theratio of scheduled tribe to generalcategory is 78% : 22%). Broadly, theentire population in the Siang region(consisting of three districts of East,West and Upper Siang) borderingBhutan could be divided in two groupsbased on their socio-political-religiousaffinities.

The first are the Adis who reside in themiddle belt. They worship and

19 According to media reports of 2008, the Indian government had not allowed the SeventeenthKarmapa Ogyun Thrinley Dorje to visit Tibetan-Buddhist dominated areas close to the borderof TAR due to the sensitive nature of the issue. However, in September 2008 he did visit Leh(Ladakh) and due to heavy snowfall was even rescued by military helicopters on the UpshiManali axis beyond Barlachla pass. He is presently in his temporary abode at his monastery atSidhbari near Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh. Recent events (2011) regarding the Karmapaare included in the epilogue.

20 Entry to the state by Indian nationals is governed by the Inner line Regulations. Other stateshaving the inner line regulation are Nagaland and Mizoram. Foreigners have to obtain restrictedarea permits.

recognize Donyi (Sun) and Polo (Moon)or Donyi-poloism. The second group isthat of the Buddhists like the Khambasand Membas who like other Buddhistcommunities of the Indian Himalayas livenear the border with Tibet. To maintaintheir Buddhist connections, children fromthese regions get educated in schools andinstitutes of Mahayana Buddhism all overIndia.

PART IV- WEST KAMENG AND

TAWANG DISTRICTS OF ARUNACHAL

PRADESH

In this region if the second half of thetwentieth century was a period ofmilitary build up and war with Chinain 1962, early twenty-first centuryhistory is centered around theconsolidation of Buddhism with anIndian touch. This is borne out by theinstitutions, and cultural and religiousinfrastructure.

Central Institute of HimalayanCulture Studies (CIHCS)

The CIHCS at Dahung was establishedin 2003 under the Ministry of Cultureand is affiliated to SampurnanandSanskrit University (SSU), Varanasi. Ithas about 130 students from all overIndia. It starts from class 9 onwards. It

is a landmark institute and has a brightfuture. What is important is that it hashighly motivated and dedicated Indianteachers hailing from all over theHimalayan belt including Tibetans as wellas teachers from the Indo-Gangetic plainsof the Hindi belt. Its dynamic principalShri Geshe Ngawang Tashi Bapu (LamaTashi), was born in Kameng District andhad his Buddhist education in Karnatakain the Tibetan establishment located atDrepung Loseling Monastery atMundgod, Karnataka (Photo-1). He is alsoformer Principal Chant Master of theDalai Lama’s Drepung LoselingMonastery in India-one of the largestTibetan Buddhist monasteries in the world,with over 3,000 monks. He has traveledextensively throughout the world,teaching, performing, and recordingwith monks from his Monastery. He wasnominated for a Grammy Award for hispath-breaking Tibetan chants in 2006(available in CD, Tibetan MasterChants, Lama Tashi, P&C Spirit Music,Inc, 2004).

The CIHCS is an appropriate institutionfor preserving the culture. With a highlevel of leadership and devotion, theexperiment has lots of potential. Rapidchanges in society need to be balancedwith both scientific and religiouseducation. Institutes such as these arethe future of the region. Unlike publicschools for the rich and the elite whereboys and girls are prepared to serve theurban world of service, industry,business and commerce—this Institute

will serve the poorer sections of theBuddhist Himalayas. In doing so, it willalso have to chart a difficult course whichnow lies before us due to urbanization,modernization and all sorts of raisedexpectations. How much of negatives itrejects and how much of positives ofprogress it absorbs is now the newchallenge.

Monasteries

Upper Bomdila monastery (Photo-2)was earlier in Tsona (now in Tibet) andhas an Indian citizen as its head. Thepresent head, HE the Thirteenth TsonaGontse Rinpoche, a former CongressMLA, who is leading the issue ofgranting the region ‘Monyul’, anautonomous status as in Ladakh. He hasfollowers spanning India and Tibet.Unlike the general impression that onlyTibetans are at the top of the hierarchy,Indian citizens from Kameng region arethe top clergy. Today gompas in UpperBomdila and Tawang are headed byIndians.

Civil – Military Relations inTawang Region

Tawang Maitreya Diwas is organised bythe Indian Army, District Administrationand YUVA (NGO) at Tawang on a regularannual basis (Photo-3). It is an importantannual event in fostering a good rapportand is much liked by the locals. It is alsovery useful for the military who canunderstand better the local culture andBuddhism. This event is followed byBuddha Mahotsav around November.21

21 The eighth Festival was held in early November 2008 which was attended by the Indian ExternalAffairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee. See http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_print.asp?id=631281 accessed on 13 November 2008.

Tawang War Memorial

This 1962 war memorial is impressive anda tourist attraction. The memorial is builtas a traditional chorten on Buddhist lines.It was personally anointed by HH theDalai Lama in 1998. This bonding of theIndian Military with the Dalai Lama hasa great significance for the people ofTawang, Buddhism and the military. Themilitary needs to be complimented inbeing sensitive to the culture. A number ofwar memorials have come up in the formerNEFA battle zone and are aestheticallybased on the Buddhist concept ofchorten.22

Part V - A New Seat of Learning atDehradun, in the State ofUttarakhand23

Songsten Library, Centre for Tibetan &Himalayan Studies, has been openedsince 2003 at Sehestradhara, Dehradun,in the State of Uttarkhand (Photo-4). Itis headed by Dr Tashi Samphel fromLadakh , Director of the Library .Theinstitute is recognized by GarhwalUniversity, Srinagar as a Research andResource Centre. It has courses inTibetan language, traditional medicinaltraining and will soon have Departmentof Buddhist Studies. The librarycollection has rare Tibetan andHimalayan manuscripts including

collections of publications on the DunHuang documents of Central Asianculture, history, literature, law,astrology and medicine. The library hasmulti-lingual Buddhist Kagyur andTengyur, the Bon Kagyur and manycommentaries of the four major sectsof Tibetan Buddhism. The institute isbound to grow and prosper. Themanagement hopes that it will alsoattract foreign scholars. Nearby isDrikung Kagyu Institute which underthe Ladakhi Abbot and PrincipalKhenpo K. Rangdal imparts rigourousmonk training to young boys (Photo-5).

Part VI - College for HigherTibetan Studies, Sarah,Dharamsala24

The Institute of Buddhist Dialects wasfounded in 1973. Besides Gelugpa it alsoincludes other traditions such asNyigma, Kagyud and Skaya Scools.With the initial aim to train Tibetanlanguage teachers, in 1991 the Collegefor Higher Tibetan Studiers (CHTS) wasestablished. It is now located about 7km away at a lower altitude thanDharamsala and beyond a tea estatenear the village of Sarah. Inauguratedin 1998, the college is a branch instituteof Buddhist Dialectics at Dharamsala.It was founded to promote the broadest

22 28 Infantry Division of the Indian Army has the Buddhist symbol of Vajra as its formation sign.23 The institute was visited by P.K. Gautam in December 2010.24 P.K. Gautam thanks Prof Garbiel Lafittle from Australia and Ms Jampa Chenzon of Environment

and Development Desk in suggesting a visit to Sarah in November 2010. The Tibetans haveestablished centres and institutes to preserve various aspects of their culture in Dharamsala.The Norbulingka Institute preserves and continues to teach ancient Tibetan art. Tibetan Instituteof Performing Art (TIPA) preserves song, dance, drama and such activities. The TibetanMedicinal & Astrological Institute of His Highness, the Dalai Lama (Men-Tse- Khnag) preservesTibetan medicine and has become a centre of international excellence.

intellectual culture in harmony withTibetan democratic institutions andimbued with the principles and influenceof Buddhist religion. The set up is theinitiative and labour of the exilecommunity. The Department of Educationof the Tibetan government formallyrecognized the college in 2001 with thedegrees and diplomas being recognized atpar with those granted by Indianuniversities. It has partnership with EmoryUniversity in Atlanta, USA besidesattracting students from MiamiUniversity, USA. A number of studentsare also enrolled from the IndianHimalayan belt. Unlike the Institute ofBuddhist Dialectics (IBD) the CHTSgives greater emphasis to secularsubjects such as language, grammar,literature, poetry, religion, politicalhistory through courses on Buddhism.To broaden the outlook, the instituteinvites guest speakers to talk oncontemporary subjects including thosefrom the local army establishment.25

Demand of Union Territory Statusto Ladakh, Mon AutonomousRegion and Gorkhaland

One positive result of the Buddhist beltin the Himalayas which is ofconsiderable importance to India both

in terms of economics and security isthat there has never been anyinsurgency in the region. All politicaldemands have been resolved bypeaceful means. However, what is ofconcern is the clash between theLadakh Buddhist Association andIslam which began in the 1980s. It isunfortunate that Ladakh, whichincludes Muslim Kargil, now appearsto be divided. Kargil district has aMuslim identity and Ladakh Buddhist.To preserve their identity the people ofLadakh in the late 1980s had agitatedfor Schedule Tribe Status andformation of Ladakh Autonomous HillDevelopment Council. Now somedemand a Union Territory status.26

Resolving this issue is difficult butessential.

Since 2004, there is a demand for thecreation of the Mon AutonomousCouncil for West Kameng and Tawang.This is led by Tsona Gontse Rinpoche.27

From a purely Buddhist point of viewit appears that the demand is to ensurea cultural and religious identity. Likein Ladakh, the perceived threat may beof the spread of other religions likeChristianity or even Islam orreassertion of Hinduism in some form.

25 Mr Passang Tsering, General Secretary of the college in arranged an interaction with students(as shown in photo 6) with P.K. Gautam on the topic of Buddhism in the Himalayan belt inNovember 2010.

26 Thupstan Chhewang, “Vindication of Leh Agitation for UT”, Border Affairs, July-September 2008,pp.23-25 and “2008 a Crucial Year for us in Ladakh”, Border Affairs, April-June 2008, pp.5-10,Sonam Wangchuk Shakspo, “Ladakh and New Delhi Made for Each Other”, Border Affairs, July-September 2008, pp.26-28 and Tsering Samphel, “Ladakh’s Stirring Saga of Valour andPatriotism”, Border Affairs, April-June 2008, pp.11-14.

27 The Hindu (New Delhi), October 20, 2008. In the Patkai region the demand for an autonomouscouncil is for Changlang and Tirap districts, probably due to the threat they perceive due tospread of Christianity with the political demands of Nagalim.

There is an ongoing agitation forGorkhaland in the Siliguri region ofDarjeeling district of West Bengal andneighbouring areas. The context ofthese demands are different and it willbe incorrect to compare them. Itappears that granting MonAutonomous Region Status will benefitboth the people and ensure the so-callednurturing of Buddhism in this belton the Sino-India border. SimilarlyLadakh’s case for a Union Territory isdriven by a desire to preserve religiousidentity and must be accommodated insome form.As regards Gorkhaland, ifit includes Sikkim, then even theexisting Buddhist identity of Sikkimmay get overwhelmed. This will havemany disadvantages as it is importantto retain the Buddhist identity ofSikkim.28

Buddhism and Ecology

Another important influence ofBuddhism is in ecological matters. Weknow how the fragile nature of theBuddhist Himalayan region has acomplex relationship with respect tonature. Buddhist values, lifestyles andexpectations also preserve ecology.Though the PRC claims it to be

harmonious, economic developmentwhich is being carried out in Tibet, it isnot in tune with the wisdom of thereligion. Tibetan nomads who are nowsidelined as far as their lifestyle ordevelopment is concerned are reportedto have been the first ones to noticechanges in the land and weather aroundthem.29 Scientific knowledge is nowchallenging the earlier (and wrong)assumption that traditional lifestylesas practiced by Tibetans as backward,irrational and unsustainable.30

Climatic warming will spell disasterand so much is dependent onsustainable land use and respect for theenvironment. Desertification of opengrassland and pastures, loss ofbiodiversity and over exploitation byway of resource extraction like water,deforestation, mineral extraction, etc.,are appearing to be the new challenges.The Tibetans have pleaded for aChinese Government rethink ondevelopment and environmentalpolicies, be it settling of nomads,fencing of grasslands, reforestation,infrastructure development, andurbanization.31 There is an urgent needfor environmental degradation to be

28 It needs to be appreciated that some scholars have opposite views. A.C. Sinha has argued for aNepalmul majority ‘Sukhim’ (united Darjeeling and Sikkim) for such reasons: 1) it will be freeof Bhutia heritage and will save New Delhi the embarrassment of creating a tiny state(Darjeeling) 2) it may appeal to emotions of West Bengal 3) it will have a viable state for NepamulIndians which will take care of language, culture and identity 4) it will be strategically locatedbetween Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet and Bangladesh with strong links to the north-eastern regionand 5) it will be ‘Indianised’, free from the legacy of the Namgyal Sikkim. See A.C. Sinha, Sikkim:Feudal and Democratic, New Delhi, Indus Publishing Company, 2008, p.311.

29 Michel Zhao and Orville Schell, “Tibet: Plateau in Peril”, World Policy Journal, Fall, pp.171-180.30 Katherine Morton, “Climate Change and Security at the Third Pole”, Contemporary International

Relations, Vol.21, No.3, May/June 2011, pp.34-55.31 Tibet 2003: State of the Environment, White Paper, Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala,

controlled in Tibet as it is the ‘watertower of Asia’ as all major riversemanate here. To this end, the studyindicates that there is an ecologicalaspect to the importance of Buddhismin the Himalayan region includingTibet. The carrying capacity of theHimalayan region is low and it is notpossible for it to support a greaterdensity of population. Bhutan being asmall country has some policies suchas gross national happiness. Sikkim hasa green and organic policy evident bybillboards and bumper stickers, butpopulation growth may make it difficultto implement. Seeing the interrelatednature of people and their environment,it is suggested that both from ecologicaland Buddhist perspectives, the inner-line status quo, restriction of populationand influx by special status continue tobe maintained in the Indian Himalayanbelt.

Summary on Buddhism in theRegion

Buddhist religion and culture is beingvigorously pursued by Indians alongthe Himalayan belt. What is importantto understand is that besides Tibethaving an area half that of Europe andone fifth that of China, its populationof six million (60 lakhs) dwarfs that ofthe Indian Buddhists in the Himalayaswhich varies from seven lakhs (census

figure) to 22 lakhs as assumed by oneauthor.32 Thus any discourse on Buddhismor Tibetan Buddhism of the Mahayanavariety can not ignore these vast regionsof Tibet and their people.

Lama Tashi, the Indian monk andPrincipal recalls that he owes all histraining in Buddhist practices to the‘Harvard’ of India at Mundgod, northKarnataka (Drepung LoselingMonastery) where most of the teacherswere Tibetans. What he implied was thata sprinkling of Tibetans monks andscholars had led to the enrichment ofthe culture and preservation of thisknowledge.

Relative Position of India andChina

There are two different narratives inChina and India. To preserve theculture and to let people developaccording to their genius India restrictsnon-tribal people from settling down inthe strategic Himalayan statesaccording to our constitution and laws.The concept of inner line is stillmaintained.33 On the other hand, theChinese carry out Hanisation of Tibet.One should not see this in purelymaterial, economic and infrastructuralterms. While India allows religiousfreedom, it is suspect in Tibet. As theMarch 2008 events (spontaneous

32 Dr Nawang Tsering, “Why Bhoti Should be in the Eighth Schedule”, Border Affairs, April-June2007, pp.16-20.

33 Some Tibetan youth are known to have admired the Sikkim model and feel that Tibetans couldflourish in a democratic pattern laid out by the Dalai Lama following the example of Sikkim,which is to some degree its own world, even if it is part of India. See Pico Iyer, The Open Road: TheGlobal Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, New Delhi, Penguin/Viking, 2008, p. 219.

demonstrations all across the TAR andalso neighbouring regions of Chinahaving Tibetan population) show,religion appears to be a very powerfulfactor in Tibet.

How about Buddhism in China?34

Box A is one theoretical snapshot of

34 For those interested in religion in China, it is revealing to know that Christians probablyoutnumber Communist Party members. According to D. Aikman’s The Beijing Factor, there couldbe 130 million Christians in China and Christians constitute between 20 and 30 per cent ofChinese population. See Niall Ferguson, Civilization: the West and The Rest, London, Allen Lane/Penguin, 2011, pp.277-288.

Buddhism in China. Appendix A isbased on fieldwork and interviews inChina in July 2009. Appendix B is anarticle by Wu Yungui of the ChineseAcademy of Social Sciences titled “TheHistory of the Institute of WorldReligions”.

BUDDHISM IN CHINA

INTRODUCTION

Amartaya Sen shows how Buddhism went first to China from India. Buddhismlater reached Tibet. The journey of Buddhism from India to China has beenparticularly notable in the case of Chan (dhyan) which transformed to Zen inJapan. In Tibet Buddhism survived and thrived. In 792 AD there was a greatdebate in which the Tibetans accepted the Indian version of Buddhism ratherthan that of China. What is important to know is that it declined simultaneouslyin China due to Neo-Confucianism and in India due to Hindu revival.

Daoist (or Taoist) opposition to Buddhism also had strong elements of Chineseintellectual nationalism and a sense of superiority of Chinese ways. For example,the early fourth century Daoist activist Wang Fu in his book claims that Lao-tzu,the semi-legendary founder of Daoism went on a civilizing mission to India andto influence Gautam Buddha.

It is the tradition of irreverence and defiance of authority which came withBuddhism from India that was singled out for a particularly strong chastisementin early anti-Buddhist criticism in China. Fu-yi, a powerful Confucian leader hadcomplained about Buddhism to the Tang emperor which parallels the contemporarydisorder generated by the present day Falungong.

New discoveries along the silk route in Dunhuang show the spread of Buddhism

from China through Central Asia till it got replaced with Islam. In the twentiethcentury, communism officially put an end to established religion. Yet in thecontemporary world, one book on Chinese Buddhism (Ling Haicheng, translatedby Jin Shaoqing, Buddhism in China, China International Press, nd.) claims thatout of the three types of Buddhism in the world (Han Buddhism, Pali Buddhismand Tibetan Buddhism), China is the main region of two (Han and Tibetan). It isparadoxical that an atheist country can take credit for owning two thirds ofBuddhism. Although there is communism as an ideology, the Chinesegovernment has again revived Buddhism as an instrument of its foreign policy,with Chinese Buddhist Association playing a crucial role.

THE NEW FAD

Like the Dalai Lama’s effort to create interest and fascination with himself, hiscause, and his religion around the world, something similar is happening inChina. A. Tom Grunfeld writes, “There is a similar phenomenon going on inChina, where the government’s attention to Tibet has resulted in a different sortof fad; an infatuation with things Tibetan, at times portraying Tibetans as ‘noblesavages’ with curious ways. Tibetan traditional medicine has become very popularwhile young Chinese are ‘dropping out’ by leading ‘hippy lives’ in Lhasa.”

Anant Krishnan of The Hindu observes that in new China’s cities millions ofyoung people are turning to Buddhism to make sense of their country’s rapidtransformation while in the far West, minority communities are searching forways to preserve their culture against the pressure of development. He reportsthat there are an estimated 100 million (300 million according to some estimates)followers of the Buddhist faith in officially atheist China.

INDIA AND CHINA

The modern development of Buddhism in China is already being assisted by theIndian Government as can be seen by the parliamentary debate on buildingIndian Buddhist temple in China. The Joint Declaration of 21 November 2006between Premier Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when theformer visited India is reproduced at Annexure I.

The President of India dedicated an Indian style Buddhist temple in Luoyang inMay 2010. India yoga gurus such as Sri Sri Ravishankar, founder of the Art ofLiving inaugurated his ashram near Beijing in October 2010. 93 year old SouthIndian yoga master B.K.S. Iyengar was honoured with a postage stamp when hevisited China for the first time for the ‘’2011 China-India Yoga summit” held inGuang Zhou. Eight postage stamps of the iconic guru and the Chinese translationof his fourth book ‘’ Trees of Yoga’’, were released.

In a broader framework India must be proactive via the ancient Nalanda trailand the new network which is emerging, including that of the Himalayan beltand South East Asian countries, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. It is unlikely thatBuddhism will encompass the whole of China, but its spread may lead to abetter understanding of democratic rights and Tibetan autonomy in future. Inany case the name Shangrila (imaginative name in the 1933 novel Lost Horizon byBritish author James Hilton) and Buddhist mythical concept of Shambala have alreadybeen innovatively used by China for tourism. In 2002, they have even renamedZhongdian County as Shangri-La (Xianggelila). The bulk of tourists are domesticHan Chinese.

It needs to be seen if the Japanese variation of Soka Gokai (which is now also popularin urban India) may also spread in China in the future. Falung Gong was suppressedas in Chinese history, secret sects and cults have been eyed suspiciously. But this nowcannot be said for Mahayana Buddhism and allowing India the opportunity topromote the religion in China.

India has nothing to lose in spreading monuments to China. Rather it will beuseful to track the historic routes of Buddhism and attempt to have Asoka typepillars in China and its neighbourhood through diplomacy.

REFERENCES

Chia, Jack Meng Tat, ‘Buddhism in Singapore – China Relations: Venerable HongChoon and His Visits, 1982-1990’, The China Quarterly, No.196, December 2008,pp.864-883.

Grunfeld, A. Tom, “Tibet and the United States, in Barry Sautman and JuneTeufel Dreyer (ed.), Contemporary Tibet, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2006.

Haicheng, Ling, translated by Jin Shaoqing, Buddhism in China, ChinaInternational Press, nd.

Krishna, Ananth, “In Search of an Identity”, The Hindu, August 29, 2010.

Lal, Dinesh, Indo-Tibet-China Conflict, Delhi, Kalpaaz Publications, 2008.

Pan., Philip P., China’s Hippies Find their Berkeley” Washington Post, September22, 2003.

Sen, Amartya, The Argumentative Indian, London, Allen Lane, 2005.

Topping, Andew Ronning, “China’s heritage on the old Silk Road”, World Policy

Journal, Vol. XXV, No.4, Winter 2008/09.

Kolås, Åshild, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition : A Place Called Shangrila,Oxon, Routeledge, 2008.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON BUILDING INDIAN BUDDHIST

TEMPLE IN CHINA AND JOINT DECLARATION OF 21

NOVEMBER 2006

Q. 2145 BUILDING INDIAN BUDDHIST TEMPLE IN CHINA

07/12/2005

LOK SABHA

UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 2145

TO BE ANSWERED ON 07.12.2005

2145. SHRI BRAJA KISHORE TRIPATHY:

Will the PRIME MINISTER be pleased to state:

(a) whether India has an opportunity to build the first Indian Buddhist templein China;

(b) if so, the details in this regard; and

(c) the extent to which Indian heritage is likely to be boosted in China as aresult thereof?

ANSWER THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNALAFFAIRS (SHRI E. AHAMED)

(a) Yes Sir.

(b) The decision to construct an Indian-style Buddhist Temple in Luoyang, Chinawas finalized with the conclusion of a Memorandum to this effect duringthe visit of the Chinese Premier, Mr. Wen Jiabao to India in April 2005. Underthis Memorandum, the Indian side would provide Rupees Five Crores to theChinese side for the construction of the Temple, in addition to providingthe Buddha idol and other accompanying material. The Indian side is alsoresponsible for the architectural design of the Temple project, its blueprint,material specifications and landscape planning, as also architectural andexpert supervision during the construction work. The Chinese side willprovide land and also undertake the construction work. The design and thearchitect for the project have been selected by an Advisory Committeeconstituted by the Prime Minister. The construction work to be undertakenby the Chinese side is expected to begin in 2006.

ANNEXURE-I BOX A

(c) It is expected that the Temple, once completed, will become an enduring symbolof the centuries-old cultural exchanges between India and China, of whichBuddhism is an important and integral part.

Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China of 21/11/2006.

IX. Revitalising Cultural Ties and Nurturing People-to-People Exchanges:

29. The centuries-old cultural contacts between the two peoples provide a strongfoundation for enduring friendship between India and China. The initiativesto rediscover these historical linkages and revitalise them in the present daycontext, including through an early completion of the Xuanzang Memorialin Nalanda and the Indian-style Buddhist Shrine in Luoyang, will furtherstrengthen these bonds. The two sides agree to strengthen cooperation inthe area of spiritual and civilizational heritage, discuss collaboration in thedigitisation of Buddhist manuscripts available in China as well as there-development of Nalanda as a major centre of learning with the establishmentof an international university on the basis of regional cooperation. In orderto promote greater awareness of each other’s culture, the two sides shallorganise a “Festival of India” in China and a “Festival of China” in India, witha joint logo. Detailed modalities in this regard will be decided by the concernedauthorities through mutual consultations.

The other narrative is about Indiawhich on the other hand allowsreligious freedom. India is preservingTibetan Buddhism which now is lodgedin India and is also the land of Buddha.When comparing the two narratives it isclear that this soft power factor withIndia is vital. Policy planners must besensitive to it. Buddhism, then with thislogic needs to be nurtured in the IndianHimalayan belt. It is no surprise thatthe Dalai Lama has mentioned Buddhismas a line of Defence by India. Whathe meant was surely that defence isnot only a function of weapons and

military power. Much like thecontemporary discourse on broadening ofsecurity agenda to include non traditionalthreats, culture and religion, but alsoprovide a soft power which militaryweapons of coercion cannot match, andwhich are available at a far lesser cost thanmilitary forces.

As regards ethnicity, it can be said thatIndians should not sound apologetic forIndian citizens being ethnic Tibetans.India in any case is a mixture of manyraces, religions and people. A study ofliterature at Box B shows that there arevery varied accounts of ethnicity.

ETHNICITY AND LITERATURE SURVEY OF THE

INDIAN HIMALAYAN BELT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP

WITH TIBET

There are a number of anthropological, social, cultural and political accounts on thecomplex nature of the ethnicity of the people in the Himalayan belt under study.

When the Dalai Lama fled to India, Jawaharlal Nehru the Indian Prime Minister statedin the Lok Sabha that, “We have large number of people of Tibetan stock living inIndia as Indian nationals. We also have some Tibetans émigrés in India” (Bureau ofParliamentary Research).

The various Tibetan type Buddhist people on the southern side of the Himalayanwatershed in India and Nepal are broadly described as Monpas in Tibetan,meaning ‘ravine dwellers’ (Das, Gautam). The ‘Gyagar Khampas’ or Kinnauris,Spitis or Ladakhis are Indian citizens with Tibetan ethnicity or religio-culturalaffiliations with Tibetans (Falcone and Tsering).

According to Kharat, a population of Tibetan race inhabits Nepal, especially theTamang region, Bhutan, Sikkim and along the westward Himalayas and is alsofound in varying numbers in the hill districts of Garhwal, Kullu, Spiti, Lahaul,Ladakh, Kashmir and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh). This shows there were manyTibetans who had settled in India much before the post-1959 events, livingpeacefully, while maintaining cordial relations with the local inhabitants of India.In the Tawang region many Tibetans settled almost a century ago and hold Indiancitizenship (Kharat).

LINGUISTIC GROUPS

According to Nawang Tsering (Tsering), Bhoti is the name of a language as wellas the name of a class or tribe who speaks this language. It is the lingua-francaof the people of Mongolia, Bhutan, Tibet, Pakistan Occupied areas of Skardu,Nepal, and the Indian Himalayan region from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh.Bhoti language is also known as Tibetan language because central Tibet hasbeen the nucleus of Bhoti culture and language for centuries.

Regarding the linguistic groups, according to the Central Institute of IndianLanguages, both Tibetan and Bhutia languages are of Tibeto-Burmese originlike Manipuri, Boro, Tripuri and others (CIIL).

Recent scholarship (Huber) shows that the entire region of Siang to Kameng inArunachal Pradesh can be divided into four linguistic groups: Kho Bwa, West Tani,East Tani and Mishmi. In the region of Subansiri and Siang, community structure isvery complex. The Membas area has a heterogeneous population. They are also mixedwith Khambas in the area of Gelling.

LADAKH

According to Dewan (Dewan), in Ladakh initially Aryan Dards followed Bon Chos.Later, some converted to Buddhism. Dards were squeezed in from the east byMongolian people from Tibet. In an alternative theory, Tibetan nomads were the firstto arrive, followed by the Mon people of north India and eventually by the Dards.There are two distinct groups of Ladakhi population (Mann). Firstly are the the Ladakhior Bhoto, Boto, Bhaota, Bodh, Bodpa, and secondly are the Mons and Dards. Accordingto Fernanda (2007), Ladakh is regarded as part of ‘ethnographic Tibet’. Mullik (1971)mentions that the whole of Ladakh, except the western end near Kargil, is ethnicallysimilar to Tibetans.

HIMACHAL PRADESH

The Anthropological Survey of India (ASI) on Himachal mentions that the Bodh, Bhotor Chanzang are primarily distributed in the Lahul and Spiti valleys. Though thehistory of the Bodh is not available, according to local accounts, those people of Tibetwho came and settled here in the past i.e. prior to 1962 are called Bodh or Bhot, whereasthose who came after 1962 are known as Tibetans (ASI, a).

SIKKIM

In the case of Sikkim, the Anthropological Survey of India mentioned that Lepchas,the original inhabitants call themselves Rongkup or Muntachi Rongkup. Later in thebook it is mentioned that Lepchas are known as ‘Monpa’ by Tibetans and are a Kiratetribe, while Bhutias call them ‘Meris’ (ASI,b).

Sinha alludes to Bhutia immigrants representing Tibeto-Burman stock, Tibetanculture, language and a combination of pastoral and semi-settled grazers. TheLepchas (in Nepali ‘lap’ is vile, and ‘che’ is speakers) call themselves Rong and areknown to Tibetans as ‘Mon-ba’ or ‘Mon-rik’, referring to the people of Moncountry—a general Tibetan name for the lower Himalayas, from Kashmir toAssam and Burma (Sinha).

The Sikkim Development Report by the Planning Commission in tracing the historymentions that no historic records exist to show how Lepchas came to the region.Lepchas themselves have no history of migration. They consider themselves the

original inhabitants of Sikkim and their myths say they originated from theslopes of Mt Kangchendzonga. No one has so far succeeded in imposing amigrating history on the Lepchas. 35. These- the oldest inhabitants, are believedto have migrated via Assam and upper Burma. They have their own languageknown as Rong. In 1642, Bhutia rule was established in Sikkim. Land monopolyshifted from Lepchas to Bhutias. Bhutias also promoted inter-marriages withLepchas and converted the spirit worshipers to Lamaist Buddhism. The nameBhutia is derived from their original habitat ‘Bhot’ (Tibet). Limbus and Tamangsare the two new schedule tribes now recognized. Tamangs are Buddhists butgenerally Limbus are not. They have their own religion, or are Hindus. Someoriginal Sikkimese Limbus, historically known as Tsong, were Buddhists, buttoday they are a very tiny minority in west Sikkim near Pemayangtse and nowprefer to be associated with the wider Limbu population that immigrated fromNepal and call themselves Limbus. More recently, some non-Buddhist Limbusdid portray themselves as Buddhist in order to be granted the tribal status butit is not the majority.36

According to late Topden, a lot of research needs to be done at the grass rootlevel. His critical appraisal of available accounts of Sikkimese history, especiallyin English language, showed how writings by British colonial civil servants,adventurers and soldiers were based on their own biased observations,translations from grossly inaccurate Tibetan texts and incorrect interpretationsprovided by local guides. The British’s exposure to Himalayan Buddhism wasalso limited. Ignorance of social systems, customs and religious beliefs of thelocal people resulted in ‘Tibetanised’ versions of Sikkimese history, given theBritish’s primary fascination with Tibet during that particular period. Earlyaccounts also suffered from a total ignorance of Sikkimese language such asLepcha. The absence of academic interest by local scholars has also resulted in avery superficial account of Sikkim. Scholarship needs to be encouraged in thisdirection (Topden).

ARUNACHAL PRADESH

According to the Techno-Economic Survey of NEFA by the National Council ofApplied Economic Research (1967), the local population consists of 82 Indo-Mongoloid tribes and sub-tribes. In Western Kameng it shows that the region is

35 We are thankful to Anna Balikci-Denjongpa, editor Bulletin of Tibetolgy in bringing this to ournotice.

36 Ibid.

home of Monpas and Sherdukpens. Both tribes are Buddhist and are stronglyinfluenced by Tibetan and Bhutanese culture, tradition and customs. In Siang,along the international frontier, the two Buddhist tribes are Membas andKhambas which resemble the Monpas of Kameng district.

What is of particular interest now is what B.N. Mullik (1971) has mentioned atpage 94 on Siang District:

“This big bend of the Tsangpo contained within it Pemako and Chimdru areas,the inhabitants of which were not Tibetans and who had more access to Indiathan to Tibet. Even as late as 1959 petitions were filed by the people of Pemakaoand Chimdru to the Government of India to take then under Indianadministration.”

According to Chowdhury (1983), ethnically the Monpas of Kameng might haveaffinity with the Bhutanese to the west and Tibetans across the northern borders.

In current government documents most of the people in Arunachal Pradesh areeither Tibetan or of Thai and Burmese origin (North Eastern Region, Vision 2020).According to Keki N. Daruwala, the tribes in Arunachal Pradesh have migratedover centuries from the Mekong and Tibet. The Adis claim Tibetan descent(Daruwalla).

Some just prefer to mention that Monpas and Sherdukpens of Tawang and WestKameng have close social and religious ties with the Tibetans (Das, Pushpita). Inthe case of Tawang and Kameng, to counter the Chinese claim, Indian scholars(Dutta) have gone on to argue that Monpas are not Tibetans and China can notclaim the area on the basis of ethnicity or religion. These arguments of denial ofethnicity are not convincing. Probably they are based on one of the initial officialpublications (Bureau of Parliamentary Research, page 38), which also empahsisedthis point. It was mentioned that the Monba, Aka, Dafla, Mir, Abor, Mishmi hadno kinship ties with Tibetans. Rather the Tibetans refer to them as ‘Lopas’–‘southern barbarians beyond the pale’.

CONCLUSION

This survey establishes the incompletely researched, complex, multi-cultural,linguistic and ethnic composition of India in the frontier zone of the IndianHimalayas. The crux is that at no time should Indians be apologetic for havingTibetan stocks in their population. Rather, it is time we shed mongoloid prejudicesall together. Priority is for an Indian identity followed by regional identities.However, more multi-disciplinary scholarship is needed to have the correct ‘data’on our own people.

REFERENCES

(ASI) Anthropological Survey of India

(a) People of India, Himachal Pradesh, Vol. 34, General Editor

K.S. Singh, Manohar Publishers, 1996

(b) People of India: Sikkim, Vol. 33 General Editor K.S. Singh

Bureau of Parliamentary Research, Congress Party in Parliament, India – China Border

Problem, New Delhi, 1960

Central Institute of India Languages, http://www.ciil.org/Main/languages/Index.htm.accessed on 30 October 2008

Chowdhury, J.N, Arunachal Pradesh: from Frontier Tracts to Union Territory, New Delhi,Cosmo Publications, 1983

Daruwalla, Keki.N, photograph Ashok Dilwali, Riding the Himalayas, New Delhi, NyogiBooks, 2006

Das, Gautam, Unlearned Lessons: An Appraisal of India’s Military Mishap, New Delhi,Har Anand Publishers, 2007

Das, Pushpita, “Management of India-China Border Area: A Case Study of ArunachalPradesh”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol.3, No. 3, July – September 2008

Dewan, Parvez, Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, New Delhi

Manas Publishers, 2004

Dutta, Sujit, “Revisiting China’s Territorial Claim on Arunachal”, Strategic Analysis,Vol. 32., Issue 4, July 2008

Falcone Jessica and Wangchuk Tsering, “We’re Not Home”: Tibetan Refugees inIndia in the Twenty-First Century”, India Review, vol.7, no.3, July – September,2008

Fernanda, Piere, Peace and Conflict in Ladakh: the Construction of a Fragile Web of

Order, Brill. Leiden, 2007

Huber, Toni, “Pushing Southward: Tibetan Political and Economic Interests inthe Far Eastern Himalayas, ca.1900-1950s”, paper presented in the Golden JubileeConference of the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, Sikkim in October2008 on Buddhist Himalayas: Studies in Religion, History and Culture (forthcoming)

Kharat, Rajesh. S, Tibetan Refugees in India, New Delhi, Kaveri Books, 2003

Mann R.S., Ladakh Then and Now, New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 2002

Mehra, Parshotam, Essays in Frontier History: India, China, and the Disputed Border,New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2007

Mullik, B.N., My Years With Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, New Delhi,

Allied Publishers, 1971

North Eastern Region: Vision 2020, Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region,May 2008

Sikkim Development Report, Government of India, Planning Commission, 2008

Sinha, A.C, Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic, New Delhi, Indus Publishing Company,2008.

Tobden, Tashi, IAS, Advisor, Government of Sikkim, “Reflections on History and theloss of Sikkimese Culture”, paper presented in the Golden Jubilee Conference of theNamgyal Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, Sikkim in October 2008 on Buddhist

Himalayas: Studies in Religion, History and Culture (forthcoming)

Techno-Economic Survey of NEFA, National Council of Applied Economic Research,New Delhi, 1967

Tsering, Nawang, “Why Bhoti Should be in Eight Schedule, Border Affairs, April-June2007

To consolidate this invaluable softpower, what needs to be done is to makefurther attempts to integrate theBuddhist Himalayan belt with nationaland international centres of learningand preserve and promote the Buddhistcultural heritage of India. As theevidence shows, Indian Buddhistinstitutions have a symbioticrelationship with those in Tibet.Buddhism is a common factor. Withthis logic, religious and cultural rootsare integrated into the IndianHimalayan region through Buddhism.Thus even the exiled Tibetan Buddhists,the Buddhists in TAR and other regionsof China, the Tibetan BuddhistDiaspora and Buddhists of the IndiaHimalayan belt have much more in

common with each other than HanChinese with Tibetans. It is no surprisethat after 50 years, Tibetans are neverunwelcome in India. This as we show isdue to the linkages of Buddhism.

In summary Indian diplomats,academics, military officers, scholarsand citizens must be educated on thecomplexities of these issues. Moreresearch and publicity concerning theBuddhist regions of the IndianHimalayas is needed at an internationallevel by the Indians. The UpcomingNalanda University has an importantrole to play (See Appendix C). SimilarlyLumbini must be saved fromgeopolitical rivalry on materialisticfoundation (Appendix D).

Unfortunately, in spite of a very highorder of academic institutes nowfunctioning in India no TibetanBuddhist in exile has been co-opted inthe project for Nalanda, thoughBuddhism in the Himalayan belt andTibet is rooted in the ancient Nalandaschool. Main reason is that the Chinesehave also funded it and it may lead toembarrassment. As pointed out byVijay Kranti,

Despite the fact that Dalai Lama andhis fellow Tibetan scholars who haveestablished and run at least threedeemed universities in India in subjectsdirectly related to the Nalanda tradition,have been completely ignored, it isinteresting to know that the committeeis headed by Prof Amartya Sen, whothough an acknowledged leftisteconomist and winner of Nobel Prizein economics, is not known for any

37 Vijay Kranti, “Karmapa Controversy: Implications for India”, Border Affairs, April- June 2011,pp.21-27.

serious association with Buddhism andinstead well known for his pro-Chinaintellectual leaning.37

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to show theinfluence and importance of Buddhism inthe Himalayan belt and beyond. Theoverlapping nature of Tibet andBuddhism as practiced in Tibet has alsobeen shown to have entwined linkageswith India. The twenty-first centuryshould not be like the twentieth withmilitary conflicts with hard power tools.Rather, importance of soft power suchas culture and religion can now besupplemented to enhance both nationaland human security of the people. TheIndian state and citizens need to bemade aware of these characteristics tonurture Buddhism in the Himalayanbelt and beyond in Tibet.

Many authoritative scholars and expertsin China today are of the view that themain reason for the decline ofBuddhism in China was thephilosophical clash betweenCommunism and Buddhism. Leaderslike Mao Zedong were particularlyhostile to religion. It is argued thatBuddhism in the PRC has always beenunder state control, and Buddhistinstitutions submitted to Communistauthority. In the early years of the Maoregime, some monasteries and templeswere converted to secular use. Manyalso became state-operatedorganizations and the priests andmonks became employees of the state.38

Prof. Wang Dehua of the ShanghaiAcademy of Social Science opines thatin 1953, most of Chinese Buddhism wasorganized into the BuddhistAssociation of China (BAC) to ensurethat Buddhism would support theCommunist agenda. One result wasthat when China brutally suppressedTibetan Buddhism in 1959, the BACapproved of the development. Buddhisttemples and art were incalculably

Appendix A

BUDDHISM IN CHINA TODAY

38 Barbara O’ Brien, “Buddhism in China and Tibet Today”, About.com (Buddhism), at http://buddhism.about.com/od/vajrayanabuddhism/a/Chinareport.htm (accessed on September 1,2010).

damaged during the CulturalRevolution in 1966 by Mao’s RedGuards.

Contemporary governments have,however, made some conciliatorygestures to Buddhism. Wang Xueshi, aParty official in charge of the BAC insouthern China, views that China isrevitalising its approach towardsBuddhism and noted that in April 2006China hosted the World BuddhistForum, in which Buddhist scholars andmonks from many countries discussedthe relevance of Buddhism in thecontemporary world.

The fact remains, however, that allmonasteries are controlled by thegovernment and the monks are, ineffect, government employees. Thegovernment views monasteries andBuddhist historical monuments aslucrative tourist magnets. It may benoted, for instance, that in 2006 theBAC expelled a master of HuachengTemple in Yichuan City, Jianxi province,after he performed commemorativeceremonies for the victims of the

Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.After the riots of March 2008, thegovernment allowed hardly any newsfrom Tibet to trickle out. Currently, afew foreign journalists are allowed inthe region, after ensuring from theirprofessional record that they are notlikely to make trouble for thegovernment.

While granting that China has investeda great deal of money in Tibet tomodernize it, and that the Tibetanpeople overall enjoy a higher standardof living because of it, the obversereality is that Tibetan Buddhism ispervasively oppressed by thegovernment. Tibetans riskimprisonment merely for possessing aphotograph of the Dalai Lama. The

government insists on choosing thereincarnated tulkus. A great manyreports say that younger Tibetans,including monks, are much less likelyto compromise with the government,unlike the Dalai Lama. The crisis inTibet is simmering, for all that it maynot always appear on the front pages ofnewspapers, and is much likely to getworse.

Buddhism is a vital force in some partsof China, especially in villages. Thecountry has an estimated 100 millionfollowers of Buddhism and there areover 20,000 Buddhist temples.39 Table 1presents skeletal figures of adherentsof Buddhism among the ethnicminority groups.

39 Information gathered from a Chinese scholar through discussion. Names are not disclosed underrequest.

Zhang Xueying, a well-known mediapersonality, is of the view, “..during its2000 years in China, Buddhism has

absorbed Chinese culture andinfluenced the Chinese way of life.Today this foreign-born religion is a

Minority Group Number Province Remark

Mulam 207,352 Guangxi Also has adherents of Taoism

Jingpo 132,143 Yunnan

Maonan 107,166 Guangxi Also has adherents of polytheism

Blang 92,000 Yunnan

Achang 33,936 Yunnan

Jing or Gin 22,517 Guangxi Also has adherents of Taoism

De’ang or Derung 17,935 Yunnan

Table 1. Ethnic Minority Groups that Practise Buddhism in China

(Table based on information given by a Chinese Scholar at Jinan University, Guangzhou, China)

constituent of traditional Chineseculture as well as a lifestyle.”40

Explaining the rationale behind theintegration of Buddhism with Chineseculture, Lou Yulie, an expert onreligious studies at Peking Universitysays that Confucianism preachesperson-oriented ethics and focuses onthe temporal world. In contrast,Buddhism values otherworldliness andbelieves in karma. The Confucianscriticized Buddhist doctrines andpractices such as tonsure, celibacy andalmsgiving. The Taoists, who believe inimmortality, also fiercely denouncedthe Buddhist concept that “everybodyis doomed to die”. Buddhism wasbanned in China on four separateoccasions in history. Lou Yulieconsiders these episodes symptomaticof a conflict between Indian andChinese cultures. Hence, Lou Yulie says,

Gradually Chinese Buddhismabandoned concepts and regulationsthat did not fit Chinese society, andintroduced new doctrines.... Huineng(638-713), the Sixth Patriarch of ChanBuddhism, prompted thedevelopment of Chinese Buddhism byintroducing Confucianist conceptsinto the religion.41

Huineng believed that everybody has aBuddha nature and can become aBuddha. He insisted that Buddhists

could attain Buddhahood withoutreciting the sutras and observing otherceremonial rituals, as long as they couldkeep Buddha in their heart.42 Hispropositions were well received bypoliticians, scholar-bureaucrats andcommon people. Huineng reconciledBuddhist doctrines with Confucianethics, such as filial piety. Havingpassed through these cultural barriers,Buddhism finally became popular andspread quickly in China.43

Fang Litian, director of the Institute forthe Study of Buddhism and ReligiousTheory, Renmin University, says:

Chinese intellectuals are split betweenConfucian secularism and thetranscendental naturalism ofZhuangzi. When encounteringfrustrations in reality, they tend torenounce the temporal world for a lifeof seclusion, though it may be mentalrather than physical. Buddhismaccommodates the spiritual needs ofpeople, raising their mental realm toa higher level without isolating themphysically from the real world. Thisis an art of life that the wisdom ofBuddhism has bestowed onintellectuals.44

Therefore, Buddhism was popularamong scholar-officials in dynastictimes. Because Buddhism helps people

40 Zhang Xueying, “Buddhism in China”, China Today, June 19, 2009, at http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/se/txt/2009-06/19/content_203310.htm

41 Zhang Xueying, “Buddhism in China”, China Today, June 19, 2009, at http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/se/txt/2009-06/19/content_203310.htm

42 Ibid.43 Ibid.44 Ibid.

Appendices

maintain psychological balance in the faceof setbacks, it is a necessary supplementto secularism. Over two thousand yearsBuddhism has also revitalized Confucianculture. According to Buddhism, deathmeans entering Sukhavati (the PureLand), providing an instructivesupplement to Confucian culture, whichvalues life and fears death. Many scholarsbelieve that the Confucian school ofpragmatic philosophy during the Songand Ming dynasties was a response to theinfluence of Chan (Zen) Buddhism.

Buddhism is also preserved in manymasterpieces of literature and art inChina. The four-toned pronunciation ofmodern standard Chinese was formedfrom the prevalent Indian style of sutrachanting.45 Yu Hai worships on bendedknees in every hall of the GuanghuaTemple, since he believes that nomatter which Buddha or Bodhisattvayou worship “what you experience is

spiritual catharsis and guidance inlife.”46

To promote Tibet study, it has been adeliberate strategy to organise and hostacademic conferences on Tibet studyannually. Many lectures are also givenon special topics, symposiums andclasses for advanced studies inacademic institutions. Exchange of visitingscholars is also undertaken betweenacademic institutions in several cities.Foreign scholars on Buddhism arefrequently invited to China now to speakover the subject. As one of the prime studycentre, the Centre for Tibetan Study ofChina has received hundreds of scholarsfrom other countries to participate insymposium and joint-research projectsand to conduct research. Another mostimportant thing that is noticed today isthat the works and research studies of theforeign scholars have been translated intoChinese.

45 Ibid.46 Ibid.

Note: Information’s and Data’s for Appendix A are compiled form various sources like: BarbaraO’ Brien, Buddhism in China and Tibet Today, (Buddhism.about.com); Zhang Xueying,Buddhism in China, (Chinatoday.com); and data collected form various open sources andfom scholarly meeting and interactions.

Appendix B

THE HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD RELIGIONS

CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

BY WU YUNGUI

In my private talks with foreignscholars and friends when I was abroadin the past years, they often put up suchquestions to me as “Why should theChinese Communists have devoted somuch attention to the study of religion,given that they do not believe in anyreligion at all?” and “Did the Chinesescholars study religion merely for thesake of eliminating it?” For clearing upthese misunderstandings, I have givenbrief explanations on several occasionsduring my stay in foreign countries, buthave never yet found an opportunity togive a detailed answer for suchmisconceptions. So, I hope to take thisopportunity to give a systematicaccount of the founding and developingof the Institute of World Religions(IWR) wherein I have worked for 35years since 1964 when I graduated froma college, which might be useful I hope,for a correct understanding of the basicfacts related with it. Needless to say,what is more significant for our purposehere is to enhance, through face-to-facetalks like this, mutual understanding,deepen friendship and broadenacademic exchanges and co-operationsbetween scholars of our two countries.I will talk about three issues as follows:

THE BACKGROUND FOR THE

FOUNDING OF IWR

China is an ancient civilized nation withmulti-nationalities and multi-religiousbeliefs. Apart from Taoism and folkreligions that were born at differenttimes in the native land, there are alsoBuddhism, Christianity and Islam thatwere introduced from overseas inhistory into China. In the course of theirtaking roots, opening out blossoms andbearing fruit in the land, all thesereligions have left their clear andenduring prints on the Chinese society,particularly on the knowledge andpractice of the Chinese people. In theirlong historical development, all thesereligions - native born or imported fromabroad, have experienced a problem ofadapting themselves to China’s socialenvironment, and as a result of in-culturation or sinicization process,these different cultural elements havebecome mutually complimentary andflourished, and thus formulatedtraditional Chinese culture with a goodharmony of different elements as whatwe understand it today. In this sensewe can say, therefore, understandingChinese religions is understanding

Chinese culture, and studies of Chinesereligions are the first step to a profoundunderstanding of Chinese society.However, such ideas were not very clearat first. A decisive factor to deepeningour understanding is an instructiongiven in 1963 by the late Chairman MaoZedong. He said in the writteninstruction that religions have had aprofound impact and influence on theworld’s population, of which we havelittle knowledge. He argued that youcan not write out a good history ofphilosophy, literature or world historywithout understanding the story ofhuman religion. His instruction cameat a crucial time that it virtually led tothe birth of the Institute of WorldReligions, the first of its kind that everappeared in the Chinese academicworld. Since then China has had aprofessional research body for religiousstudies backed by the state. At its earlydays IWR had only three researchdepartments with some 20 personnel.It was affiliated then to the Philosophyand Social Sciences Division of theChinese Academy of Science (theformer body of today’s ChineseAcademy of Social Sciences). Its work,however, was soon interrupted by theCultural Revolution just after it beganto operate. With the ending of theCultural Revolution, China was usheredinto a new period of reform andopening, in the outside world. With thefundamental changes taking place inevery aspect of social life, man’s attitudeon religions has experienced a bigchange, which in turn laid down a goodfoundation for religious studies on thepart of Chinese scholars. Today as werecollect the history of IWR, we arehappy to find that we have now over 80

working staff, and we are moredelighted to see that we trulyunderstand today the nature of religionand the significance of religiousstudies. A general point of view sharedin common among my colleagues in theInstitute today is that we shouldconduct research on human religion ina correct way, that is comprehensive,historical as well as dialectical in nature.We should not only pay attention to thestudy of human religious ideas as wedid in the past but also to the study ofthose ideas that embodied themselvesin the forms of human religious culture.And to do so, the first step for us is tomake friends with religious believers,Chinese and foreign alike. Our generalattitude towards religious people can betermed as “respect each other, learnfrom each other, and co-operate onequal basis.” Compared to the earlydays of IWR, we can say that ourunderstanding of its policy today is abreak-through in the sense that wereally understand what religion meansto us as human beings. If we must putin simple words our understanding ofthe scope and meaning of religiousstudies today, it should be like this: Weare trying to make a deep andsystematic study of human religiousphenomena from the dimensions oftheory, history and reality. And religiousstudies can be conveniently termed“human science” because such studiesare aimed at understanding of thehuman nature which exists deep insidethe depth of human heart.

THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

As a research institution at the state

level, IWR shoulders heavy tasks inscientific research, whose working staffshas a strong sense of mission. For thesake of discipline development andpersonnel-training, we are trying tocombine producing academic workswith talents-training, combine personalinterest with the needs and demandsin scientific research, and combine thecollective interest of the Institute withthe interest of the state. For themanagement of scientific research,multi-level projects are organized andmanaged by the Academy through itsScientific Research Bureau. Projects atthe Institute level are organized andcoordinated by the director-generalthrough its Department for ScientificResearch Affairs. Projects at theInstitute level are organized andcoordinated by the chairman of thedepartment. Another classification ofthe projects followed for years is toclassify projects according to theirsource of funds. Thus, we have six typesof projects: state-funded projects,academy-funded projects, academy-supported younger scholar projects,institute-funded projects, department-level projects and personal projects.Apart from these, we accept each year,special tasks commissioned ordistributed by the departments of theState Council concerned, which were inmost cases investigation reports oncertain hot religious issues. Theprincipal purpose of scientificmanagement is to guarantee the qualityof the projects undertaken by theworking staff of the Institute. For this,procedures such as project-sponsoring,middle-term check up, finalexamination and approval of the

projects, assessment of the final resultand publication of the works completedare normal practice for the scientificmanagement department. Anotherimportant aspect in scientific researchmanagement is to help personnel-training. To recruit and train upresearch workers, IWR has adoptedtwo measures. One is to recruit workingstaff from college graduates,particularly from those having masterand doctor degrees, and help themgrow up after they enter the Institute,through such methods as sending themabroad for postgraduate studies ordoing research for a period of time,training them by distributing work tothem, and examining and raising theirworking abilities through professionalcheck and promotion of academic titles.This has yielded good results. Mostbackbones in the Institute areuniversity graduates in 1960s. Forexample, Professor Yang Zengwen whohas been to Japan many times foracademic visits is one of them. As forthose young and middle-agedbackbones, most of them are collegegraduates with MA or Ph.D. degreeswho have worked as guest scholars fora period in foreign universities.Graduates with doctorates working inthe Institute (17 in number) haveplayed an important role in their posts.For example, Dr. He Jingsong who cameto Japan this time as a member of ourdelegation is one of those doctorstrained by the Institute. As a youngassociate professor in Buddhist studies,Dr. He is diligent in work and haspublished three books, including A

History of Buddhism in Korea, the firstbook of its kind ever published in

Appendices

China. Another way for talents-trainingis to find “good buds” in the course ofdiscipline- development and to helpthem grow by assigning tasks for themto accomplish. This is basically a dutyof the chairmen of the departments andwe are grateful to them for their role inthis connection. To promotedisciplinary building, IWR hasestablished seven sub-departments,each of them constituting a sub-branchof learning. Thus we have departmentsrespectively for Buddhist Studies,Christian Studies, Islamic Studies,Taoist Studies, Confucian Studies,Contemporary Religious Studies,Studies on the General Theory ofReligion and Studies on BuddhistCulture and Art. For publication ofpapers, articles and reports written byour colleagues in the Institute, we havetwo journals (Studies on World Religions

and World Religious Cultures), bothpublished quarterly. An old Chinesesaying “an excellent master has gooddisciples” summarises it aptly. Mostchairmen of the departments areexperts with rich and profoundlearning. They have trained, throughtheir work, a good many young andmiddle aged scholars for the Institute.Naturally, not all of those who havereceived training will surely becomefirst-rate talents.

MAJOR ACADEMIC WORKS

PRODUCED BY IWR

Religious studies can be dated back toancient times in China. However,modern religious studies with newoutlooks and approaches have been lesspopular until the first 30 years after the

founding of the People’s Republic ofChina. For a long time in history,Chinese scholars were interested inreligious studies in Buddhism andTaoism, but they left only a smallnumber of works on them. Thisbackwardness in religious studies haschanged a great deal nowadays throughprotracted efforts on the part ofChinese scholars. For example, in 1994,IWR welcomed a special occasion forcelebrating its 30th anniversary and wewere very happy to find that on displayin the exhibition hall, were over 150books and more than 1,000 papers andarticles on religion produced by theInstitute. If with these, works producedby other Chinese scholars were added ,the number would have becomesurprisingly large. If calculatedaccording to the fields involved, theabove-mentioned publications can beclassified into 10 categories: (1) workson the history of different religions (2)works on philosophy of religion (3)works on the general theory of religion(4) works on different subject matter ofvarious religions (5) introductory workson religion for general readers (6)religious classics with annotation (7)re-publication of ancient religiousliterature and of valuable materials (8)re-publication of religious culturalrelics and literature unearthed (9)religious dictionaries and otherreference books (10) translations ofvaluable works by foreign authors. Ofall the departments in the Institute, theBuddhist Studies department is thebiggest one. Its scope of interest coversfour aspects, namely, Buddhism in theHan nationality populated areas,Tibetan Buddhism, Theravada

Buddhism and Buddhism in foreigncountries. Buddhism among the Hanpeople is widely studied. HanBuddhism works have a wide coverageincluding those on Buddhist scriptures,historical development of Buddhism,doctrines of different sects or schools,Buddhist philosophy, temple economy,Buddhist tradition at differentlocalities, biographies of eminentmonks and the inter-reaction ofBuddhism and traditional Chineseculture. Evaluation of scientific resultis a complex matter. People may veryoften than not have different opinionsabout one book. Generally speaking,the most influential works onBuddhism include: The Great BuddhistSutras in Chinese Language (edited byRen Jiyu), History of Buddhism in China(Ren Jiyu), An Intellectual History ofBuddhism in China (Guo Peng), Historyof Chinese Zen Buddhism, History ofChinese Hua Yan Sect (Wei Daoru), AHistory of Buddhism in Japan and ModernHistory of Buddhism in Japan (YangZengwen), etc. Apart from Buddhism,other disciplines have also theirrepresentative works. Christian studiesare noted for the best-known works:Contemporary Catholicism (Ren Yanli),Contemporary Theology of Protestantismand Contemporary Theology of Western

Catholicism (Zhuo Xinping). Major worksin Islamic studies include A History ofIslam (edited by Jin Yijiu), History of Islamin China (Li Xinghua) and Outlines ofIslamic Law (Wu Yungui). Importantworks in Taoist studies include Abstractsof Taoist Scriptures, History of ChineseTaoism (edited by Ren Jiyu), Chinese TaoistMetaphysics and Taoist Philosophy (LuGuolong). Theoretical work on religionis best represented by Professor Lu Daji’stwo books: On Religious Studies andHistory of Theories of Religion in the West.Religious studies are a new branch oflearning in China. Though we have madegreat progress in the past 20 years, we arestill faced with quite a few difficulties andproblems, such as knowledge-restructuring, training of young scholars,increasing quality of academic works, etc.In fact, we have a long way to go. Inconcluding my speech, I would like toexpress once again my hearty thanks toour Japanese host, Mr. Yasuo Morita,chairman of the board of trustees of theInstitute of Oriental Philosophy for hiskind invitation to our delegation to visitJapan and to make presentations beforesuch a great audience. Thank You.

(Source: http://www.iop.or.jp/0010/yungui.pdf)

Appendices

Note: This note “History of the Institute of World Religions” in Appendix B is written by WuYungui a Scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social Science, and this piece, and thispiece was shared to us by a Chinese Scholar. This piece can also be found at www.ip.or.jp/0010/yungui.pdf

Appendix C

THE UPCOMING NALANDA UNIVERSITY47

The new Nalanda InternationalUniversity48 in Bihar being rebuilt willsoon provide momentum to thesystematic study of Buddhism in Indiaof various shades and nuances.According to Shashi Tharoor, Nalandawas destroyed three times by invaders,but only rebuilt twice. The first time waswhen the Huns under Mihirakula laidwaste to the campus during the reignof Skandagupta (455- 67CE), whenNalanda was only a few decades old.Skanda’s successors rebuilt it. Thesecond destruction came a century anda half later, with an assault by theGaudas in early seventh century. Thistime the great Hindu kingHarshavardhana (606-48) restored theBuddhist university. Nearly 800 yearsafter it’s founding, Nalanda wasdestroyed a third time and burned byTurkish Muslim invaders underBakhtiar Khilji in 1197. This time therewas no reconstruction. The author, aformer Minister for State for External

Affairs argues that if we are to rebuildit after 800 years, we will need not justmoney but the will to excellence, notjust a physical plant but a determinedspirit. A great University is the finestadvertisement for the society thatsustains it. If we recreate Nalanda, itmust be as a university worth its name– and we must be a society worthy of atwenty- first century Nalanda. 49

Through the look east policy and theupcoming Nalanda University, Indiawill take its rightful place in theBuddhist world. Early twentieth centuryIndian Tibetologists such as SaratChandra Das - who wrote the firstTibetan- English Dictionary and An

Introduction to the Grammar of the Tibetan

Languages (1902) were pioneers.50 But atpresent, Indian scholars of Buddhismin general and Tibetologists inparticular are rare or if they exist arebarely known. Rather the best scholarwho also undertake painstaking field

47 Revised work based on IDSA web comment, PK Gautam, “ The Upcoming Nalanda University”of August 31, 2010 at http://www.idsa.in/node/5841/1873#comment-1873

48 The idea of Nalanda University was that of Singapore. It organized a Nalanda symposium in2006. Later in an East Asian Summit support of China, Japan and Korea was enlisted. See S.D.Muni, “Nalanda: a soft power project”, The Hindu, August 31, 2010.

49 Shashi Tharoor, “Reconstructing Nalanda” in The Elephant, the Tiger & the Cell, New Delhi,Penguin? Viking, 2007, Chapter 36, pp.167-169.

work in remote Indian border region aremostly foreigners and whites – likethe linguist of West Arunachal PradeshProf Toni Huber, Professor of TibetanStudies, Humbolt University, Berlin(Germany), Prof Alex McKay, formerlyof University of London, and Indo-Tibetan Historian, affiliate fellow,International Institute of Asian Studies,Lieden, the Netherlands and Dr HeleenPlaisier of Leiden University, Denmarkwho leads in this surge for Lepchastudies . Scholars such as Melvyn C.Goldstien and Mathew T. Kapstien ofthe US have no matching Indiancontemporaries.

High calibre and motivatedprofessionals need to be appointed inthe university. More young scholarsmust be encouraged to enter this fieldby creation of jobs and incentives.Network must be established rapidlywith Namgyal Institute of Tibetlogy(Gangtok), Central Institute of HigherTibetan Studies Sarnath, (Varanasi),Sampurnanand Sanskrit University,Varanasi, Central Institute of HimalayanCulture Studies, Dahung, Central Instituteof Buddhist Studies, Choglamsar(Ladakh), Songsten Library, Centre forTibetan & Himalayan Studies,Sehastradhara, Dehradun, DelhiUniversity and other universities inIndia that have departments of Buddhiststudies. India will need to catch up withBuddhist studies, Tibetology andBuddhism in the Himalayan belt asis being done in many Westernuniversities.

We can draw a parallel with the state ofinternational studies in India. Indianpolitical scientists and those in thestrategic community lament that unlikethe West, there is no India specificinternational studies in India or itsimportant off-shoot in internationalrelations. India is branded as aconsumer of ideas. The Nalanda initiativemay go the same way if the statedoes not step in to create and supportthe human resource needed for suchan enterprise. It should not be asinecure for retied bureaucrats in anycase.

A former Principal of the CentralInstitute of Buddhist Studies,Choglamsar (Ladakh) felt,“..historically we need to understand thatit is the ‘Nalanda System ofReligion’ that informs Buddhism inthese parts (Buddhist IndianHimalayan Region and Ladakh). Thetop managers of the forthcominguniversity, have no deep knowledgeabout Buddhism and its nuances. Theclimate, terrain and environment has tobe conducive for Buddhism. People alsomust be living and practicing it. Inplains the impact and influence getsdiluted. The best place for a centre ofthis knowledge is Ladakh. Further, weneed to have practitioners to haveNalanda school fully operational.Though both faith and academicknowledge have their roles, absence ofpractitioners is lacking and is a keyissue”.50

50 Tsetan Namgyal, “Tibetan Language and Culture Studies”, Himalayan and Central AsianStudie,Vol.13, No.1, January- March 2009, pp.88-101.

Appendices

It may be good idea to have its extensionin Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkimand Arunachal Pradesh. The ideal placeto encourage scholars to be involved orrecruited for present and future is fromthe ancient Buddhist belt all along theHimalayas. Other regions and scholaralso must be encouraged. Many non-practising Buddhists are indeed in various departments of India- but thenumber is less and the quality of future

generations is an issue. The statetherefore, must also revive studieslinked to Nalanda with departments ofBuddhist Studies of Indian universitiesand institutes. Jobs must be created toencourage the young generation ofIndian scholars to master Prakrit, Pali,Bhoti, and other aspects of BuddhistStudies which originated in India.Nitisastras also needs to be rediscovered.

Appendix D

SAVING LUMBINI FROM GEOPOLITICAL RIVARLY

ON MATERIALISTIC FOUNDATION

One popular case which assumes thatIndia lacks strategic imagination wasreported in the media in July 2011. Itwas of Chinese interest in developingLumbini in Nepal at par with worldclass facilities like the Vatican andMecca.51

Problem here is that some Indiananalysts jump to materialisticconclusions. Nepali scholar KanakMani Dixit has explained the problemsin converting this holy place into aDisneyland :

While Beijing’s interest in Lumbini iswelcome, what is disconcerting isheavy-handed carpetbaggermethodology. A Lumbini Master Planwas developed by the great Japaneseplanner Kenzo Tange in 1978 at thebehest of U-Thant, the first AsianSecretary-General of the UN. TheMaster Plan sets out the strategy tomaintain the spiritual worth of the

Sakyamuni’s birthplace whiledeveloping the larger region forpilgrimage and tourism. 52

Kanak Mani elaborates that :

The Sakyamuni, a historicalpersonage rather than a figure ofmyth, surely wanted Lumbini toserve as a spiritual centre to guide theworld’s seekers. Would he haveapproved the conversion of the placeinto a commercial Disneyland? Oneoften hears complaints that Lumbiniis ‘so under-developed’, andcomparisons are made to Mecca, theVatican and Bethlehem, but that isperhaps the very point – Lumbini isa ‘minimalist’ response to theSakyamuni’s suggestion to lookinward in the search for externalpeace. The income for Nepal shouldcome from visitors who arrive topartake of the very spiritualism thatKenzo Tange sought to preserve. 53

51 See C. Raja Mohan, “Clinton and ASEAN”, Indian Express, July 20, 2011.52 Kanak Mani Dixit, “ Between Sycophancy and Adventurism- II”, Republic, July 28, 2011 at http:/

/www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=3397553 Kanak Mani Dixit, “Between Sycophancy and Adventurism- II”, Republic, July 28, 2011 at http:/

/www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=33975. The late KenzoTange’s finest buildings include the twin arena of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the Yamanashipress and broadcasting centre at Kofu (1964-67) and Hiroshima peace park and peace centre(1949-55).

It has been clarified by the UnitedNations Industrial Organisation that itis not involved in any activities relatedto the Lumbini Special DevelopmentZone in Nepal.54

Comment by Tom Turner English landscape

architect : It is difficult to think ofanywhere in the world less ideologicallysuited to a Baroque design thanLumbini. Buddhism is a faith whichadvises us to turn away from the endless

cycle of desire and follow a life of quietcontemplation. The Baroque style isassociated with pride, boastfulness andChristianity on the march. Mysuggestion is to leave Tange’s linear andcircular canals in place, as symbols ofthe world’s materialistic temptations,but to utterly ignore them in theplanting design and futuremanagement of the Lumbini WorldHeritage Site. 55

54 In July 2011, media had reported that the Chinese foundation Asian Pacific Exchange CooperationFoundation (APECF) had plans to build a $ 3 billion” special development zone “ to transformthe town of Lumbini into a major Buddhist pilgrimage centre”. See Anant Krishnan, “Furtherdoubts on Lumbini project”, The Hindu, August 20, 2011.

55 http://www.gardenvisit.com/garden/lumbini_garden_nepal#ixzz1Vj27dj10 accessed on August22, 2011.

Photo 1: Lama Tashi( in the centre), Principal Central Institute of Himalayan Culture Studies,Dahung, Arunachal Pradesh, with his team of teachers.

Gontse gaden Rabgyelling Monastery(Upper Bomdila)

Photo 2

Photo 3: Last Day Scene of Civil- Military Maitreya Mela at Tawang

Appendices

Photo 4: Songsten Library, Centre for Tibetan & Himalayan Studies, Dehradun

Photo 5: Drikung Kagyu Institute, Sahastradhara, Dehradun. Training Session of young Indianmonks in progress.

Photo 6: Indian Students from the Himalayan Belt undergoing training at the College forHigher Tibetan Studies, Sarah, Dharamsala. Standing far right is Mr Passang Tsering, GeneralSecretary of the College

Photo 7: Copy of a picture post card (many are Indians from the Himalayan Belt and otherBuddhist countries)

Appendices

WHY REFUGEES AND THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN

INDIA, BHUTAN AND NEPAL

Chapter 3

INTRODUCTION

Why Tibetans flee and escape from Tibetin spite of harsh conditions in crossing theborder and reaching India? We argue thatthere are four enduring pull factors: fortrue religious, spiritual and culturaleducation denied in Tibet, to see theFourteenth Dalai Lama , more freedomand opportunities in life, and becauseIndia is the land of the Buddha.

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IS NOT

ENOUGH

There are problems with measuringeverything with gross domestic product(GDP). According to News from China,Tibet recorded two digit GDP growth of12.2 per cent for the last 18 years.1 The May2011 issue further informs that China willinvest 26 billion Yuan in Tibet in the year2011 on major projects such as the Lhasa-Shigatse section of the Qinghai- TibetRailways, the Qinghai- Tibet plateau

1 “Tibet Today” , News from China, January 2011.2 “Tibet Today”, News from China, May 2011.3 Ibid.4 Andrew Martin Fischer, “The Political Economy of Boomerang Aid in China’s Tibet”, China

Perspective, No.2009/3, pp.38-53.

power grid interconnection project, andLaohuzui hydro- electric project of 11th

plan by 2011.2 It asks the question – whohas benefited from Chinese Tibet policy?It then answers that the 5th Forum onWork in Tibet Conference of 2010 hadmore favourable policies. Hanisation is nottrue. There are 95 per cent Tibetans ofwhich 96 per cent are farmers and herders.The 14th Dalai Lama is lying. 3

However from a study of secondaryliterature including field work by scholarsin Tibet, discussion with Indian andinternational scholars and Tibetans in exile,a totally different picture emerges.

Although it may be true that CCP hasspent a great deal of money in Tibet, butnot necessarily on Tibetans. China hastaken away more that it has given. It givesto itself, in the sense that recipients aremostly Han Chinese.4 The mostbalanced findings are perhaps of thenoted anthropologist Melvyn C.

Goldstein and his co-authors. Fieldwork from 2006 to 2009 with PuchungWangdui a Research Scientist from theTibetan Academy of Social ScienceLhasa shows that it is unclear if people’sfirst orientation fulfils Beijing’s broaderpolitical objective and the standard ofliving is improving. They point out thatthere are other deep-seated issues thatconcern Tibet, such as: (a) Restrictionson monks and monasteries, (b)Language and (c) Large number of non-Tibetan migrant workers.5 Their policyprescription is that “current decisionmakers in Beijing apparently believe thatit is enough, but we suggest that it is tooearly to say whether this belief is corrector just wishful thinking”.6

ASSAULT ON RELIGION AND

CULTURE

Why Flee? Had the Chinese policies werein tune with the religion and culture of theTibetans, it would not have created socio-economic miseries. Why Tibetans flee andescape from Tibet in spite of harshconditions in crossing the border andreaching India? One of the importantfactor that pulls them is that truereligious, spiritual and cultural educationis denied in Tibet. Kharat in field trip in1999 noted that every month hundreds ofnew refugees enter India, some register,

some do not. Four types were classifiedby him:

(a) Who fled Tibet due to torture andatrocity.

(b) Monks and nuns to take religiouseducation about Buddhism inIndia and this is prevented inChina.

(c) The pilgrimage population whichcomes here just to get blessings ofDalai Lama and intends to return.

(d) The youngsters who comes to Indiafor the purpose of good moraleducation as they do not get theopportunity in China. 7

Matters have become worst. Thespontaneous uprising of March 2008 notonly in TAR, but in ethnic Tibet havemade a deep impact on theinternational community. It shows howGDP by itself in insufficient to knowthe feeling of the people. Policies suchas government’s role in reincarnationhave all the potential to boomerang.Even in 2011 there was a standoff at Kiritmonastery8 (in Sichuan province) andmonks are known to have selfimmolated themselves for their religionand beliefs. A case of a nun Hong Leitaking this extreme step indicating thatoxygen like religious freedom is beingdenied.9 In November 2011 Sonam

5 Melvyn C. Goldstein, Geoff Childs and Punchung Wangdui, “ Beijing’s “ People First”Development Initiative for the Tibetan Autonomous Region’s Rural Sector- A Cases Study fromShingatse Area”, The China Journal, No.63, January 2010, pp.57-75.

6 Ibid.7 Rajesh. S Kharat, Tibetan Refugees in India, New Delhi, Kaveri Books, 2003, p.63.8 The monastery is also spelled as Kirti in many print media accounts.9 Hindustan Times, Novemver 5, 2011.

Why Refugees and the Status of Refugees in India, Bhutan and Nepal

Tsherab, a 26 year old Tibetan protestorfrom Dharamsala tried to immolatehimself opposite the Chinese Embassyin New Delhi.

The cyberspace is also being usedmenacingly. In China posts on the webon Tibet, democracy, religion andpolitics in general tends to be takendown by 30,000 public sensors withina day or two of publication.10 In 2009Canadian researchers uncovered‘Ghostnet’. This programme had thecapability to remotely turn on acomputer’s camera and microphonewithout alerting the user and export theimages and sound silently back toservers in China. A top target of theprogramme were offices related to nongovernmental organisations working onTibetan issue.11

ADJUSTMENT AND ADAPTATION IN

HOST COUNTRY

Sociologist Girija Saklaini wrote thatTibetans have successfully emerged

10 Alexander Klimburg, “ Mobilising Cyber Power, Survival, Vol.53, No.1, February- March 2011,pp.44-45

11 Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and Whatto Do About It, New York, HarperCollins, 2010, p.59.

12 Girija Saklaini , The Uprooted Tibetans in India: A Sociological Study of Continuity and Change( 1984), New Delhi, as quoted by Dawa Norbu, “ The Settlements: Participation and Integration” , inDagmar Bernstore and Hubertus Von Welck (ed) , Exile as Challenge: The Tibetan Diaspora,Hyderabad, Orient Longman, 2003, pp.186-212.

13 Christoph von Furer- Heimendorf , The Renissance of Tibetan Civilization (1990) as quoted byDawa Norbu, “ The Settlements: Participation and Integration” , in Dagmar Bernstore andHubertus Von Welck (ed) , Exile as Challenge: The Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman,2003, pp.186-212.

14 Thubten Samphel, “Maintaining Vitality in Exile: The Tibetan Refugees in South Asia”, HarvardInternational Review, Vol.XXXI, No.3, Fall 2009, pp.60-63.

15 Dagmar Bernstore and Hubertus Von Welck, “ Introduction” and Gerlad Schmitz, “Tibet’sPosition in International Law” in Dagmar Bernstore and Hubertus Von Welck (ed) , Exile asChallenge: The Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman, 2003, pp.1-8.

from a self-sufficient barter economyinto a competitive economy and haveadjusted to the new situation, which isa tribute to the Tibetan society. Thethree reasons for the success of Tibetanin India given by her are: Tibetans arehard working people, their womenfolkalso work as hard as men if not more,and Tibetans have a natural instinct fortrading. 12

European anthropologist, Christoph vonFurer-Heimendorf, has termed thepreservation of their cultural identityand religious institutions as ‘renniassance of Tibetan civilisation’.13

On the question of resilience and as themost successful refugee group, weconcur with Thubten Samphel.Samphel as Secretary General of theDepartment of Information andInternational Relations for the TibetanGovernment-in-Exile quotes14 DagarBerstorf and Friedrich-NaumannFoundation director Hubetus von Welckwho have identified three majorreasons.15 The three are, the ability of

individual Tibetans to survive andsustain themselves economically.Second, the education system created in exile and third, the Dalai Lama hasintroduced democracy to his people andis turning over political power to adirectly democratically elected leader,the Kalon Tripa.

LAYOUT OF CHAPTER

This chapter is in two parts. Part 1 is aliterature survey on refugees in Indiaand related issues including localincidences of security concern. It alsoincludes sections on Bhutan and Nepal.Part 2 is summary of findings during afield trip to Dharamsala and Dehradunin April 2009.16 Basic data for betterunderstanding is at the followingAppendices which are placed at the endof the chapter:

(a) Appendix A. Data andDocumentation of Tibetanrefugees.

(b) Appendix B. Position of TibetanGovernment in Exile and IndianGovernment on refugees.

(c) Appendix C. Policies on TibetanRefugees/Status as perInternational Law in India.

(d) Appendix D. Select Parliamentary

16 Details are at Chapter 5A. A survey of Tibetan exiles by Mr Chok Tsering(an exile himself )formerly of the Vivekanand International Foundation, New Delhi titled “ Socio- Political andEconomic Conditions of Tibetan Refugees in India: A Case Study of Dharamsala” of October2011 is avilable at http://www.vifindia.org/article/131

17 Dagmar Bernstore and Hubertus Von Welck, “ Introduction” and Gerlad Schmitz, “Tibet’sPosition in International Law” in Dagmar Bernstore and Hubertus Von Welck (ed) , Exile asChallenge: The Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman, 2003, p. 3 and pp.45-71 respectively.

debates on Tibetan Refugees andDeclaration between India and thePRC.

PART I: LITERATURE SURVEY

Struggle According toInternational Law

The Tibetan state may have ceased toexist after Chinse annexation, but theTibetan people have nevertheless theright to demand self-determination. Astate which does not protect the livesand well being of its citizens – as in thecase of the PRC vis a vis Tibetans – hasforfeited the right to rule.17 InStrasbourg Declaration (1988), the DalaiLama proposed autonomy. The TibetanYouth Congress opposed this. However,non-violence is common to both.According to international law, Tibetanpeople have the right to demand self-determination.

Central Tibetan Adminstartionand Tibetan Government in Exile

The Tibetans as refugees have set up aParliament in Exile. Its currentorganisation (as shown in the currentAnnual Report of 2009) has the followingdepartments:

1. Religion and Culture- 208monasteries (over 27451 monks)

and 17 nunneries (over 1696 nuns)established in exile

2. Home- Looks after 58 agricultural,agro-industrial and handicraftbased settlements

3. Finance

4. Education – 77 schools of which 28run Central Tibetan SchoolAdministration, under Govt ofIndia,

5. Security (including refugeereception)

6. Info and IR (incl foreign missions)and

7. Health – 53 centres of medicine

It is attempting democratization since2001 of the administration. TheFourteenth Tibetan Parliament in Exileunder Kalon Tripa, Chairman of Kashag(Cabinet) Samdhong Rinpoche (sincereplaced by Lobsang Sangye in 2011)had 46 Deputies from all religioustraditions (Nyigma,Sakya, Kagyue,Gelug and Bon) and regions (U Stang,Dotoe, Domey, Europe and NorthAmerica).

Budget

As far as the budget goes, StephanieRoemer’s work throws some light onit.18 The Central Tibetan Administration(CTA) faced enormous financialconstrainst in early years. In 1964

money was raised by from the statetreasury, with some aid from the IndianGovernment. The Dalai Lama received$ 180,000 annually from CIA from 1950sto 1974. Annual revenues increased overthe last 47 years in exile from $ 42,000to $ 3,003,479. This leap in the 1990s isattributable to opening of seven CTAbureaus in Switzerland, France,Hungary, Russia, Austria, South Africaand Taiwan. Fund raising and donationsnow appear self sustaining. NowTibetans in comparative terms arebetter off than many locals.

The CTA maintains itself not onlythrough generous donations byinternational donors, but also byrequiring taxes be paid by exiles abovethe age of six. This voluntary tax(Danglang Chatrel) also exihibitspopular support for a stable Tibetangovernment in exile. 19

The MHA’s Annual Report 2010-2011mentions expenditure of Rs 18.72 croreson their resettlement on one residuaryhousing scheme in Uttarakhand.

Stages of Settlement in India

Before the PRC invasion of Tibet, someTibetan settlers had found home inNorth Bengal and Sikkim in search ofbetter standards of living to India. Theyhad never encountered Chinese rule,they had allegiance with Karmapa,rather than Dalai Lama, and they had

18 The financial part is based on Stephnie Roemer, The Tibetan Government – in – Exile: Politics atLarge, London/New York, Routledge, 2008, pp.123.

19 Jessica Falcone and Tsering Wangchuk, “We’re Not Home” : Tibetan Refugees in India in theTwenty- First Century”, India Review, vol.7, no.3, July – September, 2008, pp. 164-199.

no desire to return. They were thoroughlyassimilated with mainstream Indiansociety speaking Nepali. Almost all wereextended Indian citizenship.20 The elitefrom Tibet sent their children to study inIndia at Kalimpong and Darjeeling ratherthan mainland China.

Initial Settlements

The Dalai Lama crossed into India on31 March 1959. By 29 April 1959, theTibetan Government in Exile(established at Musoorie) was renamedas the Central Tibetan Administration(CTA). In 1960 it moved to McLeodGunj(an abandoned earthquake hit hillstation of the British era). On September2, 1960, the Tibetan Parliament in Exilecame into existence, later renamed asAssembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies.Indian authorities rehabilitated therefugees, not in one settlement but insettlements scattered all over India.The Tibetans were settled as under:

(a) In spring of 1959 the Governmentof India set up two temporarytransit camps in Assam (Misamari)and West Bengal (Buxa, formerBritish detention camp). The campin Assam was planned for 9,000.Three months after the Dalai Lamareached India, it had 15,000 people.Livelihood was based on beggingand selling valuable personalbelongings.

(b) Due to the increasing number ofdeaths of the Tibetans due toclimatic factors like heat, the DalaiLama requested the Indiangovernment for cooler places. Inresponse, numerous exiles weresent to Himalayan region as roadworkers. For security reasons theTibetans were not settled into largehomogenous communities. Theywere scattered to differentlocations to discourage anyunifying political activities.

(c) On further appeal from the DalaiLama, the centre asked Sikkim,Bhutan, and all Indian stategovernments to provide land forthe Tibetans. Sikkim, Bhutan,Orissa, Karnataka, HimachalPradesh and Uttar Pradeshresponded favourably. Therefugees were settled in 1)agricultural settlements 2) agro-based industries and 3) carpet-weaving and handicraft.

(d) First agricultural based settlementswas set up in 1960 at Bylakuppe inKarnataka. In 1962 the secondsettlement was set up at Chaglangin Arunachal Pradesh and the thirdat Tezu in Lohit District the sameyear. The fourth was established atMainpat in Chattisgarh (formerMadhya Pradesh) in 1963. The fifth

20 Jayant Kumar Ray and Kingshuk Chatterjeee, “ Immigrant Communities”, in D.P.Chattopadhyaya, General editor History of Science , Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization,Vol. X. Part 6, Jayant Kumar Ray (ed) , Aspects of India’s International Relations 1700 to 2000 :South Asia and the World, New Delhi, Centre of Studies in Civilization, 2007, pp.59-98.

was established at Chandragiri inOrissa and the sixth at Mundgodin North Karnataka. By 1969, 21agriculture based settlements wereoperating in India, Nepal andBhutan. Later, eight moreagriculture based settlements wereset up at Hunsur and Kolegal inKarnataka, Bhandara inMaharashtra, Bomdila inArunachal Pradesh, Changtan andLeh in Ladakh, and Herbertpur inUttarakhand (earlier UttarPradesh).As it was not viable torehabilitate all refugees inagriculture based settlements asmany were nomads and traderswith no idea of farming, agro-industrial settlements werelaunched . Some examples being:wool mill at Bir, tea estates at Birand Chauntra, Tibetan crafts atBajnath – all in the Kangra valleyin Himachal Pradesh, a limestonequarry at Kumrao, a hydrated limeplant at Sataun, a fibre glass factoryat Paonta Sahib and a handicraftcentre in Puruwala (in SirmourDistrict of Himachal Pradesh). AHimalayan Marketing Society wasset up in Delhi. Handicraft centrewere set up in Kalimpong,

Darjeeling and Nepal followed bycentres at Dalhousie, Dharamsala,Kalimpong, Shimla, Clement Town,Rajpur and Dehradun. Similarsettlements were also set up inNepal. 21

Due to population rise and shortage ofland, the Dalai Lama took steps toresettle refugees outside India – likeNepal, Bhutan, Europe, North Americaetc.

Data Bases, Fresh Arrivals andInflow of Refugees to India

The refugees came in waves. First wasin 1959 of 85,000. The second exodusbegan in early 1980s. Between 1986 and1996, nearly 25,000 people took refuge(40 per cent were monks or nuns) andin 1999, around 2,200. 22 Map indicatesrefugee clusters.

EllaRolfe gives the figure of influx ofabout 25,000 which followed from 1985and quoting BBC indicated a steadytrickle of 2,200 between 1996 and 1999.23

UNHCR Country Profile- India,September 1999 mentions that around2,400 Tibetan exiles continue to arrivein India via Nepal each year.24 Kharatin a field trip in 1999 noted that everymonth hundreds of new refugees enter

21 Tsewang Phuntso, “ Government in Exile “, in Dagmar Bernstore and Hubertus Von Welck(ed) , Exile as Challenge: The Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman, 2003, pp.125-149.

22 Rajesh Kharat, “Gainers of a Stalemate: The Tibetans in India, Ranbir Samaddar (ed), Refugeesand the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947- 2000, New Delhi, Sage Publications,2003, pp. 281- 320.

23 Ella Rolfe, “Refugee, Minority, Citizen, Threat: Tibetans and the India Refugee Script”, SouthAsia Research, Vol. 28, No. 3, November 2008, pp.253-283.

24 Amalendru Misra, “A Nation in Exile: Tibetan Diaspora and the Dynamics of Long- DistanceNationalism”, Asian Ethnicity, Vol 4., No.2, June 2003, p 198.

India, some register, some do not. Fourtypes were classified by him:

(a) Who fled Tibet due to torture andatrocity.

(b) Monks and nuns to take religiouseducation about Buddhism inIndia as this is prevented in China.

(c) The pilgrimage population whichcomes here just to get blessings ofthe Dalai Lama and intends toreturn.

(d) The youngsters who come to Indiafor the purpose of good moraleducation as they do not get theopportunity in China. 25

New Delhi’s current position is that thenewly arrived Tibetans in India are‘pilgrims’. Although the legal status ofall Tibetans in India (except, of course,the new arrivals who are considered aspilgrims) continues to be that ofrefugees, the law does not bar themfrom engaging in business, buyingproperty or occupying positions in thepublic sector. 26

The publication brought out by theTibetan Parliamentary & PolicyResearch Centre, Understanding the

25 Rajesh. S Kharat, Tibetan Refugees in India, New Delhi, Kaveri Books, 2003, p.63.26 Amalendru Misra, “A Nation in Exile: Tibetan Diaspora and the Dynamics of Long- Distance

Nationalism”, Asian Ethnicity, Vol 4., No.2, June 2003, pp.189- 206. The newcomers or Sarjowashave a lot of cultural differences such as in dress, speech (which is not the Lhasa dialect butdialect of Amdo and Kham), prefer Chinese pop music over Bollywood songs and watch ChineseTV serials. See Tenzin Sonam, “A Tibet of the Mind”, Himmal SouthAsia, December 2010, pp.50-53.

27 Honey Oberoi, “Rethinking Tibet”, Economic and Political Weekly, May 10, 2008, pp. 80-83.

Issues of Tibet (2007) at page 11, mentions:

Each year hundreds of Tibetanchildren ranging in ages from six toeighteen cross the Himalayas seekingsecular or monastic education inIndia. In 2006 alone, 2445 Tibetans,mostly young children fled from Tibetand have registered with the TibetanReception Centre, Dharamasala.

According to Honey Oberoi, in the past15 years (approximately from 1996),1,20,000 Tibetans, includingapproximately 18,000 politicallyrevolting nuns and monks and longterm ex-political prisoners have crossedthe border for asylum in Bhutan, Nepaland India.27

Figures of the Minstry of Home Affairs(MHA) in its Annual Reports 2010- 2011on Tibetan refugees is based oninformation provide by the Bureau ofHis Holiness at 1,09,015 as on February2009. The majority of these have settledthemselves either through selfemployment or with governmentassisted agricultural and handicraftschemes in different states in thecountry. Major concentrations are in-

(a) Karnataka - 44, 468

(b) Himachal Pradesh - 21, 980

(c) Arunachal Pradesh - 7,530

(d) Uttarakhand - 8,545

(e) West Bengal - 5,785

(f) J and K - 6,92028

The MHA’s Annual Report mentions :

13.47- Tibetan refugees began pouringinto India in the wake of the flight ofHis Holiness the Dalai Lama in theyear 1959 from Tibet. TheGovernment of India decided to givethem asylum as well as assistancetowards temporary settlement. Carehas been taken to retain their separateethnic and cultural identity.

13.48- As per information provided byBureau of His Holiness the DalaiLama, the population of Tibetanrefugees in India in February 2008 was1,10,095. Majority of these refugeeshave settled themselves, eitherthrough self-employment or with theGovernment’s assistance underagricultural and handicrafts’ schemesin different states in the country. TheMinistry of Home Affairs has spentan amount of about Rs.18.72 crore upto November 2008 on resettlement ofTibetan refugees. The rehabilitation ofTibetan Refugees is almost completeexcept one residuary housing scheme

under implementation in the Stateof Uttarakhand.29

Refugee Information in Bhutan andNepal

Besides India, other countries which havesubstantial Tibetan refugees are Nepal andBhutan. The status and relations arebriefly given below.

Bhutan

Initially, 4000 refugees were settled inBhutan after agreement between Indiaand Bhutan. By 1973 there were tensionsfor reasons such as growing nationalconsciousness of Bhutan, comparisonof the privileges of the exiles with thoseof the locals, assassination of theBhutanese king under curiouscircumstances with suspicion onrefugees and the Tibetan’s non–assimilative way of living. All Tibetanswere requested to take Bhutanesecitizenship in 1979, else facedeportation back to the PRC. With theCTA’s intervention, 2300 applied forcitizenship– against the will of theGovernment in Exile. The remaining4,000 settled in India and by 1998, theTibetan population in Bhutan was only1584. Since the 1980s, Bhutan hasofficially disallowed influx of newTibetan refugees.30

One area which demands further study

28 Annual Report MHA, 2010-11, p.249, Chapter XII.29 Annual Report MHA, 2010-11, p.249, Chapter XII.30 Jessica Falcone and Tsering Wangchuk, “ We’re Not Home”: Tibetan Refugees in India in the

Twenty- First Century, India Review, vol.7, no.3, July – September, 2008, pp 164-199, n.37 andStephanie Roemer, The Tibetan Government in Exile : Politics at Large, 2008, pp.74-76.

and understanding is that Bhutan also hastwo traditions of Nyigma and Drukpa.Both traditions are also in Tibet. TheDrukpas are the ruling people and thisaspect of how Nyigmas of Sikkim linkwith those of Bhutan and other dynamicsneed to be understood and grasped tounderstand the politics of that region. Thislink is indirectly related to Tibet and therelationship of its people with those ofBhutan.

Nepal is a transit country to reach India.

Between 13,720 and 30,000 are in Nepalin 14 settlements (35 per cent). Balance(65 per cent) are scattered in remoteregions near Tibet’s border engaged incross – border trade. Conditions forTibetans are the worst in Nepal.Unofficially they could be 100,000. Since1995, authorities have not issued anynew residential cards. All new arrivalsafter 1995 are illegal, several times theyhave been repatriated. Applying forNepali citizenship is strongly opposedby the CTA. 31 In an article in theGuardian by Isabel Hilton, it ismentioned that under Chinesepressure, Tibetans can not legally ownproperty , travel, go to university, drivecars or own business or register theirNepal born children. They are easy

targets for extortion by everyoneincluding the Maoists who havebankrupted many Tibetanbusinessmen.32 The US government hasoffered visas to 5,000 Tibetan refugees.Brazenly, Nepal will not let themleave.33

It may be recalled that the Royal NepalArmy had mounted operations againstthe Tibetan guerrillas in Mustang in1974. Unlike India, how Nepal treatsTibetans refugees is a litmus test for theNepalese government to show itsinclinations towards China. For China’ssecurity concern in Nepal it appears,are related to the flow of Tibetanrefugees. In April 2003, for the firsttime, Nepal forced Tibetan refugeesback into Chinese territory rather thanallowing them to proceed to India as ithad done over the years.34 KingGynendra engineered the closure of theDalai Lama’s representative office inKathmandu, stopped issuing exitpermits to new refugees and haltedregistration of marriages and births ofTibetans and closed down the TibetanWelfare Office.35

Author and journalist Jonathan Greenin his book Murder in the High

Himalayas, which is based on thefamous case of Chinese border guards

31 Spephanie Roemer, ibid, p.76.32 Isabel Hilton, “Dissolution of paradise, The Guardian, 9 September 2009.33 Ibid.34 Jonathan Holslag, “The Next Frontier: Regional Instability and Prospects for Sino-Indian

Cooperation”, Strategic Analysis, Vol.33, No.5, September 2009, pp. 652-663. Author quotesManish Dabhade and Harsh Pant, “Coping with Challenges to Sovereignty: Sino- Indian Rivalryand Nepal’s Foreign Policy”, Contemporary South Asia, 13(2), 2004, pp.157-169.

35 Ibid.

shooting down fleeing 17 year oldTibetan nun Kelsang Namtso at theNepal border close to Mount Everestin 2006 (caught by video camera by theRomanian Sergiu Matei), gives a figureof about 2,500 annually.36

A field trip survey at Dharamsala inearly 2009 and discussion with theHome Secretary of the TibetanGovenment in Exile indicated that themajority of respondents (Tibetanrefugees in India) chose Tibet - Nepalroute to escape from the Chinesecontrolled border. They revealed thatthey first land in Nepal and throughUNHCR, pass to India. Almost 1500-2000 Tibetans used to escape from Tibetannually but this has stopped since theMaoist government in Nepal came topower. This they feel is due to theinfluence as well as nexus of theChinese government with the Maoistgovernment in Nepal. In 2008, theycounted less than 500-600 refugeearrivals in India, and till April 2009,none had arrived. This shows theintensity and intimacy of Chinesegovernment with the current Maoistregime in Nepal. This may be taken as abarometer of India’s foreign relationwith Nepal.

36 Jonathan Green, Murder in the High Himalayas: Loyalty, Tragedy, and Escape from Tibet, New York,PublicAffairs, 2010, p. xv

37 At a talk at the USI of India New Delhi on March 10, 2010 the information of the currentinflows and return of refugees was not known. Unpublished proceedings of a talk by ColonelVirender Sahai Verma (Retd), “Tibet a Reality Check”.

38 Isabel Hilton, “Dissolution of paradise, The Guardian, September 9, 2009.39 Nidhi Bhardwaj, “The Strategic Significance of Nepal’s Secret Deportion of Tibetans to China”,

Article No. 1809, 15 April 2011, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

A professor of JNU mentions that as in2009, each year the inflow may be 6,000refugees. Informal conversation atDharamsala by authors of this work, inApril 2009 revealed that it may be about2,000 per year. Of late none are comingvia Nepal since Maoists have becomepart of the political process and the pro-Chinese leaning in Nepal. It has notbeen possible to trace the route ormethod now being adopted.37 Due totightening of the border security withChina, the refugee flow into Nepal fromTibet has dropped from about 2,500 ayear to 500 since March 2009 despitecontinuing repression inside Tibet.Since 1990, the Nepalese governmenthas not allowed Tibetans to register asrefugees but it has continued to offerimportant transit routes to India.38

Another source presents a figure of thenumber of refugees appearing at theKathmandu reception center havingcome down from a peak of almost 3,000per year in 2006 to 2008 to 770 in 2010.39

Escape from Nepal to India

Escape routes are along mountainpasses on the Tibet- Nepal border.Nepal has failed to honour agentleman’s agreement with the UN to

provide safe transit to Tibetans on theirway to India.40 Jonathan Greenmentions that Tibetans flee the countryin a brutal journey over the Himalayas.Some are escaping for a new life inIndia. Most mention that all they wantis to meet their exiled leader, the DalaiLama.41 In the 1990s, China had anunofficial policy of turning a blind eyeto those escaping. Later due to theimage problem in connection with the2008 Olympics, policies to put an endto it were enforced ruthlessly. Theauthor observes that the esacape routesare a closely guarded secret by theTibetans.42

Due to the Chinese assistance to NepalArmy, the number of Tibetan refugeesannually crossing into Nepal droppedfrom 3,000 to 500 in the year 2008. Chinawas giving cash ‘prizes’ to Nepaliborder guards to apprehend and deportthem.43

In spite of 11 percent of Nepal beingBuddhist with close cultural and ethnicaffinity of its people living on itsborders with Tibet, Nepal is leaningtowards China by being ruthless.44

Surely it is not a good example to follow.It seems an unbecoming idea of acivilisation and nation which values and

protects Tibetans and TibetanBuddhism.

Refugees in Areas where Military isDeployed close to the Chinese

What happens if, say, at Nathula aTibetan succeeded in crossing theborder/ LoC and sought asylum orrefugee status in India? As access andinformation to border regions was notprovided and thus not mandated for thestudy, it is difficult to answer thisquestion. However, the terrain is harshwhere both militaries are deployed inclose vicinity in areas like Ladakh,Sikkim or Arunachal Pradesh. As theseareas have heavy military presenceswith extremely low populationdensities, refugees are unlikely to takethis high altitude and inhospitableroutes. They, in all probability, wouldrather take the easier route viaNepal. Informal talks with officers whohave served in the region and have beeninvolved in border talks with theChinese, give an impression that thePLA shows a deep concern on any suchinfiltrators. It is understandable thatinfantry battalions responsible for theirbattalion defended area can not allowany such movement. They may well beChinese spies pretending to be

40 Utpal Parashar, “India Losing Little Gate Game”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 05,2010.

41 Jonathan Green, Murder in the High Himallays: Loyalty, Tragedy, and Escape from Tibet, New York,PublicAffairs, 2010, p.XV.

42 Jonathan Green, Murder in the High Himalayas: Loyalty, Tragedy, and Escape from Tibet, New York,PublicAffairs, 2010, p. 36. We the authors also were faced with this issue of the escape route.Outof courtesy and karuna, we avoided to discuss this subject in our meetings with Tibetans.

43 Purna Basnet, “China’s Success”, Himal, South Asia, April, 0211, pp.26-27.44 Export of Tibetan carpets has traditionally been a good foreign exchange earner for Nepal. Now

due to cheap Chinese mass produced imitations, this carpet industry is in hard times in Nepal.

refugees. Probably the standardoperating procedure may well be tohand them back where defences aremanned in near eye ball to eye ballscenario. This can now be contrastedwith how Assam Rifles was maderesponsible to receive the Dalai Lamain 1959. Much has changed and Indiaand China have agreed to resolve theirdisputes peacefully. It will thus be betterif status quo is maintained. What isimportant is that the nuances of this mustbe well understood by the commanders.An impression should not be createdthat India is “pushing back” genuineTibetan refugees. This aspect mayneed more deliberation.

Overcrowding and Other Issues

Facilities are now overcrowded andnewcomers face problems. Dharamsalahas the bulk of the aged refugees.Younger generation from Tibet prefernot to stay in camps but in isolatedscattered camps not part of refugeeestablishment. In 2003 they had 20 percent unemployment rate.45 Staff writerGreg Buno from Council of ForeignRelations had observed that there wereonly elderly refugees in the agriculturalsettlements in Orrisa, implying that the

youth are getting attracted to urbancentres where livelihood other thanagriculture is possible.46

Returning Refugees

Perhaps this is the greyest area of anydata. Some refugees, mostly the elderlyvoluntarily return after seeing the DalaiLama.47 No figures or routes taken, orhow they re-enter the TAR or otherparts of China is available or has beenfound in any open source except thatone author who had done field work inYunnan and wrote Tourism and Tibetan

Culture in Transition mentions:

Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinesegovernment welcomed Tibetanrefugees who had fled the country, aswell as second generation Tibetansborn in India or Nepal, back to their‘native’ China. The invitation wasalso backed by financial support toreturning Tibetans, which providedadditional incentives to Tibetans whowere tempted by opportunity toreturn ‘home’. Thanks to theirEnglish skills and other ‘ culturalcompetence’, many of the ‘returnees’found work in tourism, some asEnglish speaking enterprises such asrestaurants and touring operations.48

45 Rajesh Kharat, “Gainers of a Stalemate: The Tibetans in India, Ranbir Samaddar (ed), Refugeesand the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947- 2000, New Delhi, Sage Publications,2003, pp. 281- 320.

46 Meeting with PK Gautam on November 12, 2009.47 On reaching India children are sent to schools and monks to monasteries and the elderly return

to Tibet. See Pico Iyer, The Open Road: The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, New Delhi,Penguin Books, 2008, p. 168.

48 Åshild Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition: A Place Called Shangrila, Oxon, Routeledge,2008, p.21.

Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC)

According to Pico Iyer, The TibetanYouth Congress (TYC) was set up in1980 by Lhasang Tsering (who presentlyowns the coffee house ‘Chocolate lodge’in Dharamsala) and Jamyang Norbu, afirst cousin of the Dalai Lama. The TYClinks 30,000 people in 83 chapters across11 nations. It has a different responseto that of the Tibetan Government inExile (TGIE). It favours a militant andseparatist path as articulated byLobsang Yeshi (Vice President) asnarrated by Pico Iyer.49

Pico Iyer elaborates that unlike the middlenon-violent path on ideals of Gandhi beingfollowed by the Dalai Lama and TGIE,members of the TYC have also resorted toself immolation. Pawo Thupten Ngodup,a 51 year old Tibetan set fire to himself inDelhi in 1998 after a hunger strike.Lhasang Tsering tells Pico Iyer:

Dalai Lama is our greatest strength,and weakness. We have forgotten theability to think for ourselves, theability to do for ourselves, to standon our own feet. And yet there was aTibet before Dalai Lama. It was onlyin the 16th century that Dalai Lamatook over Tibet. Our history goes backtwo and a half thousand years.50

Lhasang Tsering continues to explain theparadox of violence and non violence:

His Highness congratulates theTibetans who fight for Indians in theIndian Army. He congratulates theTibetans who give their lives to thewar in Bangladesh. But a poor youngboy in Lhasa throws a stone at aChinese – His Highness condemns itas an act of violence. 51

According to its website accessed inJuly 2009, the TYC with 30,000 membershas 81 regional branches in Nepal,Bhutan, Norway, Canada, France, Japan,Taiwan, Australia, USA and Switzerland.It has no political ideology and when itwas raised on October 7, 1970 atDharamsala it was blessed by the DalaiLama. Its founding members wereTenzin Geyche Tethong (the firstPresident), Lodi G. Gyari and SonamTopgyal.

There is however some difference ofopinion on the peaceful path of theDalai Lama and also his middle pathapproach including accepting the TARto be a part of China. The TYC has notdeviated from the principle of non-violence. All policies are based on HisHoliness’ (the Fourteenth Dalai Lama)philosophy.52

49 Pico Iyer, The Open Road: The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, New Delhi. Viking/Penguin, 2008, pp.193 and 202. TYC in the largest non – governmental organization in the Tibetandiaspora.

50 Ibid, p.215.51 Ibid, p.216.52 Kalsang Phunstok Godrukpa, President of Tibetan Youth Congress , interviewed on 28 March

2003 by Dagmar Bernstorff in Dagmar Bernstore and Hubertus Von Welck (ed) , Exile asChallenge: The Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman, 2003, pp. 406-408.

The Dalai Lama’s older brother GyaloThondup is one of the strongest voice ofindependence. He had written a forewordto a book featuring pieces by LhasangTsering and Jamyang Norbu arguing thatthe Dalai Lama’s position was ‘apathetically watered down compromise’sponsored by ‘pocket-Kissinger’, “friends”of Chinese leaders.53 Another activist isTenzin Tsundue- Tibetan writer. He hasmanaged to protest against continuedoccupation of Tibet during visits to Indiaby Chinese leaders and dignitaries forwhich he has been imprisoned. He vowsto continue the struggle.54

According to Abanti Bhattacharya theTYC had laid down clear aims, with theprimary objective of total independenceeven at the cost of one’s life. Keepingwith the traditions of non violence, itlaunches campaigns from time to time.It also organizes cultural exhibitions and

festivals to create awareness about Tibetamong people all over the world.55 P.Stobdan in imagining on such futurescenario mentions, “The possibility ofradicals such as TYC - resorting to violentstruggle and engaging in cross borderoperations cannot be ruled out in postDalai Lama scenario”.56

Learning from Gene Sharp andSamdhong Rinpoche

The learned and former Kalon TripaSamdhong Rinpoche has done somedeep thinking on the issues of nonvilolence. Out of the six kinds ofprincipled non violence types theorisedby Gene Sharp57 , he feels thatSatyagrah is the closest to Tibet’scommitment to non-violent action andis the most perfect form of non-violentresistance.58 We feel that the TYC willnot deviate from this in future.

53 Ibid, p.217.54 Tenzin Tsundue, “Lhasa, in translation”, The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 14, 2006.55 Abanti Bhattacharya, “Chinese Nationalism and the Fate of Tibet: Implications for India and

Future Scenarios”, Strategic Analysis, Vol.31, No.2, March 2007, pp.237-266.56 P. Stobdam, “Tibet and the Security of Indian Himalayan Belt”, in K. Warikoo (ed), Himalayan

Frontiers of India: Historical, geopolitical and strategic perspective, London/ New York, Routledge,2009, p.118.

57 Gene Sharp, Gandhi as Political Strategist. The six major types are non resistance, activereconciliation, moral resistance, selective non-violence, Satyagrah and non- violent revolution.The Arab Spring revoltion which began in early 2011 is also informed by Gene Shap’s work onGandhi.

58 Samdhong Rinpoche, “Education for Non-Violence”, in Dagmar Bernstorff and Hubertus vonWelck (Edited), Exile as Challenge: the Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman, 2003, pp.454-470.

REFUGEE ESTABLISHMENTS

Source: Modiefied from Planning Council CTA.

Refugee - Host Relations

We find that the late Tibetan scholar and Professor Dawa Norbu’s work is the bestin portraying this relationship. As is the practice, the author first thanks the peopleand the Government of India for living upto their ancient humanistic heritage,despite their own economic and space problem.59 Two crtical aspects of India’s

59 Dawa Norbu, “The Settlements: Participation and Integration”, in Dagmar Bernstore andHubertus Von Welck (ed), Exile as Challenge: The Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman,2003, pp.186-212.

benevolent policy towards the Tibetanrefugees – the liberal ‘ non- assimilative’framework as reflected in the separatesettlements, and the broad ‘ delegated’authority of the Tibetan leadershipheaded by the Dalai Lama- ensuresTibetan cultural identity and socialautonomy in a sea of the hostpopulation.60

What is new is that with the spread ofurbanisation, most refugeeestablishments which were once remoteare now a part of new towns and cities.Islands of unique Tibetan pockets suchas in Karnataka are now on the nationaland international tourist circuit.Compared to 1960s and 1970s, relativelyspeaking, some Tibetans may be betteroff than many poor Indians. Businessinterest of locals also may compete.There is also an inverse relation for thecause. The young may not be idealistas their parents and grand parents.Finally there is the information andcommunication technology revolutionwith globalisation. Some of thesefactors are important to understandthe complex micro or grass rootrefugee- host relations.61

60 Dawa Norbu, “The Settlements: Participation and Integration”, in Dagmar Bernstore andHubertus Von Welck (ed), Exile as Challenge: The Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman,2003, pp.186-212.

61 One good work is Jessica Falcone and Tsering Wangchuk, “We’re Not Home: Tibetan Refugeesin India in the Twenty- First Century”, India Review, vol.7, no.3, July – September, 2008,pp 164-199.

62 Pushpita Das, “ Nathu La: Pass to Prosperity ButAlso a Challenge”, IDSA Strategic Comment,July 04, 2006 at http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/NathuLaPassToProsperityButAlsoAChallenge_PDas_040706

63 Data extracted from survey of literature given in brackets.

Local Incidences of Concern inIndia

During field vist scholars have noticedsome concerns which are regionspecific. One example being theapprehension of people of Sikkim thebefore border trading post at Nathulawas inaugurated in July 2006. In thelate 1950s and 1960s Tibetans crossedover to India and settled in Sikkim andin due course of time added ‘Bhutia’ totheir name and started availing ofreservations facilities extended toscheduled tribes of the state. Beingbetter educated than local Bhutias, theywere able to grab top positions in thegovernment. The fear was that openingof borders may lead to a massive influxof refugees with impact on demographyand voter lists.62 However, this fear itseems is unfounded as no such thinghas happened. Table 3.1 records somelocal incidences which have beenportrayed as security concerns orpotential areas for problems.63 We findthat issues are local and more dialogueand understanding is needed forsustained positive relations.

Table 3.1 : Local Incidences of Concern in India

Serial Incidence Remarks

1. April 22, 1994 at Dharamsala, Gaddi youthstabbed to death by a Tibetan refugee in afight that developed over an India–Pakistancricket match.(Bibhu Routry, “Tibetan Refuges in India”,Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 26. Issue 2)Key sentence: “Political generosity hasfailed to percolate down to the popular levelwhen those involved are faced with realitiesof competition for livelihood” (p.84) .

(a) Mob stormed Tibetan administra-tion and looted Tibetan shops

(b) The Dalai Lama threatened tomove out the HQ fromDharamsala. Relented later whenBJP leaders and CM apologized andassured safety and cordial relations

(c) Resentment over driving up landprices, benami land purchaser envybecause of prosperity of some shopowners, meat eating by monks

2. In July 1999 a Tibetan youth killed a localstudent in Manali. 140 shops of Tibetanrefugees ransacked by irate mob (BibhuRoutry, “Tibetan Refuges in India”, RefugeeSurvey Quarterly, Vol. 26. Issue 2).

Indirectly linked to perceived prosperity

3. (a) November 2000, Students Union ofArunachal Pradesh found out that 1,600Tibetans in Tawang District and 181 in WestKameng and 300 in Bomdila had managedto obtain ST certificates. Also refugees inWest Kameng, Lohit and Changalngdistricts were alleged to have moved out ofcamps to dominate business and economyin Tawang and West Kameng and wereacquiring land by money power.(b) Locals in Dehradun dislike the meateating habits of monks.(Bibhu Routry, “Tibetan Refuges in India”,Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 26. Issue 2).

(a) Formation of Bharat Tibet SahyogManch in 1999 along with RSS/BJP.In 2001 the Dalai Lama joinedhands with World Hindu Counciletc for conflict resolution

(b) Govt has tightened control bymaking Registration Certificate(RC)more difficult, and restrictingmovement

4. In Chandragiri (Orrisa) refugee campoccasional local resistance to the visiblepresence and economic success of theTibetans migrants. Local political leadersseem to quote the instances such impositionof aliens on the local tribals as an exampleof lack of concern for socio-economic interestsof the tribals.(Ashok K. Behuria, “Forced Migrants,Citizens and the State: A Study of StateBehaviour Towards Forced Migrants,Tibetans, Tamils and Bangladeshis”,Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 6,November- December 2002, pp.1-9).

Such resistance (author assumes) hasnot so far led to violence mainly becauseof the culture of peaceful coexistence

Serial Incidence Remarks

5. This phenomenon is not unique toTibetans. Later in the 1990s field workby scholars did not show much tensionin south India. In 2010 anecdotalaccounts mention that there was nolocal tensions but just that the localswere unhappy about Tibetans wantingto be issued ration cards. The issue ofration cards could over time lead toTibetans wanting to vote in elections,etc. There was some apprehensionsabout the greater financial resourcesthat Tibetans seem to have whichenables them to acquire property in thatarea. The fear could be related to thelocals losing out to Tibetans in terms ofownership of property, the locals’dominance over the electoral stakes,etc. 64

(a) In Karnataka in the initial phases in1970s the locals had expressed problemsand felt relatively marginalised at thecost of refugees. There was internalopposition.

(T.C. Palakshappa, Tibetans in India: A

Case Study of Mundgod Tibetans, NewDelhi, Sterling, 1978 as quoted byRajesh. S. Kharat, Tibetan Refugees in

India , New Delhi, Kaveri Books, 2003,pp. 87-88 and A.V. Arakeri, Tibetans in

India: the Uprooted People and their

Cultural transplantation, New Delhi,Reliance, 1980).

(b) Since the 1980s, the economicdominance of the Tibetans andfavourable treatment meted to them bythe Government of India in terms offinancial and material transfers hasincreasingly caused animosity andjealousy among the locals, whichpartly led to disputes and evenkilling.(Stephanie Roemer, The TibetanGovernment in Exile: Politics atLarge, 2008).

64 We thank Dr Kalyan Raman and Dr Pushpiat Das in sharing these impressions.

PART II: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON

STATUS OF REFUGEES DURING FIELD

TRIP TO DHARAMSALA AND

DEHRADUN IN APRIL 2009

During our field trips to Dharamsalaand Dehradun our respondents told usthat officially Tibetans do not haverefugee status in India as India is not asignatory of the 1951 Convention ofUNHCR or others resolutions. They areenjoying good lives in India in exile.

Over the question of citizenship rights,some said that they are eligible but only2 to 3 per cent have obtained the Indiancitizenship. Rest are not interested,even His Holiness himself does notwish that Tibetans should obtainIndian citizenship. This would damagethe movement in two ways. One, itwould depress the Tibetans living inmainland Tibet and accept Chinese ruleas a fait accompli. This would be a realblow to the entire movement from

within. And second, if Tibetans rally forIndian citizenship who would fight forthe Tibetan cause? Entire efforts of halfa century would go in vain. Some havealso expressed that initially the facilitiesprovided by the Government of Indiain the forms of land, housing and otheramenities were adequate but aspopulation grew over the period thesefacilities have become scarce. Now thereis a problem of space, economicopportunities, job and social securityservices. “We expect,” as many noted,“that the concerned governmentauthorities should revise our status andprovide revised facilities”. On ourquestion of birth certificate, they saidthat they required a comprehensiveprocedure for this. Right now they havethree sets of authorities which providebirth certificate. The CTA (CentralTibetan Administration) inDharamsala, provides birth certificate,in Delhi some agencies provide while

schools certificates are also consideredvalid. On renewal or issuance ofcertificate, they expressed somedissatisfaction. There are some cases ofcorruption, delays and denial as well.They also raised the objection thatwhen they are here for a decidedly longperiod then why is their certificaterequired to be renewed every year. Whynot renew it every five or 10 years? Onthe matter of issuing of new certificates,they wondered why certificates are notissued when the fresh lots of refugeesare allowed to enter India. There aremany hundreds living withoutcertificates. This always createsproblems for them, particularly whenthey move from one place to anotheror from one state to another. Most ofthe respondents agreed that althoughthey are not harassed by the localadministration, they need to be issuedwith their papers. This would give themconfidence.

l Arrivals in the late 1950s and early1960s were given refugee status. In1963 recognition as refugees wasstopped. Since 1986 Indiangovernment aid now only includestransport to settlement areas.

l Tibetans have to possess a GreenBook issued by the TibetanGovernment in Exile. These are alsocalled Freedom Books. These are tobe renewed each year.

l Tibetans are issued RegistrationCertificate (RC) by Indianauthorities from the Foreigner ’sRegional Registration Office (FRRO)which needs to be renewed eachyear. Tibetans over the age of 18 whowere born in India are also eligibleto obtain the RC.

l The second wave of refugees wereable to obtain the RC by claiming

Appendix A

DOCUMENTATION OF REFUGEES

that they were born in India.Tibetans without legal status are notprovided with governmentassistance, nor are they permitted tolive in settlement without officialauthorization.

l Travel within India is allowed afterobtaining permission from Indianauthorities and reporting back tothe local police upon their return.

l Since the Tibetan exile governmentis not recognized as a nationalgovernment by other countries, theycannot issues passports themselves.For international travel, Tibetansmust obtain an Identity Certificate(IC) from the Indian Government.The application must have theGreen Book and RC.

TIBET’S PARLIAMENT IN EXILE

CURRENT ANNUAL REPORT 2009,P.61

Unlike many other groups in exile,Tibetans continue to use internationalpermits for ID and travel. They have notsought Indian or other citizenship, andcertainly not Chinese citizenship—exiles continue to be weighed down bythe strain of statelessness, the price ofholding on to their Tibetan identitywhile being unable to return home asfree people.

To discourage the process ofcitizenship- This is to keep movementfor autonomy and Tibet question alive.In other words if citizenship is taken,then the movement for freedom andnationalism will extinguish. Fromliterature survey, CTA prefers exile/refugee status. Some possible reasonsbeing:

(a) It will be a blow to the freedomstruggle.

Appendix B

POSITION OF TIBETAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

AND INDIAN GOVERNMENT ON REFUGEE STATUS

(b) Loss of Tibetan culture.

(c) Loss of refugee status and foreignfunding.

(d) A diminishing sympathy for theTibetan freedom struggle. 65

Some second generation refugees havetaken Indian citizenship, mostly to availof facilities of passports and visas to goabroad. Though the general impressionis that they want to go to greenerpastures to the West66 (including theirgetting citizenship and doing well inlife so to speak) with risingexpectations, it cannot be applied acrossthe spectrum. This could be morepronounced in Dharamsala.

THE INDIAN POSITION

No policy document of Indiangovernment could be located. Howeverimplicit understanding probably is thatit serves strategic purpose to keep themas exiles.

65 Rajesh Kharat, “Gainers of a Stalemate: The Tibetans in India”, Ranbir Samaddar (ed), Refugeesand the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947- 2000, New Delhi, Sage Publications,2003, p.305.

66 Pico Iyer, The Open Road : The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama , New Delhi , PenguinBooks, 2008, pp. 35-36

Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao hadpromised that India will not allow anyanti-Chinese activities on Indian soil.

India is not signatory to UN conventionon refugees or its protocol. It hasmembership on executive council as ithas large number of refugees (3 lakhs).Article 21 of the constitution isapplicable to refugees. There is norefugee law or definition of refugee.However, absence of law does not mean

absence of performance. All refugees inIndia are well looked after. In a TVprogramme on refugee day on 20 June2009 on X channel, Tashi Wangdu,second generation India born Tibetan ,Secretary Bureau of the Dalai Lamastated that he hopes the new UPAgovernment will sign a convention onrefugees. This indicates that Tibetansmay prefer to see India become partyto the treaty. 67

67 News X “Uprooted People”, panel discussion 2030 to 2100 hours on 20 June 2009 conducted byanchor Monika Kshtriya. Panelists, Kiran Kaur, UNHCR, Virender Dyal, Colin Gonsalves, TashiWangdu et al. and others including video conferencing. The panelists mentioned that a Modellaw proposed by UNHCR in 2008 is being examined by a high level committee.

BACKGROUND

India Not Signatory to 1951 convention

and 1967 Protocol: For its own nationalsecurity reasons India is not a signatoryto the convention on refugees of 1951or protocol. However, India is a memberof the executive council as it has a largenumber of refugees (about three lakhsin total from various countries). It hasnot enacted national law on refugees,instead it deals at political andadministrative levels in an ad hocmanner, case by case in context.Refugees are treated as per law of theland. They were granted asylum byIndia and the principle of non-refoulment68 has been strictly adheredto. For Tibetans, refugee status was till1963. Newly arrived are termed as‘pilgrims’. Second wave of refugeesobtained Registration Certificate by

Appendix C

POLICIES ON TIBETAN REFUGEES STATUS AS PER

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INDIA AND UNGA

RESOLUTIONS

claiming birth in India. Tibetanswithout legal status are not providedGovernment assistance, or permitted tolive in settlements without officialauthorization.

The Tibet’s Parliament in Exilemaintains that:

Unlike many other groups in exile,Tibetans continue to use internationalpermits for ID and travel. They havenot sought Indian or other citizenship,and certainly not Chinesecitizenship— exiles continue to beweighed down by strain ofstatelessness, the price of holding onto their Tibetan identity while beingunable to return home as freepeople.69

Nevertheless, Tibetan refugees born inIndia are entitled to Indian citizenship

68 The principle of non-refoulement is the cornerstone of asylum and of international refugee law.Following from the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, as setforth in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this principle reflects thecommitment of the international community to ensure to all persons the enjoyment of humanrights, including the rights to life, to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degradingtreatment or punishment, and to liberty and security of person. These and other rights arethreatened when a refugee is returned to persecution or danger. See http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain

69 MHA Annual Report 2009, p.61

according to section 3 of Indiancitizenship Act 1955, though takingcitizenship is still very rare and limited.The Delhi High Court judgement ofDecember 2010 in case of Ms NamgyalDolkar born to Tibetan parents in Indiaon April 13, 1986 is a new developmentand needs to be observed withsympathy.70 With this court rulingaccording to the Citizenship(Amendment) Act 1986, any personborn in India on or after January 26,1950, but prior to the commencementof the 1986 Act on July 1, 1987, is citizenof India by birth. Thus 35,000 are eligible(born between 1956- 1987). The case isnot new. One Tibetan pointed out that

“We all knew about the 1986 Act longback in school time and still chose tostay as refugees. The Act is not new atall, but much hyped recently only. Backin college I wanted to join NationalDefence Academy (NDA) but later Ichose not to. It’s clearly written in theeligibility criteria that those Tibetanstudents whose parents are in Indiafrom before 1962 can join the NDA”.

UNGA RESOLUTIONS

UNGA resolutions of 1959, 1961, 1965and 1991 UN 42 Sub- Commission onhuman rights is reproduced below.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL

ASSEMBLY - RESOLUTION 1353 (XIV)

New York, 1959

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles regardingfundamental human rights andfreedoms set out in the Charter of theUnited Nations and in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights adoptedby the General Assembly on 10December 1948,

Considering that the fundamentalhuman rights and freedoms to whichthe Tibetan people, like all others, areentitled include the right to civil andreligious liberty for all withoutdistinction,

Mindful also of the distinctive culturaland religious heritage of the people ofTibet and of the autonomy which theyhave traditionally enjoyed,

Gravely concerned at reports, includingthe official statements of His Holinessthe Dalai Lama, to the effect that thefundamental human rights andfreedoms of the people of Tibet havebeen forcibly denied them,

Deploring the effect of these events inincreasing international tension andembittering the relations between

70 The Delhi High court has directed the Ministry of External Affairs to issue a passport. See KanuSarda, “ Ministry of External Affairs to Issuse Passport to Tibetan”, December 27, 2010 at htpp://www.dnaindia.com/

peoples at a time when earnest andpositive efforts are being made byresponsible leaders to reduce tensionand improve international relations,

1) Affirms its belief that respect for theprinciples of the Charter of theUnited Nations and of theUniversal Declaration of HumanRights is essential for the evolutionof a peaceful world order based onthe rule of law;

2) Calls for respect for thefundamental human rights of theTibetan people and for theirdistinctive cultural and religiouslife.

ASSEMBLY - RESOLUTION 1723 (XVI)

New York, 1961

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1353 (XIV) of 21October 1959 on the question of Tibet,

Gravely concerned at the continuation ofevents in Tibet, including the violationof the fundamental human rights of theTibetan people and the suppression ofthe distinctive cultural and religious lifewhich they have traditionally enjoyed,

Noting with deep anxiety the severehardships which these events haveinflicted on the Tibetan people, asevidenced by the large-scale exodus ofTibetan refugees to the neighbouringcountries,

Considering that these events violatefundamental human rights andfreedoms set out in the Charter of theUnited Nations and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights,including the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations,and have the deplorable effect ofincreasing international tension andembittering relations between peoples,

1) Reaffirms its conviction that respectfor the principles of the Charter ofthe United Nations and of theUniversal Declaration of HumanRights is essential for the evolutionof a peaceful world order based onthe rule of law;

2) Solemnly renews its call for thecessation of practices whichdeprive the Tibetan people of theirfundamental human rights andfreedoms, including their right toself-determination;

3) Expresses the hope that MemberStates will make all possible efforts,as appropriate, towards achievingthe purposes of the presentresolution.

ASSEMBLY - RESOLUTION 2079 (XX)

New York, 1965

The General Assembly

Bearing in mind the principles relatingto human rights and fundamentalfreedoms set forth in the Charter of theUnited Nations and proclaimed in theUniversal Declaration of HumanRights,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1353 (XIV)of 21 October 1959 and 1723 (XVI) of 20December 1961 on the question ofTibet,

Appendices

Gravely concerned at the continuedviolation of the fundamental rights andfreedoms of the people of Tibet and thecontinued suppression of theirdistinctive cultural and religious life, asevidenced by the exodus of refugees tothe neighbouring countries,

1) Deplores the continued violation ofthe fundamental rights andfreedoms of the people of Tibet;

2) Reaffirms that respect for theprinciples of the Charter of theUnited Nations and of theUniversal Declaration of HumanRights is essential for the evolutionof a peaceful world order based onthe rule of law;

3) Declares its conviction that theviolation of human rights andfundamental freedoms in Tibetand the suppression of thedistinctive cultural and religiouslife of its people increaseinternational tension and embitterrelations between peoples;

4) Solemnly renews its call for thecessation of all practices whichdeprive the Tibetan people of thehuman rights and fundamentalfreedoms which they have alwaysenjoyed;

5) Appeals to all States to use their bestendeavours to achieve thepurposes of the present resolution.

UN SUB-COMMISSION ON

PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND

PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS

Resolution 1991/10

Geneva, August 23, 1991.

1) At its forty-third session, the Sub-Commission on Prevention ofDiscrimination and Protection ofMinorities adopted, on 23 August1991, resolution 1991/10 entitled“Situation in Tibet,” as follows:

“The Sub-Commission on Prevention ofDiscrimination and Protection ofMinorities Guided by the principles ofthe Charter of the United Nations, theInternational Bill of Human Rights andother international instruments in thefield of human rights,

Concerned at the continuing reports ofviolations of fundamental human rightsand freedoms which threaten thedistinct cultural, religious and nationalidentity of the Tibetan people,

1) Calls upon the Government of thePeople’s Republic of China fully torespect the fundamental humanrights and freedoms of the Tibetanpeople;

2) Requests the Secretary-General totransmit to the Commission onHuman Rights information on thesituation in Tibet provided by theGovernment of China and by otherreliable sources.”

The TPPRC’s Indian Parliament on the

issue of Tibet: Lok Sabha 1952- 2005 (2006)has reproduced nearly all the debatesas it pertains to Tibet. Some debatesrelevant to the present study arehighlighted below. These are followedby those on the Ministry of ExternalAffairs web pages.

NUMBER OF REFUGEES

In various debates from 1967 to 1989 theanswers to the number of refugeeswere:

(a) As in 1967, the total number whohave come over since March 1959is about 51,000 (p.289).

(b) 867 in 1967 and 240 in 1966(p.289).

(c) As in 1972 there are about 58,000Tibetan refugees living in India(p.328).

(d) As in 1989 there are about 80,000Tibetan refugees living in India(p.346).

In 1967 there were fears that refugees51 in number who had crossed over inUttar Pradesh may have some Chinesespies coming with them. In reply it was

Appendix D

SELECT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON TIBETAN

REFUGEES AND DECLARATION BETWEEN INDIA

AND PRC

said that the government is taking allprecautions by screening etc (p.282).

CITIZENSHIP

On May 5 1976 the Deputy Minster inthe MHA clarified that:

(a) Every person born in India on orafter 26 January 1950, becomes acitizen by birth under -subsection(I) of section 3 of Citizenship Act,1955, subject to exceptions undersub-section (2) thereof.

(b) Tibetans who came to India andhave been residing in India formore than five years will acquirecitizenship rights only if they aregranted certificates ofnaturalization by the CentralGovernment under section 6 ofCitizenship Act, 1955.

(c) A few applications have beenreceived for grant of Indiancitizenship by naturalization andthese will be dealt with as per rulesand regulations on the subject(p.332).

The Stand of Government of India on

Tibet- Debate of April 20, 1978

The Government of India has

consistently held that Tibet is a regionof the PRC. It is well known thatthousands of Tibetans led by HH theDalai Lama, fled to India from Tibet.HH Dalai Lama was granted politicalasylum by the Government of India onthe condition that he and the Tibetansin India would not take part in activitiesvis-a-vis the PRC. This is in line withour policy of not interfering in theinternal affairs of other countries.However, the Government of Indiaprovides humanitarian assistance torehabilitate the Tibetan refugees inIndia and supports the preservation oftheir culture and religious traditions(p.334).

Objectives of Central Institute of

Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath

Debate of 5 May 2003

The Institute was established in 1967 byefforts of Nehru and the Dalai Lama. Itwas associated with SampurnanandSanskrit University till 1975. It wasgranted autonomy in 1978. In 1988 itwas declared Deemed University,managed and supported by theDepartment of Culture. Its objectives:

(a) Preservation of Tibetan Cultureand Tradition

(b) Restoration of Ancient IndiaSciences and Literature preservedin Tibetan Language but lost in theoriginal.

(c) To offer alternate educationalfacilities to the students of IndianHimalayan Border formerlyavailing of the opportunity ofreceiving higher education in Tibet.

(d) Accomplishment of gains of

teaching and scope of research intraditional subjects throughmodern university educationsystem with provisions for awardof degrees in Tibetan studies.(p.348).

QUESTIONS FOUND ON

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

WEB PAGES FROM 2000 TILL JULY

Discussion on Karmapa Issue

Unstarred Question No 1011

To be Answered on1.3.2000

----------------------------SHRI Y.S. VIVEKANANDA REDDY:

SHRI U.V. KRISHNAMRAJU:

SHRI R.L. BHATIA:

Will the Minister of EXTERNALAFFAIRS be pleased to state:

(a) whether China has soughtinformation from IndianGovernment about KarmapaLama’s visit to India;

(b) if so, whether India had alsorequested China to provide fulldetails about how Karmapa Lamaleft Tibet and let it know thecircumstances under which the17th Karmapa Ugyen Trinley Dorjemanaged to travel the long arduousroute to Dharamsala;

(c) if so, whether both the countrieshave agreed to discuss this issueamicably;

(d) if so, whether India and China areworking together about thisepisode and there is a clear

understanding between India andChina on this issue; and

(e) if so, the details thereof?

ANSWER: THE MINISTER OFEXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRIJASWANT SINGH)

(a) Following the arrival inDharamshala on January 5, 2000 ofLama Ugyen Thinley Dorji,recognised by his supporters as the17th Gyalwa Karmapa, the ChineseGovernment requested theGovernment of India to provideinformation regarding hiswhereabouts.

(b) The Chinese side has beenrequested to share with us detailsregarding the circumstances of hisdeparture from Tibet for India.

(c) - (e): India and China have been intouch through diplomaticchannels. The two sides have notedwith satisfaction the improvementand development of bilateralrelations on the basis ofPanchsheel.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karmapa Origin

----------------------------SHRI SURESH CHANDEL:

(a) whether the Government is awareof the fact that the Chief Secretary

of Sikkim issued a firm statementon the 17th Karmapa Rinpoche,who escaped to India in January,2000 from Tibet, has Indian origin;

(b) if so, whether the Chief Secretaryhas made this Statement with theapproval of the Government ofSikkim or the Union Government;

(c) if so, the details thereof; and

(d) if not, the steps proposed to betaken in the matter which issensitive and affects the Indo-China relations?

ANSWER: THE MINISTER OFEXTERNAL AFFAIRS : (SHRIJASWANT SINGH)

(a): Government is not aware of anysuch statement made by the ChiefSecretary of Sikkim.

(b) - (d): The question does not arise.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Asylum to Karmapa

----------------------------

SHRI RAGHUNATH JHA:

SHRI AMAR ROYPRADHAN:

SHRI SURESH KURUP:

SHRI MADAN LAL KHURANA:

SHRI MADHAV RAO SCINDIA:

SHRI VARKALA RADHAKRISHNAN:

SHRI ANANT GANGARAM GEETE:

SHRI SHANKERSINH VAGHELA:

Appendices

SHRI SUKDEO PASWAN:

SHRI LAKSHMAN SETH:

SHRI MOINUL HASSAN:

SHRI R.L. BHATIA:

SHRI RAMESH CHENNITHALA:

SHRI K.P. SINGH DEO:

SHRI BIJOY HANDIQUE:

SHRI G.M. BANATWALLA:

SHRI RAM PRASAD SINGH:

SHRI MOHAMMAD ANWARULHAQUE:

(a) whether the Government haveobtained the necessary informationabout the flight of the 17thKarmapa along with his team fromTibet to Dharamshala in January,2000;

(b) if so, the details thereof;

(c) if not, whether the mystery stillsurrounds the reported flight ofKarmapa Lama from Tibet and hisproposed visit to Rumtekmonastery in Sikkim;

(d) whether Dalai Lama has requestedthe Union Government to giveasylum to Karmapa;

(e) if so, whether the Government havealso received any request fromsome organisations to providepolitical asylum to Karmapa alongwith his associates;

(f) if so, whether the Government havereceived any protest from Chinaand some organisations against

providing asylum to Karmapa;

(g) whether the Government proposesto give him the same status as hadbeen given to Dalai Lama;

(h) if so, the action taken by theGovernment on this issue; and

(i) if not, the action taken/proposed tobe taken by the Government in thisregard?

ANSWER: THE MINISTER OFEXTERNAL AFFAIRS: (SHRIJASWANT SINGH)

(a) - (i): Lama Ugyen Thinley Dorji,recognised by his supporters as the17th Gyalwa Karmapa, arrived inDharamsala from Tibet on January5, 2000. The Chinese side has beenrequested to share with us detailsregarding the circumstances of hisdeparture from Tibet for India. Theofficial Chinese position on LamaUgyen Thinley Dorji’s arrival inIndia is that Lama Ugyen ThinleyDorji had gone abroad to “get themusical instruments” of theBuddhist rituals and the “blackhat” used by previous Karmapas.His Holiness the Dalai Lama haspublicly stated that Lama UgyenThinley Dorji would like to stay inIndia and study. Representationshave been received from hissupporters regarding his continuedstay in India. Representations havealso been received against hiscontinued stay in India. The matterrequires careful considerationtaking into account all relevantfactors.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To be Answered on 10.05.2000

KARMAPA ISSUE

----------------------------

SHRI GEORGE EDEN:

SHRI RAMESH CHENNITHALA:

Will the Minister of External Affairs bepleased to state:

(a) whether the Government havereceived any officialcommunication from theGovernment of China regardingthe stay of Karmapa in India;

(b) if so, the details thereof; and

(c) the action taken thereon?

Answer: The Minister of State forExternal Affairs: (Shri Ajit KumarPanja)

(a) - (c): Lama Ugyen Thinley Dorji,recognised by his supporters as the17th Gyalwa Karmapa, arrived inDharamsala from Tibet on January5, 2000. The official Chineseposition on Lama Ugyen ThinleyDorji’s arrival in India is that LamaUgyen Thinley Dorji had goneabroad to “get the musicalinstruments” of the Buddhistrituals and the “black hat” used byprevious Karmapas. The Chineseside has been requested to sharewith us details regarding thecircumstances of his departurefrom Tibet for India. India andChina have been in touch throughdiplomatic channels. The two sideshave noted with satisfaction theimprovement and development of

bilateral relations on the basis ofPanchsheel.

ASYLUM TO KARMAPA

----------------------------

SHRIMATI SHYAMA SINGH:

Will the Minister of External Affairs bepleased to state:

(a) whether the Government haveunofficially permitted Karmapa tostay in India; and

(b) if so, the reaction of China thereto?

Answer: The Minister of State forExternal Affairs: (Shri Ajit KumarPanja)

(a) & (b) Lama Ugyen Thinley Dorji,recognised by his supporters as the17th Gyalwa Karmapa, arrived inDharamsala from Tibet on January 5,2000. The official Chinese position onLama Ugyen Thinley Dorji’s arrival inIndia is that Lama Ugyen Thinley Dorjihad gone abroad to “get the musicalinstruments” of the Buddhist ritualsand the “black hat” used by previousKarmapas. The Chinese side has beenrequested to share with us detailsregarding the circumstances of hisdeparture from Tibet for India. Indiaand China have been in touch throughdiplomatic channels. The two sides havenoted with satisfaction theimprovement and development ofbilateral relations on the basis ofPanchsheel.

Appendices

OBJECTION TO KARMAPA STAY

----------------------------

SHRI R.L. BHATIA

(a) whether China has objected to thestaying of Karmapa Lama in India;and

(b) if so, the reaction of theGovernment thereto?

ANSWER: THE MINISTER OFEXTERNAL AFFAIRS: (SHRI OMARABDULLAH)

(a) No Sir.

(b) Does not arise.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Declaration on Principles for Relations

and Comprehensive Cooperation

Between the Republic of India and the

People’s Republic of China

23/06/2003

At the invitation of Premier of the StateCouncil of the People’s Republic ofChina H.E. Wen Jiabao, Prime Ministerof the Republic of India H.E. Atal BihariVajpayee paid an official visit to thePeople’s Republic of China from 22 to27 June 2003.

The Indian side recognizes that theTibet Autonomous Region is part of theterritory of the People’s Republic ofChina and reiterates that it does notallow Tibetans to engage in anti-Chinapolitical activities in India. The Chineseside expresses its appreciation for theIndian position and reiterates that it isfirmly opposed to any attempt andaction aimed at splitting China andbringing about “independence ofTibet”.

POST-DALAI LAMA CONTINGENCIES

There are two complex issues related tothe post-Dalai Lama scenario.

First, who will be chosen successor andconsidered legitimate? The PRC,Tibetans in the TAR, Tibetans in thePRC and Tibetan exiles need to beconsidered in this issue of authenticity.The role of India and other countriesalso cannot be ignored. The hierarchyof the leadership issue will also comeinto focus for scouting the tulku(reincarnation). Within Gelugpa thenext is Panchen Lama: a Chineseselected one is in the PRC; the oneendorsed by the Dalai Lama is missingin China. The next in hierarchy isprobably the Karmapa, now in India(endorsed both by the PRC and theDalai Lama). According to AshwaniKumar, the Karmapa is the spiritual

1 Ashwini Kumar, “Karmapas: A historical and philosophical introduction”, Bulletin of Tibetology,New Series, No. 1, 13 February 2002, pp. 7–15. In a presentation to the research committee, P.Stobdan mentioned that the Karmapa is ninth in the hierarchy; his hierarchical status may bein doubt, although in the search for the Twelfth Gyalwang Drukpa Rinpoche of Hemis Gompaof Ladakh in the 1960s, the lama reincarnation was located by rights and rituals of the DalaiLama, Karmapa (the sixteenth), Dudjon Rinpoche and Sakya Trichen.

2 Pico Iyer, The Open Road: The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama , New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2008, p.121.

3 Chering Dorjay, “How Rescue Mission Was Carried Out”, Border Affairs, October–December2008, pp. 14–16.

4 Stephanie Roemer, The Tibetan Government in Exile: Politics at Large , London , Routledge ,2008 , p. 177.

Chapter 4

leader of the Kagyud school of TibetanBuddhism and ranks third in thespiritual hierarchy after the Dalai Lamaand Panchen Lama.1 Pico Iyer alsoplaces him third in the hierarchy.2 Forthe first time the Karmapa was allowedto travel outside his exile in Sidhbari(near Dharamsala) to border regionssuch as Ladakh in September 2008 andwas received well.3 To the best of theinformation available, he has not beenallowed to go to Sikkim.

The Dalai Lama has stated that hissuccessor will not be found within thepresent Chinese borders but from theexile community. A new Dalai Lamainstalled by the Chinese in Beijing – likethe Eleventh Panchen Lama – may beseen as a puppet.4 The Chineseleadership has proclaimed that the

Fifteenth Dalai Lama will be born in thePRC and will be chosen throughtraditional methods.5 Confusion iscertain in future on this account. Willthe Tibetan Parliament in Exile play apart via democratic means? Like theTenth Sikh Guru, will the institutioncome to an end? In India, the first lineof opinion of importance in thechangeover will be that of the Tibetanrefugees.

The second issue is- how does Tibetannationalism play out in the absence ofa charismatic leader such as theFourteenth Dalai Lama? Will theTibetan Youth Congress (TYC), whichwas in any case opposed to the peacefulmiddle path become more strident, butat what and at whom? Will China’s“strike hard” policy win hearts andminds? Can a spontaneous movementsuch as of March 2008 in Tibet berepeated? Will Tibetans in exile go theway of the Parsis in India? Will Indiaand Tibetans lose its case for Tibet inthe case? Will there be a day whenTibetans return to Tibet (eithervoluntarily, or as a negotiatedsettlement or no more welcome asguests and expelled by India?)

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

Åshild Kolås, author and researcher atthe Peace Research Institute, Oslo:6

The interim period between two Dalai

5 Ibid.6 Åshild Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition: A Place Called Shangrila , Oxon, Routledge,

2008 and “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion”, Journal of Peace Research, 33(1), February1996, pp. 51–66.

7 Internet correspondence with task force leader in November 2008.

Lamas is in practice almost 20 years,since a regent would be in charge whilethe new Dalai Lama was a minor. So thescenario for when the current DalaiLama passes away should be careful totake into account how the interimperiod functioned traditionally. Theyoung Karmapa would probably havea very important informal role in thisperiod, but I don’t think he couldbecome a regent. He is not a Gelugpalama, and historically the regent wouldnormally be a member of thearistocracy. So in my view the Karmapacould not fill the formal leadership slot.The exile government has for a longtime embarked on a process ofdemocratization, and there woulddefinitely be a “democratically elected”regent, if at all, so the secular nature ofthe regency would probably be evenmore prominent today than it was in thepast. This is according to myunderstanding of the role of the regentand the interim period between twoDalai Lamas. This is a sensitive topic todiscuss with Tibetans though, becausemany Tibetans do not like to talk aboutthe Dalai Lama passing away. Still thisis a very important question.7

Abanti Bhattacharya:

Given the scenario where no second lineof Tibetan leadership is in sight, thefuture of Tibet, particularly in the post-Dalai Lama era, is uncertain. This

uncertainty could have its impact on India-China relations, as Tibet remains a liveissue shaping them. Several trends mayemerge among Tibetans in the post-DalaiLama era:

l A vacuum in leadership after theDalai Lama may lead to a powerstruggle between the TGIE and theSeventeenth Karmapa, while thewhereabouts of Panchen Lama areuncertain.

l Infighting among various Tibetanmonastic organisations may arise.

l The TYC may go radical and launcha more open political and evenarmed struggle.

l India could recognise thedemocratically elected TGIE, ifrelations with China deteriorate,and some other states may followsuit.

l The Tibetan community in Indiamay pose a problem if conflict ofinterest grows with locals and theIndian Government could then askthem to return to China.

l The Tibetan diaspora couldcomplicate negotiations on theborder problem between the twocountries.

l The TGIE may fall into disarray withno leadership and the Tibetanmovement fizzles out.

8 Abanti Bhattacharya, “Chinese Nationalism and the Fate of Tibet: Implications for India andFuture Scenarios”, Strategic Analysis, 31(2), March 2007, pp. 237–66.

9 Abanti Bhattacharya, “As China prepares for post-Dalai Lama Tibet, what is India to do withthe Tibetan Exiles?”http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/AsChinapreparesforpost-DalaiLamaTibetwhatisIndiatodowiththeTibetanExiles_abhattacharya_250310

l China may prop up its own DalaiLama and the pro-PRC Tibetansmay rally behind the Chinese-appointed Dalai Lama.

Much will depend on what courseIndia-China relations take in the future,the ability of the Tibetans to conduct aunified and peaceful national struggleand the approach of the reformistforces in China.8

In a commentary in March 2010 Abantipoints out that the Fifth NationalConference on the Work of Tibet washeld in Beijing on January 18–20, 2010(the first time after the March 2008uprising) to address the issue of thefuture Dalai Lama. The thrust was topromote Tibetan Buddhism to bluntWestern criticism of China’s repressivepolicy. She suggests that while Chinahas shown eagerness for the DalaiLama’s return to China, it has notcategorically refused to take back theexiled Tibetan population based inIndia. China according to the author isbuying time till the Dalai Lama passesaway, after which, it hopes, the Tibetanmovement would naturally fizzle out.9

Dennis J. Burke concedes that this willbe a complicated problem. Tibet willsuffer confusion, power play andweaknesses. The reasons given are:

(a) There are elements in the Tibetancommunity who are holding back

Post-Dalai Lama Contingencies

on more radical action purelybecause of the Dalai Lama’sleadership. Petty acts of terrorismcannot be ruled out.

(b) Tenzin Tsundue believes thatTibetans have enough unity tocontinue the peaceful path in theDalai Lama’s absence.

(c) China may choose a successor likeit did for Panchen Lama (the onecurrently recognized by theTibetans is missing in China). Itmay happen that there are twoDalai Lamas.

(d) Without the recognition of thePanchen Lama (under house arrestor dead) the Tibetan choice of theDalai Lama will need the blessingof the next higher Lama, theKarmapa, who has yet todemonstrate that he is entirely onDharamsala’s side and who hasnot, in this incarnation or theprevious one, been called upon tolegitimize the choice of successor.

(e) It takes 18 years for the new DalaiLama to be old enough to takepower. In the past this led to theappointment of regent, and onceagain the logical choice is theKarmapa.10

Stephanie Roemer proposes thehypothesis that “The function andpolitical legitimation of the CTA asTibetan government in exile is

determined by the institution of theDalai Lama”. In her opinion, theFourteenth Dalai Lama has been aunifying force, yet he hinders a seculardemocratic transformation of the exileTibetan political system as a whole. Isthe exiled Tibetan political system in aposition to handle his death in termsof keeping things stable andcontrollable? The institution of theDalai Lama is based on tulku, theconcept of reincarnation since theseventeenth century. The absence ofsuch a leader generally leads toinstability. Unsteadiness is most likelybecause of the existing factionalismalong regional, religious and politicallines among the Tibetan exiles. Thepresent Dalai Lama says that hisreincarnation will not be born in thePRC. It is possible that the SeventeenthKarmapa emerges as leader, but thecrucial question is whether he has theexceptional personal qualities, theexpertise and the charisma comparablewith those of the Fourteenth DalaiLama, which will allow him to handlepolitical affairs until a new Dalai Lamacan succeed. The death of theFourteenth Dalai Lama will reveal the realstrength of the CTA to act as anexile government on behalf of the entireTibetan nation.11

Pico Iyer writes that the Dalai Lamasays that the time of tradition is nowover. He may designate his ownsuccessor from among the young lamas

10 Denis J. Burke, “Tibetans in Exile in a Changing Global Political Climate”, Economic and PoliticalWeekly, April 12,2008, pp. 79–85.

11 Stephanie Roemer, The Tibetan Government in Exile: Politics at Large , London , Routledge , p. 177.

around him and ask Tibetans to treathim as their leader, whether or not hebears the title of the Dalai Lama.12 TheDalai Lama insists that the future is inseparating church and state. Iyer’s bookThe Open Road: The Global Journey of the

Fourteenth Dalai Lama lists two viewsof some exiles: (a) possible civil war andterrorist action; (b) continuation of thedemocratic pattern laid out by the DalaiLama.13 Iyer quotes the Dalai Lama tohave said that

All depends on the respect of theTibetan people for their popularlyelected leader. 100%, impossible, but60, 70 and still 30 and 40% opposed:it can create some problems. We’rein a foreign country; meantime if theIndian government withdraws someformal recognition, then I don’t know.Very complicated. (pp. 228–9)

The Dalai Lama also mentions that thesystem of elected Prime Minister is inplace. One of the first factors hementioned when contemplating thefuture was not Tibet or even China butIndia, which would grow anxious if theystarted to assert themselves too muchas a political force (p. 229).

Mohan Guruswamy speculates that:

(a) The lid on Tibetan militancy keptby Dalai Lama will be off, leading

12 Pico Iyer, “A Hell on Earth”, The New York Review of Books, March 2009, pp. 6–10.13 Iyer, The Open Road n. 2, p. 219.14 P. Stobdan, “India’s Concerns over Tibet – I and II”, Defence & Technology, June 2006 and July

2006, pp. 36–41 and pp. 38 to 43. Also see P. Stobdan, “Tibet and security of the Indian Himalayanbelt”, in K. Warikoo (ed.), Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, geo-political and strategicperspectives (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 102–21.

15 Mohan Guruswamy, “India’s ‘Tibet Policy’ “, South Asia Defence and Strategic Year Book, 2009,pp. 72–6.

to challenge of political power of thenext Dalai.

(b) The chosen leadership will bechallenged by the Chinese who willfoist their own incarnation.

(c) Young exiles will stake a claim oftemporal leadership; powerstruggle to include regents.

(d) Splintering of the exile leadershipwould be the objective of theChinese.

Regarding consequences for India hementions how Indian Buddhists of theHimalayan belt are integrated withTibetans. This contradicts P. Stobdan’sview.14 Guruswamy points out that theDalai Lama has shown restraint by notovertly interfering with the functioningof the numerous monasteries, but afuture religious leadership might notbe so restrained, particularly when easyWestern money is involved. He isuncomfortable with the fact that Indiahas anointed the Tibetan Dalai Lamaas the only Buddhist leader werecognize.15

P. Stobdan: The Chinese treat the DalaiLama as a strategic commodity and willinfluence both the process of the nextDalai Lama’s selection and the role hewould play in Tibet. They will seek toinstall their own nominee and will have

nothing to do with the Dalai Lama basedin India. India will then land up with aTibetan problem of its own that may haveother kinds of implications.16 He furtheramplifies:

(a) Chinese efforts to gain control overTibetan refugees will intensify viamanipulation of the Karmapa.

(b) There would be much turbulencebetween faction-ridden refugees.The Chinese will further attempt todivide the Tibetans (like inShugden and Karmapacontroversies).

(c) Cross-border forays by radicalgroups like the TYC, ChushiGangdrug, etc. cannot be ruledout.17

As regards reincarnation, he argues thatChina has been preparing for thecontingency for more than a decade toensure that: (a) the transition has nosecurity implications (b) China is ableto control both the selection processand its choice of candidate for the nextDalai Lama. The Chinese have enacteda law in 2007 for the next Dalai Lama.18

Further options suggested by the DalaiLama are:

(i) Ending the born-again rule andrelying on referendum to decidethe future.

(ii) For the selection option he hassuggested the Zen model of

choosing a qualified adult, orsuccessor in consultation with othereminent lamas or passing the seat tothe next lamaist hierarchy, SakyaLama or Karmapa.

As the Tibetans place the lama ahead ofeven the Buddha, option (i) above is leastlikely and may also end the Gelugpa–Lamaist supremacy, leading to sectarianstrife. The Dalai Lama can be proactiveand appoint the fifteenth reincarnationwhile he is still alive, hoping that anamicable solution would be found beforehis demise.19

C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C.Khanna:

The pessimists fear that China is engagedin changing the demographic profile ofTibet, reducing Tibetans to a minority intheir own land and thus exterminatingTibetan civilization. They believe that theChinese are willing to wait till the presentDalai Lama dies, in the hope that it wouldextinguish Tibetan resistance. In a moreoptimistic scenario, painted byimportant exiled Tibetan scholars, theamazing economic liberalisation inChina could lead to a gradual politicaldemocratisation. This, they hope, willeventually result in a change in Beijing’spolicy not only towards internal dissentbut also towards Tibet. It is their hopethat a non-dogmatic post-revolutionaryleadership will think differently andmore liberally about Tibet.

16 Stobdan, “India’s Concerns over Tibet – I and II”, n. 14.17 Stobdan, “Tibet and security of the Indian Himalayan belt”, n. 14.18 Discussed at IDSA, June 20, 2008.19 Ibid.

Some Tibetan leaders argue, perhaps withreason, that those in present Chineseleadership who believe that the problemwill go away when the present DalaiLama dies are miscalculating.20

In Rajiv Sikri’s assessment contrary towhat the Chinese Government may bethinking, the situation may deteriorateand go out of control after the presentDalai Lama is no more as there is noleadership like his for the peacefulmiddle path. 21

B. Raman notes that after the violencein March–April 2008 the Chinese haveregained their confidence in 2009. Theyare convinced that the internationalcommunity barring sections of WesternNGOs has accepted the irreversibilityof the ground reality of Tibet as anintegral part of China. They areprepared to show patience and wait forthe Dalai Lama’s death and thereafternominate their own Dalai Lama. Whatthey are worried about is that HisHoliness might try to pre-empt this bychanging the traditional process bywhich a successor is chosen. B. Ramanis certain that when the Dalai Lama dies,his successor – however chosen and bywhomever – may not enjoy the samereverence and loyalty from the Tibetansin China. The Chinese are counting onthis possibility for ultimately wearing

20 C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, India and China: The Way Ahead, 2nd edition, New Delhi,Har-Anand, 2004, pp. 176–7.

21 Rajiv Sikri, Challenges and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy , New Delhi, Sage, 2009, pp.98-99.

22 B. Raman, “Civil Disobedience Movement by Tibetans Continues”, Indian Defence Review, April–June 2009, pp. 154–5.

out the Tibetan resistance. At present,the Chinese are not making an issue ofthe Dalai Lama’s activities from his exilein India. They understand the love andreverence for him from the Indianpeople. Once he dies, the Chineseattitude to the activities of his followersfrom Indian territory may harden andcould become a new friction point inSino-Indian relations. The author urges theGovernment of India to identify thevarious possible scenarios with regardto Tibet during the next 10 years andexamine its options.22

Michel Bonnin- The Chinese order ofSeptember 2007 “Reincarnation ofTibetan Living Buddha” stipulates thatall decisions on this issue by religiousentities have to be approved by ChineseState Administration for ReligiousAffairs. Bonnin points out that the term‘Living Buddha’ does not appear to holdmuch significance for TibetanBuddhists, who only speak of“incarnation”. There is a growingsuspicion, especially since theaforementioned order regarding the‘Living Buddha’ that the Chineseleadership is simply waiting for theDalai Lama’s death so as to replace himwith someone less charismatic andmore docile. The regime hopes thatwithout the revered spiritual leaderaround, Tibetans would lose much of

their capacity to unite and resist.Quoting views of the Chinese writerWang Lixiong it is realised that shouldthe Dalai Lam die in exile it could leadto a feeling of despair in Tibet, givingrise to more serious conflict. That is whyit is necessary to conceive of a changein strategy leading to an acceptance ofreal autonomy for Tibetan people. Theperiod of 2012 is to be watched, for achange in heart in Chinese leadershipwhen a new generation of leaders takeoffice.23

SOME CHINESE VIEWS

There is one view (by at least two Indianscholars) that for the Chinesegovernment the window of opportunityis to settle Tibet during the presentDalai Lama’s lifetime.24 Most of thesurvey of literature, including fieldworkin China, points to the reality that theChinese will attempt to have their ownway. This is in contrast to the surveycarried out by our task-force studymember in China in August 2009, givenbelow (names of the Chinese scholarsand officials are not disclosed underrequest).

Inputs from China: Field Study

Impression

The recent series of protests in Tibethave put immense pressure on theChinese government to take resolute

action on the issue. Although themovement looks calm for the moment, theChinese authorities anticipate thatit may take a violent turn at any timelike the recent Xinjiang crisis of 5 July2009. A group of Chinese writers andintellectuals have shown the courage topublicly question the government’scurrent Tibet policy. The psychologicalimpact of the Tibetan movement couldbe debilitating for China in the longterm. Many believe that it could perhapshave inspired the other ethniccommunities like the Uyghurs to try tocoalesce with Tibetan groups, bothwithin and abroad. Tibet and Xinjiang areseen as issues related to China’snational prestige for a long-time.

While the government’s plan on thefuture of Tibet looks resolute and seemsmuch more economic-oriented, thepolitical strategy in the post-Dalai Lamaperiod remains somewhatundisclosed; interactions andinterviews with leading Chineseofficials and scholars suggest that it isa complex issue. While the governmentseems not to compromise its stanceover the issue, it remains critical due toChina’s constant reiteration overTawang and Arunachal Pradesh linkingit with historical China-India boundaryissues.

An assessment of this point is made

23 Michel Bonnin, “ Far from Harmonious: the Chinese Authorities’ Handling of the 2008 TibetCrisis “, China Perspective, No.2009/3, pp.66-72.

24 Ravi Bhoothalingam, “For a ‘Harmonious Resolution’ of the Tibetan Question”, Economic andPolitical Weekly, August 18, 2007, pp. 3383–7 and Iyer, “A Hell on Earth”, n. 12.

after talking to many leading experts,scholars in Shanghai, Guangzhou,Sichuan and Beijing.

l Most officials and scholars are of theview that China will elect a separatespiritual leader to be called the nextDalai Lama for China’s Tibet afterthe demise of the current DalaiLama. Leading experts are of theview that under the current scenarioChina is unlikely to make anycompromise on the Tibet questionas the Dalai Lama has alreadydamaged China’s image at theglobal level.

l Though there are some rounds oftalks have happened, however,under the present Dalai Lama’stenure, any kind of understandingbetween the Chinese governmentand the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) looks almostimpossible. China will make noconcession unless the Dalai Lamaapologizes to China and its peopleover his “ugly” remarks for manyyears.

l A high-profile Communist Partyofficial in Beijing during ourinteraction said that under threeconditions China will start makingsome concessions and try buildingsome understanding with theTibetan leaders. They are: (1) TheDalai Lama should apologize andpublicly accept his fault; (2) give upthe independence of Tibet issue andpublicly accept that Tibet is a partof China; (3) acknowledge that theterritory of Tawang or ArunachalPradesh belongs to Chinahistorically.

l In the post-Dalai Lama period, manyscholars and experts in China are of theview that any kind of rational talkswith the TGIE look impossible. Still, ifa situation arises for bilateral talks, nothird party, say India or any otherpower, should be involved in this talk.The talks should be exclusivelybetween the TGIE and the Chinesegovernment.

l If such talks take place, the Chinesegovernment may give an option forthe TGIE to come over to China. Butthat should be done exclusivelybetween the Chinese governmentand the TGIE. The latter would haveto accept certain conditions. Itwould be asked to take part inChina’s “national security” strategyunder certain given conditions andcriteria. But before that, the Chinesegovernment will make it sure thatthe TGIE is honest and holdssentiments of loyalty for thecountry. The Chinese governmentwill see how it can accommodatesuch a huge number of refugees.

l There is widespread debate inChina among the experts thatimmediately after the current DalaiLama, the Chinese governmentshould bring some laws andregulations to tighten the “nationalsecurity” sentiments in theautonomous region. This is beingdebated after the protests in Tibetand Xinjiang. Though one is notsure about the extent and nature ofthe forthcoming laws andregulations, surely the Chinesegovernment will bring somepolitical and legal measures in order

to prevent the “autonomous region”from resorting to protests and violence.

l China is aware that the Tibetans andUyghurs in Xinjiang may uniteagainst it at the international level.It is keeping tabs on the WorldUyghurs Congress (WUC) followersand particularly the supporters ofChief Rabeeya Kadeer. It may alsoinvestigate whether the extremistUyghurs and the TYC activists haveany kind of terrorist links and areplanning to damage the Chineseinterests at any point of time.

l After the riots in Urumqi on July 5,2009, most of the Chinesegovernment officials are linking theXinjiang and Tibet crisis as“national concern issues”. Thoughthe nature of the crises in the tworegions is different, to the Chineseofficials the intention seems thesame, being aimed against Chinaand the Chinese government.25

CONCLUSION

The strategy is to prepare for allcontingencies and let the Tibetansthemselves conclude matters within theframework established so far, assumingthat the civil society, governmentmachinery, policymakers, analysts,scholars and the Tibetans in India areall alive to the future scenarios andcontingencies. For this a dialogue mustbe initiated with the TGIE. A joint

scenario exercise must be played out if notalready done. The decentralizedleadership of refugee establishment mustbe incorporated so that the post-Fourteenth Dalai Lama era is acceptedwith calm, fortitude and further cohesionamong the Tibetans. The exiled PrimeMinister Dr Lobsang Sangay will play acentral role in bringing this about.

After the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, India’stask will become more difficult. Thetransition and institutionalization of theTibetan movement will need to befacilitated by India openly. Here theinternational community can be shownhow India can manage such issues ofhuman rights, cultural protection anddemocracy. This will demand a cohesiveand well-coordinated response not onlyby the Ministry of External Affairs butother organs such as Department ofCulture, Home Ministry and Ministryof Defence (for military signalling likethat of 1986-87 and professionalism fora limited war, better logistics and roadsin the region and massive people’sparticipation to repulse a Chineseoffensive).

The first phase starting with the DalaiLama’s escape in 1959 is nearly over.Preparations need to be done for thecoming phase. The Indian publicopinion also needs to be built up to bemore favourable for the Tibetans’desire for autonomy. Only then thepolitical will to implement new policieswill be generated.

25 The above points are made by Dr Jagannath P. Panda on his field study impression from China.

HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DO TIBETAN REFUGEES

WIELD IN THE INDIAN SOCIO- POLITICAL

ENVIRONMENT?

Chapter 5

ASSESSMENT BY TASK FORCE

MEMBERS DURING FIELD TRIP TO

DHARAMSALA AND DEHRA DUN

The young westernized Tibetangeneration has, to some extent,influenced the Indian counterparts intheir environment. There is now the so-called jeans culture, free social mixingof sexes, and an increasing habit ofeating out; and at some places (Majnuka Tila in Delhi and Dharamsala)smoking and the marijuana culture hasalso grown and is copied by someIndian youths.

Overall, their influence on the Indiansociety is quite localized andinsignificant . Their presence in Indiaitself is infinitesimal. They do not makeany deliberate attempt to expand theirculture; rather they remain confined intheir sanctuaries. There is also notmuch social mixing of sexes from thetwo cultures. At Dharamsala there hadbeen one marriage between a Tibetangirl and local boy but it broke up aftertwo years. In Dehradun intermarriagesare relatively more; but in a period of50 years of settlement of the Tibetans,these examples carry insignificantweight.

HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DO TIBETAN

REFUGEES WIELD ON THE INDIAN

SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT?

Although the political policy of theTibetans is more or less the same atboth Dharamsala and Dehradun, theirsocial relations with local Indians arequite different. In Dharamsala andMcLeodGunj the Tibetans are moresecluded; they are more comfortablewith foreigners. They hardly interactwith the local populace, but theiraloofness is taken without rancour. Thelocals, generally appreciate theirpeaceful and humble ways.

The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of theTibetan Parliament-in-Exile usually takepart in the local functions of social andcultural importance.

The young Tibetans’ lifestyle, which istrendy and fashionable, is influencingthe local Indian youth. Tibetan societymaintains a fair degree of genderequality; we found them equally activeat all places we visited. This hasimpressed the Indian social system,especially in Dehradun.

MARRIAGE AND ADOPTION

There has been no case of intercultural

adoption. In Dehradun some interculturalmarriages have taken place, mostlybetween Sikh boys and Tibetan girls butnone between Tibetan boys and Indiangirls. This is not because of any socialproblem as such; their economic andindeterminate social status in India is themain hurdle. The Tibetans are not citizensand their economic position is not quitestable. All intercultural marriages areinitiated by the couple themselves and theirparents only facilitate them. Thesemarriages have been successful, unlikein Dharamsala.

In McLeodGunj, Tibetans are moreinterested in marrying foreigners,particularly Western tourists; thesemarriages generally do not endure.Marriage provides a route to migrate tothe Western countries. Abroad, they aremostly employed in the hospitalityindustry. They are fluent in English,well attuned to Western culture,discipline and habits, are punctual andhard working.

RELIGIOUS CONVERSION

Tibetans continue to adhere to Buddhismas individuals. There has not been a singleconversion. The older generation revereBuddhism; much of the youngergeneration is the least bothered aboutreligion. Buddhism has a social base inIndia and is respected. So they feel at homewith their religious affiliation. SomeTibetans have, however, converted toChristianity after migrating to the West.

MEMBERSHIP OF RELIGIOUS/CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS

The mahants (priests) of the twotemples informed us that sometimesthe Tibetans visit their temples merelyas an outing. The McLeodGunj templeMahant said that the Dalai Lama, whenhe was living on the premises of thetemple, used to visit the temple. Aftermoving over to the main town ofMcLeodGunj, he has hardly visited thetemple.

SURVEY OF REFUGEE ESTABLISHMENTS: DHARAMSALA

AND DEHRADUN IN 2009

Chapter 5-A

INTRODUCTION

Tibetans in exile have successfullyreconstituted their institutions and setup non-governmental organisations(NGOs) to keep alive their culture and

language at various places in India.Dharamsala, which houses the TibetanParliament-in-Exile, is the mostimportant site for Tibetans in India.

The strong cultural heritage of theTibetan community at Dharamsala andDehradun – their identities, memoriesand narratives – have come to beinformed by an increasingly strongmeta-narrative focused on religiosityand suffering. This meta-narrative isbuilt both intentionally and organically

by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile(TGIE) and numerous organizationsopenly funded and supported byforeign associations and agencies.Among these are NorbulingkaInstitute, the SOS Children’s VillageDharamsala, the Tibetan YouthCongress, the Tibetan Women

Main Office of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, Dharamsala. It is closed on Sundays.

By Dr Jagannath P. Panda and Zakir Hussain

Association, and the Tibetan Centre forHuman Rights and Democracy.

Ironically, as the target of the meta-narrative is to support Tibetans and toconserve their cultural affluence andtradition, it also restrains theindependence of personal experience,generating homogenized narratives.

As we leave the guest house and walkdown to the hills of the Tibetancommunity in Dharamsala, we are

immediately surrounded by a wide-ranging mixture of ethnicities –Tibetans, monks and nuns, PahadiIndians, Westerners – amidst thebeautiful mountains. At McLeodGunjthis diverse group of individualsmeshes together perfectly.

WAVES OF MIGRATION

There have been three waves of Tibetanrefugees into India, as follows:

l The first wave fled out of Tibet withthe Dalai Lama, which continued inthe 1960s

l The second wave after the 1960s to1990s

l The third wave since the 1990s.

The post-1990s refugees generally crossed-in the hope of better education, bothmodern and monastic; to escaperepression; and also as they wereattracted by the lure of migrating to theWestern countries, which is notpossible in China. These are mostly inthe age group of 15 to 30.

ARRIVAL ROUTE

The Home Secretary of the TGIE is ofthe view that the majority choose theTibet–Nepal route. They first land in

Nepal and through the UNHCR, passto India. Almost 1,500–2,000 Tibetansused to escape from Tibet annually, butthis has been stopped since the Maoistgovernment came to power in Nepal.In 2008, less than 500–600 refugeesarrived in India; in the first four monthsof 2009, none had arrived. This may betaken as a barometer of the intensityand intimacy of the Chinese

Main Chowk (Centre) of the TibetanParliament-in Exile, Dharamsala

Secretary Mr. Phurbu Tsering of Tibetan

Parliament-in-Exile in his office,

government with the Maoist regime inNepal and also India’s relations withNepal.

CURRENT OCCUPATION

The respondents belonged to fouroccupational categories, viz.,administrative, business, professionaland casual labour.

The first category is associated with theTibetan administration as well asschools and other official organisationsrunning in India. Their salaries rangebetween Rs. 7,000 and Rs. 20,000. Theyare keenly interested in grooming theiroffspring in a modern milieu.

The business class is the largest group.The first are those who run the well-

known Tibet markets in cities. They sellwoollen clothes, special Tibetan attires,etc. Some Tibetans are also engaged inseasonal trading, such as sellingwoollen clothes during winter. Theypurchase their items mostly fromLudhiana and sell mostly in Delhi.

Some others are engaged in cateringand restaurant services, where theyprovide Tibetan specialities, or modernservices like computers, internet café, photoshops, etc.

The emerging youth, which is the thirdcategory, are mostly the post-1990Indian-born generation. At Selakui inDehradun, we were informed by Mr.Tenzin Pao Dhashi, Director, TibetanSOS Vocational Training Centre, thattheir students are well received byrenowned hotels and bakeries like theTaj, Radisson, Hotel Rajdoot, etc. inDelhi, Goa, Mumbai, etc. Theysometimes make campus recruitmentsor call the training centre to sendtrained professionals. The trainingcentre watches the market performanceclosely and also learns from thefeedback it receives. The strengths ofthese students are their effectiveEnglish communication skills,punctuality, efficiency, adaptability,sense of hygiene and dedication to theirprofession. The training centre alsotakes vigorous training sessions inextra-curricular activities, which includecommunicative, interpersonal and teamworking habits.

Staff of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile

Survey of Refugee Establishments: Dharamsala and Dehradun in 2009

Students doing practical work at Tibetan SOSVocational Training Centre, Selakui, Dehradun

We found the classes were well equipped with modern implements and facilities and werestaffed by able instructors. Everything looked spic and span, with attentionto minute details.

Students at a cooking session at the Tibetan SOS Vocational Training Centre, Selakui, Dehradun

Workshops of the vocational training school at Selakui, Dehradun

Very few Tibetans are engaged in casual labour. They are mostly employed in catering,sales, etc. In Dehradun, Tibetans are employed by Indian shopkeepers mostly sellingfashionable items and they are well liked.

Some of the newly arrived refugeeswant to complete their monasticeducation and return to Tibet. Othersaspire to migrate to the Western

countries. The monks feel underpressure in China because the Chineseauthorities do not permit the Tibetansto revere the current Dalai Lama. TheChinese have their own brand ofBuddhist philosophy and strictlycontrol the religious lives of theTibetans.

STATUS OF TIBETAN REFUGEES –THEIR RELIGIOUS STATUS AND

POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Theoretically, the Tibetans neither enjoyeither refugee status nor have they beengranted citizenship. They hold anintermediary position. They do not havecitizenship rights or the UNHCR declared status. In this situation theyare politically insignificant as they donot have suffrage/voting rights.

The Tibetans maintain a cordial relationwith all political parties and especiallywith those which are in power. Tibetanleaders want to maintain a close

Mr. Tengin Choe Ton, Deputy Staff

relation with the ruling political parties sothat they help in solving their local

problems; manage the localadministration with the help of rulingparties; and sort out their differences onvarious issues such as law and order. Theyalso seek favour of the ruling parties to getregistration of new refugees and facilitaterenewal of the older ones. They do notexhibit preference for any single politicalparty.

Tibetans are particularly grateful for thefreedom of religion prevailing in India.It works as a strong magnet for the newrefugees to escape from China. At thebig religious seminaries andmonasteries there are huge statues of

Zakir Hussain with Buddhist LinguistAdministrators at McLeodGunj, Dharamsala

Discussion with Tibetan monk scholars inMcLeodGunj

Gautama Buddha. The monks alsorepose faith in the Guru-Chela (teacher-student) relationship between Indiaand Tibet.

CONDITIONS OF LIVELIHOOD

The Tibetans’ conditions of livelihoodare just like those of Indian citizens.Their lifestyles are generally trendy andfashionable; they converse in Englishand exhibit a middle class attitude.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

In Dharamsala/McLeodGunj it isdifficult to guess the Tibetans’economic status; in Dehradun it iseasier. In Dharamsala they maintain agood status in clothing, shoes and inhealth. Monks usually wear goodquality maroon cloaks and shoes (Rs.2,500–3,000); the youth wear expensivejeans and shirts.

The TGIE staff expressed satisfactionwith the economic situation of theTibetans. But individual Tibetansrevealed a different story. They

expressed deep concern over their pooreconomic condition. Outwardly theywore good clothes and expensive shoesand maintained an expensive lifestylebut lacked a bank balance. They haveno regular and fixed income because ofthe uncertainty and temporary natureof their professions. This was attributedto their refugee status; it was felt thatcitizenship could improve theireconomic conditions.

They also regularly receive charity. Thishas been a good bulwark to theireconomic security. The funds anddonations come from the US, Canada,the UK, Germany, France, etc.

These charities and donations are usedto run hospitals, schools, administrativefunctions of the Parliament-in-Exile,maintaining hygiene, imparting Englishspeaking courses free of cost to allTibetans and meeting expenses of otherwelfare activities. These donations thushelp in maintaining good personal,public and social lives of the commonTibetans. If these donations dry upsome day, the quality of the Tibetans’lives will suffer considerably.

Zakir Hussain (third from left) andJagannath Panda (third from right) with

monk scholars of The Buddhist LinguisticUniversity, McLeodGunj

Deputy Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament-in- Exile, Ms.Gyari Dolma at Dharamsala

THE POST-DALAI LAMA SCENARIO

Two major scenarios are seen as possibleby the respondents: a power struggle inthe structure, and decline in the Tibetmovement, particularly at theinternational level.

The First Scenario: There may be acomplex power struggle. Even theKarmapa may like to influence thepower structure. This may for some timerock the business of the Parliament-in-Exile, but this would not be beyondcontrol. Over time, the parliamentarycommittee which is formed particularly to

deal with thepost-Dalai Lama situations would fill thegap.

The Second Scenario: The passing away ofthe present Dalai Lama wouldnaturally cause a setback to the pace ofthe Tibetan movement globally. Thereis no other successor who can come upto his stature. Globally, the current DalaiLama has lifted the Tibetanmovement through his benignpersonality, reasonable writingcampaigns and addressing nationaland international meetings andgatherings with equal passion and

enthusiasm. The current generation ishabituated to his presence.

VIEWS ON THE HEALTH OF THE

DALAI LAMA

The Dalai Lama’s health is causing concernto some, particularly after his kidneyoperation. He also has problems withmemory. The Tibetans have maybe 10years to reach some meaningfulagreement with the Chinese governmentduring the Dalai Lama’s sojourn on earth.All sects are against violence as a meansof freedom struggle.

Who are the most influential leaders

next in line? Why? How is the Chinese

Interviewers with the Speaker Mr PenpaTsering of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile,

With a Taiwanese Scholar taking education inBuddhist Linguistic University, McLeodGunj

Central Worshipping Hall, Dehradun. It isthe only centre in India which impartsteaching in Tantric Buddhism in India.

position/behaviour viewed in the post-

Dalai Lama period?

When the Dalai Lama is no more on thescene, the Chinese government will createrifts in the ranks of the movement forTibetan independence by creatingsuspicion and misguiding the Tibetans,particularly the new generation. It will alsouse its Panchen Lama card. China will notconfine its campaign to the Indian borderbut also cover the global audience throughmedia propaganda, blogs, etc.

What is the possibility for

negotiations?

The present century is a century ofnegotiation. Hence, the door fornegotiations is always open. The trackof the negotiations would be within theframework of the TAR (TibetAutonomous Region) as expressed bythe Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Most of therespondents want to achieve this within hislifetime as the future is very uncertain.

POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS

There are three streams of opinion.

The first group perceives the future as goodand relatively stable. They haveconfidence in their leaders and faith ingetting cooperation from the world intheir freedom struggle.

The second group is apprehensive butoptimistic. Although it would be toughand tedious to negotiate with China, itis not impossible. Effective plans andpolicies need to be chalked out tohandle the probable future situation.Two probable scenarios are envisaged:(i) it is easy to get the Tibet issue settledduring the current Dalai Lama’slifetime; (ii) the post-Dalai Lamasituation would be tough to negotiatewith China at least for a decade. Someexpressed the view that if the Tibet issueis not settled during the present DalaiLama’s lifetime, it would take another50 years and they are prepared for it.The 50-50 Vision document is expectedto review the performance of the Tibetmovement in the last 50 years and todevelop the freedom struggle roadmapfor the coming 50 years.

The post-1990s generation appearedparticularly restive and impatient. Mostof them want to migrate to the Westerncountries, but show a strong

Mr. Duke Tsering, Principal,Tibetan Children’s Village School, Selakui,

Dehradun

With Mr. Sonam N. Dagpo, Secretary,International Relations,

Department of Information & InternationalRelations, Dharamsala

commitment to the Tibetan cause. Theywant to contribute to the strugglefinancially. They see the TibetanDiaspora as a platform to contributeand act for the Tibetans’ cause.

The third generation of Tibetans issomewhat casual towards the cause ofTibetan freedom. In their view, waginga liberation movement from an alienland will not be effective. They want togo back to Tibet and wage the war ofindependence from there. Thisinspiration was gained from the strongagitations waged on the occasion of theBeijing Olympics by the Tibetans inTibet itself. The atrocities committed byChinese authorities have also enragedthese young ‘Turks’.

Almost all respondents reject violenceas a path. Violence in their view isagainst the tenets of Buddhism. Itwould hurt the Dalai Lama and losethem the support and sympathy of theworld. Numerically they areinsignificant in comparison to theChinese military might anddemography. Tibetans totally numbersix million; their exiled community inIndia is just 125,000. If they agitateviolently, it gives an excuse to theChinese authorities to repress them.The Indian government would also notlike this.

A third group is indifferent and doesnot have its own independent views.They are mostly the older generation ofthe 1970s or earlier. They have full faith inthe Parliament-in-Exile.

The staff of educational institutions havea more optimistic vision. They think thatimparting modern education while

preserving their cultural,traditional and religious ethos wouldeffectively prepare the Tibetans to fightfor the cause of Tibet with a modernvision. The new generation isenthusiastic about pursuing modernscience and technology, humanities andprofessional courses. They are verysupportive of the cause of Tibetmovement but do not show aninclination towards violence. At thesame time they are curious to knowChina’s moral right to occupy theirhomeland and why the world is nottaking adequate steps to pressuriseChina to free Tibet.

The TCV school has a declared mission: toensure that all Tibetan children under its

care receive a sound education, a firm

cultural identity and become self-reliant and

contributing members of the Tibetan

community and the world at large. Theschool’s motto is “Others before Self”.The school was founded in 2004 and isaffiliated to the CBSE, New Delhi.

The instructors at the school also toldus that the new generation is moreinquisitive and interactive. They do nottake things for granted. Some studentshave also exhibited traits of frustration

Students of the Tibetan Children’s Village(TCV) School Selakui, Dehradun

and disbelief in the current style ofcarrying out the freedom movement. Tomanage this, the authorities of theschool have arranged religiousinstructors to educate them about theBuddhist ethos from time to time. InSelakui, Dehradun, the school hasarranged a special religious class whichis open round the clock. Here, a monk(from Dharamsala) interacts andanswers the queries of the students inthe light of the Buddhist philosophy.Our discussion with the monk revealedthat the new generation is restive. Someof their major concerns are: why do welive in exile; what is the world doing forus; why can India not come forward andhelp us in getting our homeland; whatis our future; how can we manage ourdaily lives; we should make progressand fight for our motherland, etc.

What may be expected from the

Government of India?

Some referred to the historical stand ofIndia on Tibet as a paradox; someothers viewed it in the modern context.They are perplexed with the Indianpolicy of recognizing Tibet as anintegral part of China.

This group supports the semi-independent Tibet policy of consultingIndia on every move. In recent yearsTibetan leaders have been activelyseeking foreign support, tointernationalise the Tibet cause. Theysee the conferment of the Nobel PeacePrize on the Dalai Lama as a result ofthat policy. They want the Indiangovernment to actively facilitate thenegotiation process between theChinese government and the TibetanParliament-in-Exile and put pressure on

China to accept the demand documenthanded over to the Chinese governmentby the Dalai Lama.

The other group agreed, with somereservation, with the current Indianstand but highly appreciated the kindof support India has continuouslyprovided. This group is politically moreactive and mature. Their ultimate endis to get freedom but currently theywant tactical entrance in Tibet throughthe process of negotiation with theChinese government. In this, theyexpect India to become an activepartner. In their view, a stronger Indiacould be more effective in bringingChina to the negotiating table. TheDeputy Speaker suggested that Indiashould reorganize its foreign policy,particularly in the South Asian regionand improve its relations with Pakistan.This would tactically weaken China inthe region. So far as India’s support isconcerned, they expect an active andpersuasive role of India. They expectIndia to mediate but at the same timeare aware of India’s limitation in thisdirection. They fully understand thepolitical implication of India going outof the way for the Tibetan cause andremember the background of the 1962war with China. They appreciate India’svision for Tibet to be an autonomousregion of China but are of the view thatin the current context, this is notenough; India should prepare theground for negotiation between Chinaand the TGIE.

The youth, when queried about thisaspect, were initially ambivalent. Someinsisted that India should strengthenthe position of Tibetans, particularly the

upcoming generation. They raisedseveral issues like educationalpreference, citizenship rights, propertyrights, and easy renewal of theirregistration cards. They asked why theirregistration must be renewed annually,given the fact that they are here on a

long-term basis. Renewal every five yearswould add to their comfort.

The business class insisted that the Indiangovernment should also arrange somepermanent fixed places for them in metro-cities. This would improve their economicwell-being.

Will the protest movement turn

violent?

Almost all respondents express a strongcommitment to a non-violent, peacefulmovement for the liberation of Tibet,particularly when they are in exile. Theirreligion does not permit them to beviolent.

The youth may be frustrated, but tokeep them firmly based on non-violence, their instructors takeparticular care to orient and guidethem.

The Tibetan Planning Commission

head at Dharamsala believes more inevolving the natural human qualities ofthe scholars than producing stereotype,soulless, money-making professionals.He said that they are interested indeveloping the fundamental qualities ofa human being through education.They emphasize on inculcating andnurturing the basic human qualitieswhich should contribute to world peaceand help them learn to live in harmonywith Nature and ecology. There is nospace for violence in their lives. Theyare also concerned that their scholarsshould not be swayed by militantnationalism or a militant way of life.One monk even termed militants as‘idiots’ and strongly believed that themovement should remain peaceful,non-violent and within Buddhistdogmas. In Buddhism, the concept ofavalokiteshvera has great impact.

Is the Dalai Lama’s leadership

adequate?

Almost all respondents believe that thedemand made by Dalai Lama is quitereasonable and the course he hasadopted is also appropriate. Theypraised particularly his peaceful non-violent method.

What more is expected from the Indian

government and other international

powers? Which country could be the

most reliable partner in supporting the

protest movement?

From the international powers theyexpect open political support. Theinternational media coordinator,Speaker and Deputy Speaker urgedstrongly, both India and theinternational power,s to openly provide

Monastery-a popular tourist sport atClement Town, Dehradun

political support for the Tibet cause. Intheir view, the time has come to openlydeclare Tibet as a political issue rather thanmerely giving economic and socialsupport. After the current Dalai Lama, ifthe Tibet movement remains unsolved, itwould suffer. They expect the world powersto put pressure on China economically,socially and morally. They are anguishedthat the Olympics were not boycotted,that everyone participated withoutpressurizing China to sign an agreementwith the Dalai Lama. Besides India, theyexpress faith in the US, Canada, France,the UK, Germany and some Gulfcountries.

What is the source of the funds for the

protest movement?

The bulk of the funds comes throughdonations and charities from the US,

Canada, the UK, France, Germany,Sweden and Israel. They also receive fundsfrom private agencies, individualsand charitable organizations.

Who is the most influential youth

leader in the pipeline? What is his

stance on the future course of the

protest movements?

The Speaker and the Deputy Speaker

expressed the belief that after the DalaiLama, the scope of the Parliament-in-Exilewould be enhanced further. It isrepresentative of all sections and providesa forum where things can bedemocratically deliberated. Tibetan youthexpress their faith in democracy;Parliament is the one forum where theycan participate and express their feelings.

Is it foreseen that the Tibet factor may

lead to another mishap betweenChina and India?

Tibetans would not want that. The currentIndian policy is not provocative.

Can the TGIE be a mediating factor

between China and India to improve

Sino-Indian relations?

The TGIE can play a constructive role,but the Chinese would not allow thisto happen. The Parliament-in-Exile is ademocratic forum which might pose akind of threat to the Chinese politicalsystem which is based on authoritarianprinciples.

Given an option, would the refugees

Jagannath Panda with Swami Maharaj, theMahant of the Temple

A local shopkeeper is also present (theprevious photo is with Zakir Hussain)

like to go back to Tibet? If yes, what

specific initiatives do they expect from

the China-India bilateral dialogue?

They universally yearn to go back toTibet if they get the desired spacethere. They expect that both countrieswould mutually help in building Tibetas an economically better-off state;assist Tibet in its modernization but atthe same help Tibet to preserve andmaintain- its unique culture, relationwith ecology and make it a land of peacewith all care to preserve its pristineculture and environment.

What is the opinion on the current

China-India relations and on possible

Chinese adventures along the border?

They view the current political India-China relation as non-cordial and ofmutual suspicion. Some bilateral issues,such as the border and Tibet itself, arethe bone of contention between them.Economic relations between the two aregrowing, but their political relations,particularly the border issues, are notmoving positively. China is doing allpossible things to seal the border linesto make Tibetans’ cross-bordermovement difficult. They see theTibetans’ return from India asprovoking anti-China feelings in Tibet.

Are the Tibetan refugees a threat to

Indian security?

Our interviews, focus groupdiscussions (FGD) with almost allrepresentatives – officials, studentsboth secular and monastic, monks,business class, teachers, lay Tibetans,etc. have convinced us that as of nowTibetans would not be a threat to Indiansecurity. They universally reject

resorting to violence as a means ofstruggle. They are deeply grateful andrespectful of the Indian government’smagnanimous treatment of them. Theywould even be happy to serve in the Indiansecurity forces. A couple of them whoparticipated in the 1971 War shared theirexperiences; some also referred toOperation Blue Star. The informedrespondents even talked of strengtheningIndian diplomacy in the region to counterChinese presence in the South Asiancountries.

Would Tibet act as a facilitator for

India to improve its (i) cultural

parameters (ii) economic conditions

and (iii) security situation? If yes, how?

i. Cultural parameters

Tibetan refugees can be India’s cultural

ambassadors in the world. Manyrespondents expressed a genuine anddeep affection for India and arearticulate about expressing theirgratitude for India’s generosity tothem. Even foreigners are appreciativeof India’s role in the matter and weresurprised that for five decades Tibetanshave been living at the same locationpeacefully and have built excellentrapport with the local people.

ii. Economic conditions

Economically, Tibetans are moreinclined towards ecologically cleanprofessions. The Head of the TibetanPlanning Commission emphasises thatliving a harmonious life with Nature isan important goal of Tibetans.

iii. Security situation

Tibetan refugees could be a source ofimproving India’s security in the

Himalayan belt ranging from Ladakh toTawang and could even prove helpfulin providing information about crucialChinese settlements in Tibet. Theycould also work in India’s interest in theevent of an aggression against India byChina. They are also ready to join theIndian defence services, para-militaryforces, etc.

FUTURE PLANS

Some expressed the view that in futurethey would like to organize moreinternational events in India, invitingforeigners to participate. Theseparticipants would spread positiveimages about India and the richness ofits culture in their countries. This wouldbe good for the Tibetans’ cause as well.

Many respondents said that they wouldlike to nourish a good, moderneducation. This would add to India’sconstructive development. They wouldalso like to promote the culture of livingin harmony with Nature, which issupported by both Buddhism andHinduism.

Issues thought relevant for addressingin the study

l Re-look at Tibetans’ problems bythe Indian government.

l The Indian government shouldconsider granting citizenships,maybe dual temporary ones, toTibetans.

l The government should also thinkof granting them property rights, sothey can purchase land and improvetheir economic well-being. Theircurrent deprivation would not begood for long-term sustenance of

the Tibetan freedom movement. Indiawould not lose anything by givingthem either citizenship or propertyrights. Both would be temporary andconditional. In any case they wouldleave immoveable properties whenthey leave India.

l The Indian government should includea concrete plan for their education. Thegovernment should consider grantingthem some quota or seats in institutesand universities of repute so that theycan groom the new generation withhealthy values. They could also beallowed to have their owngovernment-sponsored schools on alarger scale.

l Currently, most of them agree with themiddle path invoked by the DalaiLama. They think that the demand forthe TAR (Tibet Autonomous Region) isquite logical and expedient. Once theyenter Tibet they would be in a positionto carry forward their broader agendaof independence. The world should

come forward to help them. They arepeace-loving, non-violent people.

Mr. Tenzin Pao Dhashi, Director,Tibetan SOS Vocational Training Centre,

Selakui, Dehradun

Differences between Dharamsala and Dehradun Tibetan Settlements

Aspect Dharamsala/McLeodGunj Dehradun

Centre Major centre One of the settlements

Political More active No so active

Socialand Cultural

Segregated from the locals. One failedmarriage with a local person

More associated with the locals. Morethan 5-6 marriages between Indians andTibetans. Tibetans mix more with thelocals and have a gregarious social life.

Living style Westernised and urbanite. Youths aremostly Westernised.

Indianised and partly modernised.Lifestyle more akin to Indian.

Outlook Intense desire to go Western countries No such intense desire noticed

VISITS TO TIBETAN ESTABLISHMENTS AND EVENTS

Chapter 5-B

PART I - DHARAMSALA

SEPTEMBER 2007

The familiarization visit to Dharamsalawas undertaken to research theliterature on diversion of YarlungTsangpo by China and on Tibet. Twodays were spent in the library of theEnvironment and Development Desk(EDD) of Central TibetanAdministration (CTA). The time wasalso utilized to meet the EducationSecretary.

Discussion with Ms Choki (editor),

EDD newsletter Green Tibet

As I had basic doubts over thetraditions or sects in Tibetan BuddhismI had taken along the classic The Dragon

in the Land of Snows (1999) by TseringShakya, which mentioned four sects asGelugpa, Sakya, Kagyu andNyingmapa. According to Ms Choki,traditions are in many waysinterchangeable and there is not muchdifference among them. She outlined

that Gelugpa is headquartered atDharamsala, Sakya at Dehradun andRajpur, Kagyu at Sidhpur (adjacent toDharamsala) and Nyingma atDehradun.1

Photos of the Missing PanchenLama

Posters were prominently displayed onthe kidnapping by the Chinese of thesix-year-old Eleventh Panchen LamaGendhun Choekyi Nyima, the second-highest spiritual Gelugpa leader. Theposter showed that the Tenth PanchenLama died under mysteriouscircumstances in January 1989. On May14, 1995, the Dalai Lama had declaredNyima as the Panchen Lama. TheChinese in November 1995 declaredanother person, Gyaincain Norbu, asPanchen Lama.

Discussion with Mr Tashi Norbu, Joint

Secretary, Education on September 5,

He explained that there are boarding

1 According to one author the headquarters of various traditions of Tibetans in exile are (a) SakyaTridzin – Rajpur, Dehradun, (b) Bonpos – Shimla, (c) Drukchen and Kagyu – Hemis (Ladakh).(d) Nyigma – Darjeeling and Kathmandu. See Amalendru Misra, “A Nation in Exile: TibetanDiaspora and the Dynamics of Long- Distance Nationalism”, Asian Ethnicity, 4(2), June 2003, n. 6.

By P. K. Gautam

and day schools. Out of 82, 65 are inIndia (other countries being Nepal andBhutan). The categories of schools are:

(a) Central Tibetan SchoolAdministration (CTSA) schoolsfunded by the Ministry of HumanResource Development,Government of India. They are likeKendriya Vidyalayas. They are thelargest. There are six residentialschools (Mussoorie, Shimla,Darjeeling and Dalhousie werenamed as examples) out of a totalof 21 . Hostels are for Tibetans only.10 per cent of the students areIndians, who are wards ofgovernment employees in remoteregions who have all-India liabilityto serve.

(b) Tibetan Children School Village(TCV). The headquarters is atDharamsala. There are 20 schools,mostly residential in Ladakh, withCBSE syllabus. They are financedby the community and donors. Thestudent strength is growing withnew arrivals.

(c) Tibetans Home Foundation. Theyare in Mussoorie and Rajpur, andare affiliated to the CBSE.

(d) Sam Bota Tibetan Schools andSociety. They are a mix of small,middle and a few large schools with

residential facility. They also admitstudents of the Himalayan regionlike Shillong (Meghalaya) andDarjeeling( West Bengal).

(e) The Department of Religion andCulture looks after the educationof lamaist children for religioustraining in monasteries.

Mr Tashi suggested that it would greatlyhelp if the Indian government opensmore schools in the Himalayan beltsince there is a lot of pressure to admitIndians in Tibetan schools.2 He said,"Being your guests we cannot refuse butour resources get stretched. If possible,open more of them of quality." Onereason why locals want Tibetan schools,he thought, was that sometimes in theIndian schools the Indian teacherswere absent.

OCTOBER 2009 AND NOVEMBER 2010

Two more visits to Dharamsala helpedin understanding how the Tibetans inexile have set up their institutes.

College for Higher TibetanStudies (CHTS)

The Institute of Buddhist Dialecticswas founded in 1973. Besides Gelugpait also includes other traditions such asNyigma, Kagyud and Skaya Schools.With the initial aim of training Tibetan

2 In 2008 when I visited the Central Institute of Himalayan Culture Studies (CIHCS), Dahung(near Tenga) in Arunachal Pradesh being run by India and met Principal Geshe Ngawang TashiBapu and had a discussion with the teachers of the school, I thought that the concerns wereexaggerated, though it could not be checked by visiting any Tibetan school in the remote borderregion..

Visits to Tibetan Establishments and Events

language teachers, in 1991 the Collegefor Higher Tibetan Studiers (CHTS) wasestablished. It is now located about 7km away at a lower altitude thanDharamsala and beyond a tea estatenear village Sarah. Inaugurated in 1998,the college is a branch of the Instituteof Buddhist Dialectics at Dharamsala .It was founded to promote the broadestintellectual culture in harmony withTibetan democratic institutions andimbued with the principles andinfluence of the Buddhist religion. Theset up is the initiative and labour of theexile community. The Department ofEducation of the Tibetan governmentformally recognised the college in 2001with the degrees and diplomas beingconsidered at par with those granted byIndian universities . It has partnershipwith Emory University in Atlanta, USAbesides attracting students from MiamiUniversity, USA. A number of studentsare also enrolled from the IndianHimalayan belt. Unlike the Institute ofBuddhist Dialectics (IBD), the CHTSgives greater emphasis to secularsubjects such as language, grammar,literature, poetry, religion, politicalhistory through courses on Buddhism.To broaden the outlook, the instituteinvites regular guest speakers to talkon contemporary subjects includingthose from the local army

establishment. Mr Passang Tsering,General Secretary of the collegearranged an interaction with studentson the topic of Buddhism in theHimalayan belt. Most teachers here areTibetans , though students are mixed.Many students are from the IndianHimalayan belt and during myinteraction with them, I realised thatthere is a great ongoing struggle in theirmind in choosing monkhood. Thoughdropouts (like in hard military life) areexpected, the key question which wasthe continued importance of monkhood in an era of globalisation whenspiritual values and practices are beingsought by humans saturated withmaterialistic matters. In simpler termsit a demand-supply issue.3 Theseyoung boys need to be applauded forhaving taken the decision formonkhood in the twenty first century.Like other Indian institutions in theHimalayan belt, this is also a synergeticexperiment and needs much moresupport and encouragement.

Tibetan Handicraft Productioncum Sale Cooperative IndustrialSociety

To restore the vanishing tradition whichis centuries old, the society (one of theoldest) was set up in 1963. The centreproduces hand knotted products which

3 Whether sufficient monk aspirants will be forthcoming from Indian Himalayan belt regionsuch as Ladakh is a moot question. According to Karine Gagné’s (an anthropologist fromMontréal University Canada) account based on her field work of August 2011 in Nubra region:

“ As a consequence of family planning in Ladakh, parents tend to have less child than in earlierdays. One consequence of this change is that the traditional custom of sending one son to amonastery tends to disappear. This in turn reduces the number of young monks being registeredin the monasteries, a situation that could be observed in the Nubra Valley”. Discussion with PKGautam of August 16, 2011 and correspondence of November 24, 2011.

are durable and attractive, garments,traditional door curtains besides traveland hand bags.

Tibetan Institute of PerformingArt (TIPA)

The TIPA throngs with the young andold and is preserving the performing artwell by hosting regular events .

Some Opinions of Locals(November 2010)

Some views of Indians : Interactionwith some locals, living there or settledoutside, showed that there are mostlyproperty and behaviour related issues .The gist was that property is now inprime land. Land prices for locals havegone up. The refugees also must obeylaws of the land. They are onlyinterested in making money. At nostage was the suspicion of any Chineseagent mentioned.

What this implies is that localsympathy is less than before, thoughthe economy through domestic andinternational tourism is directly relatedto TGIE in Dharamsala. This we felt isan unacknowledged part of thediscourse. The new narrative in one wayis of vested interest of property dealersand national security who may like tooust the refugees and grab the propertywhich is in prime location now.

Some views of Tibetans : Interactionshowed that there was a split opinionon citizenship. The TYC and the TGIEare not keen on it. Some local Tibetandesired it. It was clear that there is anongoing struggle on Tibetannationalism with freedom struggle.One recurring discourse was that all

Tibetans were very respectful andthankful to India. Some Americanstudent-interns from Miami Universitywere appreciative of India for theirgesture to preserve a civilization (softpower).

PART 2 TIBETAN REFUGEES

ESTABLISHMENT AT CHOGLAMSAR

(LEH, JAMMU AND KASHMIR),SEPTEMBER 2008

Discussion with Mr Damdul Jingirpon,Chief Representative Officer, Officeand Assembly Hall, The Local TibetanAssembly, Sonamling TibetanSettlement, Choglamsar

He estimates that there are about 7000Tibetan refugees settled in the place. Heis from the first generation of refugees.In his 38 years of service, he has servedwith establishments all over India likeZero in Arunachal Pradesh, ), MadhyaPradesh, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh,Shimla and Solan(Himachal Pradesh).He has been responsible for thedistribution of agricultural land torefugees. The gist of our talk:

(a) The help given by India wasacknowledged with gratitude.

(b) The history of Tibet was traced as asovereign country. He emphasisedthat during the II World War, Tibetwas neutral, which proves itssovereignty. Tibetan people alsoinclude Tamangs, Gurungs,Sherpas and Khampas (riders).Ladakhis also have Tibetan names.

(c) All sects flow from one to anotherand are meshed, Nyigma toKagyup to Saskya to Gelukpa. The

crux is the "Nalanda School", basedon the work and philosophy ofIndian gurus in the past. In hisperception the difference betweenHinduism and Buddhism is thatthe Buddhists pray for tomorrow,while the Hindus pray for thepresent.4

(d) Some with wealth manage toacquire Indian citizenship.Tibetans are free to travel withinIndia, for example, even in Ladakhsome trinket shops have been setup by Tibetans,.

(e) Some lama training is going on inthe TAR.

(f) Very few new refugees are coming.Most refugees in India are thoseborn in India. They are welleducated and have beeninternationalised. He gave thefollowing important stages in thecondition of the refugees :

(i) The first stage was from 1959to 1989 (a dark period till the1980s)

(ii) January 1990 onwards therehas been improvement intheir status.

(g) The Dalai Lama is unlikely to diesoon. He will sort out matters forthe scenario that will follow hisdemise.

(h) In Tibet, communist China isequally harsh on its own Han

people when required. The karmahas now shifted to Tibet.

Discussions with Mr. Tenzin, the

Tibetan Shop in-charge, in the camp

l Job opportunities in India arelimited.

l Unlike some Western countries,citizenship is not given in India,which poses obvious constraints forthe new generation in thisglobalized world.

l A new university is coming up atBangalore which is being set up bythe Dalai Lama's sister. The one atVaranasi was founded by theGovernment of India.

l There are some problems related tothe Ladakhi language and identity.

l The Shugden sect is opposed to theDalai Lama.

One impressive refugee initiative inLadakh is the Krama DupgyodChoeling, Tibetan Monastery,Choglamsar. It is a massive openground where a grand stand has beenset up with an impressive row of stupas.

PART 3- MUNDGOD, KARNATAKA,JANUARY 2009

A most impressive mirror image of theTibetans in exile is the DrepungLoseling Monastery, Lama Camp,number 2, PO Tibetan Colony,Mundgod, Karnataka. The nearestrailway station is Hubli or, alternatively,

4 He probably was relating to the long-term future of Tibet which he envisions.

Alnavar Jn. This is typical "Malgudi"country of R.K. Narayan and the heartof the vocalists of Hindustani classicalmusic like Mallikarjun Mansur,Gangubai Hangal and Bhimsen Joshi.

This visit was undertaken on the urgingof a charismatic Indian, Lama Tashi, theprincipal of the Central Institute ofHimalayan Culture Studies, Dahung,Arunachal Pradesh. He had been theprincipal chant master to theFourteenth Dalai Lama. He waseducated as a monk at Mundgod, whichhe compared to Harvard. Herecommended that no study ofBuddhism can be complete without avisit to Mundgod. How the refugees gotthis land is not covered in this report ,but the policy planners' vision inallotting this land has been remarkableindeed.

Being a holiday, the top managerscould not be met, but a walk throughthe establishment was sufficient toconvey the aura and ambience. LayTibetans were seen shopping in themarketplace. The local grocer andcobbler spoke fluent Tibetan. This isnot surprising if one remembers thatin Bodh Gaya, due to Sri Lankandominance, shopkeepers and beggarsspeak Sinhala.

The new Assembly Hall is impressiveand so is the Buddhist Institute wherechanting lessons were on with anassembly of about 400 to 500 studentmonks or so, including children. ABuddhist delegation (probably fromJapan or Thailand) was also beingshown around. Two monks at theentrance greeted us (taxi owner ShriKale, driver Hanif and self ), and

introduced themselves as belonging toHimachal Pradesh. They could havebeen easily mistaken for Tibetans -which is the general impression of thepeople of the plains. The Indian monktrainees took pains to tell us that theyare Indians and many students arefrom other Indian Himalayan states.

The most popular photograph ofMundgod is of a group of monks infront of the monastery, which isdistributed to all visitors. The local caféin-charge, where we had gone for aquick bite, proudly introduced himselfas a Khampa and also tried to explainwhat was Tibetan Buddhism andGelugpa, etc.

Surprisingly, the owner and the driverof the taxi which was hired fromAlnavar, both in their mid-forties, werevisiting the monastery for the first time.They were thoroughly impressed andshowed a keen interest in listening tohow states such as Himachal Pradeshhas made such exile locations goodtourist attractions not only forforeigners but domestic travellers.

Visitors report that other refugeeestablishments in south-westKarnataka (Bylakupe, Hunsur andKollegal as shown in the map inRoemer's book) are like a mini-Ladakhin their landscape, with a majesticambience full of spiritual and culturaltreasures.

Social harmony prevails in the area. Infact, the monastery stood out as a jewelin the pristine terrain. The roads are ina sorry state. If the soft power is to befully exploited, the roads leading to themonastery must be improved and

regional publicity must be given for thelocal tourists to visit this place.Strengthening this conclusion is thefact that the taxi crew vowed to bringtheir families to see the place at the nextopportunity.

PART 4- SARNATH AND BODH GAYA,MARCH 2009

Sarnath

Besides the temples and the museum,the main focus was to see the CentralInstitute of Higher Tibetan Studieswhich has been alluded to in ChapterTwo. The most senior Tibetan facultyhad proceeded to Delhi to participatein the "Thank You India" event at IIC.The campus was well maintained andpresented a highly professional look.Prof D.R. Singh (economist and theregistrar) was very helpful. Heintroduced me to Lama WangchukDorje Negi from Himachal Pradesh. Hefurther guided me to the examinationsection where Shri S. Bhattacharyabriefed me. In short he mentioned that(1) there are sufficient number ofaspiranst to seek admission.Candidates must have knowledge ofTibetan as a prerequisite; (2) there areabout 400 resident students; (3) trainingin chanting is not given(from a Tibetanlady in his office I could gather that evenat Sampuranand SanskritUniversity(SSU) this is not beinggiven). The syllabus includes:

(a) High school/Permadhyam (9, 10)Tibetan and Sanskrit, both arecompulsory. Hindi or English isoptional.

(b) The Buddhist Philosophy or Mul

shastra which has Bon, and fourstreams of Buddhism (Nyigma,Gelukpa, etc). Optional subjects areEconomics, Political Science,History, Pali and Tibetan History.

For Class 11 and 12 (called UttarMadhyama) the course is for two yearsand Shastri (like BA) is for three years.Specialization like astrology takes nineyears.

At the computer section I met MrJampa Chophel, a third-generationTibetan, born and brought up inKarnataka at Mundgod. He now teachesTibetan astrology. He explained thatstudent distribution is 40 per centIndians from the Himalayan belt,including Nepalese and a fewMongolians. 60 per cent students wereTibetans. All modern subjects aretaught by Indians and traditionalsubjects by Tibetans.

Bodh Gaya

Bulk of the Buddhist devoteesthronging the place are from Sri Lankaand Thailand. So much is the influenceof Sinhala that shopkeepers and evenbeggars speak that language. The mostserious devotees appeared to beTibetans doing penance likecircumambulation and bending/stretching and going around by lyingflat, getting up and inching forwardaround the Bodhi tree temple. At otherplaces mostly Tibetans (with asprinkling of Western Buddhists) wereengrossed in bending and stretching onthe mat for hours and days as part ofthe ritual. This was also common atNalanda and Rajgir.

Bodh Gaya has many temples of

Buddhist nations. It is likely thatMongolia will get land soon to have itsown set-up.

PART 5 - - TIBET HOUSE, AND THE

TIBETAN PARLIAMENTARY AND

POLICY RESEARCH CENTRE,NEW DELHI, 20095

Tibet House

Tibet House was established by theDalai Lama in 1965 with the aim ofpreserving the unique cultural heritageof Tibet and to provide a centre forTibetan and Buddhist studies. TheHouse emphasizes intercultural andinter-religious dialogue and ecologicalresponsibility from a Buddhistperspective.

The museum has old and rare art objectssuch as scores of Thangka paintings,hundreds of gilded bronze, copper,brass, black stone and sandalwoodstatues as well as other religious andritual implements, objects of war andhousehold use, and jewellery. Mostitems were taken out of Tibet by theexiles.

The collection at the library is modest.But it has rare religious scrolls likeTanjur and Kanjur and other materials.There are old records, news letters,correspondence and some journals andmagazines of historical importance.

Interaction with Librarian YeshiJigme

Mr. Yeshi Jigme is 26 years old, with

education as Shastry. Shastry isequivalent to post-graduation. He camefrom Tibet 10 years ago in search of abetter future and followed hiseducational career while living in amonastery in Varanasi. He earns asalary of Rs. 5000-6000 per month. Inhis view, career prospects are limited forTibetans in India. Back home, he hashis parents and siblings. His fatherworks at a grocery shop owned by a HanChinese. His brothers work on casualbasis. He is satisfied that he hasobtained an education but now his topconcern is to get a decent job, save somemoney and send or take it with him toTibet and do some business there. Buthe is also scared of going back as theChinese authorities track the India-returned Tibetans.

Economically, Tibet has progressed overthe last few decades but the benefitsaccrue to the Han Chinese. This is adeliberate policy of the Chineseadministration.

The Chinese keep a tight vigil onreligious practices, particularly worshipof the Dalai Lama. Tibetans who returnfrom India are well received by thesociety. Monks are well respected andsometimes they also propagate secretlythe messages of the Dalai Lama amongthe Tibetans.

A combination of persuasive diplomacyand international pressure could bringsome relief to Tibetans in China. Indiacould play a more proactive role.

5 This survey was done by Dr Zakir Hussain

If the Chinese provide good economicopportunities and education to theTibetans, would most of the Tibetansgo back there? His answer to thequestion was a mixed one. Many wouldlike to go back and take advantage ofthe better economic and educationalopportunities there, but very few wouldforget the cause of Tibet and DalaiLama.

Is it possible that the Chinesegovernment would declare a provisionof refugee allowance? What would beits effect on Tibetan refugees in India?He was dismissive of such a suggestion.In his view, all those who are loyal andtrue to the cause of Tibet would neverbe wooed by such moves.

Is it possible that Tibetan refugees inIndia might become a threat to Indiansecurity? He cannot imagine such apossibility, which would clearly implyingratitude on the part of the Tibetans.

He is of the view that the Tibetmovement lost a historic moment onthe eve of the Beijing Olympics.Dillydallying by the West encouragedthe Chinese government to come downheavily upon the protesting Tibetans.

Tibetan Parliamentary and PolicyResearch Centre (TPPRC),April 2009

The TPPRC, formed in 1991, is a jointproject with Friedrich-NaumannFoundation, a public-funded Germaninstitution which broadly championsthe cause of liberal democratic idealsand is engaged in strengtheningpluralist developments. The institute isengaged in seeking support of theglobal masses in favour of the Tibetan

freedom struggle as well as inculcatingdemocratic ethos among the Tibetanpeople.

Broadly, the Institute's objectives are:

l To promote the political agenda ofthe TGIE

l To promote the political image of theTGIE

l To strengthen the democraticprocess and institutionalisation ofdemocracy among the Tibetanpeople

l To strengthen the non-violentnature of the Tibetan movement

l To examine the developments intheir socio-economic and politicalcontext and to bring matters ofconcern in the international area tothe notice of the ATPD.

Interview with Mr. Choechung

Wangchuk, Executive Director, TPPRC

l He is concerned about the decliningTibetan population in India. Someof the contributing factors to thisdecline are the new educationsystem, career consciousness

Members of the group: Group Photo ofTPPRC Governing Council

resulting in delayed marriage, theone-child norm and the monasticorientation of sending them tobecome bhikus and bhikunis.

l The Tibetan parliament is notproperly understood by the oldergeneration; they see it as a divisionof power and authority of the DalaiLama.

l The new generation of Tibetanrefugees need some pro-activeleadership which could provide acontinuous back-up and educatethem on the latest policydevelopments. This would probablyprepare and sustain them for thefuture of the movement. He agreedthat the movement is passingthrough a dilemma.

l He was also equally concerned aboutthe education of the presentgeneration.

l He expressed concern about theongoing continuous flow of Tibetansfrom mainland Tibet to India.

l Overall, he is optimistic aboutachieving the Tibetan goal ofautonomy. They fully repose theirfaith in the Dalai Lama and hispolicy of the TAR.

l He expects a more proactive andmeaningful cooperation from the

Western countries. He also thinksthat the Indian government shouldmediate in materializing the TARagenda.

PART 6- DELHI : 2008 TO 2011

Delhi University

The Department of Buddhist Studies,Delhi University, was visited a numberof times to learn about Buddhism as inthe Himalayan belt.6 Prof Gangnegiemphasized the importance and deepimpact of the work of Rinchen Zangpo(period prior to Atisa) in HimachalPradesh and Ladakh. The region hasmade good economic progress. Manewalls have been constructedprominently and cultural shows areorganized in a big way.

An Indian student doing PhD researchon the expulsion of Buddhism fromIndia in the twelfth century was of theview that the new generation ofTibetans (about 300 or so are put up ina hostel at Rohini, Delhi) are not verykeen on Tibet: they are more interestedin cars, mobiles and a good life.7 Aprofessor at JNU who deals with Chinanoted, however, that though the youthmay have a modern outlook, thetraditions are very much alive andsurviving.

6 I thank Dr Hira Paul Gangnegi, Professor at DU (who hails from Himachal Pradesh) and hiscolleague Dr Kelsong in explaining the nuances of Buddhism . Dr Gangnegi also came as adiscussant at IDSA in a seminar on Buddhism in the Himalayan Belt. In February 2011, DrArvind Kumar Singh, Assistant Professor, was kind enough to give me a pictorial run down ofhis visit to Lhasa by road from Nepal which he undertook in 2010 with a team of academics .

7 Such aspirations are natural to any youth and the Indian youth was probably biased.

Some Excerpts from Seminars,Meetings and Tibetan CulturalEvents

In Delhi, Tibetan activists (both exilesand Indians) , scholars and researchersconduct a number of events regularly.Some points of key importance and themessage conveyed are as under:

(a) The Seminar on China's Disregardfor Environmental Concerns in theHimalayas organised by TheTibetan Parliamentary and PolicyResearch Centre, New Delhi atIndia Habitat Centre on June 29,2007. Executive programmer wasMr Acharya Yeshi Phuntsok ofTibetan Parliament and PolicyResearch Centre.The chairman wasDr N.K. Trikha, journalist.Presentations were done byglaciologist Syed Iqbal Hasnain,Air Vice Marshal R.C. Routela(retd), noted mountaineer, KhirenRijiju, MP from Arunachal Pradesh(BJP) and Mr Tenzin Tsultrim,Head Environment andDevelopment Desk (EDD),Department of Information andInternational Relations (DIIR),Central Tibetan Administration(CTA). Their thrust was on Chinesedesigns to divert Yarlung Tsangpo,how India needs to be cautious andproactive, and ecologicaldegradation of Tibet by the Chineseeconomic model.

(b) Prof. M.L. Sondhi, Institute forAsian Pacific Affairs, seminar on1914 Shimla ConventionAgreement and Consequences onJuly 4 , 2008 at IIC Annexe. Somechairs/presenters were Amb. C.V.

Ranganathan, Amb. Ranjit Gupta,Rajiv Vora, Naresh Kumar,advocate, Supreme court, DrAnand Kumar of JNU, Lt Gen J.F.R.Jacob (retd), Maj Gen Vinod Saigal(retd), Dr Parshotam Mehra,author.

(c) The Tibet Study Group's opendebate on "Five Questions onTibet" at Constitution Club, RafiMarg was held on November 3,2008. Important Indians who spokeor chaired sessions were Prof P.Stobdan, Amb. Sudarshan Bhutani,Prof. Mira Sinha, Shri RaviBhoothalingam, Amb. RanjitGupta, Colonel Manmohan Sharma(retd), Colonel Virendra SahaiVerma (retd) and Major Johri(retd). On the Tibetan side therewere Mr Tempa Tsering,representative of the Dalai Lama inNew Delhi and Mr Acharya YeshiPhunstok, executive programmerand member, Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile.

(d) International Conference onContribution of Tibetan Culture toGlobal Understanding: Progressand Prospects, held fromDecember 18-20, 2009 was aninternational gathering of scholarsat the initiative of Tibet House, heldat the India International Centre.The event had participants fromthe Government of India, formerbureaucrats, Indian academics andinternational scholars. Thesessions were devoted to culturalevents, oral and textual heritage,medicine and healing, responsiblehuman action, art and architecture,role of institutes and spiritual

practice. Not all representativeswere Tibetans. Representatives ofTibet House from RussianFederation were Russians. Papersfrom Tibet House were presentedby heads from Spain, Germany,Italy and Mexico, amongst others.The conduct of such events withvoluntary participation by Indianintellectuals shows how, besidesIndia, the idea of Tibetan Buddhismhas spread to the world.

Two spiritual-cum-cultural events werealso attended to gain furtherknowledge. The first was Tibet StudyGroups at IIC annex organized byColonel Virendra Sahai Verma:“Answers to Your Questions on TibetanCulture and Religion”by His EminenceTai Situ Rinpoche (teacher of Karmapa)on January 20, 2008. Unlike theseminars which had the familiarstrategic community, these events wereattended by the religiously inclined.Middle-aged and elderly Westernforeigners were in maximumattendance. The discourse was spiritual,including blessing a newly marriedcouple (wife Brazilian and husband, aNon Resident Indian).

The second was on December 16, 2008at IIC organized by the Foundation forUniversal Responsibility of HisHoliness the Dalai Lama. It was anexhibition of paintings by artist Dremeyand chants in Sanskrit from theMahayana Canon by Vidya Rao,followed by Durga chants. The last itemwas 21 Tara chants in Tibetan by Tibetanmonks. The relationship betweenSanskrit and Buddhist chants was verypowerful. Buddhist chants in a way

resemble the ancient Dhrupad traditionof Hindustani classical music.

The Foundation for UniversalResponsibility of His Holiness the DalaiLama also conducts lectures onproblems facing humanity such asglobal warming. Dr John Stanley isworking on an ecological Buddhistproject . He is a Senior biologist andResearcher at McGill University(Canada), a Nyigma practitioner . InNovember 2008 he talked about”Climate Breakdown at the Third Pole:Effects of Global Warming on China,Tibet and India” and urged to replacethe US $ 3 trillion global oil industrywith biofuels and other nonconventional means. His discussantwere none other than firebrandsenvironmental activists such asVandana Shiva and Sunita Narain withTV anchor and Tibetologist RajivMehrotra in chair.

The Tibet Study Group also is active inorganising lectures and facilitating theKarmapa to visit New Delhi for lectures.A discourse by Gyawang Karmap(theSeventeenth Karmapa) at the NehruMemorial Museum and Library on”Compassion in Every Day Life” wasattended on April 30, 2011. In suchteachings the devoted attendance bylay Tibetans is commendable. Evensmall toddlers as a cultural habitprostate themselves as a show ofrespect.

Vivekanand InternationalFoundation(VIF), New Delhi.

On 6 and 7 September 2011, the VIForganised a conference on ‘Tibet in theAftermath of Devolution of Political

Authority’.8 The conference wasdesigned to address topics like Tibetanpolitics and new leadership, Chineseand Indian perceptions of Tibetproblem, Chinese policy in Tibet andstrategic implications for India andother related themes. The VIF puttogether an array of eminent strategicexperts, including Tibetan stakeholdersfor the conference who deliberatedupon a range of complex issues. HisExcellency Dr. Lobsan Sangay, theKalon Tripa of the Central TibetanAdministration (CAT) delivered thekey note address at the conference - hisfirst formal interaction in public sincehe assumed the high office onAugust 8, 2011. In his keynote address,Dr. Sangay drew a cultural, political andenvironmental map of Tibet. He spokepassionately about challenges that thenew responsibility has bestowed uponhim. Dr. Sangay elucidated what thedevolution of power means in generaland to him in person. Defining thegeographical setting of Tibet, he saidthat Tibet's area comprises parts ofChinese province of Yunnan, Sichuan,Qinghai, and small parts of Gansu.Talking about Tibet's geographicalsignificance, Dr. Sangay said it is amajor source of fresh water for anumber of countries in Asia, especiallyfor countries in Southeast and SouthAsia. Dr. Sangay expressed his deepanguish at China's continuing damconstruction activities over Tibet'smajor rivers. The ecological balance

which the Tibetans have so assiduouslypreserved through the centuries standsthreatened due to China's damconstructions activities on such amassive scale. On the issue ofdevolution of political authority, theKalon Tripa said it is a serious issue withmajor implications. The Kalon Tripaalso made it amply clear that HisHoliness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama isnot setting a new precedent by handingover his political authority to a newincumbent. Devolution of politicalauthority of Dalai Lama is in fact thecontinuation of a political processwhich was established a long time ago,precisely with the Fifth Dalai Lama inthe seventeenth century. The March2011 declaration of the Dalai Lamahowever signifies the separation ofpolitical and spiritual authority of theinstitution of Dalai Lama. His Holinesswas keen to shed his political authorityto a new leadership so that he coulddevout more time for global peace andharmony. Defining his own role as theKalon Tripa of the Tibetan Governmentin Exile, Dr. Lobsang Sangay mentionedthat he would energize his effort toensure that Tibetan people are able tostand on their own feet and take themovement forward. He would alsostrive to fulfill the vision of HisHoliness of creating a seculardemocratic society.

In the valedictory session, Mr. LalitMansingh, former Foreign Secretary

8 See seminar report at http://www.vifindia.org/event/report/2011/09/15/A-Report-on-Seminar-Tibet-in-the-Aftermath-of-Devolution-of-Political-Authority

and India's Ambassador to US,reflected on the need to revisit India'sforeign policy, especially against thebackdrop of past achievements andfailures. Mr. Lalit Mansingh not onlyrecounted India's consistent failures onTibet front, but he also spelt out a seriesof measures which are needed torecover lost ground. Suggesting a newpolicy approach towards Tibet, Mr. LalitMansingh said that India should lookfor a reciprocity-based approachtowards China and remove restrictionson activities and movements of DalaiLama and the Karmapa. He also urgedthat India should completely identifyitself with Tibetan culture and TibetanBuddhism and associate the Dalai Lamawith the Nalanda University Project. Hestressed that “friendship with China isa desirable goal, but it can not be

allowed to override our concerns forIndian security or Tibetan autonomy.”

CONCLUSION

The response, activities and eliteattendance at events show howentwined Tibet, its religion, culture andhistory are with India. The national TVchannel Doordarshan regularly airsinterviews of the Dalai Lama by RajivMehrotra, the well-known anchor andauthor. It is important to know howissues of Tibet are deliberated on indemocratic India. It is surely a silentsoft power with India. In all eventsattended, Tibetans were seen to behighly cultured and respectful.

Not only the state, but also the society,thus, has a stake in the matter.

THE CHINESE APPROACH TO THE TIBET

QUESTION

Chapter 6

1 This assessment is based on interviews with select scholars, government officials and a Tibetanin Shanghai. Most were reluctant to go on record.

2 “China invests $54million in Tibet’s future”, Xinhua, December 1, 2011, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-12/01/content_14199283.htm

3 “China invests $54million in Tibet’s future”, Xinhua, December 1, 2011, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-12/01/content_14199283.htm

INTRODUCTION

This chapter assessing the Chineseapproach to the Tibetan question is intwo parts. Part I is based on interviewsconducted in China in July 2009. Part IIincludes Sino-Tibetan dialogues andviews of some Chinese scholars.

PART ITIBET’S FUTURE: A VIEW FROM

CHINA1

Is China constructing an economic Tibet?

To counter the current crisis in Tibet,the government has launched a numberof massive investments to preserve 22historical and cultural relics in thesouthwest Tibet Autonomous Region.As for the latest reports, the Chinesegovernment along with the regionaladministration of the TibetanAutonomous region have spent 340million yuan ($53.6 million) especiallyon the Tibet’s cultural facilities in the

last five years.2 According to Xinhua,this amount is almost six times morethan the total investment made to theTibetan Autonomous region from theyear 2000-2005.3 Interactions withseveral experts from the SASS, SIIS,CIIS, CASS suggest that thesedevelopmental programmes areintended by the Chinese to underscorethe proposed Chinese initiatives inTibet, to heighten the government’simage in the region throughdevelopment, and to consolidate itshold on the isolated region throughsome attractive investments.

These investment or financial planshave not really helped the cause of Tibetor the Tibetans. A Tibetan who worksin a Shanghai grocery says, “TheseChinese policies of pursuing economicgrowth and generating FDI have thestatus of Tibet as an ‘autonomousregion’ at stake”. He faces manydifficulties in China being a Tibetan.

The owner of the shop behaves withhim very roughly sometimes because heis a Tibetan, and calls him a “nationalshame”. In short, China’s economic-centric perspective in the region seemsvague, without political reforms toaccompany this process in Tibet. As aresult, social tension is rising in Tibet.Liu Jiawei, a scholar from the SichuanUniversity says in a personal discussionthat the majority of the Tibetanpopulation is from rural areas and doesnot have adequate healthcare andmedicines; hence; the government triesto bring necessary policy reforms.

Educational facilities and opportunitiesfor the Tibetan children are minimal;many parents cannot afford theirschooling. Local Tibetans, who strugglefor their identity and rights, see littleprosperity and growth, while ethnicChinese who have migrated to theregion have become highly wealthy. Aninfluential Chinese think-tank scholarin Beijing suggests that the populationof Tibet as per the 2008 data is 2,870,800,and the population of Tibetans hasincreased from one million to 2.7million. He says that as per thegovernment’s eleventh Five-Year Plan(2006–2010), the regional government inTibet had planned to finish buildingnew houses and buildings for 219,800households involving 1,252,000 farmers.Similarly, another scholar is of the viewthat by the end of 2008, the region hadinvested more than seven billion yuanto help 200,000 families, or about onemillion farmers and herdsmen to buildhouses.

Today, Tibetans are increasingly beingmarginalized as their economy and

their population of 1.3 billion becomesintegrated with that of China. Under theCommunist regime’s “Westerndevelopment strategy” which waslaunched in 1999, the Tibetans arelosing their grip over the region bothgeographically and culturally.According to one Shanghai Academy ofSocial Science scholar, Tibetans areworried that the Chinese government’sfast-track economic policies in Tibet areheavily linked with its political agenda.These Communist initiatives are of themost serious concern for the survival ofTibet’s unique religious, cultural andlinguistic identity. The “Westerndevelopment strategy” is a massiveChinese political undertaking, affectingmore than 70 per cent of China’s totalland area and almost a quarter of itsvast population, including Tibetans,Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang regionand other national minorities.

Prof. Wang Dehua says in the sameofficial Chinese view is that economicinvestment has catalysed Tibet’sdevelopment as a region. The currentaction plan on Tibet is to bring all-rounddevelopment both for the Tibetans andthe Chinese. He admitted that it has ledto unexpected negative consequences ingovernance also. In his view economicdevelopment and national integrationare two separate and probablyconflicting issues. As a result, economicdevelopment and integration may notproceed at the same pace.Conventionally, a higher level ofeconomic development implies greateropportunities for education andprosperity. Ethnic consciousness andidentity will depend heavily upon thelevel of education.

The Chinese Approach to the Tibet Question

4 “Conclusion: Prospects for Growth and Development”, Report on the Economic and SocialDevelopment of Tibet, China.org.cn, March 2009, at http://www.china.org.cn/china/tibet_democratic_reform/content_17522143_8.htm

Similarly, another Chinese expert (namenot disclosed under request) acceptsthat it is a great challenge to strike abalance between economicdevelopment and environmentalprotection. According to him, thecentral government has always madeenvironmental protection its toppriority in promoting development inTibet. He asserts that natural reservesaccount for 15 per cent of China’s landterritory, higher than the averageinternational level of 10 per cent. Theratio in Tibet, which boasts more than40 various natural reserves, is about 30per cent.

He also adds that on the environmentalprotection issue, the government iscurrently following a plan titled“Protection and Construction of theEcological Security Screen in Tibet”(2008–2030). The government pursuesa “felling by quota” policy and strictlycontrols the scale of tree-felling. Thegovernment has also implemented arotation system for lumbering bases, soas to help restore vegetation. A projectfor the protection of natural forestresources on the upper reaches of theYangtze River in Tibet has beenimplemented in the three counties ofJomda, Gonjo and Markam, which hasa weighty bearing on the ecology of thelower Yangtze Valley.

China increased investment inaccordance with the Tibet Autonomous

Region’s Project Scheme in the eleventhFive-Year Plan (2006–2010). Accordingto the 2006-2010 scheme, 77.88 billionyuan was to be invested in Tibet for theconstruction of 180 projects. Whenthese are completed, the totalinvestment will exceed 100 billion yuan.4

Such an enormous investment willmaintain Tibet’s economic growth at arelatively high level, providing theregion’s economic development withpromising prospects. However, anotherscholar from the SAAS, Shanghai saysthat the only solution to the Tibet crisisis that the Dalai Lama should correcthis mistakes and get closer to the centralgovernment and do somethingbeneficial for the people, including theTibetans. He fears that some of therefugees settled in India, particularlyfrom the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC),are having strong extremist andterrorist linkages.

The proposed projects in Tibet up to2010 included an airport in the northernNgari Prefecture and extendingavailability of drinking water, electricityand telephone lines to herdingcommunities. Strategically, these willhelp China in any future borderconfrontation in the region. Further, ithastens absorption of Tibet by massiveHan Chinese migration into Tibet.Xinhua recently reported that China hasstarted constructing a new airport in theNorth-western Qinghai province to

establish linkage with the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.5 According to Yang Yang,the deputy chief of the provincialdevelopment and reform commission,the airport known as Huatugou airportin the Mongolian-Tibetan Autonomousprefecture of Haixi, is one the threemain new airports that Chinesegovernment has planned to built inQinghai before the year 2020.6

However, the region remains one of thepoorest parts of China, with annual percapita income less than the equivalentof $100 per year. The currentinvestment agenda has raised incomesfor a few locals but it has also broughtabout a substantial increase entry ofmigrant Chinese labourers havingdominance over the Tibetans.Previously, the central governmentsubsidies and investments went eitherto the extractive industries or to theChinese administrators and settlers.Broadly, the outline of China’sprogramme of developing its westernregion is designed at exploring localresources in Tibet on behalf of China’soverall economic expansion. This givesenough scope for foreign investors whocounterbalance the human rightsgroups critical of China. The attractivepackages and proposals from theinternational companies and investorsare helping the government agenda intaking full charge of Tibet’s mineral andother natural wealth and ensuring itscontrol over the Tibetan people.

Party officials in Beijing and Shanghaiargue that an improved investmentenvironment has attracted increasingoverseas capital to the TibetAutonomous Region. There are fresheconomic measures in the pipeline tobuild a “Tibet of Chinese style”. Thereis hardly any doubt, however, that thecurrent Tibetan protest manifests theresult of several years’ hard-linepolitical as well as economic policies ofthe government in suppressing Tibetanautonomy.

On the political front, the governmenthas been limiting free expression byarresting academics, closingnewspapers and magazines, strictlycontrolling Internet content, andutilizing a refurbished “strike hard”campaign to circumvent legalsafeguards for criminal suspects andalleged separatists, terrorists, and so-called religious extremists. There hasbeen a severe official campaign toeradicate Falun Gong. Imprisonment ofpolitical opponents, journalists andgroups that do not come under theparty’s specified norms or are criticalof the government has been common.The press is tightly controlled; so isreligion. The constitutional norms inChina, particularly Article 4, affirm theequality of the country’s 55 ethnicgroups and require the state to adoptpolicies advancing their “specialcharacteristics and needs”. Not onlydoes the constitution prohibit

5 Xiong Tong, “China builds new airport in Tibet Plateau”, Xinhua, December 31, 2011, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/31/c_131337116.htm

6 Xiong Tong, “China builds new airport in Tibet Plateau”, Xinhua, December 31, 2011, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/31/c_131337116.htm

discrimination, it also guaranteesminorities the same freedom ofthought, expression, assembly andreligion as the majority Han Chineseenjoy.

Whatever may be the consequence ofthe current protest movement in Tibet,the world is witnessing the emergenceof a Chinese design of an “economicTibet”. Three interrelated policymeasures: the open backlash againstthe Tibetans’ economicmarginalization, the rising Han Chinesepresence in the Tibetan region and thegovernment’s regular policy assault onTibetan ideology, culture and ecologywill help in constituting a “Chinesemade Tibet”, which will heavily be aCommunist construct to accentuateChina’s political base in the region.

Economic development is clearly visiblein Tibet. New buildings and roads havechanged the look of both Lhasa andTibet as a whole today. The region isalso heavily guarded by soldiers of thePeople’s Liberation Army (PLA). Theregion is awash with Chinese flags andpolitical messages about the progressof Tibet under China. The commonpeople of the region, however, have notchanged much. They dress in thetraditional Tibetan style, prefer Tibetanfood and maintain the same oldlifestyle. Young Tibetans seem to havefound a balance in preserving their

identity while living fully in the modernworld. They are still deeply religious.They are more articulate and political,combining traditional skills withinternet/new tech savvy attitudes. Theyare well informed, analytical andcritical. They understand better what itmeans to be united in a region wheremilitary and politics dominate everydaylife. They are travelling outside Tibet forbetter jobs. To maintain their identityas Tibetans, there is an element ofdistinctness they maintain in theirlifestyle.

PART IISINO- TIBETAN DIALOGUES AND

VIEWS OF SOME CHINESE SCHOLARS

Sino –Tibetan Talks

The Fourteenth Dalai Lama’srepresentatives till February 2011 haveheld 10 rounds of talks with theCommunist Party’s United Front WorkDepartment. The talks began in 2002.7

Talks of February 2011 had no result orworthwhile outcomes.

In an interview to The Hindu, theChinese Ambassador to India, MrZhang Yan, mentioned that talksbetween the central government andthe Dalai Lama may continue if he givesup his separatist proposition,recognises that Taiwan and Tibet are“inalienable”8 parts of China and stops

7 In November 2008 Mr Lodi Gyari led the Tibetan team for eight round of talks. He was the leadperson designated by the Dalai Lama to commence negotiations with the Chinese government.See Lodi Gyari, “ China and the Future of Tibet”, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol.12, No.2, Spring2009, pp.4-8.

8 Manjeet Singh Pardesi, Visiting Fellow IDSA, in an interaction had pointed out that he hasnever found the use of the word “inalienable” by Indian officials. We acknowldeg his insights.

violent activities; the Dalai Lama,however, is pushing for greater Tibet;his Middle Path is nothing less thanTibetan independence.9 In anotherinterview the Ambassador mentionedthat the door for negotiations with theDalai Lama was still open. In 2008 threemeetings had taken place. TheAmbassador complimented India forproviding security to the Chinesediplomatic premises, preventingprotestors from reaching there.10

In March 2009 on the occasion of theSerfs’ Emancipation Day, the politicaland religious leadership like NemaTsering, Vice Chairman of the People’sCongress of TAR and Living BuddhaTsemonling Tandiz Trinic expressed theopinion that the activities of the DalaiLama are aimed at splitting the countryrather than furthering autonomy.11

Official organs of the state like BeijingReview, News from China or People’sDaily online regularly feature articlesand news items which reiterate thatTibet is part of China and how thecultural and ecological aspects arebeing taken care of as Tibet develops.Scholars from Chinese think-tankswrite likewise and shift the blame to theperiod of the Cultural Revolution as 10disastrous years. Accusations of Chinaindulging in Sinicisation, secularisationand ecological degradation arecountered.12

The Chinese Strategy could be based onthe logic that with the end of theFourteenth Dalai Lama, the Tibetanstruggle will fade away. However a fewChinese academics warn that thewindow of opportunity exists while heis alive and it is prudent to negotiatenow. The evidence of the revolts of1987 or 2008 ethnic Tibet cannot bejust explained as some designs of theDalai Lama. In 2011, about 2,500 monkswere in revolt in Kirti monastery inSichuan.

On the issue of reincarnation, theChinese government has made it clearthat it has the final say in choosing hissuccessor. They then elaborate that theDalai Lama cannot abolish theinstitution of reincarnation. This ispossible due to various contingenciesthat the Dalai Lama has been hintingat, of which he had also suggested thatit may end.

Views of Chinese Scholars

Beijing writer Wang Lixiong and 338others have given 12 suggestions fordealing with the Tibetan situation afterthe March 2008 demonstrations. Theseinclude: (1) stop one-side propaganda(2) support the Dalai Lama’s appeal forpeace (3) provide proof of the Dalaiclique’s activities (4) avoid foul

9 The Hindu (New Delhi), April 9 , 2009.10 The Hindu, March 3, 2009. Till mid-2009 six Sino-Tibetan meetings had taken place.11 The Hindu, April 1, 2009.12 Ma Zongshi, “Eyewitness to Change in Tibet over Half a Century”, Contemporary International

Relations, 19(2), March – April 2009, pp. 1–31.

language for the Cultural Revolution13

(5) provide evidence of riotsorchestrated by the Dalai Lama (6) takeofficials to task if the phenomenon ofgovernment-instigated “popular revolt”is true (7) hold trials as per law withoutthe motive of revenge (8) allow crediblenational and international media (9)appeal to the Chinese people anddiaspora to be calm and tolerant (10)introspect on mistakes having led to thesituation (11) allow freedom ofreligious beliefs as per the constitution(12) eliminate animosity and bringabout national reconciliation.14

Thus, although the government hascentral authority with a rigid stand,these voices indicate that there existsconsiderable space for manoeuvre andaccommodation due to publicperception.

An Indian psychologist has suggestedthat the Tibet conundrum can be solvednot through grandiose structuralchanges, but through small, local, andcreative innovations which reduce riskand sit well with traditional practiceand culture . 15

Wang Lixiong and other scholarspleaded through the internet to end theone-sided Chinese governmentpropaganda to stir up inter-ethnicanimosity. They suggested a number ofmeasures, which included holdingdialogues.16 This is probably the first ofits kind and shows how publicperception may be changing forreconciliation. In the view of Pico Iyer,

Part of unusual fascination of theChina-Tibet issue, after all, is that itseems to suggest a larger questionbeyond geopolitics: How much cananyone live by bread alone, and towhat extent does some sense of innerwealth either triumph or at leastmake sense of all material riches wemight gain? It’s no surprise, perhaps,that 100,000 Han Chinese havealready taken up the study of TibetanBuddhism, and their numbers arerising quickly.17

Wei Wang looks at the situation of Tibetand the position of the Dalai Lama fromthe standpoint of Confucian ethics andthe Buddhist Middle Way in order tofind a solution to the problem. While

13 On the use of diplomatic language for the Dalai Lama, Indian author Virendra S. Verma similarlyhas appealed that China should reign in its party cadres to be polite and use acceptable languagefor a person who is one of the most respected and admired leader in the present world. SeeVirendra S. Verma, “ Post – Dalai Lama Situation and the Middle Path: Discussions with Chinesescholars in Beijing”, China Report 45: 1( 2009), 75-87.

14 “Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation, by Some Chinese Intellectuals”,The New York Review of Books, May 15, 2008, p. 62.

15 Ravi Bhoothalingam, “ Lateral Thinking and the Tibet Conundrum”, Paper presented at aworkshop at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies , New Delhi, May 13, 2010.

16 Wang Lixiong et al with 338 others , “Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation,by Some Chinese Intellectuals”, The New York Review of Books, May 15, 2008, p. 62.

17 Pico Iyer, “A Hell on Earth”, The New York Review of Books, 56(6), April 2009, pp. 6–10.

acknowledging the legitimategrievances and aspirations of Tibetans,he argues that the outside world playsan often negative role by seeking tointerfere on the basis of subjectiveopinions and unverified assumptions.He urges the Chinese government toreach an agreement with the DalaiLama so that he may come backpermanently to his country.18

Fiction or Factual Scenarios?

Even before 1959, the Chinese weresuspicious of India’s involvement in theunrest in Tibet. The Chinesegovernment regarded Kalimpong as afocal point of the revolt whereconspiracies were hatched.19

In an age of scenario planning and riskmanagement, fiction can also be madeto look like a possible scenario (highimpact, low probability). HumphreyHawksley in his popular Dragon Fire has

18 Wei Wang, “Confucianism and the Solution to the Tibet Problem”, World Affairs: The Journal ofInternational Issues, 13(4), Winter 2009, pp. 168–80.

19 Xuecheng Liu, The Sino- Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations , Lanham, MD, UniversityPress of America, 1994 as quoted by Steve Hoffmann, ‘Rethinking the Linkages between Tibetand the China- India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 8(3),Summer 2006, pp. 165–94.

20 Humphrey Hawksley, Dragon Fire, London, Macmillan, 2000.21 In an interactive session at the IDSA of June 15,, 2009, Mr James Clad, Senior Fellow and professor

Near East and Middle East of the National Defence University, USA, felt that the Chinese have“wild ideas” about the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Similarly they could have ideas about Tibetans.

the novel begin with how Tibetancommandos attempt to rescue a jailedBuddhist monk at a prison in Lhasausing aircraft and resources of theIndian military by hijacking a militaryhelicopter and an AN-32 transportaircraft. This episode leads to a Chineseresponse and a war which turnsnuclear.20

Courtesy al Qaeda and LTTE, any covertforce is likely to evoke the worst casescenario by the adversary and theChinese are no exception. They arepossibly going to link it with extremeradical terrorism.21 As has beenmentioned at Chapter Three, scholarssee the Tibetan Youth Congress ashaving the potential of turning violent.This, however, is mere conjecture. Eversince the US initiated and led the globalwar on terror launched in 2001, theblanket term terrorism and terrorist hasbeen loosely used.

Note: Data’s and Information for this chapter ar collected from interactions with Chinese scholarsand various open sources like China Daily, Report of the Economic and Social Development ofTibet (China Tibetology Research center), China.org.cn, People’s Daily and other news and mediasource.

INFLUENCE OF THE MONASTIC ORGANIZATIONS

INCLUDING THE DALAI LAMA'S INSTITUTION ON THE

SINO-INDIAN BORDER QUESTION AND TAWANG

Chapter 7

MONASTERIES IN EXILE

There are 208 monasteries(with over27451 monks) and 17 nunneries(whichhave more than 1696 nuns) establishedin exile . In addition there are sixcultural centres for the study ofspiritual and secular tradition. 1

Tibetans with Indian support have setup mirror images of monasteries oftheir homeland. Also, historically Tibetwas the source of power and head lamaswere appointed at the behest ofTibetans.

The Indian monastery at Tawang is nowheaded by an Indian (who succeeded aBhutanese). Tsona monastery set up byexiles at Bomdila, interestingly, is underan Indian. About the historic Hemismonastery in Ladakh, local LadakhiBuddhists of prominence have blessedthe appointments of the clergy.

To place this in perspective it needs tobe noted that in Ladakh the Kagyupahas two prominent

sub-sects which are non-Gelugpa. TheChangpa nomads of Durbok follow theDri-Gungpa sect and those of Nyomablock follow Drugpa sect. Examples ofmonasteries under sub-sects are: Dri-Gungpa – Lamayaru, Phiyang,Shachukul; Drugpa – Hanle, Hemis,Chemrey, Stakna. The overall pictureis not very clear on the nationalities ofthe abbots of monasteries which existedbefore the refugees came to India. Thereis a considerable overlap. The photo ofthe Dalai Lama is displayed in alltraditions. This probably is his way ofunifying the Buddhist traditions.

Overlap is necessary, as explained byLama Tashi, who is an Indian educated,in Karnataka. The monks inphotograph 7 in Chapter 2 compriseboth Tibetans and Indian citizens ofthe Himalayan belt. Similarly, when theDalai Lama visited Tawang in 2009, theIndian media mentioned that Tibetanshad flocked to see him, whereas theywere mostly Monpas from Arunachal

1 Tibet’s Parliament in Exile, 2009, New Delhi, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre,New Delhi,2009, p.51. Over 140 are in India scattered in refugee establishments and theHimalayan belt.

Pradesh. The media had never reportedthis properly and hence a lot of ideasin public domain are not supported byresearch.

The Dalai Lama has a magnetic appealfor most Tibetans. It is difficult to shakeoff the historical Tibetan influence. Aharmonious blend seems to exist. Weneed to ensure that sections of theIndian Buddhists from the Himalayanbelt do not perceive themselves to bemarginalized by Tibetans.2 To that enddialogue may be initiated onprocedures and institutions ofappointing abbots and other suchincarnations both of Tibetanmonasteries set up by the exiles and theIndian ones. Currently, due to thecharismatic Dalai Lama there isimmense trust. This may not be the casewhen he is no longer on the scene. Weneed to be prepared for it.

As has been shown in Chapter 2, theKarmapa and his tradition also have adiscourse on security implications.Most analysts, who wrote in the NewDelhi-based media when the Karmapaescaped to India in 2000, consideredthat this controversy involves a securityrisk, as people of Sikkim will be affectedas they follow this sect. However, mostSikkimese are followers of the Nyingma

tradition. What security impact theKarmapa struggle will have thus maynot be that serious for the locals.Interaction with the Principal of theCIBS at Ladakh also revealed that inLadakh there is no impact on the societyin Ladakh of politics related to theKarmapa.3

THE STATUS OF TIBETAN REFUGEES IN

INDIA – THEIR RELIGIOUS AND

POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Tibetan refugees are not affiliated withany Indian political parties. Thisposition basically emanates from theirstatus: neither do they hold refugeestatus nor citizenship. Withoutsuffrage, they become politically lesssignificant. At the same time they havemaintained cordial relations with allpolitical parties and more particularlywith the current ruling one. Our fieldsurveys at two important Tibetansettlements, Dharamsala/McLeod Gunjand Dehradun convinced us that theTibetans themselves are not interestedin increasing their political connections.Their leaders have good relations withpolitical leaders. This gives themleverage in managing their affairs atlocal levels. The local administrationgenerally treats them well. The higher

2 Our interaction with Indian monks, academics from Himalayan belt and abbots outside Delhishowed no animosity or jealousy against the exiles . Most felt that some Indian intellectualshave over politicised this issue in the past.

3 According to media reports of 2008, the Indian government had not allowed the SeventeenthKarmapa Ogyun Thrinley Dorje to visit Tibetan Buddhist dominated areas close to the borderof the TAR due to its sensitive nature. However, in September 2008 he did visit Leh (Ladakh)and due to heavy snowfall was even rescued by military helicopters on the Upshi Manali axisbeyond Barlachla pass. He is presently in a temporary abode at his monastery at Sidhbari nearDharamsala in Himachal Pradesh. Recent events( 2011) regarding the Karmapa are includedin the epilogue.

Influence of the Monastic Organizations....

levels such as the Dalai Lama also havea good understanding with almost allthe political parties.

Beyond the Himalayan belt, whereverthey have their settlements they havemaintained their exclusive Tibetanculture and religious identities.Generally, they do not mix up withIndian Buddhist centres but arerespected in Indian society. The tenetsof Buddhism such as non-violence,rejection of consumerism, self-restraintand peaceful coexistence are cherishedin India and are very much a part of lifein India. Hence, the Tibetan refugeesare not regarded as aliens. Their ownway of living in India has also beenexemplary. Over a long period of almostfive decades, these Buddhist monks andsenior persons have maintained adisciplined, cordial and peaceful life inIndia which is well appreciated inIndian society.

TAWANG

India’s position on Tawang and itsethnicity has been covered in detail inChapter Two. India undoubtedly is in adominating position as regards Tawang.The Indian military is well integratedwith the civil population. Civil-militaryrelations are well developed. So also isdomestic tourism. The Indian militaryhas well adapted to Buddhist practicesand aesthetics in its monuments andsurroundings. This needs to be further

integrated by formations deployed inthose areas.

SOME CHINESE VIEWS.4

While most experts and scholars do notwant to talk too much on the post-DalaiLama scenario, they are trying to linkthe Tibet issue with Tawang andArunachal Pradesh quite strongly now.In fact, China is increasingly becomingobsessive over Arunachal. It is mainlyinterested in Tawang, the place whichborders Tibet and Bhutan. In theChinese contention, it historicallybelongs to Tibet, and wants India toreturn it in order to settle the borderdispute. Many refer to the issue ofArunachal Pradesh as a “complexhistorical chapter ”. Most Chineseexperts refer to the fact that the sixthDalai Lama hailed from Monyul inArunachal Pradesh. In the Chinesecontention, three parts of this region –Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul – wereunder the Tibetan administrative andjurisdictional control. Though it hasofficially claimed time and again 90,000sq. km. of land in Arunachal Pradeshand Sikkim, Beijing’s primary interestis limited to Tawang. A leading expertin Shanghai asserts that “historically,Tawang belongs to Tibet; and Indiashould realize this fact quickly in orderto avoid a situation like 1962.”5

Public opinion in China is keen ontaking a firm stand on Arunachal once

4 Recorded by Jagannath Panda in China in August 2009.5 A piece has been written on this issue at the website. See, Jagannath P. Panda, “China’s eagle eye

on Arunachal”, July 10, 2009, at http://www.idsa.in/strategiccomments/ChinaseagleeyeonArunachal_JPanda_100709

again . In the wake of India’s strategicplanning in the North-East, Chineseexperts rue their government’s mistakein not gaining control of ArunachalPradesh during the 1962 War. A scholarin Shanghai points out, for example,that “it was a costly error on the part ofChina” to have declared a unilateralceasefire on November 21, 1962without gaining control over the region.To this day, China calls ArunachalPradesh as Southern Tibet and laysclaim on this territory.

CONCLUSION ON TAWANG AND

RELATED ISSUES

Chapter Two has covered India’sposition. In brief it can be said that:

l Just because the Sixth Dalai Lamawas born in Tawang does not meanTawang belongs to the PRC. Withthis logic China should also claimMongolia as it was the birthplace ofthe Fourth Dalai Lama. In any casethe Chinese had tried todelegitimise the Sixth Dalai Lamafor his behaviour and he died veryyoung (probably poisoned orkilled). However, Tibetans reveredhim.6 The regent had kept the deathof the Fifth Dalai Lama a secret. TheSixth Dalai Lama had already grownup by the time he was discovered.

He was a poet and lover of . TheChinese saw it as an excuse forintervention and stirred up rumoursagainst him.7 Lhabsan Khan, GushriKhan’s grandson, assumed the titleof King of Tibet in 1697. He set outto restore the political authoritywhich his grandfather had yielded.This placed him in directconfrontation with the Tibet regentwho wanted no Mongol influence.Lhabsang announced that TsayangGytso was not the true Sixth DalaiLama and with the approval of theQing emperor sent him into exile inBejing; the Dalai Lama died enroute. The monks then turned toGeluk’s Mongol followers, theDzungars, for aiding inoverthrowing Lhabsnag Khan whoin the meanwhile had installed afake Dalai Lama. In 1771 theDzungar cavalry aided by Tibetanmonks and laymen quickly defeatedLhabsang Khan.8 The Chinese arenow trying to construct a narrativeon the Sixth Dalai Lama whom theythemselves had rejected. This fact ofhistory has not been highlightedforcefully by India.

l India should not be apologetic onthe ethnicity of the people of Tawangto include Tibetan stock.

6 Tibetans tended to be more tolerant and termed his behaviour as “pure vision” of tantric ethos.See Matthew T. Kapstein, The Tibetans , Malden, Blackwell, 2006, p.142.

7 Thubten Jigme Norbu and Colin Turnbull, Tibet: Its History, Religion and People , London, PenguinBooks , 1972, p. 294.

8 Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama , Berkeley,California, University of California Press, 1997, pp. 11–12. Also see Inder Malik, Dalai Lamas ofTibet , New Delhi, Uppal, 1984.

Influence of the Monastic Organizations....

l Counterclaim for Minsar and revivalof Pemako and Chendru who hadpetitioned to join India may berevived with archival research.

l Tsona Gonpa leadership at Bomdilais now with Indians. This does notmean that India can lay claim toTsona in Tibet.

TIBETAN REFUGEES AND INDIA'S SECURITY

Chapter 8

As discussed in Chapter One, the layersand perception of security need to beplaced in context.

Incidents that occurred in Himachal orArunachal were purely local, and notpart of any grand design by Tibetans.The local aberrations also have to beseen in the growth of tourism andlivelihood for locals as in Dharamsala.However, it is better to have regulardialogue with refugee establishmentsthrough local officials and also centralgovernment officials in charge ofsecurity. There are no weapons with therefugee establishments.. Therefore, tosay that they can use weapons liketerrorists is not correct.

There is a possibility of Chinese spiesinfiltrating, but that is an issue forcounterintelligence.

As regards mood swings and intra-Tibetan conflicts, post-Dalai Lama orstruggle over the Karmapa, there is aprobability of violence and unpleasantevents. However, the probability of itsimpact on Indian Buddhists of theHimalayan belt is very low. We need toshape both the Dalai Lama politics andthe Karmapa politics.

Tibet will remain an issue in India'sforeign policy with China. India's standis consistent and is based on

humanitarian grounds. As an emergingworld leader and an ancient civilization,India has elicited admiration from theworld on its handling of the Tibetans.Soft power is inherent and refugees ina paradoxical way allow us todemonstrate our soft power.

The Chinese are not likely to let go thisissue. They will get their own FifteenthDalai Lama. They will equate Tibetanswith al Qaeda and will charge Indiawith harbouring terrorists. They willorchestrate a stance on Tawang by theirscholars, think-tanks, diplomats andothers. All possible attempts will bemade to project that India is weakerthan China and is on the defensive. ForIndia, abandoning its stand on therefugees is not a strategic option. Theghost of 1962 is to be exorcised; then arenewed and vigorous debate anddialogue must be allowed to happen inIndia on this issue.

THE KARMAPA

When the Karmapa escaped to India in2000 many saw it as a security risk, inthe perception that the people of Sikkimfollow this sect. The fact however is thatmost Sikkimese follow the Nyigma sectand are not likely to be affected by theKarmapa struggle. Interaction with thePrincipal of the CIBS at Ladakh also

revealed that there is no impact on thesociety in Ladakh from politics relatedto the Karmapa.

The late Tashi T. Tobden, when askedabout the Karmapa and the people ofSikkim, noted:

(a) Most Sikkimese are of Nyimga sect.Factions within the sub-sect maytry to get support.

(b) The Karmapa controversy is verymuch a Tibetan problem. TheFourteenth Karmapa was verystrong. He spread the sect all overthe world. Unlike Christians orHindus, Tibetans were not initiallyas well organised. Now like otherreligions, they are flush with funds.

(c) Post-Fourteenth Dalai Lama periodtill the Fifteenth Dalai Lama comesof age, the Karmapa may be thehead. This is the current situation.The future is not easily predictable.

(d) It was a conscious decision to putthis region in exile in 1959 . Mostof these refugees were from Kham.Thus they were located at Sikkimand the Dalai Lama atDharamsala.1

ASSESSMENT

Our assessment is that the Tibetanrefugees are not likely to be a threat toIndian security. Their number itself isminuscule. Tibetans themselves arestrongly against any kind of activity

which may be interpreted as a threat tothe security of India. India should adopta gradual but definite plan to nurturethe Indian version of Buddhism in thisregion, so that the epicentre of theBuddhist soft power remains in India.India needs to invigorate the historicalpast. For instance, the Indian legacycarried by Padmasambhava to Tibet andvisits of various other scholars to Tibetfrom time to time should be broughtinto focus all over India in general andthe Himalayan belt in particular. Indianeeds to rejuvenate its culturaldiplomacy in the Himalayan belt.

SHORT ANSWERS TO RESEARCH

QUESTIONS

It is now possible to give short answersto the research questions presented inthe Preface.

(a) What is the influence of Tibetan

Buddhism on the Indian Himalayan

The influence overlaps with TheravadaBuddhism as practised by Indians inthe Himalayan belt with Vajrayana aspractised in Tibet. Both overlap and areinclusive. The political influence is notoverwhelming.

(b) What is the status of the Tibetan

refugees, their religious status and

political affiliations in India ?

The status is well respected and is ademonstration of India's enduring soft

1 Interview of Shri Tashi Tobden, IAS, Advisor Government of Sikkim by P.K. Gautam in Gangtokin October 2008. Tashi Tobden tragically died in a motor car accident in 2009.

power.

(c) What would be the scenario after the

Dalai Lama passes away?

India will have to facilitate assumptionof leadership role by the Prime Ministerof the TGIE. The Task Force stronglysubscribes to this position and fearsrisk of division of Tibetans over theFifteenth Dalai Lama, which in any casewill have a Chinese version like thePanchen Lama.

(d) What influence do Tibetan refugees

wield in the Indian socio-political

environment?

Benign.

(e) How do Tibetan refugees factor in

Sino-Indian relations?

Historically, refugees from Tibet werecentral to Sino-Indian relations. Noweconomy and trade may appear to beovertaking it as the first concern, butin soft power terms, India giving shelterto them is inherent to our strategicculture based on soft power.

(f) How much influence do the

monastic organisations, including the

Dalai Lama's institution, have on the

Sino-Indian border and Tawang

question?

In Arunachal Pradesh, Indian (Tawang)as also important monasteriesreconstructed by exiles (like Bomdila)are under Indian monks. Ladakhpresents a mixed picture. Data are notavailable and more information needsto be collected on the authority andpractise of appointment of heads ofmonasteries by organs of the statehaving resources and mandate to collectit. 2 Indians have great trust in the DalaiLama, which may not endure for hissuccessor. For this, a dialogue with theTGIE needs to be initiated.

(g) Are Tibetan refugees a threat to

Indian security?

No. Concerns of Tibetan nationalismleading to violence by the TYC areexaggerated. We seem to be keener toimpress the Chinese with the "Nepalimodel". Bringing in an analogy of thedemand for Gorkhaland indicates aniggardly attitude unbecoming ofIndia's civilisational character. This fearis unfounded.

2 The India connection is very vital. Khunu Lama Tenzin Gyaltsen (1895-1977) also called NegiLama was born in Kinnaur, Himachal Pradesh . The 14th Dalai Lama was his student. SeeRobert Thurman, Why the Dalai Lama Matters: His Act of Truth as the Solution for China, Tibet, andthe World, New York, Atria Books, 2008, p.80. Secondly , His eminence, the 102nd Gaden Tripa: Rizong Se Rinpoche Thupten Nyima Lungtok Tenzin Norbu is the supreme spiritual head ofthe Gelukpa. He is from Ladakh . In the history of Gaden Tripa, they are not only supremespiritual heads of Gelugpa but they were tutors and spiritual advisers to young Dalai Lamasand regents of Dalai Lama during his absence.

Tibetan Refugees and India's Security

CONCLUSION AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS

Chapter 9

EXCERPTS FROM SOME RECENT

POLICY-RELEVANT WRITE-UPS BY

INDIAN SCHOLARS , ON THE TIBET

QUESTION

S.D. Muni:1

l The March 2008 uprising, in the yearwhen China was to host theOlympics, was the third. The firstwas in 1959 when India allowed therefugees into its territory. Thesecond, in 1988, was not very serious.India did not react in 1988 as it wasplanning to initiate the process ofnormalisation. The March 2008uprising was in support of Tibetanautonomy and cultural rights. Thiswas unlike the earlier events. TheChinese were ruthless in the use offorce. This placed the Indiangovernment in a dilemma as India’srelations with China had improved.The Tibetan issue was a bighumanitarian obligation andconcern for India. The position of theTibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE)had been sympathetic to India’sposition on the McMahon Line andTawang. India’s response was to play

safe in order to preserve thecooperation momentum in itsrelations with China. Thegovernment was also cold towardsthe Dalai Lama. His appointmentsand meetings with Indian officialsand even the Vice President werecancelled, marking a clear breakfrom the past bonhomie. However,the Chinese were still not happywith continuing demonstrations inIndia by Tibetan refugees. The DalaiLama was also not happy withIndia’s “overcautious approach”.

l India still has a vulnerable North-East which can be exploited byChina. There is nonetheless a livelydebate in India if the Tibetan causefor autonomy can and should beabandoned unceremoniously.

l Regarding China, Indianpolicymakers are hesitant to have aforward policy on issues like Tibet.

The author captures the trend well, butdoes not suggest clear-cut policies.

Rajiv Sikri : The work has policy focus.The author points out that “The more

1 S.D. Muni, India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimensions ,New Delhi, Foundation Books/Cambridge University Press India, 2009, p. 107.

repression there is, the less credible isChina’s claim to ‘peaceful rise’.”2 Theauthor strongly suggests that in therepressive regime of China in Xinjiangand Tibet, India must stand up to Chinaand assert itself. China’s Tibet policy hasbeen a failure. Sikri welcomes theremark of the Indian Prime Ministerthat India does not endorse the harshand vituperative official Chinesedenunciations of the Dalai Lama. He iswaiting for the Indian government togive its Tibet policy a clear strategicdirection.3 On the policy on populationsettlement he suggests that the areasthat are opened up by road must alsobe settled with people; otherwise, Chinacould create unpleasant groundrealities in these areas.4

We do not subscribe to settlement ofpopulation . This policy has a domesticdimension problem. Settling people forfear of Chinese claims later isunfounded. Ladakhi or Arunachalipopulation in any case is less. The innerline and identity of minorities in thebelt must be maintained.

P. Stobdan : The Chinese-occupied landof Jammu and Kashmir of Aksai Chinis also directly related to Tibet. InLadakh, Chinese settlements have

reached much closer to the LAC ascompared to 10 years ago. They havebeen constructing infrastructure indisputed areas and have now begun tosettle population opposite Ladakh inthe disputed territory in a swath ofLadakhi traditional pastureland. AsIndian nomads urbanize and migrateto cities, the Chinese nomads encroachon India’s claim in the Ngari region.The ramifications of Chinese advanceinto Ladakh are serious.5 In the past,according to a very practical opinion, itwas presumed that in any package dealin future, India may well exchangeAksai Chin for Tawang as Tawang has alarge population settled and Aksai Chinhad none. This settling of populationin Aksai Chin, if true, leads to thepossible conclusion that the Chinesewill continue to harden their stand toeven claim Aksai Chin on settledpopulation basis.

Prem Shankar Jha, a leading journalistand author, spoke in the “Air ChiefMarshal P.C. Lal Memorial Lecture” atthe Centre for Air Power Studies inMarch 2009 on India’s Tibet problem.6

He argued that the Sino-Indian borderwar of 1962 was because of the Chineseanxiety over Tibet. China also blamed

2 Rajiv Sikri, Challenges and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy , New Delhi, Sage, 2009,p. 10.

3 Ibid., pp. 100-101.4 Ibid., pp. 105.5 P. Stobdan, “Is China Desperate to Teach India Another Lesson?”, Strategic Analysis, 34 (1),

January 2010, pp. 14–17.6 Prem Shankar Jha, “India’s Tibet Problem”, AIR POWER, 4(2), Summer 2009, April – June,

pp. 9–22.

Conclusion and Policy Suggestions

India for the March 2008 uprising.China’s deeper worry stems from thefear that its policy of assimilation isfailing because India has enabled theTibetans to keep their culture, religion,and state structure alive. China regardsthe Tibetan presence at Dharamsala asan existential threat with the youngerTibetans becoming more vocal and, inits assessment, violent. Whateverexcuse New Delhi had of notunderstanding China’s predicament inTibet should have disappeared whenChinese think-tanks and internet siteslaunched a tirade of accusation againstIndia of conspiring with Tibetan“splittists” to endanger China.

Implicitly the Chinese have hinted toNew Delhi to stop the TGIE fromfunctioning out of India altogether. Aslong as India remains a democracy andso long as the Tibetan movementremains non-violent, no Indiangovernment can accede to this demand.India can thus help in facilitating Sino-Tibetan dialogue. For the Dalai Lama,three amendments are suggested as ablueprint for genuine autonomy:

(a) Drop the demand to create greaterTibet and limit proposals to theTAR.

(b) Reduce the number of subjects tobe developed upon theadministration of the TAR from thepresent eleven to four: religion,culture, education, and personaland customary law.

(c) Drop the demand for an immediateshift from the present system of“government from above” to“government from below” andpropose a timeframe to carry it out.

CONCLUSION

From the academic discourse it is clearthat competition with China is intense.Both hard power and soft power willcontinue to play important roles.

Buddhism is embedded in the Tibetansin exile. In spite of the age of realism,this religious and cultural magnanimityof India has made the Tibetans thankfulto India. It is good strategic thinking tokeep the flame of Buddhism alive forthe Tibetans and have this as a pressurepoint to allow Tibetans to returnvoluntarily to the PRC in anaccommodative agreement such as thatof Hong Kong. At no time should Indiabe seen as niggardly over the fate ofover 100,000 refugees. To that endadministrative procedures for issue ofdocuments need to be made moreprofessional, departing from the‘inspector raj attitude’ which creeps inat lower levels of bureaucracy. Localmeetings of Tibetan exile leaders withpolice and district administration mustbe held regularly.

Wherever trouble with the locals hastaken place it is because politicalgenerosity has failed to percolate downto the popular level when thoseinvolved are faced with the realities ofcompetition for livelihood. If the 1959influx leading to the 1962 war was thefirst era, today we are in the second eraand present and future generations ofpolicymakers and those in the deliverymechanism of dealing with Tibetanrefugees need to be made aware of thiscomplex issue in its new form.

Post-Fourteenth Dalai Lama, themovement for Tibet may fizzle out andsplinter. It may lack charismatic

leadership, but Buddhism willdefinitely survive. This suggests thatfrom treating it as a leadership issue,India needs to reinforceinstitutionalization of the faith. A Tibetwith its indigenous people providesgreater security to India than a HanisedTibet. The best option is to be preparedfor all contingencies. For this a dialoguemust be initiated with the TGIE. A jointscenario exercise must be played out, ifnot already done. Decentralizedleadership of refugee establishmentsmust be incorporated so that the post-Fourteenth Dalai Lama era is acceptedwith calm, fortitude and furthercohesion among the Tibetans. Theexiled Prime Minister will play a centralrole. The preferred option is a peacefulone.

Literature classifies three types ofsecurity problems that refugees maypose to the receiving country: strategicsecurity may be threatened if they getarmed; structural security may bethreatened if they compete for scarceresources; regime security may bethreatened if they vote in domesticpolitics. None of this applies to theTibetans in exile. However, at times animpression is created in some visitorsto Dharamsala – where the atmospherehas become cosmopolitan andinternational – that the Tibetans nolonger bother to respect Indians and arenot grateful any longer. On the contrary,the Tibetans did hold a function inMarch 2009 called “Thank You India”in Delhi to express their gratitude. Moreof such activities, without expectingthem to be servile, may be encouragedby Tibetans in various exileestablishments to revive the strong

bonds which they share with India. Themessage to the TGIE on this accountmust be communicated by officialsdiplomatically.

A step-motherly treatment has beenreported towards the Chakma andHajong refugees. This has more to dowith the lack of a clear refugee policy.These issues are possibly highlightedby pro-China elements.

The various claimants to the title of theKarmapa have led to a fiercecompetition within the sect. In our workwe found that most of the officialgovernment establishments wereinfluenced unduly by the camp of therival Karmapa (Than Trinley Dorje)claimed by Shamar Rinpoche whooppose the Karmapa (Ogyen TrinleyDorje selected by Tai Situ and GyltabRinpoches).

A hypothesis regarding the Karmapa asa Chinese agent also exists. This is aweak and insensitive argument, morea result of the competing Indian TVchannels for catching public attention,with no sensitivity to religioussentiments of cornered exiles. AEuropean diplomat was amused tocomment that adolescents andteenagers are not capable to internalisethe nuances of espionage training. It isonly possible for matured adults whoare professional spies. Surely in India ,if professional intelligence agencieshave evidence, action needs to havebeen taken. The issue is over 10 yearsold, long enough for some solidevidence. Good counterintelligence isin any case a principle of security.Belittling the Karmapa in TV bytes isnot counter intelligence.

It is said that Mao used the imagery ofthe palm of the hand (Tibet) and fivefingers (Bhutan, Sikkim, NEFA, Ladakhand Nepal). It has never cost Chinaanything (apart from a communiquéfrom the Xinhua news agency) to claimthese areas as theirs. Further, theChinese rightly thought that theseclaims could be extremely useful in thefuture.7 As a counter, Nehru rushedthrough a series of defence treaties withBhutan (August 8, 1949), Nepal (July31,1950) and Sikkim (December 5,1950).8 The study of Ladakh, Sikkimand Tawang indicates that this sort ofan argument by the Chinese has nofoundation. It must be admittednevertheless, that the palm-and-five-fingers symbol is a powerful similereminding us of our defeat in 1962 andthe deeper designs of the Chinese.9

Much more effort and psychologicalunderstanding is needed in India to getrid of such notions. India has at laststarted building roads (earlier the pettheme was: do not build roads as theywill favour the Chinese attackers). Weneed now to construct narratives anddiscourse that will neutralize this palm-and-fingers analogy. This is best doneby the soft power of religion andculture. The Indian Himalayan belt is

rather like Indian skin in the Himalayasnourished by Buddhism.

Ethnicity in the Himalayan region asshown in Chapter Two is complex andneeds more research. India should notbe apologetic about Indian citizensbeing ethnic Tibetans. India in any caseis a mixture of many races, religions andpeople. Rather, we also need to take upthe issues of the people of Pemako andChimdru (now in Tibet, who hadpetitioned to join India). This also couldbe better researched as a counter toChina by India. Reclaiming ownershipof Minser enclave, composed of severalvillages located inside Tibet in MountKailash region needs a fresh look.Minser was a sovereign part of Indiauntil the mid-1960s.

The influence of Indian Buddhists isappreciable. The leadership providedby Lama Tashi in Dahung as head ofthe CIHCS has great promise andpotential. Similarly, Bomdila monasteryunder Indian charge and the littlepublicized influence of Tsona Lama areinnovative Indian realities. Overall theBuddhist people residing along the“skin” or outer cover of India ofLadakh, Himachal, Uttarakhand andArunachal Pradesh are very

7 V. Sundaram, “Abject Story”, News Today, November 6, 2006, http://newstodaynet.com/2006sud/06nov/1811ss1.htm (accessed October 26, 2008); Abanti Bhattacharya, “China’s Inroads intoNepal: India’s Concerns”, IDSA web commentary of May 18, 2009. Both authors refer to thepalm-and-fingers analogy. L.L. Mehrotra also alluded to the fact that “Mao had long ago calledSikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh and NEFA as fingers of the Chinese palm; see India’s Tibet Policy , NewDelhi, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, 1997, p. 15.

8 Dawa Norbu, “India and Tibet” in Foreign Service Institute, Indian Foreign Policy Agenda for 21stCentury ,New Delhi, Konark, 1998, pp. 256–76.

9 One good example is G.S. Bajpai, China’s Shadow over Sikkim , New Delhi, Lancer, 1999.

nationalistic. Sensitivity to overdoingOperation Sadbhavana (activates to winhearts and minds of insurgent by civicaction in Kashmir valley with someoverlap in Kargil and Ladakh region)and Sindhu Darshan (over– exaggeratedHinduisation of the river) whichthreatens Buddhist identity must beexercised.

An Indian counter to Chinese claimsand designs should be put in place.Diplomats, academics, military officers,scholars and citizens must be educatedon the complexities of the issues. Allranks in military units must beeducated and trained to comprehendthe nuances of the problem. MoreIndian scholars need to be encouragedto research on the people to know thembetter and to get rid of the 1962 warpropaganda and anti-Mongoloidattitudes of mainland Indians.Appendix A has briefly introducedsome arguments which need to bedeveloped and refined further.

Granting Mon Autonomous Regionstatus in Arunachal will benefit boththe people and ensure the so-callednurturing of Buddhism in this belt onthe Sino-Indian border. Similarly,Ladakh’s case for a Union Territory ismore driven to preserve religiousidentity and must be accommodated insome form. As regards Gorkhaland, ifit includes Sikkim, even the existingBuddhist identity of Sikkim will getoverwhelmed. This will have manydisadvantages as it is important toretain the Buddhist identity of Sikkim.

Seeing the interrelated nature of issues,it is suggested that both from theecological and the Buddhist perspective,

inner line status quo, restrictingpopulation and influx by special statusbe maintained in the Indian Himalayanbelt. Tibet’s environmental degradationthat may result due to China’s economicand demographic policies needs to bewell understood with scientificevidence. The Tibet–Qinghai plateau isa global ecosystem and water tower ofAsia. India must expose the decline andengage in dialogue with China and theinternational community to preserveecology with Buddhist values of wantlimitation.

More frequent civil society dialoguemust be maintained in refugee pockets.As joblessness grows in India withpopulation growth and risingunfulfilled demands, mob-likebehaviour cannot be ruled out by thelocals. It is a reality that some refugeesnow appear to be better off than manypoor Indians. Here the TGIE needs tointrospect and carry out some changesso as not to lose local support for theirideals as in the past. Urban growth isnow closing in to what were consideredremote places. Land and property valuenear refugee camps in Dhramsala,Dehradun and some other places isnow exorbitant. Land mafia may alsohave interest in ousting the refugeesand grabbing land. Preventivestrategies need to be applied with localmodifications. Out of the box thinkingis needed.

Though data is hard to get, there is agreat heartburn in a section ofintellectuals on appointments ofTibetan monks to Indian monasteries.‘Tibetanisation of Himalayas’ had beena concern of some.While we theauthors may conclude that it is not an

issues, but the TGIE and Tibetans alsoneed to keep sensitivities of thediscourse in mind in order not toexacerbate these perceptions. Dialoguemay be initiated on procedures andinstitutions of appointing abbots andother such like incarnations both ofTibetan monasteries set up by the exilesand the Indian ones. At present due tothe charismatic Dalai Lama there isimmense trust. We need to be preparedfor a change when the Dalai Lama is nomore on the scene.

Branding anyone with high cheekbonesor slant eyes as Mongoloid (thusChinese in nature or characteristics) isfraught with danger. Mention alsoneeds to be made of wrongly depictingthe dragon as evil. This could be aninfluence of the Judaeo-Christian artform inherited in India during thecolonial period. In Western art one mayfind the devil and the dragon asnegative symbols. In the Himalayanbelt, Tibet, South East Asia and China,the dragon is a symbol of fertility andnot evil. Ascribing negativeconnotations to the dragon needs acorrective.

Tsona Gonpa leadership at Bomdila isnow with Indians. This does not meanthat India can lay claim to Tsona inTibet. As discussed in an earlierchapter, just because the sixth DalaiLama was born in Tawang does notmean Tawang belongs to the PRC; in anycase the Chinese tried to delegitimisehim. This fact of history has not beenhighlighted forcefully by India, whichnow needs to be done.

In spite of 11 per cent of Nepal beingBuddhist with close cultural and ethnicaffinity of its people living on itsborders with Tibet, Nepal is leaningtowards China and is being ruthlesswith the refugees. India may at leastindirectly pursue these issues in Indo-Nepal relations dialogues onhumanitarian grounds.

Buddhism in China declined mainlybecause of the clash betweenCommunism and Buddhism.Buddhism in China has always beenunder state control. Contemporarygovernments have, however, madesome conciliatory gestures toBuddhism. Buddhism is still a vitalforce in some parts of China, especiallyin villages. But government-sponsoredprojects and study curriculum on Tibetand Buddhism seem to dominate andinfluence the public minds largely. It islikely that with modernisation moreChinese Han people may have betterregard for Tibetan Buddhism than whatthe Chinese state may offer. India willneed to be proactive in not allowing itsnatural position to sustain theleadership role of Buddhism beingovertaken by China in the region ofSouth Asia, South-East Asia and EastAsia. Undoubtedly, Buddhism and therole of the monks in society will survive.In the aftermath of the earthquake thathit the Tibetan Qinghai region in April2010, the spontaneous role of monks inrelief and recovery operations hasexposed to the Chinese people a newrole, in which they may no more bebranded as troublemakers.10

10 The Hindu, April 24 ,2010.

POLICY SUGGESTIONS BY P.STOBDAN

A number of authors in India havesuggested scattered policies on theTibet question to include Sino-Indianrelations, refugees, boundaries, rivers,people on the borders and the like.Generally, the suggestions align to theline of a political party. Anyone aligned,for example, with the right wing partieswill have a pro-Tibet and anti-Chinastance; it is the reverse for theCommunists/Left. The second type arescholars who see the entire problemfrom all aspects and who suggestoptions. Stobdan perhaps is a rare casein the present times, who has suggestedclear bullet-point measures.11 Thischapter will first go into thesesuggestions critically and then suggestpolicy measures. Policy measuressuggested by Stobdan are:

(a) India’s present ambivalent Tibetpolicy may risk damaging relationswith China and creating mistrustamong Tibetans. The decision toretain the Tibet card needs to bedecisive and clearly defined.

(b) While emerging Chinese strategyneeds close watch, present-dayliberal regime to refugees needs tobe contained.

(c) Refugee laws need to be enactedand measures improved againstillegal entry.

(d) Need to check illegal migration onthe opening of Nathula.

(e) As the Dalai Lama seeks politicalsupport base, NGOs supportingthe Tibetan cause need to bewatched over in Indian states bythe Centre.

(f) Hold of influential Kagyu, Sakyaand Nyingam lamas isstrengthening in the Himalayas.They have taken over Indianmonasteries; government needs toestablish how many are under theircontrol.

(g) The Dalai Lama needs to be toldnot to interfere in India’s internalaffairs.

(h) The Karmapa poses a greatersecurity challenge than the DalaiLama. He needs to be won overwithout being given undueimportance, as he is unlikely to beaccepted as a leader by the majorityof Tibetan refugees.

(i) Post-Dalai Lama contingenciesneed to be thought out.

(j) The Tibet question can also be abridge of moderation in Sino-Indian relations. Asian Buddhist(Mongolia, Bhutan) look to India asthe fount of Buddhism. This needsto be treated as a diplomatic asset.

(k) Tibetan studies need to beencouraged.

11 P. Stobdan, “Tibet and the Security of Indian Himalayan Belt”, in K. Warikoo (ed.), HimalayanFrontiers of India: Historical, geopolitical and strategic perspective , London, Routledge, 2009,pp. 102–21.

(l) In light of the above, there is a needto create a Tibet cell to coordinatepolicy matters with long-termperspective.12

COMMENTS AND POLICY

SUGGESTIONS BY AUTHORS

The authors are of the view thatsuggestions on refugees appear to bevery harsh. The monasteries of Tawangand Bomdila are under Indians. Exilemonasteries are in any case Tibetanestablishments and can have Tibetanswithout any quarrel. 13 The case ofLadakh is not clear. If the Dalai Lamais in the loop, then surely after himthere may be problems and thus,greater engagement and dialogue onthese issues with Tibetans in exile bythe Indian government is nowdesirable. As regards the Karmapa,fieldwork has established that there isunlikely to be any adverse impact onIndians. Of course we need to win himover.

We reinforce the suggestions (j) and (k)and it is here that innovation can takeplace as suggested in Chapter Two.More deliberation, like public andparliamentary debates, needs to bedone on refugee law for a decision. Thelast suggestion, about having a Tibetcell is also welcome. Care needs to beexercised, however, that wrong signalsare not sent over this cell to China. More

effort on Tibetan and Buddhist studiesby itself will take care of this. It shouldnot in any case be overtly bellicose andjingoistic.

ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS

Climate change, as a topic, we find ismultidisciplinary. This topic is not onlymultidisciplinary but trans-disciplinary. Besides issues as above,the following is suggested:

(a) A survey of all establishments andreligious establishments needs tobe conducted for fact finding byincorporating the exiles. This willmap data so that better informedpolicies can be made.

(b) It may be premature to think ofgiving Indian citizenship to theTibetans at present. More dialoguewith the TGIE needs to be initiatedas they themselves are againstgranting citizenship. Thoughsigning of the convention onrefugees is not under the previewof this work, there is a good casefor having a refugee policypreferably after a national debate.As regards the flow of refugees, thepolicy of not permitting inflows bymilitary where it is deployed closeto the Chinese border, must beexplained to the TGIE so thatwrong impressions are not formedthat India is sending them back as

12 Ibid.13 There are 208 monasteries( with over 27451 monks) and 17 nunneries(accommodating over

1696 nuns) established in exile . In addition there are six cultural centres for the study of spiritualand secular tradition. See Tibet’s Parliament -in -Exile, 2009, New Delhi, Tibetan Parliamentaryand Policy Research Centre, New Delhi,2009, p.51.

a routine. Need for exigencies ofmilitary action must becommunicated to the Tibetanauthorities in India.

(c) From our interactions and fieldwork there is a sense ofunhappiness with issues of RC andIC. The procedures for issue ofRegistration Certificate(RC) andIdentity Certificate (IC) needs to bestreamlined. It needs to beundertaken in a professionalmanner so that the ‘inspector- raj’type of tendencies are not allowedto creep up over time. It should notappear that the state is bent onharassing. At the same time bettertechniques with trainedprofessionals need to be in placeto weed out agents and spies. Inshort, there is a need forsophisticated counterintelligence.

(d) Tibetan language must bereintroduced as a subject at theNational Defence Academy(NDA). A former Chief of the ArmyStaff has suggested that theshortcoming of language skills atregional level must be overcomeand Tibetan must be taught.14

Diplomats dealing with China andTibet may also be given adequatelanguage training in Tibetan.Academics with knowledge ofTibetan must be made use of.Buddhist studies institutes must beupgraded with the best of human

resources with Indian faculty. Indiamust be seen by other countries asa centre of Buddhism by activeparticipation in its study andfestivals.

(e) At present there is a dearth ofIndian academics in this field. Mostacademics of Tibetolgy, culturalstudies of the Himalayan beltincluding anthropology andlinguistics are Western. We mustencourage Indian scholars tobecome world class in this field.Finance, resources and jobs mustbe created for this to happen.

(f) India should not allow China toassume the leadership role ofBuddhism. More thaninfrastructure, what is needed is asocial capital based on Buddhistvalues. Through the ‘Look East’policy and upcoming NalandaUniversity, India will take itsrightful place in the Buddhistworld. We need to recall ShashiTharoor’s urging, “…if we are torebuild it after 800 years, we willneed not just money but the will toexcellence, not just a physical plantbut a determined spirit. A greatUniversity is the finestadvertisement for the society thatsustains it. If we recreate Nalanda,it must be as a university worth itsname – and we must be a societyworthy of a twenty-first centuryNalanda”. High calibre and

14 General Shankar Roy Chowdhury (Retd) , “Untapped Potential: ARTRAC is an intellectual forcemultiplier for the Indian Army”, FORCE, 7(8), April 2010, pp. 28–9. The former Chief of theArmy Staff suggests that other regional languages that need to be taught are Urdu, Sinhala,Burmese, Banhal, Bhutanese, Pashto and Dari.

motivated professionals need to beappointed in the university.Network with Namgyal Institute ofTibetology (Gangtok), CentralInstitute of Higher Tibetan Studies(Sarnath), Sampurnanand SanskritUniversity (Varanasi), CentralInstitute of Himalayan CultureStudies (Dahung), CentralInstitute of Buddhist Studies(Choglamsar, Ladakh), SongstenLibrary and Centre for Tibetan &Himalayan Studies, Sahstradhara,Dehradun , Delhi University andother universities/institututes inIndia must be established rapidly.India will need to catch up withBuddhist studies and Tibetology tobe on par with many Westernuniversities. Simultaneously, thestate must provide maximum helpto Tibetan monasteries (likeMundgod) in India to be top classworld centres and continue to haveproducts such as the less knownIndia Lama Tashi. High qualitydocumentary film makers may becommissioned by the IndianCouncil of Cultural Relations(ICCR) to film the achievements ofIndians from these institutes.

(g) The government must begin

comprehensive dialogues with theTGIE on various contingencies.Facilitation of democracy and, ifneed be, de-institutionalisation ofthe Dalai Lama and related ordersmay be one option. At the sametime, the Dalai Lama could be aninstrument of negotiations. To thatend, the old practice of the DalaiLama meeting with the PrimeMinster in transit through Delhimust be revived. He should be freeto visit any part of India or to meetanyone. To that end, India’srejection of Chinese pressure onthe Dalai Lama visiting Tawang inNovember 2009 is demonstrative ofour strength and is welcome. InNovember 2011 China wantedIndia to prevent the 14th Dalai Lamafrom addressing a Buddhistconvention in India organised bythe Asoka Mission, founded in 1948by Cambodian monk DharmavaraMahathera.15The boundary talks inNovember 2011 also gotpostponed on that account.16 TheChinese consulate in Kolkatta hadofficially approached the ChiefMinister and Governor of WestBengal not to attend a talk by theDalai Lama at Indian Institute of

15 Shobhan Saxena, “Return of Buddha”, Times of India, December 4, 2011. 35 Chinese monks didnot turn up for the occassion

16 Sandeep Dikshit, “Dalai Lama’s Delhi programme behind border talk postponement”, The Hindu,November 27, 2011, Jayant Jacob, “India says can’t gag Dalai , China stalls border talks” ,Hindustan Times, November 27, 2011 and Ananth Krishnan, “China warns New Delhi aginst‘providing’ a platform for the Dalai Lama”, The Hindu, November 29, 2011. The objection toIndian joint commercial offshore ventures with Vietnam in South China sea could also be onereason for this postponement of border talks.

Mangerment , which was rightlyignored.17 It is very unreasonableof China to insist on such things.India’s stated position is that theDalai Lama is a “spiritual leaderand honoured guest”. India’snational interests are also have afoundation of national values andrejection of such undue Chinesedemands is justified.

(h) The Ministry of External Affairscould bring out an issue brief toprepare diplomats and others tocounter any Chinese claims. India’scase on Tawang must be forcefullyarticulated. Appendix A lists someof these arguments. Based on thiswith further refinement, specialcapsules may need to be conductedfor military officers and otherpersonnel who interact withChinese counterparts in BorderPersonnel Meeting (BPM).However not much of scholarlywork seems to exist on oral historyand changing attitudes of peoplebefore and after the 1962 war. Itmay be a worthwhile idea to havemore number of research scholars

including locals to carry outfocused research by living in theregion and recording oral history.In the absence of this type ofresearch we may continue to takerumours and stories as authenticdata. 18

(i) No Indian statement has evermentioned that Tibet is an“inalienable” part of China. Indiahas only accepted that it is anautonomous part of China. It isimportant that policymakers revivethis aspect. Otherwise, as memoryfades, unwittingly Indianpolicymakers may accept Tibet tobe an “inalienable” part of China.19

Also, there is no need to renamethe Indo-Tibetan Border Police:doing that will show weak resolve.It is necessary to insist onreciprocity in dealing withChina.20Rather, seeing theunreasonable attitude of China,leading scholars of China in Indiahave merit in the suggestion that“India should stop saying TibetanAutonomous Region is part ofChina till Beijing accepts Arunachal

17 Subrata Nagchowdhury, “China to Bengal: Skip Dalai Lama Talk”, The Indian Express,December 1, 2011.

18 One monograph on the topic , but mostly on trade which came to notice is by Col. Gautam Das,Tawang Border Trade: Problems and Prospects, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi , OccasionalStudies No.11, May 2007.

19 Recall how Chinese suzerainty changed to sovereignty in the 1950s. Early 20th century , to upholdthe notion of Chinese’ ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet as a counter to Russian influence . The term“suzerainty” does not exist in international law. See Gerald Schmitz, “Tibet’s Position inInternational Law” in Dagmar Bernstorff and Hubertus von Welck ( Edited), Exile as Challenge:the Tibetan Diaspora, Hyderabad, Orient Longman, 2003, pp. 45-71.

20 Sujit Dutta, “Managing and Engaging Rising China: India’s Evolving Posture”, The WashingtonQuarterly , Vol.34, No.2, Spring 2011, pp.127-144.

Pradesh and J &K as integral partsof India”.21

(j) The concept of soft power ofBuddhism as obtained in India andin the Himalayan belt also needs tobe incorporated in the trainingcurriculum of administrators,diplomats and military officers.There may be even a departmentof soft power studies using ourspiritual diplomacy. A coordinatedeffort needs to be made. In the USthey have a Tibet coordinator in thegovernment. In India we need acentral point, as various ministrieshandle the issues. The Departmentof Rehabilitation of the Ministry ofHome Affairs handles refugees;also the Indo Tibetan Border Policeworks under it; the Department ofCulture handles universities andschools in India; universities fundsocial studies like linguistics andanthropology; the MEA handlesvisas and related issues; theMinistry of Defence handlesoperations; while the NationalSecurity Adviser attempts to havea holistic picture. At the state levelthe Chief Minister and theGovernor with their staff and otherministers/officials have key roles toplay. Finally, the people of the

border region practising Buddhismmust broaden the agenda. To havean underlying soft power message,this project could well be called“Padmasambhav” or “Atisa”.

(k) Non-Mongoloid Indians must beeducated and trained to get overprejudices against Mongoloidpeople. This issue concerns how wetreat look-alike people from theNorth-East, Tibetans, Nepali hillfolks and Bhutanese.

(l) A consulate has no political role asper technical definition. It looksafter Indian citizens. A case for aconsulate in say KailashMansarovar region (Lhasa, if thereis no suitable city nearby) may beconsidered if reclaiming Minsar isnot possible initially.

(m) More study is needed on Tibet.While this work has touched uponTibetology or Tibet Studies, theinfrastructure and ecology, anddemographics are importantdrivers of the future security scene.A comprehensive study needs to beundertaken on Tibet in the future.One scenario exercise to includethe concerns of Tibetan Buddhismand ecology of Tibet is at Appendix B.

21 Sujit Dutta, “China’s High Risk India Gamble”, September 3, 2010 at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasHighRiskIndiaGamble_sdutta_030910

INDIA’S CASE ON ARUNACHAL PRADESH AND

TAWANG

Appendix A

The boundary issue, of late, has alsobecome more of a territorial issue. TheChinese have not recognized ArunachalPradesh as a part of India. It calls itSouth Tibet. They have now begun tohave separate pages for visa (stapledvisa) to Indian citizens of Jammu andKashmir – a signal which is extremelyrude. The Chinese governmentappeared very upset over the visit of theIndian Prime Minister to ArunachalPradesh in October 2009 during the run-up to the state elections. Even on Sikkimthey are not forthright on it being a partof India. They continue to occupy AksaiChin and Shaksgam Valley (swappedfrom Pakistan in 1963) in Jammu andKashmir and are entering into anagreement with Pakistan forconstruction of infrastructure and damsin POK. Although the Chinese claimthat they do not support insurgents inthe North East, the routes for illicit armsand movement via Yunnan andMyanmar are still open.

This appendix must be read inconjunction with Box B on ethnicity inChapter 2. The key message is that Indiashould not be apologetic in acceptingethnic people from Tibet or Tibetanswho migrated in history to India asIndians. It is also a lesson in

overcoming prejudices against peopleof Mongoloid ethnicity. The Appendixhas sections on:

(a) Argument over Tawang byParshotam Mehra.

(b) The Case of Pemako and Chimdru

(c) Meeting with Buddhistintellectuals and monks, and visitto monasteries .

(d) Monpas, the 1962 War and theCurrent Discourse

(e) Civil-Military Relations

PARSHOTAM MEHRA’S BOOK

By far the best scholarship is byParshotam Mehra. His account showsthat the line suggested by Ivan Chenduring the Simla talks of October 1913would have included Tawang as part ofIndia. But McMahon drew his line onthe map after the greatest deliberationin 1914 and that only after Bailey andMorehead had categorically confirmedthat Tawang was Monba and notTibetan in character. The British rulerskept changing their stance while Lhasarefused to withdraw its tax gatherers.The British did not want to offend theChinese who were their partner in the

global war against fascism. Later,according to Mehra, the Raj’s ‘Bania’mentality was at play – the actingGovernor computed that making afrontier on Sela and Diggien river wouldcost almost a quarter. Tawang was to behanded over on a platter. Only in 1951Indian control became effective whenBob Khating made control of Tawangpossible.22

Pemako and Chimdru

B. N. Mullik had noted:

This big bend of the Tsangpocontained within it Pemako andChimdru areas, the inhabitants ofwhich were not Tibetans and who hadmore access to India than to Tibet.Even as late as 1959 petitions were filedby the people of Pemakao andChimdru to the Government of Indiato take them under Indianadministration.23

Tibet is not a monolithic block. Thepeople of Tibet also vary from Amdo,

Kham, U and Stang, etc.24 The same isthe case with regions of south east Tibetclose to the Indian borders whereethnic/linguistic boundaries overlap. Ifthe Buddhist people of Pemako andChimdru had petitioned to join India,they probably did it on a plea ofethnicity. Yet now they are a part of theTAR. This is a good case for review. In asimilar fashion, India also has peoplewith ethnic links closer to the Tibetanswho remain Indians. In the case ofTawang and Kameng, scholars haveargued defensively that Monpas are notTibetans and China cannot claim thearea on the basis of ethnicity or religion.In any case the people of Tawang have noinclination to be part of the TAR.25

Besides, Tibetan ethnicity is no ipso facto

logic for demanding territory. InLadakh, Changpas, both from Tibet andLadakh, operate freely in the grasslandsof Changthang.

Neville Maxwell’s account shows howCaptain Lightfoot of the Indian Armyreached Tawang in April 1938 and

22 Parshotam Mehra, Essays in Frontier History: India, China, and the Disputed Border , New Delhi,Oxford University Press, 2007.

23 B.N. Mullik, My Years With Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal , New Delhi, Allied, 1971, p. 94.24 According to Åshild Kolås, historically, Tibetans have distinguished between three major regions

of Tibet: U- Tsang (the central and western part of the TAR), Amdo (the Tibetan area of Qinghaiand Gansu, and the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan), and Kham (Diqing, Ganzi, theTibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan, and the Eastern part of the TAR). For some Tibetansthese regional identities are mutually exclusive similar to ethnic categories. Visitors from easternTibet are called Khampa and not Tibetans. See Åshild Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture inTransition: A Place Called Shangrila , Oxon, Routledge, 2008, pp. 82–3. Michel Peissel historicallyincludes the Dalai Lama’s territory (area of U and Tsang and three kingdoms of Nagri or westernTibet) in the Tibetan world with the independent Tibetan kingdoms of Ladakh , Spiti, Kulu,Kangra, Mustang, Sikku, Bhutan and Dergue as well as the large principalities of Amdo and thewarring kingdom of Kham. See Michel Peissel, Cavaliers of Kham: The secret war in Tibet , London,Heinemann, 1972, p. 7.

25 The Chinese in their interactions with Indians say that their Tawang tract claim is due to Tibetanpressure groups, but do not elaborate. Interview of Professor Steve Hoffman, April 8, 2009, atIDSA.

Tibetan officials flaunted theirauthority by collecting taxes under hisnose. After partition, only Walong hada post. The penetration of the Tawangtract was halted at Dirang Dzong:Tibetan administration of the Tawangtract was still unchallenged. Only in1951 did an India official (MajorKhating, a Manipuri Naga from IndianFrontier Administrative Service), moveto Tawang.26 We can write off such anaccount as irrelevant, but morearguments have to be developed toexplain why even though the people inTawang were taxed it does not make itChinese territory. Ignoring Maxwell’swork, even if biased, does notstrengthen our argument. This is bestdone by historians of the McMahonLine or through a white paper.

Meeting With Geshe NgawangTashi Bapu(Lama Tashi),Principal , the Central Institute ofHimalayan Culture Studies,Dahung, Arunachal Pradesh

The principal and teachers in aninteraction highlighted importantissues which need to be attended to.Some being:

(a) Lama Tashi informed us that UpperBomdila monastery was earlier inTsona, (now in Tibet) and has anIndian citizen as its head. Thepresent head, His eminence, theThirteenth Tsona Gontse Rinpocheis also a Congress MLA, who wasout of town in connection with the

26 Neville Maxwell, India’s China War , Bombay, Jaico, 1970, p. 73.

issue of granting the region“Monyul” an autonomous status asin Ladakh. He has followersspanning India and Tibet. Theprevious Rinpoche, who is now nomore, was Lama Tashi’s uncle. Healso had to flee Tibet in 1959 andwas initially kept at Shillong, by theIndian government. What thismeeting highlighted was that Indiancitizens from Kameng region had alsobeen in the clergy. Today UpperBomdila is also headed by Indians.The head Lama of Tawang as wasinformed is now an Indian. LamaTashi agreed that there was a lot ofconfusion in the people’s minds overoverlaps in cultural and religiouspractices.

(b) No concrete answer was given to apost Fourteenth Dalai Lamascenario. He felt that it may be toomuch of a worry for bureaucrats.

(c) It was felt that Tibetan refugees donot pose any security threat toIndia.

(d) Lama Tashi was of the view thatrather than calling it TibetanBuddhism, Central AsianBuddhism was more appropriate.Tibetan Buddhism is now like abrand name.

(e) Inner line restriction is veryimportant as it is a sensitive area.

(f) He sees no option but to continuethe tulku (reincarnation system).

Appendices

Democratic means are unlikely tosucceed in this aspect.

(g) The society, more so the youth intransition, was a challenge asconsumerism was spreading. It wasclashing with Buddhist values.Young minds often got confused.Some students have left theboarding due to absence ofentertainment. The jhummias arefinding it tough to continue thetough practice of swiddenagriculture. People are shunningagriculture, though horticulture iscatching on, which is a good thing.

(h) As regards research on the people,it was mentioned that knowledgeis very superficial. The Universitysystem and funds provided, do notsuffice in studying aspects of theregion by Indian scholars as yet.Also, the history of Tawangmonastery is at times wronglyquoted as the most ancient,whereas it is of the sixteenth orseventeenth century. Discussionwith other teachers, revealed thatthere was a subtle conversion toChristianity in other animist belts,and Gompa like structures hadbeen converted to churches. It wassuggested that the NEHU has agood department of anthropologyand can do good work. As regardsto data on urbanization ofArunachal Pradesh,fixed at 25% bysome scholars, looked superficial,as no worthwhile jobs wereavailable. On the charge of Lamasnot doing much on ecology , it wasmentioned that Lamas are too laidback under present circumstances

and need to be more active.However, this is not a general view,as due to the complex knowledgethat they learn and need totransmit, if they dissipate theirenergies, the focus may well belost. Society has also a role toperform and must object toenvironmental degradation.

MONASTERIES

A Reason for the Secretive Nature

of Monasteries: In conversation withofficials , one perception observed wasthat the monasteries and institutionsare very secretive. They reveal nothingto a casual visitor on subjects likehierarchy , budget and so on . This isprobably due to the fact that thereligion is highly evolved and esoteric.Much depends on oral transmission.Scriptures are well preserved and oneneeds to be a scholar of their languageto read them. Also lack of languageskills and poor basic knowledge of thepeople and religion may also becontributing to this. Thus sharinginformation is discouraged or so itappears to visitors. In any case wedoubt if other religious organisationsprovide ready-made data that the layvisitor wants. This desire for notwishing to be unduly disturbed by ideasof growth and modernisation andpreferring isolation also exists inneighbouring countries. Bhutan is aclear case of not allowing too manypeople snooping around and interferingin their deeply religious way of life. TheBhutanese have thus restricted thenumber of tourists. They would ratherhave cultural solitude than a crowd of

tourists disturbing their way of life andecology. Why this is important is that thissensitivity must be cultivated wheninteracting with these organisations. Dueto overlap of devotees and monks , it iscommon for people mixing up Indianmonasteries with those set up by theTibetans in exile.

Bomdila: Gontse Gaden Rabgyelling

Monastery (Upper Gonpa): Animpressive monastery on a heightoverlooking Bomdila. It dates back tothe year 1965. It owes its inception tothe Twelfth reincarnation of TsonaGontse Rinpoche, who got thismonastery built before his death in theyear 1966. The monastery of Bomdila isan imitation of the Tsona GontseMonastery, located at Tsona in Tibet.The main prayer hall of the monasterywas added later on by the Thirteenthreincarnate of Tsona Gontse Rinpoche.This hall was later sanctified in 1997 bythe Dalai Lama. Apart from the prayerhall, Bomdila Monastery also comprisesof a temple of Lord Buddha andresidential quarters for the monks. It isalso known as Gentse Gaden RabgyelLling Monastery.

TAWANG

Tawang is a national heritage site . Themain Buddhist attractions are :

(a) Tawang Monastery including

Centre for Buddhist Cultural

Studies . This is a dominatingstructure. It has a museum and aCentre for Buddhist CulturalStudies supported by centralgrants. The school has both dayscholars( locals) and a boardingschool with a combination of

religious and other academicsubjects.

(b) Serjey Jamyang Choe Khorling

Monastery and Buddhist Cultural

Preservation Society. This is theformer Sangeling monastery . Italso has a Buddhist CulturalPreservation Society. Its abbot wasa Bhutanese Geshe KuenzangWangdi. He also like others hadstudied in world class exiledTibetan seats of learning inrefugee establishments atKarnataka.

(c) Urgyeling, World Peace Park , Birth

place of the Sixth Dalai Lama. Thisplace is the birth place of the SixthDalai Lama. It has a “ chandan”tree which is highly revered as itrelates to the Sixth Dalai Lama.Here it is important to note thatjust because the Sixth Dalai Lamawas born in Tawang does not meanTawang belongs to the PRC. Withthis logic Mongolia also should beclaimed by China as it was the birthplace of the Fourth Dalai Lama. Inany case the Chinese had tried todelegitamise the Sixth Dalai Lamafor his behaviour and he died veryyoung (probably poisoned orkilled). However Tibetans reveredhim. The Sixth Dalai Lama’s deathwas under mysteriouscircumstances. The regent had keptthe death of the Fifth Dalai Lama,a secret. The Sixth Dalai Lama wasalready an adult when he wasdiscovered. He was a poet andlover. The Chinese saw it as anexcuse for intervention and stirredup rumours of a mistake and fraudon him, though he was respected

Appendices

by the Tibetans. Lhabsan Khan,Gushri Khan’s grandson, assumed thetitle of king of Tibet in 1697. He setout to restore political authority whichhis grandfather had yielded. Thisplaced him in direct confrontationwith Tibet regent who wanted noMongol influence. Bone of contentionfor Lhabsang Khan was behaviour of6th Dalai Lama. Lhabsang publiclyannounced that Tsayang Gytso wasnot the true 6th Dalai Lama and withapproval of Qing emperor sent himto exile in Biejing where the 6th

Dalai Lama died in route. Themonks and populace howevercontinued to consider him as thetrue Dalai Lama. Monks thenturned to Geluk’s mongol follower,the Dzungars for aid inoverthrowing Lhabsnag Khan whoin the meanwhile had installed afake the 7th Dalai Lama. In 1771Dzungar cavalry aided by Tibetanmonks and laymen quicklydefeated Lhabsang Khan. Whatthis shows is that the Chinese arenow trying to construct a narrativeon 6 th Dalai Lama whom theythemselves had rejected. This factof history has not been highlightedforcefully by India and now needsto be included. Best historians ofinternational repute must come outwith historic accounts explainingthis issue on why the claim ofTawang and 6th Dalai Lama has nosolid evidence for it being claimed

now by PRC.

(d) Thukje Chueling Nunnery. This isone of the two nunneriesaccommodating 44 interns.

MONPAS , THE 1962 WAR AND

CURRENT DISCOURSE

Indians from mainland India have avery limited knowledge about thepeople of the remote border regionssuch as the north eastern Himalayas.Very often they mix up Indians from theregion as hailing from foreigncountries. History shows the drawback isdue to pro- Mongoloid prejudices. EvenSardar Patel in his November 1950letter to Nehru, when Tibet was occupiedby China , had stated that :

The contacts of these areas(northern or north- easternapproaches consisting of Nepal,Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and thetribal areas in Assam) with us, areby no means, close and intimate.The people inhabiting theseportions have no established loyaltyor devotion to India. EvenDarjeeling and Kalimpong are notfree from pro- Mongoloidprejudices 27

Quoting from books by Indian authorssuch as B.N Mullik (My Years with

Nehru: the Chinese Betrayal) and D.KPalit (War in the High Himalayas), PeterStephen Rosen in his book on theIndian military titled Societies and

27 Letter as quoted in Mullik, B.N., My Years With Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, New Delhi, AlliedPublishers, 1971, p. 118.

Military Power: India and Its Armies

(pages 240-241) writes:

“The colonial outlook of the IndianArmy in NEFA was nowhere betterexemplified that in its unwillingnessto enlist the cooperation of friendlytribals especially Mompas of Tawangwho suffered under Tibetan rule andwho, initially were pro - Indians. Asa result when crisis arose it was theChinese who utilised Mompas ——as guides and informers and forproviding safe houses.”

How these authors have reached theseconclusions remains a mystery. Thereare no archival accounts in open accessto the history of the conflict. Thisdiscourse is unfair to the locals.

On a deeper study of extant secondarysources it could be felt that Tibetanporters were confused with the localsin some accounts. B.N. Mullik in hisbook at page 343 does allude to the factthat the “Chinese had evacuated thepopulation from the frontier in theTsona- Le Shao sector and had broughtTibetans from the rear areas to assistthem”. Later he mentions that Tibetanswere used as slave labourers to buildroads (page 345).

Refreshingly , the present localdiscourse makes this above assertionstand on its head. During the inaugural

ceremony of the Maitreya Mela inTawang in October 2008 senior militaryofficers said that the locals of Tawanghad a rather different story to tell aboutthe 1962 war. Firstly they said thatunlike the Indian Army, they never ranaway thus ‘we the Monpas are trulyIndians’. Secondly they observed that allmilitary structure ahead of Bomdilabuilt till date by the military appear tobe temporary unlike say in Tenga/Rupawhere permanent accommodation hascome up implying that the military is stillnot certain whether it will continue tooccupy the area and may withdraw.While these observations are to someextent anecdotal, they bring out onefundamental issue. That is of theassimilation of the people of north-eastand the border regions in India hasmany more avenues and issues. It iswell known and recorded how thepeople of Arunachal Pradesh areintegrated with India. They speak Hindiwith pride, unlike those in otherregions.

Field visits by IDSA scholars in therecent past have shown very positivenationalistic feelings among the localsin Arunachal Pradesh .28 In March 2011,most people interviewed across the tribes stated that Chinese claim is notvalidated by history. The monks saidthat China’s claim is a distortion ofhistory. China is not attractive to the

28 See Pushpita Das, “Management of India-China Border Area: A Case Study of ArunachalPradesh”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 3(3), July–September 2008, pp. 92–105 and NamrataGoswami. “ China’s Claim on Arunachal Pradesh: Local Perspectives”, IDSA Issue Brief ,July 7, 2011.

Appendices

local people. 29 Recent work at IDSA onArunachal identifies the next threechallenges of delivery on governance,(improving infrastructure), riparianissues, and better roads and bordersecurity. 30 Besides fear of being in aseismic zone , the common perceptionis that one area where more work isneeded is on construction of dams. Theparamount view in local discourse inArunachal Pradesh is that India is nowplanning to build dams on Arunachalirivers to counter China’s territorialclaim. 31 In contrast , according to IDSATask Force Report on water, establishingthe user’s right is the only way availablefor India32 in not allowing China tobuild dams or in diverting the YarlungTsangpo, else China will legally win afuture case to divert the YarlungTsangpo. Thus top down and bottomup perceptions need to be matched. Inlong- term ecological thinking,ecologists and hydrologists may alsoneed to have ecological argumentsrather than “user rights” principles.Theses principles are understandable forvast irrigated area as in the Indusplain, but on Yarlung Tsangpo andArunachal Pradesh – which is an Indianas well as global biodiversity hot spot,this needs a deeper ecologicalunderstanding in the long- term.

SOFT POWER OF RELIGION AND

CULTURE

After the military take-over of Tibet in1950, all the areas once ethnicallyconnected with Tibet became, forBeijing, a part of the Chinese empire.Mao used the image of the palm of thehand (Tibet) and the five fingers(Bhutan, Sikkim, NEFA, Ladakh andNepal). One has to understand that ithas never cost China anything (apartfrom a communiqué from the Xinhuanews agency) to claim these areas astheirs. Further, the Chinese rightlythought that these claims could beextremely useful in the future.33 Muchmore research and psychologicalunderstanding is needed to get rid ofsuch notions. We have at last started tobuild roads (earlier the pet theme was‘Do not build roads as they will favourthe Chinese attackers’). We need nowto construct narratives and discourse that will neutralise this hand, palm andfinger analogy. This is best done by thesoft power of religion and culture. TheIndian Himalayan belt is rather like anIndian skin in the Himalayas nourishedby Buddhism.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Positive nationalistic attitudes during

29 Namrata Goswami. “ China’s Claim on Arunachal Pradesh: Local Perspectives”, IDSA IssueBrief , July 7, 2011,p.4.

30 Ibid, p.3.31 Ibid,,p.12.32 Water Security for India : the External Dynamics, IDSA Task Force Report, New Delhi, IDSA,

September 2010, p.51.33 V. Sundaram, “ Abject Story”, News Today, November 6, 2006, http://newstodaynet.com/2006sud/

06nov/1811ss1.htm accessed October 26, 2008.

Maitreya Mela in Tawang indicate thatfrom the people’s perspective there is noissue at all.34 The mela of 2009 was enjoyedas much by the locals as by the military.35

This relationship needs to be publicised.

The respect shown by the locals to the DalaiLama during his visit to Tawang inNovember 2009 was phenomenal. Saintlypeople and religious heads have alwaysbeen revered in the Indian culture. This isone cultural issue which may not be wellunderstood by the Chinese. For this thecase of the Tawang war memorial isimportant.

Tawang War Memorial. This 1962memorial is impressive and is a touristattraction. It is a traditional chorten onBuddhist lines and was personallyanointed by the Dalai Lama in 1998 .Streams of domestic ( mostly Bengali)tourists in family groups flock themonument . Its upkeep by the jawansof the Indian Army in keeping with

34 Field trip by PK Gautam in 2008.35 Lt Col K.R. Rajkumar, “A Bond of Friendship”, Sainik Samachar, 57(1), January 1–15 ,2010,

pp. 22–3.36 The authors are thankful to Dr Nitasha Kaul in suggesting ( during interaction with Professor

Dibyesh Anand’s presentation on the boundary question at the IDSA on January 15, 2010 ), theneed for regular exposure to troops by way of short capsules on the local traditions, culture andreligion. A former commanding general of the mountain division while interacting with one ofthe authors of this report also agreed to it . Some excellent coffee table books have been producedby the military officers posted there on orchids. Future projects must now shift to deeperunderstanding of the local people.

Buddhist traditions is commendable. Thisbonding of the Indian Military with theDalai Lama has as great significance forthe people of Tawang as for the Tibetansand the military.

The New Civil- Military Agenda. TheIndian Army has done away with thepractice of newly inducted unitsmarching on foot to their operationallocations from the railhead. Thispractice was essential in the 1960s and1970s. The new way is now to havefamiliarisation of troops to local culture,religion and customs. This can be doneby a short cadre on induction and as arefresher for all ranks, which will go along way in winning the respect of theinhabitants of the area. This will alsogenerate a new phase of patriotism.36

The army can give back by ensuringthat local language and literature is alsorevived.

Appendices

TIBET 203037

Appendix B

DRIVERS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Economic Tibet. China’s aim is to havean economically advanced Tibet.Mineral resources that will feedmainland China is the main motivationfor this development Urbanisation,infrastructure building, extension ofrail, roads and airports, convertinggrasslands to farmland will continue.Demographic Changes. DemographicChanges continue by way of settlementof Hans in Tibet. Like in the case ofInner Mongolia or Xingjian, the localwill become minorities.

The Status and Role of the Dalai Lama.

By having the government’s rolesupreme in incarnation, the selection ofthe future Dalai Lama lies with the state(like it was done in the case of PanchenLama). No one born outside China canlay claim to reincarnation. This makes

the government in theory morepowerful than the spiritual leadershipin exile.

Ecology and Climate Change. Due toglobal warming brought about byanthropogenic reasons, “the glaciers inthe Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau and theTianshan Mountains would retreat at anaccelerated rate, and some smallerglaciers would disappear”38. “Inparticular, accelerated melting ofglaciers in western China due to climatewarming will further reduce the area ofglaciers and glacier ice reserves, thushaving significant impacts on rivers andrun-offs with sources in glacier-meltedwater. Future climate change willfurther increase the vulnerability ofecological systems, diminish thegeographical distribution areas of maintree species for afforestation and rare

37 Scenario planning although not a tool for prediction was considered yet another way to projecttrends. The pioneering stand -alone scenario exercise appeared first as an edited chapter. SeeP.K. Gautam, “Tibet 2030“, in Ajey Lele, Namrata Goswami and Rumel Dahiya( Editors) , Asia2030 : The Unfolding Future, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers, 2011. For a case for treating Tibet asa regional if not as a global common see P.K. Gautam, “Climate Change, EnvironmentalDegradation, Tibet: Implications for Environmental Security in South Asia”. Strategic Analysis ,Vol.34, No.5, September 2010, pp.744-755.This part (since updated) was earlier published in “ Tibet 2030”in Ajey Lele, Namrata Goswamiand Rumel Dahiya (Edited) , Asia 2030: The Unfolding Future, New Delhi , Lancer Publishers ,2011, pp. 200-207.

38 China’s National Climate Change Programme, National Development and Reform Commission,the PRC, June 2007, p. 6.

tree species, enlarge the outbreak scopeof forest diseases and insect, andincrease the frequency of forest firesand burnt-over areas, shrink inlandlakes and cause the decrease andfunctional degradation of wetlandresources, speed up the reduction of thearea of glaciers and permafrost, andsignificantly alter the spatialdistribution pattern of permanentpermafrost of highland ecologicalsystem on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau,and damage bio-diversity. Climatewarming would possibly reinforce thedrought trend in northern China, andintensify water scarcity and imbalancebetween water supply and demand. “ 39

Environmental degradation due toclimate change is also considered athreat by the Environment andDevelopment Desk of Department ofInformation and InternationalRelations , Central TibetanAdministration (CTA), Dharamsala.This driver is common to both, the PRCand the CTA. Both admit that there isan onset of an ecological crisis in theTibetan plateau and the adjoining areasdue to climate change.

Attitudes of the Tibetan People.

Tibetans in exile may continue withtheir ideas of greater autonomy. InsideTibet, things are still opaque. Howevertaking a cue from the spontaneousdemonstration in March 2008 across theTAR and also from other provinces ofChina having Tibetans in majority or insizeable numbers, this driver isimportant.

SCENARIO 1: HANISED AND

DEGRADED TIBET

Hanisation and Demographic Changes.

With Hanisation and DemographicChanges Tibetan Buddhism is likely tobe at a crossroad . The Chinese wouldhave their own Fifteenth Dalai Lama bythen. While the CTA has not expressedopenly many options may happen.Scenarios could be the end of the DalaiLama process with a democratic system,or a parallel Dalai Lama in exile. Dueto internationalization of TibetanBuddhism and culture, thehumanitarian and culturalresponsibility to preserve Buddhistculture will not only be shared by Indiabut also by the internationalcommunity.

Division Between Traditions of Tibetan

Buddhism. It is possible that attemptsof the Fourteenth Dalai Lama to unifytraditions would have borne fruit.Although the division of the PanchanLama of Gelugpa tradition is wellknown (one selected by China and oneselected by the Dalai Lama- who ismissing in China), the exiledgovernment under its Prime Ministermay be the temporal head. For spiritualhead, Tibetans will be split and bethrust under a great transitionalstruggle. If they follow old traditionsthen they will be split between spiritualheads of their traditions, who may wellbe in the PRC. The present FourteenthDalai Lama due to his charismaticpersonality is unlikely to be replaced

39 Ibid , p.9.

Appendices

with a similar lama. The SeventeenthKarmapa who in his teens fled to Indiain 2000 would have come of age, but itis doubtful if he will be able to thecommand spiritual and religious poweras the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Thefallout of the struggle is hazy andcomplex.

ECOLOGY

The environmental degradation ofTibet will continue. By the time thesecond commitment period of theKyoto Protocol begins in 2013 ,business as usual emissions worldwidewould have added to the existing stocksof excess green house gases in theatmosphere. The trees, soil and oceanswill not be able to sequester them.Scientists are worried that a warmingTibetan plateau will change thedynamics of the Asian monsoons.40

Glaciers that feed rivers like the Yellow,Yangtze, Mekong, Salween, Indus,Ganges and Brahmaputra which areshrinking at an average rate of 7%annually will have great impact onwater, food, energy and biodiversitysecurity.41 About 60 to 190 billion tonsof carbon locked up in permafrost may

begin to release accelerating globalwarming.42 Extreme weather eventsthen will be a norm.

Pastures. The Russian TibetologistRoerich has mentioned that depriveTibet of its cattle breeding region andthe country would starve.43Thenomads’ positive relationship withecology will end. Animal products likeskins, meat , milk and butter ratherthan being produced though nomadsmay be factory produced . Use of packanimals such as yaks, dzos (crossbreeds), goats and sheep for trade willdecline. Health of glaciers, grasslandsand the nomadic life are very delicatelybalanced with the ecology.44

In Sino- Tibetan relations, the differentperspectives on the economic path ofthe PRC and the CTA is unlikely to getresolved as Hanisation, urbanisation,infrastructure building, extension ofrailway network and roads willincrease.

SCENARIO 2 - A RESPONSIBLE CHINA

A clear vision of China’s own identityand the type of society it wants,emerges.45 Unlike the expectations of

40 Michael Zhao and Orville Schell, “Tibet: Plateau in Peril”, World Policy Journal, Vol. XXV. No.3,Fall 2008, pp. 171-180.

41 Ibid.42 Ibid.43 As quoted by Wim van Spengen, Tibetan Borders: A Geohistoric Analysis of Trade and Traders, London

and New York, Keegan Paul International, 2000, pp. 98-102.44 Michael Zhao and Orville Schell, “ Tibet : Plateau in Peril”, World Policy Journal, Vol. XXV. No.3,

Fall 2008, pp. 171-18045 Barry Buzan, “China in International Society : Is ‘ Peaceful Rise Possible’ ?”, The Chinese Journal

of International Politics , Vol.3. No.1, Spring 2010, pp.5-36.

realists, China promotes a peacefulinternational society based on itsdomestic foundation. China’s peacefulrise of the last 30 years is carriedforward even more peacefully inharmony. Compelled to be animportant world power, China carriesout reforms to cater for autonomy ofTibet. It encourages greater religiousfreedom and some democratic freedomin China. In Tibet it controls Hanisationand agrees to change the capitalisticmode of growth and development bykeeping in mind the people’s traditionalpreferences. Tibetan is made the officiallanguage with priority over Mandarinto help the people. With open policiesit permits return of Tibetans in exile andallows the Dalai Lama to be a spiritualleader. It accommodates the TibetanGovernment-in-Exile in its politicalstructure. In some ways it follows theHong Kong model for Tibet. Thisresults in manifold increase ininternational tourism simultaneouslytaking care of ecology. These policiesalso permit China to have the worlds’leadership role in Buddhism. Itimproves foreign relations with theBuddhist countries of East and SouthEast

In ecological matters traditionalpractices of nomads are revived tosustain healthy grasslands. Ecologicalconcerns top the policies, as by 2030adverse impact of climate change wouldbe peaking. A realisation would havedawned on public and politicalleadership that solution lies incooperation with neighbours andrespecting traditional ecologicalknowledge.

WILD CARD SCENARIO

Internal forces make China implode.With capitalistic policies the societybecomes brittle. Societal and culturalmoorings get uprooted. Restrictionsand rigid state high- handedness by thestate, expectations for freedom ofspeech and choice which is denied,creates tensions in Chinese society.Disparity between the rich and poorincreases. The economic growth bubblebased on GDP bursts with chronic andirreversible environmental degradationand pollution of rivers and cities.Climate Change exacerbates thesituation with negative impact on snowand glaciers of Tibet. Water and soilstress lead to massive shortages in food.China loses its manufacturingadvantage and joblessness grows.Reforms in China reach their limit .Thisleads to revival of Maoism ( likeNaxalism in India) with Chinesecharacteristics of the Great Leapforward and the Cultural Revolution.Mainland China sees shades of theWarring Period re-emerge.

People of the regions in the peripherylike Tibet and Xingjian, who for longfelt suppressed on top down economicpolicies and demographic change assertthemselves. Scenario could replicatefragmentation of former Soviet Union.The TAR demands Greater Tibet andturmoil takes place in China and itsregions.

International community comes to helpChina with proviso to grant autonomyto Tibet in accordance with the desireof Tibetans as a tool of conflicttermination over civil conflict andseparatism.

Appendices

POLICIES FOR INDIA

Policies to Cater for Scenario or to HelpShape Scenarios

One question that must be asked is,“Are the policies meant for the scenariowhich unfolds or are the policies meantto help shape or facilitate scenario?” Ifwe continue to base our behaviour onthe Cold War and pre-Cold warthinking, then it appears that a realistmodel based on fear and greed willdominate the thinking.46 The ideal maybe if scenarios are conceptualised andefforts applied to achieve them with aliberal view. However, it needs to benoted that “how little we understand,and how we control even less”.47

With having written scenarios based onimagination and literature survey, it ishoped that these policies may beacceptable to the Chinese, Tibetans andIndians. Rather , it may motivate bothChina and India to address the questionof Tibet.

Tibetan Buddhism

The first policy suggestion is onTibetans and Buddhism . India needsto take initiative to facilitate a dialoguebetween the CTA in exile in India, andthe Chinese. Misperceptions that ledto the 1962 border was need to beremoved. India is a plural society and

Tibetans have been given shelter forreligious , cultural and humanitarianreasons. Real Tibetan Autonomy doesnot mean break up of China. It meansreligious and cultural rights, andgrowth and development on Buddhistvalues, and not ruthless capitalisticmodes which attempt to dominate orrule nature . It is unlikely that inScenario 1, the Tibetans will give uptheir external struggle even in the postFourteenth Dalai Lama scenario.Rather, post Fourteenth Dalai Lamathere may be no leader of stature forChina to engage. The situation maybecome worse with young Tibetansshunning the path of non- violence. Theideal is scenario 2 though India willneed to work hard to retain its topposition in Buddhism. Scenario 3 willtest India’s foreign policy anddiplomacy. It is unlikely that India willact like a predator, rather India willneed to further cooperate over the waterresources emanating from Tibet . Indiaas a responsible power with regionaland global influence will be pivotal inconflict resolution.

Ecology of Tibet

Tibet is a global ecosystem and aclimate crankshaft similar to theAmazon rain forests. It is the sourceof all major rivers to South and South-

46 With wise hindsight, some scholars mention that break up of Soviet Union was planned whenthe Star War initiative was launched in 1980s. This led to the Soviets imploding due tounsustainable high defence expenditure

47 Thomas Homer Dixon, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization,Washington, Island Press, 2006, p.29.

East Asia. Narrow sovereign thinkingon Tibet will do more harm than good.It is linked to the Indian Himalayas.Thus the time is ripe for the countriesof the region to conduct, consolidateand record scientific studies on thedegradation of the ecosystem, both dueto man-made economic policies and dueto climate change. The countries of theregion must reach a positive conclusionand understanding of both adaptationsand mitigation. This will be the firststep based on hard facts and scientificevidence. India’s National Action Planon Climate Change (NAPCC), mentionstwo things. It says that availablemonitoring data on Himalayan glaciersindicates that while recession of someglaciers has occurred in someHimalayan regions in the recent past,the trend is not consistent across theentire mountain chain. In its NationalMission for Sustaining the HimalayanEcosystem, it “seeks to understandwhether, and the extent to which, theHimalayan glaciers are in recession andhow the problem would be addressed.This will require the joint effort ofclimatologists, glaciologists, and otherexperts. India will need to exchange

information with South Asian countriesand countries sharing the Himalayanecology”. 48 For ‘2030 studies’ suchinitiatives must now be implemented .There should be joint deliberationson the common rivers according tointernational norms of water sharing.

NOMADS

The third policy suggestion is for arelook on the nomads. The time to callthen primitive is now over. Traditionalecological knowledge has been theirbasic tool. That must be preserved .Pastures and grasslands must beallowed to flourish.49

MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE BY

DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The fourth policy suggestion ismitigation of climate change. Both theHimalayas and Qinghai-Tibet plateauare unique eco-systems. They needunique global help. Here India, Chinaand countries dependent on the Tibetecosystem must argue for thedeveloped countries to limit emissionto avoid tipping events.

48 NAPCC, p.15 and 5.49 Tibet is 70 per cent grassland and its health is fundamental to survival of one million nomads

with a population of 70 million domestic animals such as sheep, yak and goat. See RobertThurman, Why the Dalai Lama Matters: His Act of Truth as the Solution for China, Tibet, and theWorld, New York, Atria Books, 2008, p.198.

Appendices

EPILOGUE AND POST SCRIPT

As is usual in writing and publishing,there was a delay in offering the reportfor publishing. In this period, besidesaccretion of literature,1 and a first ofits kind, media interview of theKarmapa on September 20, 20092, thefollowing events happened :

(a) There was a very embarrassingevent in connection with theKarmapa and his organisation inJanuary 2011 which was then playeddown.

(b) There was an impetus given to theprocess of democratisation bymeans of election in the exilecommunity for the Kalon Tripa(Prime Minister) in March 2011followed by results andparliamentary sessions.

We give below a brief summary with a

conclusion which has a bearing on ourwork.

THE KARMAPA (UGYEN) EPISODE OF

The temporary abode of the Karmapais at Gyuto Ramoche TantricUniversity, Sidhbari near Dharamsalain Himachal Pradesh. He visited the USonce in 2008. In September 2008 hevisited Leh, Nubra and Changthangon his Dharma tour. Due to heavysnowfall, he was even rescued bymilitary helicopters on the UpshiManali axis beyond Barlachla pass. Hewas denied permission to visit the USin 2010. He visited Bodh Gaya inDecember 2010 and made short trips toDelhi. In January 2011, the local policeapprehended some money beingferried by Indian businessmen

1 Some of the new generation of Indian scholars being Reena Marwah and Sharad K .Soni,“Tibetans in South Asia : a research note”, Asian Ethnicity, Vol.11, No.2, June 2010, pp.263-268,Preetika Rathee, The Tibetan Diaspora in India and their Quest for the Autonomy of Tibet, ManekshawPaper No.24, New Delhi, Centre for Land Warfare Studies /Knowledge World, 2010, BhavnaSingh, “A Paradigm Shift? : Elections to the Tibetan Government-in-Exile 2011, Institute of Peaceand Conflict Studies Special Report, No.105, New Delhi, June 2011 and Sana Hashmi, “DalaiLama and Devolution of Political Authority in Tibet,” World Focus, No. 383-384, November-December 2011, pp.875-871. At the IDSA a number of young researchers started work on theissue of Tibet and wrote web comments. See Pranamita Baruah, “Resolution of Tibet , a will –o-the – wisp”, April 13, 2009, Gunjan Singh, “ The 51st Anniversary of the Tibetan Struggle: Whatis the future?”, March 12, 2010 and Prashant Kumar Singh, “ Decoding the Dalai Lama’s PoliticalRetirement”, March 14, 2011. Another unique work was a survey done by a yong budding. Tibetanscholar after interviewing more than 150 refugees at Dharamsala in 2011. This is probably afirst article done by a Tibetan. See Chok Tsering, “Socio-Political and Economic Conditions ofTibetan Refugees in India: A Case Study of Dharamsala”, Vivekananda International Foundation,New Delhi at http://www.vifindia.org/article/131

2 See Appendix A.

purported to be linked to illegal landdeals and monetary transactions by theorganisation where the Karmapa wasresiding. Issues highlighted by theEnglish language media in particular,being :

l Acquisition of Benami (purchasingproperty in the name of someoneelse) land

l Detection of foreign currency andnot following procedures for itsaccounting

l Accusation of his being a Chinese“spy”

The Tibetans, including manyBuddhists from the Himalayan belt,organised protests and carried outcandle light marches. Later by midFebruary 2011 , the central governmentgave the incident a clean chit and thematter was almost forgotten , but theinjury had been done.3

The media was very crude, to the pointof being rude. They also gave falseinformation without admitting to theerror in mentioning that the Karmapahad travelled to Hong Kong (whereasit was not the case. The anchor beingArnab Goswami of Times Now TV) . Insum, media demonstrated itsuncultured and ugly face to grabviewership based on Television RatingPoint (TRP)4 and sensationalism . This

“media lynching” basically accusinghim of espionage and treating him as ahawala don, a la Bombay underworld,hurt the sentiments of almost allTibetans the authors interacted with.A Tibetan student wrote :

I was very hurt. After the DalaiLama, the Karmapa is the nextimportant Lama for us (as thePanchen Lama’s whereabouts is stillunknown). About the large amountof money that was found at his office.I’m not surprised at all. All Tibetanlama’s receive large donations fromtheir disciples the world over. TheKarmapa being such an importantlama obviously has scores of followerswho are more than happy to donatemoney to their guru. The previousKarmapa (16th) also had a hugenumber of followers from foreigncountries, and I was always aware ofthe immense wealth his monasterypossessed.

This money does not go for evildesigns but for sustaining hundredsof monks and their religiouseducation. Monasteries in India arethe seat of Tibetan culturalpreservation.

I, as a Tibetan, have immense respectfor any decision taken by the DalaiLama. As the Dalai Lama himselfrecognised the 17th Karmapa, I have

3 A political war of words however continued between Virbhadra Singh, Union Minister whocalled it an unfair accusation and pointed out their shoddy ways of probe. He was counteredby the CM of HP, Shri Dhumal. See, The Tribune, New Delhi, February 5, 2011.

4 TRPs, are an audience measurement criterion that indicates the popularity of a television channelor programme. The TRP measure is very useful for advertisers, who use it to help them decidewhich TV channels and programmes to place their advertising in.

Epilogue and Post Script

no reason to believe he has anythingto do with the Chinese government.I believe he is totally innocent......asfor the money...it is not a big deal..alllamas receive thousands andthousands of rupees, which is spentwell in religious studies. All this isfor the betterment of the society...tospread the message of peace andhumanity throughout the world. Ithink it is very irresponsible on thepart of the journalists to spreadrumours without proper verification.

Mr Choekyang Wangchuk , Member,the fourteenth Tibetan Parliament inExile, Executive Director , TibetanParliamentary & Policy ResearchCentre, New Delhi made the followingpoints:

l Astha (belief) not considered bymedia

l There is a lot of voluntary donation

l Media baron (who controls themedia in question) Murdock’s wifeis Chinese, so this smear is nosurprise.

l Does not agree with TV showargument by former officials suchas Ranade and Poonapa that theKarmapa has not criticized Chinaopenly – hence is pro- China .5

The Chinese called it “ mistrustfulattitude of India”. The FourteenthDalai Lama had brushed it aside. Heblamed attendants and wisely askedfor an inquiry. One reason given byIsabel Hilton- author of The Search for

Panchen Lama was that a section ofIndian intelligence was suspicious ofhim and of his supporters.

The English language print mediacarried a series of opinion editorials(Op-eds). In summary :

(a) C Raja Mohan6: Giving a newlease of life to an old issue in publicreflects poorly on India. There is aneed to show sophistication andmaturity.

(b) B Chellaney7: This episode is aforerunner to two dueling Dalai

5 http://www.timesnow.tv/Debate-Grand-Chinese-design-1/videoshow/4364093.cms.Former Officials who were on the Times Now TV channel Debate made the following points:

(a) Shri J. Ranade, formerly of R and AW: Since the Karmapa does not criticize the Chinese ,he may be their agent.

(b) Leela Poonapa, former Deputy National Security Advisor:(i) Government of India does not determine reincarnation and there are four claimants to

the 17th Karmapa.(ii) Refugees are incumbent to obey laws of the land. Many facilities have been set up by

hosts for the refugees. People in Himachal Pradesh are hurt when such reports comeout against their guests.

(iii) He was silent about the pre-Olympics turmoil.6 C. Raja Mohan, “Chinese Takeaway: Karmapa Trouble”, Indian Express, February 2, 20117 Brahma Chellaney, “Sceptre and altar: the Karmapa case”, Live Mint, The Wall Street Journal,

February 2, 2011 at http://www.livemint.com/articles/2011/02/02201747/Sceptre-and-altar-the-Karmapa.html

Lamas in future. The Dalai Lamais an asset. India must have a planto positively influence successionrather that be at the receiving endas in the Karmapa affair.

(c) Youdon Aukatsang (Member,Tibetan Parliament in Exile)8 : MostTibetan institutions in Indiacontinue to face repeated rejectionfrom the Ministry of Home Affairs(MHA) in obtaining papers relatingto the Foreign Contribution(Regulation) Act, 1976 (FCRA) inorder to receive donations legally.

(d) Dibyesh Anand ( IR ProfWestminster University andauthor)9: The Chinese must belaughing at the Indian mediacircus. Another let down oftheTibet cause by India . ExiledLamas provide stability. Do notmalign him.

(e) Claude Arpi10: What is the truth?Is Ugyen a victim of high intriguein his own monastery? Arpi felt thatthat the Chinese government hasbeen benefiting the most fromthese frivolous charges of spyingand poor accounting . The lastthing that Beijing wants today isto see the Dalai Lama designate aspiritual successor.

(f) Tsering Shakya (author and ProfUniversity of British Columbia)11:Suspicions make it seem as ifTibetans are more loyal to theirspiritual leader rather than thecause of Tibet . Protests in 2008were manifestation of Tibet’sfreedom. Other lamas are also notas vocal in anti-Chinese speechesas the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Sowhy brand the Karmapa’s lack ofutterance as evidence? The stage-managed escape story ismisguided. It shows failure of theChinese policy. As it relates to cash,the problems in cash dealings etcis an open secret. Tibetans havegreater access to global remittanceand donations now. Even China issuspicious of the donations.

(g) Sunanda K. Datta-Ray12: Authorpointed out the recurrence of thebungling traditions of civilservants tying rings aroundpoliticians. Datta-Ray blames theDirector General, Indian PoliceService, for trying to grab mediaspace with conjectures, andmeddling in state craft. Officials areattacking him from behind a cloakof anonymity. There should beproper channels and forums fordealing with such issues. To accuse

8 Youdon Aukatsang, “ Karmapa does not deal with donations”, The Times of India, February 4,2011.

9 Dibyesh Anand, “Buddha’s not smiling”, The Hindustan Times, February 2, 2011.10 Claude Arpi, “The Karmapa Mystery “, The Pioneer, February 2, 2011.11 Tsering Shakya, “The Karmapa Conundrum”, The Wall Street Journal (Asia), February 2, 201112 Sunanda K Datta- Ray, “ Targeting the Karmapa”, February 11, 2011 and “ Slandering Karmapa”,

Deccan Herald, February 9, 2011.

him of being China’s agent isunethical.

(h) Col Virendra Sahai Verma(Retd) (former military intelligenceofficer)13: We have swallowedfabrication about the Karmapa’sChinese connection. Writer hadvisited Tsurpu in 2008. He pointedout that the terrain /layoutindicates that escape was possible- much easier than the Dalai Lama’sescape in 1959. We have too muchfaith in Chinese security.

(i) B Raman14: The escape story isdoubtful. This is a sensitive issuewhich could have an impact onrelations with China and could hurtthe feelings and sensitivities of thefollowers of the Karmapa. Weshould carry out a vigorousinvestigation, keeping the DalaiLama in the picture, and await theresults of the investigation assuggested by the home minister.We should avoid speculation thatcould prove counter-productive.

(j) Karma Topden (Former MP fromSikkim and spokesperson)15 : Howcan he be a Chinese spy? He wasthe one who exposed Chinesesuppression and pressure on himto denounce the Dalai Lama.

(k) Tenzin Tsundue (Tibetan Writer and

Activist)16: India’s first line ofdefence should be to capture theloyalty of its Himalayan population.People from Ladakh, Lahaul, Spiti,Kinnaur, Sikkim, and Tawangprotested the allegations by themedia. The Dalai Lama, thePanchen Lama and the Karmapaare the Sun, Moon, and Star forTibetans. So after the Dalai Lama,the Seventeenth Gyawang Karmapawill be our leader and will becomethe spiritual guru of Buddhistsacross the world, including thescenario when Buddhists in Chinaare given freedom to practise theirfaith. It is thus in India’s interestto host such an avatar as a refugeerather than hand the sceptre to atriumphant China.

Finally in May 2011, the Karmapa,Ogyen Trinley Dorje broke his silenceover the recent developments. Heissued a press statement.17 The mainpoints being that he is not a Chinesespy, he is grateful to India for hercourtesy and hospitality and the DalaiLama is his spiritual and temporalleader (The Press Statement is atAppendix B).

This episode which we call the“Karmapa trigger ” assumesimportance as it tells us that both, thespiritual and temporal leadership

13 Virendra Sahai Verma, “When Security Hawks Swoop” , The Times of India, February 11, 2011.14 B . Raman, “Why the Karmapa issue could hurt Indo-China ties” , February 1, 2011 at http://

www.rediff.com/news/column/why-the-karmapa-issue-could-hurt-indo-china-ties/20110201.htm15 Interview by Nidhi Mittal “ He is No Spy”, The Pioneer, February 6, 2011.16 Tenzin Tsundue, “ In a muddle kingdom”, Hindustan Times, February 23, 2011.17 E mail from Karma Chungyalpa, General Secretary, the Karmapa Office of Administration.

being held by the Fourteenth DalaiLama, will be missed in the nearfuture. This is an issue which not onlythe Tibetans in exile but also those inTibet need to come to grip with . Thusdemocratisation was a great historicstep to which we now return below.

ELECTIONS TO THE PARLIAMENT IN

The Fourteenth Dalai Lama begandemocratisation soon after reachingIndia . In 1963 he presented a draftconstitution which called fordemocratic governance through aParliamentary system. In 1991 heredrafted the constitution to enhancethe status of the elected Parliament. In2001 he further democratised it byintroducing a directly elected PrimeMinister who was answerable to theParliament.18 A Charter was adopted bythe Assembly of Tibetan People’sDeputies (ATPD) . Election of Kashag(cabinet), with ministers (kalons) andkalon tripa (prime minister) were heldin 2001. Prof Samdong Rinpoche wasthe prime minister of the fourteenthTibetan Parliament in Exile from May2006 to May 2011.

Elections for the fifteenth Parliament inexile were declared on April 29, 2011.

There were three candidates andLobsang Sangay19 was elected.

The Dalai Lama in his addresses toparliamentarians, and to Tibet supportgroups in Europe had made it clear thathe intends to democratise.20 OnFebruary 26, 1992 he set forth“Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Policyand Basic Features of the Constitution”.The gist being that Tibet should have amulti-party system of parliament withthree organs of the government-legislature, executive and judiciary.Tibetans in Tibet shall bear the mainresponsibility in running the affairs ofthe state. As for himself, the Dalai Lamahas made up his mind that he will notplay any role in the future governmentof Tibet.21 He has also outlined thenature of the interim government to beformed when Chinese forces withdrawfrom Tibet during the transition period.In his farsighted thinking he has madeit clear that during this period Tibetanofficials presently working there underthe Chinese should be ready to assumefull responsibility. It will be theresponsibility of the transitiongovernment to form a ConstitutionAssembly with representatives from allparts of Tibet.22

But as the first step, there is a need to

18 Vijay Kranti, “ A Master Stroke from Monk Statesman”, Border Affairs, April- June 2011, pp.14-20.

19 Born in Darjeeling of refugee parents. Alumni of Delhi University Hans Raj College and CampusLaw Centre. Fullbright Scholar and a senior fellow at Harvard Law School.

20 “His Holiness the Dalai Lama said….”, Tibet’s Parliament in Exile 2009, New Delhi, TibetanParliamentary and Policy Research Centre , 2009, pp.3-4.

21 “Future Plans”, Tibet’s Parliament in Exile 2009, New Delhi, Tibetan Parliamentary and PolicyResearch Centre , 2009, pp.59-60.

22 Ibid, pp.59-60.

put an end to both the spiritual andtemporal powers being held by areligious head in exile. This is not easy.When the Dalai Lama proposed to stepdown as the political head, the firstreaction of the Tibetan Parliament inexile was to ask the Dalai Lama toreconsider his proposal. The Kashag,the cabinet urged him to continue. Butthe elections were held. LobsangSangay was elected, with the parliamentslated to begin session in September2011. Thus the elections of 2011 to electa new Prime Minster is considered thekey for sustaining the TGIE in future.Not all countries supported thisexercise of democracy by the exiles.Nepal did not permit voting, thussending a clear pro one-China policysignal.

Dr Lobsang Sangay in his inauguraladdress on August 9, 2011 during theoath taking ceremony said:

The result of this election should senda clear message to the hardliners inthe Chinese government that Tibetanleadership is far from fizzling out. Weare a democracy that will only growstronger in the years ahead. And weare here to stay. I pledge to strengthenand sustain our movement untillfreedom is restored in Tibet, and HisHoliness the Dalai Lama returns toour homeland.23

On 6 and 7 September 2011, theVivekanand International Foundation

(VIF) New Delhi organised aconference on ‘Tibet in the Aftermathof Devolution of Political Authority’. 24

His Excellency Dr. Lobsan Sangay, theKalon Tripa of the Central TibetanAdministration (CTA) delivered thekey note address at the conference – hisfirst formal interaction in public sincehe assumed the high office on August8, 2011. In his keynote address, Dr.Sangay drew a cultural, political andenvironmental map of Tibet. He spokepassionately about challenges that thenew responsibility has bestowed uponhim. Dr. Sangay elucidated what thedevolution of power means in generaland to him in person. Defining thegeographical setting of Tibet, he saidthat Tibet’s area comprises parts ofChinese province of Yunnan, Sichuan,Qinghai, and small parts of Gansu.Talking about Tibet’s geographicalsignificance, Dr. Sangay said it is amajor source of fresh water for anumber of countries in Asia, especiallyfor countries in Southeast and SouthAsia. Dr. Sangay expressed his deepanguish at China’s continuing damconstruction activities over Tibet’smajor rivers. The ecological balancewhich the Tibetans have so assiduouslypreserved through the centuries standsthreatened due to China’s damconstructions activities on such amassive scale. On the issue ofdevolution of political authority, theKalon Tripa said it is a serious issue with

23 Varinder Bhatia, “Will sustain movement till Tibet is free, Dalai Lama returns home”,indiaexpress.com, August 9, 2011.

24 See seminar report at http://www.vifindia.org/event/report/2011/09/15/A-Report-on-Seminar-Tibet-in-the-Aftermath-of-Devolution-of-Political-Authority

major implications. The Kalon Tripaalso made it amply clear that HisHoliness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama isnot setting a new precedent by handingover his political authority to a newincumbent. Devolution of politicalauthority of Dalai Lama is in fact thecontinuation of a political processwhich was established a long time ago,precisely with the Fifth Dalai Lama inthe seventeenth century. The March2011 declaration of the Dalai Lamahowever signifies the separation ofpolitical and spiritual authority of theinstitution of Dalai Lama. His Holinesswas keen to shed his political authorityto a new leadership so that he coulddevout more time for global peace andharmony. Defining his own role as theKalon Tripa of the Tibetan Governmentin Exile, Dr. Lobsang Sangay mentionedthat he would energize his effort toensure that Tibetan people are able tostand on their own feet and take themovement forward. He would alsostrive to fulfill the vision of HisHoliness of creating a seculardemocratic society.

In the valedictory session, Mr. LalitMansingh, former Foreign Secretaryand India’s Ambassador to US,reflected on the need to revisit India’sforeign policy, especially against thebackdrop of past achievements andfailures. Mr. Lalit Mansingh not onlyrecounted India’s consistent failures onTibet front, but he also spelt out a seriesof measures which are needed torecover lost ground. Suggesting a newpolicy approach towards Tibet, Mr. LalitMansingh said that India should lookfor a reciprocity-based approachtowards China and remove restrictionson activities and movements of DalaiLama and the Karmapa. He also urgedthat India should completely identifyitself with Tibetan culture and TibetanBuddhism and associate the Dalai Lamawith the Nalanda University Project. Hestressed that “friendship with China isa desirable goal, but it can not beallowed to override our concerns forIndian security or Tibetan autonomy.”

MEDIA INTERVIEW OF THE KARMAPA,SEPTEMBER 20, 2009

Appendix A

Probably the first print media interviewwas given by the Karmapa to RashmeeRoshan. His answers give a fair idea ofhis thinking. Some extracts are givenbelow.

Question: Is India being diplomaticenough to and about China and viceversa?

Answer: Obviously I can’t speak fromthe perspective of a politician who isactive in these communications.Obviously the government of eachcountry has its own interests in theongoing conversation. They are doingwhat they can to advance their owninterests. I’m not able to comment onwhat those interests might be. But if Iwere to make some observations andguesses from my own vantage point, itseems to me that the Chinesegovernment is acting somewhatdeliberately in attempts to slightlyirritate the Government of India.

Because of this the neighbourlyrelationship has suffered a little bit.India has always been a relativelypeaceful country, a country that hasalways had a reasonably good record ofvaluing peace, India does not seeminterested in pursuing any type of

conflict. However, India is on the risein the world and perhaps the Chinesegovernment feels some type of impulseto blunt this rise somehow. Perhaps thatis what is causing some of the thingswe see today.

Question: You haven’t visited Chinasince your swashbuckling escape toIndia in January 2000. Have you everbeen invited back and what is yourrelationship with the Chineseauthorities?

Answer: Relationship! I don’t have aparticular relationship at all with theChinese government. When I lived inTibet, it was of course controlled byBeijing so there was no choice but tohave some form of relationship.However, I have left Tibet and now livein India and so I’m completely removedfrom any type of control exerted by theChinese government and so there is nocommunication to speak of, there is norelationship at all.

Question: But as the only senior TibetanBuddhist monk to be recognised byboth the Chinese and the Dalai Lama,many say you could be the hinge onwhich relations between Tibetans andChina swing in a new direction. But yousound very angry with Beijing.

Answer: No, it’s not that I have anyanger or aversion to the Chinesewhatsoever. Since I am a Dharmapractitioner, I try to maintainimpartiality and be free from excessiveattachment to my own side andaversion to and hatred of others. Interms of where my own interests lie,I’m very passionate about supportingthe middle path that has beenarticulated by His Holiness the DalaiLama. In His Holiness’s vision of thismiddle path, there is great benefit forthe people of Tibet and also greatbenefit for the people of China.

If we follow the middle path, both theGovernment of China and the peopleof Tibet will be benefited. This visionis something that about 90 per cent ofTibetans support – the vast majority ofTibetans. I simply consider myself oneof those Tibetans whose responsibilityit is to further the cause of the people.Now in terms of specific opportunitiesthat might arise from me to serve thisvision, I’m not so sure.

Right now, the government-in-exile ofTibet has been engaging Beijing indialogue but perhaps the dialoguehasn’t always been fruitful. So, we haveto wait and see what kind ofopportunities arise.

Question: Do you think those‘opportunities’ will have arisen by thetime you are 50? You’re 24 today andTibetans have already been in Indiamore than half a century. Will Tibetansbecome totally Indian by the timeyou’re 50?

Answer: Due to the kind support of theIndian government and the Indian

people and due to the exemplaryleadership of His Holiness the DalaiLama, we Tibetans have been able topreserve Tibetan culture in the diasporato some degree. Nevertheless, we wouldobviously rather be preserving theculture of Tibet inside a Tibet that wasamenable to us. Obviously, that’s notthe situation now so that means there’sgoing to be some challenges for us inpreserving our culture exactly the waywe want to.

Really, if you want to preserve Tibetanculture in the long term, that has tohappen inside Tibet. This is why I feelthe situation of Tibet is dire and thatpeople in the world need to pay moreattention to it. The situation is not onewhere we can take our time and wait10, 20, 30 years to see what happens,what conditions might change becausethe danger is so great that much of ourculture could be lost and the chancesof restoring our culture greatlydiminished.

So it’s actually quite a hot potato thatwe have here. We have to do somethingquickly. In the language of yourquestion, if we were to wait 50 years,we would be in danger of losing a greatchunk of Tibetan culture that could notbe recovered.

Question: You are young, so youunderstandably sound impatient. TheDalai Lama is 73, many say you shouldsucceed him because you embody thestory of your people – of oppression,escape and exile – and have beencoached by the Dalai Lama.

Answer: Well, you made some remarksabout people perceiving me to have a

Appendices

special background. I would acceptthat, generally speaking, I do have somespecial attributes in my background interms of my life story and this subjectof the future of Tibetan leadership andpossible successors to the role ofleadership that the Dalai Lama plays,has been a popular topic in the generalconversation around the Tibet issue.

However, as I always say, I am just oneof the students, the followers of theDalai Lama and there are a great manyTibetan people who are doing awonderful job serving the vision of HisHoliness and implementing his vision.I try to do my best too but in terms offuture roles that I might assume, I’malready the Karmapa, that’s my role andit’s already one I feel quite weigheddown by, it’s heavy responsibilities.

For the future, my view is that I willcontinue as I am now, serving the visionof His Holiness the Dalai Lama and allof us who are serving this visiontogether will be successful.

Question: But if you were asked – bypopular appeal – to assume leadershipof the Tibetan movement, would youaccept? Yes or no?

Answer: It’s really quite an involvedissue. In order for anyone to assume the

role of leader of the Tibetan people, it’simportant to have historical context orat least an examination of the historicalcontext. For anywhere between 800 and900 years, the Karmapa has been a veryapolitical figure, a person who hasconcentrated solely on spiritualleadership, not involved in any way withgovernmental leadership.

So I think it would be very difficult tochange that historical pattern overnightand turn the role of the Karmapa intosomething more than strictly a spiritualteacher. Furthermore, we have to bemindful that the Dalai Lama is enjoyingexcellent health, he’s very active, he’sstill contributing tremendously to thecause of the Tibetan people, he is thestrong leader of the Tibetan people andthat will continue.

It’s important not to get too far aheadof ourselves. There’s a lot of talk aboutwhat an authentic Tibetan democracywill look like in the future, who are theleaders going to be, but that’s alldiscussion at this point and weshouldn’t try and reach too far into thefuture.25

25 “Video war games satiate my feelings of aggression”, Times of India, September 20, 2009.

PRESS STATEMENT FROM THE SEVENTEENTH

GYALWANG KARMAPA, OGYEN TRINLEY DORJE OF

MAY 2, 2011

Appendix B

There have been many media reportsrecently about the Karmapa name andinstitution. I did not respond to thembecause I did not want to addunnecessary public controversy whilethe investigation was at a critical stage.

However, the time has come to makecertain fundamentals clear to those whomay still nurse any doubts. Let me atthe outset state categorically that:

1. I am not a Chinese spy, agent orplant in India.

2. I am deeply grateful to theGovernment of India for giving merefuge in this great country and forall the courtesy and hospitalityshown to me since my arrival here.I am also very moved by the marksof affection that the Indian peoplehave always showered on me. Indiais my home now and I would neverdo anything against the interest ofthe country or her people.

3. His Holiness the Dalai Lama is myspiritual and temporal leader, andI am committed to the well-beingof the Tibetan people.

It would appear from media speculationthat some people still wonder why I left

Tibet in December, 1999. I have givenpress interviews on the subjectpreviously. Today, I wish to reiterate thatmy spiritual education as theSeventeenth Karmapa could not becompleted if I had remained in Tibet. Ihad to receive the oral teachings of theKarmapa Lineage which have beenpassed down in an unbroken chain fromIndia since the time of Lord Buddha.The origins of my lineage are inNalanda whose great scholar, Naropa,received the teachings from his teacher,the Mahasiddha Tilopa. Naropatransmitted these teachings to theTibetan Marpa, who passed them on tohis disciple, Milarepa, and thence toGampopa, from which they passed toDusum Khyenpa, the first Karmapa.The Karmapa Lineage is thus deeplyrooted in India where my illustriouspredecessor, His Holiness the SixteenthKarmapa, also found refuge in India,and established Rumtek Monastery inSikkim. All the gurus of my lineagewere in India. The Chinese Governmentwould not allow them to visit me inTibet. I could not live up to the highexpectations from my position withouttheir spiritual guidance. If I had stayedin Tibet, I strongly believe I would havehad to denounce His Holiness, the

Dalai Lama.

Tibet is under Communist China’stotalitarian regime. Unlike democraticIndia, there is no religious freedomthere. Many Tibetans, including theillustrious heads of the different sectsof Tibetan Buddhism had to flee to Indiafollowing the Cultural Revolution. Eventoday, distressing news is coming outof Tibet regarding the current unrest atKirti Monastery in the Tibetan area ofNgaba in Sichuan province. On March16th, the self-immolation of a youngmonk named Phuntsok reveals theunderlying tension that has beensimmering for decades due to China’smisguided policies addressing thegrievances and resentments of theTibetan people.

Reports say that the ongoing militarysiege of Kirti Monastery, the arrest ofover 300 monks, and the death of twoelderly local residents in police beatingshave increased fears that if theauthorities did not abandon use offorce, the situation may deteriorate intofull-scale violence costing lives ofhundreds of unarmed and innocentTibetans. I understand there are stillsome 2,200 monks completely isolatedand the monastery is blockaded by thesecurity police; the fate of these monksis still unknown owing to the April 21stofficial order sealing the Ngaba andKandze areas to visitors.

Frequent peaceful protests carried outby the Tibetans are symptoms of abroken and wounded peopledesperately crying out for therestoration of their cultural identity,religious and human rights. Since KirtiMonastery is very important with great

historical significance throughout theNgaba region, I join His Holiness theDalai Lama and His Eminence KyabcheKirti Rinpoche in their appeal to theCentral Chinese Government and theinternational community to peacefullyresolve the current crisis in Ngaba.

Tibet was an independent nation fromancient times. It maintained strongreligious, cultural and trade ties withIndia. The common border was openand peaceful, allowing not only the freemovement of trade and people but alsothe flow of the finest thoughts of humancivilization. Hindus and Jains reveredMount Kailash and Mansarovar Lake asplaces of holy pilgrimage. Tibetansregarded India as the holy land of LordBuddha and aspired to make apilgrimage to Bodh Gaya. Buddhismcame to Tibet from India. Along withBuddhism came much of the Tibetanlanguage and the Tibetan script whichwas derived from ancient Indian scripts.We honour Indian saints and sages likeShantaraksita, Padmasambhava,Atisha, and many others who came toTibet. Scholars and practitioners fromrenowned institutions of learning likeNalanda and Vikramasila inspiredmany of our religious schools.

Today, India is our second home. TheTibetan culture and religion hasflourished in India’s free andwelcoming atmosphere. India hasgiven refuge to His Holiness the DalaiLama and to many Buddhist lineageheads who have set up monasteriesaround the country. Tibetan Buddhism,culture and the Tibetan way of life thrivein India.

I am deeply conscious that India has

not only saved Tibetans and their wayof life from extinction but also enabledus to draw inspiration from this holyland of the Buddha and take Buddhismto distant parts of the world where itwas unknown previously. I pray that

Lord Buddha’s teachings and MahatmaGandhi’s philosophy of non-violencecombined together become a source ofpeace and harmony for the entireworld.

Appendices

50-50 Vision Document 124Ahinsa 21Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal Memorial Lecture

163Aksai Chin 163, 175Al Qaeda 153, 159Amdos 10, 18–9, 176Anthropological Survey of India (ASI) 49Arakeri, A.V. 90

Tibetans in India: the Uprooted People andtheir Cultural transplantation 90

Arunachal Pradesh 14–5, 24, 26–7, 37, 48–9, 51,65–6, 68, 77–8, 80, 83, 89, 112–3, 135, 137, 142,154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 166–7, 173, 175, 177–8,181–2

Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies (ATPD)140, 195

Atisa 23, 26, 141, 174Ayurveda 23

Baltistan 34Islamisation of 34

Beijing Review 151Bharat Tibet Sahyog Manch 89Bhattacharya, Abanti 11, 86, 106Bhuikku Sangasena, Ladakh Scout soldier 32Bhutan 24–5, 28, 30, 35, 37, 42, 48, 75, 77–81, 85,

133, 156, 166, 169, 178, 180, 182Bhutani, Sudarshan 12, 142Bodh Gaya 137–8, 190, 202Bodhisattva 58Bomdila 38, 69, 78, 89, 154, 158, 161, 166, 168,

170, 177, 179, 181Bon 19, 39, 49, 76, 138Bonnin, Michel 111Border Affairs 33Buddhism

banned in China 57

Chan 57Chan (Zen) 58Chinese 44, 55, 57Communism and 55, 168Daoist (or Taoist) opposition to 43ecology and 41Han 44, 63importance and influence of 24Indian scholars of 64influence of 24, 34, 41knowledge and literature of 26Mahayana 10, 19, 22–3, 25–6, 29, 35, 37, 42,

45, 143Nyingmapa tradition of 35pacifism and 20–21Pali 33, 44Tantric 23Tibetan 12, 19, 26–7, 30, 33–4, 39, 42, 44, 47,

55–6, 62, 83, 105, 107, 132, 137, 143, 145,152, 160, 168, 174, 177, 185, 188, 197, 202

types of 44Zen 33, 63

Buddhist Association of China (BAC) 55Buddhist Cultural Preservation Society 179Bureau of Parliamentary Research 48, 51Burke, Dennis J. 107

Cambodia 21Capitalism 27Central Institute of Buddhist Studies,

Choglamsar (Ladakh) 65Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies

(CIHTS), Varanasi 26, 65, 100, 138, 172Central Institute of Himalayan Culture Studies

(CIHCS), Dahung, Arunachal Pradesh 26,37–8, 65, 68, 137, 166, 177

Central Institute of Indian Languages (CIIL)48

Central Tibetan Administration (CTA),Dharamsala 76–7, 80–81, 91, 93, 108, 132, 142,144, 185–6, 188, 196

Central Tibetan School Administration (CTSA)133

Centre for Buddhist Cultural Studies 179Centre for Tibetan Study of China 58Chakma refugees 16, 165Chenga Sherup Jumney Rinpoche 31Chenrezig 20Chimdru 51, 166, 175–6China and India 9, 12, 42, 128, 188, 194

boundary issue 175China-India Yoga summit 44Declaration on Principles for Relations and

Comprehensive Cooperation 104Festival of China 47Festival of India 47People-to-People Exchanges 47relations 10–12, 25, 107, 129, 162, 169strategic rivalry 9

China, People’s Republic of (PRC)anti-Buddhist criticism in 43Buddhism in 43–4, 55–6, 63, 168

decline of 55development of 44

distrust of India 9Indian aggression against 9Indian style Buddhist temple in 44landmass 18literature and art in 58occupation of Tibet 12, 26, 86revival of religion in 27war with India 9Western Development Programme in Tibet

13Chinese Academy of Science 60Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 43, 60Chinese Red Guards 25, 55Chintamani Dharni 22Choejung 22Choje Tokden Rinpoche 30Cholka-Sum 18Christianity 29, 40, 59, 68, 116, 178Chushi Gangdrug 110Chushul 28

Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1986 96Climate change 184–5, 187, 189

mitigation of 189College for Higher Tibetan Studiers(CHTS),

Sarah, Dharamsala 39, 40, 71, 133–4Communism 55, 168Confucianism 43, 57Confucian school 58Cultural Revolution 20, 25, 55, 60, 151, 187, 202Culture

Bhutanese 51Bonpo 22Buddhist 22, 25–6, 185Chinese 56–7, 59–60, 63Confucian 58Indian 25, 57, 183literary 22local 38, 183Nepali 14pre-Buddhist 22religious 60Shamanistic 22Tibetan 13, 18, 49, 93, 145, 156, 197, 199, 202Western 116

Dalai Lama, theChinese pressure on 172Fifth 21, 28, 144, 157, 179, 197Fourteenth 11, 14, 20, 28–30, 35–6, 72, 85, 106,

108–9, 114, 124, 137, 144, 150–51, 160, 164–5, 172, 177, 185–6, 188, 192–3, 195, 197

health 123politics 159Seventh 20Sixth 20, 157, 179

Daoism 43Darjeeling 14, 29, 41, 77–8, 133, 180Daruwala, Keki N. 51Das, Sarat Chandra 64

An Introduction to the Grammar of theTibetan Languages 64

Tibetan-English Dictionary 64Dehradun 15, 27, 39, 65, 70, 75, 78, 89–90, 115–7,

119–20, 122, 126, 131–2, 155, 167, 172Delhi University 21, 65, 141, 172

Department of Buddhist Studies 141

Desertification 41Devachan 32, see also Non-governmental

organisations (NGOs)Dharamsala 12, 15, 17, 27, 29, 39, 71, 74–5, 78,

82, 84–5, 89–91, 93, 100, 102–3, 105, 108, 115–8, 122, 126–7, 131–5, 155, 159–60, 164–5, 185,190

Diplomacy 12–3, 45, 129, 139, 160, 174, 188Indian 129spiritual 13, 174

Diqing 19Dixit, Kanak Mani, Nepali scholar 67Dogras 21Donyi-poloism 37Dorje Palsang, Tibetan Sakya scholar 31Drikung Kagyu Institute 39, 70Drikung Kyabgon Chetsang Rinpoche 30Drikung Kyabgon Chungtsang Rinpoche 30Drukpa Kargyu School 29Durbok 28, 31, 154

Ecology 41, 127, 129, 148, 150, 167, 174, 178–9,186–7, 189

Education 31, 34, 38, 72–3, 75, 79, 100, 118, 121,125, 127, 130, 133, 139–41, 147, 164, 191, 201spiritual and cultural 72, 73system 75, 100, 140

Ethnic groups 25, 149

Fa Hien 11Faith 14, 27, 34, 44, 65, 68, 122, 124–5, 128, 141,

165, 194institutionalisation of 14

Fang Litian, director of the Institute for the Studyof Buddhism and Religious Theory, RenminUniversity 57

Fifth Forum on Work in Tibet Conference of2010 72

Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976(FCRA) 193

Friedrich-Naumann Foundation 74, 140Furer-Heimendorf, Christoph von, European

anthropologist 74

Gampo, Tibetan King Songtsen 21Gangtok 20, 26–7, 34–6, 65, 172

Gansu 10, 18–9, 144, 196Ganzi 19Garhwal 17, 39, 48Garhwal University, Srinagar 39Gelugpa 19–21, 32, 39, 105–6, 110, 132–3, 137,

154, 185Global warming 143, 184, 186Goldstien, Melvyn C. 65Gorkhaland 15, 40–41, 161, 167Green, Jonathan 81, 83

Murder in the High Himalayas 81Guo Peng 63

An Intellectual History of Buddhism inChina 63

Guruswamy, Mohan 109Gyakar Kadu 22Gyalo Thondup 86Gyalwa Gotsangpa 29

Harshavardhana 25, 64Hawksley, Humphrey 153

Dragon Fire 153He Jingsong, Dr. 61

A History of Buddhism in Korea 61Hilton, British author James 45

Lost Horizon 45Hilton, Isabel 81, 192

The Search for Panchen Lama 192Himachal Pradesh 24, 27, 49, 66, 77–8, 80, 135,

137–8, 141, 190Himalayan belt 13, 24, 26, 37–8, 40, 42, 45, 47–8,

53–4, 65, 109, 130, 133–4, 138, 141, 154–6, 159–60, 166–8, 171, 174, 182, 191

Hinduism 40, 130, 136Hindu, The 44Hiuen Tsang 11, 25Huber, Prof Toni, Professor of Tibetan Studies,

Humbolt University, Berlin (Germany) 35,65

Huns 25, 64

Identity 12, 15, 19, 34, 40–41, 51, 74, 80, 88, 93,95, 98, 117, 125, 136, 147, 150, 156, 163, 167,186, 202Buddhist 41, 167Indian 51

Muslim 40regional 15, 19, 51Tibetan 12, 93, 95

Indiaassistance to Tibetans 14asylum to the Dalai Lama 9border relations 24Chinese agents in 17foreign policy 145, 159, 188, 197Gorkhaland movement in 15importance of Tibet for 11

ecological 12religious and cultural 11, 53, 164, 188

local incidences of concern in 88–9Lok Sabha debates on Tibet 16, 99‘Look East’ policy 171Muslim conquest 22, 25, 64national security 10nuclear tests in 1998 11Planning Commission 49, 129

Sikkim Development Report 49Tibetan refugees in 95

asylum to 11lack of policy for 16, 165, 170policies on 95shelter to 9status of 155

threat from China 11India Himalayan belt 53Indian Citizenship Act 1955 96Indian Coucnil of World Affairs 204Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR)

172Indo-Tibetan relations 22, 38, 122, 177

cultural 21, 22Institute for Security and Development Policy

(ISDP) 204Institute of Buddhist Dialectics (IBD),

Dharamsala 39–40, 134Institute of Oriental Philosophy 63Institute of World Religions (IWR) 43, 59–62

academic works 62history of 60

Iyengar, B.K.S. 44Trees of Yoga 44

Iyer, Pico 85, 105, 108–9, 152The Open Road: The Global Journey of the

Fourteenth Dalai Lama 109

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) 30, 80, 163, 174–5Operation Sadbhavana 167

Jammu and Kashmir Society Registration Act-VI of 1998 30

Japan 21, 43, 61, 63, 85, 137Jha, Prem Shankar 163Jin Shaoqing 44

Buddhism in China(trans.) 44Jin Yijiu 63

A History of Islam 63JNU 82, 141–2Journal of Peace Studies 89

Kailash Mansarovar 11, 174Kalam, Abdul, Indian President 34Kalimpong 14, 77–8, 153, 180Kamalsila 26Kameng 27, 36–8, 40, 49–51, 89, 176–7Kapstien, Mathew T. 65Kargil 27, 40, 49, 167Karmapa 16–7, 20, 29, 33, 36–7, 76, 100–108,

110, 123, 143, 145, 155, 159–60, 165, 169–70,186, 190–94, 197–8, 200–201escaped to India 36, 155, 159politics 159press statement 201, 203print media interview 198

Karnataka 38, 42, 77–9, 88, 90, 135–8, 154, 179Khalji, Muhammmad Bakhtiar 25, 64Kham 10, 18–9, 160, 176Khampa 18–21, 48, 135, 137Khanna, Vinod C. 110Kharat, Rajesh. S. 14, 48, 73, 78, 90

Tibetan Refugees in India 90Kolås, Åshild 106K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 23Kranti, Vijay 54Kumaon 17

Ladakh 14, 24, 26–9, 31–4, 36–41, 48–9, 65–6,78, 83, 105, 130, 133, 136–7, 141, 154–5, 159–61, 163, 166–7, 170, 172, 176–7, 182, 194

demand of Union Territory Status 40monasteries 27rivalry between sects 28teacher tradition in 29Thervada Buddhist practice in 32

Ladakh Autonomous Hill DevelopmentCouncil 40

Ladakh Buddhist Association 40Lamaism 19Lama Tashi 38, 42, 68, 137, 154, 166, 172, 177Languages

Balti 27Bhot 33, 49Bhoti 33, 48, 66Bhutia 48Bodhi 27Boro 48Brokskat 27Changsktat 27Chinese 13Hindi 22, 31, 33, 38, 138, 181Ladakhi 14, 27, 136Manipuri 48Nepali 14Pali 33, 44, 66, 138Prakrit 66Rong 50Sanskrit 22–3, 26, 33, 37, 65, 100, 138, 143,

172Shina 27spoken 21Tibetan 14, 19, 21, 33–4, 39, 48, 171, 202Tibeto-Burmese 19Tripuri 48Urdu 27

Laohuzui hydro-electric project 72Leh 27–9, 31–2, 78, 190Lhasa 10, 20, 44, 72–3, 85, 150, 153, 174–5Literature survey 75, 93, 188

Central Tibetan Adminstartion and TibetanGovernment in Exile 75

Data Bases, Fresh Arrivals and Inflow ofRefugees to India 78

Escape from Nepal to India 82Initial Settlements 77Learning from Gene Sharp and Samdhong

Rinpoche 86Overcrowding and Other Issues 84Refugee establishments 87, 117Refugee Information in Bhutan and Nepal

80Refugees in Areas where Military is

Deployed close to the Chinese 83Returning Refugees 84Stages of Settlement in India 76Struggle According to International Law 75

Li Xinghua 63History of Islam in China 63

Lobsang Sangay, Dr, exiled Prime Minister 114,196–7

Lou Yulie 57LTTE 21, 153Lu Daji 63

History of Theories of Religion in the West63

On Religious Studies 63Lu Guolong 63

Chinese Taoist Metaphysics and TaoistPhilosophy 63

Lumbini 53, 67–8Lumbini Master Plan 67Lumbini World Heritage Site 68

Mahabodhi International Meditation Centre,Choglamsar 32

Mandarin 10, 187Mansingh, Lalit, former Foreign Secretary and

India’s Ambassador to US 144–5, 197Mao Zedong 55, 60, 166, 182Mayer, Jean-Francois 12McKay, Alex 36, 65McLeodGunj 77, 115–6, 118, 122, 131McMahon Line 162, 177Medicine 23, 39, 44, 76, 142

Ayurvedic 23traditional 23, 44

Mehra, Parshotam 142, 175Miami University, USA 40, 134Mihirakula 25, 64Ming emperor 21Minstry of Home Affairs (MHA) 76, 79–80, 99,

Annual Reports 2010- 2011 79Monasteries 13–4, 20, 27–32, 34, 36, 38, 42, 55,

69, 73, 75, 102, 109, 121, 133, 136–7, 139, 151,154–5, 161, 166–70, 172, 175, 177–9, 191, 193,201–2Alchi 28, 32Chemrey 28–30, 154Dorje Drak 32Dotsok 29Drepung Loseling 38, 42, 136Drikung Thil 30Drukpa Kargyu 29Gontse Gaden Rabgyelling 179Hemis 29–30, 154hierarchy and organisation of 28in exile 154Kirit 73Likir 28, 32Matho 28, 31Phyang 30Rumtek 36, 102Serjey Jamyang Choe Khorling 179Shachukul 31Stakna 28–30, 154Taklung Tse 32Tawang 179Thak Thog 31Thikse 28, 32Upper Bomdila 38, 177

Mon Autonomous Council for West Kamengand Tawang 40

Mon Autonomous Region 40–41, 167Mongolia 22, 25, 48, 139, 157, 169, 179, 184Monks 20–21, 26–7, 29–32, 38, 42, 55–6, 63, 70,

73, 75, 78–9, 89, 118, 121–2, 129, 137, 139, 143,151, 154, 156–7, 161, 167–8, 175, 179–81, 191,202Drug-Pa 28Indian 26–7, 42, 70, 137, 161

Mount Kailash 30, 166, 202Mullik, B.N. 51, 176, 180–81

My Years with Nehru: the Chinese Betrayal180

Muni, S.D. 162Myanmar 21, 45, 175

Nagarjuna 26, 30Nalanda 25–7, 33–4, 36, 45, 47, 53–4, 64–6, 136,

138, 145, 171, 197, 201–2Nalanda International University (proposed)

26, 36, 53, 64, 145, 171, 197Nalanda School 33–4, 54, 65, 136Namgyal, Chosgyal Sengay 29Namgyal, Drung Ngawang 30Namgyal Institute of Tibetology (NIT), Gangtok

26, 35, 65North Eastern Vision Document 35, 51

Naropa 26, 30, 201National Action Plan on Climate Change

(NAPCC) 189National Council of Applied Economic

Research 50National Defence Academy (NDA) 96, 171Nationalism 43, 93, 106, 127, 135, 161National Museum, Delhi 33Nawang Tsering, Dr, Ladakhi scholar and the

former Principal of Central Institute forBuddhist Studies, Choglamsar 25, 32, 48

NEFA 39, 48, 50, 166, 181–2Nehru, Pandit Jawahar Lal 26, 48, 100, 143, 166,

180Neo-Confucianism 43Nepal 24–5, 35, 48, 50, 67–8, 75, 78–85, 118–9,

133, 166, 168, 180, 182, 196Maoist regime in 82, 119

News from China or People’s Daily online 151Nitisastras 66Nomads 18, 28, 33, 41, 49, 78, 154, 163, 186–7,

189Chinese 163

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 32,38, 111, 117, 169

Norbu, Dawa 14, 87Norbulingka Institute 117Nubra 27, 190

Padmasambhava 26, 28, 31, 160, 202Pakistan 48, 89, 126, 175Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) 175Palakshappa, T.C. 90

Tibetans in India: A Case Study of MundgodTibetans 90

Palit, D.K. 180War in the High Himalayas 180

Panchen Lama 20, 105, 107–8, 124, 132, 161,184, 191–2, 194

Pang-Koneyama 22Peace 21, 67, 127, 129–30, 144, 151, 192, 197–8,

203Peking 12, 21, 57Pemako 51, 158, 166, 175–6People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 83, 150Phyang 30Plaisier, Dr Heleen, Leiden University 35, 65Pondicherry 32

Qinghai 10, 12, 18–9, 72, 144, 148–9, 167–8, 184–5, 189, 196

Qinghai-Tibet plateau power grid 72Qinghai-Tibet Railways 72

Raman, B. 111Ranganathan, C.V. 110, 142Rao, P.V. Narasimha, Prime Minister 94Ravishankar, Sri Sri, founder of the Art of

Living 44Refugee Survey Quarterly 89Reincarnation 19–20, 29–30, 36, 73, 105, 108,

110, 151, 177, 179, 184concept of 19, 108

ReligionChristianity 29, 40, 59, 68, 116, 178freedom of 121Hindu 11, 20, 25, 34, 43, 64, 89, 150Islam 27, 29, 40, 44, 59, 63

Religious freedom 27, 42, 47, 73, 187, 202Ren Jiyu 63

Abstracts of Taoist Scriptures 63History of Buddhism in China 63History of Chinese Taoism 63The Great Buddhist Sutras in Chinese

Language 63Ren Yanli 63

Contemporary Catholicism 63Roemer, Stephanie 76, 90, 108

The Tibetan Government in Exile: Politics atLarge 90

Rolfe, Ella 16

Rosen, Peter Stephen 180Societies and Military Power: India and Its

Armies 180–81Roy, Raja Ram Mohun 22

Saklaini, Sociologist Girija 74Sambhota, Thonmi 21Sam Bota Tibetan Schools and Society 133Samphel, Dr Tashi, Secretary General of the

Department of Information and InternationalRelations for the Tibetan Government-in-Exile 39, 74

Sampurnanand Sanskrit University (SSU),Varanasi 26, 35, 37, 65, 138

Sankritayan, Rahul 23Santaraksita 26Saraon, Professor K.T.S 21Sarnath 65, 100, 138, 172Scripts

Brahmi 22Devanagri 22Gupta 22Kashmiri 22Sarad 22Sharada 21Tibetan 22, 34, 202

Sects 19, 28–9, 31, 36, 136, 154–5, 159–60, 165Drigung-Pa 30Ge Lugs Pa 28Gelukpa monastic 28Kagyud Drugpa 29Kagyupa 31Red Hat 31

Security 10, 12–5, 17, 33, 36, 40, 47, 54, 75, 77,81–2, 88, 91, 95, 110, 113, 122, 129, 135, 140,145, 151, 155, 159–61, 165, 169, 174, 177, 182,186, 194, 197, 202ecological 12human 54national 10, 15, 54, 95, 113, 135principle of 17, 165problems 15, 165regime 15risk 36, 155, 159strategic 15structural 15

threat 15, 33, 177traditional 13understanding of 13

Seminar on China’s Disregard forEnvironmental Concerns in the Himalayas142

Sen, Prof Amartya 54Shachukul Monastery 28, 30–31, 154Shaksgam Valley 175Shanghai Academy of Social Science 55, 147Shigaste 19Shiyong, Wang 13Shugden 17, 19, 110, 136Sichuan 10, 18–9, 73, 113, 144, 147, 151, 196, 202Sikkim 14, 24, 34–6, 41–2, 48–50, 66, 76–7, 81,

83, 88, 101–2, 105, 155–6, 159–60, 166–7, 175,180, 182, 194, 201original inhabitants of 50

Sikkim Institute of Higher Nyigma Studies 35Sikri, Rajiv 111, 162Siliguri 41Singh, Nain 17Sino-Indian border war of 1962 163Sino-Tibetan relations 9, 18, 171Sino-Tibetan Talks 150Skandagupta 25, 64Soft power 13, 25, 27, 47, 53–4, 135, 137, 145,

159–61, 164, 166, 174, 182Songsten Library, Centre for Tibetan &

Himalayan Studies, Sehestradhara,Dehradun 39, 65

SOS Children’s Village Dharamsala 117Sri Lanka 21–2, 33, 45, 138Stanka Rinpoche 30Stobdan, P. 17, 86, 109, 142, 163Strategic Analysis 9Studies on World Religions 62Subba, Tanka B. 14, 17Survey of India 17, 49Swedish Tibetan Society for School and Culture

in Europe 31

Taklung Tsetrul Rinpoche 32Taoism 56, 59, 62–3Tashi Namgyal, Ladakhi king 30

Tashi Wangdu, Secretary Bureau of the DalaiLama 94

Tawang 27, 35, 37–40, 48, 51, 69, 89, 112–3, 130,154, 156–7, 159, 161–3, 166, 168, 170, 172–3,175–81, 183, 194Civil – Military Relations 38Maitreya Mela 69, 181, 183Tawang Maitreya Diwas 38Tawang War Memorial 39, 183

Techno-Economic Survey of NEFA 50Temples 55–6, 116, 138

Buddhist 55–6Guanghua 58Huacheng 55

Tenzin Tsundue 86, 108, 194‘Thank You India’ 138, 165Tharoor, Shashi 25, 64, 171The Bulletin of Tibetology 35The Central Institute of Buddhist Studies (CIBS),

Choglamsar, Ladakh 26, 32–3, 36–7, 155, 159The Heart of Life 23Theravada 22, 62, 160Thiksey Cultural and Welfare Society 32Thrinley Thaye Dorje 36Tiananmen Square massacre 56Tibet

central 18, 32, 48Chinese control of 9Chinese perceptions and strategy on 15Chinese reasons for takeover of 9Chinese repression in 10, 73, 79clandestine survey of 17division of 18

Inner 18Outer 18

eastern 19ecology of 188environmental degradation of 186ethnographic 18, 49Hanisation of 13, 42Hanised 14, 165important for India 11India’s policy on 11, 93, 99, 126literary culture 22movement 123–5, 128, 140

political activities from Indian soil forsecession 14

position of India and China on 42post-Dalai Lama 105, 107, 112–3, 123–4, 156,

159post-Dalai Lama contingencies 109

risk of division of Tibetans 161reforestation 41regions of 18, 42religion of 19sovereignty and independence 21status of 9, 146

conflict over 9strategic importance of 12Tibetans flee and escape from 72–3traditions 19, 20twentieth century 19urban 13

Tibetan Academy of Social Science Lhasa 73Tibetan Autonomous Counties 18Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures 18Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) 10, 12–3,

18–20, 24, 35, 43, 53, 73, 84–5, 105, 124, 130,136, 141, 151, 164, 176, 185, 187

Tibetan Buddhist Diaspora 53Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and

Democracy 118Tibetan Children School Village (TCV) 125, 133Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE) 11, 18, 25,

75, 77, 85, 90, 92, 107, 113–4, 117–8, 122, 126,128, 135, 140, 144, 161–2, 164–5, 167–8, 170,172, 196–7Annual Report of 2009 75

Tibetan Handicraft Production cum SaleCooperative Industrial Society 134

Tibetan Institute of Performing Art (TIPA) 135Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research

Centre (TPPRC) 79, 99, 140, 192Understanding the Issues of Tibet 79

Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile 76–7, 93, 95, 106,115, 117, 126, 192–3, 195Current Annual Report 2009 93election 195

Tibetan Planning Commission 127, 129Tibetan plateau 18, 185–6Tibetan Reception Centre, Dharamasala 79

Tibetan refugeesarrival routes 118citizenship rights 90, 99, 121, 127escape from China 121establishments 135faction-ridden 110funds and donations 122Hajong 16, 165Identity Certificate (IC) 92, 171influence on Indian society 115institutions 117marriages 116occupation 119Registration Certificate (RC) 89, 92, 95, 171religious conversion 116settlements 131, 135status 83, 90, 92, 93, 95, 121, 122, 155suggestions on 170threat to Indian security 129, 140, 159–61UN convention on 94UNGA resolutions 96–7

Tibetansalphabet 22conditions of livelihood 122Drokpa 18ethnic 10, 18, 47, 166exiles 26, 78, 105, 108monastic system 20political policy of the 115Sama-drok 18Scheduled Tribe certificates in 15standard of living 56, 73status 122struggle in exile 15tradition, religious 31translation 22writing system 21Yulva 18

Tibetans Home Foundation 133Tibetan SOS Vocational Training Centre,

Selakui, Dehradun 119Tibetan Women Association 117–8Tibet House 139, 142–3Tibetology 26, 35, 65, 172, 174Tibet Study Groups 143Tilopa 26, 30, 201

Times Now TV 191Togden Rinpoche 31Tourism 45, 67, 84, 135, 156, 159, 187Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition 84Trisong Detsen 21Tsang 10–11, 18, 20, 25Tsona Gonpa 168Tsona Gontse Rinpoche 38, 40, 177, 179TYC 15, 85–6, 106–7, 110, 114, 135, 148, 161

UNHCR 78, 82, 90, 118, 121Universal Declaration of Human Rights 96–8UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of

Discrimination and Protection of MinoritiesRights 98

Urbanization 38, 41, 178Urgyeling 179U-Tsang 10, 18Uttarakhand 24, 27, 39, 76, 78, 80, 166Uyghurs 112, 114

Vajra Mask Dances 31Vajrayana 19, 160Varanasi 26, 35, 37, 65, 136, 139, 172Vikramasila 25, 202Violence 75, 85–6, 89, 111, 114, 123, 125, 127,

129, 156, 159, 161, 188, 202–3Vivekanand International Foundation (VIF),

New Delhi 143–4, 196

Wangchuk Dorje Negi, Lama 138Wang Dehua, Prof. 55, 147Wang Xueshi 55Wazir Committee 34

Wei Daoru 63History of Chinese Zen Buddhism, History

of Chinese Hua Yan Sect 63West Bengal 14, 29, 41, 77, 80, 133, 172World Buddhist Forum 55World Hindu Council 89World Peace Park 179World Religious Cultures 62World Uyghurs Congress (WUC) 114Wu Yungui 43, 63

Outlines of Islamic Law 63

Xinjiang 112–4, 147, 163Xizang (XAR) 10

Yang Zengwen, Professor 61, 63A History of Buddhism in Japan 63Modern History of Buddhism in Japan

63Yarlung Tsangpo 132, 142, 182Yasuo Morita 63Yeshi, Lobsang, Vice-President of the TYC 14Yunnan 10, 18, 56, 84, 144, 175, 196YUVA 38

Zanskar 27Zhang Xueying 56Zhuo Xinping 63

Contemporary Theology of Protestantismand Contemporary Theology of WesternCatholicism 63

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Col P. K. Gautam (Retd) is Research Fellow at the IDSA since 2005.

Dr. Jagannath P. Panda is Research Fellow at the IDSA.

Dr. Zakir Hussain is Research Fellow at Indian Coucnil of World Affairs, SapruHouse, New Delhi. An economist, his interests are political economy of WestAsia, migration, energy and issues related to refugees. He was member of thetask force when he was working at the IDSA.

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