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Gender bias & parental choice. Foetal sex determination + selective abortions Sex ratio in census biased against girls Jha et al (Lancet, 2006) -- survey of 1.1 million households in India Difference in sex ratios of additional child depending on sex of previous children - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Gender bias & parental choice Foetal sex determination + selective abortions Sex ratio in census biased against girls Jha et al (Lancet, 2006) -- survey of 1.1 million
households in India Difference in sex ratios of additional child
depending on sex of previous children Interpreted as evidence of selective abortion “10 million missing female births” over 20 years
Elsewhere? China – “40 million girls are missing” Evidence of gender preferences in US Probability of having 3rd child highest for
parents with 2 girls Lower for parents with 2 boys, lowest for
1B 1G
Dahl-Moretti divorce rate higher if first child is a girl
(fathers seem to prefer boys) Shotgun marriage rate higher when first
child is boy (ultrasound) Prob. Of second child higher when first is
girl Survey evidence: fathers prefer boys
Gallup poll of 2129 adults, 2000 & 2003 Suppose you could have only 1 child,
what gender would you prefer? Women: 35% G, 30% B Men: 19% G, 48% B
How can this imbalance persist? Market failure in the marriage market? Parents failing to realize that future
market conditions may be very different from today’s?
Is parental choice good? Dharma Kumar (1983): given
discrimination, parental choice can reduce gender bias by improving women’s position in marriage market
Contrary view -- sex determination & selective abortion illegal in India.
How should we think about welfare If abortion is fine…what about selective
abortions? If foetus has no rights, then does not
enter welfare calculation Welfare in terms of parents and surviving
children
Bride Price/dowry Let q be the bride price that clears the
marriage market Two models a) Walrasian markets b) Frictional search market
Walrasian Market
r (sex ratio)
Bride price
ρ
-ρ
1
Rational expectations equilibrium Parents make decisions at t=0 At t=1, marriage market operates Bride price q – transfer from boy to girl
Rational expecations eq Price & sex ratio (q*,r*) anticipated at t = 0 Parents make choices to maximize
payoffs Payoff from boy is U(r*)-q* Payoff from girl is V(r*)+q*
Unique REE ratio is r*=1 Many possible bride prices in equilibrium One possible bride price is q* such thatU(1)-q*=V(1)-q*Parents indifferent between boys and girls at this
price. Other bride prices also possible, where U(1)-V(1)-2q* ≤ 2c and V(1)+2q*-U(1) ≤ 2c Equilibrium is efficient
Frictional market
r (sex ratio)
Bride price
ρ
-ρ
1
Marriage market with frictions Price determined thru decentralized
bargaining. If r=1, q=0. If r<1 but close to 1, q will be positive but
small (small imbalances have small price
effects) In equlibrium, r*<1 and q*>0
WelfareWelfare increasing in x at x*
Congestion externality still obtains(efficient ratio not necessarily 1)
Policy Ban on selective abortion: unworkable? Incentives for having girls + tax on boys Removing gender discrimination in
workplace Future social problems arising from sex
ratio (externalities of other sorts) Liberalizing of laws, e.g. on
homosexuality
Extensions Heterogeneity in wealth poor boys may be worst off in marriage
market imperfect foresight?
Conclusion In the absence of prices, parental choice
reduces welfare due to congestion externality With bride prices, the sex ratio will be balanced
in REE if the marriage market is Walrasian With prices and a frictional market, the sex ratio
can be unbalanced, and inefficient. Congestion externality in marriage market.
Implications for UK and DCs Allowing gender choice for family balancing
reasons May or may not result in aggregate imbalances If no aggregate effects, then choice improves
welfare May be offset by aggregate effects E.g. if parents with 1 girl more likely to select
than those with 1 boy.
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