Gilbert Ryle

Ryle showed how the misapplication of an ordinary term can result in a category mistake by which philosophers may be seriously misled.

Where’s the University?

in The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle sharply criticized Cartesian dualism, arguing that adequate descriptions of human behavior need never refer to anything but the operations of human bodies.

This form of logical behaviorism became a standard view among ordinary-language philosophers for several decades.

Gilbert Ryle

Australian philosopher.

In Perception and the Physical World (1961) and A Materialist Theory of Mind (1968) Armstrong strictly defends the identity of mental events with states of the brain.

Armstrong also argues for the objective reality of qualities and relations in Universals and Scientific Realism (1978) and Universals (1989) .

D. M. Armstrong

Australian philosopher. Influenced by the methods of Ryle, Smart defends a strictly physicalist philosophy of mind in Philosophy and Scientific Realism (1963).

J. C. C. Smart