First List - Wills

FIRST LISTInheritance

Nacar vs. NistalL-3306, December 8, 1982

FACTS: At various dates since the year 1968, the defendant Nacar have incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff Japitana in the total sum of P2,791.00, which said amount had long been overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to this date have not been able to pay, despite repeated demands from the plaintiff. Defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970 leaving among other things personal property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the possession of the defendant Nicanor Nacar. Plaintiff Japitana filed a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.99.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the plaintiff has a claim against the estate of Isabelo Nacar, which is now in the possession of his stepson, Nicanor Nacar. HELD: The trial court ruled for the interest of both parties will not for the meantime Dismiss this case. This court requires plaintiff Japitana to put up the addtl bond of 1000 after which the latter may be entitled of the custody of the carabao subject of litigation pending final termination of this case. Supreme Court held that although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana’s rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of action against the former. It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the possession of the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for the recovery of an outstandingdebt of the late lsabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has nothing to do.

DOCTRINE: Succession; Filing of money claim ex contractu by action against the administrator of the deceased is not allowed. Such claim must be filed in the administration proceedings  of the estate of the deceased.

Anderson v. PerkinsL-15388, January 31, 1961

Rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death

FACTS: Dora Perkin Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins. On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting of a bond. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. The special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death. About two years later, special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might be obtained in their disposition. When the motion was heard, court required the administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in compliance therewith, the special administrator submitted to the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too voluminous to enumerate. Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale reasoning that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made. Lower court approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule

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81, section 2 of Rules of Court;(2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate. Lower court denied the MR. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES: 1.WON the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them

2..WON the opposition of the surviving spouse of the deceased that she is entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in question should be entertained

3.WON the oppositor-appellant should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim.

HELD: The lower court approved the proposed sale.

1. No, Section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only. It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable property. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator top reserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold" .

2.Yes, Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of the

properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought to be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books — can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City) left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.

3. No. It does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

DOCTRINE: The special administrator may be authorized to sell the personal estate of the decedent even if it is not perishable property. His authority is not limited to the sale of perishable property. His function is to preserve not only the property of the decedent's estate but also its value. Hence, he may be empowered to sell personal property which is not perishable.

The sale of the alleged personal estate of the deceased husband cannot be authorized where his widow claims that some of the items thereof are conjugal or are her own personal property.  The conjugal partnership must first be liquidated and the issue of ownership adjudicated.

Maria Vda. De Reyes, et. al. vs. CA,G.R. 92436, July 26, 1992

RIGHTS TO THE SUCCESSION ARE TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH

FACTS: During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the

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Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.

In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.

In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-inlaw of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.

On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.

In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally partitioned the property. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land. Including Rafael Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land which should have been received by his father.Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the land, as shown by the torrens title over the land. Gardiola’s defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could not have inherited this land for it was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it.

The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.’s heirs. Stating that there was no evidence that the Gavino’s children had a written partition agreement. CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936,

although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.

In Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.

But even if we are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:"Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."

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In Ramirez vs. Bautista, this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs — petitioners herein — in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.

The instant petition then is without merit.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against petitioners.

DOCTRINE: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. In Ramirez vs. Bautista, this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.

-There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. Partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.

Danilo I. Suarez, et. al. v. CA, et. al.,G.R. No, 94918, September 2, 1992

FACTS: Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot and been liquidated or partitioned.

In 1977, petitioners' widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by CFI of Rizal to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents amount of P70,000 as damages.

The judgment against petitioners' mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, were levied and sold on execution in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reivindicatory action against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property.

Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.

On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final deed of sale over the properties.

On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with RTC for a MR claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction sale which motion however, was denied. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private respondents from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.

Private respondent Valente Raymundo filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of the petitioners to prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by RTC. Raymundo filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by RTC through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding petitioner's pending motion for the issuance of alias summons to be served upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was later denied. RTC issued an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to private respondents the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.

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Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated June 10, 1987, RTC lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias summons. On appeal to CA. CA rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not, petitioners are barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest in the 5 valuable parcels of land in Pasig.

HELD: No. It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

Article 888 further provides: "The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."

Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides: "If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother.

Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that

portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.

DOCTRINE: The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

Intestate Nelia A. Constantino v. CA, et.al.,

G.R. No. 116018, November 13, 1996, 76 SCAD 47

FACTS: JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque, Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee, entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. The heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.

After having the document drafted — with several spaces left blank including the specification as to the metes and bounds of the land — petitioner asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the document with the understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one of the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.

However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties.

On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding the surrender to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June 1986 respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for annulment of the deed and cancellation of

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the certificates of title, with prayer for recovery of damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10 October 1984. In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document before the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about the survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale reflect the true intent of the parties?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10 October 1984.

As found by the trial court, such contention was contradicted by petitioners' own witness who positively asserted in court that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the signing. . Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold.

HeirsHeirs of Yaptinchay vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 and Lot No. 1132.

On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay. On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation ("Golden Bay") under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. ("TCT") 225254 and 225255. With the discovery of what happened petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative

Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.

The private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they have not established their status as heirs.

Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners' submission that the respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue on heirship be decided upon in a case of Declaration of Nullity of TCT/Reconveyance Case.

HELD: The said Motion to Dismiss was granted, holding that petitioners "have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple."

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED.

To begin with, petitioners' Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an appeal.

Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

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DOCTRINE: The issue of heirship must first be resolved before proceeding with the civil case.

Other than mere allegations, the claimant must show proof of his heirship.

The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.Valente Raymundo v. Teofisto Isagon Vda. De Suarez,

et.al.,G.R. No. 149017, November 28,2008

FACTS: Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez' marriage was blessed with both material wealth and progeny in herein respondents (Danilo, Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo - all surnamed Suarez) Governed by conjugal partnership of gains regime, spouses acquired numerous properties (which includes land in Caniogan Pasig; property in Pinagbuhatan Pasig). Husband Marcelo Sr. died in 1955, thus, Teofista and herein respondents with Elpidio Suarez, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement (EJS) of Estate Marcelo Sr.'s estate.

Such EJS mentioned that the surviving spouse, together with the legitimate children of the deceased are the Estate’s legal heirs and noting that a certain Eufrocina Andres shall be the guardian and legall administrator of the minors (elpidio, danilo, evelyn,Marcelo jr., & reggineo).

Also, it was mentioned that there are no known debts/financial obligations of whatever nature and amount against the estate of the deceased. Moreover, Teofista received absolute and exclusive ownership of the conjugal assets (1/2 of each property on the list and 12k plus with 2 banks). IN sum, the 7 legal heirs (including the surviving spouse, shall each and all receive and be entitled to a share equivalent to one-seventh (1/7) of the estate of the deceased MARCELO SUAREZ, which estate is comprised of the many parcel of lands in Pasig and Rizal plus 12k shares of stock with consolidated mines)

1975: Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages to which the CFI rescinded and held them liable for 70k damages

June 24, 1983: When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, subject properties were levied and sold on execution with the plaintiffs being the highest bidder, they bought such around 95k. Certificate of sale issued and registered in their favor. Final deed of sale over properties was also issued by the Prov. SheriffJune 21, 1984 (before expiration of the redemption period): respondents filed a revindicatory action against petitioners for the annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied properties alleging in their complaint that they cannot be held liable for the judgment rendered against their mother, Teofista, not having been impleaded therein; and consequently, the subject properties, which they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither be levied nor be sold on execution.But RTC issued an order directing Teofista to vacate the properties, to place petitioners in peaceful possession thereof and for respondents to surrender the torrens titles and other pertinent documents.

MR was filed by respondents explaining that there is a reinvidicatory action pending but RTC denied suchThus, petition for certiorari was filed by Teofista before the CA but the latter dismissed such because certiorari was not the proper remedy and that Teofista failed to appeal and the other respondents failed to institute a 3rd party claim.

In other litigation concerning the Reinvidacatory case, the RTC handling such issued a writ of PI which enjoined the petitioners herein from transferring the levied properties. Subsequently the case was dismissed but the RTC lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of summons.

Because of such, petitioners herein filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the various orders of the RTC handling the reinvidicatory action- CA granted their petition and ordered the reinvidicatory action to be dismissed.

Respondents appealed to SC (In case Suarez v. CA)- SC pointed out the ff (w/c reversed and set aside the CA’s previous ruling and reinstated the reinvidicatory action- to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion):

a.) only one-half of the 5 parcels of land [subject properties] should have been the subject of the auction sale on the basis of ART. 777, 888, 892(2)

b.)b.) The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned property is

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different from and adverse to that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners [herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of their mother [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [Marcelo Sr.]. Therefore, petitioners [herein respondents] are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest

Upon reinstatement of the reinvidicatory case, every pleading by respondents were hotly opposed by petitioners.

The reinvidicatory case, was re-raffled and transferred to different court branches in Pasig for various reasons until part of records went missing and were lost.

April 12, 1993: Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 71, to which Civil Case No. 51203 was remanded, filed a report on the records of the case, explaining that due to the demolishing of the building, the records went missing including the notice of judgement from the CA’s Judge Claravall which dismisses the complaint and the SC’s copy of decision reversing such decision of ClaravallThus 3 impt. Filings happened:

1.) Motion for leave to file and admit supplemental complaint by respondents – praying that levy and sale at public auction of the subject properties be annulled and set aside, as the bid price was unconscionable and grossly inadequate to the current value of the subject properties; sought a re-bidding with respect to Teofista's share in the subject properties; and that TCT in name of petitioners be cancelled2.) Manifestation and Motion (to Execute/Enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court) by respondents pointing out that the SC itself had noted the current increased value of the subject properties and that petitioners unjustly enriched themselves3.) Urgent Motion [to direct compliance by plaintiffs (herein respondents) with SC Decision or to consider the matter submitted without evidence on the part of plaintiffs] filed by therein defendants, including herein petitioner Valente, pointing out that plaintiffs (herein respondents) have yet to comply with the RTC, Order commanding them to submit (to the RTC) any evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Suarez, in order for the court to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista.

Then the orders came from difft. RTC to apply respectively with the 3 filings:

1.) March 17, 1995 – Judge Lorenzo admitted the supplemental complaint2.) January 22, 1996 – Judge Santos ordered the implementation of the decision of the SC dated September 4, 1992 which mandates that:". . . and Civil Case No. 51203 (reinvidicatory action) is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioner and to annul the sale with regard to said portion."

Such annulled the auction sale and the TCT titles in favour of petitioners; and ordered Teofista to submit any evidence which shows the settlement of the estate (MR filed by petitioners with the court but such was denied)Then an order dated April 8, 1999 by Judge Estrella ordered counsel of respondents to supply the birth certificates and other pertinent documents which will prove affiliation with the deceased. Crossfire again and position papers were filed by both parties but the ruling explained that a new ruling (Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Del Rosario) confronts their situation where it held that- “The declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.” On this basis, the court dismissed the case without prejudice to the right of the respondents to institute a special proceeding.

MR filed by respondents but was denied; certiorari filed again with the CA to which the latter granted on the ground that the past SC decision became final and executor. Hence, this certiorari by herein petitioners.

ISSUE: WON Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario (which held that a declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding and not in a civil action) applies in this case

*basically, petitioners insists that herein respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.

HELD: No, the ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable in this case.

Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista — and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs — has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals. True, this Court is

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not a trier of facts, but as the final arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.

SC’s directive in the Suarez’ case ("Civil Case No. 51203/reinvidicatory case is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.") has no intimation in SC’s decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.

Petitioner, moreover, cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. (as based from the records and the law)

Articles 262, 263, 265 and 266 of the Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelo's death, support the foregoing conclusion, to wit: Art. 262.The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following cases:(1)If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;(2)If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the same;(3)If the child was born after the death of the husband.Art. 263.The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.

Art. 265.The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

Art. 266.In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.

Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties only by virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofista's, and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory heirs.

Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession. The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as "that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs, excluding secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedent's estate.

Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein respondents' rights to the succession vested from the moment of their father's death. Herein respondents' ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelo's death, although their respective shares therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold

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on execution sale to answer for Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents' share therein was null and void.

In fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the subject properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject properties. THEREFORE, there is no need to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to institute a separate special proceeding for a declaration of their heirship. Petition is DENIED.

Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Ella Garagani, Isagani, Adrian, Natahniel, Nieva, Jonathan, Dionesio, Florence and Jeremias, all surnamed Asok,

G.R. No. 172248, September 17, 2008

FACTS: Spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok owned several parcels of land September 14, 1973 and February 22, 1982, respectively- THEY DIED & their 11 children inherited the properties. Inheritance includes a lot covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4272 (1967), located in Misamis Oriental. (Land as a free patent)

Pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with quitclaim executed by the spouses' children, the subject property was inherited by Denison Asok – hence, OCT became a TCT under his own name (1987)

August 31, 1989: Denison and wife (ELLA GAGARANI, respondent) borrowed P100,000 from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines, a government financial institution created and operating under EO 81, as amended by RA 8523

As a collateral, they mortgaged the lot in Misamis Oriental. On due date, however, they failed to pay the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed pursuant to Act 3135. Petitioner emerged as the highest bidder with a bid of P163,297.

November 28, 1991: certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioner; was registered subsequently and a new TCT issued alsoOctober 24, 1993: Denison died and succeeded by his surviving spouse and children (respondents)

May 15, 1998: respondents filed a complaint for repurchase against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Initao, Misamis OrientalJuly 3, 1998: they filed an amended complaint on learning that TCT No. T-9626 had been cancelled by TCT No. T-27172 issued in the name of petitioner. They invoked their right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of CA 141 (Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from date of the conveyance)

RTC dismissed the complaint and reconsideration was also denied. It ruled that the one-year period for redemption should be reckoned from the date of sale, i.e., November 28, 1991. Then the five-year period provided under Sec. 119 of CA 141 should be counted from the expiration of the redemption period, i.e., November 28, 1992.Therefore, respondents had until November 28, 1997 to exercise their right to repurchase. However, the complaint was filed on May 15, 1998 which was beyond the prescribed period.

Respondents appealed to CA. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated March 28, 2006. It held that the period of redemption started from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, i.e., December 24, 1992, and not from the date of sale. Thus, respondents had until December 24, 1998 to repurchase the property and the complaint was seasonably filed.

Hence this petition by petitioners alleging that:a.) Petitioner contends that respondents cannot claim the right under Sec. 119 which covers homesteads and free patents because the free patent issued to Asok's parents had already been cancelled and a new TCT had in fact been issued to him. Thus, the property mortgaged to it was no longer covered by a free patent but by a TCTb.) respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-law and grandchildren.c.) even if respondents could be considered as being entitled to the right under Sec. 119, this had already prescribed because the period should be counted from the date of conveyance which means the date of sale and not the date of registration of the certificate of sale.

ISSUE: 1.) WON the free patent issued to Denison Asok's parents had already been cancelled by the issuance of new TCT before the mortgage.

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2.) are respondents the "legal heirs" contemplated in the provision (on patentees)?

3.) WON even right of respondents had already prescribed (under Sec. 119)

HELD: 1.) The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it. Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the patentees' son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee.

Ferrer v. Mangente The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the deceased. There is no question then as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers

2.) Petitioner is wrong.

The rationale behind Sec. 119, we reject a restricted definition of legal heirs. It is used in a broad sense and the law makes no distinctions. In Madarcos v. de la Merced, we held that:The term "legal heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them. EHCcITxxx xxx xxxVerily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of

compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its purpose . . . Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA. In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase the property because this would be "more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail". Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.

3.) Argument lacks merit.

Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA: Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: . . . If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act

There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest may redeem the property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. The five-year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one-year redemption period. Here, the certificate of sale was registered on December 24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993. Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five-year period, or until December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141. Consequently, the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines is ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of respondents upon payment by the latter of the redemption price.

Requisites of a formal will

Paz Samaniego-Celada v. Lucia D. AbenaG.R. No. 14545, June 30, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner was the first cousin of decedent Margarita Mayores, while respondent was the decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929.

Margarita died single and w/o any ascending nor descending heirs. She was survived by her 1st cousins.

Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament where she bequeathed ½ of her undivided share of a real property in Manila to respondent, Norma Pahingalo and Florentino Abena in equal shares. ½ of her undivided share of a real property in Makati was bequeathed to respondent, Isabelo Abena and Amanda Abena in equal shares. She likewise left ALL of her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.

Petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of Maragaritas estate on Aug. 11, 1987.

On Oct. 27, 1987, respondent file a petition for probate of Margarita’s will before the same court (RTC of MAKATI)

Petitioner argues that Maragarita’s will failed to comply with the formalities required under ART. 805 of NCC. Because the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another. The signatures of the testator on the pages of the will were not similar indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will was procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of the execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon respondent and her nephews for support. These alleged handicaps affected her freedom and willpower to decide on her own.

Respondent: the petition for review raises questions of fact not of law and as a rule, findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: W/N the will conformed to the formalities required by law.

HELD: YES. We rule in favor of Respondent.

The issues raised by petitioner were pure questions of fact which may not be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. Since the petitioner and her siblings are NOT compulsory heirs of the decedent under ART. 887 NCC and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has NO legal right to claim ANY part of the decedent’s estate.

DOCTRINE: The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind.

While it is true that the attestation clause is not part of the will, the court, is of the opinion that the error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is NOT material to invalidate the subject will.

Manuel L. Lee vs. Atty. Regino B. TambagoAC No. 5281, February 12, 2008

FACTS: Manuel Lee charged Atty. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament. He averred that his father (Vicente Lee, Sr.) never executed the contested will and that it contained the forged signatures of purported witnesses to its execution. In the questioned will, the decedent bequeathed his entire estate to his wife save for a parcel of land which he devised to his half-siblings. The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before Atty. Tambago on June 30, 1965. Complainant however pointed out that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the acknowledgement of the will was dated Jan. 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature in a deed of donation containing his genuine signature.

Respondent: complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by him per affidavit of Gloria Nebato, the common law wife of Vicente Lee Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit of his children. The complaint was filed simply to harass him because of the criminal case filed against him by

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complainant before the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper.

ISSUE: W/N the will conformed to the formalities required by law.

HELD: The Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

The investigating commissioner found Atty. Tambago GUILTY of violation of the old Notarial Law which constitutued an infringement of legal ethics.

The investigating commissioner recommended the SUSPENSION of respondent for 3 months.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the investigating commissioner and suspended Atty. Tambago from the practice of law for 1 year and his notarial commission is revoked. He is also disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for 2 years.

We affirm with Modification.(resolution of the IBP)

NO.

The will in question was attested by only 2 witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered VOID.

A notarial will, as contested in this case is required by law to be subrscribed at the end therof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

An acknowledgement is the act of who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer of court and declaring it to be his act of deed.

The acknowledgement in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose (1) to safe guard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

This requirement was not complied with due to the absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses in the acknowledgement. Similarly the

notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same acknowledgement was a clear breach of law. These omissions by the respondent invalidated the will.

DOCTRINE: The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills.

The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testatments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

Danilo Aluad, Leonora Aluad, Divina Aluad, Prospero Aluad, and Connie Aluad v. Zenaido Aluad

G.R. No. October 17, 2008

FACTS: Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.  On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a “Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos” (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Mariacovering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.  The Deed of Donation provided that: “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event  that  the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded” 

Later on, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.  Subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her “remaining properties” including Lot No. 674 to respondent. Matilde died, while Maria died later on of the same year.

Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent.

The respondent contended that “Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last

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Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad.   These two lots are in his possession as true owners thereof.”

ISSUE: WON the CA erred holding that Deed of Donation Inter Vivos as in fact a Donation mortis causa.

HELD: RTC held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. 

CA reversed trial court’s decision and ruled that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and such it had to, but did not comply with the formalities of a will since it was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause as required by Art. 805 of the CC. It declared respondent as the rightful owner.

NO.DoD as one of mortis causa since:(1)         It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2)         That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3)         That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It means that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her lifetimeThe statement in the Deed of Donation reading “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them.  For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. As the Court of Appeals observed, “x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said

properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name.”The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed. Defects found by the Supreme Court:Witnessed by only two not three or more witnesses as requiredWitness did not acknowledge the will before the notary public as required under Art. 806The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed.

Effect:It is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother.  But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated.  With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.

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