Government 1740 INTERNATIONAL LAW Summer 2008 Individual Human Rights: The Problem of Enforcement

Government 1740INTERNATIONAL LAW

Summer 2008

Individual Human Rights:

The Problem of Enforcement

OUTLINEI. Multilateral “enforcement”

A. International human rights monitoring bodies1. Duties of oversight committees2. The individual complaints process

B. The Human Rights Commission:1503 proceduresC. General AssemblyD. The security Council

II. LitigationA. Domestic courtsB. Foreign courts

IV. Political mechanismsA. Hegemonic pressureB. Multilateral pressureC. The role of NGOs

I. MULTILATERAL “ENFORCEMENT”

MECHANISMS

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING

BODIES•Charter based bodies:

•Commission on Human Rights

•Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities

•Treaty-based bodies:

•Committee against Torture Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights•Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women•Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination•Committee on the Rights of the Child •Human Rights Committee*

Duties of the Treaty Oversight Committees

• receive reports

• receive individuals complaints

• issue general comments

The Individual Complaint Process

(ICCPR)• First Optional Protocol

• Patterns of individual complaints

• Findings

Jamaica

Finland

0

5

10

15

20

25

Leastdemocratic

moderatelydemocratic

mostdemocratic

degree of democracy

Average number of individual complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee

Closed cases Active cases

UN Human Rights Commission

The Torture ScaleType of activity:

Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5

Psychological mistreatment

Frequent, often

Used without reference to frequency

Sometimes, occasional

Isolated reports with disciplinary response

Rough handling, other abuse

Frequent, routine

Regular brutality, sever maltreatment of prisoners

Sometimes, occasional

Isolated reports with disciplinary response

Beatings Frequent, routine

Common (or not uncommon), numerous reports

Allegations or indications (any reported – regardless of redress)

Isolated reports with disciplinary response

torture Prevalent, widespread, repeated, methodical

Common, several reports, numerous allegations

Some, occasional (unless redressed)

Unsubstantiated; unlikely true; isolated, with redress

None

Abused to death

Common, frequent, many, widespread

Some, occasional incidents, several reports

Isolated reports

None None

Source: Oona Hathaway, 2002

Torture trends of the UNHR Commission

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

To

rtu

re s

cale

UNCHR members UNCHR nonmembers

1503 PROCEDURES

• ECOSOC Resolution 1503, (1970)

• Consistent pattern of gross violations

• Investigations can be initiated by the UN Human Rights Commission

1503 PROCEDURESStates Investigated Under the 1503 Procedure

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

19

67

19

70

19

73

19

76

19

79

19

82

19

85

19

88

19

91

19

94

19

97

20

00

Year

Nu

mb

er

of

Inv

es

tig

ati

on

s

Number of Countriesinvestigated

1503 Subjects: Practice of Political Terror

00.5

11.5

22.5

33.5

44.5

Po

litic

al T

erro

r S

cale

UNCHR member 1503 subjects

States Investigated under 1503 Procedures by the Commission on

Human Rights (through 2003)

• Afghanistan, 1981 - 1984

• Albania, 1984 – 1988, 1995

• Antigua & Barbuda, 1997

• Argentina, 1980-1984

• Armenia, 1994-1996

• Azerbaijan, 1994 - 1996

• Bahrain, 1991-1993

• Benin, 1984-1985, 1988

• Bolivia, 1977-1981

•Botswana, 1977•Brazil, 1974-1976•Brunei, 1988-1990•Burma, 1979-1980, 1990-1992•Burundi, 1974-1975•Central African Rep., 1980-81•Chad, 2002-2003•Chile, 1975-76, 1978-79, 1981,

2000

1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Czech Republic, 1997• Djibouti, 2003• El Salvador, 1981• Equatorial Guinea, 1976-79• Estonia, 1994, 1997• Ethiopia, 1978-1981• Gabon, 1986• Gambia, 1997-1999• German Dem. Rep., 1981-83• Germany, 1994• Grenada, 1988• Guatemala, 1981• Guyana, 1974-1975• Haiti, 1981-1987

•Honduras, 1988-1989•Indonesia (and East Timor),

1978-81, 1983-85•Iran, 1974-1975, 1983•Iraq, 1988, 1989•Israel, 1975-1977•Japan, 1981, 1998•Cambodia, 1979•Kenya, 1993, 2000•Korea, Rep. of, 1977-1982•Kuwait, 1994•Kyrgyzstan, 1997-1998•Laos, 1995

1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Latvia, 1995, 1997, 2000

• Lebanon, 1997

• Liberia, 2002-2003

• Lithuania, 1997

• Malawi, 1977-1980

• Malaysia, 1984

• Maldives, 2001

• Mali, 1996

• Moldova, 1995

• Mozambique, 1981

• Nepal, 1996, 1999

• Nigeria, 2002

• Pakistan, 1984, 1985, 1988

•Paraguay, 1978-90, 1998

•Peru, 1998

•Philippines, 1984-1986

•Portugal, 1974-1975

•Republic of the Congo, 2000, 2001

•Rwanda, 1993-1995

•Saudi Arabia, 1995-1999

•Sierra Leone , 1996-1999

•Slovenia, 1995, 1996

•Somalia, 1989-1994

•Sudan, 1991-1993

•Syria, 1989, 1992, 1997

1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Tanzania, 1974-1975, 1997

• Thailand, 1995, 1996

• Togo, 2001-2002

• Turkey, 1983-1986

• Uganda, 1975-81, 1995, 2000-01

• United Arab Emirates, 2000

• United Kingdom, 1974-1975

• United States of America, 1997

• Uruguay, 1978-1985

•Uzbekistan, 1996-97, 2003•Venezuela, 1982•Viet Nam, 1994, 2000•Yemen, 1998-1999, 2000•Zaire (Dem. Rep. of the Congo)

1985-89, 1991-93•Zimbabwe, 2000

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat1.htm

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Condemnatory resolutions

UNGA State-Specific Human Rights Resolutions by Year

02468

1012141618

1946

1952

1958

1964

1970

1976

1982

1988

1994

2000

Year

Nub

er o

f Res

olut

ions

P

asse

d

Number of Resolutions

Political Terror Practices of UNGA Members and Their Resolution Targets

0

1

2

3

4

5

Po

litic

al T

erro

r S

cale

named in UNGA Resolution UNGA average

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

• Human rights role is growing

• Chapter VIII enforcement power against threats to international peace and security

• Can refer cases to the International Criminal Court

Darfur, Sudan

II. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

DOMESTIC COURTS

• Example: Israeli Supreme Court decision, 1999.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

year

Chilean Court Cases on Torture (Corte Suprema and Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago)

Mentions CAT Does not mention CAT

Pinochet Extradition,1998

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

number of Supreme Court

cases

1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year

Torture litigation in Israel

Cases Filed Cases Decided

1991:Israel ratifies

CAT

1999:Landmark

torture ruling

USE OF OTHER COUNTRIES’ LEGAL

SYSTEMS

The Alien Tort Statute:FILARTIGA V. PENA-

IRALA• Background: foreign nationals, incident of

torture on foreign soil

• Alien Tort Statute (ATS)

• Torture is a breach of customary international law, enforceable in US courts

THE CASE OF THE BURMA GAS PIPELINE

0

5

10

15

20

25

Alien Tort Claim Act Cases Initiatedin United States Courts

Source: USA*Engage – a pro-business NGO opposed to “unilateral sanctions” in US foreign policy. http://www.usaengage.org/legislative/2003/alientort/alientorttpcases.html

III. POLITICAL MECHANISMS

• Peer (state) pressure•Bilateral•multilateral

•Domestic (internal) pressure

•Transnational (NGO) pressure

Number of States with Amnesty International Sections

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Year

Num

ber o

f Sta

tes

Sections

HUMAN RIGHTS NGO GROWTH

Human Rights Watch Sections and Offices

0

2

4

6

8

10

1219

78

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

Year

Numb

er of

Se

ction

s/Offic

es

Watch

Office

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Number of Internet Users (Millions)

US and Canada Western Europe Rest of the World

NGOs: BOOMERANG EFFECT

REPRESSIVE STATE

XXXXXXXXXXdomestic human rights demands

Coalition with transnational NGOs

Intergov.Organ.

Foreign gov’t

Multilateral or bilateral pressure

SUMMARY• The international human rights regime is characterized by weak enforcement.• Multilateral fora to hear individual complaints and render recommendations

exist, but often have no teeth.• Domestic enforcement is preferable in theory, but is the judiciary

independent?• The use of foreign courts is a theoretical possibility, but has been only rarely

used.• Bilateral political pressure usually takes a back seat to foreign policy goals.• Treaty commitments can change domestic politics and empower demands of

locals for rights realization.• NGOs are a crucial form of external vigilance; especially important in

extremely repressive political regimes.