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POLICY BRIEF
“For” or “against” Europe? Dissatisfied with democracy and “against” the EU, like the populists on the left and right, or “pro” EU, like the moderate, mainstream parties? These divisions will shape the 2019 European election campaign, but do they also reflect voters’ preferences? The results of a repre-sentative 12-country survey on the European elec-tions in 2019 show that this is not the case. If it were up to the voters, the divisions in the new European Parliament would run not only between populist and mainstream parties, but also between economically and culturally left-wing and right-wing camps. Left-wing and right-wing populists only agree on their dissatisfaction with democracy and their EU scep-ticism. On substantive issues, they are even more deeply divided than the electorates of mainstream parties. In their economic and cultural preferences,
left-wing populist voters agree much more strongly with socialist, social democratic and green voters. Meanwhile, the preferences of right-wing populist voters are more similar to those supporting the Christian democrats and conservatives. Only liberal voters sympathise with the right on economic ques-tions and with the left on cultural questions. For the new European Parliament, this means that without the populist parties at the margins, consensus and positive majorities are only possible through a grand coalition of most of the parties of the mainstream left-right spectrum. If this bridge cannot be built, negative majorities might lead to a self-imposed gridlock and stagnation in Europe. The stronger the populist-extreme forces become, the more likely it is that such a scenario becomes a reality. But Europe still has a choice.
Europe’s Choice Populist attitudes and voting intentions
in the 2019 European election
Representation gaps cause populism: those who feel that they are poorly represen-
ted are more populist in their thinking and at the polls. The same also applies to the
2019 European elections. However, populist citizens only agree on two things:
they are sceptical towards Europe and dissatisfied with EU democracy. When it
comes to substantive political issues, left-wing and right-wing populist voters are
even more divided than the voters of the mainstream parties. This makes it more
difficult to form new majorities in the next European Parliament.
Future of Democracy | 01.2019
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POLICY BRIEF
Page 2 · Issue 1 | 2019 · Europe’s Choice
Representation and Populism Does a lack of representation intensify populist
views? Does the perception that their own positions
and interests are not adequately represented by the
parties make people more populist?
There has been plenty of speculation about these
questions, much of it theoretically well-founded.
Empirical evidence of a causal relationship between
representation and populist attitudes has so far
been scarce. Closing this research gap is one of the
objectives of this study.
In order to investigate the causal relationship bet-
ween representation and populism empirically, we
have designed and conducted an innovative survey
experiment for this study.
The primary goal of the experiment was to randomly
change people’s feelings of representation, in order
to measure the extent to which populist attitudes are
affected by a perceived lack of representation. For
this purpose, respondents were first asked about their
positions on various questions which play a role in
public debate on the European elections. They were
then shown randomly chosen party scenarios, which
differed according to whether and how much their
own position on a topic was represented by the parties
of their country in the European election campaign.
Respondents could then indicate the extent to which
they felt represented by the parties of their country in
this scenario. Finally, they were asked their opinion
on various typical populist statements in order to
ascertain the level of their individual populism. Using
this experimental setup, we were then able to deter-
mine statistically whether perceived representation
influences the level of populist attitudes:
Do people who feel poorly represented express more
support for populist statements?
The short answer to this question is: yes – at least
those respondents who were not populist already.
The results of the analysis show that representation
gaps can activate and reinforce populism. Poorer
representation by political parties in a democracy
can lead to an increase in populist attitudes. For the
fight against populism, these results mean that good
representation can help limit the spread of populist
attitudes. If parties endeavour to reflect the various
positions and interests in society and to represent
them in the political process, they thereby contribute
to countering the further spread of populist attitudes
in representative democracies.
But what does this mean when it comes to dealing
with populist attitudes in the run-up to the 2019
European elections?
Given these results on the connection between
representation and populist attitudes, two things
in particular seem important to us:
On the one hand, our analysis shows that
the parties’ efforts to ensure that voters feel
Method: Structural equation models (SEM).Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
4.25
4.50
2 31 4 5 6 7
Feelings of representation
Po
pu
lism
ind
ex
The representation effect – worse representation means more populism
lessrepresentation
– more populism
morerepresentation
– less populism
Sources:
All analysis, data and figures in this POLICY BRIEF are based on the results of the study “Europe’s Choice – Populist attitudes and voting intentions in the 2019 European election”, by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Robert Vehrkamp and Christopher Wratil, Gütersloh 2019.
This text is a slightly shortened version of the Executive Summary of that study. The national samples of respondents are representative of the electorate in each of the twelve European countries surveyed. The survey was conducted by YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung in a survey wave in January 2019. A total of 23,725 respondents from twelve EU member states were intervie-wed (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom).
For further details and for information about the methodology, see the section “About the study” and the methodological appendix of the study.
POLICY BRIEF
Page 3 · Issue 1 | 2019 · Europe’s Choice
represented are worthwhile. Representation
counts! It is an important contribution against
the further spread of populist attitudes among
voters, and is therefore a goal which is worth
every effort.
On the other hand, election campaigns are always
a special opportunity to improve representation:
by taking up and defining important issues, and by
discussing them in controversial terms, political
parties can improve voters’ sense of representation
in election campaigns, and hinder the spread of
populist attitudes.
But do voters make their voting decisions for or
against a party? Do they vote for the party that
best represents their interests, attitudes and
preferences? Or are they more likely to vote
against other parties whom they do not support
at all and whose electoral success they want to
prevent? We have examined these questions by
empirically measuring and interpreting positive
and negative party identities.
The (forgotten) relevance of negative partisanship There is no doubt that voters are showing
declining levels of identification with mainstream
political parties across Europe. But how are voters’
behaviour and decisions influenced by negative
party identities, i.e. the explicit rejection of
parties?
So far, there has been little empirical research on
this subject in Europe. For this reason, in this study
we have developed measures of negative and positive
party identities for the twelve countries examined.
A positive party identity is attributed to those
respondents who state that they “definitely” would
vote for a particular party in European, national,
and regional elections. Conversely, we classify people
as having a negative party identity if they have
indicated for each of the three elections that they
will “definitely not” vote for that party.
The figure at the bottom shows the average level of
positive and negative party identities for each of the
six main European party groups we have analysed.
It turns out:
Positive party identities are
much less widespread than negative party
identities. This may indicate that many citizens
do not opt first and foremost for the party to
which they feel most attached, but rather react
against parties that they most strongly oppose. They
may then vote for the party that seems to promise
them the best protection against the
parties they most strongly oppose and whose
electoral success they therefore want to prevent
at all costs.
The level of positive partisanship of the two
traditional party groups of the mainstream
spectrum (i.e. social democratic and socialist
parties as well as Christian democratic and
conservative parties) is almost identical but
significantly lower than the positive partisanship
of right-wing populists and right-wing extremists.
Populist radical right and extreme right parties
face the highest proportion of voters with a
positive party identity: 10.3 percent of the
eligible voters interviewed in the twelve European
countries surveyed identify positively with a
right-wing populist or far-right party.
The two party groups on the left and right margins
not only face relatively high levels of positive party
identities, but at the same time also have a parti-
cularly high level of negative party identities (52.2
and 52.8 percent respectively). In other words, these
party groups not only have a solid base of voters, but
also have a large number of sharp critics. This also
shows that the adaptation of the ideas and rhetoric
Positive and negative party identities by party groups
In percent
AVERAGE
52.8
48.8
50.7
52.2
47.8
47.0
42.0 6.1
4.4
6.7
4.3
6.2
10.3
6.3
negative party identities positive party identities
Populist radical left and extreme left parties
Green parties
Social democratic and socialist parties
Populist radical right and extreme right parties
Liberal parties
Christian democratic and conservative parties
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
POLICY BRIEF
Page 4 · Issue 1 | 2019 · Europe’s Choice
On economic and cultural questions, meanwhile, a
more classic ideological left-right divide can be seen,
with the supporters of conservative, populist radical
right and extreme right parties at one end and the
supporters of green, social democratic and socialist
parties as well as populist radical left and extreme
left parties at the other.
The divide between the supporters of mainstream
parties and those of populist and radical parties
is very clear when it comes to support for EU
membership. In line with other parts of the study,
agreement with eight typical populist statements
was used to measure how populist respondents were.
This allows us to locate the supporters of the Euro-
pean party groups in a space defined by populism/
Euroscepticism:
The quadrants of the populism/Euroscepticism
space, on page 5, reveal very clear that the populist/
pro-European quadrant and the nonpopulist/Euro-
sceptic quadrant are completely unoccupied.
None of the party groups analysed is more populist
than the average and at the same time more pro-
European than the average, or less populist than the
average and at the same time more Eurosceptic than
the average.
The supporters of all party groups are thus located
exclusively in the two remaining quadrants in the
top right (= less populist and more pro-European
than the average) or in the bottom left (= more
populist and more Eurosceptic than the average).
The voters of all mainstream party groups can be
found in the non-populist, Europe-friendly quad-
rant. Green and liberal voters are the least
populist and most pro-European, while
supporters of the group of Christian democratic
and conservative parties are a little less populist
than pro-European, compared to the average
across the electorate. Socialist and social-
democratic voters, meanwhile, are a little more
remarkable in their pro-European position than
their position on the populism dimension.
In the populist-Eurosceptic quadrant, on the
other hand, we find the voters of left- and
right-wing populist and radical parties. While
their degree of populism is similarly high, they
differ in the extent of their Euroscepticism:
of these two party groups may be a risky strategy for
mainstream parties, since a majority of voters firmly
reject them.
Our results are also highly relevant to the 2019 Euro-
pean election campaign: against the background of
decreasing positive partisanship throughout Europe,
the mobilisation of negative identities could play an
increasingly important role. Precisely in the con-
frontation between mainstream and populist parties,
the mobilisation of negative identities in Europe
seems to be becoming increasingly important:
populist parties are mobilising against the main-
stream parties, while mainstream parties increa-
singly rely on the (counter)mobilisation of voters
against the populist parties.
Which divisions result from this among voters, and
how are they likely to shape the 2019 European
elections and the new European Parliament?
Divided EU Parliament: populists against the mainstream?
Are the European elections above all a struggle
between mainstream parties and populist parties,
between “pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics”,
or even between “supporters” and “opponents”
of democracy?
The overall picture shows that when it comes to
attitudes towards the political system – that is,
populist attitudes, satisfaction with democracy
in the EU and support for membership of the EU –
the divisions between party supporters are very
different from those related to economic and
cultural questions.
Looking at populist attitudes and attitudes towards
the EU system, we find a clear polarisation between
the supporters of mainstream parties (Christian
democrats, conservatives, social democrats, liberals
and greens) on the one hand and the supporters of
populist and extremist parties – left and right –
on the other. While the supporters of mainstream
parties are predominantly satisfied with democracy
and EU membership and show a low level of populist
attitudes, the supporters of populist and extremist
parties are more strongly opposed to EU member-
ship, more dissatisfied with EU democracy, and
more populist.
POLICY BRIEF
Page 5 · Issue 1 | 2019 · Europe’s Choice
the supporters of populist radical left and
extreme left parties are much less Eurosceptic
than those of the populist radical right
and extreme right parties. Nevertheless,
the supporters of both party groups are
more Eurosceptic than the average of all voters
and than the voters of all mainstream party
groups.
When we consider how satisfied people are with
the functioning of democracy in the EU, rather
than support for EU membership, almost exactly
the same picture emerges.
In summary, then, the divide between main-
stream parties and “populists and extremists”
is very striking both on the question of support
for EU membership and on general satisfaction
with the functioning of democracy in the EU.
These attitudes to the political system reveal two
clearly separate party camps: the supporters of the
mainstream parties stand in contrast to the populist
and extremist camp on the left and right margins,
who are Eurosceptic and dissatisfied with democracy
in the EU.
This is precisely the distinction between the
“pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics” as well
as the “mainstream” and “populist” parties that
has increasingly been invoked in the current
European election campaign, shaping political
rhetoric.
But how similar are those who vote for populists on
the left and right when it comes to economic and
cultural issues?
In other words: How uniform is their vision for the
future direction of European policy?
Left against right I – the economic dimension
To answer these questions, it is helpful to look at
the voters of the party groups before the 2019
European elections according to their economic
and cultural left-right preferences. For this purpose,
two additive indices were generated in this study,
which locate the preferences and attitudes of the
party supporters on an economic and a cultural
dimension.
As the illustration on page 6 shows, at the
far left of the economic spectrum are the
supporters of populist radical left and extreme
left parties, with an average index value of 4.79.
Right next to them are the supporters of the
green parties (4.87), and soon after that come
the supporters of the social democratic and
socialist parties (5.16). These three party groups
are clearly to the left of the average of all eligible
A divided EU Parliament? – Euroscepticism
Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group, the axes show the weighted average of the whole electorate. Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
po
pu
list
no
n-p
op
ulis
t
Eurosceptic
pro-European
Green parties
Liberal parties
Populist radical left and extreme left parties
Christian democratic and conservative parties
Social democratic and socialist parties
Populist radical right and extreme right parties
POLICY BRIEF
Page 6 · Issue 1 | 2019 · Europe’s Choice
considerable. A different picture emerges on the
left and right side of the economic spectrum. There,
the gap in political positions between voters in the
economically left-wing and the economically right-
wing party camps is only 0.37 index points on each
side. In summary, this means that the economic
preferences of the party supporters of the two
populist and radical party groups differ more than
three times as much from each other as those of the
supporters within the economically left and within
the economically right party camps.
Left against right II – the cultural dimension
A similar but not completely identical picture
can be seen for the cultural left-right dimension
in the figure on page 7: The locations of the respec-
tive supporters of the European party groups are
first depicted on a cultural dimension from left to
right. And here, too, a clear picture emerges: to
the far left of this dimension, there are the green
parties, whose voters have an average index value
of 2.40 when it comes to cultural preferences. Not
far away are the supporters of the social democratic
and socialist parties (2.94), the populist radical left
and extreme left parties (3.02) and the liberal parties
(3.08). The supporters of these four party groups are
thus clearly to the left of the average of the whole
electorate (3.60). To the right, on the other hand,
are the supporters of Christian democratic and
voters (5.61). By contrast, supporters of populist
radical right and extreme right parties (5.95),
liberal parties (5.99), and Christian democratic
and conservative parties (6.32) are clearly to the
right of the average.
The overall depiction of the economic left-right
dimension thus shows clearly that camps have
been formed by the supporters of the two party
groups regarded as being “left-wing” and the
green party group on the left, as well as the two
“right-wing” party groups and the liberal parties
on the right.
This is also illustrated by the distance arrows
between the different party groups, the length
of which indicates how strongly the preferences
of the voters of different party groups differ from
one another. The preferences of the voters of the
mainstream party groups are furthest apart in the
figure, as the index value of Christian democratic
and conservative party supporters deviates by
1.45 points from that of the greens. The second
largest distance on the economic left-right
dimension is between the supporters of the two
populist and radical party groups: here, the
political distance between the supporters of populist
radical left and extreme left parties and the sup-
porters of populist radical right and extreme right
parties is 1.16 index points, which is likewise very
Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group.Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Economically left or right?
economicleft
economicright
Christian democraticand conservativeparties
Populist radical rightand extremeright parties
Populist radical leftand extreme
left parties
Greenparties
Social democraticand socialist
parties
Liberalparties
4.874.79 5.16 5.95 5.99 6.32
Mainstream parties
Populists
economic righteconomic left
POLICY BRIEF
Page 7 · Issue 1 | 2019 · Europe’s Choice
conservative parties (3.79) and, to the far right, the
voters of populist radical right and extreme right
parties (4.55). In cultural terms, the supporters of the
liberal parties therefore position themselves clearly to
the left of the average. The supporters of the liberal
parties are thus the only group to defy clear over-
arching left-right classification, since they appear
economically right-wing and culturally left-wing.
Thus, in cultural left-right preferences, there is
once again a contrast between the supporters of
the two left-wing party groups and the green party
group as well as the liberal parties on the left side
of the cultural left-right dimension and the two
right-wing party groups of the Christian democrats
and conservatives as well as the right-wing
populists and right-wing extremists on the
right side.
However, a different picture emerges within the cul-
turally left and right spectrum. There, the political
distance between the voters within the cultural left
(0.68) and within the cultural right (0.76) is only
about half as great.
In summary, this means that the cultural preferences
of the voters of the two populist-extreme party
camps differ about twice as much from each other
as those within the culturally left-wing and within
the culturally right-wing party camp.
Consequences for the new EU Parliament
What can be deduced from these results for the
coming European Parliament?
In theory and purely in terms of voter preferences,
new coalitions in the European Parliament are
conceivable in economic and cultural matters – for
example between Christian democrats/conserva-
tives and right-wing populists, whose voters are
sometimes closer to each other in cultural matters
than the voters of some mainstream parties. But
the past shows that most mainstream parties are
reluctant to form coalitions with populists and
Eurosceptics. It is not by chance that the data of this
study show that left and right populist parties have
particularly high levels of negative party identities.
Especially in the European Parliament, the pro-
European consensus of the mainstream parties
has strong binding force and has repeatedly taken
precedence over ideological differences between
mainstream parties. Even during the financial crisis,
when highly controversial economic questions
had to be decided, the mainstream parties in the
European Parliament preferred to compromise among
themselves on the economic dimension rather than
involve EU opponents and populists. Coalitions based
on the “Austrian model”, as exemplified by the ÖVP
and the FPÖ, are therefore unlikely in the European
Parliament even after 2019.
Culturally left or right?
culturalleft
culturalright
Christian democraticand conservativeparties
Populist radical rightand extremeright parties
Populist radical leftand extreme left parties
Greenparties
Social democraticand socialist
parties Liberal parties
2.942.40 3.02 3.08 3.79 4.55
Mainstream parties
Populists
cultural rightcultural left
Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group.Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
POLICY BRIEF
Page 8 · Issue 1 | 2019 · Europe’s Choice
A Policy Brief of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
The policy brief of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s
“Future of Democracy” program is dealing with current
topics and challenges related to democracy. It concentrates
on the issues of political participation, the future of parties
and parliaments, the sustainability of democratic politics
as well as new forms of direct democracy and citizens’
participation. It is published 6–8 times per year on an
unfixed basis.
Legally responsible for content
Bertelsmann Stiftung · Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
D-33311 Gütersloh · www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Dr. Robert Vehrkamp, Christina Tillmann
Editorial assistance and inquiries:
gaelle.beckmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Tel. +49 5241 81 81105
April 2019 | ISSN: 2198-9796
Authors:
Dr. Robert Vehrkamprobert.vehrkamp@bertelsmann-stiftung.deTel. +49 5241 81 81526
Dr. Christopher Wratilc.wratil@uni-koeln.de
Prof. Dr. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwassercristobal.rovira@mail.udp.cl
and EU scepticism remain the populists’ only and
greatest common denominator. The populist-extreme
“anti-EU camp” remains a fiction when it comes to
concrete issues: left-wing and right-wing populist
voters are even further apart in their preferences
regarding such issues than the mainstream parties of
the moderate left-right spectrum.
For the new European Parliament this means that
consensus and positive majorities are only possible
with broader coalitions of mainstream parties.
Without the populist-extremist margins, positive
majorities could in future require consensus
between socialist, left-alternative, green and
social-democratic parties, all the way to Christian
democratic and conservative parties. The stronger
the populist-extremist margins become, the more
this forces mainstream parties to reach consensus in
“grand” coalitions. If the mainstream parties do not
succeed in building this bridge, negative majorities
will lead to self-imposed gridlock and stagnation in
Europe. The stronger the populist-extremist margins
become, the more likely this scenario will be. But
Europe still has a choice.
Conclusion: Conflict or consensus in the new EU Parliament?
Poor representation creates populism. Conversely,
this means that good representation is an excellent
strategy against populism. But good representation is
not an easy business in democracies. It requires those
who are represented to give their consent and believe
in the legitimacy of the system. If people do not feel
adequately represented in the diversity of their inte-
rests and attitudes, this creates dissatisfaction with
and criticism of democracy. Representation deficits
activate and trigger populism.
Populists on the left and right then use such repre-
sentation deficits for their own purposes. This will
also shape the European elections in 2019, where
they will benefit from the vulnerabilities of the
mainstream parties. They defend the supposedly
“true” interests of an allegedly “homogeneous”
people against a supposedly “corrupt and evil elite”.
They turn voters’ perceived representation deficits
into populist criticism of the EU and its democratic
system. However, dissatisfaction with democracy
Prof. Dr. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser is Professor of Comparative Political Science at the Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) in Santiago de Chile and Associate Researcher at the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES).
Dr. Robert Vehrkamp is Senior Advisor in the Bertelsmann Stiftung‘s Future of Democracy program and is currently a visiting scholar in the Department of “Democracy and Democratization” at the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB).
Dr. Christopher Wratil is John F. Kennedy Memorial Fellow at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University and Associate Member of the Cologne Center for Comparative Politics at the University of Cologne.
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