Government and Public Sector The Dead Generalist Reforming the Civil Service & Public Services...

Government and Public Sector

The Dead Generalist Reforming the Civil Service & Public Services

Ed Straw

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Problem, What Problem?

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What does the state offer this woman?

‘Criminalisation of my partner’

‘Criminalisation of the father of my children’

‘Imprisonment of the father of my children’

‘Take my children away from me (into care)’

Domestic Violence

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The state service provided to victims of domestic violence has changed very little in 30 years.

The new Act will make some difference

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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?

The window on the world is

partial, obscured

Wrong skills and motivation

Very little stimuli to improve

No mechanism to translate

strategy into action

Endemic under-achieving

public services

• Civil servants areimpartial,impassionate andpassing through

• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome

• Policy not change

• Producer dominated, not customer driven

• Office bound, notservice sampling

• Lack of transparency

• Institutional consultation

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Traditional Civil Service Approach

• A generalist is assigned to it

• Staff assigned to the job from the civil service

• Largely office bound

• ‘Passing-through’-orientated

• Issue guidance and wait for the world to change

• Future careers dependent on serving inside

• Analyse the problem academically and as a policy matter

• Impartial

• Dominated by departmental silos

• Basic assumption is to carry on as before

• Change has to be justified

Rough Sleeping Approach

• Led by a deep specialist/practitioner

• Staff hand-picked for the job from a range of backgrounds (including civil service)

• ‘Service sampling’ approach

• Goal-orientated and time-limited

• Committed, well led, motivated group

• Future careers depending on success of with this objective

• Analyse the problem from the ground and from the customer and redesign the services accordingly

• Passionate

• Joining up services

• Explicit about the need for change

• Challenging assumptions and working practices, and do things differently

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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?

The window on the world is

partial, obscured

Wrong skills and motivation

Very little stimuli to improve

No mechanism to translate

strategy into action

Endemic under-achieving

public services

• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through

• Civil servants areoften unskilled

• High personalautonomy, limitedperformancemanagement, little accountability

• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome

• Policy not change

• Producer dominated, not customer driven

• Office bound, notservice sampling

• Lack of transparency

• Institutional consultation

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The British Civil Service 2004

“So hard to find a point of responsibility and ownership and someone who will make it happen. Management by

committee, decision by committee, good people up to their ears. Dead wood lying all around”

Source: Client-side project manager for financial systems upgrade

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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?

The window on the world is

partial, obscured

Wrong skills and motivation

Very little stimuli to improve

No mechanism to translate

strategy into action

Endemic under-achieving

public services

• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through

• Civil servants are often unskilled

• High personal autonomy, limited performance management, little accountability

• Civil Service valuesare inward lookingvalues

• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome

• Policy not change

• Producer dominated, not customer driven

• Office bound, notservice sampling

• Lack of transparency

• Institutional consultation

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Civil Service Values

Incorruptibility

Impartiality

Integrity

Independence

Adaptability

“Enduring Values”:

Who chose these values?

Achievement

Outcomes

Delivery

Customer driven

Public service

Accountability

What about these values:

Who should choose these values?

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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?

The window on the world is

partial, obscured

Wrong skills and motivation

Very little stimuli to improve

No mechanism to translate

strategy into action

Endemic under-achieving

public services

• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through

• Civil servants are often unskilled

• High personal autonomy, limited performance management, little accountability

• Civil Service values are inward looking values

• Role Confusion

• Knowledge shedding– no institutionalmemory

• Refuge taken inlanguage and process – alternative diplomatic immunity?

• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome

• Policy not change

• Producer dominated, not customer driven

• Office bound, notservice sampling

• Lack of transparency

• Institutional consultation

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Role confusion is widespreadWhy do we have a civil service?

• To administer Government?

• To run the country?

• To serve ministers?

• To protect ministers? From themselves?

• To regulate ministers?

• To put political objectives into practice?

• To shock absorb?

• To prevent or limit bad ideas going into practice?

• To educate parliament?

• To prepare legislation?

• To develop policy?

• To deliver services?

• To reform public services?

• To survive?

• To look after its own?

• To ‘mind the shop’ and provide continuity as ministers come and go?

When a civil servant gets up in the morning, what is she responsible for? What does he go to work for?

Organisations without a clear role perform below their potential.

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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?

The window on the world is

partial, obscured

Wrong skills and motivation

Very little stimuli to improve

No mechanism to translate

strategy into action

Endemic under-achieving

public services

• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through

• Civil servants are often unskilled

• High personal autonomy, limited performance management, little accountability

• Civil Service values are inward looking values

• Role Confusion

• Fixed resourceallocation – no socialinvestment bankers

• No internationalrankings, no processcomparisons

• Little performancemeasurement ofservice costs andoutcomes

• Innovation nearlyimpossible

• Change must bejustified, not retainingstatus quo

• Knowledge shedding– no institutionalmemory

• Refuge taken inlanguage and process – alternative diplomatic immunity?

• Un-joined upgovernmentdepartments andpublic services

• It takes forever: 3 months versus 5 days

• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome

• Policy not change

• Producer dominated, not customer driven

• Office bound, notservice sampling

• Lack of transparency

• Institutional consultation

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Timetable for Resource Accounting and Budgeting

IMPLEMENTATION

PLANNING

1993 1998 2003 2008

Spec

Systems

People

Reporting

Training

Law

Reporting

Planning - Spending Reviews

Control

Source: Head of Government Accounting

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Why such an absent performance by the government machine?

The window on the world is

partial, obscured

Wrong skills and motivation

Very little stimuli to improve

No mechanism to translate

strategy into action

Endemic under-achieving

public services

• Civil servants are impartial, impassionate and passing through

• Civil servants are often unskilled

• High personal autonomy, limited performance management, little accountability

• Civil Service values are inward looking values

• Role Confusion

• Fixed resource allocation – no social investment bankers

• No international rankings, no process comparisons

• Little performance measurement of service costs and outcomes

• Innovation nearly impossible

• Change must be justified, not retaining status quo

• Knowledge shedding – no institutional memory

• Refuge taken in language and process – alternative diplomatic immunity?

• Un-joined up government departments and public services

• It takes forever: 3 months versus 5 days

• Voluntary sector keptweak and off balance

• Client-side ITmanagement isabsent

• Project procurement:no such thing as badofficers only bad soldiers

• Research isacademic, statisticalaccuracy observed,unaware of tangibleoutcome

• Policy not change

• Producer dominated, not customer driven

• Office bound, notservice sampling

• Lack of transparency

• Institutional consultation

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So the issue is…

What can he Do for her?

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Finding Answers

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Finding Answers

Monetary Policy Committee Other Countries DVD Player Wider organisational theory

1980 2000Performance

Pric

e

• Finland• New Zealand• Australia• France• US• Singapore

ExternalEnvironment

Leadership

Mission,Strategy,Direction

Culture

ManagementPractices

StructureSystems, Procedures,

Reward Process

Work UnitClimate

Motivation

Task Requirements /Skills / Abilities

Individual Needs& Values

Individual &OrganisationalPerformance

What Works Here

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Finding Answers: Monetary Policy Committee

• Clear role: Optimise Interest Rates

• Independent of both government and civil service

• Specialists, appointed for expertise and reputation among peers

• Transparent deliberations and decisions

• Politicians set decision-making framework

• Depoliticise decision making

• Make it a specialism

• Create public accountability through transparency

• It’s a Learning Organisation

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Finding Answers: Other Countries

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Finding Answers: Industry Learning

1970’S US, invasion of high quality, high value Japanese automotive and consumer electronic products and industries

Led to ‘knowledge acquisition engines’ e.g. business schools & organisational gurus

Who asked…

• What were the Japanese doing that made such a difference?

• How did they do it?

• What were the underlying organisational principles?

• Could these be replicated in different national cultures?

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Finding Answers: Learning Engines

A National Industry

International Industry

To learn is to change

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Local Government: Learning Engines

Free movement of Staff

University

Local Government Information Unit

Conferences

Local Government Chronicle

Service Journals

SOLACE CIPFA

LGA

PwCDeloitte

E&YKPMG

Professional Institute

Professional Standards

IDEA Knowledge Transfer

Ranking: CPA

Best Practice Identification

Motivator / Intervention

Knowledge acquisition, cross-sector

Practice and Implementation

Audit Commission

A Local Authority

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Learning organisations are stimulated by the right leadership:

Vanity

Ability

Termination

Sustainable Excellence

Unsustainably high

performance

Low Performance

High

Low High

NIH

No culture

Nothing to learn

Self-importance

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Leadership and responsibility

Armed Services: No such thing as bad soldiers only bad officer

IT, Defence & All bad projects start with bad clientsOther Projects:

Leading the Learning

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Solutions

System One: The Essential Drivers of Performance

System Two: Structure of Government

System Three: Organising to Deliver

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The Dead Generalist Reforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals

System One: The Essential Drivers of Performance

Government OrganisationsRegulation

Ministerial Behaviours

Product and Service

StandardsNational

Scorekeeping

• CPA equivalent, international ranking• Programme & initiative evaluation• Audit Commission equivalent, best

practice• Service specific professional institutes,

conferences and journals• Powerful educational institutes• Values

More Learning• Free movement of staff• Specialist staff• Leadership for learning

Fully independent Office of National Statistics

Stimuli to improve

• Independent of government & of the civil service• Public confidence in control of delivery resources• Clear roles for civil service

• Borrowing• Expenditure• Unemployment• Crime• Schools• Waiting Lists

• Etc

RankingLearning

Transparency

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The Dead GeneralistReforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals

System Two: Structure of Government

Foreign Affairs / Europe

Economic management

Departments

NationalStrategy, Planning, Budgeting

Problem solving

Regulation of private sector

Indirect delivery of

public services

Direct delivery of

public services

Prime Minister’s Office

Ministry of Finance

Political, parliamentary &

legislative management

• Priorities• Objectives• Financial modelling

for citizens

• Project groups• Time limited• Structure around

consumer

• Best practice,international

• Effectiveframeworks

• Efficiency Review

• Complexpartiallyautonomoussystems

• Direct ministerialappointment

• Independence frommonolithic civil service

• Clarity of outcomes• Freedom to manage• Strong accountability• New scorekeeping• Knowledge & learning• Governance

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The Dead Generalist Reforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals

System Three: Organising to Deliver

DepartmentAgency / NDPB

AccountabilityPeopleFree Movement of StaffSpecialisation & professionalisation

Electorate

Parliament

Government

Minister

Management

• Direct Ministerial appointment• Change some of the people• End graduate recruitment public

service recruitment• End job for life• Centre ground for terms & conditions• Recruit flexibility for the task, not service• End job churn• End grown-your-own• Join the corporate services gene pools• Preserve political, parliamentary &

legislative expertise• Remove innovation obstacles and add

stimuli• Change not policies• Special public services capacities• Organising principles

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The Dead GeneralistReforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals

Getting There

• Self-reform? No history of success

• By-pass reform? Existing

• Imposed reform? Choice

• Abolition? Sanction

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The Dead GeneralistReforming the Civil Service & Public Services – Proposals

But, we can’t have this conversation…

• Politicians are in the delivery–reform Stoner dilemma

• Reform is scared off, self-preservation becomes the priority

• “Politicisation” creates paralysis

• Keep playing the “corruption” card and the “constitution” card

• No external market, governance, or media pressure – who owns the civil service?

Create open discussion

Create pressure and desire for reform

Crate a sense of responsibility for reform

Day 1 issue

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Reforming the Civil Service

“This will take a political act of bravery comparable to the transfer of interest-rate setting powers to the

Bank of England and the establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee”

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ed.a.straw@uk.pwc.com

for soft copies

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©2005 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. All rights reserved. PricewaterhouseCoopers refers to the United Kingdom firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (a limited liability partnership) and other member firms of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited, each of which is a separate and independent legal entity.