Forecasting Suspicious Account Activity at Large-Scale Online …matei/papers/fc2019slides.pdf ·...

February 2019

Forecasting Suspicious Account Activity at

Large-Scale Online Service ProvidersHassan Halawa1, Konstantin Beznosov1, Baris Coskun2, Meizhu Liu3, Matei Ripeanu1

1 University of British Columbia2 Amazon Web Services

3 Yahoo! Research

Automated attacks

2

operating on alarge-scaleexploiting

unsafe decisionsmade by

individual users

■ Phishing

3

■ Phishing □ Online Services

4

5

■ Phishing■ Overview □ Current vs. Proposed Current Defenses Proposed

Reactive

Signatures

Proactive

Anomalies

EvolvingAttacks

FalsePositives

Forecasting

EarlyWarning

identifyingattack/attacker patterns

miningbehavioral /usage patterns

6

■ Phishing■ Overview □ Current vs. Proposed □ Highlights

■ Experiment at a Large-Scale Online Service Provider(4 months production data / 100+ million users / 100+ billion login events)

■ Promising Performance as an Early Warning System (AUROC ~ 0.92 / FPR ~ 0.5% / ACC ~ 99.5% / REC ~ 50.6% / PRE ~ 18.3% using only a 1 week historical trace and predicting 1 month in advance)

■ Supervised ML Pipeline for Forecasting(predict future suspicious account activity from historical traces)

■ Evaluation Across Varied Classification Exercises (1 week trace → [7, 90] day forecast / 3 weeks → [21, 34] days)

7

Account Registration

Account Compromised

Account Flagged

Account Remediation

Legitimate Owner

Time

Overview of thelifecycle of a compromised account lifecycle

■ Phishing■ Overview■ Approach □ Account Lifecycle

✔ ✘

Legitimate Owner

Legitimate Owner

Attacker

8

■ Phishing■ Overview■ Approach □ Account Lifecycle □ ML Pipeline

Goal: Forecast suspicious account activity using supervised machine learning

Data Source

Data Pre-Processing

Model Selection

Ground Truth User Activity

Susp. Acct. Classifier

Model Evaluation

Unstructured Data

Structured & Labeled Data

Susp. Acct. Population& Susp. Acct. Scores Defense Systems

MetricsAUROC, BTR, PRE, REC, FPR

9

Time

Overview of aclassification exercise

Training Interval Testing IntervalBuffer Window

(BW)

■ Phishing■ Overview■ Approach □ Account Lifecycle □ ML Pipeline □ Classification Exercise Data Source

Label Window (LW)

Ground Truth

Data Window (DW)

User Activity

Label Window (LW)

Ground Truth

Data Window (DW)

User Activity

Susp. Acct. Classifier Susp. Acct. Population& Susp. acct. Scores Defense Systems

10

■ Phishing■ Overview■ Approach■ Evaluation □ Classification Exercises

Notation DW - Data Window, BW - Buffer Window,LW - Label Window, H - Prediction Horizon

Time

HyperparameterOptimization

Overfit Check

PreprocessingImpact

Performance forWider Windows

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■ Phishing■ Overview■ Approach■ Evaluation □ Classification Exercises □ AUROC

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■ Phishing■ Overview■ Approach■ Evaluation □ Classification Exercises □ AUROC □ PRE/REC vs. Horizon

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■ Phishing■ Overview■ Approach■ Evaluation■ Recap

■ Experiment at a Large-Scale Online Service Provider(4 months production data / 100+ million users / 100+ billion login events)

■ Promising Performance as an Early Warning System (AUROC ~ 0.92 / FPR ~ 0.5% / ACC ~ 99.5% / REC ~ 50.6% / PRE ~ 18.3% using only a 1 week historical trace and predicting 1 month in advance)

■ Supervised ML Pipeline for Forecasting(predict future suspicious account activity from historical traces)

■ Evaluation Across Varied Classification Exercises (1 week trace → [7, 90] day forecast / 3 weeks → [21, 34] days)

February 2019

Forecasting Suspicious Account Activity at

Large-Scale Online Service ProvidersHassan Halawa1, Konstantin Beznosov1, Baris Coskun2, Meizhu Liu3, Matei Ripeanu1

1 University of British Columbia2 Amazon Web Services

3 Yahoo! Research

15

Backup/Discussion Slides

16

■ Discussion □ Account Suspiciousness vs. Vulnerability

Time

Suspicious

in Future (Forecast)

Mining Historical Behavioral/Usage Patterns

Vulnerable

at Present

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■ Discussion □ Current vs. Proposed

(1)Throttled Outbox

Delayed Inbox

(2)Personalized Controls

Targeted Education

(3)Efficient Compromise-Detection Campaigns

(1)Email ClassificationAnomaly Detection

(2)HTTPS Browser Lock

Two Factor Auth.

(3)Incident Response

User Reports

Feedback based on identifying vulnerable users

Feedback based on identifying attack patterns

AttackLaunchedPhishing emails

(1) Operator

Filter

SystemInfiltratedEmail in

inbox

(2)UserFilter

UserVictimizedCredentials

stolen

(3) Remediation

FilterCompromise

Detected

V Robust

Users

Honeypots

DifferentialDefenses

Prioritization

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(1) Operator Filters (2) User Filters (3) Remediation Filters

Defense Resource Prioritization

Targeted User Education

Efficient InspectionEffective Exercises

Throttling DuringEmergencies Captive Portals

Mitigate Adversarial

Learning

Personalised Control & Advice

Infer Attack Origin

IdentifyNew Attacks

Design of new defense mechanisms■ Discussion □ Proposed Defense Mechanisms

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■ Discussion □ Evaluation of Mechanisms ML Pipeline Vulnerability Classifier Vuln. Population

& Vuln. Scores Proposed Defenses

Simulation Analytical Models Practical Experiments

Output MetricsCost, Effectiveness

Evaluation of proposed defense mechanisms

InputAttack Propagation

Population DistributionDefense Parameters

S I R

S I R

S I R

V Robust

A/B TestDefense ApplicationTargeted Education

Defense EvaluationSecurity Exercise

20

Vulnerable Robust

Long-TermVulnerability

Scores

Context-SpecificVulnerability

Scores

Proposed Defenses

■ Discussion □ Context-Specific Defenses

■ Limited Access to User Data

■ Limited Computational Resources

■ Imperfect Groundtruth

■ Aggressive Pruning Heuristics

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■ Discussion □ Results Presented as Lower Bounds

22

■ Discussion □ Buffer Window Sizing

23

“Social engineering, in the context of information security, refers to psychological manipulation of people into performing actions or divulging confidential information. A type of confidence trick for the purpose of information gathering, fraud, or system access, it differs from a traditional "con" in that it is often one of many steps in a more complex fraud scheme.”

■ Discussion □ Social Engineering

■ Cost of attack

■ Multi-Stage Attacks

■ Similar dynamics to epidemics

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■ Discussion □ Focusing on the Vulnerable Population as a key defense Element

■ Targeted

■ Efficient

■ Proactive

■ Robust

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■ Discussion □ Advantages of Proposed Paradigm

26

■ Discussion □ Robustness

■ Current defenses are attack/attacker centric

■ Based on attacker-controlled behavior/features

■ Attackers can employ adversarial strategies

■ Discussion □ Reactive Defenses

Focus on identifying attacks/attackers

27

[SNS’11] Tao Stein, Erdong Chen, and Karan Mangla. 2011. Facebook immune system. In Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Social Network Systems (SNS'11). ACM, pp. 8, New York, NY, USA.

Begin Attack

Initial Detection

DefenderResponds

AttackerDetects

Attack

Mutate

Detect

Defense

Attacker Controls

Defender Controls

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■ Discussion □ User Education

■ First line of defense

■ Direct cost (attack) vs. Indirect cost (effort)

■ Distribute cost proportional to user vulnerability

■ Paternalism

■ Fairness (Service Discrimination)

29

■ Discussion □ Legal/Ethical Considerations

■ Feasibility to develop a vulnerability classifier

■ Inaccuracies in predicting the vulnerable population

■ Some defense mechanisms may violate user expectations

■ Targeted protection may be confusing / complex

30

■ Discussion □ Adoption Challenges

■ Offline Worlds

■ Online Worlds

■ Our Experience

31

■ Discussion □ Related Work

■ Large-scale social-bot infiltration feasible

■ Defense system leveraging the proposed paradigm

■ Deployed at Telefonica’s OSN Tuenti (50+ million users)

32

■ Discussion □ Our Experience (Integro)

33

■ Discussion □ Integro

[ECS’16] Boshmaf, Y., Logothetis, D., Siganos, G., Lería, J., Lorenzo, J., Ripeanu, M., Beznosov, K., and Halawa, H. (2016). Íntegro: Leveraging Victim Prediction for Robust Fake Account Detection in Large Scale OSNs.Elsevier Computers & Security. 61: 142-168.